Abstract

This article examines the European Union’s collective securitization of Russia across two critical junctures: the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Why did the EU, long energy-dependent and internally divided, adopt substantial but fragmented measures that changed little in 2014, yet achieve unprecedented unity, scope, and institutionalization after 2022? Applying a tailor-made version of Sperling and Webber’s six-stage collective securitization framework, the analysis traces how precipitating events, institutional securitizing moves, member-state audience responses, and policy outputs interacted differently in each phase. Through qualitative analysis of EU institutional documents, Council conclusions, and member-state discourse, the article identifies three factors that account for the variation in outcomes. First, the greater salience and interpretive clarity of the 2022 invasion generated broader and more durable audience acceptance than the hybrid and ambiguous conflict of 2014. Second, higher levels of intra-EU alignment after 2022, including the convergence of previously cautious governments, reduced veto constraints and enabled cohesive collective action. Third, the expanded availability of policy instruments anchored securitization into routinized governance rather than crisis-driven reaction. The findings sharpen the scope conditions of collective securitization theory by demonstrating how event salience, member-state alignment, and the instrumentalization of capacity jointly determine whether securitizing moves translate into thick and enduring collective securitization.

Keywords

Collective securitization, European Union, Russia, EU-Russia relations, Security discourse, Copenhagen School