

From Fragmentation to Routinization: The European Union's Collective Securitization of Russia, 2014–2022

Khayyam Rzazade

University of Genoa, Italy, ORCID: 0009-0004-1208-3867, corresponding address:
khayyam.rzazade@edu.unige.it

Abstract

This article examines the European Union's collective securitization of Russia across two critical junctures: the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Why did the EU, long energy-dependent and internally divided, adopt substantial but fragmented measures that changed little in 2014, yet achieve unprecedented unity, scope, and institutionalization after 2022? Applying a tailor-made version of Sperling and Webber's six-stage collective securitization framework, the analysis traces how precipitating events, institutional securitizing moves, member-state audience responses, and policy outputs interacted differently in each phase. Through qualitative analysis of EU institutional documents, Council conclusions, and member-state discourse, the article identifies three factors that account for the variation in outcomes. First, the greater salience and interpretive clarity of the 2022 invasion generated broader and more durable audience acceptance than the hybrid and ambiguous conflict of 2014. Second, higher levels of intra-EU alignment after 2022, including the convergence of previously cautious governments, reduced veto constraints and enabled cohesive collective action. Third, the expanded availability of policy instruments anchored securitization into routinized governance rather than crisis-driven reaction. The findings sharpen the scope conditions of collective securitization theory by demonstrating how event salience, member-state alignment, and the instrumentalization of capacity jointly

determine whether securitizing moves translate into thick and enduring collective securitization.

Keywords: *collective securitization, European Union, Russia, EU-Russia relations, Security discourse, Copenhagen School*

First published online on 13 October 2026

Introduction

In recent years, Europe's security environment has undergone a profound transformation. Russian actions have "destroyed key elements of both the post-Cold War security system and the post-World War II security system in Europe" (Menon & Rumer 2016: 1). Echoing this assessment, the European Council described Russia's full-scale invasion as "a tectonic shift in European history" (European Council 2022a), while the EU's Strategic Compass referred to the "return of war in Europe" and called for "a quantum leap forward" in security and defense (Council of the EU 2022f). These formulations signal not merely a crisis, but a fundamental rupture in the post-1991 order of cooperative security. Even Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov has conceded that "we are at war with the West," underscoring the depth of the divide (Fubini 2022).

For nearly three decades, EU-Russia relations oscillated between cooperation and contestation (Haukkala 2015). The EU's aspiration for strategic partnership eroded after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and collapsed entirely following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In 2014, the EU adopted restrictive measures and suspended bilateral summits (European Council 2014a), yet internal divisions and economic interdependence constrained further escalation. By contrast, after February 2022 the Union adopted successive and far-reaching sanctions packages, including financial restrictions, energy embargoes, and coordinated asset freezes (European Council 2022b). The invasion led to the adoption of the Strategic Compass, marking a qualitative strengthening of EU security and defense policy (Council of the EU 2022f). This contrast raises a broader question about the evolution of the EU's collective securitization of Russia.

How can we account for the European Union's shift from a constrained and incomplete collective securitization of Russia after 2014 to a sustained and thick collective securitization following the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine? The puzzle underlying this question is straightforward: Why did the EU – long energy-dependent and internally divided – adopt substantial but fragmented measures that changed little in 2014, yet achieve unprecedented unity, scope, and institutionalization after 2022?

In order to answer these questions, this article explains the EU's evolution from a constrained, piecemeal response in 2014 to a sustained, institutionalized

collective securitization after 2022. It traces how precipitating events, discursive moves, audience responses, and policy outputs interacted across two phases, accounting for the post-2022 consolidation into a routinized security status quo. The analysis shows why the same organization that stalled in 2014 succeeded eight years later. It argues that three factors account for this variation: the greater salience of the 2022 invasion (E1), the higher degree of intra-EU alignment among member states (E2), and the expanded availability of policy instruments enabling institutionalized responses (E3). One objection is obvious. A full-scale invasion was of a different order of magnitude than the events of 2014. Magnitude alone, though, explains the scale of the reaction but not its durability, which depended on alignment and on how the Union used its instruments.

The comparison between the two phases is guided by three analytical expectations:

E1: Event salience and clarity: The greater salience of the 2022 full-scale invasion, compared to the more ambiguous and gradual escalation in 2014, increased the likelihood of audience acceptance and facilitated a stronger and more sustained collective securitization by the EU.

E2: Intra-EU alignment: Higher levels of member-state convergence after 2022 – particularly the movement of previously cautious governments such as Italy and Greece toward the mainstream position – and the partial alignment of Hungary – reduced veto constraints and enabled a broader and more cohesive collective securitization than in 2014.

E3: Instrumentalization of capacity: The activation and expansion of post-2022 policy instruments – including wider sanctions packages, financial restrictions such as SWIFT disconnections, energy embargoes, and the adoption of the Strategic Compass – anchored securitization into a routinized and institutionalized security status quo that had not been achieved in the 2014 phase. Activation here means using instruments that already existed but had not been applied. What changed after 2022 was not the EU's capacity but its readiness to use it.

Theoretically, the article builds on the framework of collective securitization developed by Sperling and Webber (2017), extending their logic from NATO to the EU context. Rather than treating the EU as a unitary actor, the analysis specifies the institutional and intergovernmental agents involved in the securitization process. It focuses in particular on the European Council and the Council of the EU as central arenas of political authorization, the European Commission and the European External Action Service as key agenda-setters and articulators of threat discourse, and the European Parliament as a secondary arena of recursive interaction that legitimizes the securitization. At the intergovernmental level, the study traces how positions adopted by Poland and the Baltic states, Germany and France, and more cautious or economically exposed governments such as Italy, Greece, and Hungary shaped the dynamics of audience acceptance and contestation.

While previous research has applied collective securitization to domains such as terrorism, cybersecurity, migration, and climate policy, the EU's collective securitization of Russia – across the two critical junctures of 2014 and 2022 – remains insufficiently examined in a structured, comparative framework.

This article makes four main contributions. Empirically, it advances three expectation-driven explanations for variation in the EU's collective securitization of Russia. First, it demonstrates that the salience of the issue is decisive: when Russian aggression became a highly visible and politically dominant concern in 2022, it generated broader and more durable audience acceptance than in 2014, when competing crises and lower perceived urgency diluted collective focus. Second, it shows that intra-EU alignment matters: shifts in the positions of key member states – including Italy and Greece, and to a more limited extent Hungary – reduced veto constraints after 2022 and enabled a more cohesive and far-reaching response than in the earlier phase. Third, it highlights the instrumentalization of capacity, arguing that the expansion of sanctions, financial restrictions, energy measures, and the adoption of the Strategic Compass embedded securitization into routinized and institutionalized practices absent in 2014. Conceptually, the article applies collective securitization theory and specifies when it produces “thick” collective securitization in the EU context, showing how issue salience, member-state alignment, and the instrumentalization of capacity jointly shape whether securitizing moves translate into durable policy outcomes rather than remaining symbolically reactive.

The article proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical literature on securitization and collective securitization, before situating the study within existing scholarship on EU-Russia relations. The methodology section introduces the tailor-made analytical framework. The empirical analysis then traces the two phases – 2014 and 2022 – through the six stages of the collective securitization model. A section on the new security status quo follows, and the article concludes by drawing theoretical and empirical implications.

State of the art and theoretical framework

From classical to collective securitization

The development of securitization theory sits within the broader post-Cold War debate between “narrowers” and “wideners” in security studies. As Eroukhmanoff (2018) explains, this debate paved the way for the Copenhagen School's reconceptualization of security beyond purely military concerns. In *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) conceptualized security as “the framing of an issue as an existential threat that justifies extraordinary measures, shifting it from the non-politicized or politicized sphere into the securitized realm.” Crucially, securitization succeeds only if the relevant audience accepts the speech act (23–27).

Since its formulation, securitization theory has generated both strong support and sustained critique (Balzacq 2005; Bigo 2002). The Copenhagen School's reconceptualization of security as a speech-act process shifted the analytical focus from material capabilities to discursive construction, influencing a broad range of security studies (Eroukhmanoff 2018: 2). However, critics have argued that its original formulation privileged elite speech acts and state actors, thereby underplaying practices, visual dimensions, and the role of non-state agents (McDonald 2008; Stritzel 2007). These limitations became particularly evident when scholars attempted to apply the framework beyond the state level. Buzan and Wæver (2009: 257–258) describe securitizations that operate above the level of the individual state as macrosecuritizations, which incorporate and coordinate multiple lower-level securitizations, sometimes ranking them and sometimes merely bundling them together. They also note that a macrosecuritization has to be maintained, because the local securitizations contained within it retain the option of defecting if the linkage to the higher level comes to look contradictory.

As international and regional organizations gained greater political authority, applying classical securitization theory beyond the state proved analytically challenging. In response, Haacke and Williams (2008) introduced the concept of “collective securitization,” defining it as the process whereby securitizing actors within a regional arrangement frame a development as an existential threat and seek validation from other regional actors (785–787). However, their formulation assumed a largely bottom-up dynamic in which states raise security concerns that the organization then processes, leaving the latter as a bargaining arena rather than an autonomous actor.

Sperling and Webber (2017) advanced this framework by distinguishing between “thin” and “thick” collective securitization. In thin forms, organizations merely aggregate member-state preferences, while in thick forms, organizations act as independent securitizing actors with autonomous authority and strategic preferences. They operationalized this distinction through a six-stage analytical model comprising: (1) status quo discourse and policy; (2) precipitating events; (3) securitizing moves; (4) audience response; (5) policy output; and (6) routinization into a new security status quo (Sperling & Webber 2017).

This account of routinization also has to answer a critique. Bigo (2002) argues that securitization is not usefully understood as a discursive practice creating exception, and that authors in the Copenhagen tradition have little sense of the daily routines of bureaucracies through which security is actually produced. Security, on his account, works through everyday technologies and through effects of power that are continuous rather than exceptional. The six-stage model is not immune to this objection, but its final stage is where the two accounts meet. Routinization is precisely the point at which a securitization stops depending on

exceptional claims and begins to operate through ordinary administrative practice, which is what the EU's post-2022 sanctions cycle now does.

In securitization theory, securitizing moves are typically made by authoritative political actors – such as government leaders, ministers, or institutional representatives – who frame an issue as an existential threat requiring exceptional measures (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998). In the EU context, actors including the High Representative, the European Council, the European Commission, and national leaders articulate such moves and publicly define developments like Russian aggression as threats to European security and shared values (Council of the EU 2014a; 2022a). Sperling and Webber (2019: 248) characterize the EU as capable of “thick” collective securitization due to its autonomous competences across multiple policy domains. Building on Balzacq's (2005; 2010) sociological critique of the Copenhagen School, subsequent scholarship has emphasized that securitization succeeds not through speech acts alone but through the alignment of contextual conditions – including audience dispositions and institutional settings – that shape whether threat framings are accepted. Scholarship since has treated the audience as an active participant rather than a passive recipient, with member-state responses functioning at once as legitimation and as inputs to the process itself (Léonard & Kaunert 2010; Jacobs & Kabata 2023; Gözkaman 2024).

Recursivity is central to the model rather than incidental to it. Member states are simultaneously actor and audience, raising threat claims and responding to those raised by others, and it is the repetition of these claims across successive meetings that produces an institutional position. The institution is therefore both the arena in which recursive interaction takes place and the medium through which its outcome is expressed. Recursivity also operates at the level of language, since the terms used to describe Russia in one setting are carried into the next and gradually narrow the range of available descriptions. Where the threat is unambiguous, this process resolves quickly, and where it is contested, it can continue for years without settling.

Collective securitization theory has been applied in the EU to the collective framing of terrorism as a transnational threat (Léonard & Kaunert 2019; Shepherd 2021; Javadi 2023), to border control and Schengen governance under pandemic constraints (Jacobs & Kabata 2023), to financial crime and money laundering through criminalization discourse (Hytinen & Heinikoski 2019), to cybersecurity and digital security challenges (Christou 2019), to energy (Hofmann & Staeger 2019; Siddi & Kustova 2021), environment and climate change as security issues within European policy debates (Dupont 2019; Morsut & Rhinard 2025).

Yet, as reflected in Lucarelli, Sperling and Webber's (2020) edited volume, the literature remains fragmented and uneven in its empirical coverage of specific issue areas. While NATO's collective securitization of Russia has been systematically examined (Sperling & Webber 2017), the EU's collective securitization of

Russia across the critical junctures of 2014 and 2022 has not been comparatively structured within the same analytical framework. This gap also sits at a distance from the wider debate on EU actorness, which has moved from asking whether a European foreign policy exists to asking what kind of power it exercises (Sjursen 2006: 169–170), and from the strategic autonomy literature, which defines autonomy as the ability to live by one's own laws rather than as independence (Tocci 2021: 8–9). Collective securitization addresses both empirically.

The literature and the analytical gap

Work on the period before 2014 traces a move from post-Soviet optimism to strategic divergence (Haukkala 2015). Although the tensions were substantial, Russia was not consistently framed as an existential threat in EU discourse, and the relationship moved between engagement and rivalry rather than settling into securitization.

The literature on the two crises that followed is extensive but uneven. Work on the 2014 period documents securitizing moves alongside patchy audience acceptance and constrained policy output, and attributes this shortfall to internal fragmentation and energy interdependence (Eder & von der Burchard 2015; Meister 2022). Work on 2022 documents the opposite pattern, with immediate institutional framing of the invasion as an existential threat, rapid convergence among previously cautious member states (Amante 2023; Schmidt & Glied 2024; Siddi 2025), and policy output unprecedented in scope, from successive sanctions packages to the Strategic Compass (Szép & Chawla 2023; Korkea-aho & Lonardo 2025).

Taken together, this work supplies a theoretical foundation for collective securitization (Sperling & Webber 2017; 2019), detailed accounts of both crises, and evidence of member-state divergence and later convergence. What it has not done is treat the two episodes as one sequence. NATO's securitization of Russia has been theorized systematically, but the EU's move from fragmented to routinized securitization has not been traced through the six-stage model. That is the task of the analysis below.

Methodology and tailor-made collective securitization framework

This article applies Sperling and Webber's (2017) six-stage model of collective securitization to examine how the European Union securitized Russia across two critical junctures: the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Rather than treating these events separately, the analysis compares them within a unified framework in order to explain variation in outcomes.

The analysis does not treat the European Union as a single, unitary actor. Instead, it specifies the institutional and intergovernmental agents involved in the process of collective securitization. At the institutional level, the European Council and the Council of the EU function as central arenas of political authorization,


where common positions, sanctions packages, and strategic documents such as the Strategic Compass require unanimity among member states (European Council 2014c; Council of the EU 2022f). The European Commission plays a crucial agenda-setting and operational role by proposing restrictive measures, coordinating sanctions regimes, issuing communications such as the Energy Security Strategy and sanctions packages, and overseeing implementation (European Commission 2024). The European External Action Service (EEAS) and the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) articulate the Union's threat discourse externally, framing Russia's actions as violations of international law and as systemic threats to European security (EEAS 2016; Council of the EU 2023a). The European Parliament serves as a secondary arena of recursive interaction, legitimizing the securitization through resolutions that explicitly frame Russia as undermining European security and democratic order (European Parliament 2014). Securitizing moves are thus initiated and articulated primarily through these institutional channels.

At the intergovernmental level, member states act as the primary audience, and their acceptance, resistance, or hedging determines whether institutional securitizing moves translate into collective action. The analysis focuses on leaders' public statements and governmental positioning, grouped into three categories that recur across both phases. Frontline states are Poland and the Baltic countries. Major powers are Germany, France, and, until Brexit, the United Kingdom. Economically exposed governments are Italy, Greece, and Hungary. How each group responded in 2014 and again in 2022 is set out in the empirical sections below.

The study adopts a qualitative research design based on theory-guided process tracing, using discursive evidence – official documents, institutional statements, and leaders' speeches – to trace the causal mechanisms linking precipitating events, securitizing moves, audience responses, and policy outputs across both phases. Rather than a systematic corpus-based discourse analysis, the primary sources serve as illustrative markers of documented discursive trajectories, anchored in the secondary literature. The empirical material includes European Council conclusions, Council decisions on restrictive measures, Commission communications (including sanctions and energy measures), EEAS and HR/VP statements, European Parliament resolutions, and leaders' public speeches and interviews from key member states. The analysis systematically examines these sources to identify securitizing moves, trace audience responses among member states through leaders' official discourse and governmental positions, and analyze resulting policy outputs such as sanctions packages, SWIFT exclusions, energy embargoes, and the adoption of the Strategic Compass. Secondary academic sources contextualize institutional authority, intergovernmental bargaining dynamics, and the evolution from fragmented responses in 2014 to routinized securitization after 2022. This article restructures the model in order to capture long-term

transformation. Instead of applying the six stages once, the article divides the process into two analytical sequences as shown in *Figure 1*.

Figure 1. Tailor-made collective securitization framework



Source: author

The first sequence begins with the pre-2014 status quo of EU-Russia relations, characterized by strategic partnership rhetoric and cooperative frameworks. The annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Donbas are treated as precipitating events. The analysis then traces the EU's securitizing moves, member-state audience responses, and resulting policy outputs, including sanctions and strategic reframing. The article treats disinformation and hybrid threats as follow-on developments within this phase rather than as independent triggering events, since 2014 marks the decisive rupture.

The second sequence begins with Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Again, the analysis examines securitizing moves, audience alignment among member states, and policy outputs, including expanded sanctions and the adoption of the Strategic Compass. This phase culminates in what the article identifies as a routinized security status quo, in which Russia is consistently framed as a central and enduring threat in EU discourse and policy practice.

Key concepts follow Sperling and Webber's definitions. "Securitizing moves" refer to official statements framing Russia as a threat. The "referent object" is the EU and its member states, including their shared norms and values. The referent object requires specification, since Ukraine is not a member state. Three things were construed as under threat. The first is the post-1991 European security order, in particular the prohibition on changing borders by force. The second is the Union's capacity to shape its own periphery, since Ukraine had been drawn

into the EU's project through the Association Agreement. The third is the territorial integrity of member states, read through precedent. The referent object was contested in 2014 and far less so in 2022, and that difference is part of the explanation. "Audience response" denotes the positions adopted by member-state governments. "Policy output" refers to concrete measures such as sanctions, energy restrictions, institutional reforms, and defense initiatives. Following Jacobs and Kabata (2023), the article treats policy practices as integral manifestations of securitization, not merely as consequences of discourse.

Applying the six stages across two sequential crises allows the analysis to trace how E1, E2, and E3 interacted over time, explaining why the EU's response evolved from fragmentation in 2014 to cohesive institutionalization after 2022.

How E1, E2, and E3 interact

The three expectations are not parallel variables. They work in sequence, and the sequence runs across both phases rather than within either one.

E1 is permissive. Event salience decided how fast the EU could respond and how easily institutions could agree on a description of what had happened, but it did not decide whether the response lasted. Salience was at its highest in the weeks after February 2022 and has declined since, while the securitization has not. What salience does is open a window. What happens in that window depends on the other two.

E2 and E3 operate in sequence and then reinforce each other. Alignment among member states had to come first, because sanctions and defense instruments require unanimity, and without agreement the instruments cannot be adopted at all. Once adopted, however, the instruments made further alignment easier. Each new sanctions package was decided against the precedent of the last one rather than from the beginning, and routine decisions are easier to take than exceptional ones. Alignment enabled instruments, and instruments then lowered the cost of alignment.

E3 is also endogenous to the first phase. The capacity used after 2022 was largely built after 2014 and because of it. The sanctions machinery, the strategic communication capacity created in response to disinformation, and the energy diversification begun under the Energy Union were all products of the constrained first phase. The failure to consolidate securitization in 2014 therefore produced part of what made consolidation possible in 2022. This is why the two phases cannot be treated as independent cases. The first phase is a cause of the second.

Status quo security discourse and cooperation in pre-2014: From "honeymoon years" to the "strategic partnership"

Before 1991 the Soviet Union had few ties with the European Community, and those it had were shaped by the rivalry between Washington and Moscow (John-

son & Robinson 2005). After the USSR broke up, Russia and the EU signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1994, which came into force in 1997. It committed both sides to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. These early years were often called the honeymoon years, and they did not last. Primakov turned Russian foreign policy toward a more assertive and multipolar course, the Chechen wars and the economic crisis took their toll at home, and NATO's intervention in Kosovo strained relations further (Forsberg & Haukkala 2016; Rumer 2016).¹

Under Putin, cooperation and estrangement ran side by side (Galeotti 2019; Lo 2015). Economic modernization gave both sides reasons to work together, through the OSCE and the NATO-Russia Council. At the same time, Moscow rejected the European Neighbourhood Policy and asked instead for a special relationship (Sergunin 2011: 13–14). The EU answered with the four common spaces, which put interests ahead of values (Casier 2018: 18–19). Disagreements over Ukraine then blocked the renewal of the agreement in 2007. In February that year Putin used his Munich speech to reject the American-led order outright, which reset the relationship well before the war in Georgia (Putin 2007). Light (2008) asked whether the strategic partnership had already become a strategic rivalry.

The 2008 war in Georgia deepened mistrust, even though the EU mediated it and relations were soon restored. What changed was the language, which now spoke of legal commitments rather than shared values (Forsberg & Seppo 2011: 121–137; Sakwa 2015). The Partnership for Modernization of 2010 was the last serious attempt to repair the relationship, and it failed (Blank 2012: 154). Putin's disputed re-election in 2012 closed the period, and Trenin (2013) read it as the end of an era and the start of a Russian pivot toward Asia. Scholars still disagree about the causes of the decline. Some point to NATO and the West (Sakwa 2015), others to authoritarianism and revisionism inside Russia (Lo 2015; Applebaum 2024).

Phase I: 2014

Precipitating series of events: Crimea and Donbas

Ukraine's politics have been unstable since independence. The Orange Revolution of 2004 brought Yushchenko to power but collapsed into corruption and division within three years (Karatnycky 2005; Kubicek 2009). Yanukovych won the 2010 election, and his decision in 2013 to suspend preparations for signing the EU Association Agreement brought protesters onto the Maidan (Åslund 2015).

1 NATO's trajectory shaped EU-Russia relations indirectly throughout this period. Enlargement and the Kosovo intervention set the terms on which Moscow read Western intentions, conditioning the EU's room for maneuver even where the Union was not the actor involved.

The Euromaidan movement turned violent – about a hundred protesters were killed – and Yanukovych fled the country (Gladun 2019: 31–33). Responsibility for what followed remains contested, with accounts ranging from Russian interference (Kuzio 2023a) to Western involvement and Ukraine's own divisions (Sakwa 2015; Mearsheimer 2014).

Moscow used the collapse of the government in Kyiv to seize Crimea, the first forcible annexation of European territory since the Second World War and one condemned by a hundred UN member states (Konończuk 2014; Toal, O'Loughlin & Bakke 2020). In March 2014 the local authorities declared independence and held a referendum that officially returned 96.77 percent support for joining Russia, an outcome overwhelmingly rejected as illegitimate by the international community (Grant 2015: 68–70). Moscow justified the annexation by self-determination, historical ties, alleged discrimination against Crimeans, and the breakdown of the Ukrainian state (Tolstikh 2014). Western observers treated it as a breach of international law (Müllerson 2014; Grant 2015). Mearsheimer (2014) argued that Western expansion provoked the crisis, a view most scholars reject in favor of accounts stressing Russian revisionism (Renz 2024; Kuzio 2023a).

Unrest then spread to Donetsk and Luhansk, where pro-Russian groups declared people's republics with Moscow's support. Unlike Crimea, the region was deeply divided (Marples 2022). Kyiv's anti-terrorist operation met strong resistance, and the downing of flight MH17 by a Russian missile made Moscow's involvement visible and drew global condemnation (Fischer 2019: 9). Russia presented its actions as protection of Russian speakers against Ukrainian nationalism (Patrushev 2014). The Minsk agreements froze the conflict without resolving it, and it continued until 2022 (Marples 2022; Åslund 2015).

The relatively ambiguous and hybrid nature of these events – combining covert military involvement, proxy conflict, and frozen agreements – is central to understanding E1: their lower salience and interpretive contestability compared to 2022 reduced the urgency of audience acceptance and constrained collective action.

EU securitizing moves

In this phase, the article attributes securitizing moves exclusively to EU institutional actors acting in their supranational capacity – the European Council President, the HR/VP, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. Member states' reactions are examined separately in the following section on audience response. It is worth noting that figures such as Donald Tusk, though formerly the Polish prime minister, appear here in their capacity as EU institutional representatives.

Triggered by the precipitating events in Ukraine, the EU's securitizing moves unfolded through successive speech acts by EU institutional actors – primarily

the HR/VP, the European Council President, and the European Commission – as well as through formal resolutions of the European Parliament, revealing a gradual shift in framing Russia from a “strategic partner” to a “challenge,” and eventually a “threat.” In March 2014, the Foreign Affairs Council condemned Russia’s “acts of aggression” and violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty (Council of the EU 2014a), while HR/VP Catherine Ashton denounced the “breach of Russia’s international obligations” (Kayleigh 2014). European Council President Herman Van Rompuy warned that Russia’s failure to de-escalate would have “serious consequences” for EU-Russia relations, marking an early discursive break (European Council 2014a). The European Parliament reinforced this stance in its 2014 resolution on Ukraine, asserting that “Russia undermines EU security” through airspace violations and coercive tactics such as gas supply cuts (European Parliament 2014).²

As the discourse hardened, Donald Tusk – soon after assuming the presidency of the European Council – depicted Russia initially as a “strategic problem of the EU,” then “the biggest challenge . . . to Europe,” later describing its conduct as “destructive, aggressive and bullying” (Croft & Macdonald 2015; BBC 2014). The 2016 EU Global Strategy consolidated this language, which labeled Russia a “strategic challenge” and reaffirmed non-recognition of Crimea’s annexation (EEAS 2016).³ These statements serve as illustrative markers of a documented discursive trajectory (Pingen 2023; Jacobs & Kabata 2023).

By 2018, the Commission had further consolidated this framing through its Action Plan Against Disinformation identifying Russia as “the greatest threat to the EU,” linking hybrid threats and propaganda to risks for democracy, security, and public welfare (European Commission 2018). While occasional conciliatory remarks, such as Commission President Juncker’s claim that “there is no European security without Russia,” suggested residual engagement, the overall trajectory reflects a steady securitization of Russia in EU discourse, evolving from cautious concern to explicit threat perception.

This discursive trajectory reflects a partial and gradual securitizing process – relevant to E1 and E2 – in which EU institutional actors escalated threat framing incrementally rather than decisively, limiting the speed and depth of audience alignment. The quality of these moves matters as much as their frequency. EU actors claimed that Russia had breached legal and normative commitments, not that the Union itself was endangered. Such framing invites condemnation more readily than extraordinary measures.

2 EU leaders also agreed to make decisions on matters related to Russia, such as freezing assets, travel bans, and canceling the EU-Russia summit (European Council 2014a; 2014b).

3 ‘The European Security Order’ section of the document has been dedicated to Russia and its actions in Ukraine stating that the EU “will not recognize Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea nor accept the destabilization of eastern Ukraine.”

Audience response: From unity to fragmentation

In the process of collective securitization, audience response constitutes a crucial stage. While it may take various forms, this study, following Sperling and Webber (2017), focuses on the official reactions and discourses of EU member states. The analysis examines member states across the three categories established in the methodology: frontline states (Poland and the Baltics), major powers (Germany, France, and, until Brexit, the UK), and economically exposed governments (Italy, Greece, Hungary).⁴ Balzacq (2005: 192–193) argues that securitization depends on the congruence of the audience's frame of reference, the external context and the actor's position, and that where the external context gives weak clues of danger the audience's frame of reference carries more weight. That describes 2014, when the same EU statements met different national frames of reference.

Poland and the Baltic states shared a pronounced sense of vulnerability. In Poland, over half the population regarded Russia as a threat, while then-Prime Minister Donald Tusk urged stronger EU and NATO responses, warning that “the risk of direct intervention [by Russia] is higher than it was several days ago” (Hyndle-Hussein 2015; Solvang 2014). Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė declared that “practically, Russia is in a state of war against Europe,” later calling it a “terrorist state” and a “threat to the whole region and all of Europe” (Krutaine & Sytas 2014; Weymouth 2017). Estonia's Toomas Hendrik Ilves described the crisis as “an undeclared war” (Sabet-Parry 2014).

Among the major states, Chancellor Merkel condemned Russia's actions as “a blatant violation of international law and of our common values” (Bond et al. 2014). German policy nonetheless diverged from this language. Berlin continued to support Nord Stream 2 while contributing personnel to NATO reassurance measures in the Baltic states (Meister 2022). President Hollande dismissed the Crimean referendum as “illegal” and contrary to international law, later softening his tone by asserting that “Russia is not an adversary, not a threat” (Élysée 2014). British Prime Minister Cameron called Russia's behavior “a breach of international law” and later warned of “a potential Russian military threat” (Osborn & James 2014; GOV.UK 2014). In contrast, Prime Minister Orbán declared that “Hungary is not part of the conflict” and avoided criticizing Moscow, focusing instead on minority rights in Ukraine (Herman & Wachs 2014). Italy's Matteo Renzi became the first major EU leader to visit Moscow after the annexation, referring to Italy as Russia's “privileged partner” and later hosting Putin weeks before the EU's sanctions renewal (Marson 2015). Greece similarly refrained from open condemnation due to its economic dependence on Russia (Smith 2014).

4 It is important to note that these categories and member states in each category are not exclusive. Depending on the time period discussed, they may be subject to switch among the categories. These categories simplify the picture to describe the general situation.

In sum, the differing responses of EU member states reveal the multi-layered nature of collective securitization. While front-line states and key EU powers pushed for a firm stance against Russia, others pursued pragmatic restraint. Despite these divergences, all contributed to shaping a collective EU response, which evolved through compromise between security-driven and interest-driven member states. This fragmented response directly illustrates E2: the absence of sufficient intra-EU alignment in 2014 meant that securitizing moves could not generate the broad and cohesive audience acceptance necessary for thick collective securitization. The process was recursive but never settled. Sanctions had to be renewed every six months, so member states had to state their positions again and again, and reluctant governments could ask for something in return each time. Renzi's blocking in late 2015 was not a one-off. It was what such a system produces. What the EU agreed on was a way of renewing sanctions, not a shared view of the threat.

Policy output

The first restrictive measures followed on 17 March 2014, when the Council imposed travel bans and asset freezes on 21 officials whom it held responsible for undermining the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine (Council of the EU 2014b). Over the following months, the EU added economic sanctions, more asset freezes and travel bans, and restrictions on trade with and investment in Crimea (European Council 2014e).⁵ The European Council also canceled a planned EU-Russia summit and noted that member states “will not hold any bilateral regular summits with Russia” (European Council 2014d). On 6 March, EU leaders had already suspended talks with Russia on visa matters and on the New Agreement meant to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (European Council 2014a). Suspension from the G8 Summit was also imposed, though this measure extended beyond the EU to include other Western partners.

The EU's subsequent actions in response to the crisis in Ukraine extended across multiple domains, including support for Ukraine, enhancement of energy security, strengthening of EU defense and security cooperation (e.g. adoption of EUGS which included the concept of strategic autonomy), and countering disinformation. Nevertheless, disunity among the member states led to the disruption in the process of securitizing Russia. For instance, in late 2015 Matteo Renzi blocked the extension of EU sanctions against Russia, while other objections were raised by Hungary, Bulgaria, and Greece (Eder & von der Burchard 2015; Coticchia & Davidson 2019). Ultimately, the EU kept the sanctions; however, it avoided further serious actions that would cause damages in major energy projects and economic cooperation (Meister 2022).

5 See the list of restrictive measures (European Council 2023b).

Yet, internal divisions and economic dependencies hindered the collective effort and limited the Union's ability to escalate measures further. The constrained policy output of this phase reflects E3: The EU's toolkit remained underdeveloped – lacking viable energy alternatives, the political infrastructure for SWIFT exclusions, and the expanded sanctions architecture that only became available after 2022. These instrumental limitations, rather than political will alone, meant that even where securitizing moves existed, the mechanisms to institutionalize them did not. The EU was also not the only available forum. NATO securitized the post-2014 events more sharply, though itself restrained by comparison with 2022, through the Readiness Action Plan and forward deployments, giving member states a route for registering resolve without EU-level agreement. That displacement helps explain why EU securitizing moves in this phase produced so little consolidation (Sperling & Webber 2017).

The scale of these measures also has to be set against national conduct. Sanctions applied to a few hundred individuals and entities and to a narrow set of sectors, and their renewal every six months meant they could not become permanent. More importantly, member-state policy did not follow the discourse. Germany continued with Nord Stream 2 (Meister 2022), and defense spending in most member states stayed well below NATO's 2 percent target (Tocci 2021). The gap between what the EU said and what its members did is what kept E3 weak in this phase, since instruments that member states decline to use do not institutionalize anything.

Phase II: 2022

Precipitating events and EU securitizing moves

Despite intermittent diplomatic efforts, tensions between the EU and Russia intensified after the annexation of Crimea, culminating in Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Western intelligence had warned of troop build-ups months earlier, but no preventive action followed (Renz 2024). President Putin justified the attack as a "special military operation" to "demilitarize and denazify" Ukraine. Scholarly explanations for Russia's decision to launch the invasion vary considerably, spanning accounts that emphasize NATO enlargement and Western encroachment (Mearsheimer 2014; Sakwa 2015), analyses foregrounding Putin's imperial revisionism and domestic political logic (Renz 2024; Applebaum 2024; Kuzio 2023a), and structural approaches focused on the contested post-Soviet order (Trenin 2022).

The EU's immediate response came during an extraordinary Foreign Affairs Council meeting, where HR/VP Josep Borrell condemned Russia's recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk and warned against using these pacts "as a pretext for taking further military steps" (Council of the EU 2022a). The following day he called the conflict "a matter of life and death . . . about the future of our global

community” (EEAS 2022). European Council President Charles Michel declared that “Russia alone is to blame. It will pay a heavy price” (Council of the EU 2022b), while Borrell identified the Russian leadership as “a major threat to international peace and security” (Council of the EU 2022c). In response to the Russian disinformation and information manipulation acts in Ukraine, he drew the attention to the EU stating that “it [disinformation] is also a significant and direct threat to the [European] Union’s public order and security” (Council of the EU 2022d).

In March 2022, the Versailles Declaration described the war as a “tectonic shift in European history” and pledged to defend “our citizens, values, democracies, and our European model” (European Council 2022a). Later that year, as Russia moved to annex Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia, Borrell reiterated that “Russia’s actions in Ukraine continue threatening peace and security in Europe” (Council of the EU 2022g), and Michel denounced the Kremlin’s weaponization of energy, stating that “Russia has launched an energy missile against the European continent” (Council of the EU 2022h). Subsequent European Council conclusions warned that the war was “putting European and global peace and security at risk” (European Council 2022b).

The unambiguous scale and visibility of the 2022 invasion – a full-scale land war in Europe – directly activated *E1* as its salience and urgency eliminated the interpretive ambiguity that had prevented collective action in 2014, generating swift and unified institutional threat framing. The framing also changed in kind. Borrell’s description of the war as a matter of life and death for the global community, and the Versailles Declaration’s pledge to defend the Union’s citizens, values, democracies and European model, located the threat inside the EU rather than outside it. Russia was no longer breaching commitments owed to others but endangering what the Union itself is, and that shift is what made extraordinary measures arguable.

Audience response: From fragmentation back to unity

The 2022 invasion supplied the external clues that 2014 lacked. In Balzacq’s terms it came closer to a brute threat, one whose meaning did not depend on how it was described (2005: 181), and the weight of national frames of reference fell accordingly. Poland and the Baltic states maintained their hardline stance, quickly framing the invasion as an existential threat to European peace. Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki called it “an existential threat to peace in Europe” and demanded “the fiercest possible sanctions” (Kuzio 2023b; Sus 2025). Estonia’s president Alar Karis declared that his country was “protecting Estonia and defending peace in Europe,” while Lithuania’s president Gitanas Nausėda urged partners to label Russia “a key and long-term threat to the entire Euro-Atlantic area” (Karis 2022; Delfi 2022). Latvian Prime Minister Krišjānis Kariņš echoed this, warning that “the Russian Empire still wants to be an empire . . . the only threat we face

in Europe” (Sydorenko 2023). These states remained the Union’s most consistent advocates of deterrence and solidarity with Ukraine.

Among the larger member states, France and Germany (the UK having left after Brexit) again shaped the EU’s central response. President Emmanuel Macron called the invasion “a turning point in the history of Europe” and “the most significant damage to peace and stability in decades,” while still attempting to play a mediating role, arguing that Russia “should not be humiliated” (Caulcutt 2022; Coffey 2022). German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, by contrast, announced a historic *Zeitenwende*, declaring that the invasion marked “a turning point for Europe” and calling for strengthened defense capacities, later reaffirming that “Russia is once again a threat to Europe” (Muttreja & Blumenau 2022; German Federal Government 2022; DW 2022). His position extended Merkel’s prior stance but marked a qualitatively more assertive shift in German foreign policy, most visibly through the announcement of a EUR 100 billion special defense fund (Sondervermögen) and the abandonment of Nord Stream 2 – a reversal of Germany’s energy dependency that had previously constrained EU-level securitization (Muttreja & Blumenau 2022).

The most notable change came among previously cautious member states. Greece’s prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis for the first time condemned Russian “revisionism” as “the main threat to world peace” (Karakatsani 2022; Stamouli 2022). Italy also reversed course, labeling Russia’s invasion “an assault on European peace and security,” with Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni continuing her predecessor’s pro-Ukraine policy, insisting that “we will continue to do it because it is right to do so” (Amante 2023; Siddi 2025). Even Hungary, traditionally resistant, joined EU and NATO allies in condemning the attack, though Viktor Orbán emphasized that “Hungary must stay out of the military conflict” and prioritized “the security of the Hungarian people” (Hungary Today 2022; Schmidt & Glied 2024). Hungary’s conditional participation – voting in favor of most sanctions packages while publicly opposing escalation and blocking specific energy measures – constitutes the “partial alignment” referenced in E2 which is sufficient to prevent a veto but insufficient to signal substantial strategic convergence.

This shift in member-state positioning is the clearest empirical manifestation of E2 as the convergence of previously cautious governments toward the mainstream position dramatically reduced veto constraints and enabled the broader and more cohesive collective securitization that had eluded the Union in 2014. Here recursion worked in the opposite direction. Because the invasion was hard to describe in more than one way, each round of statements narrowed the range of positions a government could hold rather than widening it. Hungary is the clearest case. Orbán kept objecting in public while voting for the sanctions, which shows how far the shared framing had already settled by the time each vote came round. Agreement was reached faster, and it held.

Policy output and comparative assessment

As in the first phase, this stage culminated in concrete measures. Between February 2022 and April 2023, the Union adopted ten rounds of sanctions aimed at Russia's capacity to finance the war. This included freezing the assets of 1,473 individuals and 205 entities, cutting Sberbank and other major banks out of SWIFT, barring transactions with the central bank, tightening export controls on dual-use technology, closing EU airspace to Russian aircraft and banning state-controlled media (European Council 2023b; Chupriyanova & Timofeev 2024; Korkea-aho & Lonardo 2025; Szép & Chawla 2023). Despite heavy energy dependence, it went further, embargoing Russian oil, petroleum products, and coal, and introducing price caps coordinated with the G7 (European Commission 2024).

The war also prompted the adoption of the Strategic Compass – an ambitious roadmap for strengthening the EU's security and defense policy by 2030 (Council of the EU 2022f). As HR/VP Josep Borrell declared, "The threats are rising and the cost of inaction is clear. The Strategic Compass is a guide for action" (Council of the EU 2022e). This step reflected a qualitative leap in the EU's strategic posture, linking external sanctions with internal capacity-building and collective defense objectives. Equally significant as an expression of E3 was the granting of EU candidate status to Ukraine in June 2022 – widely interpreted as a geopolitical response to the invasion that linked the securitization of Russia to the enlargement agenda (Koval & Vachudova 2024) – and the first use of the European Peace Facility to fund military assistance.

National conduct in this phase moved with the discourse rather than against it, and this is where the collective character of the securitization becomes visible. Member states supplied lethal and non-lethal military assistance bilaterally, a step they had declined to take after 2014, while the Union financed and coordinated that assistance through the European Peace Facility, an off-budget instrument created within days of the invasion. The distribution is telling. Of the EUR 85.7 billion in military aid allocated by the EU and its member states by mid-2026, some EUR 81.3 billion came from member states themselves, with EU institutions accounting for the remainder, a figure held down by the fact that Peace Facility reimbursements are recorded at national level (Trebesch et al. 2026). European allocations overall, at roughly EUR 195 billion, now exceed those of the United States. Defense budgets rose across the Union, most conspicuously in Germany, whose *Zeitenwende* reversed a restraint that had survived 2014 intact. What distinguishes this phase from the first is therefore not the volume of EU declarations but the consistency of national action with them.

New security status quo: A collectively securitized Russia

Official discourse since late 2022 shows how far the securitization has been institutionalized. On the first anniversary of the invasion the European Council

condemned Russia for weaponizing food and energy and for spreading false narratives about the war (Council of the EU 2023a). Announcing the tenth sanctions package, Borrell denounced the missile campaign against civilian targets (Council of the EU 2023b), and von der Leyen described Russia as waging war in the public space through lies meant to polarize European societies (EEAS 2023b). Council conclusions in March 2023 again named Russian aggression as a central threat (European Council 2023a), Borrell called the planned stationing of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus an irresponsible escalation (EU Neighbours East 2023), and Michel described Russia as attacking both Ukraine and the rules-based international system (Council of the EU 2023c).

What matters here is not the force of any single statement but the fact that the framing no longer has to be argued for. Borrell's insistence that the Russian narrative be countered in Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America shows how far that frame now travels beyond the Union itself (EEAS 2023a). The process has also continued past the period this study covers. By early 2026 the EU had adopted nineteen sanctions packages and proposed a twentieth, adding restrictions on Russian LNG imports, lower oil price caps, shadow fleet designations, and wider anti-circumvention measures (European Council 2026). Each package is now decided against the precedent of the last rather than from first principles, which is what routinization looks like in practice.

The spread across policy areas followed a common mechanism. Once Russia was established as a threat to the Union itself, instruments in adjacent fields could be reinterpreted as security instruments without new authorization. Energy diversification became a security requirement pursued through REPowerEU, disinformation moved from a communications problem to a defense matter, and defense planning was consolidated in the Strategic Compass. The frame arrived first and the machinery adapted to it.

Conclusion

This article set out to explain why the European Union's collective securitization of Russia remained constrained in 2014 but consolidated after 2022. By comparing the two phases through a tailored version of the collective securitization framework, it shows how the EU's response evolved from hesitation and fragmentation to unity and institutionalization.

In the first phase (2014–2021), the EU's actions were cautious and fragmented. Russia's annexation of Crimea and its support for the Donbas conflict triggered strong rhetoric but only limited policy change. In the second phase (after the 2022 invasion), the EU reacted with far greater speed, unity, and determination, adopting an unprecedented range of sanctions and developing new security instruments. This comparison explains why the same organization that stalled in 2014 succeeded eight years later.

As the empirical analysis across both phases demonstrates, three factors – introduced at the outset as E1 to E3 – consistently account for this transformation, with their interaction traceable at each stage of the securitization process.

E1: Event salience. The 2014 crisis was serious, but its meaning and scale were debated. The hybrid nature of the conflict and the diplomatic space created by the Minsk agreements allowed some member states to question whether Russia posed a direct, existential threat. In contrast, the 2022 invasion was an unmistakable case of large-scale aggression. The salience and visibility of the war reduced uncertainty and made it easier for EU institutions and member states to agree that Russia represented a direct and urgent threat. As shown in the precipitating events sections, this contrast in event salience was the permissive condition that opened the door for the deeper dynamics of E2 and E3.

E2: Intra-EU alignment. In 2014, divisions among EU members limited collective action. Frontline states such as Poland and the Baltics pushed for a tougher line, while others – especially Italy, Greece, and Hungary – hesitated due to economic interests and energy dependence. This fragmentation slowed decision-making and diluted policy outcomes. After 2022, however, more member states aligned with the harder stance, reducing veto risks and allowing deeper cooperation. This widening convergence turned the relationship between Brussels and national capitals from one of negotiation and compromise into one of reinforcement and unity. This shift, documented in both audience response sections, was not automatic but driven by the convergence of previously resistant governments whose domestic calculations changed after February 2022.

E3: Instrumentalization of capacity. The EU's tools also evolved. In the first phase, responses focused mainly on targeted sanctions, suspended summits, and declaratory strategies – symbolically important but limited in effect. By contrast, the post-2022 response was far more extensive and operational: multiple rounds of sanctions, the exclusion of Russian banks from SWIFT, energy embargoes and price caps, bans on airspace and state media, and the adoption of the Strategic Compass to guide defense and security policy until 2030. These actions gave the EU a much stronger and more institutionalized set of instruments, turning securitization into a matter of daily governance rather than crisis management. This instrumental expansion, traced in both policy output sections, transformed securitization from a reactive posture into an institutionalized and self-sustaining governance practice.

Together, these three dynamics show the EU acting as a “thick” collective securitizing actor – not merely an arena for state bargaining, but an organization capable of framing threats, coordinating responses, and maintaining them over time. The study also highlights the importance of recursive interaction between institutions and member states: securitizing moves and audience responses constantly shaped each other. This feedback process first produced a fragile equi-

librium after 2014, and then, following the 2022 invasion, a much stronger and more stable consensus – what this paper calls a routinized security status quo.

The findings sharpen the scope conditions of collective securitization theory in several ways. First, they demonstrate that the EU can act as a genuinely autonomous securitizing actor – able to define threats collectively and sustain long-term responses. Second, they suggest that success in collective securitization depends not only on audience acceptance but also on the creation of lasting practices and instruments that translate discourse into policy. Third, the study shows that the salience of the event (E1) is a permissive condition, but member-state alignment (E2) and the instrumentalization of capacity (E3) determine whether securitization endures or fades. Finally, the analysis highlights how securitization can spread across policy areas – from foreign and security policy to energy, disinformation, and defense planning – creating the foundations for a long-term European security order.

Beyond these internal dynamics, external factors also helped shape this outcome. U.S. leadership, Ukrainian resilience, and the global energy reconfiguration supported the EU's unified response. Similarly, NATO-EU complementarity reinforced credibility and coordination. These factors, however, functioned more as facilitating conditions than as main causes. They are treated as contextual because they operated through the three expectations rather than beside them, making alignment easier to reach and changing which instruments member states would accept. Neither produced collective securitization on its own, as the post-2014 period shows. They strengthened intra-EU unity and enhanced the EU's ability to act, but the key dynamics remained within the Union's collective securitization process itself.

This study's limitation is that it focuses on elite discourse and institutional action. It does not directly assess how European publics perceive the Russian threat or whether EU measures have changed Russian behavior. The timeframe captures the consolidation of securitization but not potential fatigue or adaptation, such as the risk of sanctions erosion. Causal claims are mechanism-based rather than statistical, emphasizing how the process unfolded rather than quantifying its impact.

Further studies could look more closely at domestic politics within key member states to understand what drove their changing positions, or examine how the EU implements sanctions and defense initiatives across countries. Comparative research could test whether the same mechanisms (E1–E3) explain collective securitization in other areas, such as China, cyber threats, or climate security. Future work could also explore how and when the EU might de-securitize Russia if geopolitical conditions change.

The comparison between 2014 and 2022 demonstrates that the EU's success depended on clearer events, stronger unity, and more powerful tools. Together, these elements transformed Russia from a partner into a routinized, existential

threat in the EU's security discourse. What began as a fragmented reaction has become a sustained and institutionalized policy line, a defining feature of Europe's new security order and the clearest evidence of successful collective securitization in the European Union.



Funding

No funding information.

Conflict of interest statement

No conflict of interest was reported.

Data availability statement

No supplementary data associated with the article.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Professor Fabrizio Coticchia and Professor Stephan Fröhlich for their guidance and support throughout the development of this article. Any remaining errors are my own.



KHAYYAM RZAZADE is an MSCA PhD Research Fellow in Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Genoa (co-supervised at Sciences Po Paris), as part of the IDEoPOP project. His doctoral research examines the impact of populist actors on foreign and defense policy across European middle powers. He is also the founder and editor of PopuliVerse, an online hub for research, news, and commentary on populism. His research interests include populism, foreign policy analysis, public opinion on defense policy, EU external action, and securitization theory. He previously taught International Security at ADA University in Baku and holds master's degrees from the College of Europe in Bruges and Ca' Foscari University of Venice.

References

- Amante, A. (2023): Italy's Meloni Ready to Risk Unpopularity over Support for Ukraine. *Reuters*, 21 March, <accessed online: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-meloni-ready-risk-unpopularity-over-support-ukraine-2023-03-21/>>.
- Applebaum, A. (2024): *Autocracy, Inc: The Dictators Who Want to Run the World*. New York: Doubleday.

- Åslund, A. (2015): *Ukraine: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It*. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics Press.
- Balzacq, T. (2005): The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context. *European Journal of International Relations*, 11(2), 171–201.
- Balzacq, T. (ed.) (2010): *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*. London: Routledge.
- BBC (2014): EU Needs ‘Long-Term’ Russia Strategy, Says Donald Tusk. *BBC News*, 19 December, <accessed online: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30543050>>.
- Bigo, D. (2002): Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. *Alternatives*, 27(Supplement), 63–92.
- Blank, S. (ed.) (2012): *Perspectives on Russian Foreign Policy*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.
- Bond, I., Courtney, W., Haltzel, M. & Yalowitz, K. (2014): The Greatest Challenge to US–European Security Cooperation Today: The Ukraine Crisis. *RAND*, December, <accessed online: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2014/12/the-greatest-challenge-to-us-european-security-cooperation.html>>.
- Buzan, B. & Wæver, O. (2009): Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory. *Review of International Studies*, 35(2), 253–276.
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O. & de Wilde, J. (1998): *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Casier, T. (2018): EU–Russia Relations in Crisis: The Dynamics of a Breakup. In: Casier, T. & DeBardeleben, J. (eds.): *EU–Russia Relations in Crisis: Understanding Diverging Perceptions*. Abingdon: Routledge, 13–29.
- Caulcutt, C. (2022): Macron Defends Russia Dialogue and Slams ‘Mistaken Morality’. *POLITICO*, 1 September, <accessed online: <https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-defend-dialogue-russia-mistaken-morality/>>.
- Christou, G. (2019): The Collective Securitisation of Cyberspace in the European Union. *West European Politics*, 42(2), 278–301.
- Chupriyanova, P. & Timofeev, I. (2024): EU Sanctions Policy toward Russia after February 2022: Major Transformation Trends. *Contemporary World Economy*, 2(2), 43–59.
- Coffey, D. (2022): Macron Responds ‘Without Weakness’ to Russia’s ‘Act of War’. *RFI*, 24 February, <accessed online: <https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20220224-macron-responds-without-weakness-to-russia-s-act-of-war>>.
- Coticchia, F. & Davidson, J. W. (2019): *Italian Foreign Policy During Matteo Renzi’s Government*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Council of the EU (2014a): Foreign Affairs Council Meeting. *Council of the EU*, 3 March, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2014/03/03/>>.
- Council of the EU (2014b): Foreign Affairs Council Meeting. *Council of the EU*, 17 March, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2014/03/17/>>.

- Council of the EU (2022a): Declaration by the HR/VP on Russia's Actions Undermining Ukraine's Sovereignty. Press Release 144/22. *Council of the EU*, 22 February, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/22/ukraine-declaration-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-decisions-of-the-russian-federation-further-undermining-ukraine-s-sovereignty-and-territorial-integrity/pdf>>.
- Council of the EU (2022b): Remarks by President Michel after the Special European Council on Ukraine. Press Release 168/22. *Council of the EU*, 25 February, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/25/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-after-the-special-meeting-of-the-european-council-on-ukraine/pdf>>.
- Council of the EU (2022c): EU Imposes Sanctions against Putin and Lavrov. Press Release 176/22. *Council of the EU*, 25 February, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/25/russia-s-military-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-imposes-sanctions-against-president-putin-and-foreign-minister-lavrov-and-adopts-wide-ranging-individual-and-economic-sanctions/pdf>>.
- Council of the EU (2022d): EU Sanctions on RT/Russia Today and Sputnik. Press Release 207/22. *Council of the EU*, 2 March, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/02/eu-imposes-sanctions-on-state-owned-outlets-rt-russia-today-and-sputnik-s-broadcasting-in-the-eu/pdf>>.
- Council of the EU (2022e): A Strategic Compass for Stronger EU Security and Defence. Press Release 301/22. *Council of the EU*, 21 March, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/pdf>>.
- Council of the EU (2022f): A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. *Council of the EU*, 21 March, <accessed online: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7371-2022-INIT/en/pdf>>.
- Council of the EU (2022g): Declaration on Russia's War of Aggression against Ukraine. Press Release 780/22. *Council of the EU*, 22 September, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/09/22/declaration-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine/pdf>>.
- Council of the EU (2022h): Remarks by President Michel following the Prague Informal Summit. Press Release 827/22. *Council of the EU*, 7 October, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/10/07/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-following-the-informal-meeting-of-the-eu-heads-of-state-or-government-in-prague/pdf>>.
- Council of the EU (2023a): Statement by the Members of the European Council. Press Release 119/23. *Council of the EU*, 23 February, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/23/statement-by-the-members-of-the-european-council/pdf>>.

- Council of the EU (2023b): EU Adopts 10th Sanctions Package against Russia. Press Release 128/23. *Council of the EU*, 25 February, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/25/one-year-of-russia-s-full-scale-invasion-and-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-its-10th-package-of-economic-and-individual-sanctions/pdf>>.
- Council of the EU (2023c): Report by President Michel to the European Parliament. Speech 248/23. *Council of the EU*, 29 March, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/03/29/report-by-president-charles-michel-to-the-european-parliament-plenary-session/pdf>>.
- Croft, A. & Macdonald, A. (2015): EU Defies Russian 'Bully' but Disappoints Ex-Soviets. *Reuters*, 21 May, <accessed online: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-eu-idUSKBN062EL20150521>>.
- Delfi (2022): Nausėda: We Must Clearly Name Russia as Threat to Euro-Atlantic Area. *Delfi*, 15 June, <accessed online: <https://www.delfi.lt/en/politics/nauseda-we-must-clearly-name-russia-as-threat-to-entire-euro-atlantic-area-90347039>>.
- Dupont, C. (2019): The EU's Collective Securitisation of Climate Change. *West European Politics*, 42(2), 369–390.
- DW (2022): Scholz: Russia 'Again a Threat' to Europe. *DW*, 30 June, <accessed online: <https://www.dw.com/en/russia-again-a-threat-to-europe-germanys-scholz-says-at-nato-summit/a-62315172>>.
- Eder, F. & von der Burchard, H. (2015): Renzi Blocks Smooth Extension of Russia Sanctions. *POLITICO*, 10 December, <accessed online: <https://www.politico.eu/article/renzi-blocks-extension-russia-sanctions/>>.
- EEAS (2016): *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe—EU Global Strategy*. EEAS, June, <accessed online: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_o.pdf>.
- EEAS (2022): Russia's Aggression against Ukraine: Press Statement by HR/VP Borrell. EEAS, <accessed online: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/russias-aggression-against-ukraine-press-statement-high-representativevice-president-josep_en>.
- EEAS (2023a): Foreign Affairs Council: Press Remarks by HR/VP Borrell. EEAS, <accessed online: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-press-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-after-meeting-4_en>.
- EEAS (2023b): Statement by President von der Leyen on the 10th Sanctions Package. EEAS, <accessed online: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/statement-president-von-der-leyen-10th-package-sanctions-against-russia_en?s=232>.
- Élysée (2014): Statement on Ukraine. 20 March, <accessed online: <https://www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-13006-fr.pdf>>.
- Eroukhmanoff, C. (2018): Securitisation Theory: An Introduction. *E-International Relations*, 14 January, <accessed online: <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/01/14/securitisation-theory-an-introduction/>>.

- EU Neighbours East (2023): Borrell: EU Ready to Respond to Russian Nuclear Weapons in Belarus. *EU Neighbours East*, <accessed online: <https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/latest-news/borrell-eu-ready-to-respond-with-further-sanctions-to-russian-nuclear-weapons-deployment-in-belarus/>>.
- European Commission (2018): Action Plan against Disinformation. *European Commission*, 5 December, <accessed online: https://commission.europa.eu/publications/action-plan-disinformation-commission-contribution-european-council-13-14-december-2018_en>.
- European Commission (2024): Price Cap Coalition Statements and Guidance. *European Commission*, <accessed online: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/price-cap-coalition-statements-and-guidance_en>.
- European Council (2014a): Extraordinary European Council Meeting on Ukraine. *European Council*, 6 March, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2014/03/06/>>.
- European Council (2014b): Remarks by President Van Rompuy. Press Release Presse 123 PR PCE 48. *European Council*, 6 March, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/25819/141373.pdf>>.
- European Council (2014c): Statement of Heads of State or Government on Ukraine. *European Council*, 6 March, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/29285/141372.pdf>>.
- European Council (2014d): European Council Meeting. *European Council*, 20–21 March, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2014/03/20-21/>>.
- European Council (2014e): Statement by Presidents Van Rompuy and Barroso on Additional Restrictive Measures against Russia. *European Council*, 29 July, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/22015/144158.pdf>>.
- European Council (2022a): Versailles Declaration. *European Council*, 11 March, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54773/20220311-versailles-declaration-en.pdf>>.
- European Council (2022b): European Council Conclusions. EUCO 31/22. *European Council*, 20–21 October, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/59728/2022-10-2021-euco-conclusions-en.pdf>>.
- European Council (2023a): European Council Conclusions. EUCO 4/23. 23 March, <accessed online: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-4-2023-INIT/en/pdf>>.
- European Council (2023b): Timeline—EU Restrictive Measures against Russia over Ukraine. *European Council*, 13 April, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/history-restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/>>.
- European Council (2026): Russia's War against Ukraine: EU Sanctions. *European Council*, <accessed online: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/>>.
- European Parliament (2014): Joint Motion for a Resolution RC-B8-0118/2014/

- REVI. *European Parliament*, <accessed online: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-8-2014-0118_EN.html>.
- Fischer, S. (2019): *The Donbas Conflict: Opposing Interests and Narratives, Difficult Peace Process*. SWP Research Paper 5. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
- Forsberg, T. & Haukkala, H. (2016): *The European Union and Russia*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Forsberg, T. & Seppo, A. (2011): The Russo-Georgian War and EU Mediation. In: Kanet, R. E. (ed.): *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 121–137.
- Fubini, F. (2022): Sergey Karaganov: ‘We Are at War with the West’. *Corriere della Sera*, 8 April, <accessed online: https://www.corriere.it/economia/aziende/22_aprile_08/we-are-at-war-with-the-west-the-european-security-order-is-illegitimate-c6b9fa5a-b6b7-11ecb39d-8a197cc9b19a.shtml>.
- Galeotti, M. (2019): *We Need to Talk About Putin*. London: Ebury Press.
- German Federal Government (2022): Policy Statement by Chancellor Scholz. *German Federal Government*, 27 February, <accessed online: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/policy-statement-by-olaf-scholz-chancellor-of-the-federal-republic-of-germany-and-member-of-the-german-bundestag-27-february-2022-in-berlin-2008378>>.
- Gladun, A. (2019): Impact of Repression on Mobilization: The Euromaidan Protests in Ukraine. *Social Justice*, 46(2/3), 29–50.
- GOV.UK (2014): PM Statement on President Putin’s Actions on Crimea. <accessed online: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-statement-on-president-putins-actions-on-crimea>>.
- Gözkaman, A. (2024): Complementarity between the EU and NATO: An Analysis from the Perspective of Collective Securitization Theory. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 24(3), 469–495.
- Grant, T. D. (2015): Annexation of Crimea. *American Journal of International Law*, 109(1), 68–95.
- Haacke, J. & Williams, P. D. (2008): Regional Arrangements, Securitization, and Transnational Security Challenges. *Security Studies*, 17(4), 775–809.
- Haukkala, H. (2015): From Cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU–Russia Relations. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 23(1), 25–40.
- Herman, L. & Wachs, J. (2014): Hungary’s Reaction to the Ukraine Crisis and Fidesz’s Foreign Policy Discourse. *EUROPP*, 20 March, <accessed online: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2014/03/20/hungarys-reaction-to-the-ukraine-crisis-illustrates-the-tensions-within-fideszs-foreign-policy-discourse-ahead-of-aprils-elections/>>.
- Hofmann, S. C. & Staeger, U. (2019): Frame Contestation and Collective Securitisation: The Case of EU Energy Policy. *West European Politics*, 42(2), 323–345.
- Hungary Today (2022): PM Orbán Condemns Russia’s Military Attack. *Hungary Today*, 24 February, <accessed online: <https://hungarytoday.hu/orban-russia-attack-condemns-aggression/>>.

- Hyndle-Hussein, J. (2015): The Baltic States on the Conflict in Ukraine. OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, 23 January, <accessed online: <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-01-23/baltic-states-conflict-ukraine>>.
- Hyttinen, T. & Heinikoski, S. (2019): Justification of Supranational Criminal Law: Collective Securitization and EU Money Laundering Provisions. *Maas-tricht Journal of European and Comparative Law*, 26(6), 815–832.
- Jacobs, A. & Kabata, M. (2023): The ‘Migrant Other’ as a Security Threat and the EU Relocation Scheme. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 31(4), 1223–1239.
- Javadi, M. (2023): The European Union as a Global Counter-Terrorism Actor (Book Review). *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 31(3), 1043–1045.
- Johnson, D. & Robinson, P. (eds.) (2005): *Perspectives on EU–Russia Relations*. London: Routledge.
- Karakatsani, E. (2022): The Greek Response to the War in Ukraine. China-CEE Institute Weekly Briefing 48(4). *China-CEE Institute*, August, <accessed online: https://china-cee.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/2022ero2_Greece.pdf>.
- Karatnycky, A. (2005): Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. *Foreign Affairs*, 84(2).
- Karis, A. (2022): Karis: Defending Peace in Europe Is Our Fight for Freedom. *ERR*, 23 June, <accessed online: <https://news.err.ee/1608638392/karis-defending-peace-in-europe-is-our-fight-for-freedom>>.
- Kayleigh, R. L. (2014): Ashton Responds to ‘Illegal’ Crimea Referendum. *The Parliament Magazine*, 18 March, <accessed online: <https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/ashton-responds-to-illegal-crimea-referendum>>.
- Konończuk, W. (2014): Russia’s Real Aims in Crimea. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 13 March, <accessed online: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/13/russia-s-real-aims-in-crimea-pub-54914>>.
- Korkea-aho, E. & Lonardo, L. (2025): How Russia’s War against Ukraine Changed EU Sanctions Decision-Making. *Journal of European Integration*, 1–22.
- Koval, N. & Vachudova, M. A. (2024): EU Enlargement and Geopolitical Power in the Face of War. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 62(S1), 135–146.
- Krutaine, A. & Sytas, A. (2014): ‘We Told You So’—Baltic Jitters Grow over Former Ruler Russia. *Reuters*, 1 September, <accessed online: <https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-baltics-idINKBNoGW2JB20140901>>.
- Kubicek, P. (2009): Problems of Post-Post-Communism: Ukraine after the Orange Revolution. *Democratization*, 16(2), 323–343.
- Kuzio, T. (2023a): Imperial Nationalism as the Driver behind Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. *Nations and Nationalism*, 29(1), 30–38.
- Kuzio, T. (2023b): Poland and Ukraine: The Emerging Alliance That Could Reshape Europe. *Atlantic Council*, 12 April, <accessed online: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/poland-and-ukraine-the-emerging-alliance-that-could-reshape-europe/>>.

- Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2010): Reconceptualizing the Audience in Securitization Theory. In: Balzacq, T. (ed.): *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*. London: Routledge, 57–76.
- Léonard, S. & Kaunert, C. (2019): *Refugees, Security and the European Union*. London: Routledge.
- Light, M. (2008): Russia and the EU: Strategic Partners or Strategic Rivals? *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 46, 7–27.
- Lo, B. (2015): *Russia and the New World Disorder*. London: Chatham House/Brookings Institution Press.
- Lucarelli, S., Sperling, J. & Webber, M. (eds.) (2020): *Collective Securitisation and Security Governance in the European Union*. London: Routledge.
- Marples, D. R. (ed.) (2022): *The War in Ukraine's Donbas: Origins, Contexts, and the Future*. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Marson, J. (2015): Italy's Prime Minister Renzi Meets Putin in Moscow. *Wall Street Journal*, 5 March, <accessed online: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/italys-prime-minister-renzi-meets-putin-in-moscow-1425576848>>.
- McDonald, M. (2008): Securitization and the Construction of Security. *European Journal of International Relations*, 14(4), 563–587.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014): Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault. *Foreign Affairs*, 93(5), 77–89.
- Meister, S. (2022): A Paradigm Shift: EU–Russia Relations after the War in Ukraine. *Carnegie Europe*, 29 November, <accessed online: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/11/29/paradigm-shift-eu-russia-relations-after-war-in-ukraine-pub-88476>>.
- Menon, R. & Rumer, E. (2016): *Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Morsut, C. & Rhinard, M. (2025): The Collective Securitisation of Climate Change: Implications for the UN and EU. *Review of International Studies*, 1–26.
- Müllerson, R. (2014): Ukraine: Victim of Geopolitics. *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 13(1), 133–145.
- Muttreja, I. & Blumenau, B. (2022): How Russia's Invasion Changed German Foreign Policy. *Chatham House*, November, <accessed online: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/11/how-russias-invasion-changed-german-foreign-policy>>.
- Osborn, A. & James, W. (2014): NATO Must Change to Better Repel Russian Threat—Cameron. *Reuters*, 1 August, <accessed online: <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ukraine-crisis-nato-cameron-idUKKBN0G156420140801>>.
- Patrushev, N. (2014): Ukraine Crisis—The View from Russia. *The Guardian*, 24 October, <accessed online: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/24/sp-ukraine-russia-cold-war>>.
- Pingen, A. (2023): European Council Confirms Unity against Russia. *EUCRIM*, 8 February, <accessed online: <https://eucrim.eu/news/european-council-confirms-unity-against-russia/>>.

- Putin, V. (2007): Speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. *Kremlin*, 10 February, <accessed online: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>>.
- Renz, B. (2024): Western Estimates of Russian Military Capabilities and the Invasion of Ukraine. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 71(3), 219–231.
- Rumer, E. (2016): *Russia and the Security of Europe*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <accessed online: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_276_Rumer_Russia_Final.pdf>.
- Sabet-Parry, R. (2014): Lithuania President Calls Russia ‘Terrorist State’. *Baltic Times*, 20 November, <accessed online: <https://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/35799/>>.
- Sakwa, R. (2015): The Death of Europe? Continental Fates after Ukraine. *International Affairs*, 91(3), 553–579.
- Schmidt, A. & Glied, V. (2024): Pragmatic Foreign Policy of Hungary in the Shadow of the Russian-Ukrainian War. *Eastern Journal of European Studies*, 15(S1), 247–267.
- Sergunin, A. (2011): *The EU–Russia Common Space on External Security: Prospects for Cooperation*. Nizhny Novgorod: Nizhny Novgorod State Linguistic University Press.
- Shepherd, A. J. K. (2021): EU Counterterrorism, Collective Securitization, and the Internal-External Security Nexus. *Global Affairs*, 7(5), 733–749.
- Siddi, M. (2025): From Middle Power to Subordinate Ally? Meloni’s Foreign Policy after the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War. *Contemporary Italian Politics*, 1–15.
- Siddi, M. & Kustova, I. (2021): From a Liberal to a Strategic Actor: The EU’s Approach to International Energy Governance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 28(7), 1076–1094.
- Sjursen, H. (2006): What Kind of Power? *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2), 169–181.
- Smith, H. (2014): Greek Farmers Hit Hard by Russian Sanctions against EU Produce. *The Guardian*, 13 August, <accessed online: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/13/greece-farmers-russian-sanctions-rotten-fruit>>.
- Solvang, O. (2014): Russia Must Recognize Ukraine Rebels’ Human Rights Abuses. *The Moscow Times*, 6 August, <accessed online: <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2014/08/06/russia-must-recognize-ukraine-rebels-human-rights-abuses-a38043>>.
- Sperling, J. & Webber, M. (2017): NATO and the Ukraine Crisis: Collective Securitisation. *European Journal of International Security*, 2(1), 19–46.
- Sperling, J. & Webber, M. (2019): The European Union: Security Governance and Collective Securitisation. *West European Politics*, 42(2), 228–260.
- Stamouli, N. (2022): Greece Tossed Aside Years of Caution in Ukraine. *POLITICO*, 23 March, <accessed online: <https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-greece-year-caution-weapon-invasion-military/>>.
- Stritzel, H. (2007): Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond. *European Journal of International Relations*, 13(3), 357–383.

- Sus, M. (2025): Status-Seeking in Wartime: Poland's Leadership Aspirations and the Response to Russia's Invasion. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*.
- Sydorenko, S. (2023): 'No Reason to Be Positive about Russia, a Threat for Generations': Interview with Latvia's Prime Minister. *European Pravda*, 20 March, <accessed online: <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/interview/2023/03/20/7158322/>>.
- Szép, V. & Chawla, K. (2023): The EU's 2022 Sanctions against Russia: External Shocks Altering EU Restrictive Measure Practices? *Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and European Law*, 11(1), 196–211.
- Toal, G., O'Loughlin, J. & Bakke, K. M. (2020): Six Years and \$20 Billion in Russian Investment Later, Crimeans Are Happy with Russian Annexation. *Washington Post*, 18 March, <accessed online: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/18/six-years-20-billion-russian-investment-later-crimeans-are-happy-with-russian-annexation/>>.
- Tocci, N. (2021): *European Strategic Autonomy: What It Is, Why We Need It, How to Achieve It*. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali.
- Tolstykh, V. (2014): Reunification of Crimea with Russia: A Russian Perspective. *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 13(4), 879–886.
- Trebesch, C., Antezza, A., Bushnell, K., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Kharitonov, I., Kumar, B., Rebinskaya, E. & Schramm, S. (2026): *Ukraine Support Tracker, 30th Release*. Kiel: Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- Trenin, D. (2013): The End of an Era in EU–Russia Relations. *Carnegie Moscow Center*, May, <accessed online: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/new_era_russia_eu.pdf>.
- Trenin, D. (2022): Mapping Russia's New Approach to the Post-Soviet Space. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, <accessed online: <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/86438>>.
- Weymouth, L. (2017): 'Russia Is a Threat to All of Europe'. *Foreign Policy*, 24 March, <accessed online: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/24/russia-lithuania-nato-grybauskaite-putin-trump-interview/>>.