Introduction

Terrorism became a vastly discussed topic after the 9/11 terrorist attacks that resulted in the United States and its allies declaring a ‘War on Terror’. As every war that is initiated by a democratic country, the War on Terror needs to be legitimised to citizens and they need to be convinced that the war has to be fought. For the legitimisation purposes, politicians use the tool of discourse (Martin 2013: 461–462). Thus there is a need to study the discourse presented by politicians, so it can be evaluated whether they intentionally influence people, for example by invoking emotions, in order to gain support for their counterterrorism policies. People are no longer considered to be purely rational beings (Freeden 2013) and their political behaviour can be influenced by their emotions. This means that if politicians invoke particular emotions in their speeches, it may lead to change in public behaviour and thus influence the public to behave as the politicians wish. There is, for instance, research that proves that people are more likely to support aggressive counterterrorism measures when they feel angry about terrorism (Sirin & Geva 2013: 718–726). In other words, emotional framing of terrorism or other phenomena has important practical consequences and indicates a lot about how possible responses may be structured (Doty 1993).

This paper attempts to contribute to the need to study emotions in political discourse concerned with terrorism by analysing terrorism discourse presented by Canadian prime ministers^[1] and the presence of emotions in these speeches. The analysis of emotions is included for the reason that, as implied above, emotions can contribute to the manipulation of public opinion and to adoption of ineffective or even counterproductive counterterrorism policies. It may be said that there is no need for such research since the speeches on terrorism are naturally emotional. This is not necessarily the case. This can be demonstrated by speeches on terrorism delivered by politicians in two other Anglosphere countries. Barack Obama, at least in some of his speeches, tried to calm the emotions down rather than invoke them. He attempted to calm the negative emotions which may lead to support of aggressive counterterrorism measures and by referring to calmness he wanted to minimise the importance of emotional framing. He told people that they should not be scared and should live their normal lives, because for them to be afraid is what terrorists want (Obama & Holland 2015). Another example of speeches that are not delivered in an emotional manner, but rather attempts to minimise the emotional framing, are speeches delivered by British prime minister Gordon Brown (Měřičková 2021). Thus, it is important to analyse the presence of emotions in speeches of political leaders to identify who invokes the emotions to gain support for aggressive counterterrorism policies and how they do that.

This paper analyses the discourse delivered by four Canadian prime ministers and the emotions invoked in their speeches. It asks: What is the character of terrorism speeches delivered by Canadian prime ministers between 9/11 and the end of 2019 and what emotions do they invoke in their speeches? Analysing the adopted counterterrorism measures is beyond the scope of this paper; however, it presents examples of such counterterrorism policies. One instance of such policies is the War on Terror itself, which is criticised by some authors (Jackson 2018). Another example would be targeted killing, which is also highly questionable and there is lively debate in the academic literature on whether it presents an effective tool or a counterproductive policy that creates more terrorists than it kills (Lehrke & Schomaker 2016: 736–741). Generally, aggressive, repressive and violent counterterrorism policies with the use of force are considered ineffective (Um & Pisoiu 2015: 231–232).

Papers that focus on terrorism discourse often focus only on some countries – usually the United States and the United Kingdom (Al-Sumait, Lingle & Domke 2009; Appleby 2010; Foy 2015). However, Canada should not be excluded from the research on terrorism discourse. Canada is fighting in the War on Terror, and even though it did not participate in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Fiorino 2015), it sent its troops to Afghanistan in 2001 and was involved in Afghanistan until the end of 2014 (Canada 2019). Furthermore, it is a member of the coalition fighting the Islamic State (Defence 2014). Therefore Canada, like other democratic countries, has to convince its citizens of the necessity of its involvement in the War on Terror. However, Canadian discourse on terrorism is analysed by few authors. There are various works on Canadian discourse, but a very limited number of these works on discourse are concerned with terrorism. Some authors analyse media discourse in Canada (Berry  2015; Campbell 2015; Smolash 2009). Other papers focus on the discourse or narrative of Canadian prime ministers but not in relation to terrorism (Cooper & Momani 2014; Dangoisse & Perdomo 2020; Gecelovsky 2020; Snow & Moffitt 2012), some even focus on the ‘bad French’ of Trudeau´s discourse (Bosworth 2019). Some other papers focus on discourse and terrorism in Canada but focus on angles different from prime ministers speeches – for example discourse of fear of Canadian university students (Shahzad 2014), or of antiterrorism laws (Patel 2007).

Very few papers focus on Canadian prime minister terrorism discourse (Brunschot & Sherley 2005), some go even further by examining the speeches by other members of Canadian government as well as other relevant documents or combine analyses of Canadian discourse with the discourse from other western countries (Beall, Goodfellow & Putzel 2006). However, these papers analyse the discourse only in a limited time period and do not focus on the whole period of the War on Terror, so these articles do not allow us to analyse how the discourse on terrorism evolved over a long period of time, and thus do not provide us with enough knowledge that would enable us to analyse the patterns of the discourse. They also do not focus on emotions invoked in the speeches. This paper attempts to fill this gap and provide an analysis of the Canadian terrorism discourse in a longer time period – presented from the 9/11 terrorist attacks until the end of 2019^[2] and in connection with emotions invoked in the speeches. This knowledge also allows us to see whether there are patterns between changes in counterterrorism policies that coincide with changes in discourse, and whether there is a relation between more violent policies, which are considered ineffective (Um & Pisoiu 2015: 231–232), and more aggressive discourse. However, these questions are beyond the scope of this paper. This paper focuses on the character of the speeches and the emotions invoked in them. In this paper, the author presents only the character of the discourse and its connection to emotions. The study of emotions is included because discourse on terrorism is unlikely to be objective, and the emotions present in the discourse influence the audience and its support for counter-terrorism measures (Sirin & Geva 2013: 718–726).

The paper uses the critical terrorism studies (CTS) theoretical framework. The CTS allows us to analyse and question the counterterrorism measures, or even the War on Terror itself. It allows us to study discourse and the manipulation of emotions to find out whether it contributes to the terrorism problem instead of providing an effective solution. The CTS literature questions the Western counterterrorism measures, the War on Terror and even describes some western actions themselves as terrorist acts (Jackson 2018).

This article provides an analysis of the speeches delivered by each of the four Canadian prime ministers who were in the office between the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the end of 2019. The author conducts a critical discourse analysis (CDA) inspired by Norman Fairclough. Fairclough proposes a three level analysis of the CDA, which focuses on the textual level which studies the character of the discourse; the intertextual level, which focuses on the relation to other discourses that already exist; and the contextual level, which focuses on the context in which the speeches were delivered and the measures that were adopted as a result of the discourse (Fairclough 2013: 94). Due to the scope of the paper, it analyses only the first – textual – level. However, it does not only focus on the character of the discourse, but also on its connection to emotions that are invoked by the discourse, as explained above. The textual level is thus the key level for the analysis presented by this paper, because it provides us with information about the objectivity of the discourse, its character and connection to emotions. These findings alone should shift the knowledge that we have about terrorism discourse and should also contribute to information that we need in order to assess the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures, i.e. whether leaders attempt to influence public behaviour by the discourse and emotions they invoke in their terrorism speeches in order to gain support for counterterrorism measures that are already considered to be counterproductive.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, it focuses on the concepts of discourse and emotions. The next part of the paper explains the methodology and analysed data. The next section presents the findings. This section is divided into four subsections, each providing the findings of one of the four analysed Canadian prime ministers (Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau). This section is followed by the conclusion, which summarises the findings that each of the prime ministers uses emotional language; although, each does so in different ways. It also shows the reader that some prime ministers attempt not only to invoke but also to calm the negative emotions down. Nevertheless the manipulative potential of the speeches is still substantial and may lead to legitimisation of counterproductive counterterrorism measures, as explained in the introduction.

 

Discourse and Emotions

The role of discourse in researching terrorism

Discourse is defined by Norman Fairclough as follows: it ‘signals the particular view of language in use . . . as an element of social life which is closely interconnected with other elements’ (Fairclough 2003: 3). Since terrorism is socially constructed, it is necessary to study language, which is an instrument of the social construction. Language is not the only tool of social construction. The discourse may also consist of visual images or sound effects (Fairclough 2003: 3); however, I focus solely on the role of language. Likewise, the academics who deal with terrorism research also recognise the importance of the study of discourse (Blain 2017; Brecher, Devenney & Winter 2010; Dixit & Stump 2016; Gleeson 2016; Hodges 2007; Jackson 2018; Lausten 2016).

There may be more discourses on the same issue, each of them presenting an opposing view, because each side sees the reality in a different way. Which of these discourses wins and becomes the dominant one depends on the relative power of the actors presenting various discourses. A great example is the article written by Pervaiz Nazir who presents the differences between the dominant discourse on the War on Terror presented by the United States and their Western allies, and discourses presented by various actors in Pakistan. These discourses are in most cases different from the one presented by the Western countries. While the United States and its allies present the War on Terror as an attempt to defeat terrorism and spread ‘freedom, democracy and modernity’ (Nazir 2010: 68), Pakistan understands the War on Terror more as an attempt to dominate and transform the Muslim world (Nazir 2010).

Since each actor presents a different discourse, and thus portrays reality differently, we need to study the discourse and reality of each actor to understand his motives and actions and to be able to understand the legitimisation of counterterrorism measures – why and how were the counterterrorism policies adopted, even though these policies are considered harmful and ineffective? Language has thus the power to create the reality we live in – what we fear, what we hate, who we like, etc. It has the power to make people feel alienated, to legitimise a war or even cruel treatment like torture. Language has the power to dehumanise people (Antwi-Boasiako 2010: 107) and present them as an existential threat which has to be feared, avoided or even destroyed. For these reasons, it is necessary to focus on the study of language and the wider discourse.

This is especially true for terrorism, which is a highly subjective label and almost every speaker describes it differently. While the US forces cooperate with Kurdish troops in Syria, Turkey (a US ally and NATO member) considers the same Kurdish troops to be terrorist fighters. The United States, in our opinion a democratic western ally, is considered a terrorist organisation by some Middle Eastern citizens. The terrorism label is even more dangerous because of the fact that once something is labelled as terrorism, politicians have free choice to use any means they consider necessary to deal with the issue (Richards 2014: 215). Not many people will question the used means because of the fear that they would be described as advocates of terrorism. As George W. Bush´s famously said: ‘people are either on the side of the United States or they are with terrorists’ (Bush 2001).  

Since overly violent counterterrorism measures are considered ineffective by academic literature, it would be more appropriate to use a combination of non-violent counterterrorism measures, such as countering terrorist financing, countering radicalisation, etc. This is closely connected to the discourse which is used to legitimise the counterterrorism measures. The legitimisation of violent counterterrorism measures with the use of force requires a different kind of discourse than non-violent measures. Even when the counterterrorism measures are mild and non-violent, if the discourse is either aggressive or creates a sense of fear in people, it may lead to their requirement that the government should adopt more forceful measures to fight against terrorism because they feel that the adopted measures are not sufficient to fight against an existential threat as terrorism is portrayed. This should demonstrate the necessity of studying the discourse. The following section will now focus on the role of emotions, which also play an important role in the fight against terrorism, and, especially, the legitimisation of counterterrorism measures.

 

Emotions as an important factor in terrorism research

The role of emotions in discourse, terrorism studies and international relations/security research in general has been increasingly recognised by researchers (Erisen &Villalobos 2014; Gartner & Gelpi 2016; Loseke 2009; Matsumoto, Hwang & Frank 2014; Wettergren & Jansson 2013; Wright-Neville & Smith 2009). In contrast to rational theory´s assumptions, people are not rational beings (Freeden 2013). It is recognised that people are influenced by emotions while making decisions. This idea was presented even in ancient times and all philosophical thinkers, such as Aristotle, Plato or Cicero stressed the importance of emotions and their role in the persuasion of audience (Wright-Neville &Smith 2009: 85). The idea of the importance of understanding emotions was supressed by the enlightenment which put a major focus on reason and rationality (Wright-Neville & Smith 2009: 89), and has only been becoming back recently. These authors recognise that people are influenced by emotions which are closely related to cognitive decision-making. This means that people do not only rationally think about the information which they receive in a speech, but, most importantly, it is essential to know how it made them feel. Especially terrorism is a highly emotional and subjective term (Antwi-Boasiako 2010: 105). If we label some act as ‘terrorist’, it depends on our subjective view and how we feel about it. If the attack happens closer to our homes, we tend to be more afraid and talk about the event as a ‘terrorist attack’ (Weinberg, Pedahzur & Hirsch-Hoefler 2004: 779). This also works in the opposite way. If we hear about a terrorist attack, it makes us more afraid than when we hear about another type of attack (Spencer 2006: 189–191).

Emotions have already made their way to the research on terrorism as well. Probably the most often studied emotion is fear. This is mostly due to the reason that the main goal of terrorists is to spread fear. It is believed that the victims of terrorism are not only people who were killed or injured, but also all the people who are scared to live their normal lives (Spencer 2006: 190). For this reason, Spencer proposed measuring the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures based on the presence of fear in society, rather than on hard quantitative data such as body count or a number of terrorist attacks (Spencer 2006: 191–195). Another emotion that is present in terrorism research is anger. Sirin and Geva studied in their article the influence of anger on the support of aggressive counterterrorism policies. They concluded that people who feel angry are more likely to support more aggressive counterterrorism measures and they provide their support even in a shorter period of time and without searching for other relevant information. What is important is the fact that according to their conclusions the emotion of anger has to be triggered by a terrorism-related action and not by something irrelevant, like for example learning about a traffic accident (Sirin & Geva 2013: 718–726).

This supports the argument that it is necessary to study the character of discourse and especially the presence of emotions in it, as well as what emotions the speaker attempts to invoke in the audience. If we want to deal with ineffective and aggressive counterterrorism measures, we have to learn why these counterterrorism policies can be adopted in the first place. To do that, it is necessary to study how these policies are legitimised and why they receive the support of the public. The manipulation of human emotions plays an undeniable role in this. Even though the academic researchers, including the studies focused on terrorism, have increasingly recognised the role of emotions in people´s decision-making and political behaviour, there still is a need for further research.

 

Methodology

The methodology used for the analysis presented in the paper is inspired by Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which consists of analysing three levels of a discourse. The first level is textual. This level comprises analysis of the character of the text itself. The second, intertextual level, analyses the connection of the presented discourse to other discourses that already exist. The last level is the contextual level, and it analyses the context in which the discourse was delivered, as well as the social practices that were adopted by the discourse (Fairclough 2013: 94). Because of the scope of the paper, it presents only the first level of the analysis and combines it with the analysis of emotions, as explained in the introduction. The first, textual level, is the key level that provides us with the knowledge about the character of the speeches and its connection to emotions. It alone is able to show us whether the speeches are manipulative and invoke negative emotions in the audience or whether the speakers rather attempt to calm the audience. The paper analyses the character of the discourse presented in the official speeches delivered by the four analysed prime ministers (Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau), what labels they use, whether they ascribe terrorism to a particular minority, what emotions they invoke in speeches, whether they attempt to make the public calm or rather angry/scared, whether they talk about terrorism neutrally/objectively, or rather use emotional language. The analysis is conducted in NVivo software for qualitative analysis.

The analysis and coding in NVivo will search for the presence of emotions in the analysed speeches. I distinguish between positive and negative emotions^[3]. Each of these categories plays a different role. Positive emotions, such as the feeling of safety, may be aimed at support of policies that make people feel safe at home, which are usually non-violent, such as legal measures. Negative emotions like hate or fear may lead to discrimination or alienation of certain groups of people, who may even be targeted. However, another group of emotions that may also be seen as positive, like nationalism, may lead to a support of violent measures such as a war as well.

All of the speeches^[4] were collected from the official Canadian government website and its archives. All of the collected speeches were delivered between the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the end of 2019^[5].  After collecting all of the speeches delivered by the prime minsters the author uploaded them and the statements into the NVivo. Since all of the speeches delivered by each of the four analysed prime ministers were collected, it was necessary to create a dataset that consisted only of the speeches focused on terrorism^[6] for each of the four prime ministers. This was done by a query in the NVivo. The author conducted a text search for the term ‘terror’ including the stemmed words^[7], and saved the result of the query as a set of speeches focused on terrorism. The created dataset now contained all of the speeches where the term ‘terror’ (including stemmed words) was used at least once. Some speeches may thus have still been primarily focused on other issues; however, since the term ‘terror’ or a similar term was used at least once, the speech still got to the dataset. As this paper presents only the analysis of the speeches focused on terrorism, it was necessary to exclude the speeches that mention terrorism only briefly, without focusing on it. This was achieved by including only the speeches with coverage of the term terrorism at least by 0.5%^[8] into the final dataset. This percentage was selected as a reasonable compromise, which meant that the dataset would consist of enough speeches for analysis and the speeches focused on different issues are excluded. A different percentage was not selected because selection of a lower percentage would lead to inclusion of too many speeches that focus on topics other than terrorism. On the other hand, including a higher percentage would also be problematic, because the next percentage similar in all speeches^[9] is over 1% and this would lead to significant reduction of the dataset. The number of speeches and percentage of all speeches before and after the reduction are presented in Table 1 and Table 2.

Table 1: The number of speeches, coverage and number of references to the word terror (including stemmed words) before reduction of the dataset

Name	Number of speeches	Coverage (min–max in speeches)	Number of references (min – max in speeches)
Jean Chrétien	57	0.05 – 2.85%	1 – 16
Paul Martin	33	0.03 – 1.52%	1 – 5
Stephen Harper	64	0.05 – 5.60%	1 – 16
Justin Trudeau	38	0.07 – 2.92%	1 – 7

 

Table 2: The number of speeches, coverage and number of references to the word terror (including stemmed words) after reduction of the dataset

Name	Number of speeches	Coverage (min–max in speeches)	Number of references (min – max in speeches) [1]
Jean Chrétien	21	0.50 – 2.85%	1 - 16
Paul Martin	10	0.53 – 1.52%	1 – 3
Stephen Harper	25	0.50 – 5.60%	1 – 16
Justin Trudeau	24	0.50 – 2.92%	1 – 7

 

^[1] Some speeches still consist only of one mention of terror (or stemmed words) and the limited dataset may even consider speeches with a lower number of references per speech than the original dataset. However, these speeches (statements) are short enough so the term terrorism (or stemmed words) presents a sufficient percentage. The percentual coverage is the main indicator that the speech is focuesd on the topic of terrorism.

When all four datasets were created, all of the speeches that were included in individual datasets were coded manually in the NVivo by the author. The speeches were coded inductively, thus there were no codes created prior to coding. The coding unit is a coherent idea that consists of at least one sentence and is no longer than one paragraph in the speech. One idea may be coded into more than one code. The parts of the speeches which do not relate to terrorism were not included in any of the codes. All of the codes that were created while coding the speeches are summarised in Table 3 at the end of the findings section of the paper.

The author created twenty different codes based on the reading of the speeches, not all of them present in speeches delivered by every speaker. The code determination includes part of the speeches where the speaker talks about the determination of Canada to fight and win against terrorism, this code refers mainly to the determination to fight terrorism abroad. The code safe on the other hand refers mostly to politics adopted to protect the Canadian homeland, which should make people feel safe at their homes. Similarly the code calm refers to parts of the speeches which attempted to calm the emotions of people and make them not scared of terrorism. The code courage includes mentions of people fighting terrorism and responding to a terrorist threat, mainly soldiers or emergency services. Two codes similar in the message the speaker attempts to send to the public are nationalism/pride and certain victory. The first referring to Canadian greatness highlighting its values, the later mentioning the certainty of Canadian (or Western) victory against terrorism. The code solidarity refers to parts of the speeches when the prime minister expressed sympathy to either a country that suffered a terrorist attack or to the family of victims of such an attack either at home or abroad. The code cooperation includes parts of speeches when the prime minister refers to the necessity of cooperation to successfully fight terrorism. Some speakers also expressed the need for patience and explained that terrorism cannot be defeated over a short period of time, these references were coded into the code patience. The codes fear and hate refer to parts of the speeches which invoke these two emotions. An example of an idea coded into fear is part of a speech describing a terrorist attack in detail or telling people that another terrorist attack is imminent. An example of an idea coded into hate is describing terrorist goals and their desire to destroy our way of life. However, these two codes are very similar and many of the statements may invoke both hate and fear in people, thus many of the statements which belong to one of these codes is also coded into the other. Closely connected to these two codes are innocent victims, a code that directly mentions the innocence of the victims who did not deserve to die, making the attack seem even more brutal, and the codes urgency and new threat, which include parts of the speeches which describe terrorism as an urgent threat which needs to be addressed immediately, and which describe it as a new threat that has never been here before. Even though terrorism itself is not new, they see the terrorist threat we face now (at the time of delivering the speech) as at least qualitatively different from the terrorist (and other) threats we faced in the past. The code Us vs. Them contains parts of the speeches which label the struggle with terrorism as a fight between us vs. them, such as good vs. evil, civilised vs. barbaric nations, etc. The code emotional words contains references where the prime minister used emotionally charged words – such as ‘barbaric attack’, ‘horrible tragedy’, ‘shocking attack’, etc. These parts of speeches do not only invoke emotions, such as fear, by for example scaring people with imminence of another attack, but actually use emotional language.

The remaining codes do not contain references invoking particular emotions but show what other topics are present in the analysed speeches. The code 9/11 refers to parts of the speeches talking about the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, not joining the Iraq War refers to speeches where the prime minister explains the Canadian decision not to participate in the 2003 Iraq War, Islam contains parts of the speeches where prime ministers talk about Islam and Muslims, usually in an attempt to calm negative emotions towards minorities in Canada, and definition contains references to the need to find a common definition of the term terrorism.

The research has some limits. The main one is the fact that the coding was conducted only by the author. The coding may be subjective, especially with codes as similar as fear and hate, as described above. For this reason the author tries to make the coding and the whole analysis as transparent as possible. The second limit is connected with the data collection. The data were collected from the archived website for Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin. For Justin Trudeau, all of the speeches were collected from his current governmental website. The only problem was the data collection for Stephen Harper. His archived website could not be opened due to technical issues. All of his speeches were found on the Canadian governmental website through the search engine; however, it is not absolutely certain that all of his speeches were found and collected. However, the author was still able to collect a total of 1076 speeches for him, which should be representative enough for the analysis. The third limitation is the terminology used on the websites of each prime minister - each of them label the speeches in a different way:  as speeches, statements or even news.

 

Findings

The following section presents the findings of the analysis. It is divided into four individual sections, each presenting the results for one of the prime ministers. It presents the character of speeches delivered by each prime minister and the emotions present in (or invoked by) the speeches. The prime ministers are ordered chronologically so it is easier to observe the evolution of the terrorism discourse in Canada.

 

Jean Chrétien

Jean Chrétien was in  office from 4 November 1993 until 12 December 2003 (Canada 2013). The article analyses his speeches delivered since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A total of 180 speeches were collected for Jean Chrétien, 57 of them contained the word terror (or words stemming from it) and 21 speeches were included in the final dataset and coded. Jean Chrétien was the Canadian prime minister during important milestones of terrorism and the fight against terrorism – the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the invasion of Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq.^[10] These events may be an explanation why the dataset for Jean Chrétien is the biggest even though his time in office (at least for the purpose of our analyses) is the shortest.

Prime Minister Chrétien framed terrorism in a more emotional than objective way. He frames it as a struggle between the civilised world and terrorists, so he frames it as a war between us and them (43 references). Chrétien uses emotionally charged words in his speeches describing terrorism (39 references). He uses terms such as ‘awful news’, ‘sad and trying days’, ‘terrible situation’, ‘a singular event transfixes the world’, ‘occasions when the dark side of human nature escapes civilised restraints and shows its ugly face to a stunned world’ (Chrétien2001). He often mentions the 9/11 terrorist attacks (24 references) and describes it as a tragic event that changed the world and can never be forgotten. The emotional references are also connected to the victims of terrorist attacks (17 references), who are described as innocent people.

Chrétien stressed the solidarity Canada felt towards its southern neighbour and the friendship Canada and the United States share. He talked about the friendship with the United States, solidarity (33 references) and cooperation (30 references), but on the other hand he stressed the Canadian decision not to follow the United States in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (7 references), because Canada is an independent country and cannot go to war only to follow their friends. He explained that Canada prefers a solution via the United Nations.

Most of Chrétien´s references (54 references) are about the determination of Canada to fight and defeat terrorists. The Determination code was selected for ideas that Canada is in the war, must fight terrorism on a global level or that this fight represents the fight between the civilised world and terrorists and the civilised world must win. This category thus refers more to the global military fight than providing safety to Canadian citizens on Canadian soil. This was represented by the code safety, which has a lower number of references (26 references). This code refers to parts of the speeches that invoked feelings of safety of Canadians at home, for example adoption of new counterterrorism laws and an increase in security measures in airports. The messages about Canadian determination are closely connected to the certainty of Canadian victory, which is stressed in 11 references.

Chrétien often invoked the feeling of Canadian nationalism and pride (44 references) when he talked about the Canadian response to 9/11 and the help that Canadian people provided to Americans at that time, pride for Canadian troops or Canadian values that need to be protected. He also talked about the courage of Canadian people, and especially its armed forces (15 references).

While Chrétien invokes emotions of fear (24 references) and hate (9 references) in people, he also tries to calm them (18 references), ask them for patience (11 references) and explain that Islam is not the enemy of Canada (5 references). He invokes fear by stressing the global reach of terrorists and the fact that they are a global threat to all countries. He describes it as a new threat that was never here before (19 references) and that is urgent (16 references) and must be dealt with now, or the terrorists will pose an immediate threat to Canada. The hate is invoked, for instance, by stressing the attempt of terrorists to destroy the Canadian (and Western) way of life, Canadian values, or by the reminder of the destruction of the World Trade Center on 9/11. However, Chrétien also attempts to make people calm, especially to prevent attacks on immigrants and Muslims in particular. He also tries to make people patient and explain that this war cannot be won overnight. 

 

Paul Martin

Paul Martin was the Canadian prime minister from 12 December 2003 until 6 February 2006 (Canada 2013). In total 205 speeches were collected for Paul Martin. Of these speeches, 33 contained at least one reference to the word terror (or stemmed words), 10 files were included in the final dataset and coded.

The code called solidarity contained the most references (11 references) of all created codes. Paul Martin delivered most of his speeches that were coded in reaction to a terrorist attack somewhere in the world, or in reaction to the death of soldiers in the War on Terror in Afghanistan. Six of the ten analysed speeches referred to these two kinds of events. In most speeches he thus expressed solidarity with countries, soldiers and their families who were victims of terrorist attacks or the War on terror. Paul Martin, as his predecessor, did not deliver emotionally neutral speeches, which may also be connected to the fact that his speeches were most often delivered as a reaction to terrorist attacks, or Canadian casualties in Afghanistan. His speeches include 10 emotionally charged ideas. He uses phrases such as ‘unspeakable attack’, ‘horrific reminder’, ‘terrible loss’ or ‘barbaric act’ throughout his speeches. Martin talks about the victims of terrorism (8 references), and stresses that they are innocent. When talking about solidarity, Martin also talks about the need for cooperation and the Canadian willingness to cooperate with countries to deal with the threat of terrorism (5 references). The emotiveness in his speeches is also connected to the reference of 9/11, which he mentioned in one of his speeches. He describes the 9/11 terrorist attacks in an emotional manner (using words such as ‘shocked’, ‘horrified’, ‘senseless act’) and as an event that cannot be forgotten. He framed the fight as an Us versus Them conflict, where Us refers to Canada and the Western world and Them to terrorists, using murder to achieve their goals (5 references).

Martin also talked about Canadian determination to fight terrorism (5 references). And the measures Canada adopted to protect its people at home and make them safe (5 references), such as the adoption of counterterrorism laws. He also talks about the steps that are taken against nuclear terrorism, making people feel safer. Connected to the determination is his assurance of certain victory against terrorism (1 reference). Martin invoked feelings of national pride, especially in connection to Canadian values that need to be protected (5 references), and about the courage of Canadian armed forces (1 reference). However, he also invoked feelings of fear (3 references) and hate (1 reference). He invoked fear by presenting terrorism as a real and present threat. He claimed terrorism to be a new threat, emerging on 9/11 (1 reference), and he stressed the urgency to deal with terrorism (1 reference), since it is a threat that presents a danger to people at the moment. Martin, unlike his predecessor, does not attempt to calm people and make them realise that the war is not aimed against immigrants in general and Islam in particular. However, he calls for the definition of terrorism (1 reference).

               

Stephen Harper

Stephen Harper was in the office of the Canadian prime minister between 6 February 2006 (Canada 2013) and 4 November 2015 ('Prime Minister of Canada' 2013). In total 1076 speeches were collected for Stephen Harper. Of these speeches, 64 contained at least one reference to terrorism and 25 of them were included in the final dataset and coded.

As with his predecessor, Stephen Harper delivered some of his speeches focused on terrorism as a reaction to a terrorist attack or death of Canadian soldiers (8 of 26 speeches), other speeches were delivered on an anniversary of major terrorist attacks from the past, 9/11 and the terrorist attack on Air India Flight 182 from 1985 (12 of 26 speeches). The character of these 20 speeches may explain why the code labelled Emotional comprises the most references (57 references). He uses emotionally charged phrases – ‘tragedy’, ‘horrific act’, ‘heinous acts’, ‘horrible acts’. The second most references describe victims (54 references) of the terrorist attacks. Harper expresses Canadian solidarity (42 references) to other countries who were victims of terrorist attacks, or to families of victims. He also stresses the need for cooperation among countries to defeat terrorism, and Canadian willingness to cooperate with her allies (11 references). As his two predecessors, Harper talks about 9/11 on anniversaries of the attack. He describes the 9/11 terrorist attacks emotionally; however, he does not describe it as the worst terrorist attack. Harper uses the label of the worst terrorist attack for the 1985 attack on Air India Flight 182 that killed all 329 passengers (280 of whom were Canadians). Harper talked about this attack in seven of the 26 analysed speeches. The references to this attack may explain why Harper did not refer to terrorism as a new kind of threat. However, this may also be caused by the fact that the War on Terror had already been going on for five years when he was sworn into office.

Harper did frame the War on Terror as an Us versus Them conflict (19 references), where the Us stands for Canada and its friends and allies, and Them stands for terrorists. He did not frame the war as a war between civilised and barbaric nations. He stresses the determination to fight terrorism (24 references) and the certainty that the war will be won (4 references). The determination to fight and defeat terrorism globally is complemented by the assurances of providing safety for Canadian citizens at home (14 references). Another element of his speeches are references to national pride (23 references) and courage (18 references); however, unlike his predecessors, he uses references of pride and courage exclusively in connection with the Canadian military, not Canadians values or ordinary people and not even rescue services.

Harper invokes fear in citizens (20 references) by stressing that terrorism is a serious threat to all countries, and especially by saying that terrorist organisations designated Canada as its target. He talks about the urgency to fight terrorism (4 references), amplifying the fear. Another negative emotion invoked by Harper is hate (9 references), when he described past terrorist attacks on Canada, or the brutality of terrorist attacks. These references could invoke both emotions – fear and hate. Harper did not attempt to calm people and their negative emotions toward minorities or Islam, as Chrétien did.

 

Justin Trudeau

Justin Trudeau has been in the office of the prime minister of Canada since 4 November 2015 until the present day ('Prime Minister of Canada' 2013). The last included date for Justin Trudeau was the speech on 31 December 2019, as explained in the methodology. Of the 718 speeches collected for Justin Trudeau, 38 of them contained at least one reference to terrorism and 24 speeches were included in the final dataset and coded.

Trudeau refers mostly to victims (58 references) and solidarity (58 references), and his speeches are also emotionally charged (52 references). The speeches on terrorism, which were included in the dataset, were mostly in reaction to terrorist attacks committed around the world (17 of 24 speeches). He uses emotional words such as ‘deeply shocked and saddened’, ‘we mourn’, or ‘cowardly attack’, ‘brutal act’. He also used emotional language when talking about anniversaries of terrorist attacks. Trudeau mentioned the 9/11 terrorist attack only in one of the analysed speeches (2 references), and, as his predecessor, he did not consider it to be the worst terrorist attack. In four speeches he refers to the 1985 bombing on Air India Flight 182, which he, like Stephen Harper, considers the worst attack for Canada. He also did not refer to terrorism as a new kind of threat, and not even as an urgent threat that needs to be solved quickly.

Trudeau describes the fight against terrorism as a fight of democracies (Us) versus the terrorists, representing hate and violence (Them) (26 references). He stressed Canadian determination to fight terrorism on a global level (22 references) and that Canada will not be defeated by terrorists (2 references). As with the previous prime ministers the paper analyses, Trudeau also invokes a feeling of safety of Canadians in their homeland (6 references). Trudeau emphasises the need for cooperation to defeat terrorism (16 references), but he also invoked the feelings of nationalist pride (12 references) and courage of Canadians (9 references). He does not ascribe these characteristics only to military personnel, but to all Canadians.

Even though Trudeau tried to make people feel safe, he did invoke the negative feelings of hate (7 references) and fear (19 references) in people as well, by describing terrorism as a very real and present threat that can strike at any time, and targets innocent people. He did not attempt to calm people, remind them that this fight needs patience or that it is not aimed against any particular community.

 

Table 3: All codes and number of references made by each prime minister in his speeches

	Jean Chrétien  (21 speeches)	Paul Martin (10 Speeches)	Stephen Harper (25 Speeches)	Justin Trudeau (24 Speeches)
Determination	54	5	24	22
Nationalism/pride	44	5	23	12
Us vs Them	43	5	19	26
Emotional words	39	10	57	52
Solidarity	33	11	42	58
Cooperation	30	5	11	16
Safety	26	5	14	6
9/11	24	3	14	2
Fear	24	3	20	19
New Threat	19	1	-	-
Calm	18	-	-	-
Innocent victims	17	8	54	58
Urgency	16	1	4	-
Courage	15	1	18	9
Patience	11	-	-	-
Certain victory	11	1	4	2
Hate	9	1	9	7
Not joining Iraq war	7	-	-	-
Islam	5	-	-	-
Definition	-	1	-	-

 

Conclusion

When looking at the evolution of terrorism discourse in Canada between 9/11 and the end of 2019, it is possible to notice that there are both similarities and differences between the character of the speeches delivered by the four prime ministers and the emotions they each invoke. The similarities are that all of them talked about terrorism in an emotional manner, using emotionally charged words. None of the four analysed prime ministers described terrorism without invoking emotions. All of them expressed solidarity with other countries who suffered from terrorist attacks and with the families of victims. The victims were also mentioned in the speeches of all of the four prime ministers. All of them also talked about the need for cooperation and the willingness of Canada to cooperate with its allies. All of the prime ministers expressed the determination of Canada to fight terrorism on a global level and all of them expressed a certainty of Canadian victory. They all invoked positive emotions of safety, nationalism and courage. However, Stephen Harper invoked the latter two only in relation to Canadian military forces. Another similarity for all the speakers is the invocation of negative feelings in their speeches – particularly feelings of hate and fear of terrorism, which was invoked using descriptions of terrorist actions, terrorist goals and by stressing that terrorism is a very real threat to Canada.

There can also be differences observed among the four speakers. While all of them describe the fight against terrorism as an Us versus Them conflict, Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau did not frame it as a war between civilised and barbaric nations. All the prime ministers mentioned 9/11 and described it in an emotional manner. However, Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau did not describe it as the worst terrorist attack in history, instead they both used this label to describe the 1985 terrorist attack of the Air India Flight 182. Harper and Trudeau, unlike their predecessors, also did not describe terrorism as a new threat that emerged after 9/11, and Trudeau did not even talk about it as an urgent threat. This can be caused by the fact that the War on Terror had already been going on for years when they got sworn into office; however, this is only one possible explanation. Jean Chrétien is the only one of the four prime ministers who attempted to calm the people, especially to calm the negative feelings towards immigrants in general and Islam in particular. Chrétien was also the only one of the four prime ministers who asked people for patience in the fight and explained that the war cannot be won overnight. Chrétien was the only one who talked about not joining the invasion of Iraq; however, this was probably caused by the fact that he is the only one who was in the prime minister’s office while making the decision. Martin was the only one who stressed the necessity of adopting a common definition of terrorism.

It can be concluded that all of the analysed Canadian prime ministers used emotional language and invoked negative emotions in people, which can lead to support of aggressive counterterrorism policies. Jean Chrétien was the only one who also attempted to calm the negative emotions towards immigrants and especially Muslims, which means that there is degeneration rather than improvement in calming the impact of negative emotions in speeches. Calming the negative emotions at least towards immigrants and Muslims may lead to lack of alienation of these groups of people and push them towards radicalisation. Since all of the speeches are emotional and influence the feelings of citizens, it is necessary to continue with this kind of research. The next step is to analyse the adopted counterterrorism measures to determine whether the emotional speeches lead to an adoption of ineffective counterterrorism measures, such as an increase in the number of troops in the War on Terror, torture, targeted killing or other violent measures. This article contributes to the literature on terrorism discourse by analysing the Canadian discourse delivered by prime ministers; however, there is still a need for further research. Similar analyses aimed at different countries is also needed, since most of the analyses only focus on a limited number of countries. The analysis of discourse on terrorism should not be omitted since it can give us an idea about the adoption and legitimisation of counterterrorism policies that may be ineffective and contribute to the issue of terrorism rather than providing a solution. Another possible analysis would be that of how Canadian prime ministers talk about homegrown terrorism since these speeches were not included in the dataset. There are three possible explanations why these speeches did not ‘make it’ to the dataset. First, the prime ministers did not address this issue in their speeches at all. Second, the prime ministers do not refer to these attacks as terrorist acts. And the third possibility is that they talk about homegrown terrorism in speeches where they focus on other issues as well, which would lead to exclusion based on percentual coverage of the word ‘terror’. All of these analyses would help us better understand how the discourse on terrorism is presented and how it influences human emotions to gain support for various counterterrorism policies.

 

***

 

Zuzana Měřičková studied International Relations at Metropolitan University Prague and Security Studies at Charles University. She is a Ph.D. candidate at Metropolitan University Prague and focuses on Critical Terrorism Studies and discourse in Anglosphere countries after 9/11. 

 

Funding

This paper is the result of Metropolitan University Prague internal grant no. E54-79 (2020/2021) funded by The Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports from the Funds for Support of Specific Research.

 

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Speeches and Documents

 Jean Chrétien

Address by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien on the occasion of a Special House of Commons Debate in response to the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001

Address by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien on the occasion of the Canada – U.S. Border Summit – September 9, 2002

Address by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to the Appeal of Conscience Foundation – October 1, 2002

Address by the Prime Minister Chrétien at the Fighting Terrorism for Humanity Conference – September 22, 2003

Notes for a Statement by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien An Address to the Nation Concerning the International Campaign Against Terrorism – October 7, 2001

Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien at the Opening of the 58^th Session of the United Nations General Assembly – September 23, 2003

Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien on the occasion of a Special House of Commons “Take Note” Debate on the International Campaign Against Terror – October 15, 2001

Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien To the 47^th Annual NATO Parliamentary Assembly – October 9, 2001

Remarks by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien Announcing Canada’ s Contribution to the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction – May 30, 1003

Statement by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announcing a National Day of Mourning in Canada on September 14, 2001 in memory of the victims of the terrorist attacks in the United States – September 13, 2001

Statement by the Prime Minister – August 2, 2002

Statement by the Prime Minister – March 20, 2003

Statement by the Prime Minister – May 31, 2002

Statement by the Prime Minister – November 10, 2003

Statement by the Prime Minister – November 8, 2002

Statement by the Prime Minister – November 9, 2001

Statement by the Prime Minister – October 26, 2002

Statement by the Prime Minister – video message – December 2001

Statement by the Prime Minister Jean Chrétien in Support of a Motion in the House of Commons – April 8, 2003

Statement by the Prime Minister- October 2, 2003

Statement by the Prime Minister to mark the two-year anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States – no date

 

Paul Martin 

Demolition of Palestinian home in Gaza – May 20, 2004

Prime Minister Martin condemns bombing in Amman, Jordan – November 9, 2005

Statement by Prime Minister Paul Martin – July 7, 2005

Statement by the Prime Minister after developments in the hostage-taking incident in a school in North Ossetia, Russia – September 3, 2004

Statement by the Prime Minister at the signing of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism – September 14, 2005

Statement by the Prime Minister on a United Nations Report proposing internal reform – March 21, 2005

Statement by the Prime Minister on the attacks in Egypt – July 23, 2005

Statement by the Prime Minister on the death of Private Braun Scott Woodfield – November 24, 2005

Statement by the Prime Minister on the third anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attack – Statement by the Prime Minister – September 10, 2004

The death of a Canadian Soldier in Kabul, Afghanistan – Statement by the Prime Minister – January 27, 2004

 

Stephen Harper

Address by the Prime Minister To the Canadian Armed forces in Afghanistan – March 13, 2006

Prime Minister Harper Declares September 11 a National Day of Service  September 9, 2011

Prime Minister Harper Marks 10^th Anniversary of 9/11 – September 11, 2011

Prime Minister Harper’s Statement Regarding 9/11 During His Address to the Australian Parliament – September 11, 2007

Statement by Prime Minister Stephen Harper on the assassination of Benazir Bhutto – December 27, 2007

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada – April 11, 2010

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada – June 23, 2010

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada – March 8, 2010

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada – May 18, 2010

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada – May 8, 2010

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada – no date

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada – no date

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada – no date

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada – September 11, 2010

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada in response to the situation in Israel – July 13, 2014

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on National Day of Remembrance for Victims of Terrorism – June 23, 2013

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on passage of second ISIL motion in Parliament – March 30, 2015

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the Anniversary of 9/11 and the National Day of Service – September 11, 2013

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the bombing at Moscow’s Demodedovo Airport – January 24, 2011

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the National Day of Remembrance for Victims of Terrorism – June 23, 2012

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the National Day of Remembrance for Victims of Terrorism – June 23, 2014

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada Strongly Condemns Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai – July 13, 2011

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada to honour the Canadian Armed Forces – no date

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada to mark the National Day of Remembrance for Victims of Terrorism – June 23, 2015

Statement by the Prime Minister on the Deaths of Sergeant Darcy Tedford and Private Blake Williamson – October 15, 2006

 

Justin Trudeau

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on an apparent terrorist attack in Manchester, United Kingdom – May 22, 2017

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on Remembrance Day – November 11, 2016

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on terrorist attacks in Brussels, Belgium – March 22, 2016

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the anniversary of the attack at the National War Memorial and Parliament Hill in Ottawa – October 22, 2016

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the attack in London, United Kingdom – March 22, 2017

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the attack in Stockholm, Sweden, April 7, 2017

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the results of the Australian general election – May 18, 2019

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the terrorist attack in France – March 23, 2018

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the terrorist attack in London – June 4, 2017

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the terrorist attack on Coptic Christians in Egypt – May 26, 2017

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the terrorist attacks on Coptic Christian churches in Egypt, April 9, 2017

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the terrorist attack in Istanbul, Turkey – January 1, 2017

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the tragic shooting in Orlando, Florida – June 12, 2016

Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada to mark the National Day of Remembrance for Victims of Terrorism – June 23, 2016

Statement by the Prime Minister on terrorist attack in Barcelona – August 17, 2017

Statement by the Prime Minister on the anniversary of 9/11 and the National Day of Service – September 11, 2017

Statement by the Prime Minister on the death of a Canadian citizen in Jordan – December 19, 2016

Statement by the Prime Minister on the mosque attack in Egypt – November 24, 2017

Statement by the Prime Minister on the National Day of Remembrance for Victims of Terrorism – June 23, 2019

Statement by the Prime Minister on the National Day of Remembrance for Victims of Terrorism – June 23, 2018

Statement by the Prime Minister on the National Day of Remembrance for Victims of Terrorism – June 23, 2017

Statement by the Prime Minister on the terrorist attack in Burkina Faso – August 15, 2017

Statement by the Prime Minister on the terrorist attack in Somalia – July 14, 2019

Statement by the Prime Minister on the terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka – April 21, 2019

 

^[1] Even though prime ministers are not the official head of Canada, they have actual executive power and thus they were selected for analysis. The Queen of England, who is the official head of Canada, only has a representative role and was thus not selected for the analysis.

^[2] The end of 2019 was chosen because I want to analyse the speeches to the present; however, I need a clear end date to which all of the speeches are available. I selected the end of 2019 because I started the research in 2018 and the end of 2019 was the last date to which I could wait before collecting all of the data.

^[3] A good definition of positive and negative emotions is provided in the article by Sirin and Geva, who describe these two distinct categories of emotions as follows: ‘. . . positive emotions are associated with the approach system motivating one to achieve positive outcomes for pleasure and reward whereas negative emotions are linked to the avoidance system activated to elude negative outcomes in order to protect again pain and harm’ (Sirin – Geva 2013: 710).

^[4] All of the available speeches, which were delivered by the four analysed prime ministers, were downloaded, regardless of the topic they covered. The speeches on terrorism were selected in the Nvivo.

^[5] As explained in the introduction – 2019 represents the present time to which all the data were available when starting the research.

^[6] For the purpose of the article there is no need for definition of terrorism. Defining terrorism would be even counterproductive, because it would artificially limit the dataset of analysed speeches. The goal of the paper is to analyse how the Canadian prime ministers talk about terrorism. A part of the analysis is also to find how and when they apply the ‘terrorism’ label to an attack or any other action. Instead of making a definition, the paper ‘lets’ the prime ministers apply their own definition. This will prevent the exclusion of speeches which may not fit our definition but do focus on terrorism, from the prime ministers’ point of view.

^[7] Words similar to terrorism, terrorist, etc.

^[8] I.e., the term terror or stemmed words constitute at least 0.5% of the whole article.

^[9] It is not possible to choose a percentage that is not similar in datasets of all analysed prime ministers, for example choosing the percentage of 75% would be problematic since one of the datasets constitutes speeches with coverage of 0.58% and then 1.14%, with nothing in between. This dataset would be more limited than the other two. This paper attempted to limit all the articles by the same percentage.

^[10] However, Canada did not participate in the invasion of Iraq.