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EDITOR'S POLICY ANALYSIS: COUNTERING IRAN

MITCHELL A. BELFER

The victims of the latest Israel-Gaza flare-up have, by now, been buried, the wounded treated and the damage taken stock of. The consequences of the conflict are being dealt with. It is time to address the causes. There is a bigger picture, Gaza, like so many others, was an outcome of an irresponsible Iran.

The Islamic Republic is destabilising the Middle East. Gaza, Syria, an insurgency in Bahrain, war of attrition in Yemen, dysfunction in Sudan, Lebanon and Iraq, all reek of Iranian interference. Certainly, Iran is not the only destabilising (f)actor; the region is replete with competing groups, states, and contrasting ideological movements. But it is the largest, and owing to its pseudo-colonial 'Twelver' ideology, its nuclear ambitions, irresponsible threats and its use of force – internally and externally – it must be seen as a regional, if not international, threat.

Few however, seem willing to expose Iran as the culprit of recent turbulence; it is treated as a public secret. So enraptured is the international community with the rhetorical games Iran plays with Israel and its nuclearisation that its more clandestine and destructive policies slip beneath the radar.

Take Sudan, Iran's arms trafficking hub: weapons enter Port Sudan and slither their way north through Egypt to Gaza, West to the Maghreb, or remain in Sudan. Iran is also engaged in Shia missionary activities to convert – for money – the local population, while cosyng-up to Omar al Bashir, the architect of the Darfur genocide. And of Syria, Iran's deployment of Hezbollah fighters, al Quds advisors and untold amounts of money and weapons to ensure that Assad's fall from power is long and bloody. On Bahrain too; many sit silently as Iran consolidates its power on the Island, as it trains Hezbollah and the so-called Sacred Defence the tactics of asymmetrical warfare; the dark arts of killing civilians by bomb in a clear escalation.

Why are Iranian fingers spoiling so many pies? Its superiority complex, coupled with its colonial ideology, drive it to attempt to

rise as a regional superpower. Yet, despite its power quest, Iran is not revisionist; it defends an untenable status quo. It does not want regional change, it is afraid of it. It anticipates that change will – if unchecked – knock on its own door.

If Israel and Hamas sue for peace, if the Assad regime is toppled and Lebanon maintains its stability, if Bahrain's reforms end recent conflagrations, Iranian regional power will be sapped and its ability of deflecting public opinion from its mounting domestic problems will be tempered. Iranians are weary of having to endure yet another year of economic hardships, of a valueless currency, of enormous taxation on petrol, of a lack of political liberty. So, Ahmadinejad, the Ayatollahs, Basij militia, al Quds, Revolutionary Guards are clutching at straws. They want to keep the region festering so they can stay politically aloft. They need to keep the region aggressive so they can imprison their critics at home.

*Policy
Analysis*

Over the past months, there were indications that Hamas and Israel were approaching a permanent truce. Gershon Baskin, a key negotiator in the prisoner swap that freed Shalit, had – reportedly – been given a completed draft agreement just hours before the latest conflict erupted. Why then did battle ensue?

Hamas' 2011/2012 evacuation from Damascus – citing the regime's murder of civilians – and Iran's unabashed reinforcement of Assad, exposed an ideological tension, resulting in the former's severing of its \$20 million a month support to Hamas.

Hamas responded by dissolving three paramilitary units, which were directed by Tehran and established a new, more unified command, the al Aqsa Protectors, based out of Gaza's Interior Ministry.

Iran was not about to lose its Israel pressure point and instead of taking that \$20 million-per-month and reinvesting it in its own national economy, it decided to divert its funding to the enemies of Hamas and Israel, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).

It is they who launched an attack against an Israeli armoured personnel carrier, wounding four, which initiated this latest episode of violence. PIJ fired the first dozen rockets into Israel and Israel escalated. Unwilling to distinguish between groups Israel punished Hamas, assassinated Akhmed al Jabari, Chief of Gaza's Security Wing of Hamas, and hit some 25 targets of opportunity. The war

was on. PIJ slipped into the background while Israel and Hamas fought.

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Such nuances are lost in the press. Spectators saw Iranian rockets soaring to Israeli targets and assumed a continued Iran-Hamas relationship. Sure, Hamas deployed Iranian built Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets. But, that was what was available; they were delivered before the Hamas-Iran split. The idea that the origin of weapons used indicates political affiliation is simply misleading. Consider that the second most prevalent rockets – and the ones which caused the most damage to Israel – were Russian made Grads. If the weapons origins argument were accurate then Russia was also supportive of the Hamas campaign. It, of course, wasn't.

No, the rockets that Hamas held in its stocks came from 2009/2010, and although Israel's interdiction of the M/V *Francop*, which contained an Iranian consignment of some 11,000 rockets and mortars was a major blow to the Islamic Republic's arms trafficking, it was reported that two similar-sized vessels successfully landed in Port Sudan in December that same year and four others during 2010.

In the heat of the Hamas-Israel conflict (21 November), French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius noted that 'Iran bears a heavy responsibility for the unrest in Gaza ... since there are long-range weapons ... and these are Iranian weapons.' What Fabius failed to point out however, is that it is not the weapons that hoist the burden of responsibility onto Iran's shoulders, it is the Islamic Republic's obvious abuse of Palestine and its sacrifice of Palestinian lives for selfish political goals.

But the Gaza violence was a side show, a sheath to conceal a more pressing issue. Syria.

More than 40,000 casualties and no end in sight. Syria's civil war has been prolonged by enormous financial, military and political support from Iran and its Hezbollah proxies. The al Quds Force has assumed control of Syria's security apparatuses and Hezbollah is waging a counter-guerrilla war because Iran cannot allow the Assad's regime to collapse; it has invested too many political energies. The victory of the opposition will undermine Iran's geopolitical position, fracture its lines of communication with Hezbollah, reduce its ability to pressure Israel, lose a vital link in its 'Shia Crescent' – Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon – diminish its ability to out-flank its true

targets: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman, and deny it projection into the Mediterranean.

This is why Iran is hedging its bets and mounting pressure onto Bahrain, territorially and population-wise, the smallest and most vulnerable Arabian Gulf state. Not only is Bahrain's opposition on Iran's payroll, but its leaders Salman and al Hashimi take their orders from the Grand Ayatollah; orders that concern when and where to 'demonstrate,' the level of sociopathic behaviour such 'demonstrators' should practise – tame or riotous – and, importantly, when to escalate to clandestine paramilitary operations such as the multiple-bomb attacks in early November.

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Iran is also calling-up its old partners for producing Bahraini instability, the Military Wing of Hezbollah Bahrain (MWHB) and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB), and is supporting the rise of new, more entrepreneurial saboteurs such as Sacred Defence, in conducting bomb, arson and small arms attacks against civilians, police and civil authorities

Iran is responsible for an assortment of regional convulsions. Just how many people have to die to satisfy its superpower lusts, is uncertain. What is certain is that far too much blood has already been spilt and it is time to confront the Islamic Republic before its influence is too great; reinforced by nuclear weapons. If the road to peace in Jerusalem, Damascus and Manama runs through Tehran, it cannot be the road less travelled.

In Washington, Obama's re-election campaign froze the administration's foreign affairs while the clouds of regional conflict gathered. Now, the US is rapidly losing its regional credibility and has yet to develop a strategic awareness to, finally, constrain Iran.

Here is a 5-point proposal for doing just that:

First, empower Turkey. This means cutting the red tape and bolstering Turkey's land, sea and air defences. If NATO drags its feet, go around it. Turkey needs to be ready to balance against Iran.

Second, using an empowered Turkey, fully arm Syrian rebels and facilitate the liberation of Syria, even if this entails a Turkish invasion of northern parts of the country and a likely set of skirmishes with Iranian forces.

Third, comprehensively act to politically, economically and militarily isolate Hezbollah, not only Hezbollah in Lebanon, the entire

organisation. They are a proxy of Iran and follow Iranian doctrines. They have been deployed to suppress Iranian dissidents in 2009, organised violence in Bahrain and are a vital element in Assad's arsenal.

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Fourth, fully engage and empower Hamas at the expense of PIJ though work to establish a functioning national dialogue between the PLO and Hamas. Hamas needs to be removed from terror lists and channels of communication with it established. This should also involve forcing Israel, Hamas and the PLO to sit down and negotiate a final settlement. There are bigger issues at stake; Israel and Palestine need to be made aware of them.

Finally, Bahrain must be protected from Iran. For too long Bahrain's allies were content on allowing the small Kingdom to bear the brunt of Iranian aggression. Now however, the stakes are too great and the pressure too pronounced for the US to sit on the sidelines of Arabian history.

Mitchell A. Belfer
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RESEARCH ARTICLES
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NOTES

THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

LAZ ETEMIKE

ABSTRACT: Since the explosion of the first atomic weapon the international system has been saddled with perceived threats to national security based around weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This is best seen through the spate of interest by countries to develop nuclear weapons. Hence, nuclear deterrence dominated the cold war calculus of international security. Even with the nuclear states the perception of safety in a nuclear world is illusory. A series of attempts have been made at arms control and disarmament. Most notable is the effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons centred on the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The effort by the US and its allies to stop the Tehran and Pyongyang programmes have once again brought to the fore the moral question associated to the NPT which itself rests on the claim of a nuclear monopoly by the existing nuclear states, or what the Malaysian delegate's (to the original NPT meeting) term, 'justifying nuclear states for eternity.' Meanwhile, while the US and Russia have taken incremental steps toward disarmament they were accompanied by measures to retain nuclear options. Despite the changed political climate of the post-cold war nuclear weapon states (NWS) still believe in the integrity of nuclear deterrence. This has questioned the credibility of the nuclear states to press others to drop their nuclear ambitions. There must be a genuine desire on their part to pursue disarmament. This work concludes that, amongst others, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty displays, in no uncertain terms, hypocrisy in international politics.

KEYWORDS: Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament

INTRODUCTION

Mingst once observed that amongst the numerous issues engaging the actors in international relations, those with a clear security dimension are the most 'salient, the most prevalent, and indeed the most intractable.'¹ Consequently, security dilemmas proliferate and

lead to permanent conditions of tension and conflict among states. And, increases in weapon potency results in heightened dangers to regional and international stability.

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Technologies produced in WWII, leading to the construction of atomic weapons with a destructive force immeasurably more potent than anything previously fielded and the security dilemma followed suit, has transformed international relations. The consequences of a nuclear armed conflict will be devastating. Throughout the Cold War a stable, though still dangerous balance of power was maintained between the US and USSR. The end of that chapter of international relations has produced a more ill-defined period where thousands of nuclear weapons have heightened the risk of nuclear war. The US and Russia have about 2000 warheads while the UK, France, China, Pakistan and India retain smaller capabilities. These have been joined by North Korea (DPRK) in 2006, Israel follows a policy of nuclear ambiguity and Iran is in hot pursuit of such weapons. This is just the tip of the iceberg as a variety of others seek, or have sought, nuclear forces to deter aggression in an period of international relations history defined, in part, by a new wave of proliferation.

Despite the constant reiteration by the nuclear powers of non-first use, it is naive to accept such assurances at face value. Indeed, historical records show that nuclear powers have, at times, seriously considered deploying such weapons, even aggressively.² Therefore, proper nuclear management – extended to other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – and transparency is required to alleviate tensions which could have dire consequences for the entire world since the most advanced weapons are able to deliver a ‘pay-load’ some 50 times greater than those deployed against Japan in 1945.³ And, it is not only the weapons themselves which require regulation, it is all the components that allow for weapons to be deployed world-wide; notably missile systems.

While developing a theoretical lens to explain nuclear proliferation and disarmament is certainly an important task as existing approaches tend to offer on snapshots of both problems and potential solutions, and therefore must be blended, twisted and reshaped if sense it to be made of counter-proliferation strategies. This work, while encouraging others to delve into such theoretical reconstruction efforts, does not further pursue a strictly theoretical solution.

Instead this work deploys a historical contextualisation to glean lessons for decision-makers and publics so that nuclear weapons remain weapons of last choice and are eventually eradicated altogether from the arsenals of the great and aspiring powers. To gain such insights this work proceeds as follows. First, it considers the proliferation of WMD to demonstrate a singular – but erroneous – strand of logic which has been weaved through the international community since 1945 and maintains that nuclear weapons are responsible for the long peace between the proverbial East and West during the Cold War. Secondly, this work turns to counter-proliferation and disarmament efforts in a bid to disclose some of the positive contributions that have been made as well as the limited successes such programmes have produced. This includes the idea of Declaratory Policy which underpins the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). Thirdly, an assessment of the US's relations to the NPT is undertaken vis-à-vis an investigation of changes to the US's strategic orientation towards WMD (2010). This section concludes with a brief depiction of the START Treaty II (Prague Summit). Fourthly, this work explores some of the obstructions to building a working consensus on the need for international disarmament of WMD. This work concludes by outlining steps forward; those policies that may be adopted to render nuclear weapons politically obsolete on an international basis.

*Laz
Etemike*

THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A SHORT HISTORY

The US, essentially, opened the gateway to advanced WMD. Not for lack of trying, the Nazis and Soviets lost the initial WMD arms race to the US whose Manhattan Project produced the atomic weapons which were deployed against Hiroshima and Nagasaki that helped end WWII in 1945. With the war over, the Nazis defeated, and the US and USSR in a Cold War, the Soviets were able to, essentially, catch-up and by 1948 had successfully tested its first atomic weapon. The UK was next in October 1952 followed by France (1960) and communist China (1964). India (1974) and Pakistan (1978) also demonstrated their domestic nuclear capabilities though neither state was considered a full-fledged nuclear power until their tit-for-tat tests in 1998. It is also noteworthy that Israel, South Afri-

ca, Indonesia, Brazil and Argentina (among others) had nuclear ambitions and advanced programmes during the Cold War. It seems, though remains unverified, that only Israel was able to successfully acquire nuclear capabilities.

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With the breakup of the USSR, a short – but dangerous – spike in proliferation occurred since, in addition to Russia, three former Soviet republics: Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, had Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on their territory. The UN, with the assistance of the US and Russia, were charged with decommissioning such weapons, marking the only time in history when country's with nuclear weapons voluntarily ceded them to international authorities for decommission. The latest member of the so-called 'nuclear club' is North Korea (DPRK) which, in 2006, successfully conducted a nuclear test.

With only nine declared or suspected nuclear powers in the world, disarmament and arms control seems wholly possible, yet it remains an elusive goal, one where the elusiveness is not mysterious but rather the opposite; states continue to conceive of the international politics as a game of brinkmanship governed by unpredictable security dilemmas. Ownership of nuclear weapons is meant to insulate states of external interference and to guarantee survivability. While this is certainly an archaic way to understand international relations, it continues to dominate many circles and thus many states continue to seek their own weapons or alliances with nuclear armed members.

Others, particularly in the US and EU, are working to illuminate nuclear weapons altogether though are forced to maintain small arsenals due to perpetual fear of abandonment – of such a non-nuclear regime – by the others. At the outset of his first term in office, and given his 'reset' with Russia, Obama (Prague, 2009) highlighted that thousands of nuclear weapons are still in service. Indeed, Obama foresaw a diminishing threat of sustained, interstate conventional wars while risks of nuclear conflict are steadily rising; points which reflect his overall worldview that true peace and security can only be achieved in a world without nuclear weapons. This is an especially important issue given the repeated attempts by al Qaeda – among other terrorist groups – to acquire nuclear weapons or some cocktail of depleted uranium or plutonium and more conventional explosives to develop a 'dirty bomb.'

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

Given the above rendition of nuclear proliferation, and considering the importance attached to issues pertaining to nuclear weapons by states and civil societies, it is essential to examine some efforts at non-proliferation and disarmament; the focus of this section.

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Proliferation*

Churchill once declared that peace is the child of potential nuclear terror; that the threat of such a devastating conflict is enough to dissuade a potential aggressor from initiating hostilities against any state, or alliance of a state, that retains nuclear deterrent capabilities. Those who believe in nuclear deterrence, typically assume that such weapons should be controlled by a small number of responsible major powers.⁵ This theory therefore presupposes nuclear monopoly, a point which underscores early non-proliferation logic and reflects the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the international community's most powerful chamber.

Efforts promoting nuclear non-proliferation after WWII began with the Truman Administration's adoption of the so-called Baruchi Plan (1946),⁶ which drew heavily on the Acheson-Lilienthal report (1946) and proposed verifiable disarmament and the eventual destruction of the US nuclear arsenal; the only nuclear arsenal at that time. It was thought, naively, that doing so would reduce international tensions. Unilateral disarmament was not possible however since the USSR was steadily closing the technological gap and would soon have WMD of its own. Hence, the Baruchi Plan was abandoned. Instead, when Eisenhower assumed office, he devised the so-called 'Atoms for Peace' (1953) programme to bring a degree of international transparency to the atomic technology race and, perhaps, lead to a general system of safeguards. While 'Atoms for Peace' was succeeded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (1957) it was not until 1960 that an honest effort to reach international agreement over limiting nuclear proliferation was reached. By then the USSR, France and the UK had acquired nuclear weapons. Still, there was no agreement. The international community had to wait an additional eight tense years (1968) until the nuclear armed states agreed to halt proliferation, a consensus enshrined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which entered into

force in March 1970.

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Kokoski argued that the NPT created a framework for controlling the spread of nuclear materials and expertise.⁷ Indeed, the signatories pledged to avoid taking any action(s) that would add to the number of countries with nuclear weapons.⁸ The treaty invariably presupposed that while the non-nuclear weapon states party to the treaty are not to manufacture or receive nuclear weapons, or any other nuclear explosive devices, the existing nuclear weapon states (NWS) are not required by the treaty to give up nuclear weapons but rather to negotiate in good faith. For the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) there was no room for negotiation. Consequently, the treaty established two classes of states: NWS and NNWS. The nuclear weapon states are those that had conducted nuclear tests before 01 January 1967.

The NPT may be broken down into three pillars; non-proliferation, disarmament and the right to peaceful use of nuclear technology. The articles of the treaty, arguably, impose only a vague obligation that all signatories move in the direction of nuclear disarmament which was to occur under strict and effective international controls. Unfortunately, the articles do not determine a time-frame for signatories to actually conclude a disarmament treaty; they were only obliged to negotiate in good faith.

The sixth NPT Review Conference (20 May 2000), the first since the treaty was indefinitely extended in 1995, adopted an important agreement on the practical steps for nuclear disarmament. This was the climax of the disarmament between the NWS and a key group of “New Agenda” NNWS over the fulfilment of disarmament obligations, for which previous conferences since 1985 were unable to reach consensus. The nuclear powers had pledged the unequivocal desire to completely eliminate their nuclear arsenals. The conference raised some concerns that the NWS had not taken disarmament seriously enough, noting that progress had stalled since the end of the Cold War while the NNWS indentified certain steps that should be taken. NWS should:

1. unilaterally disarm,
2. provide more information on their nuclear capability and the implementation of disarmament agreements,
3. reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons,
4. take concrete measures to further reduce the operational

status of nuclear weapons system

5. involve all five nuclear powers 'as soon as appropriate' in nuclear reduction and disarmament negotiations.⁹

For some observers, the 'as soon as appropriate' was seen as watering-down the basic aims of the steps, despite that they were intended to be carried out within 5 years.

*Laz
Etemiike*

NPT is only one of several treaties designed as confidence building measures (CBM) to create a transparent atmosphere for nuclear dialogue. Even with its limited objectives, NPT was, and remains, a cornerstone of nuclear limitations. Yet, since the 1970s, efforts at actual arms control – particularly between the US and the USSR produced few or no results. Among these efforts was the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I (1972) and SALT II (1979). Others include: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) (1987), the Missile Technology Control (MTCR) (1987), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I (1991) and START II (1993) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (1996). Remarkably, Russia did not ratify START II while the US under Bush withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) (1972) in order to pursue the development and deployment of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) systems. The US senate, for its part, refused to ratify the resulting CTBT (1999).

Declaratory Policy

Returning to the basis of nuclear management based on the NPT regime, declaratory policy is part of the bargain which originally underpinned the treaty. The purpose of the declaratory policy is deterrence. For this reason declaratory policy of the use of nuclear weapons has been a contentious issue in deterrence and disarmament discourses. Declaratory policy is, essentially, an official policy statement on the exact circumstances a nuclear weapon might or might not be used. Declaratory policies are central CBMs.¹⁰

The declaratory policy attempts to reconcile disarmament and deterrence since it represents an effort to devalue and delegitimise nuclear weapons to move towards a world in which nuclear weapons have less of a role in international politics. In other words, by creating transparency over nuclear strategies – and supposing that

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NWS were not being deceitful – and, as the case was and remains, relegating such weapons to a defensive posture, the NWS actually lead-by-example and indicate that developing, storing and maintaining nuclear weapons is expensive and, largely, inappropriate. And, under such a declaratory policy, the NNWS were given negative assurances: reassurance that their decision to forgo the nuclear options would not leave them exposed to nuclear coercion.¹¹ Nearly all nuclear deterrence strategies were accompanied by attempts at reassurance and arms control; to reassure NNWS, prevent arms races, improve crisis stability, and reduce costs.

Unfortunately, Obama's declaratory policies as developed under the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) only explain the US's vision of disarmament. They try to balance disarmament and deterrence but do not reassure NNWS and the NPR – the latest declaratory policy – explains identifies and then justifies the US's contradictory position on disarmament and deterrence. In short, US policy regarding its nuclear posture is ambiguous and ambiguity over such an important issue causes undue anxiety in both NNWS and the other NWS. Therefore, it is important to single out the NPR (2010) and assess its international impact.

THE US AND THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW (NPR) 2010

The NPR 2010 document presented the US's position on nuclear weapons and deterrence. The document reflected the Obama Administration's sentiment of building a world without WMD by reducing their strategic role. The document listed three conclusions. Firstly, that the US would continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the US or its allies and partners the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons. Secondly, the US would only contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend its critical interests or its allies and partners. And, finally, that the US would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear proliferation obligation.¹²

Assessing the document, Warren notes that the actual reduction in the US's nuclear mission was rather moderate and it was 'difficult to see truly any shift in US nuclear planning.' He observed that Obama's NPR appeared to continue nuclear planning against regional adversaries with WMD.¹³ In short, the declaratory policy embedded in the NPR should be seen as justifying the continuation of previous administration's nuclear strategies rather than reassuring other NWS and NNWS alike.

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The NNSA was more forthcoming on US plans. It reported US plans to evolve and sustain its nuclear deterrent. The NNSA had planned to spend some \$175 billion (USD) over the next two decades building new nuclear weapons factories, testing and simulating facilities, and modernising and extending the lives of the present nuclear stockpile. Obama's Administration plans to stockpile, maintain and modernise US nuclear weapons despite its commitment to nuclear disarmament. This position contrasts sharply with Obama's 2009 Prague speech based on creating a world free of nuclear weapons.

One area where the US is consistent is in regards to the NPT, and it took further steps at reinforcing that treaty during the NPT Review Conference in 2010.

NPT Review Conference 2010

The NPT Review Conference (NPTRC) was called for by the US to discuss challenges facing the treaty. The conference considered nuclear disarmament, including specific practical measures such as: nuclear non-proliferation; the promotion and strengthening of safeguards; regional disarmament and non-proliferation; measures to address withdrawal from the treaty and measures to further strengthen the review process.¹⁴ The conference was a significant test of how it would meet unfolding challenges.

The conference final document reviewed commitments and produced an action plan for nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Many analysts are of the opinion that the language of the concluding document on its action plan was watered down compared with previous versions, leaving it up to the next review, in 2015, to determine how far these steps will take the international community towards ful-

filling NPT goals.¹⁵

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The 2010 Review document was seen as forward-thinking and balanced. Praise was heaped on the US and others for steps taken to advance nuclear disarmament. The conference also encouraged the early entry into force of the CTBT and the urgent need to get on with long-delayed talks on the fissile material cut-off treaty. For some, the conference strengthened a non-proliferation regime, while others saw the achievements of the conference as modest. Since then no achievement has been recorded. Yet the NPT has managed through some difficult times and it speaks to its wide-acceptance that few states have joined the NWS since the treaty's inception back in 1968. Other treaties have not fared nearly as well.

The New START Treaty

START II has not yet fulfilled its intentions. The treaty includes detailed definitions and counting rules that both the US and Russia should utilise to identify the forces limited by the treaty. Both parties were expected to maintain a comprehensive database, indicating the locations, members and technical characteristics of weapons limited by the treaty. While there were some positives in START II, there were also many negatives in terms of limits versus reduction.

On the bright side, for instance, the new limit of 1550 deployed strategic warheads was 74% lower than the 6000 warhead limit of the 1991 START Treaty, and 30% lower than the 2200 deployed strategic warhead limit of the 2002 Moscow Treaty.¹⁶ Alternatively, START II, while limiting the number of deployable warheads, it fell silent on the actual number of warheads in their arsenal. In other words, START limited the amount of deployed nuclear weapons, not the amount of weapons in total. Additionally, the treaty makes no mention of how the limits would be achieved and verified.

For all its successes and shortcomings START II has been polarising. Yet of all the critics of the treaty, none are more vocal than the US Senate, which has been deploying every filibuster in an attempt to stall its ratification indefinitely. In fact, some republican senators rehashed Cold War arguments to delay or defeat the pact, suggesting that the treaty will limit US efforts to build missile defences pointing to the provision in the treaty that bars the use of

missiles interceptors. The senators accuse Obama's Administration of not doing enough to modernise the US's nuclear forces. Not everyone agrees and a Senior White House Official argued that the US came away (from the START II negotiations) a clean winner. Why a 'winner?' Because the US retains its nuclear deterrent and has found a way to redeploy its nuclear weapons without decommissioning them. Like Russia, the US is unwilling to disarm rendering START II moot.

*Laz
Etemike*

BARRIERS TO NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION AND DISARMAMENT

Rourke rightly observed that security concerns constitute the most formidable barrier to arms control and nuclear non-proliferation and suggested that the anxiety during the Cold War spawned a huge arms build-up that has yet to be fully appreciated, let alone reduced.¹⁷ Owing to the Cold War, NWS decision-makers' mentality is skewed towards that period of international history rather than the unfolding period and exhibit extraordinary resistance to change.

Equipped with such old-fashioned thinking, the NWS were caught completely off-guard as the threat of nuclear terrorism thrust the nuclear clock a minute closer to Armageddon following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and the arrest of a man thought to have constructed a 'dirty bomb' by mixing plutonium with conventional explosives. The threat was further increased as a wave of so-called "rogue" states began to seek revisions of the distribution of power associated to possession of nuclear weapons. The only solution to such challenges, as the logic of the Cold War dictated, was to react on a tit-for-tat basis. Hence Bush began building anti-weapons systems, while Russia developed the SS20 – a stealth delivery system – and China increased the tempo of its nuclear programme; steps deemed to negate the spirit of disarmament.

Yet, Bush was the worst spoiler of the disarmament gains in the decade before his Presidency. Having viewed arms control treaties and multilateral non-proliferation agreements as inherently unverifiable and overly constraining of US security strategy, Bush simply side-stepped, ignoring the CTBT, pursuing national missile defence and developing a nuclear bunker-buster weapon.¹⁸ He explored the

option of putting anti-missile weapons in space and reached a nuclear cooperation deal with India, which is not party to the NPT.¹⁹

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Obama, while publically supporting the elimination of all nuclear weapons, emphasised that the US will not disarm unilaterally and that as long as nuclear weapons exist, it will retain a strong, safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. This prompted Taylor to conclude that as long as nations possessing nuclear weapons continue to behave as though they feel more secure with than without them, more non-nuclear states can be expected to join the nuclear club.

Rauf notes that in the field of diplomacy the NWS have systematically and determinedly opposed all attempts, since the 1995 NPTREC, to be involved in a substantive engagement on nuclear disarmament issues in any multilateral fora, be it the NPT review process, the CD, the First Committee or even NATO councils.²⁰ At the NPT Review, the NWS accepted 'talking sessions' on nuclear disarmament, but continue to reject any and all proposals calling on them to either implement existing bilateral treaties, negotiate new reductions, or to take unilateral measures towards nuclear disarmament.

Such behaviour – of NWS – made many NNWS weary of renewing the NPT and demanded that the NWS should set a clear timetable for dismantling their arsenals.²¹ This prompted Malaysian delegates to the conference to demand that without a pledge by the NWS for a timetable to dismantle, renewing the treaty would be 'justifying nuclear states for eternity.' In essence the treaty was meant to maintain their monopoly.²²

Without the NPT it is uncertain how nuclear relations would unfold. And yet, the treaty has been violated time and time again and has many wondering whether it is becoming completely irrelevant. Consider the following short history of undermining actions which render the NPT a shell of its intentions.

Firstly, between 1975 and 1996, the US authorised transfers of nuclear parts to the UK under a National Security Decision Memoranda. It is also true that some of the fissile materials for the UK Trident Warhead were purchased from the US Department of Defence and property services. This was certainly against the spirit of the NPT and reveals that nuclear states can freely interact while insisting on a ban for others underlining that the difference between

NWS and NNWS is absolute, sending the message to other states that acquiring nuclear weapons increases national power and bargaining positions.

Secondly, India, Pakistan and Israel have been 'threshold' countries in terms of the international non-proliferation regime. Both India and Pakistan are publically opposed to the NPT as it stands and India has consistently attacked the treaty since its inception, labelling it, in 1970, as a lopsided treaty in favour of the existing nuclear powers. India refused to sign the treaty because China is a nuclear state and the two are locked in an enduring dispute. Former Indian Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherje, stated in 2007 that India's opposition was not because of a lack of commitment for non-proliferation but because they consider NPT as a flawed treaty which does not recognise the need for universal, non-discriminatory verification and treatment.

Thirdly, the Middle East conflict has also posed a major barrier to the NPT treaty. Israel feels unsafe among its Arab neighbours and following repeated hostilities. The US has been a staunch supporter of Israel, and has not pressed Israel to allow IAEA inspectors to its existing facility at Dimona. Now that the Arab-Israeli conflict has evolved into an Israel-Iran conflict, the latter uses the case of Israel to justify its own nuclear aspirations and (former) Iranian President, Al Muhabidean, remarked that nothing was said about Israel's suspected nuclear weapons programme. He also noted that the NWS were not making any effort to destroy their stockpiles. So, since the NWS reserve the right to keep nuclear weapons, Iran should reserve the right to develop them as well.

Fourthly, Israel has individually has expressed disdain for the NPT. The concern of Israel is its security hence Israel scorned the resolution by the IAEA calling on it to sign the NPT. Israel insists that it was unfair to single Israel out when they are not the only nation not to have signed it (Pakistan and India are not signatories). Israel has also argued that it has an inherent right to its arsenal. For instance, Horcy, the Israeli Atomic Chief, claimed that the call for Israel to join the NPT violates basic principles and norms of international law.

Finally, hostilities between India and Pakistan pose another obstacle to nuclear disarmament and to the success of the NPT. This is because they act as a reference point to those who desire to de-

velop nuclear weapons and it is well documented that Pakistan's so-called Kahn network is responsible for developing Iran's nuclear programme.

In addition to the above points, Rauf listed several impediments to nuclear reductions:

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1. the deterioration in relations between the US, Russia and China,
2. the increased saliency of nuclear weapons in Russia's security policy,
3. the rise of domestic groups in Russia and the US that remain unconvinced about arms control as an element of national security policy,
4. the Eastward expansion of NATO without considering non-proliferation,
5. increased reliance by Russia on nuclear arms, notably sub-strategic weapons,
6. NATO's continued reliance on nuclear weapons in the absence of credible threats,
7. heightened proliferation concerns in South Asia, the Korean Peninsula and Middle East.²³

Together, these may be insurmountable without a comprehensive, international rethink of the values of nuclear weapons.

CONCLUSION

Nuclear proliferation is difficult to stem for the reasons highlighted above. Nuclear disarmament amongst the nuclear states appear very distant and possibly unachievable. For instance, complaints over the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament have been a perennial feature of most NPT reviews. The significance of these complaints derives from the fact that the NPT is the only legally binding instrument through which the NWS committed themselves to nuclear disarmament.

This is supported by the ICJ, when it asserted that Article VI of the NPT committed the NWS not only to negotiate but also to conclude on nuclear disarmament. Hence the NPT provides a legal framework within which the NNWS could hold the NWS accountable for their actions on nuclear disarmament.²⁴ The NPT implicitly

stated that possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS is a temporary, not permanent situation. Consequently, the NPT is both a nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation treaty with the later being a contributing condition for achievement of the former and vice versa.

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Arguments for nuclear proliferation or selective proliferation hardly offer a solution to the issue as also noted by the Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyed Axworthy in 1998 that the nuclear powers need to see themselves as others see them and to ensure that they do not send messages that they did not intend. He noted that the nuclear powers should be circumspect about the political value they place on NATO's nuclear forces lest they furnish arguments proliferators can use to try to justify their own nuclear programmes. Hence, Washington's confrontation with North Korea and Iran over their nuclear weapons programme has raised a host of important moral questions that touch on the credibility of the NWS and the possible success of the NPT.

In this light, this work calls for the revisiting of the Baruch Plan of 1946. The plan had proposed the verifiable disarmament and destruction of the entire US nuclear arsenal, the establishment of an International Atomic Development Authority and the creation of a system of atomic sanctions, which not even the UN Security Council could veto, and which would proportionately punish states attempting to acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons or fissile materials.

It is obvious that countries that wish to possess WMD usually claim so not only on the basis of their security but also to exercise political and military power in the international system. Possessing nuclear capabilities certainly conveys some illusory security and prestige. What the NWS fail to realise is that the failure of disarmament treaties also risks creating an environment that makes non-proliferation more difficult. A better solution therefore, is to revisit the Baruch plan with faith that the great powers would be courageous enough to embrace and implement it.

The conclusion is that a world without nuclear weapons can only work only if leaders are rational and wanting to avoid the catastrophe accompanying any use of such weapons.

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FAILED STATES AND THEORIES: THE (RE)SECURITISATION OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

MATIA VANNONI

ABSTRACT: Over the past two decades, the term “failed state” has been popularised among both academics and policy-makers. This work seeks to adequately provide for the historical and cultural background driving the term and its theoretical and practical implications. However, the bulk of this work is concerned with questioning the analytical validity of the term “failed state” and argued that its creation was inextricably related to a phenomenon typical of the beginning and the end of the Cold War: the securitisation of underdevelopment. Accordingly, the concept of failed state is analysed as a discursive construction rather than an analytical tool.

KEYWORDS: Failed States, Securitisation, Development, Discourse, Policy-Making

INTRODUCTION

According to Gates, fractured or failing states [are] the main security challenge of our time.¹ Yet such terms' entry into mainstream discourses render them “over-used” in the political lexicon of post-Cold War politics, a point reflected in the intimidating results produced by a simple Google search; some 468 million hits. Failed states have not only penetrated the Internet, other public communications systems have grown accustomed – some may even suggest comfortable – deploying the thematic.² Yet for all the attention the term failed states has received, it seems that international scholarship, let alone wider publics, are no closer to appreciating the gravity of situations facing the states which now have the term failed added as an adjective.

This work argues that the concept is analytically moot, and hence weighing into the definition debate is futile. However, to orientate readers, a popular depiction of failed states and how they are selected as such is provided for according to Newman's identifica-

tion which may be seen in Table 1.³

For methodological clarity, it is important to briefly present the indexes which provide such research to be able to gauge whether or not there are political motivations behind the deployment of the term.

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Failed States: The Indexes Behind the Term

This work examines five indexes which themselves have targeted failed states:

1. **The Failed States Index (FSI)** is sponsored by the so-called Fund for Peace and is published by in the Foreign Policy Journal.⁴ This index deploys social, political and economic indicators to reach its conclusions;
2. **The Global Peace Index (GPI)** is sponsored by the Vision of Humanity, which is part of the Institute for Economics and Peace; an international think tank self-described as being 'dedicated to the⁵ research and education of the relationship between economic development, business and peace.'⁶ The main difference from the precedent one is that the Global Peace Index is more focused on the trends of armed conflicts, assuming the latter as the main indicator of state failure.⁷
3. **The Human Development Index (HDI)** is associated to the UN Development Programme and has become one of the leading indexes for measuring state capacities to deliver public goods (regarded as an indicator of state strength). As argued below, the HDI and GPI vary in conceptualising the functions of the state, with the former selecting a more Lockean approach (re: the state as a service provider⁸) and the latter opting for a more Weberian disposition, conceiving state functions as related to coercive-power monopolisation within a territory.⁹
4. **The Index of State Weakness (ISW)** in the Developing World of the Brookings Institution closely resembles the FSI though contains more robust security connotations.
5. **The State Fragility Index (SFI)** of the Centre for Systemic Peace and the Centre for Global Policy and sponsored by the One Earth Future Foundation measuring state effectiveness and legitimacy.

Considering the above indexes and their associated institutions, two noteworthy aspects may be highlighted: first, the institutional prerogatives driving such research and, second, discrepancies between them.

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The clear majority of centres and institutes tasked with examining failed states tend to be financed by governments. For instance, the State Failure Task Force – funded by the CIA – produced a series of reports which reflect US approaches. Hence, there is a decidedly subjective element to failed state assignments. The role of think tanks as epistemic communities and the interactions between them and policy-makers will be duly analysed in the following sections. Also, discrepancies are evident. While there is general consensus on the worst performers, the lists are rather dissimilar among themselves. Anyway, according to these studies, roughly a quarter of all states are fragile to different degrees; either failing or already failed and the situation is not progressing with the proverbial clock for some states, namely the weakest, has remained stuck in the 1970s without ameliorating their position. That is why, as illustrated below, many scholars question the Westphalian ontology and call for a post-sovereign international order.¹⁰ Yet more traditional approaches to understanding failed states paints only a partial picture. Before moving on to addressing other, more dynamic aspects of the phenomenon, it is essential to first draw a line between failed and rogue states so as to avoid confusion. This is especially important since practitioners tend to misuse concepts of failed states; they deploy the logic of rogue states and apply the term failed.

Indeed, Bilgin and Morton commence their research via a theoretical lens to clarify the two thematics in IR and discover that the main difference is based on focus,¹¹ which is on the internal characteristics in the case of failed state and on the external behaviour in the case of rogue state.¹² Indeed, rogue state is used to indicate the behaviour of a given state in the international realm which is close in spirit to the concept of predation,¹³ namely a state which does not follow the appropriate rules of the game, determined by the ‘structure of identities and interests.’¹⁴ After 9/11, rogue states were perceived as major sources of international threat or, as Bush noted, that unlike ‘the Cold War today’s most urgent threat stems from [...] a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states for

whom terror and blackmail are a way of life.¹⁵ Also, concerns about rogue states are closely related to more classical conceptions of international security, whereas the concept of failed state is usually associated to so-called human security.

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Such a view has recently been challenged by those advocating juxtaposition between such approaches to security. Keohane, for instance, notes that 'future military actions in failed states, or attempts to bolster states that are in danger of failing, may be more likely to be described *both* as self-defence and as humanitarian or public-spirited.'¹⁶ Despite differences, many factors bolster the interconnection between the terms failed and rogue. Being a failed state may be a precondition for being a rogue state, as suggested by Stern who asserted that 'we have to understand the role of failed states that often provide or condone safe havens for organised terrorism.'¹⁷ Furthermore, many scholars and policy-makers tend to overlook differences between such labels. Despite such obvious overlap, this work is limited to assessing failed states for several reasons. First, the concept is more related to the internal characteristics of a state and may be framed within the broader discussion on development. Second, it is a multi-faceted topic not limited to security issues; it extends to economic, social and political dynamics as well. Finally, the term failed state has many implications on the ontological and epistemological aspects of the study of the international system.¹⁸ The following section illustrates the theoretical approaches to the study of failed states widespread in IR theories and political sciences.

THE THEORETICAL STATE OF ART

Newman identifies three streams of studies on failed states, which will be analysed in this section.¹⁹ It is worth conceiving them as 'opinion clusters [which are] more or less structured networks [with] formally structured orientations or approaches to [certain] issues.'²⁰ The first comprises those scholars who uncritically accept the concept of failed state and therefore, concentrate on practical implications.²¹ The most noteworthy aspect of such a stream is its policy orientation. This is crucial since it bears consequences for how studies are conducted and the results these have on the functioning world. Additionally, this cluster is closely interconnected

with security studies.²² The following section will analyse this in light of the literature on epistemic communities and norm entrepreneurs with special attention to the relation between such an opinion cluster and policy-makers. The second stream on failed states is based on critical approaches and extends the analysis to broader discussions.²³ As mentioned, since roughly a quarter of the states in the international system have, since their formation, suffered from some form of weakness, several scholars have begun to question the pillars of the international arena itself. Starting from the concept of failed state, some challenge the concept of sovereignty and the Westphalian system,²⁴ whereas others focus on the epistemological factors which such a term bears starting from a critique to the first stream of studies.²⁵ This work may be framed in the latter approach despite acknowledging contributions of the others. Thirdly, many stress the interventionist connotations of the concept and wholly reject it.²⁶ The division between such approaches is for the sake of exposition and overlaps exist among them. Yet, for reasons of clarity it is worth analysing them separately.

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The majority of studies on failed states may be included in the first cluster; this represents the so-called “establishment approach” towards this topic where roughly all relevant actors are influenced by it (states, international organizations etc.). For instance, the indices noted above clearly express this stream. Despite the heterogeneity of such studies, several common features may be identified; Bilgin and Morton stress the common assumptions, which will be integrated by contributions from other authors.²⁷ First, they all presuppose an approach to the development of the state inherently related to its internal characteristics in line with the so-called Washington Consensus and the approach typical of the international financial institutions (i.e. WTO and WB) since the 1990s.²⁸ Accordingly, causes of “failure” are exclusively internal, aloof from any consideration on the colonial experience of those states²⁹ or positions in the system.³⁰ Here, the state is regarded as the agent of development.³¹ This bears important consequences such as the reduction of state failure to empirically observable factors, which in turn may be manipulated by foreign policy-makers. Whatever the conception of the state, whether Lockean or Weberian, these studies focus on the symptoms of state failure without understanding the surface. The result is a categorisation of states in order of weakness ‘rath-

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er like Victorian butterfly collectors, to construct lists and typologies of the different species.³² A myriad of such categorisations are available in the literature, from simple dichotomies strong/weak,³³ through detailed taxonomies³⁴ to *continua*.³⁵ Furthermore, the indices reveal examples of categorisations of states according to different criteria resting on the assumptions of this stream of studies. Consequently, the concept of state failure ‘rests on the assumptions about stateness against which any given state should be measured as having succeeded or failed.’³⁶

As mentioned, the main characteristic of this cluster is its policy-oriented nature. Indeed, the principal objective of categorising state is rarely merely an academic exercise: ‘the goal is to assess states in order to assist in calibrating the conditions for successful intervention.’³⁷ The following section will present the fallacies of this approach.

Regarding the second stream, several differences between the various authors are clear, though it is possible to identify two sub-groups. First, scholars who use failed states to investigate sovereignty via its Westphalian conception. Accordingly, sovereignty is not perceived as something monolithic and as a *status per se*. Rather, as Sorensen aptly notes, ‘sovereignty is like being married, you either possess this status or you do not, one can no more be a 75% sovereign than 75% married.’³⁸ Such an ontological revolution entails two assumptions:³⁹ either new post-national politics based on human rights⁴⁰ or an international system where sovereignty remains a prerogative of states, which are capable of disaggregating, transferring and pooling it though.⁴¹

Both bear interventionist (even neo-colonialist) consequences in their extremist versions. Indeed, the ‘responsibility to protect’ inherently contains and ‘intervention dilemma’,⁴² namely the Westphalian state is not always compatible with global human rights. For instance, state sovereignty may hamper humanitarian intervention and popular sovereignty may produce tyrannous government with deleterious effects for human rights.⁴³ As Havel announced during the Kosovo conflict ‘the evolution of civilisation has finally brought humanity to the recognition that human beings are more important than the state.’⁴⁴ Furthermore, Krasner, assuming that ‘the fundamental rules of conventional sovereignty [...] no longer work’,⁴⁵ criticises the policy tools *repertoire* used to cope with failed states.

As a result, he proposes a variety of forms of ‘*de facto* trusteeship and shared sovereignty’ to deal with the problem of failed states.

Regarding the second sub-group characterising this approach, many focus on the epistemological implications of the concept.⁴⁶ Since this approach will be utilised below, it is sufficient to mention two points for now. Firstly, discussions on failed states may not be separated from the broader discussion on development. Secondly, the concept concerned is set aside as an analytical tool, thus focusing on it as a discursive construction. The factors behind its creation and the effects it bears will be duly analysed in the ensuing section, which provides a critique of the first cluster based on the second.

The third opinion cluster focuses on rhetorical aspects of the concept of failed state underlining its interventionist connotations. In line with what Johnston defines as the second generation of security studies, namely the approach to security widespread in the mid-1980s⁴⁷ which focused on the rhetorical use of concepts by politicians,⁴⁸ this stream focuses on the ‘failed state doctrine.’⁴⁹ Indeed, Pha and Symon stress the instrumental use of the concept of failed state for various purposes (all with interventionist consequences).⁵⁰ For instance, the concept may be used in order to fill the *vacuum* left by the fall of the USSR and thus the lack of a *nemesis* for the US hegemony,⁵¹ or simply to pursue neo-colonialist policies. As Havel noted ‘I really do inhabit a system [...] where words can prove mightier than ten military divisions.’⁵² This work, despite acknowledging the importance of the instrumental use of rhetoric, extends the analysis to the discursive origins of the term failed state.

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FAILED THEORIES

This section analyses under new epistemological premises the fallacies of the aforementioned first opinion cluster and its attempts to utilise the concept of failed state as a purely analytical tool. This analysis may not be separated from the broader discussion on development, of which the concept of failed state is a derivation. Indeed, the discourse is inherently interconnected with the modernisation theories on development formulated in the 1950s/1960s. As all concepts which are designed to describe reality with a certain degree of abstraction and without normative connotations, the definition of failed state has to respect a twofold requirement:⁵³ the coverage of

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all *phenomena* concerned and the inclusion of all (and only) external characteristics. Such a concept (especially in the Weberian conception of state's functions) does not add anything to the already possessed tools used to analyse states.⁵⁴ Furthermore, as demonstrated by Rist, the concept of development as created in the 1950s/1960s falls short in respecting such requirements. Some of the criticisms which Rist refers to the Rostowian organic conception of development apply in turn also to the concept of "failed state." Such a concept relies on a given perception of development which has many characteristics. First of all, it entails a marked "directional" (if not teleological) connotation with two main consequences. For some authors the principal assumption is that development follows a defined path, which is the one already walked by *developed* states. Indeed, it is characterised by a strong ethnocentrism or by what Latour calls 'particular universalism'⁵⁵ falling into the field of studies of sociology's institutionalism, namely the diffusion of Western values, norms and institutions as benchmarks to analyse (and evaluate) other realities.⁵⁶

For others, the unit of measurement is the ideal-type state and obviously 'compared to an ideal, reality is bound to appear as incomplete, even in the cases that served as the basis for the construction of the idea in the first place.'⁵⁷ The concept of sovereignty, like the concept of modernity, becomes to function like Fitzgerald's green light:⁵⁸ something sought but never reached. This approach is ethnocentric in a more subtle way, in that it compares the (Western) states themselves, which have been the basis for the creation of the ideal-type of state, to the concept derived from them. The logic behind the indices shown in the introduction reflects this. Furthermore, the concept of failed state as conceived by the first cluster is markedly ahistorical, namely it suffers from what Hobden and Hobson⁵⁹ define as chronofetishism and tempo-centrism. Indeed, the concept of failed state rests on the assumption that the present is something reified, naturalised (emerged spontaneously) and cut off from a historical context. Indeed, failed states are not perceived as former colonies: the elephant in the room is usually ignored. With decolonisation 'their right [of colonies] to self-determination had been acquired in exchange for a right to self-definition.'⁶⁰ the term "colony" disappeared along with its historical legacy. Furthermore, tempocentrism leads to the practice of conceiving the past as

a function of the present and thus seeing history as characterised by isomorphic systems functional to the ultimate stage and which alternate one after the other. A revealing example is the Rostowian take-off model,⁶¹ which represents the apex of modernisation theories and the basis for the Western approach to the Third World for more than two decades. Thirdly, the concept of failed state relies on a conceptualisation of the interaction between state and society as two separated (even counterpoised) realms. This *phenomenon*, defined as the “Huntingtonian formula,”⁶² is one of the characteristics which link the concept of failed state to the securitisation of underdevelopment at the beginning of the Cold War; the next section will deal with this aspect. The ethnocentric, ahistorical and teleological conception of development and the concept of failed state in turn represent the central element of modern religion:⁶³ it is a mixture of beliefs and practices with strong normative connotations. Accordingly, it is worth analysing the concept concerned in its discursive connotation rather than in its analytical use. Under the light of post-modern conceptions of development the following section copes with development (and the concept of failed state) as a discourse; a social construction.⁶⁴

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Solutions sought by IR scholars to circumvent such a problem and thus individuating an analytically viable concept to describe reality are numerous, though they will be only mentioned here. Some focus on social forces in the historical creation of the state and thereby overcome the Huntingtonian separation between state and society.⁶⁵ Others claim the reunification of international political economy with security studies⁶⁶ whereas there are scholars who pose themselves in the broader discussion on development questioning for a higher role of history. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the discourse on development has overcome the fallacies typical of its earlier approaches and thus introducing new elements in its theories, such as detailed historical analyses and a trans-disciplinary approach.⁶⁷

THE (RE)SECURITISATION OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Building on the previous section, this part analyses the concept of failed state as a discursive construction. A caveat is needed: the method utilised is qualitative discourse analysis, under the light of

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an agent-centred constructivism⁶⁸ with focus projected on the role of epistemic communities and norm entrepreneurs in creating and propelling inter-subjective understandings.⁶⁹ The indices and major studies of the members of the first cluster are analysed to deduce the logic behind the origins of the term failed state. This part of the work explores the concept of failed states as an “inter-subjective understanding” which is sustained through agency and which shapes identities and interests of agents⁷⁰ by focusing on the similarities between the post-WWII discourse on development and the one on failed states in the last two decades. A parallel may be drawn between the *phenomena* which led to the creation of the modernisation theories of development in the 1950s/1960s and the ones which led to the concept of failed state. As Gilman suggested,⁷¹ the concept of development was a discursive construction which was to play a crucial role in the “psychological warfare” throughout the Cold War. In 1950, Project Troy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) led to the creation of the Centre for International Studies (CIS) (1952) under the aegis of Millikan, who in turn recruited for research activities Lerner (communication scholar), Pye (political scientist), Rostow (economist)⁷² and Hagen (philosopher). The project, funded by the CIA and the Ford Foundation, retained the mandate to consider different types of propaganda methods. While the members, who were all Lasswell’s protégés and strongly influenced by his political psychology views, had different backgrounds, they shared one commonality: they were all markedly interconnected with security and strategic studies. Indeed, many of them played an active role in WWII with respect to strategic studies. The result of Project Troy were different policy proposals between 1954 and 1961, in which the theory of modernisation was drawn, and which took a crucial role in the formation of the US policy toward the so-called Third World.⁷³ Several factors reinforced the influence of the CIS, such as the power position of conservatives – re: Eisenhower’s Administration and a Republican majority in Congress – the beginning of the Cold War and the way the discourse was structured.⁷⁴

A comparison may be drawn in order to deduce the similarities between these two historical *momenta* and understand the reasons why the result was the (re)securitisation of underdevelopment. First of all, many structural characteristics are similar, in that both the 1950s and the 1990s may be considered as crises of the internation-

al system.⁷⁵ Secondly, such historical *momenta* were characterised by an high influence of (neo)conservatives in the US Administration and of (ultra)modernists in the American social sciences. Accordingly, the result was what Newman⁷⁶ calls the securitisation of underdevelopment; this section focuses on this aspect despite acknowledging the importance of the other factors.

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As mentioned above, two factors bolstered the creation of the ethnocentric and an ahistorical concept of failed state in the first cluster: the influence of security and strategic studies and the close interconnection between scholarship and policy-making.⁷⁷ Although these are mutually reinforcing, this part of the work analyses them separately. Many authors emphasise the merging of security and development in the creation of the term failed state with the result of limiting the development agenda to geostrategic and security interests.⁷⁸

The ‘silliest academic development of the Cold War,’⁷⁹ namely the isolation of security studies from other approaches, is one of the main reasons for the creation of the concept of failed state. The mechanism whereby this happened is termed by Hay⁸⁰ conjunctural mode of political rationality: the solution to an external stimulus is sought in the pre-existing structure of the system; geostrategic approaches typical of the Cold War. Accordingly, reality is framed in a way suitable for pre-existing analytical/operational tools, and not vice-versa; as argued by Maslow who posited that:⁸¹ ‘it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.’ The result was the discursive creation of the concept of failed state through a process of abstraction in which ‘contradictions are brought together in a simplified inter-subjective understanding within a broader meta-narration.’⁸² Consequently, ‘although the “formal Cold War” has ceased – involving the stalemate between capitalism and communism – a “structural Cold War” still prevails – involving new justifications for the persistence of old institutions.’⁸³ A second hand data analysis carried out on the main international economic newspapers⁸⁴ revealed that the term failed state and related jargon was mentioned only once in the last two decades: this is telling of the monopoly which security studies enjoys in this field.

The discourse on failed state is so diffused and broadly (almost universally) accepted in that it bears several features which are typical of a successful narrative. First of all, it is centred on the concept

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of “direct responsibility,”⁸⁵ namely there is widespread consensus that bad governance in failed states is the reason for their situation. Indeed, in the first cluster the agency-based approach,⁸⁶ namely the conception that state failure is man-made, is a common assumption. Secondly, the same factor which led to the creation of such a concept has bolstered its diffusion among practitioners and academics: the fact that it does not represent a “Copernican revolution” in IR theories is an advantage given the resistance to change typical of social and political sciences, as pointed out by several behavioural scientists. Thirdly, a successful narrative has to recruit a variety of external symptoms in a simplified, general and flexible generalisation.⁸⁷ In fact, as illustrated above, the studies of the first cluster associate to the term failed states a myriad of complex political, economical, social phenomena. Accordingly, all the evil in the world may be reduced to a single source: failed states. This narrative points to a clearly defined enemy, which incarnates the perfect nemesis of liberal democracy. Thirdly, such studies have enjoyed attention by the means of dissemination: from the Internet, where the foreshown indices are available, through the broadcasting world to more specialist means of communication, such as political and IR publications.⁸⁸ Lastly, the role of epistemic communities and their close relationship to policy-makers strongly supports the diffusion of such a narrative not only in the academic world but also in the real one.⁸⁹ A telling example is the fact that the aforementioned Failed State Index is taken as a benchmark in the 2010 *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, which sets the priorities of US Administrations in the development policy arena.

The other factor is the close interconnection between the scholars and policy-makers regarding the role norm entrepreneur the former plays. Indeed, the similarities between the task force created at the MIT in the 1950s and the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) created in 1994 are revealing. Both were/are funded by the CIA and established on the explicit request of a US Administration, these two bodies had (and the latter still has) the objective of carrying out studies for US policy-making. In fact, the 1995 report of the PITF was a milestone for the concept of state failure; it is considered the first comprehensive attempt to tackle the issue. Not only does such a close relationship bear consequences on the high attention granted to the narrative of failed states by practitioners,

but also on the way the narrative itself is structured. Concerning the first aspect, many scholars underline the role of think tanks as norm entrepreneurs in this regard. Institutes providing the failed states indices and many others have been able to ‘convince a critical mass of [actors] to embrace new norms.’⁹⁰ Furthermore, prominent scholars have also played a role and blur the line between practitioners and academics. Telling examples are Jack Straw, (former) UK Foreign Secretary and Stephen Krasner, (former) Director of Policy Planning at the US Department of State.⁹¹ Their roles as norm entrepreneurs has been supported by many exogenous factors, such as the influence of conservatives in key states and the high role of ultra-modernists in the social sciences.

*Failed States
and Theories*

Such a close relationship between academic and policy-making circles has influenced the discursive creation itself of the concept of failed state in two main manners. Firstly, that the first clusters’ studies focus only on measurable and material indicators of this phenomenon is related to the necessity to build policies on such studies.⁹² Secondly, the solutions implicitly or explicitly suggested by these studies are of a managerial and organisational nature.⁹³ That is why the aforementioned “Huntingtonian formula” is a characteristic of this approach to failed states; the solution is sought at the state level, which is more manageable than the societal one. Thirdly, such institutional tools represent a one-size-fits-all model perceived as a “silver bullet” solution. A noteworthy factor is their inherently interventionist connotation based on institutional engineering.

Consequently, the concept of failed state may be perceived as a discursive construction, but also as a normative concept. Indeed, while it falls short of describing reality and therefore being analytically unfeasible, it represents a model towards which policy-makers aspire. Accordingly, reality is shaped in order to fulfil the model and not vice-versa. As stated before, inter-subjective understandings shape identities and, in turn, the interests of actors.

The consequences of the uncritical use of the concept of failed state in the policy-making are multiple, though they will only be identified due to spatial constraints. First, there is the risk of a self-fulfilling prophecy; a juxtaposition between the “me” and the “I”⁹⁴ of the allegedly failed states: if conceived and dealt with by other states as failed it is probable they will become failed. Second,

the narrative of failed state has interventionist and even neo-colonialist connotations if instrumentally deployed. Thirdly, spurious interpretations of “failed states” may lead to ineffective or disproportionate actions, creating dynamics of path dependence.

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CONCLUSION

There were six men of Hindustan to learning much inclined, who went to see an elephant though all of them were blind, that each by observation might satisfy his mind [...]. So six blind men of Hindustan disputed loud and long, each in his own opinion exceeding stiff and strong; though each was partly in the right, they all were in the wrong!⁹⁵

As this quotation suggests, the common structural characteristics in place at the beginning and at the end of the Cold War led to the same phenomenon: the securitisation of underdevelopment. Despite differences, it is beyond doubt that the concept of failed state and related jargon is a derivation of an approach to development inextricably connected with security and strategic studies. The same factors which contributed to its creation have also played a crucial role in its diffusion as a mainstream narrative about development in the last two decades. Unfortunately, this has borne several drastic consequences in the way the major powers have dealt with the rest of the world. A last caveat is needed: the objective of this work was neither to give definite answers to the problem nor to fall into an infinite epistemological cycle. Instead, the aim of this work was to underline the dynamics where the term failed state has been created, not to propose an alternative narrative on the development of the state. Regarding the second point, this work avoided the eternal struggle between holism and individualism, which has been at the centre of the debate in social sciences since the 19th century. Indeed, constructivist theories tend to fall into the trap of cultural relativism, which may lead to intellectual stalemate. Nonetheless, even though not so easily achievable, the quest for an analytically viable concept is a reasonable objective: the important point is to acknowledge that such analytical tools derive from given agents acting in given circumstances and they may be the objects of analysis and evaluation themselves. In a pioneering work on the

epistemology of knowledge, Puchala (1971) compares the blind men of the notorious story with IR scholars. Indeed, like the blind men trying to identify the mysterious being by touching different parts of it, IR scholars conduct their research activities in the same way: by focusing on different dimensions of the same phenomenon and by wearing different theoretical glasses. As in the case of the blind men, there are not right or wrong answers.

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BARRIERS TO RECOVERY: CONTINENTAL CRISIS AND MEDIA THREAT INFLATION

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ABSTRACT: From the wars in Vietnam and Iraq to the Arab Spring, recent history is full of examples of how media outlets interact with government processes to shape public opinion and constrain the practical avenues policymakers may take in domestic and international affairs. The recent European financial crisis cedes a unique opportunity to study both how media commentary is formulated and the effects it has on the policy choices of governments in international economic affairs. This work, through analysis of original data drawn from case studies of six media outlets in two countries over the course of the recent sovereign debt crisis, seeks to contribute to the field an understanding of the role that such outlets play in influencing popular perception of international issues during times of crisis. With reference to the literature on the press in political and foreign policy affairs, it is found that outlets are incentivised to inflate particular national or international components of reported affairs based on different economic states of affair. These findings have significant implications for the formulation of policy in the future, particularly in the European Union, where continuing integration of political and economic processes requires a delicate balance of emphasis on international prosperity and sovereign interests.

KEYWORDS: Media, Public Opinion, European Union, Sovereign Debt Crisis, Economic Stability

INTRODUCTION

The global financial crisis, starting with stock market crashes in 2008 and continuing to this day, has strained the budgetary processes of numerous countries around the world. In Europe, rising government debt and the difficult task of coordinating fiscal countermeasures in the eurozone have, since late 2009, led to the gradual intensification of social and political unrest aimed at finding a fix to several overarching issues. Despite the barriers-free

nature of trade, demographics and financial institutions in the European Union (EU), the ongoing crisis over the state of sovereign debt has brought both the political and monetary union on the continent closer to fragmentation than ever before.

At the most basic level, while countries across Europe suffer from a commonality of responsibility to address the economic problems of the Union, not all member states have experienced a commonality of the situation. In contrast to the gradual recovery of many, some economies have suffered through drastic austerity measures, requiring bailout financing and continued stimulus attempts. In Greece, continued economic shocks and failures of fiscal governance have led to social uprisings and a change of power. Similar circumstances in Portugal, Spain and other countries across Europe contrast with France, the UK and Germany (to name a few), where more disciplined implementations of austerity measures, while painful, have largely led to steady market recoveries.

The contrasting circumstances raise a significant question: has Europe's near-fragmentation only been economic in nature? The clear reality of such situational differences across Europe, existing as a function of common economic and institution imperatives, indicates that the social effects of the crisis in countries across the eurozone has been different, not only in terms of responses to the crisis, but also in terms of perspectives on the future role of the EU and the single currency. After all, populations have, to greater or lesser degrees, been coping with common problems and burdens that should, in theory, be shared equally by all.

Economic crises affect countries differently; they are exposed to varying domestic and international economic conditions. However, as the case of the EU's sovereign debt crisis highlights, there can be considerable difficulties when it comes to the measurement of social discrepancies surrounding the treatment of similar issues across countries. As a result, this essay seeks to construct and analyse a particular relationship between the role of print media in reporting socio-political issues and changing economic conditions at the national level.

The constraints of print media outlets, necessarily distributively tied to the geographic area in which they operate, allow us to examine the relationship between national economic issues and the transformation of the frames through which the public views them.

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This work asks if print media frames questions and issues of Europe's economic health differently depending on the national origin of the publication. If so, do such media outlets suggest a nationally-based discrepancy in the way in which different populations yet view the role of the EU and the eurozone?

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A broad look at the comparative health of national economies in Europe over the past three years of the crisis may indicate some likely trends in the representative nature of print media framing across national borders. After all, the framing of issues in those countries that have fared relatively better in the crisis, still affected as they are by ties through the common currency to poorer-performing countries, would logically focus increasingly on the actions and problems of other states. In contrast, media framing of similar issues in poorer-performing countries may be more likely to focus on the role of systemic institutions as the country becomes more dependent on coordinated international action to stave off disaster. These hypotheses will be tested below.

The research undertaken in this essay could help policymakers, both within and beyond the eurozone, understand the social ramifications of economic policies enacted in culturally-diverse regions that are economically interdependent. Through understanding of the results of the cross-country content analysis in this study, European policymakers may, as they move forward towards closer fiscal union in the future, be able to more accurately understand how social perspective, as represented by framing from mass-distribution media outlets, manifests itself in the political and economic machinations of different members of the eurozone. Perhaps most importantly, this research could help policymakers understand the role of media outlets as a mechanism through which popular opinion is transmitted to the higher levels of political governing. Ultimately, this could aid in the formulation of socio-economic policies that are better designed to efficiently and fairly aggregate interests and integrate economic processes across borders.

This work proceeds in four stages: First, I begin with a discussion of the existing literature on issue framing and the role of the media in influencing the direction of social and political actions on economic and international issues. Next, I present data coded from six major circulatory print media outlets in two European countries with very different experiences over the course of the crisis – Ire-

land and Germany. Here, I test the above hypotheses by highlighting trends in the media framing of economic issues across time, paying particular attention to differences in the portrayal of the EU's structures and institutions versus the actions of fellow member states and nationally-based organizations. In the third section of this essay, I ask whether or not crisis conditions can be said, in line with supporting literary theory on competing frames of the media, to alter the delivery of perceptions in reporting. Moreover, I propose an alteration of existing theory for explaining the media framing during economic crises. In particular, I discuss the implications of trends in both the Irish and German media case studies. Finally, I conclude by scrutinising the outcomes of this case study analysis, identifying ways in which the theoretical trends discussed can affect future policy formulations and suggesting methods for conducting further research in the future.

*Barriers to
Recovery*

FRAMING AND THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN AGGREGATING SOCIAL INTERESTS

In the field of political communication, the role of the media in establishing the “frames,” meaning the contextual lens through which the public views a myriad of issues, is well studied. Numerous authors have contributed to the understanding of the complex relationship between the various factions of the press, the public and the government. In this section, I establish a basic position of understanding the ways in which media organisations choose to engage in the framing of different issues and the role they play in shaping, aiding and constraining the policy decisions and paths of governments. This basic position will take some reference from recent changes to socio-political circumstances in the EU. Ultimately, an understanding of the motives and capacities of media organisations is necessary to fully complement a test of changing reporting behaviours over time and build a theory of media-crisis reaction with appropriate literary context.

In the above introductory section, it was proposed that countries faring better over the course of international crises, in this case the economic crisis over sovereign debt in the EU, over time would see the focusing of popular attention on those aspects of the international system that are most relevant to national interests

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(and vice versa, with focus instead going to relevant domestic concerns). While it is logical that the public may generally refocus on those aspects of political-economic policy, insofar as it affects the interests of individuals that are most in need of repair or revision, does the frame constructed by media organisations as they report news reflect this?

First, it is necessary to frame the role of the media in modern, globalised societies appropriately. In political economic terms, the modern media could be said to act as one of several societal “gateways” through which the public is affected by national and international happenings.¹ Furthermore, the media acts as an outlet for popular sentiment that could potentially influence national policy.

The basis for these assertions lies in the fact that the path that today’s states have taken to reach the current level of globalised interconnectedness has greatly altered traditional barriers through which domestic populations interacted with the world. In the immediate post-Second World War period, the US led in the construction of a multilateral trade regime that focused on government responsibility for correcting inefficiencies in free markets and guaranteeing full employment. Though this led to high economic growth in the non-communist world, the currency crises and stagflation in the 1970s and 1980s led to a reversal of focus on such matters. As a result, the international system slowly began to refocus on the spread of neoliberal reforms, including the privatisation of state-owner enterprises, tax reforms and other measures that increased the autonomy and effective influence of private sector forces.²

Embedded liberalism, as Ruggie called the first post-war system, emphasised shared norms connected to certain public sector-driven practices.³ The effective result of such policies on a global scale was the spread of high growth economic practices that ceded control of domestic processes to governments; governments could, in effect, buffer at the border to shelter domestic society from the turbulence of international markets. However, neoliberal reforms around the world, most especially in Europe with the formation of the monetary union, essentially served to decouple economic processes from domestic control, causing the clash of social conventions and mechanisms for broadcasting desires at national levels. Though floating exchange rate regimes allow many countries to affect some measure

of control during bust periods, the EU's monetary union in particular showcases the new multi-level approach that some countries must cope with when dealing with economic matters⁴⁵

This work argues that, with diminished government capacity to shelter society and represent the abilities of the country to influence economic circumstances, the media in Europe has taken on a strong and popularly representative position in society that aggregates interests and accurately presents popular sentiment.

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Whyte*

Elsewhere in the field, significant literary evidence reveals that media focus is largely defined by its relationship to government. Early work on "indexing" – meaning the reporting of news based on a broad survey of information coming from various source types – indicates that because of the common appearance of government commentary as experts on most subjects, all news sources are likely to report a government-centric viewpoint.⁶ Authors like Bennett have expounded this relationship by arguing that media outlets are simply optimising the reach of their limited resources, as well as responsibly delivering the most appropriate and important information from representatives to their democratic readership.⁷

In 'Competing Images of the Press,' Thrall lays out three particular camps of belief about the actions and role of the media when it comes to government relations – the lapdog, the watchdog and the attack dog.⁸ Proponents of the first school tend to see the media as a mouth of the government and an institution that exists to follow the line of the party.⁹ Others believe that the press acts more like a watchdog, wisely drawing scrutiny and attention to those areas of government responsibility that require popular oversight. Both of these camps contrast sharply with believers in the attack dog media, in which news organisations see it as their task to relentlessly ridicule and critique the actions of politicians so that leadership of the country is constantly in question.¹⁰

Each of these "images" of the press represents a view on how media organisations frame a variety of issues that are related to the government. These camps are particularly pertinent in the context of this essay's research, as any perceptible alteration of the frame in which news and coverage of particular issues is presented is likely to correspond with one or more of the above camps. However, with these images in mind, it is necessary to consider the circumstances of European integration and the diminished role government play,

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to some greater or lesser degree, in buffering society and acting as a gateway to international and economic affairs. The data used below to measure framing as it has occurred over the course of the sovereign debt and wider financial troubles will be analysed from each of the three “image” perspectives in order to gauge the applicability of each to media-government relations during periods of crisis.

EUROPE IN CRISIS: THE CASE STUDIES

As a precursor to the analysis of more inclusive samples of media from across the eurozone in the future, this work’s examination of framing and perception in the media focused on sources from two countries that represent opposite ends of the range in terms of success in weathering and recovering from the global financial and European sovereign debt crises—Ireland and Germany. In doing so, this work establishes a lens and framework through which other studies review the relationship between media reporting and government policy in political economic matters.

These countries were selected for several reasons:

Firstly, both are members of the eurozone. Because the pressures of reform are likely to be less present in countries outside of the monetary union, even within the EU, research performed using data from other countries in such a small-n test may have ended in skewed results.

Secondly, both occupy opposite ends of the economic spectrum within the eurozone. By calculating a debt-to-Gross Domestic Product ratio, it is clear that Ireland and Germany are representative of those countries in the EU able or unable to reign in spending and implement appropriate austerity measures. Over the course of Europe’s sovereign debt crisis, from late 2009 until October 2011 when this study was performed, Ireland’s debt oscillated between 85% and 95% of GDP, while Germany’s hovered between 55 and 60%.¹¹

This study looked at the three largest newspapers in both Ireland and Germany by circulation. As a result, a final factor influencing the choice of these countries and their newspapers was that:

Thirdly, Irish and German sources, while clearly representative of countries with vastly different economic experiences, are either primarily published in English or are popular enough that print editions are multi-lingual. This helped control for human errors from

translation.

The newspapers involved were: the *Irish Independent*, *Irish Examiner* and *Irish Times* in Ireland and *Bild*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in Germany.¹² Together, these newspapers reach between 10-24% of the adult populations of each country on a daily basis. It is worthwhile noting that *Bild*, in particular, reaches almost 5 million people daily and dwarfs the circulatory power of any of its peer outlets. Nevertheless, *Bild* is still limited by the geographical confines of its physical circulation reach in Germany.

Focus in this survey was placed on headline stories from the one month period that included the onset of the sovereign debt crisis and the first major bailout initiatives from 23 May 2011. For the purposes of comparing results, further data was coded from the same sources for the one month period starting on 01 September 2011. This second period included the resurgence of major financial difficulties in various eurozone states, including Greece, Ireland and Spain. The applicability of articles in each newspaper over those periods was based on a clear discussion of international and national economic health as the main topic(s) involved, with each being coded to gather data on the perspectives expressed and information presented therein.

Specifically, each article was placed into categories by area issues (domestic politics, global financial crisis, EU politics, etc.). Data was drawn through a simple count of mentions of international institutional names and organizations versus their corresponding national counterparts (e.g. The European Commission vs. The Italian Prime Minister or the Portuguese Central Bank). Furthermore, each article was coded so as to gauge the tone in which it was delivered, with positive and negative adjective usage noted alongside the use of statistical citations that trended positively or negatively.

The point of coding each article in this manner and drawing these particular types of data lay in the applicability of the perception of the international processes at work in Europe held by the average citizen. In terms of answering the question of whether or not media-reported viewpoints and biases changed over time during crisis periods relative to observable economic circumstances, it was logical to focus on a very basic dichotomous methodological data collection regime and rely on straightforward cross tabulations and

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graphical models that provided simple means for view contrasting trends.

CASE STUDY FINDINGS

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In this section I discuss the results of the six sets of coding regimes. Coding of articles from across the two single month periods proceeded without hitch and focused, as discussed above, on the relevant media portrayal of the perception of international versus national institutions and associated individuals. Using a basic set of coding rules for judging sentiment that directly referenced each of these mentions and any use of statistical models, data was also drawn that indicated positive or negative positional representation of the issues being discussed. Neutral or descriptive phrases were discounted and statistical models were deemed to be positive or negative only if the data being presented described a > 66% discrepancy for poll data and above or below a 30% discrepancy in the trends detailed for economic statistics (e.g. Survey responses show that 75% disapprove of government spending cuts or unemployment went down from 10 to 7 %). It is also noteworthy that circulation numbers across all publications declined over the course of the period by at least 10%, something that was most notable in Ireland where the Irish Times and Irish Examiner lost almost a third of their readership. All results were coded and all models estimated using Stata 12.0.

RESULTS

The range of articles surveyed in this test was broad. In both countries and across all six newspapers were a variety of different article types. In general, it was found that each newspaper reported on at least one issue or presented at least one headline news story every day that was related in some way to the global or European economic crisis or its domestic manifestations. For the bigger newspapers, particularly *Bild*, the *Irish Independent* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, the number of articles that addressed such issues was higher.

Using Stata, the results for each newspaper were correlated with each other and then coded into indices. This was done for all data coded out of each article and allows us get the bigger picture drawn by the data from each country during both of the two one-month periods.

The first indices portray the total number of articles in each


country by type. For the purposes of discriminating between the contextual circumstances in which each mention of international or national institutions was made, each piece was coded into one of the four following categories:

1. Global Financial Crisis,
2. Sovereign Debt/Eurozone Crisis,
3. Political/Economic Troubles of the EU Member States
4. Domestic Political/Economic Troubles.

Graphic 1

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In Ireland, there was a fairly clear trend in the types of articles




covered over the course of the two periods. While focus on the global financial crisis was low during both periods, as Graph 1 shows, there are several interesting changes that indicate framing shifts for Irish print media outlets.

Articles focused on the Eurozone Crisis in period one represented about 20% of all coverage on political-economic matters. By

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period two, this had nearly halved to a little over 10% of coverage. While it is interesting to note that period one, starting on 23 May 2011, included the first major bailout initiatives in several eurozone countries, this is still a sharp shift away from focus on international affairs. Perhaps more importantly, there is a stark shift in article focus from coverage of the political-economic troubles of other nations in the EU to domestic reportage. Between the two periods, the number of articles devoted to describing issues and events related to the affairs of other EU countries fell by almost exactly a third from 49–33percent while, at the same time, the number of pieces devoted to the description and analysis of domestic affairs more than doubled from 24 to 52% of all coverage.



Graphic 2

In Germany, trends between the two periods, in terms of the types of articles covered, were noticeably different and certainly more drastic than those in Ireland. These trends existed across all newspapers in Germany and were coded into a country-specific index, similar to Ireland. In all instances across all types of articles,

there was at least a 30% change in month-long coverage patterns. This was higher in most cases.

Between 23 May and 23 June 2011, media focus on the global financial crisis was relatively low, representing about 18% of all coverage on political-economic affairs. Similarly, focus on the eurozone crisis itself was low, 20% of all coverage. Other news categories, namely those focusing on domestic political issues (35%) and happenings in other EU member states (27%) made up the remainder of all coverage. These figures for news coverage of specific issues during the first month period indicate that the huge economic difficulties being experienced in Greece, Ireland and elsewhere, while of great interest and concern, were clearly as of yet weakly associated with the broader eurozone and global financial crises which, at this time, could still be said to be in a phase of slow recovery.

During the second month-long period, between 01 September and 01 October 2011, these coverage statistics drastically change. Focus on the global financial crisis jump to 37% of all coverage – the most of any category of article – while reportage of the eurozone crisis saw a no less impressive leap to 35% of all coverage. On the other end of the spectrum, news stories analysing both individual EU member economic and political troubles and domestic issues plummeted, with reporting of the former falling by a third to 18% and the latter by 75% to represent just under a tenth of all stories covered.

To recall the above hypothesis, countries weathering and performing better economically over the course of the global financial and eurozone crises would logically see an associated shift in perspective that focuses on the problems of others (and vice versa), as it is those other states that continue to cause downturn in international systems. To preliminarily analyse these hypotheses on the basis of changing article focus over the two month-long time intervals presented here, it would seem that media outlets in Ireland – where markets were seen to perform poorly over the period – reported significantly less on matters related to international affairs. Conversely, Germany, whose economy recovered strongly over the course of the period and was somewhat immune to the debt problems plaguing the EU's weaker economies, saw a drastic shift in media focus away from domestic politics and towards issues and relationships in the international arena. These findings may indicate a need to reject the null hypotheses.


However, this study also drew data about article content and disposition towards particular issues, something that may help re-

fine our understanding of the overall trends that appeared in both countries.

In both countries, and across all six newspapers, there were fairly clear trends in terms of mentions of international versus national institutions (and associated individuals) over the two time periods. As Graph 3 shows, Irish print media outlets between May and June 2011 tended to mention institutions of international organisations and of other nations in relatively balanced doses. In the later time period this changed. Stories that solely mentioned international institutions, which had been the lower in terms of appearance in earlier stories, accounted for more than 45% of all articles in September. While there were a similar number of news stories that had references to the institutions of other countries alongside international actors, the most drastic change was the near 100% (42% of all mentions down to 2%) drop in the number of stories that solely referenced individuals, institutions or groups associated with EU member states.

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Percent Mentions of EU Vs. National Institutions Between May-June and Sept.-Oct. 2011



Graphic 3

In Germany the trends between the two time periods were even more striking. Articles in all three newspapers between 23 May and 23 June 2011 were dominated by mentions of international organisations and associated individuals. Of the articles from which data was coded, 82% solely mentioned international figures and institutions while articles providing balanced international-national outlooks and those solely reporting on national figures made up a far smaller, 14% and 4% respectively, portion of coverage.

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In the second period of analysis, the market share of coverage of each of the categories of mentions shifted. With almost no balanced coverage of both international- and nation-level actors (5%), articles solely mentioning EU and global institutions nearly halved to just 42% and those mentioning national players spiked to 53% of all reported.

Here, with respect to the hypotheses that have been proposed in this test, it is clear that focus shifted in both countries from one type of actor to another. In the context of the above shifts over the two periods in both Ireland and Germany, this media data may suggest a twofold perspective on the economic and political machinations within each country.

In Germany, where media outlets clearly switched the focus of reporting away from international institutions and towards the troubles and happenings of other countries, articles became increasingly focused on topics of broader global affairs over the time period. This indicates that, although the direct objects of discussion and analysis in German newspapers were nations and associated groups, reporting was contextually based on addressing topics more broadly related to the regional and international crises. This was further seen during testing as a cross tabulation of the trends of distribution of different types of mentions across newspapers with the overall tone of each article broadly indicates that Germans, as represented by these news outlets, had international institutions framed positively during period one. This remained the same in period two, though the much higher number of references to other countries was associated with negative adjective use and an overall frame that was more highly critical.

The data also suggests the opposite trend in Ireland, where articles talked increasingly about domestic and localised troubles in other EU member states as a function of the international institutions that likely were seen as the primary means for enacting situational change. Here, the framing of issues across Irish newspapers

was an exact reversal of the trend seen in Germany, with a positive outlook on national figures and other countries during the first period shifting to the trend of using overwhelmingly negative grammatical mechanisms in conjunction with discussions of the international system.

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Finally, testing included the coding of usages of statistics and polling data as journalistic means of information conveyance (see Table 1 below). In Irish media outlets, there appeared to be no change in the use of overwhelmingly negative data in association with article content. The usage of negatively-disposed statistics remained the same, even as content and framing changed, perhaps indicating simply that the severity of the economic circumstances in Ireland over the period of the crisis has not changed; only perceptions of the actors involved, the potential sources of relief and the framing of the issues themselves became different over time.

In Germany, the amount of used data negatively associated with the topics being covered in articles rose by over 40%. Taken in the context of the other results of this study and with respect to the hypotheses, this indicates that the external recessionary effects of the global and eurozone crises, while contrasting with steady domestic economic growth during both periods, were increasingly seen as related to Germany interests, at least in terms of media coverage on the issue.

Table 1

The Use of Statistical Data in Newspaper Articles
by Positive or Negative Connotation

Ireland	May-June 2011		September-October 2011	
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
Data Negatively Associated With Article Content	22	81.48	22	75.86
Data Positively Associated With Article Content	5	18.52	6	24.14
Germany				
Data Negatively Associated With Article Content	17	36.96	29	78.38
Data Positively Associated With Article Content	29	63.04	8	21.62

Overall, the results of this study yielded a variety of conclusions

about the nature of media reporting in the countries involved. Moreover, the data provides us with much insight into mechanisms of frame-shifting during crisis periods and could be the proof-of-concept test for a much larger-n test of countries, both within in out-side the eurozone. On the surface, the hypotheses proposed above seem to be supported by the results. To recap, the hypotheses are as follows:

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The framing of issues in those countries that have fared relatively better during periods of international crisis would logically focus increasingly on the actions and problems of other states.

In contrast, media framing of similar issues in poorer-performing countries may be more likely to focus on the role of systemic institutions as the country becomes more dependent on coordinated international action to stave off disaster.

Despite high amounts of topic-level focus on international issues in Germany and domestic/national-level happenings in Ireland, the tone and content emphasis of articles coded across the two one-month time periods leads me to fail to reject these null hypotheses, as there was a clear shift in the framing of media coverage along the lines proposed above.

DISCUSSION

In the case of Europe's sovereign debt crisis and the disparate experiences of countries across the eurozone, framing of broad issues in print outlets, tied as they are to geographical circulatory areas, can be used to determine what sources are most crucial to the functioning of the media and the portrayal of the news. After all, if it can be assumed that the media is a gateway through which governments and their subject populations interact and view each other, it is highly important to understand how the informational frames of the media are formed.^{13,14,15}

In this study, the data collected showed that media portrayal of different issues, particularly of the effects of domestic political-economic troubles, shifted over time in both Ireland and Germany, with the former largely focusing with concern and negative sentiment on international institutions and the latter focusing negative crisis-based sentiment on domestic- and other country-level matters.

Why did media outlets cover news stories and portray issues in both countries, often referencing similar content, in these ways? The literature on the role of media framing, particularly with respect to the government, may have some answers.

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There are certainly a variety of observed trends that could explain such shifts in focus by newspaper outlets. As Bennett (and others) argued, limited resources on the part of media organisations tend to consolidate the significant effect that resorting to indexed and government-centric information sources have in influencing the content of the media.¹⁶ In Germany and Ireland, this would fit with the observed trends of the study. Media focus in both countries changed to frame economic problems as a function of those institutions that were of greatest import to both domestic and broader international economic troubles. In the case of Germany, increasingly negative articles were run from May to October that emphasised the role of individual countries in the world, particularly in the EU, in causing systemic economic issues and preventing a broad recovery. In Ireland, those same countries met with a more positive reflection, but were overshadowed by primarily negative coverage of the international system and the failures of institutions.

However, given that the media coverage studied here represents commentary on internationally-induced economic matters and that works in the literature on political communication have shown that governments are almost never able to lead the media and dictate the content of press outlets, is it not perhaps more reasonable to say that the limited resources of such organisations will be spent canvassing official sources of information?¹⁷ Considering the reality that information on the crisis primarily comes from beyond the country, media outlets in European countries may logically look elsewhere, from the reports of other countries governments and international institutions to multinational statistics research organisations that are set up to look at such matters across borders, for perspective.

The works of Herman and Chomsky, arguing that media firms are most highly motivated and incentivised to bias coverage of events based on potential for profit, supports the idea that media outlets in crisis contexts will be driven to seek information most conducive to securing a favouring and profitable environment to operate in.¹⁸ In the two countries studied here, this implies differ-

ent things. In Ireland, focus on domestic- and country-level problems as a function of international institutions is the logical outcome of crisis-driven media coverage policies because outlets have an interest in securing the conditions for the domestic recovery of the marketplace.¹⁹ Moreover, as the supranational nature of the EU insulates media organisations to a large degree from the backlash of institutions that come under closest scrutiny, there is little reason for balanced coverage. In Germany, the opposite focus on other countries as a function of the problems of the international system is similarly logical, as media outlets have an interest in preventing future domestic downturn from the spread of foreign problems. In the German case, this may imply congruency with government policies in terms of focus on fixing international issues for which the country is seen as a regional leader, but different with respect to the fact that profit-centric media policies likely bias domestic perceptions of international issues through framing, thus diminishing the representative control of policy that the government has.²⁰ Finally, these trends toward outlet-centric framing practices are further reflected in both countries by two factors that came out of this study. First, the overwhelming use of statistical data from non government sources across both periods, particularly in Irish newspapers (three quarters of the 82% of all articles in period 2 with respect to half of the 47% in period 1 indicates that there was an obviously high level of reliance on information sources whose only criteria was issue relevance, not government linkage. Secondly, the significant decline in readership for each paper over the period between May and October (over 10% in all cases and around 30% for both the Irish Times and Examiner) indicates that, from a business perspective, there are clear incentives for media organisations to support framing on certain issues that are popular and could improve their operational climate.

A final set of conclusions seem relevant to the operation of media outlets in framing issues during crisis periods here, particularly with respect to Germany and Ireland during the global and sovereign debt crises. Thrall's proposal that the views of the media can be split into three distinct groups based on intent – the watchdog press, the attack dog press and the lapdog press – pertinently describes beliefs about how media organisations focus their efforts to provide a certain type of coverage.²¹ However, since it is argued here

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that media organisations are incentivised by profit and by their own ability to influence the flow of information as a gateway between governments and the public, it would perhaps be most fitting to link the mentality of the “dogs” with that of intentional threat inflation^{22,23}

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For both countries, there is a distinct change their stance relative to the government could be labelled. In Germany, where media coverage initially focused on the troubles of other countries in the context of problems in the international system, outlet-level concerns about profits could certainly have led to the use of frames that, by supporting the German view that domestic reforms were needed in other countries, essentially represented an attack dog mentality. Though German media coverage of issues fell closely in line with domestic government commentary on the crisis, this research argues that lack of government influence over the processes of frame construction in media organisations and strong economic performance relative to other states make an attack dog definition of mentality with respect to other countries most apt.

Similarly, in Ireland, though framing of issues domestically and abroad as a function of international institutions fell closely in line with government commentary on the crisis at most points, the high number of mentions of non-government sources of statistical and poll information indicates that there was no causal link leading from government processes to media coverage. Rather, this and declining readership numbers would again imply that media organisations are motivated to construct certain frames during crisis situations based on what is thought to be popular and what will ultimately be beneficial for the future operation of outlet business. In other words, in Ireland over the period, print media outlets shrugged off the patronage of government-centric information sources and perspectives to frame issues from the watchdog position.

Ultimately, this study implies that, given an assumption of media-centric frame construction, there exists a phenomenon of “media threat inflation” during crisis periods, in which organisations act as the drivers of national perspective in the context of their own needs.

The result of this is that there are implications for future research. A broader sample of countries would certainly allow future studies to control for the situational significance of Ireland and

Germany either being in abject crisis or being a leader of the economic area responsible for dealing with the crisis. Those countries that have experienced middling to good recoveries would be good candidates for a further media study.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Barriers to Recovery

The results of this study have many implications for future research into the behaviour of media organisations during crisis periods. Data gathered from news sources in both nations studied indicates a direct correlation between economic performance across the period of the global financial and sovereign debt crises and the orientation of media coverage. It is clear that, over time, media organisations were incentivised to construct different methods for framing news articles. This essay, through testing and analysis in which the researcher's null hypotheses failed to be rejected, argued that the unique political-economic makeup of the EU, and precipitous changes in the economic and circulatory circumstances of each newspaper over the period studied, indicates that frame construction is outlet-centric and, thus, premised entirely on the interests of media organisations. To expand upon this analysis in the future, it would be appropriate to undertake a similar study with regards to a greater number of countries, controlling for a broader range of crisis-based political-economic circumstances and compensating for any biases that result from only drawing from English language sources.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this study has significant implications for the formulation of both economic and social policy, particularly in the EU, in years to come. In Europe, where increasing divergence of sovereign political economic issues has already stressed the processes of international economic governance and forced alterations of the fiscal and monetary structure of the system, the phenomenon of media threat inflation observed in this study represents one aspect of a broader dynamic in which nationally-based interest groups, particularly private-sector market-driven entities, may not be incentivised to promote mechanisms of international integration. Though a natural occurrence in any free market system, such interest group activities pose significant obstacles

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to the development of relationships institutionally defined more by their supranational applications than country-specific relevance. As seen during the sovereign debt and broader eurozone crises of the past years, the manifestation of this effect is especially evident with relation to policies that, in the short-term, benefited some international actors over others.

Ultimately, future policies of both domestic and international stakeholders must aim to ameliorate the effects of geographically-constrained interest groups as they are motivated to act on interests that constrain government reliance on non-biased popular opinion. After all, without the appropriate interplay between international and domestic concerns, between social and economic processes, how can a paradigm-spanning institution like the EU hope to construct an appropriately distributed system of accountability and support for coping with future iterations of what has undoubtedly been the continent's greatest challenge of fragmentation in over half a century?

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NOTES TO PAGES

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 - 17 See Robert Elegant (1981), 'How to Lose A War: The Press and Viet Nam,' *Encounter*, 57:2, pp. 73-90. See also Andrew Mullen and Jeffery Klaehn (2010), 'The Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model: A Critical Approach to Analysing Mass Media Behaviour,' *Sociology Compass*, 4:4.
 - 18 See Herman and Noam Chomsky (1988), *Manufacturing Consent*, NY: Pantheon Books, pp. 1-36.
 - 19 *Ibid*, pp. 28-34.
 - 20 Again, such diminution of government control over components of the propaganda-related mechanisms of the press, as a result of national crisis and interest group-response, is well studied though with focus on conflict-based catalysts. See Elegant (1981), pp. 73-90.
 - 21 Thrall (2000b), pp. 5-7.
 - 22 Though originally used as a conceptual term by Chaim Kaufmann with respects to the Bush Administration's successes in selling the idea of War in Iraq, threat inflation is relevant in this case, describing the manner in which media outlets are incentivised to maximise their operational potential by highlighting aspects of the news that will resonate well with the reading and buying population. See Chaim Kaufmann (2004) 'Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War,' *International Security*, 29:1, pp. 5-48.
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THE “ARAB SPRING” IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

MIRON LAKOMY

ABSTRACT: *The Greater Middle East has traditionally played a major role in French foreign policy. Following WWI, the 3rd French Republic acquired Syria and Lebanon which created a foundation for political, economic and cultural ties between France and the Arab world. In the post-Cold War era, French diplomatic activity in the region was split into several main priorities which gravitated around being a solid mediator between Israel and the Arabs for the construction of a durable peace – via treaty – while supporting Arab and French regional interests. This work explores the dynamics of French foreign policy in the Middle East with particular emphasis on the most recent set of transformations brought about by the Arab Spring. This work seeks to reveal the level of preparedness (or lack thereof) of France for such eventualities as well as reveals the role France may play in the future.*

KEYWORDS: France, Middle East, Arab Spring, Foreign Policy, Revolution

THEMATIC INTRODUCTION

The Middle East plays a major role in French foreign policy. After WWI, the 3rd French Republic acquired territories formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire: Syria and Lebanon; creating a foundation for strong cultural bonds between France and the Arab world. The end of WWII reinforced French interests in the region. Despite the rising challenges in its colonies, especially in Algeria, Paris – in the 1940s and 1950s – struggled to retain a presence and French attempts to suppress Algerian independence created widespread distrust among the Arabs. This was strengthened during the Suez Crisis (1956) and close cooperation with Israel; the 4th French Republic (1950s) developed a robust military alliance with Israel including the latter’s nuclear weapons development programme.¹

When de Gaulle assumed power (1958), French foreign policy fundamentally changed. De Gualle reduced military cooperation

with Israel and began to support the Arab cause instead. He also agreed to establish an independent Algeria which helped overcome a major hurdle between France and the Arab states. Both decisions were welcomed in the Maghreb and Mashriq. The real breakthrough however took place in 1967 as a reaction to the Six-Day War. Despite causing US anger, France officially supported Arab and Soviet policies during the conflict. Symbolically, de Gaulle adopted an arms embargo against Tel Aviv in what became a turning point for French diplomatic activity in the Middle East. Since then, France's foreign policy has been widely perceived as "pro-Arab." Subsequent presidents – until Sarkozy – remained somewhat loyal to the approach adopted by de Gaulle; a point reflected in French cooperation with Hussein's Iraq and arming Qaddafi's Libya.²

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The Gaullist perception of the Arab world remained mostly unchanged, even after the Cold War. Traditional French diplomatic activity in the Middle East (post-1991) may be broken down into four priorities. Firstly, the 5th Republic attempted to gain the status of mediator between Israel and the Arab states. This goal was based on the assumption that France could play a major international role because of its unique value system. Additionally, this priority may have been perceived as a result of the traditional *politique de grandeur*.³ Such convictions became an important element of French political culture. As Zeldin notes, France has unique capabilities to act as 'a mediator between the West and the Muslim world.'⁴ It certainly attempted to utilise its position.

Secondly, and connected to the first, France prioritised a general peace agreement between Israel and the Arab states. Such an agreement could be achieved *only* through diplomacy, with mutual respect for the interests of both sides. This goal was summarised by Chirac during an official visit to Jordan. He remarked that the 'new Middle East [should be] reconciled or coexist, [with a] peaceful and prosperous Palestinian state, widely accepted and free of Israeli terrorism, Jordan as an example of democracy and development, Syria in possession of all its territory, at peace with its former enemies, a free, sovereign and dynamic Lebanon and strong and healthy Egypt, being a pioneer of peace.'⁵

Thirdly, France maintained support for Arab interests. While this priority was not officially admitted, French goals in the region tended to favour the Arab position; a point visible in the declaration

of Chirac (April 1996) in Cairo. He listed four main goals for France:

1. ensuring the right of self-determination for the Palestinians,
2. ensuring the security of Israel,
3. establishing long-lasting peace between Israel and Syria, based on Lebanese independence and regulating the status of the Golan Heights and,
4. the full sovereignty of Lebanon.⁶

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These goals benefited the Arab states rather than Israel, although it is noteworthy that Israeli security was mentioned. Such an approach should have allowed for French interests to have been achieved and secure its political influence in the region.

Finally, in regards to the Maghreb states, despite the end of French colonisation, North Africa (after 1991) was considered by many as *Francafrique*; part of its traditional sphere of influence, a point underscored by Pascallon's suggestion that the 5th Republic wanted to play a role of a *gendarme* in North and Central Africa.⁷ Influence in the Maghreb was regarded as an important attribute of French status. These priorities were fundamental for France's activities in the Middle East since 1991.

The beginning of the 21st century produced new challenges for France in the region. Due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the political and security situation fundamentally changed. However, despite new problems (re: Iraq 2003 and Iran's nuclear programme), French policy stayed focused on maintaining friendly relations to Arab political elites. In particular, Chirac based his activities on contacts to a number of African and Arab politicians from Tunisia, Syria and Lebanon. For several years this approach went unchanged since it allowed France to secure its national interests. However, it also caused multiple tensions in relations to Israel (and the US) and, owing to the enduring pro-Arab strain of French foreign policy, Tel Aviv strongly opposed the involvement of France in peace mediation.⁸

Only after 2007 did French diplomacy in the Middle East change. Sarkozy maintained the traditional French support for Arab dictators however he also improved relations with Israel. Unlike his predecessors, Sarkozy no longer clung to unconditional support for the Palestinians, a point visible during his visit to Israel (June

2008), when he accepted the logic behind the construction of the wall dividing Israel from Palestine. His critical approach to Hamas and friendly gestures towards Tel Aviv resulted in success, as the 5th Republic finally became a key mediator in the Middle East peace process. It was a great accomplishment; the 5th Republic maintained friendly relations with Arab states and Israel for the first time.⁹ From this initial historical context, it is important to fast forward to more contemporary issues since the unfolding set of revolutions sweeping the wider Middle Eastern region have undermined an assortment of relations while producing new opportunities and challenges. The remainder of this work is based on evaluating the way France has dealt with regional transformations; how it has reacted to the Arab Spring and sought to carve an appropriate niche to fulfil its enduring national interests. To achieve these goals, this work evaluates four Arab states regarded as central to France's international engagement. These are: Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Libya. The subsequent evaluation considers these one at a time though attempts to construct adequate bridges between these cases and the attempted fulfilment of French foreign policy objectives in the region.

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TUNISIA, FRANCE AND THE ARAB SPRING

The Arab Spring, ostensibly, began on 18 December 2010 in Tunisia following the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a series of demonstrations following that ultimate act of defiance and, in typical fashion, the attempted suppression of such demonstrations by the police forces of Ben-Ali. Over the span of several weeks of street battles and the abandonment of the regime by Tunisia's armed forces, a transitional government succeeded the exiled Ben-Ali. Overlapping the events in Tunisia, demonstrations erupted in Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Syria and Yemen while lesser street activities occurred in Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait and Lebanon (among others).

While each of these had its own reason for combustion; some based on legitimate demands, others on sectarianism and external agitations, and others still rooted in tribal power imbalances, together they produced an acute set of challenges for France (among others). Yet, since this work is concerned with the manner in which

France's foreign policy reacted to the Arab Spring, analysis will remain fixed on it.

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Several factors produced the clear impetuous for change to France's foreign policy. First, as noted in the introduction of this work, France's regional engagement was based on personal relations with several Arab dictators and hence, when Tunisia (especially) began to agitate for democratic reforms France found itself in a serious dilemma. On one hand France was officially a champion of democratic movements around the world and therefore should support, if not openly encourage civilian thrusts against authoritarian regimes. Alternatively however, supporting such movements would undermine a foundation of France's regional influence. Second, since it was impossible to predict the scope and results of the Arab Spring, France was caught in suspended animation waiting for – rather than shaping – policy responses. Third, the unfolding revolutions produced general instability, a point which further underscored France's seeming momentary disengagement since one of the key reasons Paris had supported authoritarian regimes was due to the perception that they were more predictable and stable. Finally, regional instability could boost illegal immigration to the EU, and hence France was keen to avoid such spill-over effects. So, when the first demonstrations in Tunisia erupted, France remained silent.

There was also a degree of embarrassment. Since France kept close political, business and personal relations with the political elites of Tunisia, it was soon revealed that many French political elites – no matter the colour of their affinity – paid homage to the Ben-Ali clique; vacationing in the country and making personal and official visits with great frequency. Indeed, in 2008 Sarkozy travelled to Tunis and piled praise on Ben-Ali for 'expanding the liberties' of his people. That same year leading member of the Socialist opposition – the now defamed former IMF managing director – Strauss-Khan also visited Tunis and congratulated Ben-Ali for being a 'model' for other emerging countries around the world. Such visits were not novel, they were merely a continuation of Chirac's policy; a policy which specifically targeted Ben-Ali as a stabilising and modernising regional power.

Such examples are typical of France's style of engagement in the Middle East. The bonds between Paris and Tunis, coupled with

fears of instability drove France to muted reflection in the early days of demonstration. As one European diplomat suggested, France positioned itself according to the logic that it is better to deal with 'the dictator you know than the dictator you don't.' Such sentiments are not the material of policy; they reflect outmoded biases and worked to confuse France foreign policy orientation to the external international environment as much as within France itself. Just as the EU and many states around the world were looking to France for policy guidance in Tunisia, Paris could do nothing but retreat from centre-stage to better gauge the situation.

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Such visible inactivity of the French government provoked internal political tensions, which reached fever-pitch as the first foreign policy announcement, with any substance, came in the form of a 'call to arms.' Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michèle Alliot-Marie, at the beginning of January 2011 suggested that France should dispatch its security forces in support Ben-Ali's regime; a shocking testament to the depth of the internal crisis the external crisis provoked. Indeed, opposition member Pierre Moscovici, commented – in response to Alliot-Marie's bizarre suggestion – that 'We [France] really have diplomacy without courage and without dignity. I am ashamed of what I have seen.' Such feelings were widespread; among the opposition and deep within French civil society. Three days later Alliot-Marie did an 'about face,' retracted her statement and clearly announced that France's foreign policy in the Maghreb is based on the principle of non-intervention. Additionally, and in contrast to the manner France had sought to re-emerge as a legitimate regional power Henri Guiano (a ranking official in the Sarkozy government), declared that France was not seeking the role of a *gendarme* in the Mediterranean. ¹¹

As noted above, assuming the role of *gendarme* was precisely what French foreign policy aimed to achieve and therefore the retracted statements sought to allay public and opposition-based criticism and were not truly policy statements (a point highlighted when, in March 2011, France fires the first salvos in the NATO campaign against Qaddafi). Alliot-Marie became a scapegoat for a dysfunctional policy approach and was forced to resign from office. On 18 January, she candidly admitted her, and the nation's, failures announcing: 'Let's face it, we were all of us – politicians, diplomats, researchers, journalists – taken by surprise by the Jasmine Revolu-

tion,¹² hardly the inspiring words of a senior member of the cabinet and rather the dumbfounded sentiment of one who had cozied too closely to the Ben-Ali regime and had to bear the consequences of its demise.

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Ultimately, with growing public concern, France's policy to Tunisia changed and the crutch Ben-Ali had hoped to continue to prop him up was withdrawn. France now actively worked to support political transformations in Tunisia and in February 2011 Prime Minister Francois Fillon presented a new plan aimed at supporting democratic reforms.¹³

APPROACHES TO EGYPT

As noted, Egypt's chapter of the Arab Spring overlapped with the events unfolding in Tunisia and demonstrations erupted on 25 January 2011 around the central Tahrir Square in Cairo. What began as a series of haphazard demonstrations aimed to show solidarity with Tunisia quickly transformed into a more organised protests against the inhumane deployment of force by Egypt's security forces, limits to freedom of speech, manipulated national elections and serial, widespread corruption. Such expressions were wrapped up in the language of deposing Mubarak who had come to be regarded as *the* barrier to modernisation and obstacle to reform. Predictably, Mubarak's government called up security forces to suppress the Tahrir demonstrations through the severing of lines of communication (the internet and mobile networks) mass arrests and the deployment of rival sub-national groups loyal to Mubarak. Despite such measures, or perhaps due to them, the raw alienation of the ruling clique from the Egyptian masses was revealed, ushering in a period of sustained violence and general instability. Following a series of stammering speeches which bordered on the delusional, Mubarak – his support from the military waning – ceded power to the Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces (11 February).¹⁴

By the time demonstrations were in full swing, and having learned (the hard way) from its mistakes in dealing with Tunisia, France opted to engage in a more active policy approach to Egypt since the country has long been regarded as a linchpin for regional stability. Additionally, any civil war in Egypt – especially one with definite Islamic overtones – would likely undermine Israeli security

and damage European political and economic interests. Swift action was required. So, on 28 January, just three days after the commencement of demonstrations, Alliot-Marie (who had not yet been forced to resign) issued France's first statement expressing 'deep concern over the demonstrations which have rocked Egypt for the past few days ... [France] deplores the casualties and calls for restraint.' Stressing France's friendship with Egypt, she called for dialogue between all parties in order to meet expectations of greater freedom and democracy.¹⁵ In other words, France would not blindly support Mubarak; different priorities were being sought. France then took the initiative to bring EU states to develop a common position, which bore fruit on 29 January, when Sarkozy, Merkel and Cameron declared – in the subtle language of diplomacy – that they are

deeply concerned about the events that we are witnessing in Egypt. We recognise the moderating role President Mubarak has played over many years in the Middle East. We now urge him to show the same moderation in addressing the current situation in Egypt.

They demanded that violence against civilians cease and human rights be respected, particularly rights connected to the freedom of speech and of assembly.¹⁶ The trickle of concern turned into a torrent and France issued an assortment of demands ranging from the responsibility to protect journalists to pushing for a rapid transition of power in Egypt; essentially regime change from within. Then, on 11 February, Sarkozy rounded off his government's public pressure against Mubarak with a welcoming of his resignation and hope that the new Egyptian authorities would establish democracy and the rule of law.¹⁷

This is not to suggest that France simply weighed in against Mubarak without pause for reflection on who would replace him. Instead, Sarkozy was acutely aware of the dangers that lay ahead and the potential for abuse of the unfolding situation in the country. Therefore, France repeatedly cautioned over the future of Egypt going so far as to call for the full rejection of any kind of religious dictatorship, stressing that Western democracies had a moral responsibility to help Egypt (and Tunisia) avoid systems that would be worse than the previous dictatorships.¹⁸ Such an orientation indicates that France was not fully swept-up in the seeming euphoria

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in Tahrir (and beamed around the world); instead it was happy to see the end of the Mubarak era and with it the end of dictatorships in Egypt though attempted to take baby-steps towards full engagement with the country's new power-brokers.

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Nonetheless, Foreign Minister Juppé travelled to Cairo in March (2011) where he personally congratulated Morsi and sought to convey France's interests in the region's return to stability. While there, Juppé announced (06 March) that 'In Egypt this movement is conducted in an admirable manner (...) The attitude of the armed forces and protesters, gathered in the Tahrir Square, are exemplary.' He also promised augmented financial assistance from France and the EU, underscoring the importance of the Union for the Mediterranean for Egypt. It is noteworthy however, that France rejected the suggestion that it cancel Egyptian debt.¹⁹

France's treatment of the Egyptian demonstrations was multipronged and contained several features worth exploring. Firstly, France openly supported the protesters and developed an anti-regime orientation. Learning from errors in Tunisia, Sarkozy expended tremendous energies attempting (partially successful) to promote France as an unflinching, unapologetic champion of democracy and inalienable human rights in the region. In doing so, Sarkozy exposed a policy inconsistency since it had, in the not-too-distant-past stated a principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Arab countries. Secondly, Sarkozy began to cooperate closely with his European allies, particularly Great Britain and Germany. This multilateral cooperation aimed at boosting the French position in the region and was not meant to construct an EU policy as such, rather it intended to legitimate France's position through the nods of approval of the UK and Germany. Thirdly, during the Egyptian demonstrations – coupled with the seeming inability of Mubarak to offer any tangible reforms – France recognised that the Arab Spring (more generally) was widespread and persistent and likely to last for some time. To better secure its interests, France undertook a series of initiatives to quell hostilities against it for its previous support of Mubarak (among others) and generate support among the so-called Arab street. Finally, France continued to harbour anxieties that the momentum of change would result in a purely Islamic revolution and subsequent state. This was a well-grounded fear since the Muslim Brotherhood – while initially taking a back-seat in the

revolution – was the most disciplined and organised opposition group in Egypt and once it began to mobilise quickly emerged as the single strongest political force in the country. To prevent the rise of a theocratic Egyptian state France set a new – if unrealisable – goal; supporting democratic reforms as *the* avenue to suppress Islamist fundamentalism. France – like many others – expected the new authorities to respect democracy and human rights, particularly related to women and religious minorities. It has been disappointed.

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THE SYRIA CONUNDRUM

In contrast to the short lived revolutionary zeal – though certainly not the long and arduous period of transformation – attached to both the Egyptian and Tunisian episodes, Syria's is one of phases, of demonstrations leading to suppression, suppression to insurgency, insurgency leading to a full-fledged civil war and the civil war seems likely to start a regional conflict. France, like many others, was overwhelmed attempting to deal with the unfolding regional fluctuations. As a result, it either underestimated the dedication of demonstrators to pursue a regime change strategy or overestimated the regimes ability to suppress the revolution. Additionally, – and perhaps most importantly – France was on good terms with the al Assad regime (especially during Chirac's presidency)²⁰ and was using its leverage in the country to balance some of the interests of Iran, Russia and China.²¹

Therefore, initially, France's reaction to the outbreak of violence in Syria was one of muted criticism and weak condemnations.

Similarly to its Egypt policy, France initiated a multilateral dynamic based around the EU, which itself only reacted to Syrian bloodshed with a limited-in-scope sanctions regime against 13 Syrian officials; adopted four months into the conflict. However with each passing day, as the death toll mounted, the EU adopted a sharper tone. On 20 June 2011, the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU took a proper stance and condemned

in the strongest terms the worsening violence in Syria. The EU deplores that the Syrian authorities have not responded to the calls to immediately stop the violence and engage in meaningful reforms. The EU considers that the ongoing violent repression

in Syria constitutes a threat to internal and regional stability (...) Stressing that the current crisis can only be settled through a political process, the EU reiterates its calls on the Syrian authorities to launch a credible, genuine and inclusive national dialogue and meaningful political reforms without delay.²²

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Expectedly, the regime's reaction was rhetorical and was not reflected in policy changes. The same could not be said of the EU, which thanks largely to French initiative, imposed personal sanctions against a wider web of Syrian representatives. These sanctions were again extended on 23 June. A third wave of European sanctions was adopted at the beginning of August.²³ These measures proved ineffective; they did not force Syrian authorities to end bloodshed. However, if seen through a more symbolic lens, they mark a milestone in the EU's foreign policy as they may be regarded as foreign policy in motion rather than in retrospect.

In addition to pursuing EU options, France also commence several unilateral initiatives. In April 2011, Juppé listed four priorities to end regime repressions. First, France pledged to use all possible diplomatic means to end strife in Syria. For example, Syria's ambassador was summoned to Quai d'Orsay to provide explanations and listen to French demands. Second, Juppé announced more robust cooperation in the UNSC to get both sides to agree to an immediate ceasefire. Third, France imposed its own sanctions against the regime. Fourth, tactic communications lines were opened to the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Fifth and finally, France was set to initiate actions within the Human Rights Council (HRC), becoming the initiators of the Council's 29 April resolution which placed blame squarely on al Assad and his regime.²⁴ France also supported the withdrawal of the Syrian candidature from the HRC.²⁵

LIBYA: FRENCH STYLE

Ultimately, France's engagement to Tunisia, Egypt and Syria pales in insignificance compared to the active role France assumed in Libya. Domestic pressure mounted against Qaddafi in February 2011 as members of Benghazi's tribes, learning from the experiences of Tunisia and sensing an opportunity, agitated for greater control over Libya's economic and political future. The Benghazi-centric

demonstrations resembled less of a series of political gatherings and more as a rallying cry to mobilise the country against Qaddafi's rule. The Benghazi crowd drove west to Misrata, was stopped dead in its tracks and then pushed back to an inch of its life, that is, until NATO intervened and threw it a life preserver. Indeed, NATO's support was so vital, many doubt whether the revolution would have survived even an additional 24 hours more on its own. NATO's actions were largely driven by French interests and, in fact, warplanes.

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The Sarkozy Factor

Sarkozy was driven by many factors. Despite Tripoli's geopolitical position beyond France's North African 'sphere of influence' (the so-called *pre carré*),²⁶ Qaddafi was perceived in Paris as a key actor in the Mediterranean littoral. Secondly, as suggested by Willsher, owing to very low approval ratings, and facing presidential elections (2012), Sarkozy was desperate for a political boost to reinvigorate his administration and reintroduce the *Super Sarko* nickname to the public domain.²⁷ These points converge with a third; Sarkozy was trying to salvage his reputation following idleness as the Arab Spring unfolded.

Indeed, the ambiguous policy during Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution coupled with cautious support for both the Egyptian and Syrian revolts, heightened French discontent. France retains the self-perception as a defender of universal values and thus the French public holds to account its leaders who are seen as undermining such values. Failing to clearly and unambiguously denounce regime-stoked violence in Tunisia, giving tied-support to demonstrators in Egypt alienated Sarkozy from his electorate and prodded him, in Libya, to apply a core element of French foreign policy: *politique de grandeur* to win over the French public.

France Libya policy was hashed in March 2011, during a decisive summit in Paris devoted to the crisis. According to Erlanger, Sarkozy announced that

France decided to assume its role, its role before history. The decision to lead the military intervention was also explained by the humanitarian need, another important aspect of traditional French foreign policy. Muammar Qaddafi's actions against the

rebels were considered by France as a “killing spree” against citizens wanting to “liberate themselves from servitude.”²⁸

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Sarkozy later added that ‘if we intervene on the side of the Arab nations it is because of a universal conscience that cannot tolerate such crimes.’²⁹ Such rhetoric marked a significant departure from the reaction to the Tunisian and Syrian crises.

Also, France must consider the foreign policy preferences of its sizable – and growing – Muslim community and balance these against the dangers of illegal immigration to Europe. When faced with having to strike such a balance, Sarkozy decided that intervening in Libya would produce three tangible results: 1. it would stem the tide of immigration since it would deny would be immigrants a reason to leave Libya; 2. it would show its Muslim population that France was also concerned with what occurred in the Muslim world; and 3. it would allow France to demonstrate its regional influence and international significance. Regarding immigration France’s Minister of European Affairs Laurent Wauquiez warned of some 300,000 would-be-immigrants to Europe, adding that France regarded Libyan immigrants as a ‘real risk for Europe that must not be underestimated.’³⁰

Finally, Libya played into another key aspect of French foreign policy; Sarkozy’s transatlantic embrace. One of Sarkozy’s 2007 campaign promises was to establish a clear delineation (or intersection when needed) of responsibilities between NATO and the EU, and re-entered the Alliance (2009) to do just that. The idea was for NATO and the EU to cooperate in managing political and military problems of a transnational manner; NATO to deal with pressing conventional and asymmetrical military actions – while retaining the Alliance’s deterrence capability – while the EU would focus on less defined security challenges. Cooperation would be based on greater involvement of European powers in NATO’s decision-making process.³¹ War in Libya provided an ideal opportunity to demonstrate how this new transatlantic security system could function.

France’s Libyan Campaign

As noted above, France assumed an assertive role throughout

the duration of upheaval in Libya. However, its first salvos were purely of a political nature as Sarkozy built the case for intervention through public appeals and consistent assigning of responsibility to Qaddafi and the tribes and military units loyal to him. This played out over nearly six-weeks in a clear attempt to heightening awareness of the situation and therefore gain a degree of legitimacy for any action that may be necessary in the future.

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Once Qaddafi's forces had pushed rebels back to Benghazi, France took the lead in demanding the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya. This was not to be a standard no-fly zone that would limit the ability of Qaddafi to deploy the air-force against rebel fighters; it implied controlling the air in order to control the ground.

French officials rushed to the UNSC to plead the case for intervention in Libya, which was initially rejected as both Russia and China remained loyal to their Libya ally. Undeterred by the initial setback at the UN, Sarkozy unilaterally recognised 'the LTNC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people,' adding, that France would send an ambassador to Benghazi. Soon after, the UK joined in the chorus and together *la entente cordial* published a joint statement emphasising the legitimacy of the LTNC and suggesting that other EU countries consider them as 'political interlocutors.'³²

On 11 March France initiated an EU summit in Brussels devoted to the Libyan crisis. It was, however, postponed; Sarkozy's decisions produced a confused policy. According to media reports, Juppé and Fillon were unfamiliar with Sarkozy's recognition of the LNTC.³³ Such recognition also surprised several members of the EU. For instance, Merkel regarded Sarkozy's unilateralism as being against the spirit of European solidarity. Despite these problems, France was determined and pushed ahead with an emergency meeting on Libyan. Some 20 world leaders heeded the call (including the US, UK, and Germany) and ventured to Paris on 19 March to discuss possible solutions. Intervention in Libya was decided.³⁴

This assembly was only last minute window-dressing however. Having passed UNSC resolution 1973 (approved on 17 March), the meeting of the 19th was surely intended to develop an enforcement strategy rather than provide Qaddafi the chance to exit Libya. Indeed, 1973 imposed the no-fly zone over Libya, called for an immediate ceasefire, and strengthened the arms embargo and an assets freeze against the regime. It also authorised the international

community to use 'all necessary means' to protect Libya's civilian population.³⁵ While much of the events between 17 and 19 March 2011 remain shrouded in mystery, it is clear that France assumed a leadership role in NATO and that NATO assumed a leadership role in enforcing UNSC resolution 1973.

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The Intervention

It comes as no surprise that on the 19th, while the assembly was still in session, the intervention commenced over Benghazi. French warplanes scrambled to secure the airspace above Libya. Surprisingly, the US played only a supportive role while the UK and France took the lead with the later contributing some 50 military aircraft – *Rafale*, *Mirage* and *Super Etendard* – which conducted hundreds of strikes against Qaddafi air and ground assets. It also provided helicopters, *Tigre* and *Gazelle* along with a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier the *Charles de Gaulle*, the destroyer *Forbin* and the frigate *Jean Bart*.

Five months later and French aircraft had conducted roughly 4500 missions; nearly a solid third of all NATO sorties. The cost of engagement was estimated at some \$2 million (USD) daily. French activities were not limited to air operations, its territorial army was also involved and providing significant material support to the rebels. Consider, for example, that by late May France was airlifting both small arms (and ammunition) and auxiliary equipment to areas south of Tripoli and the Djebel Nefousa Mountains.³⁶ This support was sufficient to tilt the scales of victory and from summer 2011, rebel units had turned the tide. Just as France had shot the first, so it is fitting that French forces were responsible for an air strike on Qaddafi's convoy near Sirte, which led to his capture and death at the hands of a lynch mob. Officially, NATO's Libya operation drew to a close on 31 October 2011.

Libya represents an important milestone in the history of France's international military engagements after WWII since it was the first time the 5th Republic participated in a NATO operation on such a large scale. According to Bumiller, this intervention changed the perception of French military capabilities in Washington³⁷ and, above all, this operation symbolise Sarkozy's vision of a new transatlantic security system where greater equality between

the US and European members of the alliance exists.

CONCLUSION

The Arab Spring has gone down in modern history as an important turning point for French foreign policy in the Middle East. For decades, France had hedged its bets by supporting dictators in the Maghreb and Mashriq. Yet, within a short period of time – essentially from the end of 2010 until early 2011 – a series of regime-shattering protests in many Arab states produced new challenges and set France on a new trajectory. Interestingly, despite its self perception as the prototypical example of a just state, France initially perceived Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution as a threat, fearing both the rise of Islamic parties and sharp increases in European immigration.

Policy change reflected the heavy public criticism lobbed at Sarkozy for allying with Ben Ali instead of the demonstrators. So, mid-demonstration and Sarkozy did an about-face and opted to support the Arab Spring. Caution was thrown to the wind during the Libyan crisis since Sarkozy recognised a chance to reaffirm French commitments to democratic values while pursuing its regional policy of power aggrandisement. France took advantage of the conflict to test the new division of responsibilities between NATO and the EU with itself at the helm; an excellent way to improve both France's and Europe's image in the eyes of the US.

Although not noted in the above rendition, it may be noted that the conflict in Libya provided economic opportunities to France in the region as well. In September 2011 media reports revealed that Libyan rebels had promised France some 35% of their national crude oil for military assistance.³⁸ This point certainly requires deeper evaluation; though this work defers to others' explorations owing to spatial constraints.

Equally important, it should be remembered that France's regional role since 2010 is inconsistent since attention is paid to mostly to Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, largely ignoring other episodes of political violence such as a Shia insurgency in Bahrain and a strange-brew of tribal and religious conflict in Yemen.

Finally, the French-led intervention in Libya led to a number of controversies. First, France only supported the rebels in their bid to conduct a regime change against Qaddafi. This ran counter to the letter (and spirit) of UNSC resolution 1973 which theoretically

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obliged the international community to use all means necessary to force both sides to adhere to a ceasefire, which was never attempted. Additionally, NATO's operation raised doubts in Russia and China. Indeed, Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Lavrov stated that

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Members of the international community, first of all our Western partners, have chosen the path of supporting one of the sides in the civil war – probably the party that represented the Libyan people's legitimate aspirations, but this still increased the number of casualties among the civilian population.³⁹

Multiple other problems such as the circumstances of Qaddafi's death, France's oil deal and the supposed infiltration of many rebel groups by al Qaeda and other Islamist extremists have tarnished the original reasons for and outcomes of the Libyan campaign. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that democracy and human rights, despite occupying a central tenet of France's declared foreign policy goals, were rather instrumental and played minor roles in French decision-making.

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DYNAMICS OF PEACE MANAGEMENT: FROM INTERSTATE TO INTER-HUMANITY DIALOGUE

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ABSTRACT: Traditionally the term “peace” has been defined as the absence of war. Yet, “peace” is closely associated to the term “security” and although “peace” and “security” are both generally referred to in interstate affairs, “peace” is more deeply attached to civil society, since it ultimately suffers in the absence of peace. Peace cannot be confined by territorial limits; a breach of peace in one territory may have consequence in neighbouring lands and may give rise to regional tensions. This work investigates peace management through the available international legal tools. In this respect the work shows how peace has links to the expansive human community where inter-territorial, inter-cultural, inter-regional, inter-ethnic, and other inter-community issues are involved. Subsequently the work suggests that a durable and sustainable peace requires adequately addressing human to human relations in a more sophisticated way and through a softer approach with long-term visions where dialogues from various levels play important roles.

KEYWORDS: Peace, Human Community, Security, International Law, Dialogue

INTRODUCTION

“Peace” is often treated as “security” with the word implying an enjoyment of a secure environment. Since peace is deeply connected to security, and since security implies a lack of conflict, it is easy to regard peace simply as the absence of war. When taken to the international level, peace as a state of affairs between recognised national entities is crucial and produces explicit differences between the domestic and exogenous areas of state activities. Obviously, the domestic area (of jurisdiction) is the physical place where state institutions, civil society and individuals conduct their interactions and it is from within this space that sovereignty – the key ingredient in statehood – is derived from. And being sovereign provides state

institutions – whether under the stewardship of elected officials or through inheritance – with legal authority over a defined territory free (in theory) from external interference. The maintenance of peace within a defined territory rests on sovereign authority, its legislative capabilities and implementation tools to uphold law and order within its jurisdiction. Sovereign authorities find its own way to maintain peace within its own national frontiers.

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Alternatively, in reference to the exogenous area of state activity, sovereignty draws a clear line between internal and external affairs. It is the guarantee that other states will not interfere in its domestic political arena and the promise not to interfere in theirs. This dimension to sovereignty may be self-limited however, since access to international or regional organisations, and bi- and multi-lateral treaties may relinquish some authority to a certain extent, in certain matters. This applies, at the present time, to transnational movements where civil societies interact with each other beyond the exclusive domain of national state sovereignty, re: in cyberspace.

The relevance of sovereignty is often questioned by scholars who examine its enduring pragmatism, which provides a functional perspective of sovereignty, such as the maintenance of peace, the failure of which may produce unwanted international attention and tensions.¹ Consequently, it has become very difficult to draw a precise line between the domestic and external affairs of states, especially when peace is at stake.

Consequently, understandings of peace have broadened to include both interstate and intrastate aspects: ranging from the absence of war (between states or within them), poverty, human rights, and natural disasters. Since there is a growing consciousness regarding civil society and inalienable rights, and considering that whenever peace is undermined, victims tend to come from that civil society, the role of sovereignty must be understood in a more limited manner, and against the ‘unlimited opportunities for oppression at home.’² This is precisely what this work sets out to achieve; to reveal the shortcomings of traditional approaches to sovereignty as they apply to an international environment defined by political nuances. To do so, this work, firstly, evaluates the role of the UN in upholding – simultaneously – the contradictory trends of (traditional) sovereignty and positive peace. This is followed by a section which

reviews some steps towards peace management. Finally, this work details approaches that may be taken so that the appreciation of peace as determined in the second section is made to be sustainable over the long-term.

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THE UN: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND PEACE

The more traditional approach to sovereignty as underlined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter has (gradually) become obsolete. The scope of the Article can no longer be limited to 'essentially within the domestic jurisdiction.' Internal state matters, with the broadened scope of peace, are internationalised and embrace the exception found in the second part of the Article. A threat to, or a breach of, the peace is *always* a criteria to level a situation no longer fully embedded in a domestic jurisdiction, implying the labelling of a situation as international to facilitate an international response. This, technically, allows the UN to intervene when peace in general is threatened or breached regardless of whether or not it occurs within a domestic jurisdiction. Civil wars, the wide-scale violation of human rights, famine, oppression of minorities, terrorism, all generate international concerns. The UN deploys the provisions of the Charter to intervene and safeguard the peace to deal with such concerns.

Despite the centrality of the UN in determining the legitimacy of operations deemed to be of an international character that target the domestic sphere of sovereign states, and considering that the UN is meant to be a universal organisation representing the interests, rights and responsibilities of the community of states, it is best placed to positively affect the transformation of interpretation required of understandings of peace. However, the UN is severely constrained since questions related to international peace and security fall within the mandate of the 15-member Security Council, which is deeply political. Well, not all members are. Instead, only five, the permanent members (P5) enjoy veto power over all substantive resolutions passed under Chapter 7 of the Charter. Vetoes are used when the national interests of one (or more) UNSC member, or its allies, are challenged by a particular resolution. This poses a significant problem for the UN system since it empowers only five states – and prioritises their interests – at the expense of the inter-

national community.

Indeed, most UNSC decisions are motivated by narrowly defined self-interests. As a result, the UNSC is often criticised because of inaction or hypocrisy. Consequently, the tools deployed by the UNSC are sometimes, but not always, effective. Even when effective actions are decided on, they are frequently time-delayed owing to diplomatic hurdles related to consensus building, the size of the UN's bureaucracy, striking a balance of interests, and convincing allies of the legitimacy of such actions. Such time-lapses may lead to untold miseries until an action is undertaken.

If, as alluded to above, peace is applicable to some form of international civil society, existing international legal mechanisms must be more reflective. The following section delves into the existing structure of peace management mechanisms, so that an adequate context is derived to encourage additional approaches for the development of human-to-human relationships and, ultimately, aims to contribute to sustainable peace.

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THE EXISTING STRUCTURE OF PEACE MANAGEMENT

The maintenance of international peace and security is among the primary goals of the UN as embodied in Article 1(1) of the Charter.³ As previously noted, the UNSC is entrusted with the task upholding Article 1(1), a point underlined in Article 24(1). Originally, the task of the UNSC was geared towards the prevention of inter-state war.⁴ The non-interference with territorial integrity and the political independence of each of state has been guaranteed in Article 2(4), which seemingly goes together with UN's role embodied in Article 2(7). The UNSC, however, bears responsibility to take effective and collective measures to repeal any threat to or breach of the peace for which, the Council simply is allowed to derogate the principle of territorial integrity and political independence; re: sovereignty. This exception is found in the second clause of Article 2(7), which presents the suspension of sovereignty, enforced by international law. Consensus based decision-making is crucial for the UNSC to act, and this process, as presented above, is replete with dilemmas.

The provisions of the Charter are divided into soft and hard cri-

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teria for the management of peace, reflected in Chapters 6 and 7 of the Charter respectively. Chapter 6 deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes; where the role of the UNSC is recommend, to disputants, ways to settle their disputes peacefully (via negotiations, mediation, conciliation or by judicial settlement). The UNSC delivers its recommendations when, in its opinion, the dispute likely to endanger international peace and security. This is more of a theoretical, rather than practical arrangement since the members of the UNSC have to reach consensus. On failure to reach agreement, the issue remains listed under Chapter 6. If, on the other hand, a majority in the UNSC – with unanimous consensus among the P5 – take up the issue, it shifts from Chapter 6 to Chapter 7, which authorises the UNSC to deploy harder tools to enforce peace.

Chapter 7 commences on Article 39, which reads that:

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The language is ambiguous enough to provide the UNSC an array of powers to act in accordance with the subsequent Articles (i.e., Articles 41 and 42) which call for mandatory sanctions including non-military and military measures. The resulting consequence of a Chapter 7 determination of a ‘threat to the peace,’ grants the UNSC virtually ‘unlimited power’⁵ to take ‘all necessary measures’ for the accomplishment of its mandate. Interestingly, the UNSC is not bound by any formula regarding what may constitute a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression when it acts under Chapter 7.⁶ The UNSC may determine that situations relating to internal disturbances, human rights violations, apartheid, civil conflicts or even (conceivably) the acquisition of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, as threats to the peace. Even the refusal of a government or opposition group to accept the results of an election may constitute such a threat; at least if it involves the outbreak of hostilities between contending factions or causes some aggravation of tensions such as refugee flows or other (potential) cross-border

effects.⁷ The idea has been supported by the *travaux préparatoires* of Article 39 of the Charter, which reflects the drafters' intention to allow the UNSC to take enforcement actions on a broad range of cases and not to subject it to restrictions in its decision when to act.⁸ Therefore, for the "international nature of a threat to the peace formulation" under the exception clause of Article 2(7), it is enough to gain Article 39 determination which would render a threat international, meaning that it no longer falls 'essentially within the domestic jurisdiction' of a state. Such a flexible use of power was not typically used – besides during the Korean War, owing to the famous 'empty chair incident' – in the formative years of the UN due to the spill-over of East-West tensions. Indeed, the UNSC was deadlocked until the end of the Cold War, when it began operating as it was originally intended.

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During, and in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War the UNSC only occasionally invoked Chapter 7 mechanisms concerning the enforcement of peace. Interestingly, in all but a few cases, such resolutions were of an intrastate nature.⁹ The majority of cases, disturbance to the peace was due to internal issues such as: civil war, repression, the violation of human rights and humanitarian obligations, the suppression of democratic processes, and policies of apartheid (etc).¹⁰ Territorial limitations were not respected when the maintenance of peace was concerned. The approach the UNSC adopted was, perhaps, pragmatic, but the effectiveness of its actions remains questionable. This view is supported by several interstate and localised civil disturbances.

Examples of a Stagnated Council

The problems associated to the UNSC indicated above have consequences far beyond the political relationship of the members themselves. Actions and inactions reverberate on the ground. It is thus important to draw attention to some of the instances of UNSC lethargy in a bid to fully appreciate the Council's shortcomings.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict—The Arab-Israeli conflicts during the second half of the 20th century serve as good examples of UNSC decision-making over interstate conflicts. In the first war 1948, the newfound UNSC invoked Chapter 7 determination of the 'threat to

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the peace' without taking effective measures under Articles 41 or 42, with the exception of calling for a ceasefire.¹¹ Even when full scale wars erupted (1956, 1967 and 1973), the UNSC proved unwilling – or, given the Cold War, unable – to take action. Similarly, during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) a consensus-based resolution was only adopted in 1987, after seven years of violent conflict.¹² Examples abound if instances of UNSC P5 members' military operations are considered; the Council could not dream of passing effective resolutions to end the US-Vietnam, China-India, UK-Argentina, France-Algeria or the USSR-Afghanistan conflicts (to name a few).

Iraq—And, seldom, does the UNSC initiate effective measures to restore the peace. However, one case stands out as an exception, the unprecedented Chapter 7 actions adopted to facilitate Operations Desert Shield and Storm (1990-1991) to repeal Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. In this case, the UNSC adopted resolution 660, and 12 additional resolutions over a four-month period; until the full liberation of Kuwait and full compliance of Iraq with UNSC directives aimed at curtailing its WMD programme. These directives, essentially, burdened Iraq with a severe sanctions regime, and caused widespread suffering in Iraq while only marginally affecting Hussein's grip on power.¹³

Rhodesia and South Africa—The unilateral declaration of independence (1965) by the white minority in Southern Rhodesia was termed a threat to international peace, only a year after the actual disturbance to peace occurred.¹⁴ The UNSC however, expanded its authority further and, acting under Article 41 of the Charter, imposed detailed trade, transport, and fiscal sanctions on Southern Rhodesia. The resolution focused on 'the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence.'

In South Africa, the policy of apartheid was consistently condemned by the UNSC from 1963, but an effective Chapter 7 mechanism was only adopted 14 years later (1977), with an embargo on arms to South Africa.¹⁵ The UNSC called for the elimination of apartheid and all kinds of racial discrimination within the country.¹⁶

Bosnia-Herzegovina—In Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992–1993, in response to atrocities and the violation of humanitarian law, the UNSC adopted a series of resolutions. Although divided on how to reach consensus on effective peace enforcement measures, the UNSC was at least successful in declaring Sarajevo and five other towns and their surroundings as ‘safe areas.’¹⁷ The resolution, by condemning all violations of international humanitarian law, ethnic cleansing in particular, as well as the denial or obstruction of access of civilians to humanitarian aid, medical assistance and basic utilities, has further extended the mandate of UNPROFOR – the peace keeping forces employed in the region – to include, *inter alia*, the use of force to deter attacks against the safe areas.¹⁸ Still, some 200000 civilians lost their lives and the UNSC’s division has been criticised for an ill-conceived understanding of civil war and ‘matters within the domestic jurisdiction.’¹⁹

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The UNSC’s behaviour is repetitive. In many occasions it has used enforcement mechanism in various manner, which some found innovative, such as, use of its power to establish judicial and other bodies with binding settlement authority under Chapter VII. The fiercely debated question – whether international law has binding enforcement authority – has been answered in the affirmative in some cases with the multifaceted application of the Security Council’s authority under Chapter VII. Whether all such applications of its authority were in accordance with international law and/or in accordance with the Charter principles have been a fiercely debated issue. Many scholars argue that a pure legal role by a purely political body may become a threat for the international community at large. This assertion while deserves further discussions, for this paper it is irrelevant. Suffice is to mention that Chapter VII authority of the Security Council has been used to include almost everything that its members agree on. Yet, as mentioned earlier, as a political body, the Security Council cannot act effectively in many occasions due to the fact that its members, especially of the permanent ones, have to counter balance their political interests. Secondly, actions in the Security Council take a lengthy process of negotiations, information exchanges, and investigations and so on. All these cause lapse of time – the time in which civil populations suffer at their most. Only in Rwanda in 1994, for example, genocidal slaughter of

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800,000 Rwandan Tutsis had occurred in 100 day before the Security Council intervened. The mass-murder of over 8,000 Bosnians by an ethnic Serbian militia in 1995 has “laid bare the horror of inaction”²⁰ by the Security Council. These facts encourage the perpetrators to let the killing continue, and thereby, let the “peace” continue to be threatened or breached, and let the people suffer as long as the elite Security Council members decide something for the fate of the concerned human community.

The frustration led some to argue for alternative arrangements regarding peace management by-passing the Security Council’s authority. In 1999 the NATO bombardment of former Yugoslavia by the US led NATO force has been widely characterised as a “humanitarian intervention” designed to stop “ethnic cleansing” by the Serbs. From a strictly legal perspective the action was criticised as being illegal,²¹ although others argue for an implied “legal” authority in the Security Council’s previous determination of a threat to the peace. Again, this caused another tension among the legal scholars. Some see it as “legitimate” even though not perhaps “legal” in the sense that there was no explicit Security Council authorisation. A need for a bridge between legality and legitimacy has been high on this debate.²² The debate culminated to the emergence of a new peremptory norm widely known as “responsibility to protect.” The idea suggests that in the event of large scale ethnic cleansing or genocide or human sufferings both from violation of gross human rights and (conceivably) from natural disaster where humanitarian support is an urgent issue being obstructed by the concerned regime, the international community should act promptly and effectively to ensure protecting the population at risk. And it is the responsibility of the international community as a whole to protect the human community. The approach is idealistic, but suffers from concrete contents and precise methods as to how to act in a concerted manner. Moreover, what many fear is that, the norm can be applied in broader and politically motivated cases. Such fear is not implausible though. Therefore, as some see, tyranny of Security Council under Chapter VII is much better in the sense that there are some checks at least. The political use of “responsibility to protect” without the Security Council’s authorisation would be extremely dangerous.

Consequently, a discussion on an alternative way concerning the management of peace has been at its crucial stage. In the beginning of last decade, international security structure has started being approached differently with yet another invention by the then US President George W. Bush – the so called “pre-emptive self-defence,” also known as the “Bush Doctrine.” The principal idea is that a state cannot just wait to receive an armed attack to attack back to defend itself. The approach altered the existing concept of self-defence. The existing notion of self-defence can be found in Article 51 of the UN Charter, which talks about an ‘inherent right of individual or collective self-defence’ and which continues only until the Security Council has taken necessary measures. As a result, such invention cannot be found justified within the structure of the UN system. It is criticised as “unilateralism” against collective security approach embodied in the Charter of the UN. Pre-emptive self-defence is a matter that bypasses the unanimous decision-making power of the Security Council putting a question mark on its authority. The recent test of pre-emption was exercised in the war against Iraq in 2003. The US administration, on failure to achieve a consensus based Security Council resolution authorising use of force against Iraq, decided to act on the basis of “pre-emptive self defence,” which, many argued, was merely a unilateral action. The Bush administration however, invited its allies to join in its effort to regime change in Iraq on the basis of President Bush’s famous statement ‘either you are with us or you are against us’ leaving no room to argue for an alternative view on “peace.”²³ The rationale behind the US action was that the (possible) possession of weapons of mass-destruction at the hand of Saddam Hussein would cause a greatest threat to “peace” for which a regime change was necessary. The US has taken up the stewardship to free the people of Iraq from Saddam Hussein’s ruling, and to secure the region at large from any further threat to “peace”, although from legal point of view the action was found to be “illegal” under international law. At the end of the war, the regime collapsed though, no weapons of mass-destruction were found. Yet a durable peace apparently is not in place in Iraq even today. In any case the pre-emptive self-defence creates yet another danger which may set up an evidence of arbitrary action by a state capable of doing so.

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WAY FORWARD TO SUSTAINABLE PEACE

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A realistic achievement of “peace” is a puzzle. Multilateralism as discussed above failed to play an effective role for an endurable peace, mainly because of global power politics. The structure of peace management is targeted to states generally. The sufferings of human community are often neglected either because of technical difficulties or because of lack of proper tools as to how to address the issue. From “multilateralism” point of view, human suffering can be seen from both action and non-action by the UNSC. Action of the UNSC leaves sanctions on the regime causing ultimately huge distress to civilians, and non-action leaves the conflict to continue, and again, causing distress to civilians. Unilateralism, on the other hand, may cause even more chaos as its authority suffers from either legality or legitimacy. Initiatives such as uniting for peace, responsibility to protect and pre-emptive self-defence are, therefore, not pragmatic solution despite the idealistic view attached to these principles. International community might fear that the principles, once adopted into practice, can be politically abused. Overall, it is hard to choose any of the alternatives at its entirety. However, the United Nations in general, and the UNSC in particular, still play an important role at least at some point in time in a conflict, which opens up further chances to keep the peace with other soft mechanisms as discussed below.

Today’s infringement of peace is not because of the occupation or annexation of land territory, and is not limited to only cross border matters. Inequality, injustice, discrimination, unfair distribution of earth’s resources, and denying one from his legitimate rights etcetera are the main issues for a fragile “peace.” Inter-state relations are not exclusively crucial; human relations has become more important, which include inter-regional, inter-cultural, inter-ethnic, and other inter-community concerns. Human peace accepts a broader concept in terms of promoting quality of human lives including protecting and respecting humans’ and peoples’ rights, maintaining equality and non-discrimination, establishing social justice, expanding fundamental human values, practicing forgiveness, and enlightening human minds with love and compassion. Human peace, thus, has to be addressed from different angles.

There is no other way than addressing such a broader and non-military concept of security in the management of peace.²⁴ A holistic approach is, therefore, required involving collective participation of stakeholders including states, non-state and supra-state actors.

Despite this subjectivity it is crucial to create an environment for interaction where dialogues play an important role in order to contribute to a greater “peace.” Perhaps the role of the UNSC is significant in creating such an environment in the post-conflict situation where community dialogue becomes effective, and contributes to a long lasting and durable peace. Mechanisms such as building of confidence, knowledge and capacity, and sharing of good practices in terms of governance including distribution of wealth and resource are fundamental. Peace is not only safeguarding inter-state security, but also about building a culture – universal and common to all the human community at large. Dialogue among the cultures and civilisations would best contribute to such a culture of peace in both pre-conflict and post-conflict societies. Some of the examples discussed below could better explain such endeavours of building a culture of peace.

In 2005, the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery of the UN Development Programme published a report showing how three Commonwealth countries – Ghana, Guyana and Kenya – were able to mitigate their contentious issues by means of dialogues.²⁵ The report was the result of systematic support provided by the UN system to build national capacities and to agree on constructive negotiations in one’s own society with a view to establishing durable peace in the society at large. In Ghana, for example, between September and December 2004, the UN supported a number of initiatives to promote capacity building measures, including soccer matches, media campaigns, and high level dialogues among the major political parties causing national actors to prevent the expected violence.²⁶ The capacity building measures such as these are not quite unfamiliar in international diplomacy. In Indian sub-continent “cricket diplomacy” has had a good standing for quite some time now to create a friendly environment to initiate peace dialogue.²⁷

Dialogue process in the post-election mistrusts amongst the rival political parties in Guyana initiated in 2002 has led to a “national conversation” to undertake reforms in the political culture in the country. Eventually, in 2006 as part of a wider strategy an initiative

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was launched to prevent any violence during the election later in that year. The initiative involved training for a network of local government officials, civic leaders and police officials which contributed to a peaceful management of disputes during national elections later in the year.²⁸ In Kenya, the approach adopted was designed as “social cohesion programme” in response to tension regarding claims from ethnic groups over the scarce resources and lands located in its northern region. The idea of social cohesion programme is about forming “peace and development committees” consisting of local leaders who by way of having friendly dialogue assist the provincial administration in the management of conflicts.²⁹ The endeavours undertaken in the above mentioned three African examples have been found effective, and as a result, they provide a basis for securing peace where dialogue play a very important role, and through which a sustainable and durable peace can be achieved where the involvement of national actors and institutions can be ensured.

Other accepted practice mostly, again in African countries, is amnesty through truth and reconciliation. In many cases an amnesty may create a nonviolent transition to peace. South African example pioneers in this context. Transition from apartheid era to peaceful democracy in 1990s was facilitated through reconciliation which would have been otherwise a civil war if perpetrators were fully separated from victims.³⁰ From the justice and human rights point of view, however, amnesty has been widely criticised as providing amnesty in other words indicates putting perpetrators above the law. Moreover, amnesty undermines international law as far as international law rejects impunity for serious crimes, such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Critics suggest that it is not amnesty but securing justice, is a valuable investment for sustainable peace. In the absence of justice to be done, further possibility of conflict and violation of human rights is possible to erupt. It is, however, important to closely look at the reality with a wider view. A vulnerable post-conflict state would not have much strength or resources to provide justice. In many cases an initiative to provide justice would even create chaos and further instability. Amnesty is indeed a cheapest solution, perhaps not a comfortable one. Yet, amnesty provides a safe transition where room for mistrust is blocked. An approach of uniting rather than separating the

people would arguably create a common ground for a dialogue to effective peace. Subject to controls and limitations, amnesty can be effective alongside justice and sustainable peace. Amnesty can be just if it brings the cessation of conflict and ends human rights abuses. South African transition to democracy and peace has just been a remarkable example in this regard.

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CONCLUSION

A stable peace requires security as well as respect for justice and human rights. Humanity stands at a decisive turning point. A durable peace, therefore, calls for establishing a culture of peace taking humanity at its core. Enforcement of peace is indeed desirable through the available multilateral means as discussed in this paper, especially where there exists a threat to or breach of the peace. However, for a culture of peace, an anticipatory approach is much demanded since enforcement only comes after peace has already breached, and offers only a short term solution, whereas anticipatory measures promote confidence for sustainable peace. The enforcement of peace, nonetheless, creates an environment for wider dialogue in a post-conflict situation, which is a pre-requisite for sustainable peace. A culture of peace, thus, need to be built on dialogue and co-existence among inter-state, inter-cultural, inter-ethnic, inter-faith communities putting humanity on top. The narrow examples of few African countries shown in this article suggest that the transition to peace and the sustaining of peace require softer approach including continuous dialogue and cooperation, consultation, forgiveness and inclusiveness, rather than hard enforcement measures in order to give the “peace” a chance to sustain.

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NOTES TO PAGES

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- 3 See Article 1(1), the UN Charter.

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- 30 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was established to grant impunity in exchange for full disclosure of past wrongs, serves as an example of the peaceful transition to democracy and viable peace. See Adam Penman (2007), 'The Peace-Justice Dilemma and Amnesty in Peace Agreements,' *Conflict Trends*, number 3, pp. 8-9, available at: <www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-bete-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=101969> (accessed 12 April 2011).

BALANCE OF POWER VERSUS COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE

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ABSTRACT: Both the concepts of Balance of Power and Complex Interdependence attempt to describe the post-cold war international system. We select Offensive Realism (re: Mearsheimer) and Neoliberal Institutionalism (re: Keohane and Nye), for theoretically contextualising the aforementioned concepts. Through a critical evaluation in contrast with the realities of the current international system we answer the question of which of these two concepts could be identified as the most relevant. Our conclusions suggest that 'complex interdependence' provides the necessary and at the same time broader framework for analysing the states and their relations after the Cold War, within which recent developments are better explained.

KEYWORDS: Balance of Power, Complex Interdependence, Offensive Realism, Neoliberal Institutionalism

INTRODUCTION

Among more conventional readings of International Relations (IR), history reveals that balances of power (BoP) – whether the international system struck such a balance or is in the midst of turmoil on the way to, or from, a BoP – characterise relations between the great powers.¹ We assume that the first BoP system emerged after the 30 Years War and the conclusion of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). While there have been other BoP systems since 1648, the most recent, the Cold War, was most pervasive.² Using BoP to divide the history of the state-system is largely accepted among scholars.³ Moreover, a spectrum of IR scholars are fully rooted in BoP. Consider Kaplan's 'models of international systems,' and Rosecrance's political history of the 18th and the 19th Centuries, as examples.⁴ In contrast, there is a seemingly endless supply of critics of BoP, who nevertheless deploy BoP to reveal its shortcomings. For instance, some suggest that the end of the sovereign state, and thus

the state-system, is inevitable and therefore seeking to understand elusive BoP between such declining actors is flawed.⁵ Others understand the flow of IR history to be driven, primarily, by hegemonic powers which dominate international interactions and set the boundaries of exchange.⁶ While such scholarship is certainly interesting, this work accepts many of the key hypotheses regarding the centrality of the state in the international system.⁷

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Yet, there is a great deal of ambiguity since the end of the Cold War deprived scholars of a fluid testing ground for theories related to BoP since the US and USSR (and their allies) were engaged in such so-called balancing behaviour for roughly a half-century and with the departure of the USSR, the international environment has become more nuanced. So, what type of international system currently exists?⁸

On one side were situated the so-called neorealists, who defend, among other things, the BoP concept,⁹ with Waltz's famous book *Theory of International Politics*.¹⁰ On the other side of the debate were the so-called neoliberals, whose bible is Keohane and Nye's work *Power and Interdependence*.¹¹ This debate endured for much of the Cold War (it continues until the present in some quarters). Indeed, the latest 'Correspondence' in *International Security* between Keohane and Waltz seems like a continuation of Cold War international relations' debates.¹² But they are no longer alone in their hypothesising and the debate may now be understood as belonging to those that cling to more archaic theories of IR and those who consider the debate as being centred on synthesising between the two parts.¹³

With this in mind, it is useful, and possible, to compare two – largely dissimilar – theories which are reflections of the aforementioned mainstream IR theories: BoP (realism) and complex interdependence (neoliberalism). This work sets two main objectives: first, to examine the use of BoP in the context of offensive realism and second, to review the advent and use of complex interdependence (CXI) as a reflection of neoliberal institutionalism. Finally, in the last section, we evaluate the two theories in order to explore which could be identified as most relevant. Hidden within this comparison is the relevance of the two concepts these theories incorporate.

In other words, if we examine both theories and consider the historical events after the Cold War, we may identify which of the two concepts of BoP and CXI best reflects the realities of the current period of international history.

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THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, BoP AND OFFENSIVE REALISM

The concept of power is very difficult to define¹⁴ though three general issues may be identified: first, it has many dimensions (economic, military, political etc.) and approaches (realist, Foucaulian etc.);¹⁵ second, if we assume the realist view of power, it cannot be measured according to commonly agreed standards,¹⁶ and if we assume others, like the Foucaulian approach, power is something that cannot be measured at all.¹⁷ Third, power in many cases is not manifested until a clash between two powers occurs; we may know for example how many missiles a nation has, but we don't know if they can all be used, if their use will be successful.

Consequently, if we are unable to formulate a common, clear and concrete definition of power, it follows that it may be more difficult to define the balance of power. Zinnes mentions eleven definitions for BoP,¹⁸ and tries to elaborate a series of cases where a BoP could exist, though notes that it 'does not exhaust the possible permutations and combinations that one might generate.'¹⁹ Alternatively, Sheehan refers to Wight's 'nine different ways in which the concept has been used.'²⁰ Examining Wight, one could argue that the BoP is about the 'even distribution of power' or the 'uneven distribution of power.'²¹

Prior to examining the use of BoP in the context of offensive realism, it is useful to consider how classical realism deploys it. Kegley and Wittkopf mention that 'if all states seek to maximise power, stability will result by maintaining a balance of power, lubricated by shifts in the formation and decay of opposing alliances.'²² Consequently, one could say that in a given system the BoP will emerge when none of the great powers of the system is able to initiate war because all the others will unite against it. Most important, a system of BoP is characterised by stability, which does not, necessarily, imply that power is evenly distributed among all states or even the great powers.

For structural realism though, if a great power attempts to acquire more power, and more specifically to maximise its power, or pursue hegemony (i.e. disturb the balance), it would be the system that will eventually punish its behaviour.²³ This is exactly the beginning of differentiation between the offensive and the defensive branches of structural realism according to Mearsheimer.²⁴ For offensive realism, a great power can, and should, try 'to gain as much power as possible and, if the circumstances are right, to pursue hegemony.'²⁵

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Mearsheimer begins his analysis by making five assumptions.²⁶ First, that the anarchical character of the international system leaves a great power, in any emergency, vulnerable. Second, he assumes that the great powers can never be certain about the intentions of their rivals and are forced to live in an environment of significant insecurity. Third, for this reason all great powers develop and maintain offensive capabilities which, in the worst case, could seriously harm their rivals. Fourth, he underlines that the ultimate goal of each great power is survival. Finally, he acknowledges that states (including the great powers) are rational actors. Mearsheimer proceeds by recognising an unlimited appetite of all great powers for more power. They are, accordingly, ready to disturb the BoP whenever they see an opportunity and they should have no restraints in doing so because their own survival is at stake. But, since the acquisition of power is an endless task, Mearsheimer argues that at the 'end of the road' lays hegemony; of course when the circumstances will be ideal for such an enterprise. What a great power requires for hegemony is not *only* military power – the dominant form of power according to Mearsheimer – but also 'latent power',²⁷ which is²⁸ defined as the entire socio-economic structure of the state that has to be solid and robust in order to allow the expansion and enhancement of the military power. Once again, the potential hegemon must carefully calculate the costs and benefits before pursuing hegemony in the particular time selected.

Furthermore, Mearsheimer argues that in the current world there can be no such thing as global hegemony.²⁹ For his theory, military land power is what counts most³⁰ and this kind of power cannot be projected through the large oceans dividing the earth.³¹ Additionally, due to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a 'clear-

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cut nuclear superiority' is needed for a state to become a global hegemon; meaning that it should have the power to eliminate his rivals without suffering any retaliation, since even one nuclear missile can cause serious harm.³² What his theory proposes is that great powers can pursue hegemony in their region, which is a much more feasible enterprise.³³ This distinction among a general balance and sub-balances is not new.³⁴ Some theoretical argumentations can be found in other theorists' work, but not an extensive theory as illustrated by Mearsheimer.

What Mearsheimer's offensive realism proposes, either explicitly or implicitly, is a description of the post-Cold War international system in terms of BoP, that can be divided into several regional systems. In each of them there is a BoP among the regional powers, which are particularly uncertain about each other's intentions. Consequently, if one of them feels confident about its power, and favoured by the circumstances, may try to disturb the balance and pursue hegemony. But, if a state becomes a hegemon in Region A, it must also sustain a BoP with the other regions by: a) preventing peer competitors in the nearby-accessible by land regions, and b) play the role of offshore balancer in more distant regions.³⁵ The failure to act in this manner may have an impact to its own hegemonic statute; like in the case that a hegemon emerges in Region B, which will try and undermine the first hegemon's position in Region A.³⁶

THE CONTRAST: POST-COLD WAR COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE

By the early 1970s, Keohane and Nye (among others) had begun to examine the transnational relations that exist among states, concerning various issues of their international political agenda.³⁷ Keohane and Nye, elaborated Haas' concept of 'economic interdependence',³⁸ albeit in the concept of world politics. In 1977, they came up with a co-authored book on *Power and Interdependence*³⁹ where CXI appears for the first time.

CXI is primarily based on the transactions between states, in terms of flows of money, goods, people and messages.⁴⁰ Accordingly, interdependence has two characteristics; it is more than a bilateral or multilateral agreement between states and far more than an interconnection. In the first case, an agreement is an intentional

act, confined strictly between two or more states. In terms of interdependence, a state is particularly affected when the oil prices are high, although it may well have not any kind of agreement with petroleum producing states. In the second case, if the price of gold increases the price of jewellery will increase too, but this has no serious effect on a state's economy.⁴¹ Interdependence exists where the effects of a transaction are particularly costly (or beneficial) like in oil prices rate.⁴² Based on such interdependence, Keohane and Nye introduced CXI as an enhancement. They claim that CXI constitutes a polar opposite to the assumptions of realism.⁴³

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CXI is based on three core characteristics.⁴⁴ First, it appears in multiple channels of connection: interstate relations; transgovernmental relations between the sectors of a state's government with those of another (for example, Departments of Environment, the collaboration of national policing forces etc.); and transnational relations between other (non-state) actors in the international system. Through this analysis, it is clear that the authors move beyond realist assumptions about states and involve other, domestic and international actors, like NGOs, multinational corporations, international organisations, bureaucrats and elites (etc). They function not only as potential influencers of a state's policies, but also as 'transaction belts' of the costs and benefits of interaction.

Second, the supposed absence of hierarchy of issues sharply contrasts realist assumptions which stress that issues of security are predominant. In a system of CXI other issues (beyond military) may emerge and different coalitions may be formed. For example, by assuming transgovernmental relations, issues like governments' interdepartmental cooperation on environmental issues, trade regulations and agricultural issues emerge as important, and the international coalitions that will be formed may be extremely different than the already existing military coalitions. Also, non-state actors exercise their own influence on the formation of the agenda in world politics.

Third and consequently, when we broaden the agenda of international issues, military power becomes less useful. Although the military power of a state is particularly important; on issues of CXI, economics, the environment, trade regulations no state will use, or threaten to use, armed force during negotiations. This analysis also

implies that there is a difference in the distribution of power; meaning the distribution of military power and of power resources (for example on trade shipping and oil).⁴⁵

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Keohane and Nye also acknowledge the role of international institutions. They claim that international institutions, among other things, can help setting the agenda, provide a forum for bargaining and coalition formation, help governments focus efforts on specific issues and give developing countries the opportunity to directly communicate with other governments' officials and pursue linkage strategies.⁴⁶

Further elaborating this last argument, Keohane focuses on cooperation and international institutions in *After Hegemony*. His main argument is that the CXI between all these actors on such issues could easily generate conflict, possibly escalating into war.⁴⁷ Due to the anarchical character of the system – he does not propose world government or a cosmopolitan system⁴⁸ – international institutions are necessary in order to provide some grounds of common understanding and cooperation.⁴⁹ Specifically, he identifies several tasks they perform:

1. enhance the likelihood of cooperation,
2. create the conditions for orderly multilateral negotiations,
3. increase the symmetry and improve quality of information,
4. cluster issues together over a long period of time, thus bringing governments into continuing interactions, and
5. create the basis for decentralised enforcement founded on the principle of reciprocity.⁵⁰

Finally, he provides a definition of institutions 'as sets of practices and expectations rather than [...] formal organisations with imposing headquarters buildings'.⁵¹

Following the Cold War, Keohane began to further refine his theory and argued that great powers need institutions in order to influence events and achieve goals since they reduce the cost of making and enforcing agreements, and reduce uncertainty by promoting transparency.⁵² On the other hand, despite the enormous influence of great powers on institutions, the policies followed are different than those that the great powers would follow unilaterally.⁵³

Later, Keohane describes the world based on the concepts of

interdependence and international institutions, although he now calls his theory institutionalism, and uses the terms “globalism” and “governance,” in a clear linguistic shift.⁵⁴ He argues that states are the main actors in the international system, supplemented though by NGOs, IGOs, and Transnational Corporate Networks, formulating ‘a complex geography.’⁵⁵ Numerous ‘networks of interdependence’ exist among them, extending to ‘multicontinental distances.’ These features constitute ‘a state of the world;’ “globalism,”⁵⁶ or networks of interdependence, which may be economic, military, environmental, social, and cultural.⁵⁷

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Interdependence, especially in such a high level of complexity as globalism, can lead to conflicts and disputes.⁵⁸ Consequently, the modern world needs ‘processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that [will] guide and restrain the collective activities’ of the actors.⁵⁹ This is what Keohane defines as “governance”. Keohane makes two significant distinctions. First, between globalism and “universality,” maintaining that we are not inhabiting an era of universality; for example, we may have a worldwide trade system, but not a fully integrated world market.⁶⁰ Second, between governance and “global government,” arguing that any attempt at regulation must be ‘consistent with the maintenance of the nation-states as the fundamental form of political organisation.’⁶¹

EVALUATION

The theory of institutionalism presents a description of the current international system based on the concept of interdependence, constituting the concept of globalism. This depiction challenges offensive realism’s view of the system; the later uses the concept of BoP. This section addresses some key points of offensive realism’s world-view in contrast to that held by institutionalisms’.

The first characteristic of the international system according to offensive realism is its division into sub-systems of BoP. The difficult part is to actually identify this division. Apart from the US, which has dominated its continent as a hegemon for over a century, there is no clear distinction of sub-systems in other continents and/or regions. Europe, for example, is particularly dependant on Russian energy resources.⁶² In Asia, we can identify Russia, China,

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India, Japan, and the oil-producing states in Middle East as powerful, though not particularly in the military sector, and definitely not as parts of a BoP sub-system in Asia. Alternatively, we can identify several networks of interdependence, in which all of these states participate and seek to prevail among others at the global level.⁶³

Second, concerning the claimed endless quest for unlimited power (mainly military), one could argue that it may be the case for states like Iran or South Korea, which seek to acquire nuclear weapons. But, in the larger picture there are several states with great influence which do not follow adopt such policies. If we consider, for example, Europe; the UK and France, already have nuclear weapons, and Germany, does not. The offensive realist assumption is baseless. Also in Africa and Asia, apart from the states that already have nuclear weapons, most others are interested in maintaining a strong position in the global economy, which will permit them to enhance their domestic economy and wealth, rather than putting together powerful mass armies to dominate their regions.

Consequently, in the case of states seeking regional hegemony, evidence suggests the opposite of offensive realism. For instance, although Russia tries to create a 'sphere of influence' in the Caucasus,⁶⁴ which could be perceived as 'hegemony in its region,' it also attempts to establish a reliable relationship with NATO,⁶⁵ enter the WTO to enhance its world trade options,⁶⁶ and it finally took a step back in the war in South Ossetia, accepting international mediation by the EU.⁶⁷ China and the other BRIC countries also try to strengthen their economy but it doesn't pursue its goals in the expense of other states in the region but with a rather international perspective.⁶⁸ These are examples of states in the process of strengthening their domestic structures, not because of their desire to dominate their regions against other competitors, but in order to enhance their position in the global economic network and influence the decision making centres. Of course, in the case of Europe, or Africa, there is no such thing as a hegemony-seeking-state. This part of the theory seems to apply only in the case of the US, though in recent years, some states in South America are attempting to break-out of US hegemony,⁶⁹ something that Cuba had already achieved in the late 1950s.

Two more issues are connected to this analysis, offensive real-

ism's claims of insecurity as a kind of motivation for the great powers' previously mentioned policies and the primary role of military power, and the supporting role of latent power.

Although both theories acknowledge the anarchical character of the international system, which generates a certain level of insecurity, this does not necessarily imply that the so-called great powers *must* seek refuge to hegemony. It may be the case that the US and the UK launched the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq due to sentiments of insecurity,⁷⁰ but it is also well-argued that international institutions enhance confidence; international organisations promote negotiations and resolution of misunderstandings; and the involvement of all states in various networks of interdependence decrease the potentiality of being deceived by others.⁷¹

Respectively, it is not easy even for such a powerful state like the US to violate, for example, the WTO, ICAO, WHO, and NATO collective decisions, although it may have a weighted vote, thus creating a certain degree of safety among their allies. We have also witnessed the great powers negotiating through their delegations in various international organisations, even in times of crisis. Furthermore, the violation of financial agreements, the voting of harmful decisions against an ally, and all other actions and practices that could be perceived as deceitful, may impact a state, since other states from around the world will react if their interests are damaged, exactly because of the high level of interdependence; something that the recent financial crisis confirms.

In the case of military power prevailing over latent power in the priorities of a great power, the response of institutionalism is particularly logical. Apart from the fact that offensive realism acknowledges that nuclear weapons are not useful (only as an element of deterrence), one could say that the military power of the states is not first priority. Great powers like Russia, China, the US, the UK, France and Germany, cannot use their power on a whole range of issues, like the environment, poverty, financial issues such as the recent crisis, and others. Moreover, most of them do not face a direct military threat from any rival; even if we consider the terrorist acts as a military threat, there are arguments saying that they have rather sociological, financial, and ideological causes rather than an endless quest for power on behalf of a terrorist group.⁷²

Latent power is an important form of power for a state facing to-

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day's world, and it does not simply serve to develop military power. A solid economy, education, health issues, and resources are necessary in order for a state to have a strong position in the international system and be able to influence decisions through the complex networks of interdependence.

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Finally, Offensive Realism draws a connection between the sub-systems of BoP, arguing that a regional hegemon always has to act as an external balancer in other regions in order to maintain the BoP there and prevent the rise of a regional hegemon. In this context, Mearsheimer mentions the obligation of the US to prevent the rise of China in Eastern Asia.⁷³ Actually the only state that can be identified today as a regional hegemon is the US. However, although the US has several concerns for the rise of China, one could not argue that the former tries to impede its rise as a regional hegemon, or that it tries to preserve the BoP in China's region. Rather, China's empowerment can add another rival for the US in many issues of the international agenda, for example China's excessive needs for energy may lead it to deepen its engagement in the Middle East,⁷⁴ and its growing economy will augment its ability to influence decisions on issues like international trade, global finance, and of course in various international organisations where the US currently has a leading voice. Moreover, the US cannot limit the potentials that the networks of interdependence give to China. For example, China may use the weak dollar against the euro to put pressure on the US, it has offered many states in Africa and South America preferential economic treatment⁷⁵ and most significantly, large US corporations (re: General Motors) have already invested tremendous monies in the Chinese economy,⁷⁶ since China is now the bigger and at the same time less exploited market.

Furthermore, if we examine other parts of the world we can argue that the US has supported the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel, making it the strongest military power in Middle East. On the other hand, the US has managed to keep the BoP in Europe; one could agree with offensive realism's view that there is not any state in Europe that has both the latent and the military power to become a regional hegemon, even if it meets the appropriate circumstances. However, after the Cold War, in an era where the EU is fully functional on an economic level, it is very difficult for a European state to seek hegemony mainly due to the high level of interdepen-

dence between the EU members; it will lose more than it gains now by breaking off the EU and seeking to become a single hegemon.

CONCLUSION

Although this evaluation was limited to the basic lines of argumentation of the theories under examination, throughout the work one could draw the conclusion that the BoP concept seen in offensive realism is unable to accurately describe current international relations. Constrained around military power, it misses a range of issues and the complex network of relations between states, as well as non-state actors.⁷⁷ Each state participates in a number of regional, sometimes continental and international governmental organisations that the network created among them is really difficult to define and explore. In this network one can identify numerous overlapping procedures on equally numerous subjects. It may be that very powerful states, like the US, have an important say in most of the organisations they participate in, but they still lack participation in a significant number of others; regional and continental. For these reasons, the complexity of states' relations in the current international environment complicated. It also gets tougher for one to map these relations if he/she decides to consider the power that these organisations possess as entities, as well as non-governmental actors with expertise and influence.

In that sense, the concept of interdependence in the context of institutionalism – seen either as CXI or globalism – provides the necessary, broader framework for analysing states and their relations after the Cold War. By endorsing this concept, one can better understand the level of complexity in modern international relations. We must also take in to account that the understanding of the concept does not simplify the complex network of interdependence, it does not provide a clear view and neither does it make it easier for researchers to map the channels of interdependence or power relations. The advantage for the researcher of understanding this concept is the vast number of data, facts, phenomena and parameters that can help produce a wider view regardless of the subject under scrutiny.

It must be noted that Keohane's approach has limitations as well.⁷⁸ When it comes to issues of war, such as the interventions

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in Kosovo, Iraq and Libya, the violation of international law and the decisions of international organisations, the theory of interdependence is unable to provide a convincing analysis. In most cases there was no clear mandate for the intervening states. In others, like Libya, the intervening states decided to adopt a broad interpretation of a UNSC mandate. Not to delve into each intervention, in general it was more the power of intervening states than their interdependence with the states in the region that enabled them to act militarily. Further research is required. Examining the complex networks of interdependence and the behaviour of states and non-state actors in order to enhance the theory and include its exceptions is a noble pursuit. This article constitutes an important theoretical exercise within the framework of the ongoing debate between BoP and CXI. This sought to provide researchers with a comparison that highlights hidden aspects of this debate deploying relevant theories.

Finally, this article brings post-Cold War issues to the more enduring debate between realism(s) and liberalism(s). While it is acknowledged that the current era shares characteristics with previous ones, it is unique in terms of economic and military capabilities, technological innovations and the diffusion and use of information. Contributing in that uniqueness are the high level of complexity and interdependence of states' national interests at the global level, which underpins societal, cultural, political and economic differences and surpasses geographical obstacles.

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NOTES TO PAGES

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HOW THE STRONG LOSE WARS: TRANSFORMATIVE GOALS AND THE OUTCOME OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT

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ABSTRACT: This work proposes an explanation of strong actor failure in asymmetric conflict. It proposes and develops the hypothesis of transformative and non-transformative goals and shows the correlation between strong actor objectives and the outcome of asymmetric conflicts. The central argument of this work gravitates around the theme that strong actors are more likely to lose if it pursues transformative goals and, on the contrary, is more likely to win if it pursues non-transformative goals. The hypothesis is supported with results of research on asymmetric conflicts which occurred between 1990 and 2008.

KEYWORDS: Asymmetric Conflicts, Transformative Goals, US, Great Powers, Post-Cold War

INTRODUCTION

Thucydides' famous remark in the Melian dialogue maintains that the 'strong do what they can and the weak do what they must'¹ is as relevant now as it was all those centuries ago. Power, that elusive concept, continues to be the engine of international politics. However, power does not, necessarily, equate to foreign policy success and history is replete with examples of strong actors unable to achieve their objectives vis-a-vis vastly inferior opponents. Asymmetrical conflicts, for instance, may balance between conventional and unconventional capabilities and render the stronger side unable to adequately deploy and project power where it is needed allowing the weaker side to inflict a heavy loss on the larger actor.

According to Arreguín-Toft, some 14% of all wars between 1816 and 2003 were asymmetric while an additional 37% were tagged as probably asymmetric.² The results of my own survey are in line with Arreguín-Toft's findings: 33% of all wars which commenced in

between 1990 and 2008 were asymmetric or probably asymmetric, and when the survey was limited only to interstate and extrastate wars, the percentage of asymmetric conflicts increased to 63%. Such findings suggest that asymmetric conflicts are rather common in international relations, but surprisingly they are among the least studied.³ In fact, the main-stream theories formulated during the Cold War focus mostly on hegemonic, major or systemic wars. And although they are highly useful in explaining causes and results of wars that erupted between great powers with relatively similar capabilities, they have little to say when it comes to asymmetric conflicts in which the belligerents' capabilities are incomparable. Moreover, theories that are based on the Thucydidean notion of power hardly explain failures of strong actors in asymmetric wars, and according to Arreguín-Toft, such an outcome is typical of almost 30% of all asymmetric conflicts.⁴

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Following the Cold War, the question of asymmetry, in particular the riddle of strong actors' failures, has drawn increasing attention of IR scholars such as Arreguín-Toft, Merom and Record, who have made significant contributions to the debate on asymmetric conflicts. Nonetheless, gaps continue to exist in theories of asymmetric conflicts.⁵

In the search for answers as to why strong states may lose a war against a weaker actor a series of mutually reinforcing variables are assessed. For instance Arreguín-Toft examines strategic interactions between strong and weak actors; Merom stresses the central role of democratic regimes, while Record focuses on external assistance that may strengthen the weaker side. There is agreement among these three scholars that a key reason behind a strong actor's failure against a weaker foe, lies in factors external to the goals of the former.

This work argues to the contrary; that strong states fail because of, not despite, its political goals. I also indicate that the political goals of the strong actor are correlated to the outcome of an asymmetric conflict. This line of argumentation is based on the general hypothesis that great powers in war with weak actors might either pursue "transformative" or "non-transformative" political goals. The former refers to a situation in which the strong actor's aim is to change the political, economic and/or social system of the weak. System transformation might be an end in itself or a means to dif-

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ferent political goals. On the other hand, the strong actor pursues non-transformative goals if he largely accepts the political, social and economic system of the weak. The strong uses its military power to force the weak to particular behaviour (either to do something or refrain from a certain action), but does not intend to change its political or socioeconomic order. In other words, the strong actor might achieve its goals without coerced transformation of the weak.

The idea of transformative and non-transformative goals is fundamental for my second hypothesis. I argue that in the case of asymmetric conflict the strong actor is more likely to lose if he pursues transformative goals, and on the contrary, is more likely to win if he pursues non-transformative goals. Such a hypothesis might seem quite conventional, because the attainment of transformative goals appears more difficult than the attainment of non-transformative goals. Transformation of the weaker actor's political or social system is definitely costly, lengthy and by all accounts an extremely ambitious task. Therefore, it should not be surprising if the strong actor fails. However, such a simple explanation of the strong actor's failure is unsatisfying and too many questions remain unanswered. Are transformative goals attainable? If not, what makes them unattainable and why do the strong actors strive for them? But if goals are within reach of the strong actors, why do they not succeed? What mistakes do they commit? Do they use their enormous resources adequately; squander them unwisely or maybe just cut corners?

In the following sections of this article I briefly present recent findings on asymmetric conflicts, and further develop the idea of transformative and non-transformative goals. To support my hypotheses I present results of research on asymmetric conflicts occurring in the period 1990-2008. The research was primary based on the Sarkees and Wayman data-set.⁶ Lists of cases are presented in the appendix in table 1 and table 2.

DEFINING ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS AND THE RIDDLE OF STRONG ACTORS' FAILURES

In this survey, I adopt the definition of asymmetric conflict that is generally compliant with the definition used by Arreguín-Toft.

Conflicts are restricted to wars (1000 battle-related deaths per year), and are coded as asymmetric when the halved product of the strong actor's armed forces and population at the start of the conflict exceeds the simple product of the weak actor's armed forces and population by at least five to one.⁷ Actors mean states, coalitions of states and nonstate entities, such as rebel or terrorist groups. Thus, the definition of asymmetric conflict used in this article includes wars between two or more states, and also between states and non-state actors. The ratio of asymmetry, here 1:5 is, in fact, a subjective matter. For instance Paul, in his description of asymmetric conflict, uses a 1:2 ratio⁸ and in many works on counterinsurgency strategy or small wars, the asymmetry between parties is automatically assumed and not measured further.⁹ However, setting the threshold of asymmetry at the level of a ratio of 1:5 has at least two advantages. First, it shows a discrepancy in actors' material power and proves that the asymmetric conflict is truly a fight between the proverbial David and Goliath. Second, it facilitates examination on a wider spectrum of conflicts.

So far my definition of asymmetric conflict is much the same as that of Arreguín-Toft. Nevertheless, I introduce significant amendments. In my research, I confine asymmetric conflicts to interstate and extrastate wars and, moreover, to those conflicts that are initiated by the stronger actor.¹⁰ Although the first restriction excludes civil wars from the survey, this does not mean that there are no "asymmetric civil wars." Measuring the material power of civil war belligerents is difficult and sometimes impossible due to poor or non-existing data, but there are still a few examples of civil wars in which asymmetry between the actors is undoubted (e.g. the two Chechnya wars).¹¹ There are substantial differences between asymmetric civil wars, and asymmetric inter- or extrastate wars. Firstly, in a civil war, the interests and goals of the strong actor are markedly different from those in an inter- and extrastate war. In a civil war, the territorial integrity of the stronger actor is usually at stake. Such a situation hardly ever occurs in an asymmetric inter and extra-state war. The territorial integrity of the stronger actor was threatened (however, indirectly) only in 2 of 7 asymmetric inter- and extrastate conflicts that erupted in the period of 1990-2008. Those cases are the two wars between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) fought in northern Iraq from 1991 to 1992 and in 1997. In fact,

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those conflicts are a reflection of civil war in Turkey between the Turkish government and the Kurdish minority.¹² In the other 5 cases the weak actor did not pose a direct, if any, threat to the strong. Secondly, the risk of withdrawal from civil war is much higher because of vital interests that are threatened. Withdrawal from any war before achieving the main goals is a tough decision for any great power and creates a real dilemma for leaders: should we fight on and sacrifice more resources until we achieve our goals or should we accept our failure, take the risk of withdrawal and search for the best way out? In civil wars however, premature withdrawal is even more hazardous because there is a high chance that the unresolved problem will reoccur and the territorial integrity of the strong actor will be threatened again. Such a situation, in fact, is quite common: in the last two decades Russia fought two wars against Chechnya, Indonesia fought twice in the province of Aceh and the Philippines fought three times against Moro rebels. Threatened vital interests of the strong actor (especially territorial integrity) and the high risk of withdrawal have a major impact on the dynamics and outcomes of asymmetric conflicts. I argue that asymmetric civil wars are more civil than asymmetric, and therefore I exclude civil wars from my definition of asymmetric conflict.

The second amendment to the definition limits asymmetric conflicts to those wars initiated by strong actors. In such a case, the stronger is not only five (or more) times stronger than its adversary, but it also decides when to attack, where and how; setting its objectives freely and is, obviously, unsurprised by the attack, so is prepared. Statistically, asymmetric conflicts initiated by strong actors are the most common case. My survey shows that between 1990-2008, there were 11 conflicts that can be classified as interstate or extrastate war. Seven were asymmetric, and all were initiated by the stronger actor.¹³ In the case of civil wars that proportion is much different. Out of 15 asymmetric or probable asymmetric civil wars, only 6 (40%) were initiated by the stronger actor.

In sum, I define asymmetric conflict as war in which the strong actor's halved material power exceeds the overall material power of the weak actor by at least five to one, where territorial integrity of the strong actor is not threatened by the weak actor, and where the war is initiated by the strong. Despite asymmetry, both in material capabilities and the situation (after all, it is the strong

who decides when to attack), the strong actor does not always win. The best known examples of strong actor failures are the Vietnam War and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In the post-Cold War era, most asymmetric conflicts have been won by the strong actor. However, the two most recent conflicts – the Iraq War and NATO intervention in Afghanistan – do not follow that pattern. Few would claim that the US (and its allies) won a decisive victory in Iraq, let alone Afghanistan, but should we categorise them as complete failures? Judging victory or defeat in contemporary wars, in which there is an observable ‘decline in the occurrence of clear-cut victory,’¹⁴ is difficult and debatable. Carroll, for instance, distinguishes fifteen (!) different conceptions of how to evaluate victory in war.¹⁵ But, in the case of asymmetric conflict, such an evaluation should be based on whether the strong actor has accomplished its goals. A conflict initiated by a much stronger actor, and moreover, in which the weak actor does not pose a direct military threat to the strong, clearly falls into the famous Clausewitzian definition of war as ‘a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.’¹⁶ It is the strong actor who sets its political objectives and decides to use military force to accomplish them. However, sometimes the strong actor does not succeed; it fails to achieve the pre-war goals and eventually is forced to abandon them.

One of the first explanations of the strong actors’ failure was proposed in 1975 by Mack. He argues that asymmetry in material power between belligerents implies asymmetry in interests. Mack contends that for the weak actor, struggling for survival, the asymmetric conflict is in fact “total war,” whereas for the strong actor, whose survival is not threatened, the war is only “limited.”¹⁷ The low interests of the strong actor creates political vulnerability. If the war drags on and its costs increase, the strong actor’s public opinion or competing elites push for quick withdrawal from the conflict. The weak actor does not face similar pressure, because the highest interest, survival, increases unity and determination.¹⁸ According to Mack, asymmetry in interests implies political vulnerability, and political vulnerability explains the outcome of the conflict. Although this seems to be true in the case of the strong actor’s defeat, it does not apply to the most common outcome of an asymmetric conflict, which is the situation in which the stronger wins. In the Russo-Georgian War (2008), Russia was the stronger actor with

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rather low interests, as its survival was never threatened by Georgia. On the other hand, the sovereignty and survival of Georgia was in real danger, but contrary to Mack's thesis, Russia clinched a quick and decisive victory. Mack assumes that strong actors will lose in lengthy, guerilla wars, however, he does not explain why some conflicts drag on and some not.

Many theories of asymmetric conflict suffer from a similar problem of generality. They explain few conflicts in detail, but leave too many exceptions. For example, Merom suggests that democracies are more prone to fail in small wars than autocracies. He states that democracies lose in asymmetric conflicts because 'they find it extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to that which can secure victory.'¹⁹ Again, a few cases verify Merom's thesis, while several others do not. His theory does not explain why the US lost in Vietnam despite the heavy casualties inflicted on the Vietnamese population. Moreover, it says little about the failures of autocracies in asymmetric conflicts (e.g. the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan), and also the successes of democracies in those kinds of wars (e.g. the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, 1999).

To avoid problems of generality, Arreguín-Toft backed his hypothesis of "strategic interaction" with extensive quantitative research. His argument is as follows. Actors come to the conflict with an estimate of resources and a strategy, that is to say a plan for the use of those resources in pursuit of specified goals.²⁰ Therefore, when the actor with more resources loses, the reason of his failure must lie in the strategy. Arreguín-Toft argues that 'strong actors will lose asymmetric conflicts when they use the wrong strategy vis-à-vis their opponents' strategy.'²¹ Although that argument was confirmed in quantitative research, it suffers from some weaknesses. Firstly, Arreguín-Toft's definitions of different strategies that are available to belligerents (e.g. barbarism) are sometimes confusing and inconsistent. As a result, the clarity of the main hypothesis is lost in speculation whether a particular strategy used on the battlefield was barbarism or not. Secondly, Arreguín-Toft argues that because every strategy has an ideal counterstrategy, actors who are able to predict their adversary's strategy will 'dramatically improve their chances of victory by choosing and implementing that counterstrategy.'²² For example, the best counterstrategy for guerilla warfare is barbarism, and for "direct defense" is "direct attack."

However, actors are not entirely free to choose the ideal strategy that will guarantee success. They are constrained by many factors: resources possessed, internal politics, culture and traditions (etc).²³ Moreover, in the case of asymmetric conflict, when a weak actor selects a strategy, it is largely determined by available resources, as it cannot implement a strategy involving resources not at its disposal. Consequently, prediction about the weak actor's strategy should be relatively easy. In the Afghanistan War, the Taliban learned quickly that in an open, large battle they are doomed to lose, and while the war continued they switched almost entirely to guerilla warfare.²⁴ Insurgents using guerilla warfare should not be a surprise for anyone.

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Actors are not entirely independent when choosing their strategy, and in many cases the strategy eventually deployed might be easily predicted. Thus, if Arreguín-Toft's hypothesis is correct, and the sources of the strong actor's failure lie in "strategic interaction," the outcome of the conflict should be known from the very beginning. The strong will lose if it chooses an unsuitable strategy for the strategy employed by his adversary. But, if the adversary's strategy is not a surprise, or at least should not be a surprise, why then, does the strong actor choose the wrong counterstrategy? That means that we should search for the solution to the riddle of the strong actor's failure somewhere else than in "strategic interaction."

TRANSFORMATIVE GOALS AND NON-TRANSFORMATIVE GOALS

Unlike Arreguín-Toft, I argue that strong actors lose because they pursue transformative goals. Actors come to the conflict not only with a strategy and resources, but also with certain political goals. The strong actors' political objectives in asymmetric conflicts are different and vary from case to case. For example, in 1999 the NATO allies waged an air campaign against Yugoslavia in order to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, two years later the US intervened in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban government in retaliation for its support of al-Qaida, and in 2008 Russia attacked Georgia on the pretext of protecting Russian citizens, but seemingly to stop NATO enlargement into the post-Soviet space. Although the political goals of such 'top-dogs' appear to be entirely different, there is a common

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denominator. The strong actors' goals might be easily divided into two separate groups: goals that require transformation of the weak actors' political, economic and/or social system, and those that do not impose such requirements. I called the latter "non-transformative goals," as the strong actor might achieve them and eventually succeed in the conflict without the need for coerced transformation of the weak actor's system. For example, consider two cases: Kosovo (1999) and the Russo-Georgian War (2008).

Kosovo

On 24 March 1999, NATO launched a bombing campaign to force Yugoslavia to withdraw its troops from Kosovo and to stop ethnic cleansing in that province. The air strikes however, proved to be ineffective. Yugoslavia mounted strong resistance and even increased attacks in Kosovo. Apparently, it was the planned ground invasion, and not the air strikes, that coerced Yugoslavia to negotiate and withdraw from Kosovo.²⁵ On 10 June 1999, NATO suspended its bombing campaign. The war was over and won. NATO achieved its pre-war goals of stopping ethnic cleansing and forcing Yugoslav troops to leave Kosovo. Significantly, the strong actor, NATO, achieved its goals without transforming the weak actor's (Yugoslavia) political system. Initially, NATO did not intend to overthrow Milošević's government and to install a more peaceful, democratic or pro-West regime. And, even if later preparation for a ground offensive and a plan for ousting Milošević were key factors that pressed Milošević to concede defeat and yield to NATO's demands, the invasion of Yugoslavia was never launched. NATO avoided entanglement in a troublesome invasion, searching for Milošević and probably fighting against guerrilla forces somewhere in the mountains of the Balkan Peninsula.

The Russo-Georgian War

Similarly, in the example of the Russo-Georgia war (2008). Russian political objectives were not entirely clear. At that time, few analysts suggested that Russian goals were much wider than maintaining control over the Georgian separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They suggested that the Russian military op-

eration against Georgia was aimed at thwarting Georgia's – and Ukraine's – NATO aspirations and also at strengthening Russian influence over energy producing states in Central Asia.²⁶ If accurate, Russia undoubtedly succeeded. A few months after the Russo-Georgian war, Sestanovich noted:

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Those NATO members that had endorsed eventual membership for Georgia and Ukraine are now divided on the issue. Those former Soviet states that had viewed closer cooperation with NATO (...) as a critical lifeline to the outside world now wonder whether this is still good idea. Energy producers in Central Asia that were considering new pipelines outside the Russian network may see such projects as too risky.²⁷

It seems that Russia achieved what it wanted when, in early August, it ended military operations against Georgia. Russia succeeded without the necessity of occupation and transformation of its Caucasian neighbour. But is it correct? Did Russia not aim to transform Georgia into a pro-Russian state? Such transformation would inevitably call for the ousting of the government of the anti-Russian and pro-Western President of Georgia, Saakashvili. However, Russia did not make a direct attempt to topple Saakashvili. Obviously Russian leaders would have greatly welcomed the fall of Saakashvili, in the same way that Western powers would have been pleased about Milošević fall in 1999. But, in both cases, neither Russia nor NATO made a serious, direct attempt to change the political system of Georgia and Yugoslavia. Both actors were able to achieve their goals without resorting to the transformation of their adversaries' political orders.

The Gulf Wars

A similar mechanism also occurred during the Gulf War. As (then) Secretary of State Baker put it, US administration officials 'would not shed any tears' if Saddam Hussein fell, but they were also 'careful not to embrace it as a war aim or political aim.'²⁸ The US achieved its primary goals of driving all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. However, the quick and successful operation had a price. Hussein remained in power, and that created the impression that the job

was unfinished. Twelve years later US President George W. Bush decided to resolve the Iraqi problem once and for all.

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The invasion of Iraq began on 19 March 2003, and after two months the mission seemed to be accomplished. On 02 May 2003 Bush declared that the major combat operation in Iraq had ended. The Iraqi government was overthrown, and in December 2003 Hussein was captured. The US undoubtedly prevailed in the Battle of Iraq. They achieved their main, pre-war goal; toppling Hussein. However, as it quickly turned out, the fall of Hussein was not the end of the war. On the contrary; it was the beginning. The US found itself involved in a long, costly and unpopular war in Iraq. And, after eight years of US occupation and full withdrawal of their troops from Iraq, it is still hard to tell who won. The thing that bothers many scholars, and probably a few politicians, was put forward by Rose who asks:

How could this happen? How could the strongest power in modern history, fighting a rematch against a much lesser opponent at a time and place of its own choosing, find itself again woefully unprepared for the aftermath?²⁹

The answer might be found in the actor's political goals. The US and their allies, as mentioned above, clinched an easy victory in the Gulf and in the Kosovo War. They achieved their political objectives in a relatively quick and cheap way. A similar scenario was drafted and enacted in the Iraq War. The US Army overwhelmed Iraqi forces and easily seized control of Baghdad. But, unlike the Gulf or Kosovo Wars, the US goals in Iraq in 2003 included ousting Iraqi leaders. From that moment, the US – intentionally or not – has been pursuing transformative goals.

TRANSFORMATIVE GOALS

In theory, an actor has transformative goals if it aims to change the political, economic and/or social order of its adversaries, or if its goals require such transformation. Thus, transformation might be an end in itself or a means to different political ends. In practice, however, states hardly ever take on the challenge of transformation as an end in itself. More commonly, they perceive transformation as

a necessary tool for different goals. Usually, the strong actor decides to transform the weak actor's political, economic or even social system if it considers that the reason of conflict lies in the nature of the weak actor. Therefore, the strong actor in order to ensure that in the future the weak will not pose a threat to its interests; tries to change the nature of the weak by imposing on him new political, economic and social institutions. At that point, transformative goals might be referred to as so-called state-building or nation-building policy.

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The attainment of transformative goals is never easy. It usually involves military occupation of a particular territory, which is often costly and risky.³⁰ Furthermore, the creation of new political and social institutions that would not only act compliantly with the occupier's interests, but also would be able to survive once the occupation is ended, is no easier. The ability to shape local society in the short time of occupation is limited. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the number of successful outcomes of nation-building is very small.³¹

It is also unsurprising that great powers are unwilling to pursue transformative goals, even if they recognise that the reason for conflict lies in the nature of their adversaries' political system. The case of the Iraq War is no exception. In September 2003 Rumsfeld stated that the US is 'not in Iraq to engage in nation-building.'³² The main political and military goal of the US was to get rid of Hussein, without engaging in Iraq afterwards.³³ The US perceived that the reason of the conflict of interests with Iraq lay in Hussein and the Ba'ath party, but ignored the fact that the dictator and his party were a fundamental part of the Iraqi political order. Therefore, resolving the conflict by ousting Hussein and the de-Baathification of Iraq inevitably led to the transformation of its political order.

As stated above, transformative goals are a difficult attainment for any actor, regardless of the power possessed. Long and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, both waged by 'the strongest power in modern history,' provide compelling evidence of that thesis. On the other hand, the examples of the Gulf War, intervention in Kosovo, and the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 show that strong actors prevail over their weaker adversaries, if the strong pursue non-transformative goals. In these cases, it is the logic of power portrayed by Thucydides in the Melian Dialogue that explains the results of conflicts. The superior military power of the strong actors enabled

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them to achieve their pre-war goals in a very short time. But the same military power seems ineffective and insufficient in pursuit of transformative goals. Transformation of the weaker actor's political or social system is an ambitious and demanding task. And even for that reason, the strong actor is more likely to lose if it pursues transformative goals.

But what if the strong loses, because transformative goals are simply unobtainable? One might argue that the political and social institutions imposed by the outside power are too artificial and fragile, and therefore are unable to survive when the outside power is gone. Furthermore, the argument holds that the formation of any social institutions is a lengthy, grassroots process, and thus it is impossible to create a new institution on an ad hoc basis. History shows that successful transformation is extremely rare, but at the same time it also demonstrates that transformation is possible.

US occupations of Germany and Japan after WWII are serve as examples. But also, the Soviet transformation of East European states might be considered as a success of the USSR. Although the USSR intervened a few times, those interventions were never lengthy and only in the case of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 did the intervention lead to war. By and large, for nearly half a century, East European states acted according to the interests of the USSR. Another interesting case is the US invasion of Panama at the end of 1989. The primary military objective was to capture General Manuel Noriega and overthrow his regime.³⁴ The US achieved these goals and installed a new government. Shortly afterwards the US withdrew.

Although the examples of successful transformation differ a lot, they show that transformative goals are, at times, obtainable by the strong actors. Why then, have the US and their allies encountered such difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan? The answer to this question lies in the relationship between the political objectives and the strategy employed. The US chose the wrong strategy for their political goals in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their initial strategy, almost entirely based on military power, was an effective tool for the attainment of non-transformative goals, but failed in the more delicate task of transformation. That however, poses another question: why did the US employ the wrong strategy? The answer might be found in the false optimism of the stronger actor,

which expects that due to military superiority, the war would be quick, cheap and successful. The more power the actor possesses and the bigger the gap between it and its adversary, the higher are the expectations of easy success in the forthcoming war. That, in turn, creates false optimism, which makes the strong actor prone to flaws in planning for conflict.³⁵ The US administration neglected planning the post-invasion phase of the Iraq War (so-called “Phase IV”), which in turn caused enormous military and political difficulties. Other explanations of a poorly chosen strategy consider global hegemony, strategic culture and the domestic policy of the US. Rose, for instance, identifies four separate factors, both inside and outside the US government, which led to mistakes in preparing and implementing strategy for the Iraq War. These are: a dysfunctional national security decision making process; an obedient and blinkered uniformed military; a trusting Congress and public; and global hegemony.³⁶ Indeed, such explains the process that preceded the invasion of Iraq, but there is also a visible pattern in the way the US government chose its political and military goals toward Iraq as well as Afghanistan. The main goals were to overthrow the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the Hussein regime in Iraq. But the second priority was to ‘keep the coalition footprint modest’ and ‘not to engage in what some call nation-building.’³⁷ In other words, the US planned to overthrow the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, and at the same time planned to avoid any deeper involvement in those countries. This however, proved to be contradictory, because ousting the Taliban and Hussein pushed the US into major engagement in post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq. From this perspective, the US mistake was not the fact that they pursue transformative goals with unsuitable strategy (i.e. largely based on military power), but the fact that they perceived those goals as if they were non-transformative. Therefore, the US did not develop a feasible plan for transforming the Afghani and Iraqi political systems after ousting the Taliban and Hussein..

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TRANSFORMATIVE GOALS AND OUTCOMES OF CONFLICTS: A CONCLUSION

The transformative goal thesis may help predict and explain the outcomes of asymmetric conflicts. Accordingly, the strong actor is

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more likely to lose if it pursues transformative goals, and contrarily, is more likely to win if pursuing non-transformative goals. Between 1990 and 2008 there were seven inter- and extrastate conflicts that may be tagged as asymmetric.³⁸ In three of them the strong actor pursued non-transformative goals. These were: the Gulf War, the War for Kosovo and the Russo-Georgia War. In all of them the strong actor clinched decisive victory and achieved the pre-war goals. Moreover, none of these conflicts lasted more than one year, and in the case of Russo-Georgia War it was a matter of days.

In the cases of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars intentions of the strong actor (whether goals were transformative or not) were not entirely clear. Although the US claimed it would not follow any transformative goals either in Afghanistan or in Iraq, it found itself transforming the political and social systems of both. To explain that, let me consider two phases of each of those wars. In the Sarkees and Wayman data-set, the Iraq War is coded as two conflicts: The Invasion of Iraq and the Iraqi Resistance. The war in Afghanistan is coded similarly. In the cases of the Invasion of Afghanistan and the Invasion of Iraq, the strong actor achieved its pre-war goals in a very short time. It took the US three months to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan and roughly the same time to oust Hussein in Iraq. However, as presented above, overthrowing the leadership of any state should be regarded as the beginning of the pursuit of transformative goals, because it leads to major changes in the political order of that state. In regimes where there is no strong political opposition to carry out transformation once the regimes' leadership is ousted by an outside power, it is the latter that shoulders the responsibility and costs of transformation.

The failure in transformation may result in restoration of former elites or in more severe conditions (e.g. civil war or the emergence of failed states). Obviously, none of these outcomes is favourable for the strong actor. It may threaten its interests, push for another intervention or reduce its international prestige, and in domestic politics it may be a reason for political turbulence (e.g. in democratic regimes, failure in asymmetric conflict may lead to failure in elections). These are a few reasons why the US did not withdraw immediately after ousting the Taliban government or Hussein.

Instead it engaged in long occupations and transformations of Afghanistan and Iraq. From that perspective, the US's pre-war goals were transformative, even though the Bush administration tried to ignore that fact.³⁹

But what about the outcome of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars? Although the US withdrew its troops from Iraq, the results of both conflicts are still unknown. However, what we know about the duration, severity and relative costs of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars suggests that both may be perceived as the failure of the US. The Iraqi conflict lasted 8 years. The Afghanistan War – after a decade of fighting – is still unfolding. Material costs, and the number of casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan, have significantly exceeded the costs and casualties of any asymmetric conflict since the end of the Cold War. Worse still is that the outcome of the Iraq War, let alone Afghanistan, is dubious. The US is still far removed from the attainment of its goals; that is the creation of a sustainable political system in Iraq and Afghanistan that would be able to survive after the US withdrawal. In other words, it is highly possible that the strong actor would not achieve its transformative goals.

The last two examined cases are two interventions of Turkey in northern Iraq against the PKK. In those conflicts Turkish goals were non-transformative as it aimed to destroy the PKK's bases in Iraq. However, as noted above, the Turkish interventions in northern Iraq were a reflection of the intra-state war between Turkey and the Kurds in the 1990s. And, although the interventions were successful in military terms, they neither resolved the Kurdish problem nor brought the civil war to an end.

This is characteristic of asymmetric civil wars in which the government side is unable to attain transformative goals towards separatist ethnic or political groups. Failure to integrate such entities into the strong actor's political and social system results in long civil wars, low-intensity conflicts, terrorism and repeated interventions.⁴⁰ The internal Turkish-Kurd conflict is a compelling example. The first war between the PKK and Turkey erupted in 1984 and lasted until early 1986, after which the conflict continued at below war level (1000 battle related deaths). By 1991 the conflict had again reached the level of an intra-state war and lasted until 1999.⁴¹ Other similar examples are the Kashmir Insurgents War, the Chechnya Wars and the Aceh Wars.

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TABLE I Asymmetric inter-state and extra-state wars 1990–2008

War name	Participants	Initiator	Strong actor's goals	Outcome
Gulf War (1990–1991)	Invasion of Kuwait U.S. Military Response	Iraq vs. Kuwait	Strong actor	Trans. Third Party Intervention
First PKK in Iraq (1991–1992)	U.S. and allies vs. Iraq	Strong	Non-trans.	Strong actor wins
Second PKK in Iraq (1997)	Turkey vs. PKK	Strong	Non-trans.	Stalemate
War for Kosovo (1999)	Turkey vs. PKK	Strong	Non-trans.	Stalemate
Afghanistan War (2001–present)	NATO vs. Yugoslavia	Strong	Non-trans.	Strong actor wins
Iraq War (2003–2011)	NATO vs. Al Qaida, Taliban	Strong	Trans.	Ongoing
Russo-Georgian (2008)	US and allies vs. Iraqi, Al Qaida	Strong	Trans.	Unknown
	Russia vs. Georgia	Strong	Non-trans.	Strong actor wins

TABLE 2 Asymmetric and probable* asymmetric civil wars 1990–2008			
War name	Participants	Initiator	Outcome
Kashmir Insurgents War (1990–2005)	India vs. Kashmiri guerrillas	Weak actor	Stalemate
Shiite and Kurdish War (1991)	Iraq vs. Shiites, Kurds	Weak	Strong actor wins
Turkish Kurds War (1991–1999)	Turkey vs. PKK	Weak	Stalemate
Dniestrian War (1991–1992)	Moldova vs. Dniestria	Weak	Weak actor wins
Abkhazia Revolt (1993–1994)	Georgia vs. Abkhazia	Strong	Weak actor wins
1st Chechnya War (1994–1996)	Russia vs. Chechnya	Weak	Weak actor wins
Croatia-Krajina War (1995)	Croatia vs. Krajina Serbs	Weak	Strong actor wins
Iraqi Kurds War (1996)	Iraq vs. PUK	Weak	Stalemate
Kosovo Independence War (1998–1999)	Yugoslavia vs. KLA	Strong	Third Party Intervention
1st Aceh War (1999–2002)	Indonesia vs. GAM	Weak	Stalemate
2nd Chechnya War (1999–2003)	Russia vs. Chechnya	Weak	Strong actor wins
1st Philippine-Moro War (2000–2001)	Philippines vs. MILF	Strong	Stalemate
2nd Philippine-Moro War (2003)	Philippines vs. MILF	Strong	Stalemate
2nd Aceh War (2003–2004)	Indonesia vs. GAM	Strong	Strong actor wins
Philippine Joint Offensive (2005–2006)	Philippines vs. MILF, NPA	Strong	Stalemate

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The mistaken belief that it is possible to overthrow the rulers of any state, without engagement afterwards, was the reason for such enormous difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, as RAND analysts note in their work on counterinsurgency, “poor beginnings do not necessarily lead to poor ends”.⁴² The same can be said about the pursuit of transformative goals. Mistakes may be rectified, strategy adjusted, and eventually the strong actor may achieve his goals and win the war. Nevertheless, lives that were lost as a consequence of initial mistakes would not be returned.

So, what lessons can be drawn from the last two decades of asymmetric conflicts? Firstly, policymakers determined to use military force must be extremely careful in setting their political objectives. They must be aware that pursuing transformative goals is a demanding and risky task in which even great powers are likely to fail. Secondly, they must be cautious when choosing their strategy. Employing unsuitable strategy for particular political goals, especially transformative, might be a reason of higher costs or even eventual defeat in the conflict. Above all, policymakers should adhere to Clausewitz’s golden rule:

No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.⁴³

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NOTE: The title of this work is paraphrased from Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s article ‘How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,’ found in *International Security* 26:1, 2001.

NOTES TO PAGES

- 1 Thucydides. *History of the Peloponnesian War*. trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1972), 402.
- 2 Ivan Arreguín-Toft. *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 20.
- 3 See Gil Merom. *How Democracies Lose Small Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3; Arreguín-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars* (2005), 20. Asymmetric conflicts are not only common, but they are also relevant. Great powers are involved in most of them, and in many cases asymmetric conflict has had a strong impact on domestic and foreign

- policy of great powers (e.g. Vietnam War, Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan).
- 4 Arreguín-Toft. *How the Weak Win Wars*. (2005), p. 3-4.
 - 5 See Jeffrey Record. *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win* (Potomac Books, 2007); Arreguín-Toft. *How the Weak Win Wars* (2005). Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*.
 - 6 See Meredith R. Sarkees and Frank W. Wayman. *Resort to War 1816-2007* (Washington: CQ Press, 2010).
 - 7 Ivan Arreguín-Toft. *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*. *International Security* 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), 96. According to Arreguín-Toft halving strong actor power simulates the tendency of strong actors to have diverse security interests and commitments.
 - 8 T.V. Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 20.
 - 9 On small wars see: Eliot E. Cohen. Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars. *International Security* 9, no. 2 (Autumn 1984); Andrew Mack. Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars. *World Politics* 27, No. 2 (January 1975); Hew Strachan ed., *Big Wars and Small Wars* (London: Routledge, 2006). Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, (Basic Books, 2003) On COIN see Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke and Beth Grill, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers* (RAND Corporation, 2010); Bruce Hoffman. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, (2006).
 - 10 I use the terms "extra-state" and "inter-state" wars according to Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*.
 - 11 For instance the material power ratio between Russia and Chechnya during the Second Chechnya War was approximately 1:35 in favor of Russia, whereas in the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 it was "only" 1:16.
 - 12 See Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*, 327-328 and 455.
 - 13 For asymmetric conflicts initiated by the weaker actor see: Paul. *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers*.
 - 14 Robert Mandel. Defining postwar victory. In Angstrom, Jan; Duyvesteyn, Isabelle. (eds). *Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War*. (London: Routledge, 2007), 18.
 - 15 Berenice A. Carroll. How Wars End. *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 4 (1969).
 - 16 Carl von Clausewitz. (ed.). *On War*. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 605.
 - 17 Andrew Mack. Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars. *World Politics* 27, no. 2 (January 1975), 181.
 - 18 Mack. *Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars*. p. 182.
 - 19 Merom. *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, 15.
 - 20 Arreguín-Toft. *How the Weak Win Wars*. (2005) p. 23.

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- 21 Arreguín-Toft. *How the Weak Win Wars*. (2001) p. 95.
- 22 Arreguín-Toft. *How the Weak Win Wars*. (2001) p. 104.
- 23 On internal politics and cultural constraints see Cohen. Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars. and also: Jeffrey S. Lantis and Darryl Howlett. Strategic Culture. In Baylis, John. (ed.). *Strategy in the Contemporary World*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
- 24 See Michael O'Hanlon. Staying Power. *Foreign Affairs* 89, No. 5 (September/October 2010).
- 25 See Sarkees and Wayman. *Resort to War*. p.181-182; Jacob Bercovitch and Judith Fretter. *Regional Guide to International Conflict and Management from 1945-2003*. (Washington: CQ Press, 2004), p. 255. And also: Daniel L. Bayman and Matthew C. Waxman. Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate. *International Security* 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000).
- 26 Stephen Sestanovich. What Has Moscow Done? *Foreign Affairs* 87, No. 6 (November/December 2008). Charles King. The Five-Day War. *Foreign Affairs* 87, No. 6 (November/December 2008). On Russo-Georgian War of 2008 see also: Ronald D. Asmus. *A Little War that Shook the World*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr. (eds). *The Guns of August 2008*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2009).
- 27 Sestanovich. What Has Moscow Done? p. 25.
- 28 James A. Baker with Thomas M. DeFrank. *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992*. (New York: Putnam, 1995) p. 435, quoted in Gideon Rose, *How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 217.
- 29 Rose, *How Wars End*, 239.
- 30 See David M. Edelstein. *Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).
- 31 Francis Fukuyama, *State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Profile Books, 2005), 50-51.
- 32 Donald Rumsfeld at the Eisenhower National Security Conference, September 25, 2003, available at www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1079.
- 33 Rose, *How Wars End*, 259.
- 34 Bercovitch and Fretter, *Regional Guide to International Conflicts*, 150.
- 35 On false optimism see Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 14-35.
- 36 Rose, *How Wars End*, 263.
- 37 Donald Rumsfeld. Beyond Nation Building. February 14, 2003, Available at: www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=337.
- 38 See Table I in the appendix.
- 39 Before the invasion of Iraq there were many analyses suggesting that ousting Saddam Hussein would force the U.S. to face the problems of

state-building and transformation of Iraq. For example, Kenneth Pollack opting for invasion warned that “the biggest headaches for the United States are likely to stem not from the invasion itself but from its aftermath.” See Kenneth Pollack. Next Stop Baghdad? *Foreign Affairs* 81, No. 2 (March/April 2002), p. 45; see also: Rachel Bronson. When Soldiers Become Cops. *Foreign Affairs* 81, No. 6 (November/October 2002); Daniel Byman, “Constructing Democratic Iraq”, *International Security* 28, no.1 (Summer 2003).

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- 40 See Table 2 in the appendix.
- 41 Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*, 455.
- 42 Paul, Clarke and Grill, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*, 96.
- 43 Clausewitz, 577.

VALUES OF THE BELGRADE REGIME

VLADIMIR DORDEVIC AND DANKO ALEKSIC

ABSTRACT: This article evaluates the legacy of Slobodan Milošević whose regime ruled Serbia for more than a decade from the end of the 1980s until 2000. The article briefly examines the main political and social aspects of the Milošević regime and analyzes a value equation by questioning the social values of Serbia in the 1990s. The main argument presented here is that years of Milošević's rule produced catastrophic consequences for Serbian society that came to champion uncivic, non-democratic, anti-European values that still embody major road-blocks for successful democratic transition of the country.

KEYWORDS: Yugoslavia, Serbia, Milošević regime, value equation, democratic transition, domestic politics

INTRODUCTION

The 1980s in Europe was characterised by communism in decline. The fall of the Berlin Wall, and ultimately the collapse of communist regimes through most of Europe – with the exception of Belarus, Moldova and Transneistria – produced a wave of freedom and hope that reverberated across the recently divided continent. Such was not the case in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Due to its internal, smouldering tensions, as well as the inability of political elites to accept new dynamics in international arena and to define common interests, the country became a stage for several conflicts, different in length, intensity and the sides involved.

The most prominent political figure of SFRY's dissolution was Slobodan Milošević, who held the positions of the Serbian Communist Party leader and, afterwards, became the president of the (Socialist) Republic of Serbia. Milošević's rule was the darkest period in the modern history of Serbia. The country was placed under severe economic sanctions by the international community, destroying the national economy and steeply decreasing living standard. Citizens were sent to wage wars that the country officially did not take part in, usually by forced mobilisation. Serbia lost its historical

allies, and the nation was labelled as an aggressor; an image still prevalent in public opinion and even among many political and academic circles around the world. Criminality bloomed. Overnight – and through criminal activities often whitewashed by patriotism – numerous individuals from the social “sludge” managed to become the elite. The system of cultural and intellectual values completely collapsed.

*Vladimir
Dordevic,
Danko
Aleksic*

Thus, the first paradox of the Milošević regime was that instead of ‘protecting the nation and national interest,’ as Milošević’s political discourse often emphasised, Serbia was turned into a pariah state ruled by an authoritarian leader whose years in power continue to be a major stumbling block in the democratisation of Serbia. Everything the regime supported and fought for was eventually lost. Regardless, the Belgrade regime was always quick to proclaim victory out of every defeat in the decade of Milošević’s rule. That leads to another paradox: despite all such victories, the regime won a majority of votes (on the level of the Republic) in every election held during the 1990s. This could be identified as evidence that the values promoted by the regime had their roots within the Serbian public.

This work intends to add to the literature on Serbia, its regional and international role, by providing insights into the Milošević regime, how it came to power, what it sought and actually achieved once secure in its position and how Serbia has had to cope with the series of disasters brought about under Milošević. This work seeks to reveal the depth of responsibility Milošević bears for the current dysfunction of Serbia as it attempts to move beyond the immediate post-Cold War years to assume its proper place as a respected member of the European and international community of states. To achieve such aims, this work proceeds as follows. The first section traces some of the more important political and social aspects of the Milošević regime between 1989 and 2000, the year of his forced departure from office and, in fact, Serbia itself. This part of the work presents and examines the full gauntlet of issues ranging from the breakup of Yugoslavia – and the wars that followed – to domestic stability and economic hardships. The work then turns to evaluating the obstacles, and successes, faced by Serbia after the fall of

Milošević, including the wholesale political transformation of the state. Finally, this work concludes with a brief, but important, evaluation of the next (potential) steps in Serbia's national rehabilitation.

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POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE MILOŠEVIĆ
REGIME, 1989-2000

At the end of the 1980s, Serbia witnessed a metamorphosis of its political elites. Hard-line communists became hard-line nationalists, atheists became passionate believers, and convinced Yugoslavs became first-class Serbs. As later developments showed, there were precious few real political ideas or sincere national feelings behind this transformation. Everything was possible, allowed and finally enacted on for Milošević to retain power. The most prominent example of this metamorphosis was Milošević himself, and the process started on territory he desperately wanted to protect Serbian interests in, but which was eventually removed from the sovereignty of Serbia by his very signature namely; Kosovo.

Milošević was sent to Kosovo in April 1987, as a high-ranking official of the Communist Party, to reduce tensions between the Albanian majority and the Serbian minority. His rhetoric was appropriate to the function he held at the time, emphasising the protection of 'brotherhood and unity:' cornerstones of the Yugoslav communist ideology. However, soon afterwards, Milošević realised that exploiting the Kosovo issue could increase his personal political power. Therefore, he changed rhetoric and presented himself as the protector of Serbia, the Serbian nation, Serbian interests and heritage in Kosovo.¹ Milošević recalled the former glory of the Serbian medieval kingdom(s), themes which entred the political mainstream as a result.

Riding the wave of nationalism, using Kosovo Serbs as a tool and under the mask of the 'anti-bureaucratic revolution,' Milošević managed to sap the (rather extensive) powers from both Vojvodina and Kosovo and changed the political leadership in them (as well as in the Socialist Republic of Montenegro), rendering their autonomy symbolic. This was done to gain control over SFRY's Presidency,

which despite violating the constitution, was supported by a majority of Serbs.² This was also a period of intensive – as the Copenhagen School would suggest – securitisation.³

According to Hadzic, there have been three waves of securitization in Serbia over the past two decades.⁴ The first, and critical, wave occurred in the second half of the 1980s and was ended with the eruption of the wars of Yugoslav succession. The core of this wave was the survival of both Serbs and Serbia. In this respect, Hadzic identified three specific lines of securitisation in Serbia. Firstly, Serbian securitising actors were (permanently) securitising the international community and its most important proponent (the US, NATO, etc). Secondly, partners in SFRY (republics and constitutive nations) were securitised and eventually presented as enemies. Finally, the “intra-Serbian,” line, based on identifying ‘true Serbian patriots’ and ‘traitors,’ was developed.⁵ The Serbian population was an appropriate public for this rhetoric; it was widely accepted and soon assumed bizarre proportions.

One prevailing characteristic of this period was the glorification of the past, i.e. Serbian history, stimulated by the anniversary (600 years) of the Battle of Kosovo Polje which was celebrated in 1989. The idea of a united Yugoslavia was presented by nationalists as a conspiracy against the Serbian nation, created specifically for the purpose of weakening Serbia (ironically neglecting that the most prominent initiator of the Yugoslav idea was Serbian King Aleksandar I Karadjordjevic and that a majority of Partisans during WWII were Serbs). Over a very short period of time, the communist legacy was abandoned, “comrades” became “gentlemen,” socialist sacraments and mottos were soon altered or forgotten. The lack of vision and ideas for the future was substituted by a specific return to the past.

Another paradox is therefore evidenced: in May 1989 Milošević became president of Serbia. Although he managed to present himself as defender of the Serbian nation, the fundamentals of his political orientation focused on keeping Yugoslavia intact. In 1992, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which constituted Serbia and Montenegro, was established. This state existed until 2003, when it was renamed into State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, with more characteristics of a confederation than federation. The situation was indeed paradoxical; Serbs portrayed by the Milošević

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regime as “victims” of Yugoslavia (a very common and extensively used interpretation by nationalists) were put in the position of being “protectors” of the very state that they felt “violated” in. During the parliamentary elections in 1992, after the proclamation of the FRY, Milošević’s party won 40.4% of the vote.

The beginning of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), in which soldiers from Serbia participated without official recognition of the state, brought economic sanctions and international isolation to Serbia/FRY. What followed, abreast impoverishment of the population, was the collapse of social and intellectual values. The state, politics and criminality became entangled and essentially merged into one, while many prominent criminals gained the status of celebrities and appropriate political influence, some even organised their own paramilitary units.⁶ It was a public secret that those units, supported and equipped by the state, were taking part in wars in Croatia and BiH. Nationalist politicians became prominent public figures, although some of their public speeches were almost beyond sense.

War marks the beginning of the second wave of securitisation in Serbia, a wave that lasts until 2000 with the overthrow of the Milošević regime. As determined by Hadzic, and seen via circumstances in Serbia during the 1990s, the mainstream political and securitising discourse was shaped and conditioned by the pace, scope and results of the wars.⁷

From the first salvos of combat until 1995, the collapse of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK)⁸ and the Dayton Peace Agreement for BiH, the main referent object was the survival of Serbs west of the Drina river and their self-proclaimed states which could not have existed neither in economical nor in a military sense without the support of Serbia.⁹ A majority of Serbs west of the Drina, although many in Serbia as well, believed that Milošević was genuinely interested in protecting them. Thus, considerable trust was lent to Milošević by the Serbian population that lived outside of the Republic of Serbia. Yet, Milošević’s actions do not reflect those of a leader truly intent on defending his people, their prescribed territories and interests. To support this claim it is important to recall that:

1. Serb paramilitaries fought in Croatia and BiH and units of self-declared Serbian states were equipped by the army of the FRY, yet Milošević never publicly stated that the Republic of Serbia was actively engaged in these conflicts, quite the opposite.
2. Initiatives by the leaders of RSK and RS to merge with Serbia/FRY, were all rejected by Milošević.
3. RSK and RS were never officially recognized by FRY.
4. In August 1994 Milošević's regime imposed sanctions on RS because of political misunderstandings.
5. The army of the FRY was not ordered to react during Operations "Flash" and "Storm" in which the Croatian Army regained control of Serb-dominated territories; these were followed by ethnic cleansing.

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Indeed, when Operation Flash commenced, information was presented very late (nearly the 20th minute) in the broadcast of the *Serbian Broadcasting Corporation* (RTS), the media wing of the government, a point which highlights the level of importance the Belgrade regime attached to RSK. Also, the army of RS – led by Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic – were equally lethargic, despite the long border between RSK and RS, and a history (albeit short) of joint military actions. It is clear that the concepts of "brotherhood" between Serbs and "holiness" of Serbian lands were not honest patriotic beliefs, but largely rhetorical devices for the political gains of Milošević and Karadzic.

At the same time, FRY was suffering from the third most robust hyperinflation in global economic history, with inflation reaching some 5,578,000,000,000,000% annually,¹⁰ (re: 113% daily.¹¹ During this period, the highest banknote denomination – this was a country where the majority of the population believed they belonged to a 'heavenly nation' – was 500,000,000,000 Dinars (five hundred billion dinars). And yet, when FRY went to the polls in parliamentary elections in December 1993 and had the ability of voting Milošević out of office, the results speak for themselves: Milošević's party won 49.2% of the vote and gained 123 parliamentary mandates.

After 1995, and following the conflict in BiH, securitising discourses were withdrawn from the Serbian issue in Croatia and BiH; RSK had disappeared, except for a minute slice called *Eastern Slavo-*

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nia, Baranja and Western Syrmia which was put under UN protection and eventually reintegrated into Croatia (1998) peacefully. In BiH, RS was confirmed as an entity within the unitary state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both Croatia and BiH were recognised by Milošević's regime in their existing borders. Thousands had lost their lives in combat; why, remains a mystery to many observers, though few would – in hindsight – consider it justified. Yet, Milošević was unfazed and in the parliamentary elections of 1997, the Serbian populace again reelected Milošević's party with some 44% of the vote, or 110 parliamentary seats. "Victory" was still incomplete; an additional "old/new" issue came to dominate the nearly-settled political environment in Serbia namely: Kosovo.

1998 marks the start of asymmetrical violence between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)¹² and Serbian security forces. This was the first armed conflict on the territory of FRY in the 1990s, though not the first time the FRY army was fighting for the "Serbian cause." As tensions rose, so did the international community's interest in preemptive conflict resolution so as not to repeat the errors it made during the conflict in BiH. Once international interest was peaked however, Milošević – who seemed unable of devising logical solutions to both internal and international problems – roused Serbian nationalism by calling potential international arbitration interference and, in that same spirit, asked for public opinion via referendum, which was held on 23 April 1998. Predictably, the results – some 94.73% of voters – were against the international community finding a solution to the Kosovo crisis.

Milošević was effectively handed a reason – and mocked democratic traditions in the process – for continuing his abrasive approach to Kosovo. The discourse on the very existence of Serbia and the Serbian nation was reactivated, while proponents of the international community, above all NATO, were labelled as existential threats, points reflected in the pervasive anti-Western propaganda in Serbian media, notably state owned television and newspapers.

In March 1999, after the Rambouillet stalemate, the elapsing of the NATO imposed deadline for Serbian troop withdraw from Kosovo and, in fact, intensified violence – mostly directed at civilians – in Kosovo, NATO commenced an air campaign against FRY in a bid to enforce the evacuation of Kosovo.

Instead of offering a public explanation as to why Serbia was

now at war with NATO, with no tangible political or military allies, the regime opted for cheap patriotism: broadcasting patriotic songs, populist speeches and replaying heroic partisan movies. Blunders piled up as, in April 1999, FRY's Parliament adopted a decision to join the Union of Russia and Belarus without mentioning such a Union was worthless as it was not discussed in Russian or Belarus's parliaments; it was a thinly veiled propaganda stunt that aimed to show Serbs that they did, in fact have allies. And yet neither Russia nor Belarus supported FRY in any meaningful way during Belgrade's conflict with NATO.

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After 78 days of heavy bombing, Serbian security forces – police, military and paramilitary units – were fully and verifiably withdrawn from Kosovo and the territory placed under UN administration; the polar opposite the referendum was meant to deliver. Again, victory was proclaimed by Milošević. The reality was rather different.

Kosovo, the final chapter of this round of Balkan violence, also proved to be fatal for Milošević's regime; it had gone too far, had made too many errors, miscalculations and empty-promises. FRY was in economic and social ruin; internationally isolated and domestically paralyzed. Dissatisfaction turned in outrage which was reflected in popular demonstrations the security forces were unwilling to suppress. Milošević's regime was toppled in October 2000 under the weight of popular anger.

Following slow but steady democratic changes to Serbia, the political discourse was considerably altered. As argued in the next section, Serbian society is still not ready to face issues related to the Milošević era and, moreover, deep divisions in society persist; keeping the country imprisoned by values belonging to Slobodan Milošević's authoritarian rule. Unfortunately, the consequences of Milošević's rule are often explained through popular conspiracies against Serbs and observed through the lens of self-victimisation and self-amnesty. Until such attitudes change, Serbian society will not be ready to accept, let alone understand, its past and will remain in doubt over its future.

THE POST-MILOŠEVIĆ TRANSITION: CONSIDERING A “VALUE EQUATION”

As suggested above, Milošević's 13 year rule produced cata-

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strophic consequences. Not only did Belgrade venture into wars in ex-Yugoslav republics and finally in its own province of Kosovo, but its international standing was downgraded to a pariah. In a state of economic disrepair and international isolation, Serbia entered a vicious circle in which its political, economic and social capital was gradually eroded in a decade that many Serbian citizens remember as the roaring 1990s. With Milošević's regime, a type of a competitive authoritarian regime,¹³ that saw delegitimisation of its political opponents and preservation of political power as its ultimate goals, Serbian citizens lived in a society of distorted values. This very distortion of values actually allowed the regime to take Serbia down a road of authoritarian rule and struck a devastating blow against the development of true civic values. As Pantić points out, values play a double role simply for they not only mirror the present, but also reflect the past.¹⁴ In this respect, as Ramet succinctly concluded, 'values are created, promoted, and reinforced or, alternatively, subverted, mocked and destroyed by any number of agents and mediums.'¹⁵

Values stand at the very foundation of any society and once a values system is reinforced, changed or distorted – and in the case of Serbia one may speak of the predominance of un-civic values – society reacts and may be thrust down a different historical path. This section presents a brief, but dense, line of argumentation on Serbian values in the 1990s. It explains the significance of these for both the period of Milošević's regime and the post-Milošević transition of Serbia.

To place this line of thinking into a historical perspective, Milošević's regime was established at the end of the 1980s in an atmosphere of a greatly weakened federal Yugoslavia and his rise to power was associated with increasing problems in the (then) Serbian province of Kosovo where issues of Serbo-Albanian relations assumed markedly nationalist contours. Turning his back on liberal communist discourses, and politicians, including Milošević's own patron and former President of Serbia, Ivan Stambolić,¹⁶ Milošević succeeded in introducing the masses into Serbian political life and swiftly rose to prominence. Considering that Serbian liberal political culture and its capital were not inconsiderable, but certainly insufficient, it does not wonder that substantial number of citizens actually supported Milošević in his rise to power.¹⁷

Embedded in paternalist traditions – with a tendency towards

a personality cult – with citizens preferring vested political power in the hands of a strong national leader, Serbian political culture remained associated to its authoritarian roots.¹⁸

In this context, Milošević's *anti-bureaucratic revolution*, presented as a strategy to protect Serbian national interests amounted to nothing more than the dismissal of those figures endangering Milošević's position. In other words, it was a power-grab. This is the fundamental reason why Milošević surrounded himself with a clique of political extremists, warlords and shady businessmen, members of the SPS and his wife's JUL. Indeed, some spectators of Serbian politics have noted that over a decade such clique isolated Serbia in an authoritarian nutshell; with Milošević atop a system that was only partly institutionalised.¹⁹ This situation has hardly been remedied.

Serbia's current political situation technically fulfils the formal requirements of a functioning democracy – after Milošević's ouster – yet the country lacks working liberal values and a functioning political culture; intolerance and disrespect are mainstream traits of political life. Yet these are hardly new and author Jovan Skerlić, wrote over a hundred years ago about similar ills: 'populism, political bickering of every kind, constant and unexpected shifts in political beliefs and attitudes, and political sell-outs.'²⁰ Within such a climate, national triggers are likely to immerse the nation in endless political bouts and such triggers lurk at every (metaphorical) corner. In Serbia, the trigger was Kosovo and innumerable politicians engaged in innumerable debates, all for the sake of the elusive "national interest." The government and opposition refuse to accept Kosovo's independence; largely because both sides have built their careers on rejecting Kosovo and it has become nearly impossible – with this generation of leaders – to shift policy. Those refusing to participate in such a hallow discourse, or are ready to criticise majority opinion, are ostracised and portrayed as national enemies. Serbian domestic political life remains immature, similar to what Skerlić described (1906) as a process of 'channelling [...] institutionalisation of the domestic political arena.'²¹

Milošević's Serbia, when nearly all other former-communist states in Europe were experiencing socio-political and economic transformation,²² was wasting away in nationalist isolationism. Dulić suggests that Serbia remains trapped in the nationalist discourse

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of the past; it has trouble managing its nationalist legacy.²³ In this way, 'Serbia is not yet a post-conflict society,'²⁴ the conflict is ever-present and involves external issues related to territory and internal issues that gravitate around national identity, consciousness and determination. Unresolved historical issues (Serb diasporas, the legacy of WWII, etc.), continues to plague the country,²⁵ and these go far beyond the personality cult encouraged by Milošević. In other words, Milošević was an accomplished political tactician rather than a nationalist and the rhetoric he deployed found deep resonance in an expecting political community, Serbia. If such feelings of historical pride and violation were not acutely felt throughout Serbian society, Milošević and his clique would have been spitting into the wind instead of leading many millions of people – in Serbia and throughout the region – on the path of extreme narratives and subsequent political violence.

In respect to the values under scrutiny, it is clear that civic culture is underdeveloped which itself is an unfortunate trademark of Serbia today. Assigning blame for such underdevelopment on Milošević, Gordy described the 1990s as the decade of the 'destruction of alternatives'²⁶ where the regime – through destroying alternatives – created a system which championed state-sponsored criminality and the formation of a corrupt elite that actually enjoyed privileges while most Serbian citizens faced grim economic realities. With the country internationally isolated, Milošević's regime depended on maintaining a sense of claustrophobia in which a number of nationalist and religious values became central features.

As a result, the regime emphasised collective over individual rights, the opposite of modern, liberal democracies.

However, the idea that collective rights trump individual rights may be found in Serbian culture that transcends Milošević. Consider, for instance, those acutely anti-Western circles within the Serbian Orthodox clergy which routinely invoked a particular ethnic exclusivity while identifying the entire Serbian nation as a "community of believers,"²⁷ assuming that that anyone who places themselves first, and beyond the community, ceases to belong to the community.²⁸ This may be seen in the many opposition political activists who were castigated for undermining the community simply because of their dissent only to be portrayed as traitors. This was especial prevalent during Milošević's time in power. The situation

has, however, become more fluid.

Certainly, in the post-Milošević era, Belgrade faced major obstacles surrounding the imposition of modern civic values. Yet, Lazic keenly suggested that liberal civic values have still not been fully accepted and firmly grounded in Serbia.²⁹ It is not that Belgrade has been unable to re-evaluate its values (and national interests) in the thirteen years since Milošević was overthrown, it has been. However, these have been only superficially examined, the nation seems to suffer from a period of either 'shell-shock' or collective amnesia. Its failure is in the inability of the state and every actor within it to properly deconstruct "Milošević's Serbia" without which the post-2000 democratic engines will stall. Unfortunately, the Serbian national question is haunting political transformation and the acceptance of a new value system. Indeed, Belgrade has continued to press on without formal and thus proper ideational foundations rooted in civic values at a time in European history when new opportunities, re: EU accession was made possible; replete with economic and political benefits that far outweigh the costs involved of overcoming Serbia's turbulent recent and more distant past.

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CONCLUSION

Unless Serbia embraces a more progressive approach – and reflective values for dealing with 20th century challenges it will remain captive to its past, a past with is not a permanent fixture but rather fluid, revised for political gains as they surface. This slow-as-molasses method instead of preventing internal – and international – conflicts – actually fuels them because the state is not able to give its people the one thing that all people demand; hope for the future. Above all, it was the catastrophic rule of Milošević that undermined Serbia. However, the former regime cannot, and should not, be blamed for all the problems Serbia faced over the past decades: anti-modern and anti-liberal nationalist traditions have their roots deep in Serbian history. The only way forward for Serbia requires nothing less than a complete re-evaluation and an attempt to a corpus of ideas and values of a modern, civic state. This certainly is much easier said than done, but must be attempted. Regardless of how cliché the notion of 'coming to terms with your past' may sound, for Serbia it is fitting. Only through the exercise of proper

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leadership, that needs to start leading rather than misleading the country's public on the compatibility of international norms and Serbian culture. By accentuating individual over collective rights and democratic rule in a society based on civic values and norms, an example may be set that will reverberate. Only by overcoming its identity crisis can Serbia be free of its past, earning a chance for the European future its citizens deserve.

NOTES TO PAGES

- 1 See 'Interview with Slobodan Milošević,' in the documentary 'The Death of Yugoslavia: Enter Nationalism,' The BBC.
- 2 One member of the Presidency was delegated by each of the republics and provinces. By installation of "his people" in both provinces and Montenegro, Milošević controlled 4 votes in the Presidency. As later developments showed, in some situations it was an issue how to persuade Macedonian or Bosnian members of the Presidency to vote in favour of Milošević. The reduction of power from the provinces occurred in 1988 (Vojvodina) and in 1989 (Kosovo).
- 3 See Barry Buzan (et al) (1998), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Colorado: Lynne Rinner Publishers.
- 4 Miroslav Hadzic (et al) (2009), *Yearbook of Security Sector Reform in Serbia*, Dan Graf: Belgrade, Centre for Civil-Military Relations, pp. 121-126.
- 5 Ibid, p. 121.
- 6 The case of Zeljko Raznjatovic ARKAN is indicative; a convicted criminal and former-prisoner in several European countries, he was supported, by the state, to establish a paramilitary unit called the Serb Volunteer Guard. Also, Raznjatovic founded the Party of Serbian Unity and was a member of parliament between 1992 and 1993.
- 7 Hadzic (et al) (2009), p. 123.
- 8 RSK was a self-proclaimed Serbian entity within the recognised borders of the Republic of Croatia.
- 9 These were the Republics of Serbian Krajina (RSK) and of Srpska (RS), within the recognised borders of BiH. RS was officially recognized as one of two entities in BiH by the Dayton Peace Agreement.
- 10 National Bank of Serbia information is available at: <www.nbs.rs/internet/latinica/scripts/showfaqsection.html?lang=SER_CIR&konverzija=yes&id_sekcije=34#330> (accessed 12 June 2012).
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 The Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës) was a military organisation of Kosovo Albanians aimed at separating Kosovo from

- Serbia/Yugoslavia.
- 13 Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik (2011), *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries*, Cambridge UP, pp. 9-10. For hybrid regimes see *Ibid*; Larry Diamond (2002), 'Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,' *Journal of Democracy*, 13:2 and Fareed Zakaria (1997), 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,' *Foreign Affairs*, 76:6.
 - 14 Dragomir Pantic (2003), 'Buducnost tranzicije u Srbiji zavisno od promena vrednosti,' in Grupa autora *Promene vrednosti i tranzicija u Srbiji: pogled u buducnost*, Belgrade: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institut društvenih nauka.
 - 15 Sabrina Ramet (2011), 'The Power of Values,' in Ola Listhaug, Sabrina P. Ramet and Dragana Dulić (ed) (2011), *Civic and Uncivic Values: Serbia in the Post-Milošević Era*, Central European University Press, p. 401.
 - 16 Ivan Stambolić disappeared under mysterious circumstances in August 2000 only to be discovered a few years later that Slobodan Milošević ordered Stambolić's assassination. See Gabriel Partos (2004), 'Analysis: Stambolic Murder Trial,' *BBC News Europe*, 23 February 2004, available at: <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3511823.stm>> (accessed 27 August 2012).
 - 17 Milošević won 63.34% of the vote during Serbia's first presidential elections in December 1990. See Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds) (1997), *Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe*, Cambridge UP, p. 162.
 - 18 Ramet (2011).
 - 19 Dawisha and Parrott (eds) (1997).
 - 20 Jovan Skerlić (1906), *Politička književnost in Skerlić*, (published in 1965), Belgrade: Prosveta.
 - 21 *Ibid*.
 - 22 Ramet (2011), p. 404.
 - 23 *Ibid*, p. 404.
 - 24 Stefano Bianchini (2011), 'The EU in the Values and Expectations of Serbia: Challenges, Opportunities, and Confrontations,' in Listhaug, Ramet, and Dulić (eds) (2011).
 - 25 *Ibid*.
 - 26 Eric D. Gordy (1997), 'Investigating the Destruction of Alternatives,' *Problems of Post-Communism*, 44: 4.
 - 27 Ivan Čolović (2011), 'Nationalism as Religion: Examples from Contemporary Serbia,' in Listhaug, Ramet and Dulić, (eds) (2011), p. 245.
 - 28 *Ibid*, p. 245.
 - 29 Mladen Lazić (2007), 'Vrednosne orijentacije politickih i ekonomskih elita u Srbiji,' in Zoran Lutovac (ed) (2007), *Političke stranke u Srbiji i Evropska Unija*, Belgrade: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and FPN. v

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RESEARCH ARTICLES
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NOTES

BRITAIN IN A GLOBAL WORLD: OPTIONS FOR A NEW BEGINNING

By Baimbridge, Mark; Whyman, Philip B.; Burkitt, Brian, Imprint Academic, 2010,
ISBN 9781845401917

*Book
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*REVIEWER: OANA ELENA BRANDA
(UNIVERSITY OF BUCHAREST)*

This work, a collection of essays, deals with the future of the UK-EU relationship, a relationship which has, in recent years, been tarnished as mutual recriminations and the ever-present “blame-game” unfolds within a Europe defined by internal tremors. With solutions in mind, the editors and authors delve deep into the origin of crises and are resolved to provide suggestions and recommendations on how this relationship should be conducted in the future.

The objectives of the book are usefully presented in the introductory section, written by Baimbridge, Whyman and Burkitt, along with summaries of the subsequent chapters and as the editors note ‘this book seeks to provide an analysis of the economic and political relationship between Britain and the EU and thereby facilitate discussion of the future direction in which this relationship might develop’ (p. 21). The main topic has been stated above, but the book is divided in several subtopics such as: British trade outside the EU, British foreign policy, the potential of trade relations with third countries, such as Canada, the impact of EU policies on British sensitive areas such as tax policy or sovereignty, (etc).

All chapters follow the same pattern: an introduction, a main corpus and a conclusion. They are all meant to demonstrate something and this is specified clearly. They are also interlinked: one complements the other; one launches a debate, the other ends it and/or provides solutions; even if the book is comprised of several different essays, it can still be read as a unitary work.

The fundamental arguments that can be summed up from all essays converge on the same topic: the United Kingdom would be better off if it adopted the model of entering interlocking networks of agreements. The current situation the UK experiences – as a mem-

ber of the EU – is damaging its potential for enhanced economic prosperity. Consequently, a strategic “step back”, as a member of the EU would highly benefit British economic and political policies – according to the authors.

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From the point of view of the argumentation, all essays are well documented and referenced. It is common for the authors to provide data and statistics, followed by detailed analyses. However, due to the excessive amount of data, some essays are slightly difficult to read and even more difficult to grasp. Nevertheless, the editors managed to strike a balance in this regard; so that more technical essays are followed by ones less difficult to understand.

All chapters are all well-written, without exception. They are clear in their purpose and all of them achieve their goals. The writing is fluent and the inner construction of the essays is transparent. Even if the aim of the book is to push a rather radical solution – diminishing the influence of the EU in the UK, by orienting the UK towards a more independent policy in aspects such as economics and politics – the tone the authors adopt is a balanced one, offering recommendations rather than urging to rash actions. Their tactic is to convince the reader by the sheer data provided, rather than propaganda against the EU. Based on this, the target readers are clearly specialists.

The added-value of this book stems from the approach used both by the authors as well as the editors. In an European landscape very much troubled by the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, with the Eurosceptics pointing the finger at the lacks and faults that occurred due to its implementation, the editors chose to put together a volume signalling the fact that the United Kingdom should explore more of its relationships to other countries, apart from the EU. The attempt is salutary, but the approach is extraordinary. The editors chose to put forward their argumentation and hope to convince their readers.

All things considered, this work comes highly recommended to all those interested in EU affairs and policies, students and advanced researchers. It is well-documented, has a good command of the topic and does not refrain from putting things into perspective. Thus, in the current context of EU policy research, this work is a must.

PEACEBUILDING

By Dennis J. D. Sandole, Polity Press, 2011
ISBN 9780745641652

REVIEWER: GÖKHAN GÜNEYSU
(ANADOLU UNIVERSITY)

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One can think of only a few works more timely than the book by Sandole entitled: *Peacebuilding*.

Currently, we bear witness to an upheaval of international and national structures; structures which have been taken for granted. Informal violence is ubiquitous and state structures, which – be they strictly in a Hobbesian mind-set or not- we suppose would have saved individuals from the ravages of conflicts and “new” wars, are either dysfunctional or simply non-existent.

Peacebuilding itself is not a completely recent issue. International community has already been trying hard to tackle this emergent trend of chaos and mayhem for years. However, as Sandole succinctly puts it, we have failed thus far and, barring a revolutionary change in the way we perceive and handle these issues, we will continue to fail.

Persuasively, Sandole underlines the limited troubleshooting capacity of the reactive and narrow peacebuilding practices, which merely aim or only manage to establish the so-called “negative” peace (i.e. “absence of hostilities”) and calls for a more comprehensive approach (“maximalist peacebuilding”). This he does diligently, yet in a manner that would allow even laymen to penetrate these very complicated issues surrounding the peacebuilding phenomenon.

Sandole tackles the *problematique* of the peace-building in the first chapter of his book. As already noted, the efforts to establish peace have hitherto been and will in the future be doomed to fail, as long as a more holistic and proactive approach is not adhered to. He stresses the fact that a national-interest oriented (dubbed by Sandole as “old” realism) policy is not capable of determining and addressing the causes of conflicts, which are now of a global character. Global is now national and national is global.

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In chapter three, the author presents the reader a solid example of an “ideal praxis” on the field, namely UNPREDEP. UNPREDEP experience was proactive in nature and tried to address the roots and underlying causes of the conflict. It tried to establish good relationships with the locals, which increased the success of the mission. In this, Sandole has brought to the fore a very convincing proof that what he recommends is do-able and has been already achieved on the field. UNPREDEP embodied important aspects of what Sandole endeavors to establish in his book; a proactive, flexible peace-building, aiming to address the root causes of conflicts in close cooperation with the locals.

In the fourth chapter, Sandole highlights the need to address global problems with a view to preventing terrorism. According to him ‘it is essential to deal effectively with the deep-rooted origins of political violence, of which terrorism is a manifestation or a symbol’, i.e. terrorism is an ‘epiphenomenon of deep-rooted conflict’ Given the real nature of terrorism, Sandole adds, the traditional counter-terrorism measures will only be counter-productive and will end up creating more disillusioned and radicalized individuals, i.e. new recruits for the terrorist groups. He advises direct or indirect negotiations with terrorists. According to the author, this is nothing but a logical step needed if global governance is to be strengthened to address the inter-connected global problems, which cause the radicalization of individuals and groups. Professor Sandole has been researching and publishing on this issue for a long time and one cannot help feeling the immense theoretical and practical experience the author brings to the table. His masterful references to the cases on the field and extensive use of the relevant academic sources are, mildly put, remarkable. The reader feels that this book represents only the iceberg tip of what Sandole can actually offer about these topics. Even in this sense, the way he distills all these years’ experience and comes up with a not-too-inflated book is praiseworthy. This makes the piece even more valuable. Vast references and creative usage of other academic works, as well as the eloquent elaboration of the most recent peace-building-relevant events make this book suitable for classroom instruction on the bachelor as well as graduate level studies.

This book is a must read for the students of the IR and CR areas as well as the practitioners on the field. Still for those merely wish-

ing to take a glimpse on the international problems, this book has much to offer, due to its clear and simple language.

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THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM

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By Colin Crouch, Polity Press, 2011
ISBN 9780745651200

REVIEWER: JAROSLAV DVORAK
(KLAIPEDA UNIVERSITY)

In his book *The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism*, Crouch analyses the desperate causes and consequences of the neoliberalism doctrine. The discussion begins with the explanation of the origin of neoliberalism by providing political and economic explanations of neoliberalism: the application of market principles in economical life, the engagement of human rights and the right to live above the poverty level are the features common to the liberalism ideologeme. The author notes that the reincarnation of liberalism took place in the US, where liberalism gained a totally different meaning.

The case of neoliberal legitimisation is developed in the analysis of the crisis of oil prices in 1973. As the idea of full employment was rejected, attention focused on the stabilisation of prices and management of inflation. Mistrust in governments appeared because of their risky interventions. Legitimisation occurred nominating the scholars who propagated neoliberalism. There were some states that experimented with the neoliberal economic regime; international organisations encouraged the diffusion of *New Public Management* implementation. Despite earlier criticism, it is accepted that neoliberalism had positive consequences, decreased the dominance of government, raised the problem of centralisation while emphasising that the new paradigm may be flexible and adapt to the different ideologies and political approaches dominating in different countries.

The book provides a comprehensive, consistent and reader-friendly analysis of market limitations; though does not provide any original ideas. The author provides for the standard limitations of neoliberalism and, in fact, agrees with Klein. Reader will likely be interested in the author's position about the entry and exit from market barriers. Crouch attempts to defend big barriers of entry and

exit from market and maintains that high exit costs became important taking into consideration the world financial crisis. In order to protect society, the author suggests the application of stricter regulations for big banks because the society lacks ideal information about the operation of markets.

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Crouch fears giant enterprises; entire markets depend on them. In order to curb the activity of such enterprises, the author analyses the antimonopoly law; in this case, in the US rather than Great Britain. Additionally, the book criticises the free choice of the consumer because, as it is claimed, the consequences of antimonopoly law have to be the welfare of the consumer rather than choices. Furthermore, the power of technocrats is acknowledged in taking care of the consumers' welfare; lawyers and economists decide what is better for the consumer, while value orientations are not so important. The remarks on national banks system are shrewd and purposeful, as a small number of banks dominate in them. Crouch continues a principled fight with the Chicago school and states that banks operate while using informal, virtual and invisible signals of regulation for institutions. Crouch views banks as actors, which are rational and seek profit, even though the need for a vegetative governmental intervention is questioned.

Even though Crouch is a fierce enemy of neoliberalism, while reading the book one can find many achievements of the ideology. Citizens may not trust the state and force the market to produce alternative choices for public services. Likewise, the privatisation of former public sector enterprises and the strengthening of the public sector, new regulation agencies are created and regulations increase.

Accepting the dominance of enterprises, lobbyist roles are analysed as they impact decision-making processes. Corporations act inside the political process, set standards, create private regulation systems and consult governments. Crouch criticises the responsibility (or lack of) of social enterprises and opposes the idea that the firm can be at least a little responsible because the cases of externality indicate the opposite. Only after a number of questions the author clarifies that the social responsibility of an enterprise can be a commodity because it creates trust between the enterprise and interested parties.

Furthermore, an attempt is made to relate the achievements of

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neoliberalism with the deconstruction of political society; however, after reading the text, it is not clear how all this is related to neoliberalism. Crouch laconically allows the readers to understand that we all are cheaters and live in the imitation world because we cheat each other, even though we expect morality from others. Accordingly, political societies are formed of five groups: political parties, the church, agitation groups (e.g. the group of patient families), voluntary and charity sector and professions. Crouch blames these for hypocrisy and subservience for neoliberals.

Finally, it is claimed that neoliberalism is in crisis and the international environment are returning to the patronage of the state. However, the question of how much government is actually needed still remains unanswered.

CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT RESOLUTION

By Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, Hugh Miall, Polity Press,
2011
ISBN 9780745649740

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Reviews*

*REVIEWER: SHALVA DZIDZIGURI
(CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY)*

Statistical analyses indicate that the estimated 150 armed conflicts which unfolded in the post-Second World War period produced nearly 40 million deaths. Famine, forced migration and widespread diseases – among other conflict-related implications – dramatically increased human suffering. Remarkably, the civilian death ratio has largely outnumbered combatant death by between eighty and ninety percent.

The failure to break the cycle of violence has not, however, hampered the sub-discipline of Conflict Resolution (CR) from developing autonomous research platforms. And, despite the manner in which international relations have transformed since the end of the Cold War and following the 11 September attacks, and the near still-birth of CR, the 2008 election of Obama and his signalled readiness to collaborate closely with other states in search for more peaceful solutions to international crises, has reinvigorated CR.

Bearing witness to such recent changes to the field, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall embark on an attempt to revise previous works on CR through the introduction of their third edition of *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* which brings new research findings and the latest empirical data into a comprehensive, flowing volume. This work provides a detailed exploration of an international phenomenon and is rooted on invoking social change in terms of understanding conflict as ‘the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups’, and resolution simply as ‘behaviour [is] no longer violent, attitudes [are] no longer hostile, and the structure of the conflict [has been] changed’.

Similarly to the first and second editions, the authors have designed the same pattern of the book structure. Twenty chapters are

equally distributed in two main parts and comprise a holistic overview of the field. Written largely in an easy to follow language, its first part is organised as a summation of the evolution, and a theoretical survey, of the subject matter.

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The second part shifts away from more orthodox conflict resolution from orthodox fount towards its new dimensions such as art and popular culture, media and modern communication, public discourse and language intractability. The current edition introduces new chapters offering a survey on those contemporary issues. Growing environmental regression that grants new facets to the otherwise overly interwoven complexion of modern conflicts also finds its reflection in the book.

Authors argue that conflicts no longer have only local implication that is confined within the state borders. Rather they have an immediate global reverberation thanks to the recent changes induced by globalization. This trend reinforces their conviction to put emphasis on the importance of Cosmopolitan Conflict Resolution that in their own words '[I]ndicate the need for an approach that is not situated within any particular state, society or established site of power, but rather promotes constructive means of handling conflict at local through to global levels in the interests of humanity'.

Every chapter is inclusive of case studies as a well-substantiation and good empirical illustrations of each discussion. Setting "sign posts" in an otherwise immense and factually overloaded text provides a helpful guidance to the reader to journey along the historical evolution of the subject and avoid confusion by richness of details.

The book offers a thorough discussion on the role of modern technologies in conflict resolution. Over decades theoreticians and practitioners alike have tested variety of approaches to explore causes and effects of conflictual violence and explore their contributory internal and external agencies in order to design effective techniques peacefully addressing the problem. Thanks to the technological breakthroughs in communication systems of recent past research institutions have designed platforms that enable to record and track the patterns and intensities of modern conflicts in a timely manner. Sophisticated computing systems transform the gathered information into data-sets of quantitative and qualitative nature and uphold the containment of lapsing violence into atrocities by alarming the world community for immediate intervention.

Unfortunately, as the book clearly describes, frequently the opposite holds true. Strikingly, development of conflict resolution techniques appears to be tantamount to the gross of homicide violence.

In closing, the edition delivers on its promise because it describes Conflict Resolution both as a scientific discipline and a practical venture. Drawing on interdisciplinary scholarship, it gives the account of conflict resolution formation in broad outlines and presents the collection of achievements the field has yielded thus far and the set-backs it struggles to repair in theoretical as well as practical sense. The book is recommendable as a useful handbook equally for researchers, practitioners and policymakers as guidance to understanding of an evolutionary process of conflict resolution as well as its current standing.

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MULTILATERAL SECURITY AND ESDP OPERATIONS

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By Fulvio Attinà and Daniela Irrera (eds), Ashgate, 2010,
ISBN 9781409407072

REVIEWER: ANNA KALIŃSKA
(*UNIwersYTET MIKOŁAJA KOPERNIKA*)

Multilateral security combined with ESDP are crucial fields within the theory of international relations and creation of their mechanisms. After the Second World War and primarily bipolar system of powers it was the United States that decided about arranging the cooperation between Western states under the aegis of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty so as to guarantee a global safety system. The authors of the book “Multilateral security and ESDP operations” start from this recognition. Nothing was more sufficient than Euro – Atlantic collaboration and efforts made in order to appease local conflicts which indirectly appeared as a result of provisions of Yalta agreement established in 1945.

The book is divided into two parts. First one depicts the evolution of peacekeeping operations carried out by international actors. Second one offers the presentation of European approach to this issue.

In the first part, the authors present sharp observations on how did the evolution of peacekeeping activities look like. They shows how did they transform from operations which aimed to widespread spheres of political influence to present ones, functioning on the different basis. The authors offer a thesis that this “difference” is about changing the way of political thinking. They claim that operations conducted nowadays, in the times of relative peace and stability have changed their motivations, from military to more complex ones, like a provision of humanitarian aid, social stability, supervision of disarmament and monitoring elections. At the same instant, peacekeeping operations which used to be neutral, now – due to external influence are often dominating over interior organization of states.

In addition, the authors put an emphasis to multilateral – mini-

lateral tendencies. Previously (starting from post – war period and ending with the beginning of the 90s) only the most powerful states were taking part in actions under the aegis of the United Nations, nowadays the idea of minilateralism made it more popular to engage single states or even small groups in handling peacekeeping problems within the frames of international order and rules of law.

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What is specifically intriguing about this scholar analysis is the included wide range of novel problems, such as – regionalization of peacekeeping operations, NGOs commitment or the influence of Security Sector Reform (SRR). To be more precise – basing on examples such as East Timor and Southern Pacific the authors explain how is the idea of regionalization changing the notion of global peace operations. As a result of this analysis, they summed up that regional aid can be successful, but it proves correct especially when multilateral support of local activities is present and adequate to conflicts' scale.

Furthermore – increasing multifunctionality of NGOs. Non – governmental organizations are no longer just taking part in United Nations' consultation procedure but they also enhance humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations. The authors suitably call them “knowledge – providers”, “peace – facilitators” and “voice – articulators”, giving the tribute to their further analysis.

What is also taken into consideration is the comprehensive change in the area of global safety, aggregated in the concept of Security Sector Reform. What was particularly implied was that its main actors, i.e. UN, NATO and EU are not taking into account the rule of “local ownership”, simultaneously devoting too much attention to the same conflicts and overlapping obligations which results in confusion and lack of efficiency and transparency instead of well-provided activities.

In the second part of this prominent tutorial the authors give a series of evidence that the number of European peacekeeping operations has increased since the development of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Nowadays, Western European countries are more capable of carrying out missions on their own, without UN's support. They are more involved in other organizations' and join hybrid missions' activities. The authors claim that although some observers are sceptical of many trends concerning European impact on peacekeeping operations this issue cannot be

omitted in this dissertation.

The authors give the book the bonus of also offering chapters' titles and subtitles in the form of questions, which absorbs readers' attention and introduces them to a decision – making process that they undertake themselves.

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“Multilateral security and ESDP operations” is an overview of practice of peacekeeping operations well-based on the newest theoretical background, heavily supported by tables, statistics and graphic data. A full, for general readers interested in international relations, as well as for scholars committed to global and local security issues.



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FIVE FACTORS AFFECTING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

YAHYA ALSHAMMARI

ABSTRACT: There are five factors that affect security and stability in the Middle East. The first of these is the ticking bomb of sectarianism between the Sunni and Shiite strands of Islam, which have become more widespread in recent years due to the politisation of sectarian tensions and their transformation among some actors to a means to achieve political demands. Secondly, the impact of the Arab revolutions and the accompanying rise of Islamist groups through the new democratic tendencies encouraged by those revolutions. Thirdly, Iran's behaviour through the use of both direct and indirect threats to several countries in the region. Fourthly, the existence of a fertile environment for terrorist groups in Yemen. Finally, the struggle between Arabs and Israelis over the existence of the State of Israel and the plight of the Palestinians. This article provides a clear set of linkages between these and investigates them with the intention of enhancing understanding and encouraging debate.

KEYWORDS: Middle East, Islamists, Arab Revolutions, Sunni, Shiite, Terrorism, Arabs, Israel

INTRODUCTION

In the current political climate of the Middle East, five main tension areas – powder kegs – have the potential to upset the tenuous balance and trigger wide-scale hostilities that are unlikely to remain localised. These are identified in this work as: 1. intra-national tensions among Palestinian Arabs and between Palestinians and Israelis, 2. heightened sectarianism between Sunni and Shia Muslims, 3. the growing Iranian regional threat, 4. swelling terrorist organisations in Yemen, and 5. the proliferation and reinvigoration of Islamists encouraged by the recent Arab revolutions. This work analyses these sources of tension to understand the nature of the risks they pose to the wider regional and international environment, and

suggests sustainable ways to inhibit conflict and its potential spill-over.

PALESTINE AND ISRAEL

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The Arab-Israeli conflict continues to be a hotbed of instability in the Middle East, largely due to its duration and the absence of any significant arbitration.¹ After more than 60 years, this conflict challenges regional peace and undermines stability;² it has – at least theoretically – been cited as the cause of open hostilities of a symmetric and asymmetric nature and is responsible for an ensuing security dilemma and its accompanying arms race.³

In 2002, during an Arab League Summit (Beirut), the representatives of the Arab states presented an initiative to resolve this dispute through establishing and normalising diplomatic relations with Israel in exchange for the latter's withdraw from the Golan Heights (Syria) and a general return to its pre-1967 borders, including from Palestinian territories in the West Bank (of the Jordan River).⁴ This initiative was consistent with UNSC resolutions 242 and 333,⁵ though posed a challenge to Israel since any full return to its pre-1967 borders would require a relinquishing of direct sovereignty over an important part of Jerusalem which is, in addition to being an inter-faith meeting point and a sacred city, also happens to be Israel's largest population centre and economic hub.⁶

In addition to the status of Jerusalem and the viability of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, two other issues act as a potential trigger for local and regional hostilities. First, millions of Palestinians continue to be refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria as well as in the US, Canada and throughout Europe. While such refugees do not directly pose a threat to the peace in the Middle East, they are often used as excuses for mass mobilisations, directed hostilities against Israel and its allies and may even be found in the rhetoric of both al Qaeda and Iran. While it is clear that Israel needs to amend the situation facing Palestinian refugees, it is equally clear that Palestine has become a rallying beacon in the Islamic world and may therefore, indirectly, spark unnecessary tension and, potentially violence.

Second, an Israel and Syria continue to be mired in a regional rivalry – as recent (February 2013) events attest – with the former

maintaining its annexation of the so-called Shebaa Farms (Syria and Lebanon) and the Golan Heights (Syria) which it acquired during the 1967 Six-Day war.⁷ This has acted as a hurdle to a negotiated settlement though is mirrored – if not eclipsed – by Syria's support for Hezbollah (and its former support for HAMAS) and its deep alliance with Iran, both of which are recognised as Israel's most formidable challengers.

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It is worth noting that the Israel-Egypt, Israel-Jordan and even Israel-GCC has stabilised and the likelihood of organised violence between these states is increasingly remote; despite the unfolding events in Egypt following the demise of the Mubarak regime.

Despite the potential of conflict escalation between Israel and Palestine and Israel and Syria, peace-making efforts have not stalled. Indeed, in April 2011, a number of former Israeli security officials such as James Berry, Ami Ayalon (Mossad), Danny Yatom and Amnon Evkin Shahak (Chief of Staff) presented a disengagement initiative that sought Israel's withdrawal from East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip to make room for the creation of Palestine. Since the Palestinian issue is widely interpreted as humanitarian first and strategic second, it is interesting that this initiative was geared towards Palestine at the expense of Syria. In other words, Israel seems ready to make some compromises with Palestine but is much less inclined to do so with Syria.⁸

Unfortunately, this Israeli-originated disengagement initiative fell on deaf ears; there were no follow-up discussions, no negotiations and, generally, no real interest in the plan. Indeed, it is striking that such important former Israeli security figures were simply marginalised by Netanyahu and his administration, which essentially killed the initiative since a wide assortment of Arab states – and the Arab League for that matter – would not endorse the initiative since it was not reinforced by any official proclamations of support. Additionally, the initiative came at a very unstable time in Arab and Middle Eastern politics; the so-called Arab Spring had already kicked off and was threatening to alter strategic relationships throughout the region. Hence, the Arab League states were compelled to deal with internal issues rather than focusing on their foreign affairs.

Modern Arab societies have grown up on a declared hatred

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toward Israel.⁹ Many of the Arab countries have raised a number of generations through school curricula that feed this hatred and remind the students that the state of Israel enforces a continuing occupation on Palestine, and that the day must come when they get back the stolen land, thereby enhancing the persistence of this conflict.

The state of Israel is home to the Jewish people, who have suffered from the scourge of global conflict and persecution, and this ideology is rooted in the conscience of the world.¹⁰ Some of the world's countries such as the USA and UK have provided a helping hand to establish the State of Israel through the land of Palestine as a country for the Jews, who suffered from the Holocaust with subsequent social fragmentation and a loss of national identity.¹¹ When King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia met with US President Roosevelt in 1945, he said that the Arabs would not be satisfied if the land of Palestine were given over to the Jews, and that the Arabs would not be quiet about that and could be expected to struggle against such a development for a long time. He further stated that the plight of the Jews was the responsibility of Germany and not that of the Arabs.¹²

Based on my own experience of living with and studying among the new generation of young Arabs, I can testify they have a strong enthusiasm to continue what they perceive as an inherent conflict with Israel. Generally speaking, these young people perceive the Arab governments as collaborators with Israel and as being keen to stay in power without fighting a new war. This is confirmed by what happened to the Israel Embassy in Cairo on September 8 of 2011 after the fall of the regime of Hosni Mubarak, when a mob of enthusiastic young people surrounded the embassy of Israel, threatened the staff and burned the Israeli flag and destroyed official papers.¹³

It is important to recognise that while future generations will not have tasted the horrors of previous wars, they will, however, be very excited to fight new battles as a result of being rooted in a culture that encourages them to break the theory of norms of the Israeli occupation, according to Arab customs. During election campaigns and discussions, the political slogans of the parties and the Arab governments rely on this conflict to gain votes and sup-

port. Textbooks and scientific topics always put this conflict first in terms of national priorities, and therefore these ideas are deeply engrained into Arab generations, who will not easily give them up.

In a superficial sense, this conflict is now stable, but this stability is analogous to the case of a passive volcano, which boils from the inside and has the potential to erupt unexpectedly at any time. Any solution to this conflict and the avoidance of further confrontations can be achieved only through sacrifice and compromise. The Arabs have presented some of these necessary concessions in return for a radical solution to this conflict. When we return to previous periods, the Arabic discourse used harsher language in demanding an end to the occupation of Palestinian land in full and on time, but in the meantime, has given up some of that vehemence through the initiative of 2002.

On the other hand, Israel does not make concrete concessions and does not accept the necessity to give up any part of Jerusalem in return for an end to this conflict. Moreover, recently the Israel government has refused the international attempts to stop the building of settlements in East Jerusalem and Jericho.¹⁴ In addition, through the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the Arabs consider Palestinian Autonomy to be a right, not a grant from the Israeli government.

And thus the Israeli stand is an obstacle blocking the possibility of any concessions for the development of a solution satisfactory to all parties. If Israel sincerely wishes a peaceful solution to this conflict, it must take the initiative to infuse a new spirit in the Arab initiative or resolve to keep the conflict going and be open about this.

THE TICKING BOMB OF SECTARIANISM

Over the past three decades, there has been an upsurge in the sectarian strife between Shiites and Sunnis in the Middle East to an unprecedented degree, with the last outbreak becoming visible through the recent Arab uprisings. Some of the rebels or governments have relied upon communal allegiances as means for the success of their ambitions. We note that in Bahrain the rebels arose from the Shiite community, whereas the Sunnis continue to support the government.¹⁵ On the contrary, in Syria, the rebels have

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accused the Shiite-based Syrian government of depending on Shiite personnel to oppress the rebels.¹⁶

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Long-term observers of the Middle East are aware that sectarian divisions have not been a problem in the past and there has been no strife between the two Islamic communities such as all too frequently exists today. The social and ideological changes that have taken place in the region since 1978 have played an active role in reaching the current state of congestion. These variables are summarised by the following factors:

1. Iran's Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 under the leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeini, which was based on the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists (or *welayat-e faqih*) under the doctrine of the Shiites. This means that the supreme leader will be a religious figure and all actions of government will be in reference to Shiite Muslims, both politically and ideologically. The Shiites that live in many Arab countries, according to Shiite belief, are required to be loyal to the Shiite religious leader in Tehran and he becomes their main religious authority and political reference.¹⁷
2. The Islamic awakening, which began in the Sunni Islamist groups in the Middle East. There are many examples, such as the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia by militants in 1979, who called for the establishment of an Islamic state under the leadership of the Mahdi.¹⁸ Also significant was the growing movement of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which in 1980 led to the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.¹⁹ Moreover, the growth of Salafi groups in Algeria and in many countries in the Middle East also reflected this growth of fundamentalism.²⁰ This awakening has contributed to the emergence of atonement for many of the Islamic currents and especially the Shiites and has caused many other Muslims to consider them as outside of the Islamic religion.
3. The implications of the Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and 1988. Over its eight-year duration, this war contributed to the extension of a political base in the Middle East based on sectarianism through international relations when the Sunni governments aided the Sunni Iraqi government, while the Syrian Shiite government stood against the Iraqis and pro-

vided moral assistance to Iran.²¹

4. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. When U.S. troops entered Iraq and the regime of Saddam Hussein collapsed, there was chaos and a breakdown of security, which contributed to the penetration of al-Qaeda to Iraq,²² as well as the influx into Iraq of many of the Shiite militants that had been opponents of the former Iraqi regime.²³ The declared goal of al-Qaeda is to fight U.S. forces and their goal of expelling all U.S. troops from Arab countries has been proclaimed through the statements of its leaders such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.²⁴ At the same time, suicide bombings occurred in the mainly Shiite cities and the holy Shiite religious sites. The Shiites accused al-Qaeda, after which there were similar bombings in Sunni communities. Unfortunately, the attacks were repeated on both sides and are still continuing. This conflict between Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq has contributed more sectarian tension to the whole region.
5. The technological revolution. We regretfully note the recent spread in the Middle East of the many television channels that incite sectarianism through criticism and the atonement doctrine and provide a platform for the instigators, such as the Alburhan channel, the Fadak channel and the World channel.

*Yahya
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Some may argue about the seriousness of the purported sectarian divisions and do not consider such to be a source of concern for the composition of the conflict in the Middle East. However, the Sunni and Shiite communities share many of the geographical locations in one country; in some countries, such as Iraq, the majority of citizens belong to the Shiite community,²⁵ while in other countries, such as in Syria, the majority belong to the Sunni community.²⁶ In light of this geographical proximity, any increase in tensions is very likely to turn into civil wars, as happened in Lebanon, which had formerly been a multi-cultural state of long standing.

Historically, sectarian conflicts are likely to be bitter and deep, as was the case in Europe between Catholics and Protestants between 1618 and 1648.²⁷ In Europe, there was a historic difference between the end of the sectarian war and the beginning of the political revolutions in France, which started in 1789, while in Germany these upheavals did not take place until the beginning of 1918.²⁸ But in the

Middle East, we are witnessing a dramatic interplay between the revolution towards democracy and sectarian tension.

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The Middle East is facing difficult choices and the possibilities for change remain open, especially after the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Iraq. Sectarian tension in the region and political sectarianism in Iraq are the influential factors to create a post-crisis in 2011 in Iraq.

To find a solution to this tension remains difficult, but when governments become less rigid, the convulsions of sectarianism will be solved more easily. It is to be regretted that some governments are contributing to the sectarian tension; for example, in the revolution of Bahrain, the dominant Shiite governments in Iraq and Iran have stated that they stand with the rebels and their demands. If the governments of Iraq and Iran already stand with the right to self-determination for the peoples of the Middle East, how is it they can support the Syrian government in its violent suppression of its own citizens, both peaceful demonstrators and, increasingly, rebels bearing arms?

Ideally, the rise of a political elite and a consciously involved and aware citizenry is the solution for the region, but this is difficult to achieve in the short term. At present, the Middle East is experiencing the Arab revolutions, which are moving toward democracy, as in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, which contributes to the formation of a political environment conducive to national action and that will allow these communities to move away from religious sectarianism.

THE IRANIAN THREAT

Since the 1978 Islamic Revolution, Iranian political discourse has taken the form of threats and intimidation towards many countries in the Middle East. These threats have focused on each of the Gulf States and Israel in particular. With the inauguration of President Ahmadinejad in 2004, this style of threat making has intensified, from the president and the government members,²⁹ as well as giving help to terrorist organisations in the Middle East such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Houthis in Yemen.³⁰

The Islamic revolution in Iran is based on the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, which, according to Islamic law, is the only representative of the expected Mahdi, a messianic figure especially re-

vered by Shias.³¹ This is made clear according to certain items mentioned in Articles 5 and 107 of the Iranian constitution, and thus, as the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, the government of Iran is considered (by the Iranian authorities) to be the de facto leader of the Muslims. According to the narrative provided by the Iranian Constitution, according to the introduction of the Iranian Constitution, it is stipulated that the Iranian Army will be developed to become an ideological army and do the necessary work in the service of the Lord and to provide for the extension of divine power in the world.³²

Jeffrey Osman discusses the basic structure of the political and legal system in Iran and he says all components of the Iranian Republic of Iran are based on two important points. The first point concerns the sovereignty of the Guardianship of the Jurist, proclaiming that he is the representative of God. The second point maintains that sovereignty is not guaranteed solely to the people of Iran, but rather extends to all Muslims everywhere.³³

In 1997, the Foundation for Organizing and Disseminating the Heritage of Imam Khomeini in Tehran issued a book called *Exporting Revolution as Seen by the Imam Khomeini, Leader of the Islamic Revolution in Tehran*. This book expresses interest in causing Iran to export Islamic revolution and in that way to bring about an Islamic world under the leadership of the religious leader in Tehran. Many pages of this book are devoted to the goal of the political regime in Tehran to export the revolution to Islamic countries, especially Arabic ones.³⁴ On the anniversary of the Iranian Revolution in 1980, Imam Khomeini said: 'We are working to export our revolution to various parts of the world.' In 1983, the Guardianship of the Jurist in Iran, now Ali Khamenei, said, 'the revolution knows no boundaries and cannot be imprisoned by walls, but rather it must be exported'.³⁵

In the Gulf States there is a stimulating environment to export the Islamic revolution, based on the following three basic pillars:

1. The presence of Shiite imams who are loyal both intellectually and spiritually to the dogmatic system of Iran, which has contributed to all the Gulf countries having become a fertile environment for the promotion of ideological ideas of the Iranian revolution by the presence of the numerous individuals who are strong supporters.³⁶ Many Shiites travel from the Gulf countries to Iran under the pretext of seek-

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ing knowledge in the seminaries of Iran.³⁷ These seminaries or religious councils have adapted their ideas to extend the influence of the religious Guardianship of the Jurist and the dissemination of these beliefs in Islamic countries.

2. Iran hopes to play a pivotal role in the region of the Middle East. Standing in front of that aspiration are the Gulf States, which, as a result of their possession of powerful economic instruments based on oil production, makes them of interest to Muslims and gives them a major role in regional developments. In the view of the Iranian leadership, exporting the principles of the revolution may be the appropriate solution to an imbalance of forces, considering that the Guardianship of the Jurist is the primary reference in Iran, along with the presence of human assets throughout the Gulf, which contribute to the export of the concepts of Islamic revolution.
3. Contributing to these factors are the presence of the Grand Mosque and the Prophet's Mosque in Saudi Arabia, the holy places for Muslims, making them a catalyst to making the Gulf a key target of that revolution. Doubtless, any authority having the control of the holy places for Muslims will be considered as the moral authority of the Muslims, which is the ultimate goal of the Guardianship of the Jurist.³⁸

Various Iranian authorities frequently make threats to the Gulf States in public statements and Iranian agents are often accused of interference in their affairs. These observations can be backed up by remembering the remarks of the Leader of the Revolution Imam Khomeini, when he said in August 4, 1987 in the Kayhan newspaper threatening those who are the hosts of the Grand Mosque and the Prophet's Mosque (that is, the government of Saudi Arabia): 'We will punish them with God's help at the right time.'³⁹ These statements have been repeated on a permanent basis, but subsequent statements have gone beyond this in the threat to attach some Gulf States to the Iranian state as provinces. For example, in 2007, in a press statement by the Hussein Shariatmadari representative of the Guardianship of the Jurist in Kayhan newspaper, he said that Bahrain was a province of the Iranian state and even the Bahrain people are demanding their return to their "Mother Home".⁴⁰

The Republican Guard foundation known as the "Quds Force" is the military wing in charge of the foreign operations of the Republi-

can Guard.⁴¹ I have mentioned previously the priorities of Iran's military to export the revolution; however, the Quds Force is a secret organisation that does not make public its goals and aspirations. In October 2011, the U.S. accused the Quds Force of planning to carry out bombings in the U.S. to target the Saudi embassy and kill the Saudi ambassador.⁴² In early 2011, Kuwait fingered a spy ring as conducting espionage of political and military interests in Kuwait and sending its findings to Iran. Also, in November 2011, the authorities of Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia announced the arrest of cells targeting vital installations and embassies in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and, after investigation, Bahrain announced that this cell had received support from Iran.⁴³

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Field Commander of the Quds Force is Qassem Suleimani⁴⁴ but the true leadership remains the Guardianship of the Jurist Ali Khamenei as the spiritual leader of the Quds Force.⁴⁵ Suleimani has been included on lists of international sanctions, and some countries have placed the Quds Force on the list of terrorist groups,⁴⁶ but this man is still uncertain about their aspirations for the future. However, the Fars News Agency published a statement issued by Major General Qassem Suleimani in front of fifty thousand members of the Basij and he said that in the region a number of revolutions are occurring and these revolutions all draw inspiration from the Iranian revolution.⁴⁷

That statement reflects the reality that Suleimani's thoughts are strategically rooted towards the export of the Iranian revolution and do not stop at the Arab Spring, but aspire to link the Arab revolutions to the principles of the Iranian revolution, which is based on the sovereignty of the Guardianship of the Jurist. Designating the leader of the Iranian Quds Force is the decision of the Guardianship of the Jurist.

Although the Iranian government has repeatedly stated that the country's nuclear program is peaceful,⁴⁸ the International Atomic Energy Agency published a report in November 2011 that indicated that there were strong doubts about the military direction connected to the enrichment of uranium.⁴⁹ Iran's nuclear program has become a source of threat to the region and, at the same time, an excuse for neighbouring countries to create similar programs and thus become a nuclear power, which contributes to the instability of the region.

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Forty percent of the world's oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz,⁵⁰ which Iran has frequently threatened to close – most recently in early 2012, when Iran threatened the world and the countries of the region during military exercises that it was conducting in the vicinity of the Straits of Hormuz.⁵¹ This is a threat to the world in general and not just to the economy of the Gulf States. The achievement of this threat could be to drastically disrupt the world economy and the public life of many of its citizens. It is certain that the states of the world, especially the major powers, will not tolerate this and will prevent any closing of the Straits of Hormuz, which brings up the danger this could be achieved only through an Iranian and international military conflict in the Middle East.

On the other hand, the Arab-Israeli conflict has, ironically, created a healthy environment for the export of the Iranian revolution to the Arab countries, by identifying its goals with the inspired feelings of Muslims and calling upon their sympathy, thereby paving the way for many people to embrace Iran's revolutionary thought. Iran has frequently used verbal threats against Israel⁵² and considers it the first enemy of the state of Iran as a means to attract the notice of the Arabs and Muslims about the political structure of the revolution.

We can analyse and confirm this approach according to the following factors:

- I. Iran does not support peaceful solutions to resolve the Palestinian issue. On the contrary, the country is working to deepen the differentiation and ideological separation between the Palestinian parties of Hamas and Fatah so as to break the international peace efforts and to further postpone any resolution of the Palestinian decision. This is confirmed by the Iranian support for Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, home to about a million people, and which provides hospitals, staff and public service in this sector that has need of outside economic support.⁵³ By providing this support for Hamas, Iran continues to prolong the separation of Hamas from the national government of Palestine, which supports peaceful solutions and continues to negotiate with permanent international institutions and Israel government parties to find solutions to the conflict. Hamas, in contrast, continues to rely first on military escalation and renounces

peaceful solutions.

2. Iran supports the creation of a turbulent environment on the Israeli-Lebanese border through support for Hezbollah, both financially and militarily. However, Iran does not support its strategic ally Syria to regain the Golan Heights, which is evident through the lack of support similar to that given to Hezbollah, as reported in the media. At the same time, Iran does not support Hezbollah with sophisticated weapons, only limited armaments despite the existence of an appropriate environment to send advanced military systems to Hezbollah, which controls much Lebanese territory,⁵⁴ all of which is of primary importance to Syria, Iran's one strategic ally in the region.

Then, Iran, on principle and through political procedures, does not support an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict and works actively to create a turbulent atmosphere around this conflict as a means to inspire the feelings of Muslims by inflammatory statements and support for Hezbollah. All this is done in order to spread the principles of the revolution and expand the influence of the Guardianship of the Jurist and to establish Tehran as a political capital for the Muslims.

SECURITY AND STABILITY IN YEMEN

Yemen suffers from the lack of security and stability, which constitutes a threat both directly and indirectly to the stability of the Middle East. There are various armed groups in Yemen and a widening conflict that could become a civil war. As a result of dependence on the power of tribal forces and the inability of the government to establish and maintain security in Yemen,⁵⁵ the country has become a magnet for extremists and fugitives from justice.

On Christmas Day of 2009, an al-Qaeda-affiliated bomber tried to blow up a Northwest airliner that was heading from Amsterdam to Detroit in the United States. Investigations showed that the man accused of involvement in the bombing of the plane, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, had received training in Yemen under the auspices of al-Qaeda. Before this attempt, an attempt in the summer of 2010 had been made to murder the Saudi Assistant Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef by an assailant believed to have come from Ye-

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men prior to the attack.⁵⁶

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As an organisation, al-Qaeda received a number of blows after 2001, which contributed to the collapse of its aspirations and goals.⁵⁷ But, in Yemen, al-Qaeda soon found a suitable environment for re-constituting its infrastructure, and established bases for basic training and planning.⁵⁸ The United States has released many members of al-Qaeda who had been detainees in the Guantanamo prison and returned them to their countries. Some of these releasees have undergone programs to advise them, as well as programs to establish their eligibility for repatriation. However, some of these releasees fled to Yemen to re-unite with al-Qaeda.⁵⁹

Individuals who sympathise with the ideology of al-Qaeda find that they can always resort to tribal areas in various Middle Eastern countries, as happened in Afghanistan and the Pakistani-Afghan border areas, as well as the mountainous geographical environments that are a feature of these areas.⁶⁰ This is what is available in Yemen, where members of al-Qaeda can make the rugged mountains of the region a new command centre, rather than the Afghan-Pakistani mountains, where the organisation has recently received several severe blows – most significantly, the death of its leader, Osama bin Laden.

In addition to the al-Qaeda organisation is the Houthis group in northern Yemen, which has been fighting the Yemeni government at least since 2004, when its leader Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi was killed by government forces.⁶¹ It is true that this organisation has not exported its ideology outside of Yemen, but the basic rule of this organisation is based on the moral expression of aims dedicated to the spilling of blood and doing murder to individuals of the West and Israel,⁶² which indicates at least an intellectual link between al-Qaeda and Houthis as regards the identity of the enemy. The two groups, however, differ in religious outlook. This organisation has suffered from successive blows from the Yemeni army in six wars, which have contributed to reducing the seriousness of this organisation, and these circumstances have frustrated the group's efforts to gain control of North Yemen and export its particular form of evil to the outside.

There is no doubt that the recent political events in Yemen in the form of protests and sit-ins and confrontations with security that have resulted from the public demand for the departure of

President Ali Abdullah Saleh, have contributed to creating a stable environment for terrorist organisations in Yemen to re-arrange their structures and to be able to operate more freely.⁶³

Yemen is a very poor country and, without assistance, the Yemeni government is unlikely to gain control over al-Qaeda in the south or the Houthis in the north. Even were the authorities to try to address one of these organisations, it would not be able to address the other at the same time. International solidarity and especially the countries of the Middle East would be able to help Yemen cope with these organisations, although this assistance should take the form of economic not military aid, to preclude any interpretations that this aid is a form of intervention in the internal affairs of Yemen. Rather, what is needed is economic and logistical assistance that will help in building a military force to help Yemen to eliminate these organisations and to curb the danger to the region and the international community.

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THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS

Many world powers have supported the rebellious peoples in the Middle East, morally and financially as well as militarily. This support can be interpreted as arising from the current mental and intellectual development of individual world citizens who share a belief in the benefits of democracy and the basics of good governance as the official form of the modern international organisation.⁶⁴ However, the results of these revolutions and the popular yearning for modern democracy in the Middle East have also contributed to the rise of Muslim Brotherhood groups and Salafi Islam.

This trend was illustrated dramatically in Tunisia when the Islamic Renaissance Party, which was inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,⁶⁵ took a dominating lead in the Constituent Assembly of Tunisia elections, with 41 percent of the vote, and thus, control of the majority of seats in the Constituent Assembly of Tunisia compared to other parties.⁶⁶ In Egypt as well, election results showed a win for the Muslim Brotherhood, with 40 percent of the vote and the Salafi Muslims with 20 percent of the vote, which means these members of the Islamic movement will have control of the Egyptian People's Assembly.⁶⁷

Under the former regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, these parties

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were banned and repressed by the government and many members of these Islamic groups were put in prison. For example, the deposed President of Tunisia Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had thousands of members of the Renaissance Party imprisoned.⁶⁸ The current President Hamadi Jebali of Tunisia spent nearly 15 years in prison, including 10 years in solitary confinement.⁶⁹

In Libya, the Islamists contributed greatly to the success of the Revolution. For example, Karim Belhadj, military commander of the rebels in Tripoli, was an internationally wanted alleged terrorist for his association with al-Qaeda and fighting in Afghanistan. Belhadj was arrested in 2004 by the U.S. government and was handed over to Libya the same year. At the present time, Islamists have military control in the country, and Islamist militias were prominent among the groups that liberated Tripoli from the former Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi, which was the final and essential stage clearing the way for eventual elections to create a new and, it is hoped, more representative government.⁷⁰

The outcome is not yet clear on the impact of the rise of Islamic organisations on the reins of power in those countries. These organisations have been able to establish a valid presence and make progress within the revolutions through popular choice; however, in the past, these organisations have played suspicious roles in destabilising the security and stability in some countries of the Middle East. For example, Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the leaders of al-Qaeda, is a graduate of the dominant Islamic organisation in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood.⁷¹ The Islamic organisations in Egypt are based on the ideas of Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Yahya Hashim and other founders of these organisations.⁷² Some of these organisations have committed numerous crimes, such as the assassination of former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat⁷³ and the massacre of Deir el-Bahari in 1997,⁷⁴ during which about 62 people were killed, as well as many other crimes that have claimed the lives of hundreds and wounded many more over the past 60 years.

Thus, given this history, the rise of Islamist groups to decision-making positions over geopolitical, economic and military sectors in important countries of the Middle East such as Egypt is worrying. The history of those organisations and their goals raise the question of whether their avowed goals and methods are in non-conformance with the development of peace and stability in

the region.

Despite the concern generated by the rise of these groups, we must also note that the ideas of some of these groups have changed and become more open. Abdelhakim Belhadj, a founding member of the Libyan Fighting Group, which is an al-Qaeda offshoot, after his release from prison, wrote a book entitled *Studies in the Concepts of Jihad and Accountability and Governance to the People*.⁷⁵ This book can be seen as a form of corrective to traditional notions of jihad in the theories of Islamist militants.

Another example is that of Rashid al-Ghannushi, who is a theoretical leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party, which is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and a winner of the recent Tunisian elections. Ghannushi has written many books such as *Public Freedoms in the Islamic State*⁷⁶ and *The Islamic Movement and the Issue of change*.⁷⁷ These books are considered to represent a historic shift in the concepts of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in the Middle East, as they deal with the freedom of other, non-Muslim parties in thought and religion, considering peaceful coexistence with them as well as the liberation of women and achieving collective security for all people, whether in the same country or at the regional and international level.

In the same direction, the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, which is established on the basis of Islamic ideas,⁷⁸ provides a fine example of moderate Islam, even with a conservative outlook. These developments can provide Islamist moderates a source of comfort as a number of Islamist groups appear to be on the verge of assuming the leadership of some of the countries in the Middle East through democratic means.

However, the Middle East has suffered previously from Islamic organisations. Even if the regulations regarding the ideas and objectives of these organisations are amended to be less dogmatic, this process needs to go through long stages in order to ensure that such changes are accepted by all adherents of the previous ideas.

We live in a crucial stage of the ideological changes now taking place in the political structure of the Middle East. These changes are certain to affect the peaceful life and security stability in the Middle East, either directly or indirectly. Certainly it is not inevitable that we have to take an ominous view as far as concerns the reality that we are living. After all, if these organisations can successfully

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participate in the creation of a healthy democracy in the region and help make it a zone free from any manifestation of violence or the threat to security, the way will be clear for developing the region as a safe environment for the life of all individuals, regardless of belief or background.

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CONCLUSION

It seems that the Middle East is on the verge of a new and historical period, which contains within it seeds of embarrassment for many of the countries involved. There remains the dormant but smouldering volcano of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition, there is the reality of sectarian divisions that directly challenge the stability of the region, especially if these divisions are allowed to politicise the region. Further, various Iranian authorities issue threats to countries in the region and the world, and make it plain that they are willing to consider the use of military force to disrupt regional and international interests, while frequently making direct threats against specific countries; none of which actions, of course, are conducive to calm in the region. In Yemen, terrorist organisations have found a new home for the realignment and consolidation of their memberships, with Al-Qaeda settling in the south of Yemen and the Houthis in the north. Al-Qaeda has become much more closely entwined in the region after having been based thousands of kilometres away in Afghanistan. These troubles are not limited to those threats, as Salafist Islamic groups and the Muslim Brotherhood have found the various Arab revolutions an attractive way to get to the centres of power in those countries.

We must understand that the complexity of these conflicts and the diversity of the rules by which each is constrained raises concerns for the difficulty of controlling all of these conflicts arising at the same time. But when we understand the reasons and motives for the formation of such conflicts and analyse them, we will be better able to develop appropriate ideas, and to balance the scenarios in ways that will curb the risks to the Middle East. Only in this way can we expect to offer help to the peoples involved so as to give them hope of a future time when the region is more peaceful and free from all forms of conflict.

Clearly, to provide more political concessions and help promote

the rise of political and intellectual elites both morally and by providing logistical support to help poor countries such as Yemen would be a strong foundation for greater stability and would help achieve the dream of peoples in the region for stability and security.

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DIVIDE ET IMPERA?: WESTERN ENGAGEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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ABSTRACT: One, important, reason driving recent instability in the Middle East is the influence of Western powers on local actors. In the first half of the 20th century the UK and France held significant sway; during the Cold War the US and USSR were dominant. After the Cold War, the US emerged as the sole, dominating foreign actor in the region. What commonality was shared among all penetrating powers? The strategy of divide and rule was widely deployed. Such a policy was introduced by various means: supporting segments of local populations (especially Arab Christians), polarising local communities against each other and through direct settler activities. This policy was efficient in the short-term but proved destabilising in the long-term. This work takes a critical, birds-eye view at the evolution of engagement in the region and offers insights into the problems produced by such approaches as well as the net benefactors and losers.

KEYWORDS: The Middle East, foreign policy, settlements, Arab Christians, radical Islamism, Israel, Hamas, Hezbollah, al Qaeda

The British were playing all sides. They were dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Mullahs in Iran, but at the same time they were dealing with [their opponents] the army and the royal families.'

Amir Abbas Hoveyda'

INTRODUCTION

This article is focused on the strategy of divide and rule carried out by Western powers in the Middle East. I briefly introduce the basic principles of this strategy through practical examples and demonstrate the consequences of the strategy.

This article proceeds as follows: The introduction focuses on a reflection of the divide and rule strategy in contemporary interna-

tional relations theory, and schematically presents the basic principles of the divide and rule. I also focus on the powers which were (or still are) the main administrators of this strategy. In the next part I focus on the earliest exercise of divide and rule and also on the most extreme cases of it, namely the cases of settler movements that supplanted a certain ethnic or religious community in the midst of larger communities for the sake of producing allies in regions where such were very difficult to come across. In this section, particular attention is paid to the manner in which the UK, France and Israel have deployed settlers.² The second part deals with how exogenous powers extended their own influence through the support mechanisms offered to local allies. The example of French and Israeli support for Lebanese Christians is revealing and will be utilised below. The third part of this work proposes an appendage-theory that seeks to show how Islamists have been deployed as so-called 'pragmatic allies' to further divide and rule the Middle East. The conclusion of this work discusses how the divide and rule strategy has evolved, how it is currently deployed and whether there are viable alternatives to it.

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This work maintains that among the most enduring and essential (simultaneously, among the most controversial) strategies used by exogenous powers when engaging in the Middle East. By exploring this strategic orientation, it is possible to contribute explanations as to the wide assortment of conspiracy theories and general hostilities that accompany Middle Eastern interpretations of European and US approaches to the region.

THE STRATEGY OF DIVIDE AND RULE

The strategic-approach, 'divide and rule,' is ancient and may be found in full deployment in nearly every epoch and every generation of human history. Despite such endurance, a comprehensive understanding of divide and rule remains elusive in IR literature.

While some authors have addressed the strategy, such as Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, for instance³

Morgenthau just very briefly mentions that divide and rule 'has been resorted to by nations who tried to make or keep their compet-

itors weak by dividing them or keeping them divided'.⁴

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He writes that the most consistent and important policies of this kind in modern times are the policy of France with respect to Germany and the policy of the Soviet Union with respect to the rest of Europe. In my opinion there are also other good examples of divide and rule in various parts of the World, and this strategy is not just limited to “competitors”, but it could be also associated with colonial rule and analogic models of rule (mandates, protectorates, etc.). Not only France and the Soviet Union but also the British were very skilled in the divide and rule strategy – most notably in India, where they supported some local Indian rulers and thus splintered the population (often on the basis of categorizing the people as Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs) to prevent an uprising against the British Raj (1858–1947). Divide and rule policies were also used by the British in Cyprus (separating Greeks and Turks), and, last but not least, in the region of the Middle East. The nations in the Middle East, India, etc. were not competitors in Morgenthau’s direct sense, but the unity of these nations was an obstacle for British interests and colonial rule.

The mechanisms of divide and conquer as used by the British and also by other great powers could be generally explained as follows: If great power or superpower X wants to increase its influence in a region or state (R) in which X has an interest (e. g. imperial, economical) but at the same time is obvious that R is usually more or less hostile to X, it will be much easier for X not to conquer all of region R and its communities militarily but to find other options or a combination thereof:

- creating allies by settler activities – e.g. French settlers in Algeria, Israeli settlers in Palestinian territories,
- finding some reliable allies (e.g. on the basis of their cultural closeness) whom power X will support politically, economically or often even militarily – e. g. the support of Lebanese Maronite Christians by Israel,
- finding some pragmatic and purely instrumental allies who will be (usually temporarily) supported (e. g. the support of Arab Islamists against Arab nationalist régimes during the Cold War or the US and Israeli support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt against Nasser) – e. g. for the purpose

of a proxy war.

The strategy of divide and rule is not merely about finding an ally in a hostile region to dominate it more easily. Usually this strategy leads to a weakening of the existing system of power structures in R and encourages the weakening and internal strife inside R. This strategy helps in pitting ethnic groups, tribes or religious groups against each other. In this situation power X advances its interest in region R much more easily and starts to dominate it.

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Many practical examples from the history of international relations (e.g. as the British policies in the Middle East after First World War) have shown that this strategy of superpower X is very effective, at least in the short-term. On the other hand, historical experience has also shown that these strategies tend, in the long-term, to bring about many “unexpected” problems. For example, power X may become extremely unpopular and hated in region R (with the exception of the proxy ally community, but some hatred of X is found even within it). In addition, insurgency and terrorism may spring up against power X. Lastly, X’s strategy may exacerbate ethno-religious tensions within region R, leading to a breakdown of the traditional bonds in the society. It may even result into civil conflicts and wars which could begin to endanger not only superpower X’s interests and position in R but all the neighbouring areas around R. Such conflicts could sometimes even become global threats.

As we mentioned above, not only Great Britain but also other Western imperial powers started to introduce *divide et impera* tactics in their regions of interest and colonies. Not so well known is the example of the German and later the Belgian policies in Burundi, where Germany and Belgium were supporting the Tutsis against the Hutus, thus participating in establishing the roots of the future genocide. The divide and rule strategy was also used in the Middle East by France, the USA and Israel. In this paper we will focus on selected cases connected with the divide and rule policy of these Western powers in the Middle East.⁵

THE EARLIEST EXERCISE OF DIVIDE AND RULE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST BY THE WEST AND THE USE OF SETTLERS AS
A TOOL OF THE DIVIDE AND RULE POLICY

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Before influence of imperial powers such as France and Great Britain started and before they introduced their versions of “divide and rule” strategy in the Middle East, there was quite long tradition of use of similar approaches in this region during history. It is not purpose of this article to analyze the politics in the Middle East in ancient times but at least it should be mentioned, that “divide and rule” strategy was used in this region since ancient times by various empires including the period of spread of Islam and first Caliphs and later by the Ottoman Empire. Initially the “divide and rule” was used especially for conquering vast territories and later for preserving their unity. Western powers, especially France and Great Britain, started to be more interested in increasing their influence in the Middle East since the end of the 18th century, when a still significant part of the Middle East was under Ottoman rule. In this period of time, the influence and ambitions of European powers (again, especially those of Great Britain and France) were growing, and on the other side the might of the Ottoman Empire was fading. One of the instruments for increasing the Western imperial influence was the use of segments of the local population (usually non-Muslim) for implementing and strengthening the Western imperial interests and influence. The direct involvement of the Western powers can be said to have truly begun with Napoleon’s military campaign in Egypt in 1798–1801. But even earlier, France started to represent itself as a protector of the Christian communities in the Ottoman Empire.⁶ The strongest Christian communities still live mainly on the territories of contemporary Egypt, Lebanon and Syria. In Algeria France started to support some local communities (e.g. the Jews of Algeria) but also developed a very active settler policy and moved significant numbers⁷ of its inhabitants there, thus strengthening its divide and rule strategy. Settlers were sometimes used as a buffer between the colonial authorities and the native population under colonial rule.

The settler strategy – the creation of “new facts on the ground” – was implemented (as part of the divide and rule tactics) by many powers during different periods of history: by Britain (e.g. in Ireland, India, and South Africa), by the Dutch (South Africa), by Israel (the Palestinian territories, especially the West Bank) or, with much success, by China (in Tibet and Uighur East Turkestan, Xinjiang).

The British are considered to be the pioneers of settler policy

in modern times.⁸ Their tactics of divide and rule was very successfully implemented in Ireland at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the English forcibly removed the traditional Catholic clans from the north of Ireland, moved English and Scottish Protestants into the same territory, and founded the Plantation of Ulster. Protestant settlers were given special privileges (such as special access to land and lower rents), which distinguished them from the native Catholics. This kind of segregation started to also be typical for more modern settler activities. We can see the results of the English settler policy in Ireland throughout the centuries: the hatred and violence (which also worsened the bad economic situation in Ireland) finally led to the withdrawal of the English from the larger territory of the country in 1922. The English stayed in most of Ulster (Northern Ireland), but the conflict there escalated during the twentieth century into the Troubles (1968–1998), and even after the peace process the situation in Northern Ireland could be dangerously destabilized.

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The British settler activities were an inspiration for some of the other powers. In the Middle East, the most notable case of this was that of the State of Israel after the 1967 Six Day War. It could look a bit like a paradox, but before the creation of Israel, the Zionists themselves were partially an instrument of the British divide and rule strategy in the Middle East. The Balfour Declaration (1917) promise to “give Zionist Jews the Jewish Homeland in Palestine” was not just an altruistic act but it was motivated also by a desire to maintain British dominance in the Middle East. The first British Military Governor in Jerusalem Sir Ronald Storrs very openly stated the following: “The Zionist will form for England a little loyal Jewish Ulster in a sea of potentially hostile Arabism.”⁹ Two decades later most of the Zionists turned against the British because of the contradictory pragmatic British policies in the Middle East. Some Zionist groups, most notably the Irgun and Lehi, even started to fight against the British and killed not just a score of British troopers but also some high-ranking British politicians (the assassination of Lord Moyne, the attempt to kill Sir Harold MacMichael, etc.).

The Israelis started their settlement policy after conquering the Arab territories in 1967.¹⁰ Since the beginning, the settlement activity was openly supported by the Israeli governments. During the reign of the leftist governments (1967–1977) it was especially in

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strategic parts of the West Bank. During the reign of the rightist governments (after 1977) the settler activity was encouraged even more strongly, as the governments even supported the religious fundamentalists from the messianic movement *Gush Emunim* ("The Block of the Faithful"). The Israeli governments created, through the settler policy, many "new facts on the ground", made the settlers a very strong pressure group segregated from the Palestinians, and made the settlements very difficult to remove (especially those in the West Bank). But the growth of the Palestinian population in the Territories was much higher than the increase of the settlers. The settlements created great tension between the native Palestinian population and the Israelis. Some settlers, especially religious ones, started to be extremely aggressive. As a reaction, Palestinian vindications were often aimed not only against settlers but also against non-settler Israelis directly in the Israeli territory, which often resulted in bloodshed. On the other hand when some Israeli government evacuated some settlements (like in the case of the evacuation of the settlements in the Gaza Strip in 2005) or just attempted to evacuate them, it caused grave anger in the settler community. It is not a coincidence that Israeli Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by a settlement supporter and that some settler groups today are strongly opposed to the Israeli government and political system.¹¹

The French settler strategy in Algeria also partially turned against the metropolis during the Algerian War (1954-62) and advanced dangerously close to leading to a civil war and a breakdown of democratic institutions.¹² The organization called *Organisation de l'armée secrète* (OAS) started to use armed struggle and terror in an attempt to prevent Algeria's independence. There were also, like in Israel, OAS attempts to kill the highest politicians (such as the assassination plot against De Gaulle) but these were unsuccessful. The majority of the French were finally evacuated from Algeria and OAS was crushed by French authorities. In contrast, the population of Israeli settlers is still growing, is still supported by the state, and remains a very important pressure group in Israeli politics.¹³

Nowadays the danger of the settler policy lies not only in breaching international law and alienating the native population but in the fact that the policy could cause serious troubles for the metropolis (the native land of the settlers). Historical experience proved that only enormous violence – which is unacceptable for contemporary

Western societies – could make the settler policy successful. Thus the USA was able to crush the Native Americans in the 19th century and settle America in a way which would be totally unacceptable today. Thus China – without a democratic political system and without public control and criticism of its government's steps – was able to succeed in its settler colonization of Tibet and Uighur East Turkestan. Thus the Chinese were able to create with their settler policy such “facts on the ground” and such a status quo that it is, in fact, practically impossible now to restore the former situation and the original ties.

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FAVORITE ALLY: LEBANESE CHRISTIANS

Arab Christians were for centuries culturally closer to Europe than the majority of the Muslim population. So it was only logical that since the age of the Crusades, and later in the age of European imperialism in the Middle East, the Arab Christians sought for Western (e. g. Papal or French) protection and became natural ally and also a good instrument of the Western imperial policies. This relationship remained unaffected by the fact that the ethnicity of the Middle Eastern Christians is predominantly Arab, but with some exceptions.¹⁴

The relationship between Christians and Muslims in the Middle East was not always perfect and in various regions there were periods of peaceful coexistence as well as times of violence and oppression (usually from the Muslim majority).¹⁵ Especially in the territory of contemporary Lebanon, there were severe conflicts between Muslim, Christian, Druze and other communities, and so the Lebanese Christians (especially the Maronites, the Eastern Christian group who always accepted the rule of the Pope) were usually the most sympathetic to the increasing French influence in region and were seeking French protection. The finest hour of the Maronite-French connection came after the end of World War One in the Middle East, when the Ottoman Empire was defeated and the French forces and administration started to rule the territory of the so-called Greater Lebanon, which was divided from the territory of the French Mandate of Syria. Many non-Christian Arab communities were incorporated into this territory, and a mandate territory with extreme religious diversity was created. The Lebanese

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political system was developed on confessional divisions, making sectarianism a key element of Lebanese political life. In this system, with French backing, the Maronites started to dominate Lebanese politics. Carl Brown assumes that as a result, finally 'most of the Lebanese Muslims identified with neighboring Muslim Arabs (some of them favored absorption into a greater Syria or some form of pan-Arab state) whereas Christians (fearing that they would become an insignificant minority in any larger Arab polity) have sought a Lebanon more attached to France and the West'.¹⁶

France finally accepted the Lebanese independence in 1943 but the configuration of the political system remained one based on sectarianism and a divergence of communities. Even though after World War Two the economic situation of Lebanon was developing very progressively, the political situation in the country and the relationship between the communities remained fragile and unstable. Destabilization came with the emergence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after 1948. The influx of Palestinian refugees (mostly Sunni Muslim) into Lebanon and the foreign politics of Israel significantly influenced the future of Lebanon and its conflicts.¹⁷

After 1945, Zionist and, later, Israeli politicians were desperately looking for an ally in the region, which was very hostile towards the newborn State of Israel. The Christians, especially the Maronites in neighbouring Lebanon, were in an analogical situation as the Zionists, so there were attempts at a cooperation between the two communities.¹⁸

One of the most explicit examples of direct cooperation between Israel and Lebanese Christians was the Israeli support for the splinter-faction of the Lebanese army called the South Lebanon Army (SLA). Israel supplied the Christian-led SLA with armaments and charged it with control of the buffer zone near the Israeli frontier to prevent Palestinian commandos from infiltrating into Israel.¹⁹ The results of the Israeli-SLA cooperation were very controversial as it partially enforced the dire humanitarian situation in Southern Lebanon and helped to create Hezbollah,²⁰ and finally the SLA sustained heavy losses and collapsed. After the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, the remaining members of the SLA were withdrawn to Israel because many of them were *in absentia* condemned by Hezbollah to death.²¹

Another group of allies to Israel in Lebanon were the Maronite

Christians, especially the Maronite Phalange quasi-fascist party led by the powerful Jumayyil family. Israel supported the Phalangists in their fight against the Palestinians in Lebanon. In 1982, following Israel's invasion, Bashir Jumayyil (openly supported by Israel) was elected President, but soon after the election, he was assassinated. It directly led to revenge against the Palestinians (who were paradoxically not responsible for the assassination) and to the infamous Sabra and Shatila massacre. The Israeli influence and the support for the Phalangists not only destabilized the situation in Lebanon but also caused an earthquake in Israeli politics, where the anti-occupation peace movement and demonstrations were boosted. The indirect participation of the Israeli Army in the Phalangist massacres also immensely harmed the image of Israel in the world and helped to raise anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism in many countries.

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The results of the Israeli divide and rule policies in Lebanon proved to be very short-sighted and harmful. Before the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, there was an extreme decrease in Israel's popularity even within formerly allied communities, and the tensions after the withdrawal led to the bloody Israeli-Lebanese conflict in summer 2006.

PRAGMATIC ALLIES: RADICAL ISLAMISTS

The most controversial example of divide and rule policy in the Middle East proved to be the pragmatic (and usually temporary) alliances of the Western powers with radical Islamist movements. There were various reasons for this (from a contemporary point of view, very paradoxical) cooperation. Contrary to the examples mentioned above (those of the majority of settlers and native allies), until today, many radical Islamist movements transformed into dangerous movements aimed against the West and also against the moderate majority of Muslims. The most dangerous radical Islamist network, Al-Qaeda, is considered to be a global threat. But it was not so long ago (in the eighties) that US foreign policy supported (through the Pakistani intelligence service ISI) Islamist militants in Afghanistan (*mujahideens*), many of whom later formed Al-Qaeda.²² Another purpose of this policy was to find proxy allies in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. But the mujahideens served also as an instrument of the divide and rule policy in the fractionalized

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Afghan society. The US cooperation with the Afghan mujahideens during the last years of the Cold War is probably the most known example of Western support for radical Islamists. But there were examples before and after Afghanistan. Since the emergence of modern Islamism in the second half of the 19th century, there were many Western attempts to cooperate with Islamist radicals and to strengthen the Western interest in the Middle East with their help. The most notable examples are:

- The British attempts to isolate Russia with pan-Islamism spread through the ring of Islamic regions and nations on the southern border of Russia in the time of “The Great Game”.²⁸¹ Later, in the time of the Cold War, there was a similar US attempt to create an Islamic bloc of nations and movements opposed to the spread of communism and the Soviet expansion along its southern frontier.²⁸²
- The British support for the Wahhabist²⁸³ House of Saud to secretly weaken the Arab nationalists – contrary to the British policy during World War One, when the British government supported Arab nationalists against the Ottoman Empire. Generally, during World War One, the British negotiated simultaneous and contradictory agreements in order to further their strategic interests – the most notable of these agreements was the secret Sykes-Picot agreement from 1916.²⁸⁴
- The US support for the House of Saud and later (since 1932) their support for Saudi Arabia partly because of the strategic oil resources in the Saudi territory and partly because of *divide et impera*; this went along with the US support for conservative regimes in the Arab World against Arab nationalist regimes.²⁸⁵
- The *Divide and impera* elements that we can find in the Reagan administration’s ties with Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Republic during the Iran-Iraqi war, illuminated by the Iran Contra Affair.²⁸⁶ At the same time the US was supporting Saddam Hussein’s Iraq against Iran.
- The US and Israeli support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria to weaken the (partially pro-Soviet) Arab nationalists, especially Nasser and Assad.²⁸⁷
- The Israeli support for the Palestinian Islamists (the forerun-

ners of Hamas) to weaken the Palestinian nationalists within the PLO, especially Fatah (Higgins, 2009).

But it was not simply “Islam as a religion” what was supported by Western powers. Islam itself has many forms, but mainstream Islam is, with some exceptions, a more or less peaceful religion like contemporary Judaism or Christianity. But Western powers did not support Islam or Muslims in general. Instead, they started to support the most fundamentalist streams of politicized Islam (radical Islamism). It was probably some kind of naiveté or ignorance together with a lack of understanding of the development of Islam and the Middle East (and also a low level of scientific knowledge about the Middle East) that caused such a strategic miscalculation.³⁰ Generally the Western world (“Western” in the context of the Cold war) had very little in common with Islamic radicals. They were usually strongly anti-Imperialist, anti-Liberal, and sometimes anti-Semitic, and some of them (in the time of Second World War) were even pro-Nazi. Usually there was only one important commonality between the Western world and radical Islamists: the enemy – secular (usually Arab) nationalism and communism. The two were interconnected: the nationalism was often made up of different varieties of Arab-nationalism (e.g. pan-Arabism, Baathism) which, in the time of the Cold War, flirted or directly cooperated with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc. As Dreyfuss says, the West started to support radical Islamists “sometimes overtly, sometimes covertly” with funding, weapons supplying, training, etc.³¹

To implement even more the policy of divide and rule (and to confuse even more the situation in the Middle East), the USA and some Western states started to support those nationalist politicians who were opposed to the Islamists – most notably Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Yasser Arafat in Palestine, and Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan. Most of them were more or less secular (although formally Muslims), and some of them were cruel dictators (especially Saddam Hussein) or leaders responsible for terrorism (Yasser Arafat). One of the most extreme examples of the divide and rule strategy was the U.S. support for both sides of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), in which Iran (led by the Islamist Ayatollah Khomeini) and Iraq (led by the Nationalist Saddam Hussein) were fighting each other in one of the bloodiest wars in the history of the Middle East (Dreyfuss, 2006: 292–302).

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Of course, radical Islamism itself is not a Western creation – the ideology of Islamism started to be formed in the second half of the nineteenth century, and it reacted, among other things, against Western imperialism – but some Western states are at least partly responsible for the emergence and spread of the violence of radical Islamists, both regionally and globally, due to their controversial divide and rule policies.

CONCLUSION

In this article we tried to focus on the main aspects of the divide and rule strategy in the Middle East. Some of them are not widely known because they contradict the justification of the current Western policies in the Middle East – e.g. it would be much more difficult for the previous US government to explain “War on Terror” in the light of the US support for radical Islamists in Afghanistan and for Saddam Hussein in the eighties. It would also be more difficult for Israel to justify some of its disproportional military actions against Palestinians if it was more well known that Israel supported the precursors of Hamas. This support was aimed against the PLO and Fatah, who are now “the better side of the Palestinians” since the beginning of the Peace Process in the nineties.

In this paper I attempted to analyze the types and the most representative examples of the Western divide and rule strategy and draw some general mechanisms and conclusions. On the other side there is not enough space to analyze other examples of divide and rule – from the Soviet Union, Russia, China, India, powerful Muslim states and other countries. But the general conclusions are sufficient enough for us to understand the logic and mechanisms of *divide et impera* in the Middle East. There are three main types of *divide et impera* in the Middle East:

1. an ally which is created artificially – settlers (e.g. the Israelis in Palestine, the French in Algeria, etc.),
2. a reliable local ally (e.g. Lebanese Christians),
3. a pragmatic ally (e.g. radical Islamists):
 - typical *divide et impera* (Israel and the USA in their approach to Hamas and Fatah since 2006 – see below),
 - *divide et impera* combined with other strategies (making proxy allies) – e.g. the US support for the mujahideens in

Afghanistan during the Cold War.

Of course it is not the purpose of this paper to say that because of the policies of divide and rule Western powers are responsible for all the evil and worsening of conditions in the region of the Middle East and in all the territories of their former colonies or regions of interest. But on the other side it is important to show that the influence of the Western powers affected the development of many Middle Eastern countries very significantly and that it helped to lay the foundations of the processes and conflicts which are “returning like a boomerang” today in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Lebanon, etc. Thus this article may help to answer the question ‘Why is the contemporary situation in the Middle East often almost unsolvable and where did the logic behind some communities and groups “hating the West” come from?’

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When I was looking for sources for this paper, I was not so surprised that it was more difficult to find reliable sources than is usually the case. I understand when a similar situation arises with “reliable” sources for various conspiracy theories (e.g. those connected with 9/11). But this is definitely a different case. It is a very difficult task to stay independent and non-biased in some Middle Eastern issues and I am afraid that some authors (even renowned ones) are using some kind of self-censorship when they write about these issues. On the other side those authors who are more courageous – e.g. the Israeli “New Historians”³² or Robert Dreyfuss – deserve praise for their research. I am convinced that not blurring the history but honesty, frankness and attempts to seek the truth could finally help improve the whole situation in the Middle East, even if it will be often very awkward for the West. During the many decades since World War Two, the Westerners were looked at with suspicion by the native Middle East population. Partially it is because of the divide and rule policies, double standards, hypocrisy and pragmatism in the Western approach to this region. For example, many people in contemporary Iraq – even if most of them probably do not read scientific texts about international relations – know about the ties between Saddam Hussein’s regime and the USA during the Iran-Iraqi War and they know the US policies since 2003 very well.

But an analytic reflection of the recent history of Western Middle East diplomacy is not enough. We have to ask if the divide and rule strategies (and the affiliated controversial policies) are already

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a question of history. The answer is negative. At least the USA and Israel are still using them, sometimes even combining their respective policies. An example of this is the case of Palestine, especially during the recent US administration: although Hamas won in the democratic elections in 2006 (and “spreading of democracy” was one of the US priorities in the Middle East), both the USA and Israel (and some other Western states) rejected the result of the elections and continued in their unilateral support for Fatah (which lost the elections), even supplying it with weapons, thus strengthening the tension in Palestinian society and fuelling internal violent conflicts.³³

We have a different case in contemporary Iraq, where the US administration turned from its previous support of the Saddam Hussein-led Sunni-minority establishment during the Iran-Iraqi war in the eighties to support the majority Shia population. The Shias were harshly oppressed by Hussein’s regime but even after the first US-led war against Saddam Hussein (1990–1991), the US left him in power and allowed Hussein’s bloody crushing of the Shia uprising against him. After the 2003 war and the defeat of Saddam Hussein, the Sunni establishment was almost completely disbanded and replaced by the Shias, who are now overwhelmingly winning in the elections. The US support of the Shia establishment in contemporary Iraq also means US cooperation with the “good allies” of Iran (a country which is considered to be a “villain” in the context of US politics) and with some fundamentalist Islamist clerics such as the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, although the US fights other clerics such as Muqtada al-Sadr. There are significant differences between the two but the inconsistency of the US policy is highly visible, and the danger of encouraging internal striving in the communities is high.

What could be done to improve the current situation? First, the Western (especially because of the influence of the US) policies in the Middle East need to be more consistent. A continuation of the contradictory and biased policies (for example in connection with events of “Arab Spring”) will only further pit the Middle Eastern nations against each other and lead to even more hatred towards the West and Western interests and values, thus giving arguments to fundamentalists and terrorist networks. So the continuation of the Western divide and rule policy is not a solution to the problem

of creating a secure future in the Middle East and decreasing the danger to regional and global security.

The solution lies in an impartial and unbiased policy in which the West and Western powers would play the role of a third party and sometimes the role of a fair mediator. Hand in hand with this offered strategy goes a greater willingness of responsible Western politicians to listen to analysts and independent think-tanks, which will be preferred over an ideological approach to the Middle Eastern issues (e.g. neo-conservatism).

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Of course the offered solution is only “an ideal” which could not be completely reached. This strategy could also probably weaken the Western influence in the whole region and bring more self-confidence to the local nations. But it may also lead to better stability, to a decrease of the level of internal struggles, and in many cases to more just solutions to local conflicts. It may also happen that the short-sighted benefits of the divide and rule policies could be swapped for a much longer stability of the whole Middle Eastern region. And that, in my opinion, is the most valuable merit of this policy change, which overpowers the other aspects.

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NOTES TO PAGES

- 1 Prime Minister of Iran in 1965–1977, executed by the Khomeini regime in 1979. Quoted from Dreyfuss, 2006: 112.
- 2 In context of this article is Israel also considered as a Western power although from the ethnographical point of view significant part of its population is of Middle Eastern origin (Sephardi/Oriental Jews, Israeli Arabs).
- 3 Machiavelli mentions the divide and rule strategy in, for example, his work *The Art of War*: ‘A Captain ought, among all the other actions of

his, endeavor with every art to divide the forces of the enemy, either by making him suspicious of his men in whom he trusted, or by giving him cause that he has to separate his forces, and, because of this, become weaker.' – Book VI of *The Art of War* (<http://www.constitution.org/mac/artofwar6.htm>).

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- 4 Hans Joachim Morgenthau. (1993) *Politics among Nations – The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: McGraw-Hill, p. 194.
- 5 Under the term “the Middle East”, we understand a wider interpretation of this term – the so-called “Greater Middle East” from Maghreb to Pakistan.
- 6 Bruce Masters. (2001) *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World – The Roots of Sectarianism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 152.
- 7 In Algeria there was a massive increase in the number of European settlers in the second half of the 19th century: from 283,000, or 10.4 percent of the total population, in 1866 to 723,000, or 20 percent of the total population, in 1896. (Lustick, 1985: 57).
- 8 Conn Hallinan. (2004) Divide and Conquer as Imperial Rules. *Foreign Policy in Focus*, 12/06/2004. Available at: <http://www.fpif.org/pdf/gac/0407divide.pdf>.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 The most problematic from the perspective of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict started to be the former territories of the British Mandate in Palestine inhabited by Palestinian Arabs: the West Bank (1948–1967, under Jordanian control) and the Gaza Strip (1948–1967, under Egyptian control). The Sinai Peninsula (part of Egypt until 1967) and Golan Heights (part of Syria until 1967) were inhabited more sparsely, and their inhabitants did not consider themselves to be Palestinians. Israel started settlement activities in all of its occupied territories.
- 11 For example, some members of the banned Kach party and some rabbis from the West Bank Settlements – most notably Rabbi Shalom Dov Wolpo and radical activist Baruch Marzel. See Susser, Leslie. (2005) The hard-line opponents of disengagement. *Jerusalem Report*, 21. 3. 2005; JTA – The Global News Service of the Jewish People (2008) “Rabbi wants Olmert hanged”, 3. 1. 2008.
- 12 Ian Lustick. (1985) *State-Building Failure in British Ireland and French Algeria*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies of University of California, p. 84.
- 13 Yehezkel Lein and Eyal Weizman (2002) *Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank*. Jerusalem: B’ Tselem.
- 14 It is interesting that some Middle Eastern Christians do not consider themselves to be Arabs, but it is often very difficult to prove what exactly

- their ethnicity is, and they make this statement mainly for cultural or ideological reasons.
- 15 Christian and Jewish communities in the Muslim world had the special (subordinated) status of *dhimmis*.
 - 16 Carl L. Brown (ed.) (2006) *Diplomacy in the Middle East*. London: I. B. Tauris, p. 281.
 - 17 Formerly many South Lebanese Shiites were against the Palestinians, but as a result of Israeli policies, many of them started to sympathize with the Palestinians and developed an extreme hatred of Israel. See footnote 17.
 - 18 Jan Fingerland. (2006) Anatomie jednoho spojení. *Lidové noviny*, 26. 8. 2006.
 - 19 The SLA was originally called the Free Lebanon Army. The command of the SLA was Christian but many of its members were Shi'a Muslims. South Lebanon is inhabited mainly by Shi'a Muslims, and a lot of them were against the Palestinian presence in Southern Lebanon because of the Palestinian destabilization of the tense political situation in close range to the Israeli border. See also Tessler, 1994: 495.
 - 20 As Israeli general and politician Ehud Barak commented in July 2006: 'When we entered Lebanon ... there was no Hezbollah. We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in the south. It was our presence that created Hezbollah.' See Augustus Richard Norton (2007) *Hezbollah*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, p. 33.
 - 21 Avraham Sela. (2002) *The Continuum Political Encyclopaedia of the Middle East*. New York, London: Continuum, p. 778.
 - 22 *Ibid*, p. 26–29.
 - 23 "The Great Game" is a term used for the strategic rivalry between Great Britain and Russia for dominance in the region of Central Asia (approx. 1813–1907). See also Hopkirk, 1992.
 - 24 Robert Dreyfuss. (2006) *Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam*. New York: Owl Books – Henry Holt and Company, p. 79.
 - 25 Wahhabism is an ultra-conservative interpretation of the Islamic faith, and it is the state religion in Saudi Arabia. Historically, Wahhabism was seen by many Muslims and Arabs as extremism, and many of the contemporary radical Islamists have a Wahhabist education (most notably the Saudi members of Al-Qaeda who committed the 9/11 attacks). See also Allen, Charles (2006) *God's Terrorists – The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad*. London: Abacus.
 - 26 The Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) itself was a major instrument of the divide and rule policy in the Middle East. It defined zones of British and French interests in the Middle East (with respect to Russia). It divided

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the Middle East without regard to the local political interests and population. See also David Fromkin (2001), *A Peace to End all Peace*. New York: Owl Books – Henry Holt and Company, p. 188–199.

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- 27 See also Craig Unger (2007) *House of Bush House of Saud: The Secret Relationship between the World's Two Most Powerful Dynasties*. London: Gibson Square Books.
- 28 The Iran Contra affair was a political scandal involving the Reagan administration, and it was revealed in November 1986. It was disclosed that senior US figures agreed to sell arms to Iran (a country under an arms embargo). The purpose of the sale was to secure the release of US hostages and to fund anti-communist contras in Nicaragua. See Hiro, 2005, p. 255.
- 29 Dreyfuss 2006, p. 205–213.
- 30 Dreyfuss writes that: ‘The United States was just beginning to feel its way around the Middle East [in the beginning of the Cold War]. Few American officials had any experience in the region, U.S. universities were abysmally weak on Middle East studies, and despite its leading role in winning World War II the U.S., militarily had virtually no significant presence in either North Africa or the Persian Gulf. The fledgling CIA, which was gobbling up Ivy League graduates and virtually anyone who could speak Arabic, was inexperienced at best. From its founding in 1947 until at least the 1950s, the CIA took a backseat to British intelligence.’ Dreyfuss, 2006, p. 66–67.
- 31 *Ibid*, p. 1.
- 32 The “New Historians” are a generation of Israeli historians and political scientists (most notably Tom Segev, Benny Morris, Ilan Pappé and Avi Shlaim) who have challenged “traditional” Israeli historians and their interpretation of Israeli history.
- 33 International Institute for Strategic Studies (2007) “ Hamas coup in Gaza” *International Institute for Strategic Studies* 13 (5). Available at: <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-13---2007/volume-13-issue-5/hamas-coup-in-gaza>.

TURKEY'S ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY GOVERNANCE

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ABSTRACT: *This article evaluates Turkey's position in European security governance. In the post-Cold War period, the administration, coordination and regulation of security has been, largely, performed through such an approach which itself is based on three assumptions. Firstly, the meaning of security was altered in terms of its conceptual and political indications. Secondly, there emerged a need to define this change and the dynamics thereof. Thirdly, states and international organisations (such as the UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE) wherein they participated came to be dominant security actors. The functioning of the network of international institutions, and its norms, is of utmost importance to Turkish foreign policy. As in case the Bosnian, Kosovar and Macedonian crises, Turkey has been included in European security governance. Turkey, as an actor centrally located in the instable Balkans-Caucasus-Middle East region, and experiencing negative impacts of regional crises, is compelled to encounter security issues and threats that increased and became more diverse in the post-Cold War period. This article proposes that Turkey should adopt a strategy that is geared toward influencing the network's functioning to the greatest extent possible instead of situating itself outside of it.*

KEYWORDS: Turkey, Security Governance, EU, NATO, UN, Bosnian-Kosovar-Macedonian Crisis

INTRODUCTION

This work evaluates Turkish foreign policy within the framework of security governance in Europe. For that purpose, the extent Turkey is included (or excluded) in European security governance is examined vis-à-vis the Bosnian, Kosovar and Macedonian crises. This examination is made by adopting a deductive method. In the first part, security governance is defined. In the second part, the role of Turkey is discussed in the light of essential elements of security governance. Finally, Turkey's role in the security governance system

in Europe in the near future is set out.

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The discourses of democracy, pluralism, human rights and security communities hint at the political transformations that took place in the international arena following the Cold War. The political order that emerged as a result of these changes is different from the conventional sovereign nation-state conception to such an extent that the dichotomy between anarchy and hierarchy in International Relations (IR) loses its meaning.¹ The said dichotomy guided a perspective that for years distinguished between the realms of politics; domestic and international. It also came to dominate the perspectives and approaches adopted by security efforts as well as international works. On the contrary, complex and mutual dependence considerably determines international relations in today's world. In this context, analysing post-Cold War security relations is rendered more difficult due to this complex mutual dependency as well as the blurring of the anarchy-hierarchy dichotomy.

After 1990, while the implications of the concept of security became wider, its administration too was conducted within a larger context. Yet another distinct attribute of this period was the maintaining of security by public and private actors including international organisations, non-governmental organisations and private companies. In this context, the question is whether or not the governance perspective may be employed to explain the interactions between security actors in security studies. Given the governance perspective's common use in other areas of scholarship, it is surprising that it is only rarely utilised with regard to security. The main challenge here stems from the conceptual ambiguity that is rooted in the past use of governance perspective in multiple subject areas. Therefore, in order to grasp security governance, it is first necessary to determine what is to be understood from the terms "security" and "governance."

THE TERM "SECURITY GOVERNANCE"

There is scant agreement over a reference point regarding the understanding of security in international relations. Consequently, the thing(s) implied by IR theories' notions of security demonstrate great variation. Therefore, the priority item here is to determine what is meant by security, what constitutes a threat to security,

and whom these threaten. Security, generally speaking, is a concept that refers to a situation wherein social life proceeds under an uninterrupted legal order that ensures individuals' living without fear. In international relations, the concept of security is considered as the security of various levels including the international system, regions, the state, the society, subgroups under a society, and individuals. According to Weaver, while the threat against a state targets its sovereignty, for a society the threat is identity-based. Societal security is the continuity of traditional linguistic, cultural and communal structures, religious and national identities and customs under changing conditions.² On the other hand, Kolodziej surpasses previous analyses at state level by claiming that security policy represents a political domain adopted by groups and states in order to influence and define the international security system's structure in part or whole.³ Strange, pushing even further, argues that the reference point should be individual security.⁴ This notion considers all misfortunes including hunger, plague, injury, bankruptcy and unemployment to be serious threats. Similarly, Booth states that liberating individuals and groups by eliminating the physical and human obstacles before their free participation in activities would produce true security.⁵ Truly, it is observed that national, societal, religious and individual security – as well as state security – falls within IRs' area of study. In this sense, Buzan maintains that security at an individual level is related to the security of states and the international system, and that security cannot be isolated at a given level at the expense of others.⁶

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The domain of security encompasses all threats to human groups' existence. In this context, these threats may be not only military but also political, economic, social or environmental in their nature. What needs to be emphasised here is that threats, first and foremost, ought to be seen as a social phenomenon. Discourses play a significant role in the emergence of threats, and their meanings are essentially a cultural matter. In this sense, although threats are inclusive of objective facts, they must be evaluated in conjunction with social and cultural elements. Also, the discourses of relatively stronger actors are more easily accepted by the international community.⁷

Three global developments had considerable influence over the change in security notions of states after the Cold War. The first is

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the erosion of the notion of Westphalian national sovereignty due non-governmental actors' increasing influence in the international political arena. The usefulness of state-centred security approaches decreased in the face of more complex interactions between local and international developments and the increased importance of supra-national networks, as well as the aforementioned powers of mutual dependency, integration, and disintegration that eroded state sovereignty from above and below.

A second global transformation that helped alter the states' notions of security in the post-Cold War era was the increased intensity, and complexity, of mutual dependency. This assertion led to the conclusion that threat perceptions and armament would cause imbalances in the international system and result in a loss of security for all states. This way, one state's individual security was associated with the sustainability of the international system. As part of this understanding, a given state's security came to depend on political- and economic assessments of international actors. It was in this framework that Yugoslavia's disintegration process was shaped by domestic developments and the assessments of internationally active actors alike.

The increase in mutual dependency in the 1990s was considered globalisation, which forms the third global change that triggered an alteration of individual states' notions of security. Globalization was understood to be a constant source of change and ambiguity in post-Cold War security studies.⁸ Rosenau pointed to the duality embodied by the mutual existence of a state-centred (Westphalian) system and a multi-focal system that was developing as part of the process of globalisation.⁹ The re-establishment of domains of authority alongside the globalisation process and an increase in the activity of international terrorist groups and organised criminal groups resulted in the adoption of multi-actor options (i.e. state and non-state actors: international organisations, multinational corporations, civil society institutions, etc.) in security-oriented efforts.¹⁰

These phenomena brought the cooperation-based security perspective to the forefront. Here, cooperation-based security describes the establishment of cooperation between interested parties with regard to security policies. In other words, it included measures that decreased other states' aggressive power.¹¹ This concept – spoken about since the 1970s – was developed as a counter-option

to balance of power policies. According to this notion, strengthening inter-state cooperation served individual states' long-term interests. The multilateral nature of the cooperative security regime emphasises the element of partnership by developing a culture of dialogue and compromise among its members. Over time, this assists the development of a collective identity.

These changes had two very crucial implications for security perceptions. First, the role of military power came to be increasingly scrutinised. Furthermore, there emerged a need to revisit the concept of security, as a result whereof it was defined anew again and again.¹² Although security studies and applications were led exclusively with an emphasis on the "continuity of state" perspective, the idea of security was analysed with the help of more complex interpretations starting from the 1990s. In this context, Buzan proposed a security vision with military as well as political, economic, social and environmental dimensions, and posed important questions regarding the compatibility of national- and international security perceptions, as well as whether or not states were capable of greater inclination toward cooperation.¹³ Baldwin claimed that this mostly stemmed from nation-states' need to redefine their political agendas in light of their assessments based on the influence exerted on them of the new international security conditions and not so much related to the notion of security itself.¹⁴

Official texts throughout the 1990s and the 2000s confirm that the international community adopted this extended security agenda.¹⁵ Truly, states and international organisations adopted attitudes in line with the new security agenda. States, in addition to their traditional security concerns regarding military threats, prioritised a variety of issues including irregular cross-border migration, terrorism, arms proliferation, organized crime, conflict prevention and management, human rights, economy, environment, drug smuggling, and epidemics.

Consequently, a holistic approach was developed to address the notion of security as a multi-dimensional matter with its military, economic, social, individual and environmental aspects. Understood as such, the problem of security proved challenging to the nation-state's capabilities and allowed some room for international non-state actors such international organisations, non-governmental institutions alongside them in accordance with the cooperative

security perspective. The concept of mutual dependency, becoming more complicated through globalisation, necessitated the management, coordination, and regulation of security issues for international actors. This need paved the way for a new approach to security policies.

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The concept of governance refers to a structure and/or order established through the common efforts of all interested actors in a social-political system. In this context, it is necessary to distinguish governance from government. While government connotes centralisation and integration, governance describes falling apart and differentiation. Disintegration may occur in three ways:

- downward** – towards local actors,
- upward** – towards the global level, and
- sideways** – towards individual and voluntary actors.¹⁶

Differentiation, on the other hand, refers to accepting heterogeneity and the conflicting nature of interests. Government stands for a centralised system of political control within the state, while governance indicates a fragmented policy-making process inclusive of state as well as non-state players at sub-national, national, and international levels.¹⁷

Governance came to be one of the concepts that are benefited from in a number of ways. In the European Union and local governments, as well as at a local level in the context of social, welfare, economic and other public policies, a multitude of academic studies are conducted in the conceptual framework of governance.¹⁸ Such studies revealed the importance of multi-actor and multi-level approaches to policy-making processes. In a global sense, governance indicates state governments' willingness to enter into multi-party cooperation in order to achieve shared goals.¹⁹ Even though state actors continue to be the main players in global governance; international organisations, non-governmental organisations, and multi-national corporations become increasingly more involved in formulation, application, monitoring, and regulation.²⁰ In conclusion, the notion of governance is inclusive of specific activities' management, coordination and regulation by multiple authorities. These three distinguishing attributes, depending on the subject area, are geared toward formal and informal arrangements, norms,

discourses and certain political results.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF SECURITY GOVERNANCE:
HETERARCHY, INSTITUTIONALISATION AND A SHARED GOAL

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In the International Relations framework, security governance refers to the shared use of administrative-, economic- and political authority for the purpose of continued peace and stability in the international arena. The presence of a shared outlook ought to be added to this definition. Security governance necessitates both intellectual and institutional foundations. In other words, security governance has to rely on proximity of discourse as much as an agreement over material components.²¹

Security governance has three elements. Primarily, it rests on a notion of heterarchical relationship defined by increasing interaction among multiple actors. Furthermore, it involves institutionalisation with its material- (organizational structure) and intellectual components. Thirdly, notwithstanding the presence of different interests, it requires a shared goal.

Security governance was caused by elements that affected the emergence of new threats and actors as well as the development of heterarchical relations among them. States, first and foremost as a result of budgetary restrictions, were forced to acquire external security resources and to transfer or privatize security services in order to increase the efficiency of their own operations.²² The second factor was the realisation that new global security threats such as supranational crime, terrorism, and immigration could only be coped with through international cooperation.²³

The distinct and mutually overlapping relationship networks between various state and non-state actors with regard to security can be apprehended with reference to governance. Even though nation-states continue to be the primary actors in international relations, other players including multinational corporations, international organisations and non-governmental organisations increasingly ought to be accounted for in analyses. Non-state actors, to an increasing extent, complement states in security mechanisms. As such, while non-state actors at once emerge as a fundamental source of insecurity, they also start to play an important role in the struggle against such threats.²⁴

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The extended contents attributed to the notion of security helped strengthen the role of non-state actors in newly emerging security domains since national governments are in possession of limited expertise and resources therein. Non-state actors such as associations, foundations, human rights and environmental organisation acquired considerable roles in making, enforcing, and monitoring non-traditional policies in security.²⁵ The costs of security policies whose focus broadened to include refugees and environmental pollution came to be met by specialised non-state actors.²⁶

Upon the end of the Cold War, while novel networks (i.e. non-governmental institutions, multinational corporations, etc.) emerged, older networks such as international organisations adapted to new circumstances. In this sense, NATO transformed its collective defence organisation functions into collective security operations. The organisation both became functional in peacekeeping operations aside from military defence (*adaptability*) and expanded eastward to include new members (*inclusivity*). During the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo NATO established civilian-military relations with non-governmental organisation and other non-state actors (*informal relations*). At this time, new networks emerged between state and non-state actors to coordinate military security, minesweeping, humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction.²⁷ The said network could surpass national boundaries and therefore sovereignty. In this way, it became possible to more effectively struggle against supranational security threats such as terrorism, WMD, and environmental pollution.

The transferring of security operations from states to regional (i.e. NATO and the EU), global (i.e. the UN) or supranational legal entities (i.e. non-governmental institutions and private security companies) manifests itself as governance.²⁸ In peacekeeping operations that are conducted as part of security governance, subject-level cooperation follows. For instance, while the UN and NATO provided security in former Yugoslavia, humanitarian aid and logistic support were, respectively, offered by non-governmental institutions as well as private security companies.

It is often seen that states unite their capabilities in order to resist another's power or to acquire benefits that they would be unable to attain by them. Inter-state cooperation may occur in the context of individual states' crucial interests.²⁹ When states mutually ben-

efit from cooperation, they facilitate and perpetuate it by forming institutions. In this sense, activities by a number of international organisations contribute to governance's increase in international relations. The term "institution" here refers to not only organisations, but also accepted and repeated behaviour. Institutions are defined as a set of formal- and informal rules that determine codes of behaviour, limits of activity, and expectations.³⁰ This understanding rests on the assumption that institutions are voluntary formations.

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Establishing and maintaining cooperation helps overcome two important obstacles necessitated by the anarchy that plays a significant role in the realist perspective.³¹ While one of these relates to the states' concerns over being betrayed, the other is related to relative gains from cheating. In case of cooperation, concerns over deception apply to that particular arrangement. However, in security, this concern remains always valid. For changes in weaponry enable shifts in the balance of power. When a state renounces a security-based cooperation, it may choose to deceive the state(s) with whom it is in cooperation for the sake of military superiority. For this reason, states need to be alert about breaches in cooperation, and put in place necessary precautions.³² This limits inter-state cooperation. Precisely at this point, institutions reduce concerns over deception in a number of ways. Institutions increase the states' information about one another by facilitating intelligence between the parties. As this situation makes it possible for potential cheaters to be identified, it also allows measures to be taken by states that would be hurt by such an act of deception. Aside from this, rules entail a rise in the number of interactions. Institutionalized renewal renders deception a high-cost option, since states are deprived of future gains. Repeated transactions also allow the deceiver to be punished: while the fraudulent state is excluded from the cooperation mechanisms, those that honour their agreements and evoke trust can easily find a place for themselves within these mechanisms to increase their individual gains. Institutionalized rules, by allowing a variety of transactions to take place between the states, increase mutual dependency. A state that cheats in one area is likely to be punished in other settings wherein they participate. Although unable to stop states from cheating entirely, this stops deception from being an attractive option by pointing out the costs. Institutions may also lower transaction costs and render unnecessary the

time and efforts devoted to individual arrangements. In this sense, they lower the costs and increase profitability.³³

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Concerns over relative gains are shaped by two factors: Primarily, the number of major players is influential. Relative gain becomes more important in settings with only two states' conflicting interests, making cooperation more difficult. However, in cases where there are multiple powers that are evenly matched, the presence of various coalitions for individual states to safeguard their interests renders relative gains less important for them. The second factor is military relations: With the possibility of using military power in conflict resolution low, individual states' relative gain assessments grow less important and cooperation may take place more easily.³⁴

Institutions soften the obligations caused by anarchy. They help lower the transaction costs by providing information and thereby make states more reliable. Aside from these, they form a domain for cooperation to establish suitable coordination points, and contribute to inter-state reciprocity and multilateralism. Institutions' being active and persuasive in order to function in certain ways stems from behavioural expectations.³⁵

As rationality (that is assumed to underlie actors' behaviour) cannot fully explain cooperation-oriented interactions, beliefs and opinions become increasingly important in accounting for actions.³⁶ For this reason, the governance approach also emphasizes the importance of discourses and identities. Discourses play a significant role in the emergence of threats. Their meaning is essentially a cultural phenomenon. In this sense, threats are social and cultural products as opposed to objective truths.³⁷ Threat perceptions do not emerge out of a supposedly objective international power structure. The discourses of relatively strong actors are also more easily accepted by the international community. In cases where objective threats are present, states choose to form alliances. With the threats gone, however, the harmony within the said alliance weakens. Therefore, the post-Soviet Union setting where it is impossible to replace the previous threat with a new one, NATO's importance had to erode. Alliances, once functional, are shaped by shared values. Faced with political change, the institution of these values demonstrates resistance, since it is easier to adapt an existing organization with a set of rules and a decision-making memory to new circumstances instead of forming new institutions.³⁸ Inter-

national institutions may serve as primary representations of such values.

Finally, the security governance perspective is supported by common goals. Here, the term may be understood both as a structure and a set of results achieved at the end of the process. Structurally, governance is inclusive of institutions and these institutions dictate entry rules, codes of interaction, and behavioural restrictions to establish patterns of personal behaviour among participants. As a process, on the other hand, governance is interested in defining the results achieved by individual actors and the activities embraced to get these results. This envisages that goals in governance reflect a sum of individual actors' preferences. Such inclinations, although competitive at times, tend to be similar. Nevertheless, the results inevitably correspond to the preferences of a majority and not the entirety of actors.

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All political life rests on its components and therefore on understanding what/whom it includes and excludes. The governance perspective, taking into consideration its emphasis on the multiplicity of actors and bases of power, is indirectly inclusive. Inclusion is the quest for a conciliation of interests as well as consensus. Governance derives its legitimacy and necessity from inclusion, even though exclusion becomes inevitable at times.

Security governance foresees the presence of boundaries. Its inclusion of many actors as part of the heterarchical relations forces us to face which actors and included/excluded as part of governance's administration, coordination, and regulation. As an entity that requires common goals, governance entails an aspect that strengthens the concerns of the excluded and the sense that their interests are hurt. In this sense, a security-providing actor's inclusion in or exclusion from institutionalisation processes and institutional structures of security administration emerges as a problem. In this context, the extent to which Turkey participates in the security governance system shall be evaluated with an eye on its membership in security organisations and its adaptation to security regimes.

Turkey, in the framework of the aforementioned security culture, found itself – in conjunction with international security pro-

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viders- a position in the security governance in the Yugoslavian disintegration process. Turkey is not a full participant in this security governance due to its non-member status in the European Union. However, the inclusion/exclusion option already foreseen in the governance does not entirely exclude Turkey from this security governance. For instance, Turkey did cooperate with international organisations during the Bosnian, Kosovar and Macedonian crises.

As a power vacuum emerged in the post-Cold War Balkans, the instability entailed serious issues for Turkey. Turkey's transportation routes to Europe were negatively affected. The flow of immigrants to the country became stronger and, as a result thereof, economic costs became higher. Due to these reasons, Turkey both engaged in military activities via international organisations and also established military relations with certain regional powers. The sovereign-equality based foreign policy that Turkey maintained since its foundation minimises the Balkan states' tendency to perceive the country as a security threat. As a result of rising numbers in international crises from 1990 on, Turkey established a peace force battalion within its 4th army corps in order to participate in peace operations. The country, in this sense, strived to contribute to UN and UN-sanctioned NATO operations. Following the Gulf War, Turkey's desire – particularly in the Bosnian War's aftermath – to actively participate in international or multilateral military operations was realized in Operation Restore Hope of 1993 in Somali.

Turkey, concerned about an emerging conflict, attempted to motivate the international community in order to prevent war in Bosnia. In this sense, the country took the matter to the UNSC as well as the OSCE. Presenting an action plan to the UN, the Turkish government demanded that military precautions be taken in addition to diplomatic pressure and humanitarian aid. Aside from these, it also strove to lift the arms embargo against Bosnians. One of Turkey's proposals to end the Bosnian War and to maintain BiH's territorial integrity was to engage in military interventions and operations against the Serbian forces under NATO leadership. The country also supported the bombardment of Serbian positions and airports.

On 08 December 1992, the Grand National Assembly mandated the government to send Turkish troops abroad to contribute to UNPROFOR as well as to participate in an international military

intervention under UN supervision. Turkey devoted a total of 18 F-16 fighter jets to join the operation to monitor adherence to the UNSC's 31 March 1993 resolution to establish a no-fly zone. Furthermore, Turkish combat ships served in the Adriatic to enforce the embargo from sea.

On 16 April 1993, NATO invited Turkey to participate in the *Deny Flight* operation that worked to monitor the no-fly zone over Bosnia. Greece declared that it would not allow Turkish fighter jets to cross its airspace *en route* to Italy. Similarly, Greece strongly opposed Turkey's inclusion in the Bosnia-based multinational force with a land unit. Aside from these, Turkey's contribution to the peace mission in BiH was kept low profile since a Turkish military presence in the Balkans would heighten Serbian and Russian sensitivities toward the country.

Turkey's request to join UNPROFOR to establish safe zones and protection for the humanitarian aid campaign in BiH was approved by the UNSC on 22 March 1994. As such, the Turkish government commissioned a 1400-strong regiment that served under the UNPROFOR between 04 August 1993 and 20 December 1995.

Following NATO's assumption of the duty to enforce Dayton Peace Accords, the Turkish Peace Force serving under UNPROFOR was supplemented to reach the brigade level. As of 20 December 1995, this force was granted to IFOR, which was replaced by SFOR on 20 December 1996. The Turkish brigade was transferred to the new body. Later, size reductions decreased the Turkish military presence to the battalion level. The SFOR Mission was transferred to EUFOR, an EU force, as of 02 December 2004.

Turkey at first stood for Yugoslavia's territorial integrity when the crises emerged. During the disintegration process, the leaders of both Federal Yugoslavia and the individual republics visited Ankara to secure Turkey's favour. As a result of these talks, it was declared in April 1991 that Turkey supported the maintenance of Yugoslavia's integrity. Later, on 9 July 1991, Kiro Gligorov – then President of Macedonia – and Alija Izetbegovic – then President of Bosnia and Herzegovina- came to Ankara in order to demand the acknowledgement of their independence. However, it was only after the developments in Yugoslavia evolved into a crisis and the European Community (EC) acknowledged the Slovenian- and Croatian independence that disintegration emerged as the inevitable

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path. Keeping these changes in mind, Turkey acknowledged on 6 February 1992 the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia.

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In line with UNPROFOR and IFOR operations, the Turkish Naval Forces devoted a total of two frigates (one on duty and another in reserve), fuel ships, as well as Mine Countermeasures ships to Operation *Sharp Guard* performed by the STANAVFORMED. Between 13 July 1992 and 02 October 1996, a total of 18 frigates/destroyers, two submarines, four fuel ships, and approximately 5000 personnel served as part of the operation.³⁹

Turkey's request to participate in UNPROFOR, to establish safe zones and protect the humanitarian aid campaign in BiH, was approved by the UNSC on 22 March 1994. Turkey served in the UNPROFOR with a regiment-level task force comprised of 1400 personnel between 04 August 1993 and 31 December 1995. Moreover, a Turkish officer served as military advisor as part of the UN BiH Mission Military Advisory Team in 2001–2002. Turkey also contributed 101 personnel to the UN International Police Force (IPTF) to enforce the Dayton Peace Accords and establish public order. IPTF transferred its duties to the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in January 2003. The Turkish government commissioned eight police officers and six gendarmerie members to this organisation.⁴⁰ SFOR was transformed into EUFOR as of 02 December 2004 and Turkish Forces remained engaged. Turkey was in close cooperation with international organisations during the Bosnian Crisis. It contributed to task forces established by the UN and NATO. In the aftermath of the war, Turkey continued to partake in international forces, and also offered help in the EU police force to become an important factor in BiH security governance, a position it maintains until the present.

As often happens in international relations, the conclusion of one problem leaves the residue that may produce a new as the Kosovo crisis unfolded, Turkish public opinion and media often pronounced the possibility that a new Bosnian tragedy was on the way. The Turkish government, on the other hand, strived to resolve the conflict through diplomatic channels. As such, Turkey proposed a number of suggestions including a 1974+ offer that would elevate Kosovo's status within the Yugoslavian Federal State as well as it

being the third federal republic within Yugoslavia. After Serbian aggression against Kosovo, the country warmed up to an international intervention headed by NATO. Turkey actively participated in NATO's 1999 operations.

Turkey was under the impression that the Kosovo Crisis could potentially threaten its own security. The violence in Kosovo could spread to Albania and Macedonia. Albania was a country with which Turkey had close military- and political relations. The possibility of Macedonia's disintegration, on the other hand, triggered a Balkan War scenario that would include Turkey as well as Greece. Following the beginning of armed conflict in Kosovo in 1998, the Turkish government remained in contact with the UN Secretary General as well as the Albanian and Macedonian ministers of foreign affairs, and the Yugoslavian ambassador in Ankara. The Kosovo Crisis was discussed in the Board of Ministers that called for the autonomy of Kosovo. Ismail Cem, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, presented Yugoslavian president Slobodan Milosevic a three-phase plan. Accordingly, the Yugoslavian government was expected to cease violence immediately, execute the education treaty of 1996, grant the rights acknowledged in the 1974 Constitution, and return Kosovo's autonomy. However, Turkey failed to get any results from this initiative.⁴¹

Turkey navigated through the Kosovo Crisis in harmony with its Western counterparts. In this respect, the country abode by the economic measures against Yugoslavia and participated in air combat maneuvers in Albanian- and Macedonian airspaces. Article 92 of the 1982 Constitution states that the Grand National Assembly exercises the authority to send the Turkish Armed Forces abroad.⁴² The Assembly's Resolution 596 dated October 8, 1998 is as follows: 'In the context of potential measures that may be taken by NATO with regard to the Kosovo Crisis, the Turkish Armed Forces have been mandated at the General Assembly's fourth session on October 8, 1998 to participate in the multilateral common force that may be formed by allied countries pending the government's discretion regarding the necessity, limits, extent and timing of such involvement.'⁴³

The failure to resolve the Kosovo Crisis through political channels and the violent turn that the conflict took in February 1999 caused NATO to initiate an air operation on March 24, 1999. Turkey participated in the said operation with 10 F-16 planes stationed

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in Ghedi, Italy. As the operation became more intense, NATO demanded additional aircraft and airports from the Turkish government. To this end, Turkey consigned eight F-16 planes as well as three tanker planes to be based in Bandirma and Incirlik, as well as allowed NATO to utilize airports in Balikesir, Bandirma, and Corlu. In addition to these, a frigate from the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 and a minesweeper – part of the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 2 – took part in the operations.⁴⁴

The initiation of military operations triggered a mass flow of refugees into Macedonia and Albania, causing a humanitarian tragedy. Turkey joined AFOR with a field duty company between May 18-September 7, 1999 in order to help resolve the crisis and to heal the wounds that resulted from it. The said company assisted the civilian population in vital matters such as nutrition, bathing facilities, and laundry. During the operation, 18,000 refugees were accommodated in Turkey. Also 3,200 refugees each were hosted in two camps – Boyana, Macedonia and El Basan, Albania – that were made active in the process. The refugees returned following the peace treaty's signing. Three members of the Turkish Armed Forces were commissioned to work at the OSCE Kosovo Mission in May-September 1999. As the mission went on to assume the police duties as part of its common operations with the UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) and the KFOR (Kosovo Force), the military personnel returned. A 15,500 strong multinational force from 34 countries continues to work under KFOR as part of five task forces. The Kosovo Turkish Battalion Task Force stationed in Prizren operates as part of the Multinational South Task Force formed by Germany, Turkey, Austria, and Switzerland.⁴⁵

Aside from its military functions, Turkey also contributed to administrative mechanisms of the Kosovo security governance. As of March 2005, the country commissioned a total of 214 personnel (128 civilian police officers and 79 monitoring officers) to work with the UNMIK-CIVPOL. 207 civilian police officers from Turkey participated in the UNMIK. A civilian mission, EULEX, was stationed in the region by the European Union to replace the UNMIK that was rendered dysfunctional by the Kosovar independence. Turkey currently serves in EULEX with 37 police officers.⁴⁶ Turkey, thanks to centuries of historical and cultural ties to the region as well as the Turkish minority in Kosovo, followed the regional developments

closely and contributed to Kosovar security and stability by offering soldiers, police officers, and experts to serve in KFOR, UNMIK, and the OSCE Mission.

Inter-ethnic tensions in Macedonia represented another test for the international community. The struggle between Albanians and the Slavs also negatively affected Macedonian Turks. From Macedonia's independence on, Turkey supported a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural unitary Macedonian state. The Slavic majority approved of constitutional and other legal changes thanks to European pressure (based on the expectation that monetary aid would be offered).

Operation *Essential Harvest* was initiated on August 27, 2001 under NATO leadership in an attempt to decommission militant groups in Macedonia. Turkey contributed to the multinational brigade that was formed for this purpose with a military team that was stationed in the Petrovac region between August 27–October 20, 2001. NATO launched Operation Amber Fox from September 2001 on in order to maintain its regional presence and assist international observers in Macedonia. Turkey participated in this operation with a mechanized infantry team and four personnel located at the headquarters. In Operation Allied Harmony that followed, the country offered three personnel members on duty at the headquarters. NATO's Operation Allied Harmony was taken over by the European Union from March 31, 2003 on. In Operation Concordia that continued until December 15, 2003, Turkey contributed two light communication teams (2 officers, 2 non-commissioned officers, 4 privates), two officers at the EU headquarters, and one officer at NATO's headquarters in Skopje.

Turkey commissioned four gendarmerie personnel and an officer located at NATO HQ Skopje as part of the PROXIMA police force formed by the European Union on December 15, 2003. The police mission ended on December 15, 2005. Following this date, the EUPAT police consultation team took over for a six-month mandate. Turkey did not take part in this effort.⁴⁷ Turkey acted with its Western allies in crises that emerged out of the Yugoslavian disintegration process. The country's participation either was in the context of UN missions or stemmed from its NATO membership. By participating in UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE operations in Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo, Turkey contributed to efforts seeking to establish stability in the Balkans.

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Based on the fact that security governance not only rests on organisations but also a proximity of values and identities, to what extent is Turkey included in- or excluded from security governance? While the intellectual basis will be established with reference to Turkey's security perceptions, the functional basis shall take into consideration the roles that the country played in security governance applications. These analyses will be conducted on the basis of security governance's inclusion-exclusion problem.

The Turkish security culture was formed by geographical determinism, the *Realpolitik* tradition, and the Westernization process.⁴⁸ Geographical determinism was instrumental in Turkish politicians and military officials to account for security policies employed to resolve a variety of insecurities and interests.⁴⁹ In short, the country acknowledged its geopolitical position as a founding element of its security culture. From the perspective of the *Realpolitik* tradition that makes up part of Turkey's security culture, the dominant realist security approach fails to account for the country's changing security needs in line with the globalization processes.⁵⁰

In the post-Cold War period when a number of international security elements were changing, NATO's significance as a fixed part of Turkey's foreign and security politics remained unaltered. Cooperation and common efforts emerged as the most efficient mechanisms in a new international environment that bore witness to escalating sensitivities toward global-level risks and threats. Turkey - a founding member of the UN as well as an actor in NATO and all other major European institutions, and a potential member of the European Union - pursued an active policy to develop friendship and cooperation in its region and elsewhere.

Evaluations of Turkey's post-Cold War international security perceptions were brought up in a variety of platforms by high-ranking personalities. Among such cases, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in his analysis of the Middle East crisis spearheaded by Lebanon, demonstrated the need for multilateral cooperation in order to facilitate regional security by saying that his country would never be a by-stander to regional developments and that the international community, along with a peace-minded UN, ought to display solidarity in order to immediately ensure a ceasefire.⁵¹ Egemen Bagis, former head of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relation of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, maintained that the world's

need for NATO increased since September 11, 2001. Underscoring the importance of cooperation and alliances between NATO members, Bagis argued: 'There are certain new dangers present in the world. Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, terrorist organisations, human-, drug- and arms trafficking are some of them. We need to struggle against these issues together. I cannot fail to mention this: the democratic values that bring us together under NATO are also the values that need to be sheltered.'⁵² He touched upon the parliamentarians' need to better explain NATO activities to their constituencies in light of potential problems in the Middle East and the Caucasus, and stated that 'particularly in order to fight the problems of the 21st century, NATO's importance shall rise.'⁵³ As seen in this statement, Turkey shared the values emphasized by NATO (such as democracy) and perceived similar threats (terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, etc.).

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Turkey's membership in European security organisations and its role in European security entailed by its Westernization path were acknowledged as the country's "Western" identity. In the late 1990s, whenever this Western identity was scrutinized, "security relations" served as an anchor in European waters.⁵⁴ Liberalism and democracy have been other significant elements in Turkish security culture's Westernization process.⁵⁵ In this context, being a full member of institutions such as the EU, NATO and OSCE that accept liberalism and democracy as their core values bears considerable importance to Turkey. Similarly, the country perceived NATO- and EU expansion as a whole and claimed that a new security structure could not be erected in Eurasia without its contribution.

CONCLUSION

The coordination, administration and regulation of security were conducted through idiosyncratic instruments. The post-Cold War security governance view was based on three assumptions. Primarily, security changed its meaning in a conceptual- and political sense. Furthermore, the need arose to define this change and its dynamics. Thirdly, states and international organisations wherein they are active (UN, NATO, EU, OSCE) became dominant security actors. In light of these assumptions, it was shown that shared goals could be identified through an institutionalisation via het-

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erarchically-related actors. The cooperation and coordination between these four institutions were influential in the perpetuation of security. Security threats were countered with diversified, *ad hoc* and operational responses with no clear drawn borders. A dynamic relationship between inclusion and exclusion accompanied these processes.

Security governance in the Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia crises was executed by, along with a number of actors, among international organisations that overly procured security. The said relations were neither in an anarchical stance nor a hierarchical order. UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE were in cooperation and coordination by themselves thanks to the notion of complementation. This was also manifest in non-members' admission to conduct security governance when necessary. Every individual organization signed up to perform the duties that they were believed to be capable of. This way, both material capabilities and intellectual roles guided the organisations. Finally, when faced with security threats stemming from intra-state violence, the organisations ensured a shared goal by constructing pace and stability over liberal norms.

Turkey adapted to the conceptual changes in security. In this sense, it has been in close cooperation with security-providing institutions and contributed to their changing functions. In general, Turkey was included in the institutional structure of security governance. However, there were also cases where the country was excluded due to its non-member status in the European Union. On the basis of this inclusion-exclusion problem, Turkey's relations particularly with the European Union came to the forefront. In security governance applications, however, the country's profile was at times like the Bosnian crisis kept low due to political and cultural reasons.

Considering the inclusion capacity of the security network that emerged out of the international organisations framework, staying out of the security governance concept would put Turkey in a bad situation. Serbia's resistance against this approach led to no success during the crises of the Balkan region. On the contrary, NATO, EU and OSCE ensured "desired" political outcomes by governing the Yugoslavian disintegration process. These results, quite naturally, are unsatisfactory for Serbia that was left out of the network. On the other hand, the states included in the network were successfully

kept away from competing and conflicting on the basis of their individual national interests.

The function fulfilled by the network of international institutions and rules during the Yugoslavian disintegration process is rather important for Turkish foreign policy. The problems that Turkey, a NATO and OSCE member, encountered in its EU membership process gave rise to the public scrutiny regarding the security network's functioning. Developing relations between the EU and NATO, coupled with the Western European Union's loss of function, created a major concern for the country. Even though Turkey is not a full member of the European Union, remaining outside of the network while it continues to maintain its power would entail considerable risks and costs. Therefore, Turkey should adopt a strategy that will maximize its influence over the network's functioning instead of staying out of it. As an actor located at the heart of the unstable Balkans-Caucasus-Middle East region that experiences negative effects of regional crises, the country finds itself compelled to deal with an increasing number of diverse security issues and threats that emerged after the Cold War. As a result thereof, Turkey is bound to comprehend and take into consideration the security governance system.

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 - 30 Robert O. Keohane, ‘Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics,’ in *International Institutions and State Power, Essays in International Relations Theory*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (London: Westview Press, 1989) p. 3.
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NON-STATE MILITARY ACTORS: THE CASE OF THE 2011 LIBYAN CONFLICT

RADANA MAKARIUSOVÁ AND ZDENĚK LUDVÍK

ABSTRACT: Non-state military actors (i.e. private military companies, contractors and/or militias) form an inherent part of the present global system. In many cases, however, the role and participation of non-state military actors appears to be rather ambiguous and unclear. In order to illustrate the activity of such actors we address the 2011 Libyan rebellion and focus on the increasing sphere of influence of non-state military actors, especially contractors and private military companies, in the Dزامahirija region. Specifically, this study analyses the reasons behind the decision of certain non-state military actors to participate in the rebellion. The time period covered in the study is divided into three phases: pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict phases. Analysis concentrates on the participation of particular types of non-state military actors and their activities over a specific period of time.

KEYWORDS: Military and Militant Non-State Actors, Contractors, Private Military Companies, Libya

INTRODUCTION

The present global system is overloaded with various forms of non-state actors. Since the 19th century, when non-state actors first appeared, they established themselves in domains where states were most keen on preserving their monopoly of power. States have always focused on seeking security and wealth and on balancing power in the sphere of international relations. Now, for the first time in history, we can witness a process of privatisation of security on a large scale. The current trend is a reaction to the end of the Cold War and to the bi-polar confrontation during the 1980s–1990s. Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq at the beginning of the 21st century demonstrate a very dramatic increase in the transfer of security agenda to private hands. In Iraq itself, the number of private mili-

tary contractors involved in the conflict increased enormously from 20,000 in 2004¹ to the estimated 100,000 in 2006. On the basis of the US Department of Defense census data it can be concluded that 180,000 private military contractors were deployed in Iraq (compared with a total of 160,000 US troops deployed there at the same time). However, even these figures are believed not to be exact. In 2007, no precise figures regarding the number of individuals fighting in Iraq were available.²

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States and state representatives are increasingly more enthusiastic about delegating their security agenda to the private sphere. The privatization of security is a way of transferring the most important and until recently exclusively state-dominated business activity to private hands. This trend is related to the current development in the international relations arena in which the state power is being transferred to other (non-state and hence non-transparent) actors. This process signifies not only the privatization of security but also, and more importantly, the privatization of power. The participation of private military companies in the domain of state security is a result of lobbying efforts of those who want to enhance their own interests and power via the most strategic domain, i.e. security inside the boundaries of states.

The process of privatization of security is accompanied by a total restructuring of security apparatus and by the monopolization of private military industry. The military industry is highly complex and the less transparent it is, more likely it is to abuse its non-transparent nature. Secret agreements are being concluded among dozens of seemingly unrelated entities while in reality, there is only one such entity, which operates under many different names and which pursues various objectives, the most important of which is profit, or the so-called war profiteering. We are facing a very important moral and ethical dilemma. In democratic systems, wars should only be conducted for a just purpose and not for personal profit. However, it is precisely this personal profit, which occupies the main rationale in the current war making and the world's most powerful armies are becoming increasingly more dependent on private military companies.

The privatization of security is a de-facto natural process of making the most profit from a war and is being adopted by both democratic as well as authoritarian regimes. When there is a con-

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flict of interests, where on one hand there is an effort to uphold democratic principles and on the other a tendency to conduct wars for the sake of increasing one's sphere of influence, the responsibility is being transferred to private, i.e. irresponsible hands. Hence, the privatization of security creates a legitimate vacuum in the sphere of security. A similar trend can be observed in authoritarian regimes, which find it disadvantageous to rely solely upon the loyalty of their state armies since there is a very thin line between loyalty and potential betrayal. However, the loyalty of private military contractors, who are not interested in the reasons of a conflict but only in the financial benefits they can reap, can be bought. When powerful democratic countries delegate their security to the private sphere, we talk about the privatization of security or transfer of responsibility to private hands, namely to private security companies. These can be defined as entities providing services outside their homeland, such as consultancy and training, which are also capable of using lethal weapons.³ When security is delegated to the private sphere by authoritarian regimes, we talk about hiring of contractors, who are defined as individuals hired for economic purposes to fight in a conflict they are indifferent to.⁴ As for other non-state military actors trying to exercise their influence in conflict-ridden regions, they are referred to as militants, i.e. irregular armed forces operating in a territory where the power of the state is absent or only very limited.⁵

In general, non-state military actors are combatants who participate in conflicts within territories they are not originally from and whose motivation is purely materialistic. As these private contractors are drafted from many different nationalities, they do not know and cannot trust one another. Therefore, the phenomenon of a mutually shared trust is absent. Private contractors are not usually given a proper military training either, which normally is very thorough when it comes to regular state armies. Since their past is generally unknown and they are not subjected to any psychological testing, it can be hard to determine whom to prosecute for potential war crimes. This alienation of contractors from the motives of the conflict is a very crucial and absolutely essential phenomenon. Their fighting is not based on the loyalty towards their state and on the classical struggle for state and personal security. Their loyalty is bought. The alienation from the real motives of the war goes hand

in hand with the irresponsibility for one's acts committed during the war. The question is who will be responsible for the nature of the conflict and/or for war crimes. It is not likely to be the army of the sovereign state but rather those anonymous, irresponsible contractors and hard-to-trace-down security companies. States' loss of ability to control the nature and the direction of war and the absence of the necessary motivating factor on the part of these private military contractors may have devastating consequences for civilians, who are not part of the conflict but who may become its main victims. The primary feature of the privatization of security, i.e. the loss of state's control over the war waged on its territory, is one of the most pressing and dangerous problems we must come to terms with. Contractors belong to a specific entity of a transient nature and hence legitimate principles cannot be upheld. Transferring contractors from one entity to another is fairly easy and depends solely on the amount of reward. Therefore, the likelihood of cooperating with a terrorist group and/or transferring valuable know-how is only a question of money and not of moral principles. As states transfer their security agenda to private security companies or to contractors and militants, they also give up their responsibility. The blood does not stain the governments or their armies, but those who are anonymous and hence not subject to prosecution. Alienation from the conflict combined with the issue of money contractors receive, creates a very dangerous precedent for their future motivation. What will be their role after their contracts expire? Will they be hired to fight in another conflict? What will happen if the contracting side does not want to engage in a new conflict? Actually, these contractors may be hired by any non-state entity, including radical and terrorist groups. This presents a real challenge for the collective security in the 21st century since neither the military nor the militant non-state actors are accounted for in the present collective security system that only accounts for conflicts conducted among states.

*Non-State
Military
Actors*

The following case study demonstrates the penetration of non-state military actors, mainly contractors and private security companies, into the military-security sphere of Libya. The case study focuses on the participation of non-state military actors in the 2011 Libyan conflict as well as in its aftermath. The period covered in the case study is divided into three parts: the pre-conflict period,

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the conflict period and the post-conflict period. The three phases are divided according to the nature of involvement of non-state military actors in the conflict. The first phase covers the period of the beginning of the Gaddafi regime in 1975 to the eruption of the uprising in February 2011. The second phase covers the period from the beginning of the Libyan uprising (February 17, 2011) to the fall of the Gaddafi regime in October 2011. The third phase covers the period from October 2011 to February 2012. The first two phases can be labeled as “Libyan” while the third as “Sahelian,” according to the geographical region the violent non-state actors operated in.

PART I: THE PRE-CONFLICT PHASE

The presence of informal military-security apparatus in the Libyan political system under Gaddafi was not a new phenomenon. The first impulse towards the establishment of such structure can be traced to 1975 when Gaddafi, as head of the victorious side in the rift within the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council, changed professional and technical criteria for army recruitment in order to prevent the threat of disloyalty. This way, the number of members of his tribe – later his family – appointed to security and military posts increased significantly.⁶ The army’s top brass was also being regularly re-shuffled. Gaddafi had slowly drawn his power support from groups whose members were of non-Libyan and non-Arabic origins and who were not part of the official armed forces, which Gaddafi did not trust. Some members of the non-Libyan and non-Arabic groups underwent the naturalization process, were given Libyan citizenships and formed an elite force within the Libyan army.⁷ These informal units were active on two levels: the internal and the external. On the internal level, Gaddafi wanted to establish loyal armed forces which he recruited from his own tribe and which he could rely upon since he did not trust the official Libyan army. On the external level, Gaddafi was trying to appear as an important actor projecting Messianic visions for the African continent. In reality, however, he interfered in the internal affairs of the neighboring countries by supporting both the government and the anti-government movements depending on his current needs⁸ (for example, Gaddafi’s mercenaries actively participated in genocides in Liberia and Sierra Leone).⁹ Such policies allowed Gaddafi to create a mas-

sive network of relations and mutual obligations. For his financial and political support, Gaddafi was, in return, able to demand support, which paid off during the 2011 uprising when those that he previously supported formed the backbone of his units.

The practice of employing non-state military actors in the services of the Jamahiriya [the full name of the country was the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya] can be traced back to the 1970s. The first mercenaries were American CIA agents Frank Terpil and Ed Wilson who Gaddafi hired as his security advisors and who in time brought other Americans to Libya.¹⁰ The power of the Libyan mercenary forces was strengthened due to unrests in the neighboring countries, i.e. the Chad-Sudan conflict or the unrest in the south of Algeria. Gaddafi benefited from such conflicts by trying to win rebels to his side.

Gaddafi's relationship with Chad and with the President of Chad Idriss Déby was very important for the formation of Gaddafi's mercenary units and in fact, Chadians formed a significant part of the Libyan mercenary units. Gaddafi supported Déby in his armed struggle against the then President Habré. In 1980, Gaddafi's army intervened in Chad in order to depose Habré from power, which did not occur until 1990 despite Libya's continuing provision of military and financial support to Déby. Gaddafi continued to support Déby after he was elected as President. Déby repaid his "debt" to Gaddafi in the 2011 Libyan rebellion and it is believed that two Chadian generals were in command of Gaddafi's mercenary units. Another country, which facilitated the formation of the mercenary structures in Libya, is Sudan, namely the Darfur region where Gaddafi supported the separatist movement vying for independence from Khartoum. Sudanese separatists later helped Gaddafi to set up mercenary units.¹¹ For years, Gaddafi had also tried to win over individuals from mercenary units operating in other African countries such as in Algeria, Mauretania, Niger and the Central African Republic (CAR).¹² By appointing Chadian generals as heads of professional command forces and by acquiring consulting-training services from non-African professional instructors, Gaddafi had a well-functioning private army at his disposal, which kept him in power for decades and which enabled Libya to act as a regional power.

Among other Gaddafi's tactics was his policy vis-à-vis the nomadic people in the Sahara, whose loyalty he was trying to win for a long

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time.¹³ Conflicts in the Sahara-Sahel region effectively decreased the control sovereign states had over their territories, a situation which played into the hands of terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaida, as well as into the hands of various nomadic tribes in conflict with states whose territory they occupied.¹⁴ The most important among these nomadic tribes were the Tuaregs, whose role is significant with regards to their participation in the Libyan uprising as well as with their long-term conflict with the Mali government.

Gaddafi was well aware of the fragile life existence the uprooted rebels led. He provided them with a comfortable base, which earned him their loyalty. They [rebels] were well aware that should Gaddafi fall, so would they. This mutual usefulness made Gaddafi's mercenary system very ruthless and cruel and there was no space left to sympathize with its enemies. Gaddafi thus gradually created a parallel army from non-Libyan rebels and non-Libyan desert tribes. Unofficial armed structures enabled Gaddafi to control the political life in the country and to meddle effectively in the internal affairs of other African states. In the 1970s, al-Failaka al-Islamiya, or Islamic Legion, was set up, which was an experimental Islamic army formed by African and Arabic volunteers that Gaddafi used for his territorial ambitions to expand.¹⁵ In the 1980s, Gaddafi planned to create the "Sahara Army", which was supposed to be set up by Sudanese President Al-Bashir's forces. This project, however, did not materialize.¹⁶ Gaddafi had at his disposal both the non-state armed "international brigades" types of units as well as regular armed elite forces. Besides rebels and nomads, Gaddafi also acquired security forces such as advisors and instructors from non-African regions. Since this acquisition of personnel probably required some degree of cooperation among secret services, it is very difficult to obtain evidence that it actually took place. There are no openly accessible sources available to conduct an in-depth research.

We can now summarize the main points of Gaddafi's strategy. First, ever since the rift in the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council, Gaddafi did not trust his own people, which is why those he relied upon were of non-Libyan descent. Second, Gaddafi took advantage of the fact that his parallel-armed structures did not have a Libyan Arab identity. He made use of the mercenaries' estrangement from the Libyan people and of their dependence on his regime. These mercenaries served Gaddafi as an instrument of

power.

PART 2: THE CONFLICT PHASE

The second phase of the conflict can be divided into two parts. The first part maps the activities of non-state military actors on the Gaddafi side, while the second part maps the activities of non-state military actors on the anti-Gaddafi side.

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First, let's discuss the mercenary units and private security companies operating on the Gaddafi side. Mercenaries were divided into three groups. The first group comprised of competent and well-trained African mercenaries and of professionals from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe fighting for financial reasons. The second group comprised of Gaddafi's formal as well as informal security units, including naturalized Libyans as well as non-naturalized individuals, mercenaries of various warlords and desert nomads from the Sahel region fighting mainly for political reasons. The third group comprised of masses of individuals from the entire African continent who were given to Gaddafi from various rulers for political reasons. Many of those were forced to fight involuntarily. In the better case, they would be subjected to a short military drill; in the worse case, they would be used as human shields.¹⁷ There is no exact data regarding their numbers. It can be implicitly inferred that the second group was more numerous than the first one but that the decisive force on the battlefield belonged to the first group. From the above, it can be concluded that there were no non-state military actors of the Libyan origin fighting on the Gaddafi side.

Gaddafi's deployment of mercenaries gained a totally new and an entirely unprecedented dimension. Their power grew and they became the main force for his regime to eliminate civilian revolt, especially after the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 of March 17, 2011, which effectively paralyzed the Libyan air forces. The task of mercenaries was to kill as many rebels as possible: thanks to their indifference, mercenaries began unscrupulously attacking Libyan civilians, thus allowing Gaddafi to conduct such operations, which a regular Libyan army would never be able to carry out. Professional fighters from Chad, Mali and Niger who had been living in Libya for a long time, had in a week's time trained novices how to handle arms and helped integrate them into the mercenary units. On the

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basis of this information it can be inferred that mercenaries were divided into fighters who had lived in Libya for years (or had been deployed outside Libya on Gaddafi's orders) and those fighters who entered Gaddafi's forces (even involuntarily) at the beginning or during the uprising to suppress the rebels (Gaddafi's son Khamis Gaddafi and Tuareg fighters' leader Aghali Alambo actively participated in this).¹⁸ Gaddafi's sons took control of the highest command of mercenaries.¹⁹ The Gaddafi regime asked loyal African presidents and governments to recruit fighters to join Gaddafi's forces in order to help suppress the rebellion. Gaddafi's emissaries contacted leaders of many countries. Nearly all these countries complied with Gaddafi's request to send fighters to Libya.²⁰ There is evidence of deployment of Guinea fighters²¹ and of construction of an air bridge between Niger and Libya through which a large number of African mercenaries came into Libya though most of them entered the country as "tourists".²² Gaddafi also got support from outside the official African governmental structures, mostly in the form of professional mercenaries, warlords' warriors and African fighters trained by intelligence agencies. These were predominantly from South Africa, who, after the fall of the apartheid, worked for the infamous Executive Outcomes. There were also [Sierra Leone former rebel leader Foday] Sankoh's units and mercenaries fighting in the uprising in Tunisia and supporting President Ben Ali.²³ In the last case, there are speculations about the role of France in the training of Chadian units and about a taciturn French agreement with their deployment in Libya to fight for Gaddafi. The presence of individuals or groups from other parts of Europe cannot be ruled out, either. For instance, Serbians and Bosnians partially operated in Libya before the uprising. Veterans of the Yugoslav conflict were hired very soon after the Libyan uprising via Bosnian and Croatian intermediaries.²⁴ They operated within ground forces and it has been speculated that they were used as fighter jet pilots to bombard civilians. Another group consisted of citizens of former Soviet Union, mainly Ukrainians and Belarusians, who were allegedly in Libya on Minsk's approval, which the latter denies. These were mostly former members of the 334th unit of the elite forces of Belarus who had some experience fighting in Afghanistan. They did not participate in combat but they worked as advisors in Libya.²⁵ Before the escalation of the conflict, there were rumors that they numbered around 500. It

is likely, however, that their numbers increased in the course of the uprising.²⁶ Lastly, it is necessary to mention the citizens of the European Union. These were mostly individual professional mercenaries who did not represent an organized and institutionalized form of cooperation as in the previous cases. These experts in heavy combat technique, strategy and combat management came from Belgium, United Kingdom, France, Poland and Greece and numbered a maximum of one or two hundred.²⁷

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Nomadic desert tribes such as Tuaregs and Berbers from Polisario [rebel national liberation movement fighting for the independence of Western Sahara from Morocco] formed another part of Gaddafi's units.²⁸ As said before, the participation of Tuaregs will be discussed in part 3. However, it should be pointed out that their previous Libyan involvement made them an effective force that could easily be tapped into by Gaddafi. Relations between Gaddafi's units and nomadic warriors were loose as the latter were recruited only when Gaddafi needed it. Sometimes their cooperation was stronger as in the case of Mali Tuaregs, whom Gaddafi granted Libyan citizenship. These so called "cadres reserves" were called upon during the Libyan uprising. Although they were partially living outside Libya, Gaddafi called them back and armed them.²⁹

As far as the remuneration of mercenaries is concerned, there were considerable differences. Mercenaries were promised between 1,000 and 12,000 USD or 1,000 USD per week for every killed rebel (data is not consistent). They were promised cars, houses and money for their families – all which, however, remained largely unfulfilled. This is mostly the case of black French-speaking mercenaries who were sent to Libya on the orders of their governments and thus fought for free. The situation for European "specialists" is different – their rates were in the range of several thousands dollars a month, if not a week.³⁰

There is some disagreement concerning the number of mercenaries. If we rule out the very low estimate of 5,000 or very high estimate of 150,000, most sources agree on 30,000–50,000 mercenaries.³¹ The majority of mercenaries were recruited from the untrained, French-speaking Africans of black complexion. On the other side of the spectrum there were the European advisors who did not take part in the fights.

At the very end of the Libyan conflict, Gaddafi's reliance on his

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unofficial fighters turned against him. His last triumph was to come from his own tribe, the al-Gaddafi. Gaddafi's son Moatasem Gaddafi recalled about 400 of them to the besieged town of Sirt. However, their numbers decreased day by day as some of them died in combat and some tried to disappear. Eventually, those who remained, dressed as civilians and ran away.³²

MERCENARY UNITS AND PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES ON THE ANTI-GADDAFI SIDE

The participation of non-state military actors on the anti-Gaddafi side in no way equals the intensity of participation of non-state military actors on the pro-Gaddafi side. This is due to the limited mandate of the UNSC, which did not allow deployment of ground troops but approved air strikes. If deployment of ground forces were to take place, it would have to be a secret mission with specific targets and goals. As far as the number (the quantitative aspect) and the variety (the qualitative aspect) of non-state military actors on the anti-Gaddafi side is concerned, it is limited to dozens of individuals from private military companies whose participation in the conflict had two main motives.

First, private security companies represented the interests of governments of intervening states who could not deploy their armies in Libya. Yet, the existence of contracts between private military companies and state actors is difficult to prove. These non-state actors were hired in a non-transparent way and both the governments and the private military companies deny [the latter's] participation in the conflict. It is very likely that the activities of private security companies were coordinated by secret services.³³

The possibility that some private security companies wanted to offer their services to both sides of the conflict cannot be ruled out entirely.³⁴ Private security companies found it attractive to offer their services to rebels because in the absence of ground forces deployed by the intervening armies, rebels could capitalize on the private military companies' know-how in terms of managing combat operations and using arms technology. Private military firms were also capable of boosting rebels' strike force combat operations and/or ensure the protection of strategic places (such as important public facilities, oil fields, oil pipelines, etc).³⁵

It has been speculated that some French, British and Qatar private military companies had provided their services to Gaddafi himself.³⁶ The most obvious example is the French firm Secopex, whose presence in Libya during the uprising is unquestionable. However, it cannot be sufficiently verified if the firm provided services to Gaddafi or to rebels or if it was sent to Libya by the French government. The last version is not all that unthinkable, as it is known that Secopex has contacts with the French secret services.³⁷ The French state was very likely involved in Secopex's establishment in Libya. Under the head of Pierre Marziali, Secopex planned to set up a liaison office and provide services to rebels. On February 18, 2011 a group of people working for Secopex arrived in Benghazi to sign a contract with representatives of the Libyan National Transitional Council. However, the group was attacked by the Katiba brigade and Marziali was shot dead. The remaining members of the group were interned and charged with supporting Gaddafi. After two days they were extradited to Egypt. The reason behind the incident could be Marziali's previous conflict with Gaddafi as well as the rivalry between the National Transitional Council and the Katiba.³⁸ Leakage of information about Secopex's presence in Libya probably made the French secret services uncomfortable. By preventing the planned cooperation between Secopex and the National Transitional Council, speculations about the French engagement in Libya could be declared groundless. This may also suggest that the French secret services are so discreetly established in Libya that no further information leaks to the public.

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A completely different case is the involvement of the group around Jean-Pierre Chabrut, the former chief of Département protection et sécurité du Front National, the security unit of Le Pen's National Front. Chabrut's goal was to "clean the space" before the arrival of foreign missions into unstable Libya and consequently offer protection to official representatives. The official Western representatives, who were gradually setting up their headquarters in Benghazi, were protected not only by special units but also by Chabrut's group. Jean-Pierre Chabrut's men were armed directly by the Libyan National Transitional Council.

To conclude this sub-chapter, all evidence suggests that private military companies on the anti-Gaddafi side operated in a highly non-transparent manner and with the aim to withhold information

from the international public in order to:

Secure interests of foreign governments in Libya:

- provide assistance with military and security activities to rebels who could be used in the rear as well as on the front-line,
- offer protection to foreign dignitaries,
- boost their own influence by assuming an ambivalent position by offering their services to both sides of the conflict (immoral financial motivation).

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As shown, the typology of deployed mercenaries differs on both sides of the conflict. The typical feature of Gaddafi's tactic was to use a whole plethora of non-state military actors with diverse motivation, while the "anti-Gaddafi coalition"/rebels exclusively used private military companies whose motivation was mainly financial. The difference is also in the number of individuals deployed (tens of thousands on the pro-Gaddafi side compared to dozen, maybe hundreds, on the other). The most significant difference lies in the reason of their deployment. For Gaddafi, mercenaries were used primarily as the main fighting force used in combats against rebels. For rebels, private military companies fulfilled a more delicate role of providing passive defense and executing highly specialized and sophisticated operations. A certain overlap can, nevertheless, be found. The operations of non-state military actors on both sides of the conflict were non-transparent and were conducted in a secret manner. Neither side admits to having deployed these violent non-state actors. When asked, they remain silent or at most, give diplomatic answers.

PART 3: THE POST-CONFLICT PHASE

In the last phase of the Libyan uprising, i.e. after the fall of the Gaddafi regime, two facts are important. First, it is the involvement of mercenaries, namely from the Tuareg tribe, in the destabilization of the larger African territory, and second, a rather significant degree of influence of rebels on the (non) consolidation of power in Libya. These two facts significantly change both the typology and the character of non-state military actors' activities during the uprising.

The nomadic Tuareg tribes live on the borders between the Arab

and Black Africa and they move across state borders. Due to de-colonization, the territory they occupied fell under the administration of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali and Niger. The Tuareg population amounts to 1.5 million people (of which 850,000 live in Niger, 550,000 in Mali, 50,000 in Algeria and the rest in Libya and Burkina Faso).³⁹ The number of the Tuareg people living in Libya thus reaches tens of thousands at most (though their numbers can rise if conditions in their home countries in Mali and Niger worsen). Some of the Tuareg living in Libya permanently occupy the southern part of the country. They were not, contrary to the nationalized Tuareg people, part of the Gaddafi structures. Most of the Tuareg population (including those living outside Libya) did not cooperate with Gaddafi in any way. The Tuareg mercenaries are just a small minority of the total Tuareg population. Poor living conditions forced part of the Tuareg ethnic group to move to Libya. The main migration wave took place in the 1970s and 1980s and was caused by extreme draught. Another migration wave occurred in 1990 and the last one in 2006. The civilian population regularly falls victim to the feuding fractions of the rebelling groups.

Gaddafi supported the Tuareg in their struggles,⁴⁰ which meant that he stood against their governments. However, his support never reached such levels that the Tuareg could gain their independence. Gaddafi skillfully played both sides against each other in order to promote his particular objectives. The Tuareg, who fled to Libya, were forced to cooperate with Gaddafi. Those, who hesitated to cooperate, were threatened with violence. Others joined Gaddafi's armed forces, both as part of his regular army as well as of his elite units, and their numbers totaled about 2,000. Gaddafi had naturalized Tuaregs who migrated from Mali since the 1980s. Gaddafi deployed them in the Islamic Legion in conflicts in Chad and Sudan. These fighters also took arms against their governments in Mali and Niger.⁴¹ Tuaregs do not share the Libyan identity. The Arab majority does not accept them and associates them with mercenaries.

After the fall of the Gaddafi regime, the activities of non-state military actors expanded further into Africa and the security situation in the Sahelian Africa (hence in the larger part of the Sub-Saharan Africa) worsened. The Tuareg mercenaries, left without a purpose and equipped with no other but war-making skills, began to return to the countries of their origin, mainly to Mali and Niger.

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The naturalized Tuaregs, who formed part of the Gaddafi formal military units, also fled Libya because their fate was uncertain without Gaddafi's protection. State representatives in Mali and Niger are now faced with a very difficult situation. Governments in Bamak and Niamey are not able to handle the influx of mobile, armed and trained fighters.⁴² A tension is rising between the Tuareg mercenaries and the local Tuareg population, which creates a burden for the entire region. The governments of the Sahelian countries will have to:

- come to terms with the loss of the Gaddafi's mediating role in security, economic and humanitarian sphere,
- focus their energies on controlling mercenaries who are left without a purpose and who pose a significant security problem which could potentially destabilize their countries,
- confront the intensive activity of militants from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad,
- deal with the rising terrorist activity of The Al-Qaida Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI),
- address a very serious food situation.

In the past, Tuaregs never possessed a sufficient potential to be able to turn the victory in the uprisings to their advantage. Now, armed with Libyan weapons, they are suddenly able to turn the situation to their advantage. For the first time, they talk about their right to self-determination and even about their independence. Prompt military interventions suggest that the Sahelian countries are aware of the real threat of destabilization, which the ex-Gaddafi mercenaries may pose and thus resort to preventive measures and offensive operations.

However, the conflict assumed a tragic dimension. It gradually transpired that Tuaregs had hastily executed 82 people, probably Mali soldiers, maybe even civilians, by slitting their throats or by shooting them in their heads. As a result of this rampage, 4,000 civilians had to flee the city. The conflict gradually led to all-out migration of the population. Only in the first ten days of February 2012, about 30,000–50,000 people fled to neighboring countries. Another 60,000 people fled from the north of Mali to the center of the country. As of February 24, 2012 about 126,000 people left their homes, of which 61,400 are internally displaced and 65,000 became refugees in the neighboring countries. This is for the first time in

20 years, that such a high number of people were forced to flee. The number of refugees keeps rising at a rate of around 800–1,000 a day.⁴³ This illustrates an entirely new dimension of influence the violent non-state military actors possess. Given the food crisis, which struck the Sahara-Sahela region in October 2011, humanitarian catastrophe in the form of famine may potentially harm both the refugees as well as their hosts.⁴⁴ In addition to this, the Tuareg people living outside their traditional territories in the south of the country, including the capital Bamako, are open to attacks from non-Tuareg inhabitants who are angry for what the Tuaregs are doing in the north of the country.

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Besides the ex-Gaddafi Tuareg mercenaries, there are also militants from the Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad – MNLA (The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad)⁴⁵ as well as terrorists from the Al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique – AQMI (The Al-Qaida Organization in the Islamic Maghreb) fighting together against the Mali state. This trio also carried out the January 24, 2012 attack on Aguelhok. This is for the first time in history that cooperation between Tuareg warriors and Islamic terrorists has been documented.⁴⁶ The MNLA movement was established on October 16, 2011 by fusing the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, comprised of young intellectuals and militant politicians, with ex-warriors from the Alliance Tuareg Niger-Mali. The third component of the MNLA, the ex-Gaddafi Tuaregs, have in recent weeks contributed to an increase in armed activities in Azawad. The chief of staff of the military section of the MNLA is Mohamed Ag Najem, the former officer from the Libyan army.⁴⁷ The AQMI has several bases in the north of the country. Its politics is based on concluding marriages between its members (primarily Algerians) and Tuaregs, on recruiting unemployed Tuaregs and on bribing its population by promising very limited social programs. Such a policy pays off. An entirely new AQMI katiba (organizational unit), which consists exclusively of the members of the tribe, emerged in the Sahela-Sahara region.

In the post-Gaddafi Libya, the situation is far from settled. The weakness of the previous government and problems in the social sphere, which affect almost every Libyan, are to blame. The infrastructure does not work and neither do the police, the army or the state administration. The distribution of social benefits is sluggish,

the banking system is nearing a collapse and unemployment is rife.⁴⁸

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The situation is also deteriorating due to the existence of groups of armed rebels operating in a parallel power structure. Hence, these ex-rebels, once acting on the will of the majority, are now turning into so-called thowars, promoting the interests of the minority. Thowars provoke conflicts with the former pro-Gaddafi followers as well as among themselves. Heavily armed thowars commit illegal acts: they control strategic places in Tripoli, collect bribes at junctions and detain thousands of people. The United Nations estimates that there are about 8,500 people, whom the thowars suspect of collaborating with the ex-Gaddafi regime, detained in 60 detention centers across Libya where they are tortured. These detention centers are outside the control of the Libyan government. Entire tribes, which amounts to tens of thousands of people, are subjected to thowars' brutality.⁴⁹ Thowars are fragmented into hundreds of militants and there is no coordinating mechanism for negotiation with the power holders. Even if cooperation among the militia chiefs does take place, this usually only concerns regional groups. In order to resolve this situation, thowars would have to be integrated into the regular army system. A total of 200,000 thowars are expected to be incorporated into the army eventually. However, for the thowars to join the army, they would have to give up any ambition to hold political power and to give up their arms. So far, the transition has not been very successful. Since being armed is the only political influence thowars have, they are not likely to give up arms until a government of their preferences is formed. Until then (elections to a 200-member assembly are scheduled for June 2012), thowars will continue to voice their political demands. Furthermore, the opportunities to solve the problem regarding detention centers and armed incidents are still very limited.⁵⁰ The weakness of the Libyan state may pave the way towards the Islamization of the country and even towards creating a fertile ground for Islamic fundamentalists. Al-Qaida encourages the AQMI to undertake terrorist activities in Libya. Several terrorists are already inside the country, trying to launch terrorist attacks. Their position is, however, far from easy. A generally weakened Al-Qaida arrived in the wrong time to the wrong place. Its ideology is out of tune with the uprising and with the Libyan people, who, riding the wave of the Arab Spring's ideals and jubilant about the end of the dictatorship, do not

sympathize with the Al-Qaida.⁵¹ Although the Al-Qaida's activities in Libya remain under the control of Western secret services, local Islamists have already established a rather significant degree of influence over the Libyan population and they have access to weapons collected by the Libyans during the uprising. Qatar is partially to blame for this.⁵²

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CONCLUSION

This case study has illustrated that non-state military actors of the Libyan origin operating on the Gaddafi side participated in the conflict in a limited way. If any Libyans took part in the activities of mercenaries, it was either the naturalized Africans (non-Libyans) speaking African languages and French but not Arabic, or the members of Libyan tribes loyal to Gaddafi. However, two questions come to mind: first, to what extent do these tribes form part of the Libyan national identity, and second, to what extent can people living in a tribal structure identify with the Libyan state? It can be inferred that Libyan citizens (civilians) were not directly involved in struggles on the Gaddafi side. They were either rebels or non-combatants.

There is a risk that some non-state military actors involved in the Libyan uprising may be responsible for the possible eruption of new military conflicts. Some former members of the Gaddafi units are still armed, though left without a purpose and having fled Libya, which means that they can be "recycled" for further use. Security situation in the Sahara-Sahela Africa is jeopardized because together with militants, a large amount of weapons and ammunition from the Libyan depositories ended up in Chad, Mauretania and Niger. The AQMI, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab may tap into these human and material resources.⁵³ At the same time, it is obvious that the conflict attracted a whole plethora of non-state military and militant actors whose involvement in the uprising was outside the control of the Libyan civil society against whom their activities were, in fact, directed. The involvement of these non-state military and militant actors was also beyond the control of the international community, which now may be threatened by their activities. The Libyan uprising shows that authoritarian regimes and not only failed states, as thought previously, provide a fertile ground for non-state military and militant actors to operate in. In fact, authoritarian regimes

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may also use these non-state military actors against their civilian population. It can be inferred that there is a direct correlation between non-democratic states and the existence of violent non-state actors. This case study also suggests that the international community should strive to set up a mechanism to control the behavior of not only these actors but also of state actors who create the conditions suitable for violent non-state actors to operate within. If there were no undemocratic regimes (or failed states), there would be no space for these violent non-state actors to operate within. This may be taken as a challenge for the international community to think further about the responsibility to protect (R2P). However, it should also be emphasized, that democratic regimes' usage of private military companies is problematic and that the concept of "war profiteering" will become hotly debated in the future.

To conclude, this case study helped to illustrate that non-state military and militant actors have not only financial, but also political motivation and/or a combination of financial and political motivation to engage in violent activities. Violent non-state actors (such as mercenaries) attract other non-state violent actors, such as militants from Azawad or AQMI terrorists and together, they are able to strike a powerful blow to the sovereignty of a state. As negative non-state actors (armed militants-Tuaregs) try to ascertain themselves in the political arena, the positive non-state actors (political Tuaregs) try to obtain power by force. In other words, negative non-state actors alter the behavior (identity) of the hitherto positive non-state actors.

Table 1: Typology of violent non-state actors fighting on the Gaddafi side

Group	Financial motivation	Political motivation	A combination of financial and political motivation
Special units made of naturalized rebels from Chad, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone	X		
Fighters of the President of Chad		X	
Chadian people settled in Libya			X
Sudanese fighters fighting against the independence of South Sudan			X

Fighters sent by the President of Guinea		X	
Polisario Front fighters			X
Citizens of various African countries, formed and led by officers sent to Libya		X	
Mercenaries from Tunisia, previously in service to the President Ben Ali	X		
JEM fighters from Darfur			X
Tuareg fighters			X
South-East European mercenaries	X		
Mercenaries from the post-Soviet space	X		
Highly specialized experts from Western Europe	X		
Mercenaries from Asia	X		
FARC snipers			X
Child soldiers	X		

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THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S ENDLESS ENLARGEMENT DEBATE

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ABSTRACT: Recent talks on UN Security Council reform mainly focused on enlargement issues based on the competing positions of the G4 (Germany, Japan, Brazil and India) and UfC (core members Italy, Pakistan, Mexico and Egypt); groups which seem unable to reach a compromise in the near future. Even if they did manage to cooperate such will not produce efficiency in the UNSC's work, since the main shortcoming of the Council is not a number of its members but the sacred veto power of its P5. Indeed, there are only five beneficiaries out of 194 UN members which are politically satisfied; the permanent members, which are relicts of World War II and since the Council continues to be formed by the P5, it is argued that the Council has lost its raison d'être. This work evaluates the international tensions derived from UNSC stagnation.

KEYWORDS: UN Security Council, Reform, Enlargement, Permanent Members, Veto Power

INTRODUCTION

After the double veto by Russia and China on the resolution about the situation in Syria at the UN Security Council (UNSC) on 4 February 2012¹ the reform of the Council once again proved its necessity. The issue of reforms is on the global agenda for several years. The first feasible reforms of the Council happened in 1965 when its membership was enlarged from 11–15.² But given to the fact that the number of the UN members increased from 117–193 since 1965³ the necessity of the Council enlargement still remains relevant. The issue became more significant at the beginning of 1990s after the establishment of the UN 'Open-ended working group on equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters relating to the UNSC'. As a result of functioning for almost twenty years, main progress achieved according to the group's proposals were holding more open meetings for non-Council members and frequent briefings by the SC President

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on its activity. Despite twenty years of intensive negotiations and numberless proposals on the Council's enlargement the UN members could not achieve any progress. The UNSC represents Second World War realities despite dramatic changes in the world politics since that time. Along with the increase of the UN membership, the SC also acts in a world which is totally different from 1945. The new challenges for peace and security need more representative and reactive body. Even the drastic change in the Council's workload demonstrates the need for enlargement. If the number of the Council's formal meetings in 1993 was 153, in 2006 they increased up to 252 which demanded broader representation of the member states.⁴

But Syrian issue and many other veto-downed problems once again proved that the enlargement of the UNSC membership will not add significant efficiency to the Council's activity if the veto power still remains. Unfortunately, the member states are too much concentrated on the issue of, which countries have to become new permanent members of the Council, that, they go far beyond the discussion of the real problems of the SC. Today, the debates are mainly focused on hundred times repeated positions of G4 – Japan, Germany, Brazil and India – which are real candidates for new permanent seats at the Council and Uniting for Consensus group which argue G4's candidacy. In such a deadlock situation there are only five beneficiaries of ineffective discussions out of 193 member states – the permanent members (P5) of the UNSC with special privilege – the veto power allowing them to control all important decisions at the UN.

ENLARGEMENT AS A MAIN FOCUS OF REFORM PROPOSALS

Until today there have been made several interesting proposals on the Council's enlargement. At the beginning these proposals meant the expansion of the Council permanent membership up to ten presumably with the inclusion of Germany, Japan, India, Brazil and South Africa. But as a result of the opposition from China against Japan, Italy against Germany, Pakistan against India these proposals seemed to be not viable, despite the huge financial support to the UN by some of these candidates. For example, the share of assessed contribution to the UN by Japan is approximately 12.5 percent, which gives it the second largest scale of assessments

among the member states, after the United States.⁵ The share of Germany is more than 8 percent which makes it the third contributor from the top.⁶

Taking into account strong resistance from a number of developed countries, especially the members of the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group the recent enlargement proposals are mainly based on increasing the number of non-permanent members and creating semi-permanent membership (seats for more than two years period). For example, one of the latest discussions on the issue at the UN on 21 February 2012 was dedicated to the UfC proposal. The proposal envisaged that an enlargement of the UNSC should only take place in the non-permanent category, creating this way a more representative, accountable and accessible Council. The UfC suggested creating a new category of seats with a longer mandate of up to six years in addition to the expansion of regular non-permanent seats. Subject to negotiation, the UfC suggested either a 3–5 year term without the possibility of immediate re-election or a 2 year term with the possibility of up to two immediate re-elections. To be eligible for re-election, Member States would have to give a break equivalent to the consecutive period served on the Council. The longer term seats would be allocated to the regional groups, while the regular non-permanent seats would instead be allocated to Small States (population under 1 million) and medium-sized States (population between 1 and 10 million).⁷

Despite the support from several countries like Pakistan, Mexico and Spain there were also states with critical position like Japan, Germany and India which argued the democracy and legitimacy in the expanded Council without permanent representation of all regions i.a. Africa and Latin America.⁸ Critics from these states were quite expected as they are main candidates to the permanent membership. The discussions demonstrated that Member States are still very much divided on the question of the UNSC reform.

These discussions were third in the eighth round of the inter-governmental negotiations on the UNSC reform which started in 2011. The five out of eight meetings has been decided to be dedicated to the five major reform initiatives, namely G4, the Uniting for Consensus group, the L.69 group, the Committee of Ten African Representatives (C-10), and Small Five Group (S-5).⁹ The positions of these groups are quite different that makes it necessary to discuss

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them separately. The positions of G4 and UfC are mere contradiction, since G4 seeks permanent seats for themselves at the Council, but the UfC proposes not to enlarge permanent seats in order to prevent G4 from this endeavour.

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L.69 emerged as a result of the draft resolution introduced mainly by India, Brazil, South Africa and Nigeria and its main elements were: expansion in both in permanent and non-permanent categories; greater representation of developed countries; representation of developing countries and those with transition economies reflective of contemporary world realities; comprehensive improvement in the working methods of the SC, including greater access of islands and small states.¹⁰

C-10 position's main feature is obtaining two permanent seats for the African states in the SC with the veto power.¹¹ The naming comes from the committee of ten Heads of State formed out of two countries from Africa's main five regions.

Small 5 (S-5) consists of the representatives of Jordan, Lichtenstein, Costa-Rica, Singapore and Switzerland. This is the only group that insists more on improving the working methods of the UNSC than on enlargement. Unlike other groups this group even proposes on the issue of veto power which is sacred theme for the P5 members. S5 strongly suggests that the permanent members of the UNSC provide explanations for the reasons of using the veto. In addition, S5 recommends that P5 refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and "grave breaches" of international humanitarian law.¹²

As it is seen, except one group of countries other groups' main focus in the reforms of the SC is enlargement. Majority of the members are very much concentrated on the issue of enlargement than improving the work of the Council. African group even has gone far away of the main aim of the reforms by demanding veto power for their candidates for permanent membership which makes the debates even worthless. It is very disappointing that the member states after almost twenty years of intensive negotiations has not been able to reach an agreement on the issue. It seems that those countries which block the proposals on the enlargement of the Council on the basis of reasonable criteria, i.e. according to the level of financial support to the UN and personal support to the peace-keeping operations, the level of engagement in internation-

al affairs and solution of international problems and adequate regional representation, prefer continue to play a zero sum game in which they are ready to achieve nothing in order to leave their rivals also empty handed. The disagreement hinders the UN members to mobilize their efforts on the solution of the main problem of the Council, namely unfair veto power.

Security Council's Endless Enlargement Debate

VETO POWER AS A MAIN OBSTACLE FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S EFFICIENCY

The notion of veto comes from the Article 27 of the UN Charter which provides that decisions of the UNSC on substantive matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including concurring votes of the permanent members. From the beginning the veto power was not welcomed by the UN members except P5. The Dutch at the Yalta conference warned that to give great powers a veto in the Council render the whole organization useless in disputes between great powers or between a great power and a small one. The Polish exile government in London about the same time objected to the proposed veto power of nations that were themselves parties to the disputes. Mexico and other eight Latin American countries at the Inter-American conference objected to the Big Four veto power. Australia's Herbert V. Evatt and New-Zealand's Peter Fraser led the opposition of 17 small nations to the veto. But at the final vote, once the United States and Soviet Union led the Big Five in conveying the attitude that without veto there would be no charter, 15 countries abstained and only two- Cuba and Colombia voted against.¹³

At the beginning of 1990s when the discussions about the UN reforms became one the main topics of the UN agenda, one could heard many critics against the veto power. But during the recent discussions the main focus on the Council's reforms is made on enlargement. The reason seems to be P5 countries resistance to accept any change to the current veto power. During discussions the permanent members of the UNSC (P5) deliver, as usual, short statements, on the one hand confirming their commitment to the UNSC reform in general terms, but on the other hand stating, for example, that the current veto structure cannot be changed. Only France and United Kingdom show more flexibility on the issue of veto not only

in words but also in practice. The analyses of the use of veto in the SC clearly demonstrate that France and UK refrain from using this right for several years. These two countries have not used the right since 1990.

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Years	China	France	USSR/ Russia	UK	US	Total
1946-1949	0	2	46	0	0	48
1950-1959	1	2	44	2	0	49
1960-1969	0	0	18	1	0	19
1970-1979	2	7	7	14	21	51
1980-1989	0	7	4	15	46	72
1990-1999	2	0	2	0	5	9
2000-2004	0	0	1	0	8	9
2005-2008	2	0	2	0	2	6
2009	0	0	1	0	0	1
2010	0	0	0	0	0	0
2011	1	0	1	0	1	3
2012	1	0	1	0	0	2
Cold War (1946-1989)	3	18	119	32	67	239
After Cold War (1990-2004)	6	0	8	0	16	30
Total	9	18	127	32	83	269

Source: <http://www.globalpolicy.org>

The table only demonstrates the figures when the veto power was imposed in fact. But it is also clear that veto power can serve for deterrence and coercive purposes without actually being cast. Unlike the actual use of veto, which has significantly declined in Post-Cold war era, it is widely known within the UN system that the informal threat of veto in the Council's private consultations has not diminished.¹⁴ This kind of veto called "hidden veto" – the quite threat of possible veto use.¹⁵ Taking the fact into account

many issues become “vetoed” even before entering the threshold of the UNSC’s hall. One of the most recent examples of the reality was the issue of Palestinian membership to the United Nations which was postponed because of the clear vision of the US opposition to granting membership to this entity.

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Returning to the use of veto in fact, after the end of Cold War this right is mainly used by US and mostly on the situations concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and criticizing Israel; since 2002 the Negroponte doctrine has been applied for the use of a veto on resolutions relating to the ongoing Israel-Palestinian conflict. On July 26, 2002, John Negroponte, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, stated during a closed meeting of the UN UNSC that the United States would oppose UNSC resolutions concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that condemned Israel without also condemning terrorist groups.¹⁶ This became known as the Negroponte Doctrine, and has been viewed by officials in the United States as a counterweight to the frequent resolutions denouncing Israel which are passed by the UN General Assembly.

The United States is followed by Russia which regards the veto power as its property and will not refuse it willingly. In the early days of the United Nations, the Soviet Union minister for foreign affairs between 1957 and 1985, Andrei Gromyko, said “no” so many times that he was known as “Mr. Veto”.¹⁷ In fact, the Soviet Union was responsible for nearly half of all vetoes ever cast – 79 vetoes were used in the first 10 years. He regularly rejected bids for new membership because of the US’s refusal to admit the Soviet republics. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has used its veto power sparingly, but this state makes it clear in every opportunity that the reforms of the Council can not deprive P5 from their veto power. Most recent uses by Russia of veto were in 2008 on Georgia and 2011–2012 on Syria.

Another permanent member of the UNSC – China began to use its veto power more frequently during the last years. Until the recent years observers have noted a preference for China to abstain rather than veto on resolutions not directly related to Chinese interests. But the scene has changed during the last years. Four out of six vetoes which this country imposed on the SC resolutions happened within the last 5 years and none of these vetoes was directly connected with the China’s vital national interests. It seems that

this country tries to demonstrate political attitude adequate to its growing economic power and play more important role in international affairs.

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VETO POWER FROM A VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
CURRENT POLITICAL REALITIES

From classical viewpoint the veto power, first of all, is a vis-à-vis contradiction to the “sovereign equality of states” which is one of the main principles of the United Nations according to its Charter.¹⁸

Another important point against P5’s veto power is that, these countries do not use veto proceeding the principles and norms of international law but rather for their own political interests. One of the examples is the decisions on admission of new members to UN. According to the UN Charter new members can be accepted by the General Assembly according to the recommendation of the UNSC including P5.¹⁹ In 2007 the United States tried to introduce a resolution in the UNSC, seeking UN membership for Kosovo. But Russia threatened to use its veto to bar Serbia’s UN administered Kosovo from the world body. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has dismissed US attempts to resolve the Kosovo problem by posing the question: ‘Why don’t we solve the case of Western Sahara first?’ – a longstanding dispute where the United States is backing its ally Morocco against the Polisario seeking an independent nation state in North Africa.²⁰ The event clearly demonstrates that even such important matter as admission of new members is not grounded on the principles of international law but purely depends on backing allies and preserving areas of dominance. How the candidate for membership has been emerged (by peaceful secession, aggression, self-proclamation and etc.) does not have any significance with regards to national positions of P5 countries. Admission of members has not to be a political decision but rather a legal issue. In this regard, it would be more acceptable if the General Assembly accepts members not according to the UNSC’s recommendations but based on the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion.

The fact that the P5 countries act purely on the national interests is not a secret as it was several times confirmed by these countries representatives, especially the United States. For example, John Bolton, the US Under-Secretary of State for International Or-

ganisations, who gave an unusually frank and chilling description of the United Nations, stated that:

“There is no United Nations. There is an international community that occasionally can be led by the only real power left in the world, and that is the United States, when it suits our interest, and when we can get others to go along... When the United States leads, the United Nations will follow. When it suits our interest to do, we will do so. When it does not suit our interest we will not.”²¹

Furthermore, the reason for which this right was established does not already exist in its scope as in 1945. When this right was created the P5 described it as *condicio sine qua non* stating that ‘in a view of a primary responsibilities of the permanent members, they could not be expected, in the present condition of the world, to assume the obligation to act in so serious a matter as the maintenance of international peace and security in consequence of a decision in which they have not concurred.’²² But today not all P5 countries constitute the main provider of peace and security in the world both financially and materially.²³ Top five providers of assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping operations in 2011–2012 have been United States (27.14 percent), Japan (12.53 percent), United Kingdom (8.15 percent), Germany (8.02 percent) and France (7.55 percent)²⁴ and five main countries which provide the UN operations with peacekeepers are Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Nigeria and Pakistan²⁵ which have replaced France, UK, Canada and Netherlands during the recent years. Except the United States none of the members of P5 plays crucial role in the protection and provision of peace and security in the world either financially or technically. The Council now authorizes the action when others take the burden which the Council, led by P5, was expected to. In other words, the permanent members permit action when, far from having special responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security.

In addition to above mentioned, it has to be noted that the contemporary world is quite different from the world of 1945. The Second World War became a matter of history and the coalition of victors collapsed in the Cold War period. Germany and Japan regained economic power and notable regional influence and became security providers in the world and also main contributors to the United Nations activity. As a result of decolonization and collapse of soviet system the number of the UN members drastically increased.

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The strength and position of “Great Powers” of 1945 declined. In a world, the circumstances which led to the incorporation of the veto Charter have vanished; and most of the arguments used to defend the veto are no longer persuasive: that the UN organization stems from a wartime coalition in which the unanimity rule prevailed; that the Allied powers saw continued observation of this rule as an important means to provide the enemy-states starting another war of aggression; that they were not ready to give up a right they have enjoyed under the League of Nations Covenant; these are considerations which can not justify the veto anymore. It has become doubtful that five states who were chosen, or established themselves, as permanent members of the UNSC in 1945 still represent that group of states whose action alone can maintain world peace.²⁶ As it was rightly mentioned by the Government of Colombia veto ‘is mechanism of non-cooperation in a system of collective security which necessarily requires cooperation. Veto has lost practically all its *raison d’être*, having become a privilege lacking any proportion.’²⁷

The facts above proves the necessity to change the SC not only in quantity but also in quality, enlargement with preservation of P5’s veto power will not bring any quality to the Council’s activity. Today’s international reality requires at least limiting the use of the veto to vital national security issues.

ABUSE OF THE VETO POWER AS A BREACH OF THE UN CHARTER

Article 24 of the UN Charter provides that in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the UNSC primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the UNSC acts on their behalf. The Article further provides that in discharge of these duties the UNSC shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the UNSC for the discharging of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII. This is to say that the UNSC has primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security conferred to it by the member states and while accomplishing this responsibility the Council shall act in accordance with the purposes and principles of

UN. If the UNSC can not exercise its main functions due to the veto used by one or more of its members it is the direct breach of the UN Charter. For example, if the UNSC cannot act in accordance with responsibilities bestowed to it and do not take appropriate measures to prevent or stop an act which constitutes a real threat to international peace and security due to the veto it is the violation of the Article 24 of the Charter. There are dozens of facts in the history of the UNSC history when the Council did not act when a situation obviously required international action. For example:

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- Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, a *de facto* state of war has existed between that state and most of its neighbors. Its occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories in the 1967 war has been regularly and overwhelmingly condemned by the UN General Assembly and resisted by the inhabitants of the occupied territories. One of the recent attacks of Israel on its neighbors was against Lebanon in 2006. Judging by the concern expressed by the UN members and the extent of the efforts by the United Nations to deal with the conflict, there is hardly any doubt that the conflict continues to threaten international peace and security. In spite of this persistent threat, the possession by Israel of weapons of mass destruction, and repeated and blatant breaches of the peace committed by the State of Israel, the Council has never determined that the situation in Israel-Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace, which could pave the way for U.N. enforcement measures for the removal of that threat. Since 1967 alone, the United States vetoed over 40 attempts by the Council to address this situation.²⁸ Even modest attempts to reduce the level of violence in the area, such as through an international monitoring mechanism, have been vetoed by the United States.²⁹
- In 1992–1993 after the collapse of the Soviet Union former soviet republics Armenia and Azerbaijan engaged in a conflict which has been lasted for 20 years. As a result of the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan 20 percent of the territories of Azerbaijan was occupied. The UNSC adopted four resolutions in 1993 (822, 853, 874 and 884) which demanded immediate release of occupied territories and removal of Armenian troops from the territories

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of Azerbaijan which have not been implemented until today. Despite the fact that Armenia tries present this conflict as an exercise of the right of self-determination of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh region there dozen of facts proving Armenia's direct participation in the conflict.³⁰ The international community recognizes the Nagorno-Karabakh region (which constitutes five percent of occupied Azeri lands) and surrounding occupied territories as a territory of Azerbaijan. Even though clear fact of aggression against the member state of UN which demanded the UNSC's action under the Chapter VII, the Council did not went beyond of adopting the resolutions of recommendatory character. It is impossible for Azerbaijan to get an obligatory resolution from the Council due to the anticipatory veto power of P5, especially Russia which is not interested in the resolution of the conflict in order to keep the region and especially the oil rich Azerbaijan under the control. As a result of enormous diplomatic efforts Azerbaijan could only achieved the adoption of the resolution A/RES/62/243 by the General Assembly on the agenda item "The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan" in 2008 which once again confirmed that the armed conflict in and around the Nagorno Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan continued to endanger international peace and security and demanded the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

- In August 2008 Russia bombed Georgia which is also former Soviet Republic and has two unresolved conflicts in its territory as a result of imperialist policy of Russia. When the Saakashvili administration tried to get back its separatist region South Ossetia under Georgia's control the Russian government did not hesitate to intervene with its military in order to remind pro-American Saakashvili regime who is the dominant power in the region. As a result of the conflict Georgia could not only return back its internationally recognized territory, but even got a heavy slip from its former "big brother". Russia punished Georgia not only by bombings, but also by recognizing the independence of

South Ossetia and Abkhazia.³¹ Georgia was punished by Putin's administration in different ways, including by vetoing a resolution on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in Georgia in 2009 which was established in 1993.³² The UN Security Council was a deaf-mute when its permanent member was bombing a small state in its south by ignoring norms and principles of international law and threatening international peace and security.

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The other provision of the UN Charter which is not obeyed by the P5 members in cases of the abuse of veto power is the Article 2 (2) which requires all member States, 'in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, [to] fulfil in *good faith* the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.'³³ The obligation of good faith is a general principle of international law.³⁴ According to Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), '[e]very treaty in force . . . must be performed by [its Parties] in good faith'.³⁵ The UN Charter is a treaty. Its members must therefore fulfill their treaty obligations in good faith, including when acting within organs established by that treaty. In the case of the UN Security Council when this body acts or in-acts in contradiction of the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter due to the use or threat to use veto power, the P5 members abuse their right of veto which demonstrates that they do not act in *good faith* in relation to their obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter.³⁶

As it is known the provisions of the treaty, which the UN Charter is, can not be interpreted separately from each other. In this regard, if the UN Charter gives the Security Council permanent members the right of veto this right shall not be realised in contradiction of other provisions of the Charter. While exercising their right of veto P5 members have to abide with the other provisions of the Charter, namely Articles 2 and 24. Otherwise, this act constitutes the breach of treaty obligations.

HOW TO ABIDE VETO?

The abolition or limitation of veto power is in the interests of all UN members, except P5. Even the real candidates to the new permanent seats at the Security Council have to be interested in

its abolition as all reasonable proposals on the Council's enlargement excludes the possibility of creation of new permanent seats with the veto power since this privilege brings no efficiency to the Council's work but makes it rather disorganized and incompetent.³⁷

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In addition, the P5 countries made it very clear that they will not accept the enlargement of veto to the new permanent members. The draft resolution (A/59/L.64) introduced by G4 in 2005 which envisaged enlargement of veto power to the new permanent members encountered with strong disagreement of the P5. The United States had urged the UN members to reject the G4's proposal, saying 'improvements in the world body's management and oversight were greater priorities that should be adopted first'.³⁸

However, any reform of the veto will be very difficult, if not impossible. In fact, Articles 108 and 109 of the United Nations Charter grant the P5 veto over any amendments to the Charter, requiring them to approve any modifications to the UNSC veto power that they themselves hold: it is highly unlikely that any of the P5 would accept a reform of the UN Charter that would be detrimental to their own national interests.

But still it is possible to overcome this power. The first effort to limit the veto came even at Dumbarton Oaks in 1945 when Australia proposed to exclude the veto from all arrangements relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes but failed to attract enough support.³⁹

One of the most successful ventures in relation to limiting the veto power came from within the P5 when in 1950 US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, developed a proposal designed to neuter the Soviet Union's veto power in relation to the Korean War. In what became known as the "Uniting for Peace" procedure, Acheson came up with the idea of turning to the UN General Assembly to respond to aggression and threats to international peace and security when the Council was prevented from fulfilling its obligations because of the threat of a veto.⁴⁰ Since the transfer of an issue from the Security Council to the General Assembly is considered a procedural matter it was therefore not subject to the P5 veto. Since then, the Uniting for Peace procedure has been used on more than ten occasions to facilitate UN action short of the use of force but its use has been rare in recent decades with the last occasion being in 1997 to take action against Israel.⁴¹ Uniting for Peace procedure can be

invoked by 2/3 majority of the General Assembly members. As this resolution constitutes only possible way at the UN to overcome the SC's inability to provide peace and security in the world as a result of the use of veto the UN Secretary General in its report in 1998 recommended member states which can not find justice at the SC to sue broader support at the General Assembly through the Uniting for Peace resolution.⁴² Despite the fact that this resolution was adopted as a result of the US proposal and leadership they refrained to invoke it subsequently. The most recent example of Syria demonstrates it clearly. The reason why the US does not invoke the UfP resolution is that they are not interested in the matter as much as to carry it to the General Assembly under this procedure which undermines the Security Council authority. And furthermore, they do not want to create so many precedents as the same action can be taken by other P5 members when the US vetoes the SC decision.

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Another way of overcoming the veto power was just ignoring the position of the SC P5 as in 1999 in Kosovo and in 2003 in Iraq which can not be a good solution for the issue. This kind of unilateral action deprives UN its credibility and authority as a universal body responsible for peace and security in the world.

There is also Advisory opinion 151 "Certain expenses of the United Nations" adopted by the International Court of Justice in 1962 which concluded that, according the Article 24 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council bestowed "primary responsibility" for action to maintain peace and security. From this, the judges deduced that a "secondary responsibility" must have been vested in the General Assembly. This means that if the Security Council can not fulfill its obligations as a primary body responsible for maintaining peace and security, the General Assembly shall act as a second responsible body.⁴³

Last but not least, as it mentioned in the previous part of the paper if the P5 members use their right of veto in contradiction of Article 2 and 24 of the UN Charter, i.e. they abuse their right and do not fulfil their obligations under the treaty in good faith, furthermore they can not perform the responsibility conferred to them, the other parties to the Charter can terminate the fulfilment of the treaty under the reason of breach of the principle *pacta sunt servanda* by the P5.

CONCLUSION

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It is obvious that the Security Council will not become more efficient just if it has 25 members instead of 15. The US will still block any decisions which contradict Israeli interests, including granting membership to Palestine, which is officially recognized by 130 UN members. And the same approach will also be demonstrated by Russia preferring legitimize killing of thousands of innocent peoples by totalitarian regimes under the pretence of defending state sovereignty. It will also block any resolution on the conflicts in post-soviet states. It is clear that the Security Council reforms will not have any crucial results without the elimination or significant limitation of the veto power which is also a relict of Second World War as the SC P5.

Even the Charter makes impossible to eliminate the veto power, it is possible for member states to abide the power in certain situations as was described above. But all above mentioned ways of overcoming the veto power does not bring any credibility to the United Nations and the Security Council. The P5 countries have to understand that while agreeing on the right of veto for them the UN members also put the great responsibility of maintaining the international peace and security on their shoulders. The veto power shall not be regarded separately from the main responsibility of the P5 states which also constitutes the most important purpose of the United Nations. If an organisation can not achieve its core purpose its whole credibility falls under question. Therefore, the UN member states have to focus on the issue of veto as strong as on the issue of enlargement. Only a proper debate about the defects of the veto might at the least yield a "more constructive interpretation" of the nature of the veto and its application. The UN members have to demonstrate their will and decisiveness based on the majority's interest and rightful demand for changing the current Council's structure and the permanent members' inviolable right. Continuous and high level calls for the elimination of veto power by the majority of member states can play a role of public opinion forcing the UN P5 to accept at least the proposals on the limitation of this privilege. At the same time, an informed public awareness of the potential for the Security Council to be bypassed might lead to pressure for exercise of the power in accordance with the Charter

aims and responsibilities bestowed to the permanent members of the Council.

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that “considerable parts of the territory of Azerbaijan are still occupied by Armenian forces and separatist forces are still in control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region”. The Assembly “reiterates that the occupation of foreign territory by a member state constitutes a grave violation of that state’s obligations as a member of the Council of Europe and reaffirms the right of displaced persons from the area of conflict to return to their homes safely and with dignity.” By referring to “member state” the Assembly once again confirmed that its member – Armenia is an occupier of the territories of Azerbaijan.

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FROM MILITARY CONFLICT TO POLITICAL DEADLOCK IN BOSNA AND HERZEGOVINA

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ABSTRACT: This article engages in the ongoing debate about the overall value of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), which is one of the most challenging issues in the contemporary peace studies scholarship. In order to support scholars who argue that the constitutional framework for the state-building process in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) offered through Dayton peace agreement did not contribute to the sustainability of the desired concept of 'one Bosnia and Herzegovina,' the article analyses the mediation process towards ending the war, the peace settlement and the long-term consequences of the reached compromises. In the end article concludes that the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be classified as an artificial agreement, considering that the international community still plays a role of mediator in what can be described as a "continuation of war by other means."

KEYWORDS: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dayton Peace Agreement, General Framework Agreement, Mediation

INTRODUCTION

The end of the 20th century has been marked as the beginning of the liberal interventionism in international relations. The liberal internationalism, which was followed by the concept of liberal peace building, engaged in the conflict resolution process with the idea that liberal democratic peace is "the ultimate goal of the peace talks".¹ This idea found its practical application through the conflict resolution processes in ex-Yugoslavia, and was the leading idea behind the peace negotiations for the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, according to Sumatra Bose, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina represents a good empirical

example of the internationally led liberal peace-building project at its best.²

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The war conflict in the former Yugoslavian republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina broke out between three dominant ethnic groups, Serbs, Croats and Muslims, in April 1992. The international community led by the United Nations (UN) and European Community (EC) engaged in the conflict resolution process even before the war conflict actually started. Consequently, the first peace settlement was offered to the conflicting parties through the Carrington-Cutilleiro plan in February 1992. Although all three representatives of the conflicting sides signed this proposal, the withdrawal of the support from the representatives of the Bosnian Muslims led to its failure.³ The international initiative for the restoration of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued during the war as well. As a result of such international efforts three more settlements were proposed to the warring parties by the end of 1994.⁴ However, none of them managed to gain support from all participants in the conflict.

In 1995 the intensive diplomatic engagement from the United States supported the efforts of the UN and EC to end the Bosnian war, and to bring stability to the region of South-Eastern Europe. By applying the carrots and sticks strategy, the United States' chief negotiator Richard Holbrooke managed to convince all warring sides to accept the peace settlement, which was negotiated at United States' military base, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, near Dayton.⁵ The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), which was the official title for the reached peace agreement in Dayton, was signed in December 1995 in Paris. This peace settlement through one short General Framework Agreement and twelve Annexes, which contain the essence of the agreement, offers not just the framework for the peace building in the post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also represents the official framework for the future state-building and democratization processes.⁶ Hence, Ronald Kostić might be right in arguing that considering the range of issues on the agenda the Dayton peace agreement 'represents one of the most comprehensive peace agreement negotiated in the recent history'.⁷

Although the Dayton peace agreement brought an end to the one of the most violent conflicts in the modern European history, its long term prospects for insuring stability in the post-war Bosnia

and Herzegovina was put to question by many foreign and domestic scholars. As Bose points out, the proposed framework, which determines the organization of state by formalizing the *de facto* division along ethnic lines in previously multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina, was submitted to the serious criticism “ever since it came into being”.⁸ The critics argue that the proposed constitutional arrangement, which granites the unity of Bosnian and Herzegovina and in the same time provides substantial level of ethno-territorial autonomy for the two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, leads to the highly ethnicized and dysfunctional state structure. This argument was in a good manner formulated by Patrice C. McMahon and Jon Western in their article *The Death of Dayton: How to Stop Bosnia From Falling Apart* where they state the following: ‘as successful as Dayton was at ending the violence, it also sowed the seeds of instability by creating a decentralized political system that undermined the state’s authority’.⁹

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The above presented criticism and the replies to them that followed contributed immensely to the scholars’ debate on the overall value of the Dayton peace agreement. Moreover, considering the amount of literature dedicated to the Dayton peace negotiations, this debate deals with one of the most challenging issues in the contemporary peace studies scholarship. On the one side of this debate scholars claim that the Dayton peace agreement failed to provide necessary constitutional framework for long-term reconstruction and reconciliation in the multiethnic environment such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. From their perspective, negotiations in Dayton did end the horrors of war, but the negotiated peace settlement did not ensure that the proposed institutional state framework would work in the long run. As the one of the first critics of the negotiated settlement points out, the Dayton agreement confirms one Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the reality of divisions along ethnic lines adds up to three Bosnias.¹⁰ In addition, the complex and ambiguous nature of the reached peace agreement allows the former warring parties to develop their own interpretation of the agreed constitutional arrangements and, more importantly, to avoid any possible future integration of the country that does not correspond to their ethnically driven interests. Therefore, considering overall results of the Dayton peace agreement, the critics conclude that this peace settlement can be seen as a failure.

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On the other side of the debate, scholars emphasize that the Dayton peace negotiation process and the reached agreement cannot be labeled as unsuccessful. The scholars argue that considering the history of the war conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the necessity to end the war, which was lasting for more than three years, as soon as possible was prior to the necessity to provide a sustainable institutional arrangement in the long run. Taking in consideration that all prior international efforts to end the war hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina have resulted in a failure, the need for any kind of arrangement that would end the conflict was essential. In addition Warren Bass underlines, 'winning any accord in Bosnia was not easy. Dayton took considerable diplomatic skills and tenacity'.¹¹ The Dayton round of negotiation had to deal with the rather fixed positions of the warring parties that did not show any interest in reaching a compromising peace settlement on their own. Thus, scholars underline that even with all its flaws, the negotiated peace treaty in Dayton was the best possible solution under presented circumstances.

Following the presented arguments made on both sides of the debate, this article aims to support the scholars who claim that the constitutional framework for the state-building process in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina that was offered through Dayton peace agreement did not contribute to the sustainability of the concept of "one Bosnia and Herzegovina". Even though the primarily goal of the Dayton negotiations was to keep the unity of the country, the reached arrangement for the institutional reconstruction of the country discouraged any possibilities for the realization of this objective. By relying on the decentralization and power sharing, the two founding principles of the consociational democracy, the Dayton peace agreement was an attempt to find the preferred balance between conflicting interests of the warring parties. The territorial and political compromise was reached, but the overall dissatisfaction with the mediated arrangements points out to the conclusion that 'Dayton failed to effectively address the political conflict over the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina that had initially instigate the war'.¹² In addition, considering the failure to address the underlying reasons behind the war conflict and the way that negotiations in Dayton were conducted, it is possible to argue that Dayton peace negotiations resemble more to a mediation towards conflict man-

agement that to a peace negotiation process. As Hoolbroke points out, the main goal of the Dayton mediation was to put all efforts towards ending the war, even though he was more than confident in the idea that what does not get done at Dayton, will not get done later on either.¹³ For this purpose the mediation process was put in the time framework of twenty days and supported by the NATO military force. The military support proved to be crucial for achieving much needed compromise toward ending the war,¹⁴ but was not the right way of dealing with the mutually excluding interests of the conflicting sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the purpose of achieving a sustainable peace solution. As a result of such strategy the Bosnian conflict was transfer from military to political realm. Hence, drawing on Clausewitz, the post-Dayton political conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be described as “the continuation of war by other means”.¹⁵ Dayton peace negotiations were more then successful in bringing the peace to the deeply divided country like Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the construction of political order was yet to be negotiated. According to the reached agreement, the role of international community in negotiating the political compromises between former warring sides was to continue, considering that the task of negotiating the reconstruction of the political order was left as a part of even more difficult implementation process. Unfortunately, thanks to the contested nature of the Dayton-designed Bosnian state, the international community plays the role of leading negotiator for more than fifteen years now. However, as pointed out by many scholars, the most worrying fact about the future of the Bosnian state is that even after more than fifteen years of international engagement the country appears to be facing the “most serious crisis since the Bosnian war”.¹⁶

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Drawing on the above-presented evaluations of the Dayton peace process, this article will be organized in the following way. The first section analyses diplomatic efforts towards ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina made before the Dayton mediation process and the Dayton peace process itself, with the purpose of pointing out that the Dayton peace agreement is more likely to be seen as a result of the conflict management mediation than as a product of the long-term peace negotiations. The second section examines the consequences of the Dayton peace arrangements for the stability and sustainability of the Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the end the ar-

ticle concludes that after more than fifteen years of consociational confederalism arguing for more centralization in the multiethnic country with recent war history like Bosnia and Herzegovina may not be such a good idea after all.

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FROM PEACE NEGOTIATIONS TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Ever since the war in the former Yugoslavian republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina broke down, and even before the actual hostilities began, the international community made significant efforts towards preventing the escalation of the conflict and negotiating peace settlement that would be in the best interest of warring sides. The first peace negotiations were initiated and led by the United Nations and the European Communities' joint efforts to prevent the war. As a result of these efforts, the conflicting sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina were presented with the first peaceful settlement, the Carrington-Cutileiro plan, in February 1992. The plan, drawing on the constitutional framework in Switzerland, suggested a reorganization of the Bosnian state through ethnic cantons. Success of the plan would prevent the possibility of war conflict and thus would keep the country together. Unfortunately, this pre-war peace settlement failed to gain support from all sides in the Bosnian conflict.¹⁷ Nevertheless, diplomatic efforts of the international community to restore peace in now war-affected Bosnia and Herzegovina did not cease to exist. Thanks to the continuation of these international diplomatic efforts a more permanent negotiation forum, the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), was established in 1992. The ICFY offered three more peace solutions for the Bosnian conflict by the end of 1994. However, none of them gain sufficient support from the conflicted sides, and thus the hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina were approaching to their fourth anniversary.¹⁸

Nevertheless, the diplomatic efforts of the international community during the three years of Bosnian conflict could not be evaluated as unsuccessful. The three-year peace initiative was led by the idea that only the legitimate peace settlement, which was acceptable to all warring sides, would discourage future aggressions. Thus, the stability and sustainability of the post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina was put before the need to end the war. With this in mind,

any peace arrangement that could be enforced was not an option. Unfortunately, this kind of negotiation strategy in the environment where the warring sides did not show any initiative for balancing their competing interests was leading nowhere. As rightfully noticed by Jutta Paczulla, 'at no stage in the period between 1992 and 1995 did any of the warring parties themselves take any initiative, or express their intention, to settle the conflict'.¹⁹ Thus, it could not be a surprise that all proposed peace settlements were dismissed.

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The peace negotiation process led nowhere and the war hostilities escalated even more. The violence culminated in 1995, with the events that took place in Sarajevo, Srebrenica and the hostage situation with retained UN peacekeepers. These events led international community to the conclusion that the approach to the peace negotiations in Bosnia and Herzegovina had to be changed. The international efforts, and the United States' led initiative, decided that it was the time to end the war in Bosnia regardless of the long-term sustainability of the reached peace agreement. The aim was to bring peace to the war-affected country and the constitutional future of the Bosnian state was put on the side.²⁰ The change in the approach of the international community led to the change in nature of mediation process. From the diplomatic negotiations, international efforts turn to conflict management. Thanks to the fixed positions of the conflicting parties, diplomacy was put on the side with the "all-out negotiation efforts",²¹ which relied extensively on the support of NATO military force.²² The United States' led conflict management process culminated with the negotiation peace talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, near Dayton in November 1995. The negotiation process was set in a time framework of three weeks. In addition, for the purpose of making the peace settlement more likely in these conditions, the complexity of the peace negotiations had to be reduced. Therefore, Michael Watkins might be right in arguing that the Dayton peace negotiations represents a good example for the use of the negotiation method of strategic simplification.²³

According to Watkins, strategic simplification theory represents a rational and well-planned use of different strategies with the purpose of making complex and comprehensive negotiations more controllable. The complexity of negotiations can be a result of the complex party structure – the large and diverse number of parties involved in negotiations – as well as the complex issue structure – a

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significant number of issues on the negotiation's agenda – or as a result of both. With this in mind, the goal of the strategic simplification technique is to reduce the number of parties and issues on the negotiation's agenda with the purpose of achieving as much as possible within the existing negotiation framework.²⁴ In other words, the aim of strategic simplification is to negotiate the best possible solutions under complex circumstances by reducing the number of aggravating factors.

Drawing on the theory of strategic simplification, it is possible to argue that Dayton peace negotiations had been facing complexity on both sides of the negotiation structure, considering the number and diversity of the negotiation parties and the number of issues that were on the agenda. Thus, in order to make the possibility of reaching peace agreement in such circumstances more likely, the negotiators had to rely on the extensive use of the strategic simplification.²⁵ This negotiation technique was used to reduce both the number of parties and number of issues in the negotiation table. With this kind of strategy in use, progressive movements towards ending the Bosnian war were possible.

The party structure of the Dayton negotiation process consisted not just of a large number of delegations, but also of very diverse and irreconcilable parties interests. As Warren Bass points out in his article *The Triage of Dayton*, the peace negotiation process involved almost hundred negotiators, which were representing eleven different delegations.²⁶ The mediation process was led by the United States, which had capacity and capabilities to led an effective mediation process. Beside the representatives of the United States, on the same side of negotiating table were also the representatives of the European Union, NATO, the United Nations and the Russian Federation. The goal of the United States in these circumstances was to ensure the support from other representatives for their role of leading mediator in the negotiation process and thus to present the unified position of the West. Nevertheless, the opposing side of the negotiating table was much more complicated. On this side of the table there were the delegations of the warring parties from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs, supported by the delegations of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition, the conflict of interests within each of these delegations increased the complexity of the peace negotiation pro-

cess even more.

The complexity of the negotiation's party structure, the three weeks time framework and the inflexibility of the presented interests by the conflicting sides made the success of Dayton peace negotiations close to impossible. Thus, in order to reach the peace settlement that would, first of all, end the war conflict as soon as possible the simplification of party structure had to be done. The goal of this strategy was to reduce the number of negotiating parties with the purpose of making the possibility of reaching the peace settlement more likely. This was done through the use of the subordination strategic simplification technique. As Watkins emphasizes, certain parties had to be convinced to be represented by the others.²⁷ This reasoning was applied to both sides of negotiation table. The United States' delegation, which was leading the negotiations, represented the unified position of the international community. The delegation of Bosnian Serbs and Croats were unified with delegations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia. Thus, the negotiation rights and interests of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats were represented by their ethnic representatives from neighboring countries. Whereas, the only side in the Bosnian conflict that represented itself at the negotiations was the delegation of Bosnian Muslims.

The complexity of the Dayton negotiations was not just a result of the negotiation's party structure. The structure of the issues on the negotiation's agenda complicated the peace process even more. The number of issues that each delegation from the former Yugoslavia brought to the agenda made the negotiations more comprehensive, but not necessarily more flexible. The goal was to ensure "a three-way recognition between BiH, Croatia and Serbia".²⁸ By doing so the negotiated peace arrangement would bring stability not just to Bosnia and Herzegovina but also to the whole region. Consequently, the Dayton peace process was not just about conflict management in war-affected Bosnia and Herzegovina. The negotiation agenda was open also for the issues that concerned the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia. Thus, in order to end the Bosnian war, besides agreeing on the issues of the warring sides, the compromise had to be made on many issues that did not concern Bosnia and Herzegovina directly. To illustrate, the Dayton's negotiation agenda consisted of the following issues: Bosnia and Herzegovina

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was to remain one state with two entities – the borderlines were to be determined, the constitutional framework for the post-war Bosnian state, the post-war elections, a framework for economic reconstruction, a freedom of movements and the right of refugees to return to their homes, a compliance with the International War Crimes Tribunal, an international police provision, the relief of sanctions for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and a Croat-Serb agreement on Eastern Slavonia.²⁹

Even though the negotiation agenda was more than comprehensive, the leading principle of the United States' peace negotiators was to seize the opportunity and do as much as it was possible in the three weeks time framework. The United States' chief negotiator Hoolbruke emphasized this approach by saying that what does not get done at Dayton, will not get done later on either.³⁰ Therefore, in order to deal with what was a large number of different and mutually excluding interests, the negotiation's issue agenda had to be simplified. For that purpose, as Watkins points out, the strategic simplification techniques, the split technique and the subtract technique, were used. The split technique, which implies the division of the issues on the agenda into two or more subsets, broke down the negotiation process into several steps and the irreversibility of every step was insured. In addition, "the steps" of the negotiation process were organized in that way that the less conflicting issues were discussed first. Hence, the issues like institutional arrangements and composition of the government were negotiated first, and the "map issue", the division of territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina between two entities, came in the end of the negotiations when all the parties were more invested in the negotiating process.³¹ The subtract technique, which recommends the elimination of the issues upon which the negotiation's parties cannot agree from the negotiation agenda, was applied in the end of the negotiation process. In the case of Dayton peace process, the issue that was blocking the peace process was the status of the city of Brčko. On the United States' initiative the conflicting sides from Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed to settle this issue by arbitration after the peace agreement had been signed.³² In sum, thanks to the strategic simplification techniques for the reduction of the complex issue structure the mediation for the peace settlement of the Bosnian war was a success.

The simplification of the party and issue structure at the Dayton

peace negotiation made the reached peace agreement one of the most comprehensive peace settlements in the history. In the same time, the war in Bosnia was ended, the sustainability of the country was to be provided through constitutional and economic framework, and the stability in the region of former Yugoslavia was ensured with the agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia. However, the Dayton peace agreement was not just the most comprehensive peace settlements in the history, but also the most ambiguous one. Considering the number of parties and issues on the negotiating agenda, the three weeks time framework, and the determination that agreement had to be made, the ambiguity of the outcome was logical. As noted by Aggestam and Björkdahl, at Dayton negotiations ‘the parties committed themselves to the terms of a compromise that deeply dissatisfied everyone, but that was sufficiently ambiguous for all sides to believe it could be used for their respective purposes during implementation’.³³ This conclusion brings us to the analysis of the consequences of the Dayton conflict management, which will be discussed in the next section.

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PEACE WITHOUT SUSTAINABILITY

The change of the international community’s approach towards peace mediation between the warring sides in the Bosnian conflict, which took place after the escalation of hostilities in mid-nineties, has consequently changed the acceptable and desirable outcomes of the mediation. The negotiations for the long-term peace settlement soon turned into conflict management mediation, and “long-term planning was sacrificed for short-term results”.³⁴ The mediation priority was to put all efforts toward ending the violence, but this time all means for reaching this goal were on the table. This kind of strategy did not hesitate even with relying on the military force in order to reach positive outcome. The international community, led by the United States, started the conflict management process that culminated with the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 1995. The agreement nurtured a territorial and political compromise that brought peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina after almost four years of war confrontations. The country was to be reconstructed on the principles of consociationalism, which recognizes the ‘ethnic groups as the corner-

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stones of government'.³⁵ Thus, according to the Dayton agreement Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be organized as 'a complex institutional structure, composed of one state, two entities, three people, an estimated 3.9 million citizens, and five layers of governance led by 14 prime ministers'.³⁶ In addition, mutual veto rights for all three constitutional ethnic groups were guaranteed. The political and territorial compromise was negotiated, and international community was there to oversee its implementation. Nevertheless, the way that this compromise was reached and the ambiguous nature of the negotiated agreement may have contributed to the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina "now stands on the brink of collapse".³⁷

The strategic simplification techniques applied at the "all out negotiations" in Dayton may have secured the reaching of the final peace settlement that ended the Bosnian war, but the long-term consequences of these techniques were to appear in the implementation phase. Doubtlessly, the simplification of party and issue structure at the negotiation table has nurtured a fragile peace settlement within the three weeks timeframe. The subordination of the negotiation rights on the ethnic bases has reduced the number of incompatible demands at the negotiation table, and thus increased the possibility for reaching the final political compromise. However, this kind of strategy has invoked the question of the legitimacy upon the entire negotiated agreement. The worrying outcome of this strategic simplification in the case of Dayton peace mediation was the fact that two parties whose negotiation rights were restricted, and thus the two parties who did not take part in negotiating the peace settlement, were two out of three parties that had to implement it. As pointed out by Kostić, the delegations of Bosnian Serbs and Croats were informed about the compromises that were made on their behalf in the end of negotiations. Logically, they marked the reached agreement as non-binding and refused to implement it.³⁸ In addition, in order to have the positive outcome of the negotiation process, the Dayton peace agreement was signed on their behalf by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia.

The above-presented paradox of legitimacy is the fundamental problem of the Dayton peace agreement that reflects on the functionality of the Bosnian state even today. Although the Bosnian Croats ended up accepting the agreed entity of the Federation of

Bosnia and Herzegovina and the signatures of the Bosnian Serb's representatives were faxed late on, the overall dissatisfaction with the agreement was more than notable. The proposed constitutional arrangement was facing resistance from all three ethnic groups in Bosnia. The Muslims described it as too federal, the Serbs saw it as insufficiently federal and the Croats challenged the specific implementation of federalism.³⁹ Drawing on these fundamental differences on the essence of the state, the scholars' claim that Dayton peace failed to produce unambiguous ending to the Bosnian war might have some grounds. Political leaders of the three ethnic groups "maintained zero-sum views of each other",⁴⁰ thus the underlining reasons that led to the war in the first place were still present. Hence, Roberto Belloni may be right in arguing that the post-Dayton political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is in fact a continuation of war by other means.⁴¹

In order to compensate for the problem of legitimacy and to insure the support for the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement from the political elites and the three ethnic groups, the international community decided to hold early democratic elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet, considering that the Bosnian conflict was far from being over and that none of the warring sides were satisfied with the Dayton arrangement, the democratically held elections reaffirmed ethno-national cleavage and enhanced ethno-national tensions even more.⁴² Therefore, from providing a framework that would discourage future hostilities in deeply divided state, the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement led to the transfer of the conflict from the military to the political realm. As described by Aggestam and Björkdahl with this 'continuation of war by other means', 'the climate of fear and uncertainty prevails long after the signing of the agreement and Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a deeply divided society'.⁴³

Thanks to these long-term consequences of the Dayton negotiation strategy, which encouraged the approach of "doing more with less", the role of international community as a mediator in the Bosnian "frozen conflict" has not changed for more than fifteen years now. The lack of the ability from the political establishment to agree on basic decision on the state level, and thus to make the system work, has invoked the constant need of international mediation. The absence of willingness to integrate at the state level,

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which is even more reinforced by the weak state institutions, has contributed to the fact that 'almost every important issue at the central government level is deadlocked'.⁴⁴ In those kinds of situations, where the political compromise among the representatives of the three ethnic groups could not be reached and the decision had to be made, the international community through the institution of High Representative intervened more directly by imposing the needed change. Consequently, for the purpose of ensuring the functioning of the state institutions the High Representative has intervened on the behalf of the international community in the Bosnian political processes more than 800 times.⁴⁵ Due to this contested nature of the Bosnian state, the argument that the functioning of the current constitutional structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina can only be sustained through the strong presence of the international actors is more than true. As emphasized by Bose, 'Bosnia is a state of international design that exist by international design'.⁴⁶

However, after more than fifteen years of ensuring the sustainability of the Dayton's constitutional framework the international community has raised the question of the constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The new opportunity for providing Bosnia with a sustainable constitutional arrangement was offered through the constitutional reform talks in 2005. Yet, all sides at the negotiating table, including the representatives of international community, had a different idea about how the new constitutional future of Bosnia and Herzegovina should look. The international community saw the reform talks as an opportunity to finish negotiation and state-building processes in the country, and thus to finish its mission in Bosnia. From their perspective the way for reaching this goal was through the centralization of the state. In other words, the goal was to ensure the full integration of the state by assigning more powers to the central-state institution.⁴⁷ Political representatives of the Bosnian Muslims had a similar idea about the new constitutional framework. According to them, Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be organized on the principles that would ensure a more centralized government and political map that would erase the existing ethnic divisions.⁴⁸ The political representatives of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats have challenged these notions for the centralization of the Bosnian state. The representatives of the Bosnian Serbs saw the reform talks as a chance for strengthening "their semi-independent

republic”,⁴⁹ while the Bosnian Croats wanted to seize this opportunity and rectify the injustice done to them at the Dayton peace talks by carving out “a Croat-dominated entity”.⁵⁰ Faced with these irresponsible demands the constitutional reform talks failed to produce results. Bosnia and Herzegovina was confronting yet another crisis that contested the very existence of the state and the international community continued to ensure the stability of the state.

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Drawing on the above-presented developments, and considering that the new round of constitutional negotiations in 2009 faced the same dead end, it is possible to conclude that the more centralized constitutional arrangement for the deeply divided country like Bosnia and Herzegovina may not be such a good idea after all. After more than fifteen years of relying on the consociationalistic constitutional framework for making the country sustainable, the move towards a more centralized country in an environment where the three ethnic groups are marked as constitutional people had to be contested. Considering that in 2005 both Bosnian Croats and Serbs accepted the existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as one country by abandoning the idea of possible separation, the notion for the more centralized country, which is to be guided by the principles of majoritarian democracy, may lead to the transfer of the political conflicts to the military realm. Even though, the possibility of the new war confrontation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is very unlikely, the applicability of majoritarian democracy, which would ensure the primacy of one ethnic group, in a still ethnically divided country with not so recent war history is highly inadvisable. However, this does not mean that the current status quo should be preserved. The constitutional changes are required in order for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be a sustainable country without international supervision. Yet, that best way of reaching this goal may be through the preservation of the constitutional federalism and further decentralization of the country, which would provide effective shared rule to all three ethnic groups. After all, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not the only country in the world where the federal units are dominant layer of government.

CONCLUSION

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The end of 20th century opened up an era on international liberal interventionism in international relations. One of the first cases where international intervention engaged in the peace-building and state-building processes was the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The dissolution of the Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia led to the war confrontations in this former Yugoslavian republic. The international community undertook the task of negotiating the peace agreement even before the actual hostilities begun. However, thanks to the lack of willingness of the Bosnian warring sides to reach a compromise, the international peace effort managed to nurture the peace settlement after almost four years of continuous war confrontations. During this period international peace efforts did not cease to exist, but the approach of the international community towards peace negotiations shifted from negotiating long-term peace settlement to ending the war at any cost. Thus, the change in the mediation strategy turned peace negotiations into conflict management process that resulted in the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 1995.

Although the Dayton peace agreement managed to bring peace to the Bosnian state, the scholars have challenged its overall positive implications from the moment it came into being. As a result of scholars' analysis, even today the debate about the value of the reached agreement in Dayton represents one of the most relevant debates in the peace studies scholarship. In general, the scholars agree that the Dayton peace agreement stopped the war hostilities and 'created the conditions for life to return to normal'⁵¹ in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the way that this peace agreement was reached ensured the unsustainability of the negotiated compromise in the long run. As Kyle Beardsley emphasizes, the actors of the conflict mediation process often tend to discount the future, and thus make bargains that would end the war even at the expense of potential long-term instability. By encouraging agreements that may not be consistent with the conflicted parties long-term interests, the mediators end up with an artificial peace settlement, which in the absence of the mediator loses its legitimacy.⁵²

Drawing on the contemporary developments of the constitutional crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the Beardsley's argumentation, it is possible to conclude that the Dayton peace

agreement could be classified as an artificial agreement. The Dayton negotiations managed to produce the settlement that ended the war, but the reached compromise failed to address the underlying reasons that led to the war in the first place. Consequently, the long-term sustainability of the agreement was sacrificed for the short-term solution and it was just question of time before the former warring parties present their true preferences that go beyond the Dayton agreement. Unfortunately, as pointed out by the constitutional reforms talks, these preferences are still incompatible and the international community still plays a role of mediator in what is now a “continuation of war by other means”.⁵³

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DEFINING AN INDIVIDUAL SECURITY COMMUNITY: THE EU AND ASEAN IN CONTRAST

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ABSTRACT: This work seeks to reveal differences in the understanding of the concept of security between the EU and the Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN) and to adequately account for such differences. This work considers that ASEAN qualifies as a nascent security community confirming that the comparison to the EU is legitimate. The EU is presented as a community of states which puts heavy significance on human security, whereas security referent object in case of ASEAN is the state. As a result of the need to conceptually comprehend those differences, this work introduces a new category of security communities: the individual security community and fits it to the current typology of security communities.

KEYWORDS: EU, ASEAN, Security, Security Community, Human Security

INTRODUCTION

Both the European Union (EU) and the Association of South East Asian states (ASEAN)¹ are projects which have made war among their members very unlikely or unthinkable, and have contributed to the security of the region. The aim of the present paper is to find any differences in the understanding of the concept of security between the two and explain the reasons for those differences. By doing so, this paper will test the following hypothesis: Unlike ASEAN, the EU represents a security community where not only war among members is unthinkable, but also conditions for the maximalisation of individual security are present. In addition to that, this paper will argue that the current typology of security communities is not sufficient to capture the differences among the analysed subjects. As a result of the need to conceptually comprehend those differences, this paper introduces a new category of security communities: the *individual security community*. This definition is very important for a

better conceptualisation of security communities in general and in understanding the process of European integration from a security perspective. The case of the EU will therefore serve as an example in which the meaning of the term *individual security community* will be explained.

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If the hypothesis is correct, to what factors can be accounted the fact that the EU has developed a closer security community (SC)? Which variable explains the fact that the EU is concerned with individual security? Is it because of values, the level of state development, systematic reasons or a different variable? Can ASEAN potentially replicate the EU?

The structure of the present paper is as follows. In the first chapter, the term security community (SC) and various understandings of the concept are defined. This will allow us to proceed with further analysis, in which this paper will seek to answer the question whether ASEAN qualifies as any kind of SC, using the methodology developed in the first chapter.² A positive answer to the above mentioned question will allow us to proceed with further comparison between ASEAN and the EU in understanding the concept of security.

The case selection was motivated by two reasons. Firstly, both cases are useful examples for the argumentation of the paper. And secondly, both the EU and ASEAN are in the process of formation of new security structures in their respective regions.

THE CONCEPT OF A SECURITY COMMUNITY

The concept of a security community received its first full theoretical attention from Karl Deutsch and associates in 1957.³ According to them, an SC is defined as a group of people which has become “integrated” to the point that members of the community have come to agreement ‘that common social problems must, and can be resolved by the process of peaceful change’ without using physical force.⁴ According to Deutsch, there are two types of security communities distinguished by the way they are created: amalgamated, which means ‘the former merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government’, and pluralistic, which ‘retains the legal independence of separate governments’.⁵ According to Deutsch, the United States

is an example of an amalgamated SC. Members of pluralistic SC possess a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions, mutual identity and loyalty and are integrated to the point that “a dependable expectation of peaceful change” is present.⁶

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Based on Deutsch's work, Raimo Väyrynen⁷ and Andrej Tuscisny⁸ further widened the typology of security communities and based the difference not on how the security communities were created, but on what qualitative difference they convey. Väyrynen and Tuscisny differentiated between interstate security communities and comprehensive security communities. The first term describes a community of states where war between states is unlikely and the latter describes the situation where both interstate conflicts as well as civil war are unlikely. Both of them would qualify as either a *pluralistic* or *amalgamated* SC. For them, therefore, Western Europe, let alone the EU, is a classic example of a comprehensive SC, while ASEAN would be interstate.

The fact that the above mentioned scholars reduced their “impossibility of war” to a societal level is very important and provides a good starting point for further analysis. Using the same logic, this paper argues that such methodology for distinguishing between security communities fails to be receptive to some features security communities might have. For this reason, this paper suggests that in order to fully understand the phenomenon, we have to focus our analysis not only on the state and group level but on the individual level as well. The need for such a step will become apparent further into the paper.

The field and the concept of human security had its renaissance in the UN Development Programme's (UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report⁹ which operated with the definition of human security as “the vital core of all human life in ways that enhance human freedoms and fulfillment”.¹⁰ From that time, many definitions of human security have evolved. For the purposes of this paper, human security is defined as “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”.¹¹ This holistic definition can hardly provide sufficient grounds for the formulation of policy, but for the needs of this paper, it is clear and sufficient.

IS ASEAN A SECURITY COMMUNITY?

The fact that the members of ASEAN have managed to settle their disputes without the use of violence for more than four decades since the 1963–1966 *Konfrontasi* between Indonesia and Malaysia,¹² and the fact that member states enjoy high levels of interaction has encouraged various scholars to proclaim it an SC. ASEAN states also managed to establish a nuclear free zone by the year 2001 when the Philippines ratified the Bangkok Treaty signed in 1995.¹³ In November 2003, ten national leaders of ASEAN countries also announced their plan to establish an ASEAN SC by 2020.¹⁴

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However, there are many arguments which support the view that ASEAN can not be considered as an SC. Therefore, for further analysis, it is crucial to ascertain whether ASEAN is an SC. If that were not the case, further comparison with the EU would lose ground.

ASEAN member states, especially Malaysia, continue to have territorial disputes with other members. Military expenditures are high as a result of the large-scale acquisition of offensive weapons.¹⁵ ASEAN has also been incompetent in solving all kinds of problems or in overcoming them all. There is a certain observable phenomenon in that the level of coherence within ASEAN culminates in a crisis situation. That means that although in times of economic prosperity and political stability, ASEAN did not show weakness, in e.g. the financial crisis of 1997, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia were heavily affected and the association was unable, at the regional level, to deal effectively and quickly with the crisis, and to coordinate strategies to combat it. Policies of states were instead dominated by national interests and in accordance with national strategies.¹⁶ Such behaviour reveals a low level of economic and political coherence within the community as well as a low level of solidarity which is a fundamental condition for an SC to exist. This can be contrasted sharply with the current Eurozone crisis and the general high level of solidarity among members.

The low level of solidarity and political coherence within ASEAN also became apparent in finding a common stance toward the bloodshed in East Timor in order to prevent conflict, or at least to mediate between the conflicting parties. Thailand and Malaysia were fighting so long over the question of who should take the lead of an ASEAN peacekeeping mission until Australia took over the management of an international peacekeeping force.¹⁷

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In addition, individual states increasingly draw their diplomatic efforts off the regional association on bilateral relations. During the economic crisis in Laos in 1999, and the steep fall of the Lao currency, the country took its request for help not to ASEAN, but to the People's Republic of China – which granted generous interest-free loans.¹⁸

However, other cases serve as an example of solidarity among members. For example, in 1979, ASEAN was able to agree on a quota of Vietnamese refugees in order to alleviate the situation of the worst affected countries: Thailand and Malaysia. ASEAN also succeeded, by joint diplomatic efforts, in preventing the international recognition of the Vietnam-loyal government in Cambodia, also in 1979.¹⁹ These successes in regional coordination and cooperation had become possible only because the individual nation-states were willing to subordinate their interests to the regional consensus. In that regard, the motto of ASEAN: “One Vision, One Identity, One Community” or

“10 countries, 1 identity” might be true in reality or might at least represent the common goal of the association. Still consultations and solidarity are not necessarily a feature of common identity. They can be also a result of the commitment of ASEAN leaders not to interfere in the internal affairs of other states which will be a significant fact in further analysis.

Some authors also raise the criterion of democracy as an important determinant in whether a region can be considered as a security community and claim that the level of trust will be low in the case of authoritarian regimes. However, this paper represents the standpoint that ASEAN is an example of states where the level of trust is relatively high precisely because the majority of states are not democratic and do not interfere in the internal affairs of other states in areas such as human rights and good governance. This paper therefore suggests that it is not fundamentally important what the nature of regimes is in creating a security community; it is rather coherence which plays the vital role.

Summing up: what has been written about ASEAN without doubt shows a certain level of solidarity among its members, but it is apparently still in the formation process and is nowhere close to the EU. Therefore, ASEAN may be assessed as a region in transformation from a security regime to an SC. Further, in academic liter-

ature we can witness a growing consensus that ASEAN is an SC,²⁰ or at least, that firm foundations are being laid down for ASEAN to become one.²¹

In Deutsch's terminology, ASEAN may therefore be considered at least as a nascent pluralistic SC. Its members have a common identity which stresses non-confrontation as a way of solving conflicts. Moreover, there is a growing sense of ASEAN self-awareness which represents a potential source of collective "identity"²² which is also present in civil society in member states and which calls for a supranational form of cooperation.

Based on the discussion above, it may be concluded that ASEAN qualifies as a nascent SC, which makes interstate conflict very, very unlikely, though not unimaginable. However, internal violence continues to be present in many of its members with the most striking examples being Burma, the Philippines, and Thailand, where the states themselves are a source of insecurity to some part of the society and to individuals, and where major social unrest occurs. The striking reality is that regardless of the fact that ASEAN is formally an SC, it is inadequate to deliver security to its citizens. Therefore, the answer to the principal question of this part of the paper has just a few implications for the lives of the people of ASEAN member states. It is important merely from an academic point of view. This point will be important for further analysis.

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GENESIS OF THE EU AND ASEAN

ASEAN was founded in 1967 by Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. In its founding document, the Bangkok Declaration, member states committed to cooperate in economic, political and cultural fields.²³ Just as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), founded by Treaty of Rome in 1957, sought to make war between Germany and France less likely, if not impossible, so ASEAN played an important security function in preventing the conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia from escalating into open military confrontation. In that respect, we can not find much difference among our analysed communities. Both of them have sought security and stability both through and for, economic development, and both communities have been successful

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in that respect. Both communities also share similarities in the part played by external factors during the time of their early creation. Both in the 1950s for the EC, and in the 1960s for ASEAN, external factors played important and very similar roles. The project of a unified Europe might not have come in to existence if the international setting had been different. Western Europe was motivated to form a more close cooperation when faced with the reality of the Cold War confrontation, in order to better face the perceived threat from the USSR. For similar reasons, ASEAN was formed to limit the influence of both China and Japan. Material constraints thus played a considerable role in the creation of both organisations.

Members of both organisations may be regarded as strong states with respect to the strength of state institutions' penetration of society and their ability to deliver most essential public goods.²⁴ If that had not been the case, an SC would most probably not have been created because, as Buzan²⁵ argues, weak states export their domestic instabilities to each other.

Both the EU and ASEAN may be labelled as pluralistic security communities. In the case of both organisations, their institutions represent certain values that translate into norms which in turn shape the preferences of the players. However, when it comes to the instruments by which these communities seek their goals, together with the implications for their citizens as members of one or another community, major differences may be found. This implies that although both communities fit into the same category, according to existing terminology, they are, nevertheless, qualitatively very different. This will be illustrated in the following lines.

EU/ASEAN: LEVEL OF SUPRANATIONALITY AND THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY

Whereas the European countries created a High Authority, a supranational body already in existence by 1957, in the case of ASEAN, there is no institution with the same role. Not only was such institution not created by the ASEAN Declaration, but, to date, it has not been created by any other document. More importantly, in the case of the EU, by every single new European treaty, we can see a gradual, and more or less continual transmission of particular policies on to the supranational level, along with the strengthening of the role

of supranational institutions such as the European Commission²⁶ (EC) and the European Parliament (EP). The process of ever deepening integration in the case of the EU goes hand in hand with the enhancing of human security of EU citizens. In the case of ASEAN, we can observe neither the same spill over effect, nor the enhancing of human security. In this respect, the only development in ASEAN is the change of discourse, wherein some member states have called for the abandonment of the principle of “non-interference” and the introduction of unanimous voting, which has not, however, been reflected in any way in the institutional setting of ASEAN.²⁷ What are the implications of the level of supranationalism for the security of our analysed cases?

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The ASEAN model places a heavy weight on the national sovereignty of the member states and the security autonomy of the region as a whole.²⁸ These principles are manifested in the stress on non-interference in internal affairs which serves the common interests of member states in the security regime, and containment of domestic opposition movements, sometimes through repression.²⁹ The principle of non-interference may be the result of various factors. It may indicate that the level of trust and common identity within ASEAN is at a low level. Furthermore, the internal context within which ASEAN was founded differs from that of the EU. As Feske³⁰ argues, it was important to the young nation-states in the first place that economic development could best be achieved in their opinion, on the basis of national and regional stability. The idea of “regional resilience” on the basis of “national resilience” continues to shape the understanding of security in the region to date. Unlike the EU, where society is mainly founded on cosmopolitan values, the societies of ASEAN members are based on communitarian ones. The relationship between state and citizens therefore, differs considerably.

These priority interests, which can be largely explained by the colonial past of the ASEAN member states, influenced both the shape of the organisation and the regional cooperation principles applicable to the present day. Thus, ASEAN is weakly institutionalised: The governing body has, regularly since 1995, held summit meetings, and, previously only sporadically. It was only in 1976 that the Central Secretariat in Jakarta was established and even up to this day, it has no independent powers, exercising only true coordi-

nation functions. The States were not prepared to give up elements of sovereignty to a superior body and surrender consensus voting.³¹

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The previously mentioned non-interference mechanism is one of the factors which helps leaders to continue their non-democratic rule within their countries without any pressure from neighboring states. Therefore, as Väyrynen argues, in reality “solidarity” has meant the mutual acceptance of the primacy of regime security in the region.³² For this reason, it can be argued that “common identity” in the case of ASEAN states, serves different purposes than that in the EU; it enables leaders to increase regime security and, therefore, ASEAN has failed to create a “liberal cognitive region”.

Owing to the fact that the EU has created an autonomous supranational structure, in the shape of the European Commission (EC) and European Court of Justice, which also holds the EC under scrutiny, EU member states have given up the principle of non-interference and have delegated powers to supranational bodies in areas including human rights. Other areas, such as consumer protection, transport, energy, the area of freedom, security and justice, public health etc. are within shared competences, which means that states can not exercise competences in any area where the EC has already done so. Although these areas are not supranational, such EC initiated legislation has been, with the consent of the Council of Ministers,³³ incorporated into the legal systems of member states. Narrowed down for the illustrative reasons of this paper, these are, for example: health and safety at work, employment and social rights, safety standards in general, consumer protection and rights, pollution limits for industry and car emissions, vehicle and industrial products safety standards, norms for children’s playgrounds, the EU policy on environmental noise etc. Developments in the sphere of justice and home affairs, in another spectrum of activities, are intended to increase the security of citizens of the EU by measures taken in those sectors. These include: European Arrest Warrants, the European Police College, Europol, the Schengen Information System, etc. As such, these considered “intergovernmental” policies have deepened the cooperation of member states in those areas where it has been necessary since the creation of the common market³⁴ and the Schengen Area.³⁵ As a result of the overall development of the understanding of security within the European integration project, the EU has addressed security in some areas

which are, by other regions or states, not seen as a security threat, eg. immigration.³⁶ The EU, therefore, is not only deepening the meaning of security, by perceiving an individual as a referent object of security, but is also widening security by the securitization of an ever broader spectrum of areas. The stress the EU puts on human security is clearly articulated in the European Security Strategy:³⁷ *'It (the EU, author's note) places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice.'*

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In this respect, the EU is qualitatively different from ASEAN. The EC, as a supranational body, has no equivalent in ASEAN and keeps national governments under scrutiny including in areas linked to the state-citizen relationship. However, the EC was not always such a powerful body. The Commission, over time, has increased its importance in the European integration process as states have willingly transferred some of their functions to the supranational level by adopting new treaties.³⁸ This process has gone so far, that the supranational bodies now represent one of the poles of power in the EU with the capacity to initiate policies, which certain members might dislike, together with having the capacity to oversee their fulfillment.³⁹ It can be argued that the EC, when it first came into existence in the form of this High Authority, reflected the will and values of members states and nowadays, reflects not only the values of member states, but the values of the EU as an institution, shaping it further, which is a phenomenon known as the agent structure problem. The structure of ASEAN reflects the nature of its member states and probably shapes their preferences but can not be regarded as an engine of integration having the capacity to shape the meaning of the security of members.

The EU's meaning of security is also reflected in the "foreign policy" of the EU, regardless of the fact that common foreign and security policy remains purely on an intergovernmental level. The EU Security Strategy claims that "The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection of our security is a world of well-governed democratic states."⁴⁰ We have worked to build human security, by ... promoting good governance and human rights...⁴¹

The greatest strength of the EU in exporting its values is the process of enlargement. 'Frank Shimmelfennig, Stefan Enger and

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Heiko Knobel have explored democratic conditionality based on neofunctionalist logic as the main mechanism through which international organisations such as the EU induce non-member state to comply with their conditions.⁴² Therefore, the Report on Implementation of the EU Security Strategy⁴³ is right when stating that ‘enlargement has spread democracy and prosperity across our continent, and the Balkans are changing for the better’. After all, it is the EC as supranational organ that sets accession criteria for potential members. Neofunctionalist theory is therefore embedded in EU security strategy. Additionally, the EU’s understanding of humanitarian intervention is a testament to the human security approach of the EU.

Arising from our previous discussion, we can now identify, that human security is a concern for the EU for three reasons: moral, legal and enlightened self interest.⁴⁴

These findings are an important point of division between the EU and ASEAN. In the case of the EU, the common identity puts more pressure on member governments, increases scrutiny over them and puts citizen first; in the case of ASEAN, the outcome is the opposite. ASEAN, as already mentioned, has rather helped to keep repressive regimes in power. The puzzle which needs to be solved now is to find reasons for this difference between the EU and ASEAN. This will be the goal of the next part of the paper.

EXPLAINING THE REASONS IN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE EU AND ASEAN

In order to discern the differences between our analysed cases further, I will apply the model developed by Cantory and Spiegel.⁴⁵ These authors identify variables which should be considered when defining any given area as a region. Such analysis is fully applicable in this given case and will, therefore, provide further explanations for the differences between the EU and ASEAN.

The box which follows illustrates the criteria proposed by the authors and indicates whether the analysed cases fulfill them.

Box: 1

Criteria	EU	ASEAN
Geographic proximity	YES	YES
Intense interaction	YES	YES
Social cohesion	YES	NO
Political cohesion	YES	NO
Economic complementarity of resources	YES	Partial
Autonomy from the international system	YES	Partial
Internal and external recognition	YES	YES

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According to this table, the deeper integration of the EU can be explained by the fact that it shares all the variables which were identified by Cantori and Spiegel, for a group of states to become a region. A more coherent region has much higher prospects of deep integration and identification of its own values. This is not the case with ASEAN which does not fulfill the criteria of social and political cohesion and only partially fulfills the criteria of economic complementarity and autonomy from the international system.

ASEAN is actually a very divergent body. The annual per capita incomes in Cambodia (1,913 U.S. dollars), Vietnam (2,957 U.S. dollars) or Laos (2,259 U.S. dollars) are much lower than those of Singapore (50,705 U.S. dollars), Thailand (8,004 U.S. dollars) and Malaysia (13,985 U.S. dollars).⁴⁶ Economically divergent states with diverse economic systems can hardly find common ground in economic matters. The above mentioned principle is even illustrated in the current "EURO" crisis and the difficulties the EU is having in attempting to deal with the problem in a region which is economically on a different level of coherence compared to that of ASEAN. The economic systems of ASEAN members are not compatible and supranational economic integration, which might potentially spill

to other areas, cannot exist, and from an economic perspective, is even not desirable.

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Apart from these economic disparities, social, political and ideological differences are other impediments for deepening integration. Political differences are particularly evident as ASEAN consists of members ranging from an absolute monarchy (Brunei) to semi-democratic or democratising societies (Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia) to authoritarian military regimes (Burma) and socialist dictatorships (Laos, Vietnam).⁴⁷ Such political differences are a major factor which results in ASEAN adopting a soft standpoint in the human rights sphere.

Social disparities are also evident in various other indicators. For example: the proportion of rural dwellers in the total population ranges from 0 percent in Singapore and Brunei to 85 percent in Laos; the average life expectancy of 74 years in Singapore to 51 years in Laos, and the adult literacy rate of 92 percent in Vietnam to 35 percent in Cambodia.⁴⁸

The above mentioned differences are significant from the security perspective as well. Given the limited resources that any organization may have to operate with, it has to decide on their allocation given the high number of possible threats. EU members are rich enough to allocate their security resources to a wider number of subjects/threats, which are often co-identified throughout the EU as an institution, compared to ASEAN. This factor also plays a major role in the way the EU and ASEAN understand security. Based on this, it is possible to develop a thesis that the allocation of resources is derived not only from the structure of the system and the values of SC, but is connected to the level of the resources as well. The difference here between the EU and ASEAN is a good example of that.

Building on the above points, it can be argued that not only domestic but structural factors too can give a birth to the SC; however its nature will remain determined by the nature of its members and the level of their coherence. In the EU, society is mainly based on cosmopolitan values whereas those of ASEAN are communitarian. The fact that ASEAN is an incoherent group of relatively young states precludes the creation of a supranational body which would be an engine of cooperation. Even if that were the case, the individual would probably not be a referent object of security in the case

of ASEAN, because as particular members are in different stages of state formation, compared to those of the EU, the concept of state or even regime security therefore prevails.

The differences between our analysed cases also illustrate the fact that one theory of security cannot explain the development in both of them. For example, a neo-realist understanding of security, which places the state at the centre of the analysis and claims that whatever policy the state wishes to pursue, it will end up in securing itself, and not a different referent object anyway, which is the result of system constraint, would fail to explain the case of the EU. As the analysis suggests, the nature of EU member states influences the integration process and the understanding of security within the EU. On the other hand, neo-realism is fully equipped to explain the ASEAN case, where some states might prefer a different kind of integration but state security still prevails given the nature of the region and the nature of ASEAN states themselves. The EU case on the other hand can be better explained by the neo-liberal school which puts humans at the centre of security and claims that in some regions, it is possible to attain human security even in the anarchic world order.⁴⁹

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DEFINING AN INDIVIDUAL SECURITY COMMUNITY

In the previous part of this paper, we have indicated a number of differences between the EU and ASEAN and also found possible explanations for such differences. We have come to the conclusion that the existence of an SC increases security of the state but does not necessarily need to increase security of its citizens, let alone individual security. It is the nature of the SC members which determines the values and policy the SC can deliver to the citizens of its member states. Without any doubt, the ASEAN SC is a decisive factor in creating a peaceful South East Asian region, but as we cannot draw any parallels between the security of the state and the security of the people living on its territory, we can not claim that the existence of any SC will increase the internal stability and quality of life of its citizens. In the post modern understanding of security, ASEAN would not be perceived as an SC.

A number of significant differences exist between ASEAN and the EU; however, the current terminology on security communities

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does not allow us to conceptualise such differences and to reflect them. For this reason, a new category of security communities, an individual security community, will be introduced in this chapter. By doing so, this paper will fill the gap in the classification of security communities, bring a new analytical tool in their conceptualisation and eventually help us to understand them better.

An individual security community is a **community of states which has created conditions for the maximalisation of human security within community of states where any kind of war is already unthinkable.**

The definition says, that in order to view any SC as an individual SC, more than one state is needed (community), which has already developed the initial stage of being an SC, be it amalgamated, pluralistic, or comprehensive (war is already unthinkable), and where the referent object of security is predominantly the individual (maximalisation of individual security). Security against some threats, such as preventable disease or poverty, can be maintained through institutions so individuals can benefit from a very high level of security in this case. For other threats, where cause and effect relations are obscure, such as cancer, unemployment, crime, etc., security measures can be chancy at best.⁵⁰ The security of both the individual and the state are therefore relative, and for that reason, the wording “created conditions for maximalisation...” has been chosen. The way in which states may create an individual SC has purposely not been mentioned in the definition. The USA and Canada would qualify as individual SCs, but their path towards this has not been similar to that of the EU. However, more research would be needed to evaluate that.

As individual represents the irreducible basic unit to which the concept of security can be applied;⁵¹ an individual SC is therefore the highest, or better, the deepest form of SC it is possible to attain within a group of states. This is the situation where individuals may enjoy a high degree of individual security in the region and where both inter state, as well as civil wars, are highly unlikely, meaning that security referent objects at the higher level are already secure.

The following illustrative diagram, fits an individual SC into the existing typology of security communities, further enlarges it and suggests that the concept of an individual SC is methodologically compatible with the current typology of security communities de-

veloped by Deutsch and further envisaged by other authors including Väyrynen and Tuscicisny.

Box 2: Conceptualisation of an Individual SC

	Referent object/s		
	State	Group of people	Individual
Amalgamated or pluralistic SC			
Individual SC			
Comprehensive SC			
Interstate SC			

Defining an Individual Security Community

The EU, as an institution, has managed not only to deepen, but also to broaden the meaning of security which is a process that is not taking place within ASEAN. Consequently, the EU more resembles Galtung's maximum approach to security where peace does not mean just absence of war but, in addition, the establishment of conditions for social justice.⁵²

It is argued that shifting the security focus away from states towards individuals is not desirable nor even possible when structural and other fundamental threats exist. While these conditions persist, policies should be adopted to tackle those issues first. The argument is that those kinds of threats might potentially wipe out all other security concerns and measures.⁵³ These lines of argument again testify that without certain structural conditions, the development of an individual security community is very unlikely.

The logic that the security of individuals is inevitably connected to the state so,⁵⁴ the security of individuals is best attained through the security of the state does not hold in all cases. In other words "the security of the state is not necessarily synonymous to that of people who live within its physical boundaries."⁵⁵ Moreover, sometimes there is no harmony between individual and national securi-

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ty. Being a citizen of a state within an interstate SC does not theoretically, and in some cases even practically imply an increase in the security of the citizen. It is only an individual SC which inevitably must have such an effect. This comparative study of ASEAN and the EU illustrates the meaning of these words in reality.

Does the fact that ASEAN states are at a different level of development imply that ASEAN may follow the European way in the future? This paper has provided some hints whether this can occur, but given the scope of the present paper, it will be left for further research. As of now, if ASEAN qualifies as a nascent SC then, the EU qualifies as a nascent individual SC.

CONCLUSION

The aim of present paper was to find differences in understanding of the concept of security between the EU and ASEAN and to test the following hypothesis: Unlike ASEAN, the EU represents a security community, where not only war among members is unthinkable, but also conditions for the maximalisation of individual security are present.

The method this paper has employed was a comparative analysis of the EU and ASEAN. Firstly, the puzzle as to whether ASEAN qualifies for any kind of security community has had to be solved in order to proceed with further analysis. The result is that ASEAN may be characterised as an organization which is moving away from being a security regime towards being a security community, which means that ASEAN is a nascent security community.

This implies that both the EU and ASEAN qualify as pluralistic security communities which shape the preference of players, so that interstate conflict is very unlikely if not unthinkable. However, such information does not tell us the whole picture because it does not include information about the meaning of the security concept for the members. As has been argued, whereas in the case of the EU, the individual is the predominant security referent object, in the case of ASEAN, it is the state or regime. In practice, this is an enormous difference between these communities with huge implications for individuals to be a member of one or the other community.

Therefore this paper has argued that the current typology of security communities is not equipped to grasp the difference between

the analysed subjects. This problem has been solved by introducing a new category of security community: *the individual security community*, which helps us to capture the different natures of the EU and ASEAN. This is also a step for the conceptualisation of security communities in general.

According to the findings, although ASEAN plays a very positive role in the security of the region, it is nowhere close to the developments which have taken place in the EU. As has been illustrated, it is the European Commission which has been, and is, the engine of such development and which secures the values of the community, sometimes at the expense of some members. Therefore, the nonexistence of a similar body in ASEAN has considerable implications. Indeed, it will take some time for ASEAN to create a genuine interstate security community. The hypothesis of the paper therefore holds.

Further research needs to be done in order to fully explain the concept of an individual security community; this was not the aim of this paper though. However, I hope that this paper has at least helped us to better understand this phenomenon and has laid the ground for further research into it.

Jiří
Brandýs

NOTES TO PAGES

- 1 ASEAN comprises Burma, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos and Malaysia.
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- 27 As a reaction to enlargement to include Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma, there is already debate within ASEAN on the possible use of „constructive intervention“ and „flexible engagement“ to reform the political system of Burma and Cambodia (Collins, 1999, Collins, A. Mitigating the Security Dilemma ASEAN Way. *Pacifica Review*, 11, no. 2, 1999).
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- 33 The Council of the EU, also known as the Council of Ministers, is an intergovernmental body of the EU consisting of ministers and heads of states, which meets twice a year on sectoral bases be it: industry and trade, foreign policy, education, environment etc.
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THE POLISH BIOMASS INDUSTRY: THE CASE OF BOBOLICE

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ABSTRACT: *The renewable energy industry has recently gathered momentum due to green awareness, the need to diversify energy sources and the rise in oil and gas prices. In many ways, the Polish biomass industry has greater potential than others new EU members (post-2004). Poland's size, as well as its large population – the sixth largest in Europe – has attracted the attention of investors. Furthermore, the country's agricultural characteristics, high dependence on foreign sources of energy, as well as its abundant use of polluting energy sources such as coal, make Poland the perfect place to invest in the biomass industry. This research analyses the potential of the Polish biomass industry via the case of Bobolice, a town in Northern Poland. The study claims that companies wishing to evaluate potential projects will raise the project's chances of success if they operate in areas where the population is larger than 4500 inhabitants, in areas where heating is consumed annually for about 7 months and where there is a variety of facilities, other than homes, which require heating.*

KEYWORDS: Biomass, Renewable Energy, Investment, Poland, Environment

INTRODUCTION

The renewable energy industry has been gathering momentum recently due to green awareness, the need to diversify energy sources and the rise in oil and gas prices. The European Union, which has set an ambitious target to enlarge the market segment of renewable and green energy at the expense of fossil oil, is largely behind the idea of supporting the industry. The fact that the Central and East European countries have joined the Union has, to a great extent, raised the biomass industry's potential to become the main source of generation of renewed energy. The new EU members' agricultural characteristics, as well as the general aspiration to strengthen the peripheral areas and the agricultural sector in those countries, has rendered biomass particularly interesting. In many ways, the Polish biomass industry has more potential than that of the other countries that joined the EU in 2004. Poland's size, as well as its large population – the sixth largest – has attracted the attention of

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investors. Furthermore, the country's agricultural characteristics, high dependence on foreign sources of energy, as well as its abundant use of polluting energy sources such as coal, make Poland the perfect place to invest in the biomass industry. And finally, Poland's proximity to Germany and Scandinavia has influenced the Polish government to commit to renewable energy and to encourage foreigners to invest in it.

This research will analyze the potential of the Polish biomass industry via the case of Bobolice, a town in Northern Poland. It will present the fundamental elements that model the industry and the matters that the considerations of entrepreneurs who wish to invest in the market. The aim of the research is also to present guiding principles for the evaluation of the economic potential of villages throughout Poland for which biomass plants are planned.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

The town of Bobolice is about 40 kilometers away from the city of Koszalin, in West Pomeranian Voivodeship. It has approximately 350 square kilometers of municipal territory and is surrounded by vast agricultural land and forests. The town has a population of about 4,500 16 percent of which is unemployed. Most of the people in the town work in agriculture, in factories that export metal to Sweden and in providing services to the surrounding villages. The town has several advanced education and sports facilities, for which people need to pay. In terms of infrastructure, the town has an electricity and heating system which is inferior to the systems found in rural areas in Western Europe. Indeed, most of those systems were installed at the end of the 1970s and there are still people who heat up their own water in their homes.¹

Bobolice has a boiler system that has been in use for the past 30 years. Although there is constant upkeep work on the system, the city council wishes to replace the current boiler with apparatus based on biomass sources, which can generate heat and electricity via cogeneration. The council intends to build a facility which will supply MW 3.8 of heat, in addition to the gas that will be used in cases of very cold winters. The aim of the boiler is to provide heat to most of the city's inhabitants, as well as to public establishments such as the local high school that has 500 pupils, the primary school with its 300 pupils, kindergartens and a regional sports cen-

ter. Other than that, the city council intends to build a hotel and more sports and leisure centers, all of which will be connected to the central boiler. The new boiler will also be able to produce “green electricity” which will be sold to the energy companies operating in the area.

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Table 1: The town's oil sources and consumption characteristics in 2009⁵⁵²

No.	Municipal Objects	Heat Energy Consumption GJ/year	Installed Capacity of Boilerhouse MW	Power Demand	Yearly Consumption of Natural Gas m ³ /year	Yearly Consumption of Coal Ton/year	Primary Energy in Fuel GJ/Year	Basic Boilerhouse Efficiency-percent	Cost of Fuel Zl/year	Cost of Fuel in rGJ of Heat
1	Residential buildings	7,412	1.16	1.09	0.00	596.50	13,123	56.48	149,125	20.12
2	Public Institutes and private houses	4,670	1.00	0.80	0.00	300.00	6,600	70.76	75,000	16.06
3	Sport facilities and Education centers	950	1.00	0.70	46,000	0.00	1.63	58.25	60,900	73.58
4	Shopping stores, Storage facilities	2805	0.66	0.66	91,000	0.00	3.19	88.07	136,500	48.66
5	Total	15,837	3.82	3.82	137,000	896	19,127.82	273.56	430,525	158.42

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Average price of coal		[zł/t]	250.00
Average price of natural gas		[zł/m ³]	1.50
LHV (low heat value) of coal		[MJ/kg]	22.00
LHV of natural gas		[MJ/m ³]	35.00
sales price of heat energy		[zł/GJ]	40.98
Price of ordered heat power		[zł/MW/m-c]	9,726.42
year turnover from heat sale		[zł/year]	1,094,916.38

CALCULATION OF HEATING PRICES AND PAYMENT COLLECTION SYSTEMS

The payment collection system for heating and the formula used to set consumer prices are similar in most of the towns and villages in the North-Western parts of Poland. The heating prices in Bobolice are set at the beginning of each year according to the price of coal and an assessment of the weather forecast for the winter months. A rise in the price of coal, therefore, raises the cost of heating, whilst a decrease in price lowers it. However, only the towns and councils whose heating consumption is below MW 5 are able to set consumer heating prices. In accordance with that provision, the Bobolice council decided that the consumer price for 1 Giga Joule of heating would be 48.90 Zloty including V.A.T. in 2009. The basic assumption of entrepreneurs who wish to work in that market, therefore, is that they need to preserve the correlation between consumer prices and coal prices in Poland in order to ensure that local consumers buy their energy products.

The payment for heating in Bobolice is made to a local company on a monthly basis but the local council suggests that groups of buildings buy electricity at reduced rates if payment is made in advance and over a long term. According to interviews with the management companies, there is not usually any problem to collect dues from the local population but a number of entrepreneurs in the biomass business consider the current collection system to be the main problem in a project such as theirs. They fear that, if the council comes into financial difficulties, it will not forward the payment to the company carrying out the project but will prefer to use the money to cover its deficit (Official documents supplied by

Bobolice energy committee).

BOBOLICE'S SOURCES OF RAW MATERIAL

In order to assess whether the project in Bobolice is feasible, the sources of raw material at the town's disposal need to be examined. An analysis of the economic potential of a facility that produces energy from renewable sources requires an assessment of the raw material sources available within a radius of 50 kilometers. An assessment of the biomass potential is made by dividing the proposed area to agricultural areas, forest areas, grazing areas, and areas without agricultural potential. The next stage is to analyze the amount of raw material that can be produced from these areas, and how accessible that material is.³

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During the project, the availability of a number of energy sources in the area was analyzed. The use of secondary agricultural products, such as straw, is a potential source of energy due to its easy availability and relatively low cost. Poland has a straw surplus of 4-11 million tons a year, and the price of a ton of straw on the local market was 45.05 Zloty a ton, not including transportation, in 2009.⁴

Despite straw's potential as a cheap, easily available source of raw material, a number of impediments arose in the Bobolice area when relying on that source, such as difficulty in concluding long term contracts with farmers, dependence on yearly crops, high transportation costs due to numerous collection points, and also low energy value that requires vast amounts of raw material. Finally, some of the facility owners refuse to use straw because of its high chlorine content which causes corrosion in the machinery.

TREE WASTE

It is estimated that about 2.5 million cubic meters of tree waste can be harvested in Poland every year, and those numbers could change in the future due to the rise in the number of trees planted in the past decades. There is no data available as to the distribution of tree waste per area⁵ but, based on an examination of the more forested areas of the country, it is likely that there is a significant amount of tree waste in Poland. It has always been customary for

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tree waste harvesting to be under the supervision of the State Forests National Forest Holding, and most of the raw material is then sold to carpentries. Bobolice is surrounded by woodland and it is the council's responsibility to take part in tree waste harvesting. The price of tree waste includes the cost of manpower and transportation, and the State Forests National Forest Holding's approval must be obtained in order to use the tree waste for commercial purposes. If such permission is forthcoming, it is estimated that the amount of dry tree waste produced could reach 150 tons a year, and that the cost would be between 80 and 120 Zloty per ton.

TIMBER

Poland's timber export industry is ranked 17th in the world and 3rd in Europe. The Polish wood industry has grown in recent years because of renewable energy and the rising number of carpentries. In order to satisfy demand, the number of trees planted between 2000 and 2006 increased by 28 percent. In 2008, the biomass industry was making use of 4.8 percent of the wood supply but that supply will become limited in the years to come, due to demand from other industries that require wood, such as the building and paper industries. The use of wood as the main component of the biomass industry is therefore anticipated to continue to decrease, as it did from 95 percent in 2008 to 75 percent in 2010. Indeed, due to the extensive demand for timber in other industries, it became more expensive in West Pomeranian Voivodeship than other sources of energy such as straw, tree waste and energy crops. In 2009, for example, the price of a ton of wood pellet in the Bobolice area was 180 Zloty including transportation, which significantly raised the anticipated cost of operating the biomass facility. Although the price tendered to the biomass project entrepreneurs was higher than the average Polish market price – which was 138 Zloty per ton, not including transportation – and despite the relatively low market prices, it was decided that this kind of raw material would only be used in the initial years of the project until local raw materials, and particularly energy crops, became available. Indeed, fear of an increase in wood pellet prices due to mounting consumption, as well as an aspiration to encourage local employment, prompted the Council and the investors to opt for local raw materials that are not

dependent on other industries.⁶

ENERGY CROPS

According to Polish government publications, Poland has an area of 2.6 million hectares of energy crops but maximal growth of energy crops is not realistic. Indeed, the Swedish case shows that only one fifth of agricultural areas allotted to energy crops are in use. Under the assumption that Poland uses 5 percent of its agricultural areas, it will be able to use 190,000 hectares at the most. An even more pessimistic estimate is that Poland will be able to make use of 59,000 hectares due to farmers' lack of familiarity with energy crops and due to the agricultural community's fear of a lack of long term commitment on the part of the EU.⁷

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The EU has a number of distinguishable energy crops such as willows, poplars, eucalyptus trees, sorghum and grass. The economic benefit of those crops depends on the quality of the soil, the time it takes to grow them and the way they are harvested. Generally speaking, the costs of energy crops are higher than other crops because most farmers are not familiar with them and it therefore costs more to implement them. When assessing risk factors, the fact that farmers need to know that a crop is at least as economically advantageous as traditional crops – and mainly corn – in order to take it on must be taken into account. There is therefore fear that energy crops not be financially viable at times of price increases.⁸

In recent years, the willow has become one of the most important sources of energy in the Polish biomass industry. Indeed, the willow is a unique species which has a 20–25 year lifespan and the ability to produce 8–12 tons of dry biomass per hectare. Willow cultivation is done mainly between November and April and is suited to the cold North European climate. According to a number of researches, willows reach full maturity within four years but biomass can already be produced after two years, although the product is less abundant in such cases. Research made in the Warsaw area and at Koszalin University shows that a hectare of willow land can produce 6.43 tons of dry biomass in the first year and 10,994 tons after three years. On the other hand, willows have a number of significant disadvantages, such as the high cost of planting them as compared with other plants, due to farmers' lack of experience with

them and their need to get expert advice. Furthermore, the cost of harvesting and drying the raw material is not only considered to be more expensive but also requires special tools.⁹

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Table 2: Comparative cost of the various components in willow cultivation according to research made in Sweden, Poland and Denmark

Country	Establishment	Fertilization	Harvest
Sweden	26	30.2	43.8
Poland	27-31 percent	16.4-21 percent	26.2-21 percent
Denmark	33 percent	34 percent	33 percent

1,000 hectares of willows are required in order to supply the Bobolice municipality's yearly biomass consumption. That amount of raw material is estimated to be sufficient for a facility with an output of MW4 that operates, on average, 4,800 hours per year. Koszalin University, which is 20 kilometers away from Bobolice, owns 80 hectares of willows that are in their fourth year and are 15-30 kilometers away from Bobolice. There is also a new willow farm, on an area of 40 hectares, in the first stages of development 12 kilometers away from Bobolice, as well a local company, with which long term agreements can be made, that owns a willow forest that spreads over 600 hectares 50 kilometers away. Furthermore, there are several vacant state-owned agricultural areas with medium to low quality soil where willow farms can be established. The use of state-owned land for the cultivation of willows can help to solve the problem of unemployment in Bobolice and enable the continuation of traditional agriculture such as wheat and corn etc. According to local estimates, dry willow will cost the consumer 120-130 Zloty per ton including transportation, thanks to the short distances from the cultivation areas.

TRANSPORTATION

Transportation is a significant factor in the assessment of whether the biomass industry is financially advantageous. According to several models, cutting back on transportation expenses can reduce energy production costs by 0.5 cents per kw/h in a biomass facility. There are several factors that influence transportation con-

siderations and, consequently, the final cost, such as lack of accessibility to an agricultural area, weather conditions, dispersed raw material areas, the amount of humidity in the raw material, keeping to working schedules, and fuel costs. On the other hand, transportation costs from facilities close to rivers and the sea can be significantly reduced by shipping the raw materials. Placing facilities close to railroads can also reduce transportation costs. The cost of transportation, however, is also influenced by raw material show that transportation costs rise significantly where collection of raw materials is not within a compression ability. Raw material such as straw, for example, is cheaper to transport because it is easy to compress. Many researches also 60 kilometer radius of the facility. Furthermore, it is important that there be collection points no further than 49 kilometers away from one another in order for transportation to operate more easily. And finally, areas without easy road access will raise transportation costs because of the need for smaller vehicles.¹⁰

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An analysis of transportation costs shows that Bobolice enjoys a number of advantages. Most of the raw materials needed for the establishment of the project are within a 20–25 kilometer radius and transportation costs make up 7–10 percent of the cost of the raw material, which is 20 to 30 Zloty per ton of willow. The remaining 25 percent of raw material is within a radius of 50 kilometers, which only raises transportation costs slightly. Furthermore, if additional villages in the area opt for biomass facilities based on agriculture, a large amount of the raw material can be transported by boat because Koszalin and the towns surrounding it are only 15 kilometers away from the Baltic Sea. Nonetheless, a number of problems have arisen in the collection and transportation of the raw materials, such as the difficult access for heavy vehicles to the willow fields belonging to the University. Moreover, most of the towns and villages do not have tools suitable for harvesting willows and for making willow chips. In order to produce biomass from willows, entrepreneurs will therefore have to buy advanced mechanical tools, which will increase expenses in the first few years.

STORAGE

Storage conditions are very important to the quality of the raw material, as well as to end prices of biomass. In most cases, drying

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is done naturally by placing the raw material in covered storage facilities, and in some cases, particularly in Germany, there is a tendency to improve the raw material by active drying. Companies that deal in biomass naturally prefer storage areas to be near the biomass burning facility in order to save on transportation costs. Raw material such as timber, however, is difficult to store in large amounts, and most of it is therefore stored for relatively short periods of 4 months or less. On the other hand, relying on agricultural raw materials calls for longer storage periods if the harvesting season is short. Furthermore, sources of raw material such as wood pellet require complicated storage procedures and longer drying time. However, most of the facilities investigated claimed that, insofar as straw and wood chips are concerned, storage costs are minimal compared to the other expenses. And finally, straw storage proved to be inefficient in most cases due to the fact that it loses its energetic value if exposed to pests.¹¹

Unlike fuel, biomass undergoes natural processes when in storage, which reduces its energetic value. Some of the raw materials in the industry contain chemicals, metal, copper and zinc, which can cause erosion during storage or processing. In most cases, the humidity of the raw material is influenced by a number of factors, such as the type and size of the raw material, the harvesting season, the harvesting age, the wind speed and the relative humidity in the area of the biomass facility. There are, therefore, some who believe that biomass drying should be done immediately after the harvesting, before it is transferred to the boilers, in order to reduce humidity and avoid damage to the raw material. That process reduces transportation costs due to the removal of the humidity and other by-products from the raw material, but drying the raw material in the collection area can cause the loss of significant amounts of it, while drying it in the area of the facility helps to enlarge the amounts that can be used.¹²

Poland's experience with facilities that dry the humid raw material is very limited. To date, there are no such facilities in Bobolice other than traditional crop storage barns. The area of the heating facility can contain raw material for seven weeks, after which more raw material needs to be brought in. Most of the agricultural areas, as well as the existing willow fields, have old storage facilities which are very cheap to run and cost no more than 2–5 percent of the en-

tire cost of the raw material. They are only a few kilometers away from the raw material areas and transportation costs are therefore not high. Furthermore, most of the raw material for industry is produced in the spring and summer months which helps to minimize humidity.

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COST, ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF BIOMASS FACILITIES

The most important factor in the success of the project is the positioning of the facility in relation to the raw material areas: the nearer the facility to the raw material area, the higher the chances of success. Other than that, the ability to diversify raw material sources lessens dependence on one single source and reduces the negative influence of commodities market fluctuations on the financial viability of the facility.¹³ Furthermore, the power system and its installation had a significant influence on the cost of the facility, and the cooperation of the local council and its willingness to help with the project proved to have great influence on its establishment. Indeed, the fact that the Council is an elected one means that its members must approve and convince the inhabitants of the town that the facility is a reliable, efficient solution in the long term, which can reduce heating costs and be a source of income for farmers and local people. And finally, a long line of permits are required from various sources, such as the Polish Power Grid Company, the Polish Committee for Standardization, the Ministry of the Environment, as well as building permits.

A number of advantages and disadvantages emerged during the analysis of the facility's potential. A significant disadvantage is the state of dilapidation of the power grid, which needs to be replaced. Furthermore, the sports facilities and the main electricity consumers are one kilometer away from the boiler and the cost of connecting them to the heating facility has become very expensive. Moreover, the site of the facility is old and neglected and must therefore be destroyed and replaced by a new site that includes a covered storage area. On the other hand, the town's heating consumption is higher than it is in other areas of Poland and the facility's profits should be higher than elsewhere. Furthermore, unlike other villages and towns in the area, most of the residents are connected to

the central heating system and there is a higher heating consumption compared to other towns due to a number of facilities such as school, sports facilities and a hotel, that are considered to be energy “gobblers”. All those elements make the project profitable despite the difficulties in setting it up.

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Table 3: Estimated expenses for the installation of the facility

Cost E. U. r	Specification of the Project	No.
2,200,000	Thermal oil boiler for biomass utilization capacity 4,5 MW + hydraulic biomass feed system + exhaust gas system with dust filtration and electro filters + ash removing system	1
74,000	Pump system for thermal oil circulation	2
53,000	Pump system for hot water circulation to central heating city net	3
29,300	Electrical power control box and low voltage connection to grid	4
99,000	Automation and control systems + central visualization SCADA system	5
165,000	Hot water buffer vessels with total capacity ~200m ³	6
164,000	Heat exchanging and measuring units (7 sets) to connect municipal objects	7
	Services:	
440,000	Constructional works related to: biomass boiler building + ORC module building + warehouse of biomass + internal roads and drives	1
530,000	External central heating pipe net connecting ORC power plant (located on the territory of old coal boiler house on Fabryczna Str.) with other consumers	2
184,000	Installation works of all equipment of ORC power plant (including start-up, commissioning and training of personnel)	3
75,000	Installation works of all equipment of ORC power plant (including start-up, commissioning and training of personnel)	4
35,000	Project management	5
100,000	Investment cost risk found	6
4,293,000	Total Net in euros	

ESTIMATES ANNUAL COST AND REVENUES OF BIOMASS

FACILITY:

Value	Unit	Specification	No.
16,743,870	Zł	Investment Cost	1
0.67	MW	Nominal Electrical Output Power of ORC unit	2
3.06	MW	Nominal Heat output Power of ORC unit	3
4.29	MW	Initial heat Power in Biomass flow	4
14,000	kJ/kg	LHV(low heat Value) of Biomass	5
1.10	t/h	Max Demand of Dry Biomass	6
4,800	H	Amount of hours of operation per year related to nominal capacity	7
	t/h	Yearly Demand of Biomass (dry)	8
130	Zł/t	Estimated Price of Biomass	9
418,596.75	2.50 percent	Annual constant costs of exploitation and services administration and bookkeeping + insurance and land taxes	11
3216	MW/h	Annual production of electricity	12
14,688	MW/h	Annual Production of heat	13
52,876	GJ	Annual Production of heat	14
180	Zł/MWh	Sales Price of Electricity	15
248.00	Zł/MWh	Sales price of "green certificate"	16
45	Zł/GJ	Sale price of heat	17
1,376,448	Zł/year	Annual turnover on electricity sales	18
2,379,456.00	Zł/year	Annual turnover of heat sales	19
3,755,904	Zł/year	Annual turnover in total	20
3,337,307.25	Zł/year	Economic Effect	21

*Polish Biomass
Industry*

CONCLUSION

Poland's agricultural structure, as well as its need to reduce the use of coal as its main source of energy, makes it a country with good potential for a biomass market. In order to establish an effective and advantageous industry, however, a number of elements that are crucial to its future success must be evaluated. The case of the town of Bobolice indicates the main considerations that companies seeking to invest in the field should make. The research shows that the

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availability of cheap raw material within a radius of 50 kilometers from the facility is conducive to the success of the project. A lack of available, cheap raw material would raise the facility's production costs and make it financially unviable. The research also shows that raw materials, such as tree waste and willows, are worth using because of their easy availability, their low cost and their contribution towards creating jobs. Furthermore, energy crops such as willows do not require high quality soil and therefore do not detract from the number of lands used for food. Moreover, the success of the project depends on continuing EU and Polish government commitment to the green energy industry. Indeed, the Polish government's support via the "Green Certificate" system has a great influence on income from electricity and heating facilities that operate via renewable energy sources. In addition, companies wishing to evaluate potential projects will raise the project's chances of success if they operate in areas where the population is larger than 4,500 inhabitants, in areas where heating is consumed annually for about 7 months and where there is a variety of facilities, other than homes, which require heating. All those factors will make for the biomass industry in Poland to be a financial success.

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THE EU AND THE ALTER-GLOBALISATION MOVEMENT'S ACTORNESS

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ABSTRACT: This article deals with two actors – the European Union and the alter-globalisation movement – and their mutual relationship regarding recognition. Both actors profile themselves internationally as environmental and human and social rights defenders; they both create their own discourses, e.g. through the dissemination of documents and declarations. On a general level these discourses are very similar and therefore there is an assumption that both actors could seek support from each other: for example, the alter-globalisation movement could seek EU support in combating neo-liberal economic doctrine, and the EU could seek the movement's support in urging global environmental protection. To present both actors and their discourses and mutual relations, various documents issued by them regarding economic, environmental-humanitarian and political topics are examined. As these documents also focus on the mutual support or disaccord between the two actors, the documents can show whether and in which sense they perceive each other as recognised actors.

KEYWORDS: EU, Alter-Globalisation Movement, Actorness, Recognition, Discourse

INTRODUCTION

We are at the end of the decade during which the alter-globalization movement has grown up, and in its discourse it has manifested demands such as participative democracy, global justice and universal human rights. At the same time, the European Union (EU) has profiled itself as an important international actor in the fields of environmental policy, human rights and social economy. According to their declared attitudes and values, the EU and the alter-globalization movement have a lot in common. In this text I would like to examine whether both the EU and the movement recognize each other as actors and in what sense: do they support each other in opposing neoliberal economic doctrine or do they stay in opposition

despite the common value paradigm?

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The aim of this text is to show in which issues and on what level there is an overlap of the EU and the alter-globalization discourse and in what sense these actors recognize each other. This should show us whether there is any interaction in terms of agenda setting or a paradigm shift between the two actors, whether there is a coalition potential regarding their opposition to the neoliberal economic doctrine, and whether this opposition builds on different sources or does not exist at all. We will be able to compare the perceptions of the same expressions in different discourses and thus understand the sources of the consonance or disagreement between the two actors.

Since I aspire to introduce the EU and the alter-globalization movement as two important actors who directly or indirectly influence the global governance system and its value basis through their discourses, I will try to focus on their actorness, i.e. their capability to act in a consistent and meaningful way. First, I will introduce the concept of actorness, which provides me with a theoretical basis for the study of the mutual recognition of the two actors. Then I will present a discursive analysis of 28 declarative documents focused on three issue clusters; in each cluster particular issues are examined in detail. In the first, economic cluster I focus on neoliberal globalization, free trade and social economy; in the second, environmental-humanitarian cluster the focal points are human rights, environmental protection and development; and in the third, political cluster I concentrate on transparency, accountability and participatory democracy. This analysis will give us a deeper insight into the examined issues and thus enable us to summarize and compare the concrete attitudes of the two actors on different levels; at the same time we will be able to see how the EU perceives the alter-globalization movement regarding these issues and vice versa.

RESEARCH DESIGN

In accordance with the aim of this text I concentrate on two actors – the European Union and the alter-globalization movement – and their discourses. As the main research method, I use discursive analysis, through which I will try to refer to common elements present in the discourses of the EU and the alter-globaliza-

tion movement.¹ The study will deal with 9 basic issues (neoliberal globalization, free trade, social economy, human rights, environment protection, development, transparency, accountability and participatory democracy), which will be structured into 3 clusters: the economic, political and environmental-humanitarian clusters. In the analysis I concentrate on these issues because they represent specific value paradigms of both the EU and the alter-globalization movement for which these actors are recognized or attractive.² The issues repeatedly appear in declarations, statements and other documents published by the two actors.

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A total of 28 documents are analyzed in this text, 14 published by the EU and 14 released as a part of the WSF and the ESF between 2000 and 2010. The chosen period starts at the time of the visible rise of the alter-globalization movement (after the November 1999 Seattle demonstrations) and covers the following ten years, during which the alter-globalization movement's participants regularly met at World and European Social Forums. In the case of the EU, predominantly Green and White Papers were used but important treaties and declarations issued during these 10 years were also utilized. In the case of the alter-globalization movement, the documents were regularly published once a year (WSF) or once every two years (ESF). In each document, all particular issues are identified, analyzed and assigned to one of the clusters. Then it is possible to compare the declaratory attitudes of both the EU and the alter-globalization movement and thus refer to the consonance or clash between the two discourses. The hypothesis is that the EU and the alter-globalization movement have the same declaratory aims and even expressly support each other in their opposition to neoliberal globalization, and thus they recognize each other as actors. This hypothesis is based on the general awareness of the EU as an actor which defines itself as an international human rights advocate, environmental guardian and sustainable development puller³ and the self presentation of the alter-globalization movement as a defender of human rights, the environment and social equality.⁴

THE ACTORNESS OF THE EU AND THE ALTER-GLOBALIZATION MOVEMENT

In this article I understand the EU and the alter-globalization

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movement as actors and I use the actorness concept to study their mutual relationships. Actorness is the ability to express interests and defend these interests on the international field. In the case of the EU, this concept is used to describe its role as an international actor and its position between super powers in a globalized world.⁵ It is a theoretical concept which is discussed within academic debates in terms of its four dimensions: legitimacy,⁶ recognition,⁷ framing⁸ and attractiveness.⁹

In this article we will be mostly dealing with the EU as an actor recognized on the international field by the alter-globalization movement regarding the examined issues. Conceptions as Europeanization,¹⁰ gravity centres,¹¹ normative power,¹² civilian power¹³ or soft power¹⁴ depict EU as a unique actor regarding the values it represents (both internally and externally) and the issues it promotes in the international arena. The EU is seen (and often perceives itself) as a leader in global environmental policy;¹⁵ as an important player regarding human rights, humanitarian aid and development policies;¹⁶ and as a source of inspiration for regionalism,¹⁷ internal governance¹⁸ and/or socio-economic models.¹⁹ It is necessary to admit that there is certainly a gap between declarations and concrete actions,²⁰ which is one of the reasons for the friction between the EU and social movements, although their declared aims are very similar, which I will demonstrate on the analysis of the relevant documents.

The second actor whose discourse I will focus on is the alter-globalization movement, which is also sometimes labeled the anti-globalization movement, the global justice movement or the movement against neoliberal globalization.²¹ On the international field the movement presents itself as an actor seeking for "another world"²² or "another Europe"²³ in many respects, including those of human rights, peace, social equality, justice, a world without war, imperialism, and the hegemony of capitalism,²⁴ and it is also recognized as such by the actors in academic debates²⁵ and by international institutions (e.g. the World Bank).²⁶ According to the social movement's theories, the mobilization of the movement is connected with building a collective identity which is based on common values, common aims and a common enemy.²⁷ These values and positions will be observed in the documents published during the WSF and the ESF, including the focus on a concrete recognition

of the EU as an international actor in the documents.

DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

In the following paragraph I will go through three specified clusters and the issues they include. For each cluster, I will deal with the alter-globalization movement first and the EU second, and afterwards I will summarize the gained information in short concluding remarks.

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The economic cluster: neoliberal globalization, free trade and social economy.

In this area, statements which refer to local, regional or global economic issues are examined. The neoliberal globalization represents a process in which a specific set of instruments is used (deregulation, privatization, market liberalization, etc.), and it deeply changes the conditions of both global and national economies.²⁸ The current state of free trade is one of the consequences of this process, and due to its relation to the development of the "third" world, it is an important topic for both the movement and the EU. At the same time economic globalization undermines national states' social security systems and thus it can represent a threat for the EU's socio-economic model.²⁹

THE ALTER-GLOBALIZATION MOVEMENT

Neoliberal globalization, global capitalism and the current state of free trade are in the centre of the alter-globalization movement's radical criticism; the movement claims a 'total rejection of the neo-liberal policies of globalization'³⁰ and opposition 'to neo-liberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism'.³¹ Neoliberal policies are seen as "destructive",³² as they destroy 'the rights, living conditions and livelihoods of people'.³³ Moreover the sustainability of the current system is doubted: 'neoliberal globalization itself is in crisis: the threat of a global recession is ever present'.³⁴ The movement perceives globalization as a complex process with various consequences outside the economic area – e.g. in terms of social rights, environmental security and cultural aspects: 'We reiterate our opposition to the neoliberal system which generates economic, social and environmental crises and produces

war. Our mobilization against war and deep social and economic injustices has served to reveal the true face of neo-liberalism.’³⁵

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The neoliberal free trade imposed by the WTO³⁶ is seen as unjust: ‘free trade is anything but free’.³⁷ Free trade agreements, including the FTAA, NAFTA, CAFTA, AGOA, NEPAD, Euro-Med, AFTA and ASEAN, are rejected while it is claimed that a new trading system should be able to guarantee ‘full employment, food security, fair terms of trade and local prosperity’.³⁸ The proposed economic model is a “social economy” which should contribute to ‘fair, mutual, democratic and equitable development’.³⁹ Although already in the first half of the decade, the ‘European order based on corporate power and neo-liberalism’ was criticized as leading to a weakening of human rights and a worsening of the state of the environment,⁴⁰ the European Union has been intensively mentioned only since the process of the creation and ratification of the “European Constitution”, which is labeled as a “neoliberal project”, began.⁴¹

*In recent years, the popular struggles against neo-liberalism and imperialism in the Americas and in other parts of the World have generated a crisis of legitimacy for the neo-liberal system and its institutions. The most recent expressions of this are the defeat of the FTAA in Mar del Plata and the Agreement for a European Constitution in France and Holland.*⁴²

Thus, next to the IMF, WB or WTO, the ‘neo-liberal policies of the states and the European Union’⁴³ are also opposed – e.g. the Ministerial Declaration of the WTO in Hong Kong is supposed to be ‘the fruit of European Union and United States intimidation tactics’.⁴⁴ The European Union is seen to be like the IMF in the sense that it is an actor proposing economic measures with ambivalent social consequences:⁴⁵ ‘The policies of the EU based on the unending extension of competition within and outside Europe constitute an attack on employment, workers and welfare rights, public services, education, the health system and so on.’⁴⁶ This is understood as a retreat from the original values of the EU: ‘On the European level, we are witnessing a liberal and anti-social front on all domains... decisions of the European Court of Justice, dismantling of the Common Agricultural Policy, reinforcement of Fortress Europe against migrants, weakening of democratic and civil rights and growing repression, economic cooperation agreements.’⁴⁷ Concerning the internal economic issues, it is especially the Directive on services in

the internal market⁴⁸ and decisions on working time and migrant labor that lie in the centre of debate.⁴⁹ To sum up, in the eyes of alter-globalists the neo-liberal globalization leads to an unjust and unfair free trade system which is contrary to a social economy that should be able to guarantee full employment or local prosperity, and the EU is taking part in this neo-liberal project; the movement draws the line between itself and the EU, which is criticized along with the IMF and the governments for, e.g. enforcement of social spending cuts.⁵⁰

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Considering the EU's economic actorness, one of the sources of the attractiveness of the EU is its socio-economic model, which is based on a specific value scheme and which for, e.g. Latino American countries represents an alternative to a neo-liberal economy.⁵¹ The economic discourse of the EU pinpoints the social-market economy which contributes to the sustainable development of Europe and 'combines economic success and social responsibility':⁵²

'National economic and social policies are built on shared values such as solidarity and cohesion, equal opportunities and the fight against all forms of discrimination, adequate health and safety in the workplace, universal access to education and healthcare, quality of life and quality in work, sustainable development and the involvement of civil society. These values represent a European choice in favour of a social market economy'.⁵³

But the EU demonstrates its actorness outside the area of Europe as well. The Agreement for a European Constitution declares that the aim of the EU's external policies is, among others, to 'encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade'.⁵⁴ Such a defined aim is not in contradiction with neoliberal economic doctrine. Besides this, the Commission admits that the international trade policy of the EU is derived from the rules that agree with the agreements of the WTO about free trade and externally uses protective measures against free trade violation.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, at the same time the EU declares that 'striking the right balance between free trade and fair trade is crucial'.⁵⁶ The Commission recognizes that the difference between the rich

and the poor countries is growing: 'We must promote free and fair trade which will benefit not just Europe but the poorest countries as well.'⁵⁷ In this respect the proposal is made that a Globalization Adjustment Fund whose objective would be to balance the inequalities brought by globalization processes should be created.⁵⁸

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Globalization is seen as both a challenge and a threat, especially regarding the competitiveness of the EU in its relations with China or India.⁵⁹ 'Globalization does not mean that if others get richer, we must get poorer. Prosperity is a dynamic concept. Globalization is the chance to increase the size of the whole cake, so that everybody gets a slice.'⁶⁰ Thus globalization is not understood as a process that should be fundamentally amended but rather as an unavoidable process to which the internal mechanisms of the EU should be accommodated ("modernization") so that the competitiveness of the European economy would be ensured. The perception of globalization is thus rather economic and one of the proposed reactions is to help those who have lost their jobs to find a new one.⁶¹ A key to combatting the poverty is particularly the support of economic growth in developing countries instead of financial development aid.⁶² This growth should be accompanied by investment support in targeted countries or by protection of socially disadvantaged people. According to the Lisbon Treaty, the external policy of the EU should 'encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade.'⁶³ On the other hand the Commission declares that '25 countries with shared values and strong institutions acting together' have 'a real chance to shape globalization, in areas like trade, international labor rules or tackling global health or security threats', because Europe is 'the most important aid donor giving leverage in terms of social justice and human rights around the world, and the leading proponent of multi-lateral solutions to environmental and the other challenges of sustainable development.'⁶⁴ The common market and the Euro enable a country to withstand the international competition and to influence the world economy.⁶⁵ These statements prove that the EU counts itself as a recognized actor.

SUMMARY

Regarding the economic cluster, a recognition of the EU is expressed by the alter-globalization movement. Nevertheless, although the EU declares the necessity of tackling globalization while maintaining social justice, human rights and environmental protection, it is still perceived by the movement as a part of the neo-liberal economic system. Although both actors are using the same terms (free trade, fair trade, social (market) economy, jobs creation) and perceive globalization as a threat or at least a challenge, they do not find harmony in terms of agreeing on a solution to the mentioned problems (deregulation vs. protection).

EU and Alter-Globalization Movement's Actorness

THE ENVIRONMENTAL-HUMANITARIAN CLUSTER: Human Rights, Environment Protection and Development.

In this part of the article I focus on “humane” values (equality, solidarity, justice, peace) and environment protection with an emphasis on the global consciousness which is in the core of both discourses and thus can be supposed to symbolize the highest rate of accordance between both actors. The alter-globalization movement highlights these issues in its demands (while neo-liberalism is stigmatized), and these issues are also ascribed to it in academic debates.⁶⁶ Very similarly, the EU builds its external attractiveness on issues of global responsibility and is perceived as doing so in academic literature.⁶⁷

THE ALTER-GLOBALIZATION MOVEMENT

For the movement the crucial problem is seen in neo-liberal policies and therefore it seeks alternatives ‘to a process of globalization commanded by the large multinational corporations and by the governments and international institutions at the service of those corporations’ interests; these alternatives should ‘respect universal human rights, and those of all citizens – men and women – of all nations and the environment and will rest on democratic international systems and institutions at the service of social justice, equality and the sovereignty of people.’⁶⁸ The required policies should be able to ‘solve the problems of exclusion and social inequality that the process of capitalist globalization with its racist, sexist and environmentally destructive dimensions is creating internationally and within countries.’⁶⁹ Globalization is thus understood as a complex

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process with interconnected consequences, and when globalization is in its neo-liberal form, these consequences are seen as mostly negative. Human, ecological and social rights should have supremacy over the economic interests, and people should be “put before profits”.⁷⁰ Global consciousness and cosmopolitanism are traced in the documents as well: ‘we commit ourselves to enriching the construction of a society based on a life lived in harmony with oneself, others and the world around (“el buen vivir”)’.⁷¹

Values represented by the movement include equality, universal rights, social justice, respect for diversity and solidarity “among people, ethnicities, genders and peoples”. In turn, the movement condemns sexism, racism, homophobia, patriarchy, exclusion and domination as well as, e.g., secret prisons. Its concrete demands cover rights to food, water, education, healthcare, housing and energy.⁷² Over time, a slight shift appeared in the alter-globalization movement’s relations towards the European Union, and this shift can be understood either as a sign of the movement’s disappointment with the EU’s policies, which have shifted towards neo-liberalism, or as a sign of the movement’s gradual recognition of the EU as an actor able to influence world politics. Despite this, regarding humanitarian-environmental issues, it was rather the UN that was perceived as an attractive and recognized actor by the movement;⁷³ the position of the movement is actually derived from the UN universal rights conception because ‘civic, political, economic, social and cultural rights, both individual and collective, are indivisible and should be guaranteed through international treaties’,⁷⁴ and governments should ‘respect their obligations to the international human rights instruments’.⁷⁵ This means that human rights and social justice are universal and indivisible and that they should take precedence over economic interests in international relations.

The movement recognizes the seriousness of climatic change for “all humanity” and supports efforts for multilateral environmental solutions, e.g. CO₂ emissions reduction.⁷⁶ Air, water and land should be protected, not treated as commodities, and multilateral environmental agreements should be obeyed.⁷⁷ Instead of genetically modified organisms (GMO), sustainable agricultural processes are supported in order to maintain biodiversity.⁷⁸ Concerning developing countries, two important instruments are mentioned in most documents: debt relief and the Tobin tax.⁷⁹ Debt creates a burden that

represents an obstacle to further development of the countries. The financial aid of debt relief, which is supplemented by the support of the amounts of money that are collected through the Tobin Tax, is believed to be a partial solution to the problem and even an obligation of first world countries.⁸⁰ No humanitarian or development activities of the EU, the World Bank or individual countries are recognized and supported; on the contrary the neo-liberal system is blamed for the damage to the developing countries' economics and environments.⁸¹

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The European Union defines itself unambiguously as an actor worthy of recognition but also as an attractive actor by means of the values it represents:

*'In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.'*⁸²

The EU stands on the values of 'respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities'. These values should be defended both internally ('the Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples')⁸³ and externally ('the European Union will continue to promote democracy, stability and prosperity beyond its borders').⁸⁴ The EU struggles for a 'sustainable development; meeting the environmental challenge; contributing to regional peace and stability'.⁸⁵ On the international field the Union builds on the principles of 'democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law' and develops partnerships with countries and organizations which share these values.⁸⁶ Other declared aims include preserving peace, prevention of

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conflicts, supporting developing countries, eradication of poverty, and protection of the environment.⁸⁷ The Laeken Declaration analyzes global threats, including poverty, racism and regional conflicts, while the EU is seen as a sphere of “humane” values, democracy and human rights.⁸⁸ Thus the EU is an actor that should, with respect to these values, change the direction of globalization so that its positive effects would be more justly spread between the ‘rich countries but also the poorest’.⁸⁹ Again, the EU clearly demonstrates its aspirations to be an internationally recognized actor or even a leader in the area of “humane” values.⁹⁰

The EU declares a ban on all forms of discrimination, including discrimination based on gender, race or ethnicity, nationality, religion, age or sexual orientation.⁹¹ ‘Women and men enjoy equal rights’.⁹² Although the Green Book is focused on internal matters of the EU, ‘the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination ... represent a cornerstone of the fundamental rights and values that underpin today’s European Union’.⁹³ The Commission highlights that the EU has an important role in enforcing a non-discriminatory approach on the international scene – e.g. the World Conference against Racism and Xenophobia in 2001. The EU’s ‘anti-discrimination legislation is among the most advanced in the world and is widely regarded as an effective model’.⁹⁴ Although most documents express protection of human rights, especially in the area of the EU, the statements also include the “developing” or “poorest” countries of the third world that are affected by globalization processes.

The Union commits itself to environmental protection, ‘promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems’,⁹⁵ particularly ‘combating climate change’.⁹⁶ But the Union is aware that particular goals may be in contradiction and therefore stresses ‘averting the global threat of climate change’⁹⁷ while acknowledging that ‘the need to address climate change cannot be a reason to limit efforts to lift the world’s poorest citizens out of poverty’.⁹⁸ The climate change combat endangers poverty eradication as the former demands huge financial resources but the EU is not willing to undergo an abandonment of the principles of its development policy because challenging global poverty is ‘one of Europe’s core values, goals and interests’.⁹⁹

The policy of the EU in the area of development aid is performed with the aim of ‘the reduction and, in the long term, the

eradication of poverty'.¹⁰⁰ The Commission refers to the Millennium Development Goals and admits that although many goals have been reached, 'around 1.5 billion people still live in extreme poverty (half of them in Sub-Saharan Africa) and one sixth of the world's population is undernourished' and therefore 'for the Union development assistance remains a matter of solidarity, of commitment and of mutual interest'.¹⁰¹ Also the pursuit of change of governance systems is an integral part of development policy in supported countries so that legitimate democratic administrations, including contributions of civil societies which would be able to guarantee peace and human rights, would be ensured.¹⁰² 'The European Union wants to promote freedom and development in the world. We want to drive back poverty, hunger and disease. We want to continue to take a leading role in that fight'.¹⁰³ The EU declares its clear willingness to be a leading international actor in development policy, which is perceived as an instrument of external policy that enables the spread of European values beyond the borders of the EU.¹⁰⁴

EU and Alter-Globalization Movement's Actorness

SUMMARY

Although there is a strong accordance between the EU and the alter-globalization discourses regarding environmental-humanitarian issues, only indirect references of support for the other group were found on both sides. The EU declares that a key role in challenging discrimination should be ascribed to civil society.¹⁰⁵ The movement refers to the labor protection of the ILO and to the UN Charter as well as to the EU.¹⁰⁶ Both actors refer in their declarations to the Charter of the UN but still the EU is viewed by the movement as 'Fortress Europe', an organization which does not fulfill the rights of migrants and asylum seekers and limits their freedom of movement and their prospects of gaining citizenship.¹⁰⁷ Despite the EU's efforts to become a leader in a multilateral solution to climate change or development policy, the movement expressed no real support for the EU.

THE POLITICAL CLUSTER: transparency, accountability and participatory democracy

The movement's demands on the principles of governance functioning can be summarized by dividing them into three areas: trans-

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parency, accountability and participation.¹⁰⁸ In the Commission's White Book, the EU presents principles of openness (which can be understood as an equivalent to transparency), accountability and participation (in the sense of representation via national, regional and local governments), adding effectiveness and coherence. Some supposed discursive junctions will be analyzed in the following lines.¹⁰⁹

THE ALTER-GLOBALIZATION MOVEMENT

Concerning transparency and accountability the movement states that 'people have the right to know about and criticize the decisions of their own governments'.¹¹⁰ States and institutions of governance (the movement addresses mainly the WTO, the IMF and the WB) should be accountable regarding their policies, especially in developing countries.¹¹¹ Without access to information and reflection, no responsible participation is possible. As they lack the attributes of transparency, accountability and participation, the international institutions (WTO, IMF, NATO) or G8 'have no legitimacy in the eyes of the people' and thus the movement 'will continue to protest against their measures'.¹¹² At the same time the movement understands that these principles must be applied to civil society (the movement itself) as well and feels 'the need to constitute a network of movements that is responsive, flexible and sustainable' yet 'also broad and transparent'.¹¹³

Nevertheless, the core of the procedural demands of the movement is represented by participative forms of democracy which enable active citizenship; 'the practices of real democracy, participatory democracy', are supported.¹¹⁴ This arrangement is understood as a better alternative to representative democracy, as the example of Porto Alegre is frequently cited in this respect, but representative democracy is not refused because the movement supports 'the establishment of electoral and participative democracy across the world'.¹¹⁵ Participative democracy is perceived as an effective way of providing legitimacy. Maybe surprisingly, the EU is placed in the same category as institutions like the IMF or the WTO; it is a target of criticism regarding the Constitutional Treaty because the document was allegedly not publicly discussed to a sufficient extent. Despite any declaration of the EU, the movement states that

‘This Constitutional Treaty consecrates neo-liberalism as the official doctrine of the EU; it makes competition the basis for European Community law, and indeed for all human activity; it completely ignores the objectives of ecologically sustainable society. This Constitutional Treaty does not grant equal rights, the free movement of people and citizenship for everyone in the country they live in, whatever their nationality; it gives NATO a role in European foreign policy and defense, and pushes for the militarization of the EU. Finally it puts the market first by marginalizing the social sphere, and hence accelerating the destruction of public services.’¹¹⁶

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For the movement this is the reason to mobilize and struggle for collective and individual rights which are endangered by the shifts in the EU’s policy towards laissez-faire policies.¹¹⁷

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Concerning political procedures, the EU is aware of its deficiencies: in 2000 the EU recognized the right for access to information, which means an openness of the system, but only on the level of transparency.¹¹⁸ Later the Commission admitted that the distrust towards politicians, the disinterest for politics and the alienation between institutions and citizens are rising, in other words that the EU policies, as well as the policies of national and global institutions, suffer from a lack of legitimacy.¹¹⁹ The Green Book published in 2006 declares the importance of transparency, accountability and participation, as these qualities contribute to the legitimacy of institutions.¹²⁰ The openness of the institutions, which is the answer to their insufficient legitimacy, should be reached through wider opportunities for direct participation of the citizens and growing accountability, among others with the contribution of civil society. Civil society is given a crucial role in the mediation of information about the interests and needs between citizens and institutions as well as an important part in development policies on the global level.¹²¹ Again, the Laeken Declaration acknowledges the entitlement of the Union’s citizens to democracy, transparency and also legitimacy of power. In its conclusion, the commitment is made to create a Constitution which will be discussed through public debate and which should guarantee citizen rights and thus contribute to a more effective functioning of the EU and a strengthening of dem-

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ocratic procedures.¹²² But the EU indirectly addresses social movements, claiming that ‘participation is not about institutionalizing protest’¹²³ although the EU defines civil society empirically as an organized civil society which should moderate critics and protest. The EU prefers to create institutionalized and structured relations with civil society organizations which are open and accountable themselves.¹²⁴

It is obvious that representative democracy is a key political principle of the EU because the EU’s functioning shall be founded on it, as representative democracy means above all representation by the European Parliament.¹²⁵ Nevertheless, there is a certain space for participative democracy, both on an individual basis and through civil society: ‘The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action’ and ‘shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society’ and thus ‘in order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible’.¹²⁶ But the movement uses unconventional means of political action, and the Commission recognizes these untraditional “democratic” channels of participation, declaring that ‘young people are now less committed than in the past to the traditional structures for political and social action (e.g. parties, trade unions), and they have a low level of involvement in democratic consultation’.¹²⁷ Therefore, ‘it is up to the public authorities to bridge the gap between young people’s eagerness to express their opinions and the methods and structures which society offers. Failure to do so might fuel the “citizenship” deficit, or even encourage protest’.¹²⁸ The EU prefers an involvement of people through traditional political channels and is willing to shape these channel so that this kind of involvement would be possible.

In the White Book on Governance the Commission accepts global responsibility and its part in defining of the principles of global governance institutions to which non-governmental actors from the third countries should also be invited.¹²⁹ In the case of the EU the reform of European governance is apprehended also as a means of strengthening the EU as an internationally recognized actor and therefore ‘the Union’s first step must be to reform gover-

nance successfully at home in order to enhance the case for change at an international level.¹³⁰ Accenting the global dimension should strengthen the EU's bargaining position on the international field and thus contribute to its advocacy of greater transparency, effectiveness and legitimacy for global institutions such as the WTO.¹³¹ This suggests that the EU is aware of the legitimacy deficiency of international institutions and at the same time it believes that the proven EU governance patterns could help improve this situation.

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SUMMARY

The movement strives for the transfer of decision-making to the local level (e.g. Porto Alegre) and more transparency and accountability, similarly to the EU. Also, regarding the adoption of European governance mechanisms by global governance which is envisioned by scholars and the EU itself, the movement believes that "another Europe for another world" should be built up.¹³² But the crucial dispute in the political area revolves around direct participation. In the alter-globalization discourse "direct participation" means the ability of the citizens to decide, preferably on a local level, about the matters at issue, while the EU discourse agrees with "direct participation" only when it is seen as participation through the institutionalized channels of initiatives or consultations.

CONCLUSION

Although originally my hypothesis was that based on the general declarations of both of the actors – the EU and the alter-globalization movement – the empirical research would show that the declaratory aims are in accordance and that therefore there is a mutual support between the two actors, only the first part of the statement seems to be correct. Although on the general level the rate of consensus is quite high, in political practice the actors are in opposition to each other. The table below shows that in eight of the nine studied issues, the discourses show an accordance with each other and some accordance can even be found on deeper level of analysis. On one hand, this shows a paradox which can be explained by two factors on the side of the movement:

- I. the movement's general distrust towards established politi-

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- cal structures,
2. the movement's particular disappointment with weak EU policies and the gap between the EU's discourse and its political actions. On the side of the EU the traditional political participation processes are preferred and therefore the demands of the movement are seen as suffering from a lack of legitimacy. On the other hand, both actors recognize each other in some respects although the EU is recognized by the movement much more markedly.

Table 1: Issue consensus or contradiction

Issue	Consensus on general level	Deeper level consensus or contradiction.
Neoliberal globalization	YES	More or less consensus but the EU prefers European responsibility over global responsibility. The movement still perceives the EU as a part of the neo-liberal system.
Free trade	YES	Different opinions as to what is "free" and also what constitutes fair trade. The movement does not believe that the WTO and its way of promoting free trade is a route to a really free and fair trade.
Social economy	YES	The EU prefers to guarantee its social-market economy model, which is not social, just and equal enough for the movement.
Human rights	YES	Consensus but not enough is being done by the EU according to the movement's opinions.
Environmental protection	YES	The EU and the movement support multilateral agreements but no direct mutual support is expressed.
Development	YES	The EU supports aid other than financial aid while the movement calls for debt relief and responsible financial flows.
Transparency	YES	Both actors strive for openness of governance systems – information dissemination.
Accountability	YES	Both actors strive for accountability of governance systems – evaluation of policies and their responsible adjustment.
Participatory democracy	NO	The EU prefers representative over participative democracy while the movement encourages direct participation on all levels, especially the local one. The EU recognizes "protest" movements.

Concerning economic issues, free trade and even fair trade are supported in both cases but the conceptions of what is free trade fundamentally differ. Current free trade arrangements, according to the movement, are unjust and only proliferate inequality and poverty. Although the EU admits that the WTO suffers from a lack of legitimacy, it supports the arrangements created within this organization. That can be a reason for why the EU is ranked among neo-liberal institutions by the movement and is therefore recognized rather as an “enemy” than as an ally. In environmental and humanitarian issues the EU profiles itself as a global value leader and aspires to be a leading actor regarding human rights, environmental protection and development policy. Still, the EU is not positively recognized by the alter-globalization movement, although, e.g. the UN conceptions dealing with these issues, including the necessity of poverty eradication, are supported by both actors. In political issues both actors seem to recognize each other even though they tend to recognize each other in a negative sense. The EU does not approve of the protest activities although it acknowledges that young people also require untraditional ways of political participation. The EU admits its deficiencies and even commits itself to taking part in global governance redefinition so that institutions such as the WTO would be more democratic. On the other hand the movement demands even more openness from the EU institutions and member state governments. This indicates that the constructions of both discourses work with the same terminologies but lead to very different interpretations, which causes the movement to recognize the EU as a part of neo-liberal economic system when it comes to the examined issues. At the same time the movement is recognized as a rather illegitimate actor due to the unconventional means through which it expresses its demands. Although both actors could probably strengthen their position in their promotion of some of their declared aims on the international field by supporting each other, this opportunity remains unutilized.

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RESEARCH ARTICLES
BOOK REVIEWS
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POLITICS AND POLICIES IN POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION: PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PRIVATISATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

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By Karoly Attila Soos, Central European University Press, 2010,
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The economic and political transition of the post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe is ranked among the most important events of the past twenty-odd years. The way that the various countries handled such transitions continue to have impact their political and economic situations today. Soos provides a comprehensive and detailed account of the dynamics of one aspect of these transitions; privatisation. Specifically, Soos compares the methods and speed of privatisation, for medium and large non-financial companies, in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. As the title of the book suggests, Soos attributes differences in the privatisation process to the politics of the countries under scrutiny and, more specifically, the influence of former Communist elites.

The first substantive chapter of the book provides a general overview of some of the debates surrounding the issue of privatisation and corporate ownership. The Anglo-Saxon model, which consists of a number of individual owners with smaller shares, and the European (continental) model, which is defined by larger shareholders, are presented as the basic choices of corporate ownership for privatising companies. However, as Soos points out in relation to the above choice as well as several other aspect of privatisation, the case of the post-Communist countries was unique and did not neatly follow the classical prescription. Choices made in privatisa-

tion were driven less by long-term economic concerns and more by political motivations and reality.

Following the more general discussion of privatisation, a specific discussion of the two phases of privatisation is offered. Soos breaks privatisation down into primary and secondary privatisation. Primary privatisation involves the initial movement of company ownership from the government to private owners. In almost all of the countries covered in the book – the exception being Hungary – primary privatisation resulted in (somewhat) scattered ownership of companies. This is largely due to the use of mass voucher privatisation and privatisation that centred on managers and employees of the company. Hungary had a much larger share of foreign investors than the other five countries, which contributed to a greater concentration in ownership. Secondary privatisation consisted of the move from the somewhat scattered ownership that resulted from the primary phase to fewer owners with larger shares. The discussion and separation of privatisation into these two phases is one of the more interesting aspects of the book. Much of the book is devoted to a very detailed comparison of the various methods and processes used in the six countries and Soos's extensive knowledge is demonstrated to great effect. However, on occasion, the discussion is perhaps too detailed and the broader picture becomes lost somewhat in an onslaught of numbers. The data presented is important and valuable, but could be displayed in a way that better highlights the main argument of the book.

The final two substantive chapters focus on the speed of secondary privatisation and why the countries of Russia, Slovenia and Ukraine lagged behind the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Soos offers an explanation that essentially results from the type of political transition that occurred. Russia, Slovenia and Ukraine are characterised as having soft transitions, meaning a number of former Communist elites maintained positions of authority in the new governments. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland had hard transitions resulting in less influence by former elites. The distinction between these two types of transitions is important because it had an impact on the two immediate factors that Soos argues account for the variation in the speed of secondary privatisation. One is the method of primary privatisation. In the countries with hard transitions, various forms of mass and voucher privatisation, as well

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as foreign investors in the case of Hungary, in primary privatisation created a better environment for secondary privatisation to take place. In the soft transition countries, insider privatisation dominated and the incentives for individual owners to sell shares was far less than in the hard transition countries.

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The second explanation also derives from the type of political transition. The role of the government in ownership and management was greater in the soft transition countries than in the hard transition countries. The influence of the government reduced the interest of large investors because it created uncertainty in the future of companies, particularly related to property rights. Related to this was the imposition of tax-type, informal payments on companies by governments in the soft transition countries. These activities added to the uncertainty as well as increased the cost to potential investors. Soos offers some qualifiers in respect to Slovenia and argues that the transition there was more gradual in nature and was more influenced by ideological concerns than in Russia or Ukraine. The link that Soos makes between the type of political transition and the speed of secondary privatisation is arguably the most important contribution of the book and is an important one.

However, once again the book suffers slightly from presentation issues. The aforementioned link should be the highlight of the book. However, it is presented toward the end of the book and receives far less attention than the description of the methods of primary and secondary privatisation. Explaining the theoretical framework of the book at the beginning and further elaborating on its implications would provide important context for the more descriptive chapters of the book.

All things considered, Soos's book is a valuable addition to the literature on the post-Communist transitions and contributes greatly to our understanding of the importance of these transitions. The book is useful to researchers who want a very detailed account of the processes of privatisation as well as to those who are looking for a more general explanation of the interaction between the political and economic transitions of post-Communist countries.

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN EUROPE: CHARACTER, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

By Gillian Wylie and Penny McRedmond, (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, 2010,
ISBN 9780230229099

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REVIEWER: ANGELINA STANOJOSKA
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Human history is replete with examples of countries founded on slavery, which believed that the exploitation of slaves was not immoral. Rather, that slaves were simply inferior to others and deserve their circumstances. Modern slavery – bearing similar but not identical hallmarks of past practices – has taken on new lingo, such as human trafficking, which in fact is the trading of people over boundaries for the purpose of enslavement. Slavery and society have been, and continue to be, walking side by side.

Wylie and McRedmond's (eds) work, *Human Trafficking in Europe: Character, Causes and Consequences* is a modern slavery encyclopaedia consisting of 13 chapters and although not formally divided into parts, three distinctive thematic sections are clearly visible.

Firstly, the authors provide a general section that introduces human trafficking in Europe, develop adequate definitions and explain some wider characteristics, causes and consequences of the phenomenon. Secondly, the work reveals that modern slavery is ever-present; visible in developed and developing countries alike. The works that comprise this part are based on the authors' own countries and produce vivid depictions of human trafficking, its etiology, and its victims quite literally in their own neighbourhoods. Finally, the latter parts of the work are dedicated to international and European policies aimed at the suppression and prevention of human trafficking. In short, this book provides a wide readership, even those unacquainted to the phenomena, sufficient information about its dynamics and central characteristics.

It commences with a thematic introduction by Wylie and McRedmond's which adequately sets the tone for the subsequent

sections by defining the scope and subject of inquiry and weighing in to the discussion on questions of legality and legitimacy while determining key causes.

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The introduction is logically followed by Munck's contribution which argues that human trafficking is best understood as a more modern way to use antiquated methods and explains root causes that are relevant to our own times. Drawing parallels between past slavery to more modern forms, both are characterised by relatively low costs for purchasing slaves, high profits for traffickers, a short time relation between the slave and trafficker, a large number of potential slaves and a general irrelevance of ethnic differences.

Arocha changes the pace of the book by theorising on slavery through a distinctly (neo)Marxist vantage; a lens that views slavery as a consequence of pre-capitalist societies and suggests economic development as a solution. This is a particularly important chapter since it readies readers for understanding the exploitation of certain segments of society, points further elaborated in the subsequent chapter by Divitti who explores the most vulnerable, children who historically and more contemporarily have been treated as merchandise. Davitti analyses child trafficking from Afghanistan to the United Kingdom and links such actions to international military interventions, the new restrictive migration politics and with global economic development.

The following six subsequent chapters review human trafficking in different countries, each of which serves as a case study. Some are countries of origin while others are countries of destination. Specifically, these chapters offer detailed information about the characteristics, phenomenology, the implementation of international and European legal instruments, state policies for its prevention and suppression, and for reducing of the demand of human trafficking. Wisniewski, Poole, Deighan, Ward and Wylie, Papendreu and Moritz, and Nanu, explore the situations in Poland, Albania, Russia, Ukraine, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Germany and Moldova respectively.

Following the more empirical central parts of this work, Jobe presents a post-script of trafficking victims after being saved. Through the experiences of 23 trafficked women with the British official authorities, the Jobe traces the victims' psychology vis-a-vis the denial of help, long asylum processes and restrictive immigra-

tion policies (in the UK).

The Palermo Protocol connects human trafficking with transnational organised criminality and attempts to widely define the phenomenon. However, the definition remains unaccepted as mainstream. With this in mind, McRedmond further elaborates the roles played by organised criminals in modern slavery and works to refine the understandings of the interaction between clandestine traffickers, victims and international approaches to combating the former.

Such theorising also requires empirical testing, a task accepted by Farka who assesses the human trafficking of Albanian children to Greece, and of Albania's legislation and the international law implemented in its codes.

This edited volume is dedicated to comprehending human trafficking and acts as a source of knowledge regarding slavery. Comprehensively written, it commences from a global perspective and then turns to focusing on regional and national levels. The work does not omit discussion of the victims and places their needs and rights at the core of the human rights based approach to trafficking advanced throughout the pages of the text. Only through learning from their lives and forced sacrifices can the international community truly understand the entire, deranged process, help victims, prevent new victims and try 'to put modern slavery out of business' once and for all.

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RISK, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY: THE OTHER WAR ON TERROR

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By Yee-Kuang Heng and Kenneth McDonagh, Routledge, 2009
ISBN 9780415471961

*REVIEWER: EMMANOUELA MYLONAKI
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Since its commencement, the Bush Doctrine, a.k.a. the Global War on Terror (GwoT), has been defined and analysed by reference to military and other violent actions rather than by reference to the lower-profile aspects of global cooperation counter-terrorism strategies. This book aims at addressing the “other” war on terror which moves beyond military campaigns to several multilateral cooperative attempts to fight terrorism. The authors examine the following alternative less-noticed non-military aspects of the war on terror: 1. the campaign against terrorism financing, 2. the ad hoc US-led informal coalition of the willing in the Proliferation Security Initiative, and 3. the cooperation of states and private actors in issues relating to aviation security.

The authors argue for the importance of private actors in global governance as a source of capacity and expertise and make constructive suggestions on policy solutions for global governance frameworks in the “other” war on terror. The book is innovative in the sense that it concentrates on informal means of global governance which may result in the harmonisation of global risk based standards to the war on terror in areas which are generally under-researched such as civil aviation. The main argument is to move beyond purely violent and military actions against terrorism to more enhanced forms of international cooperation which has the potential of resulting in the victory of the “other” war on terror.

Following a detailed presentation in chapter one of the adopted theoretical framework, ideas about managing the World Risk Society and global governance literature are examined in chapter two in order to demonstrate ways by which global governance may help to manage risks. Chapter three examines in details the development

and activities of the Financial Action Task Force, its mechanisms and processes and assess its effectiveness in reducing terrorism risk. Chapter four focuses on the PSI attempt at counter-proliferation and mitigating the risks.

It demonstrates another dimension and manifestation of the wide spectrum and range of cooperative global governance efforts against terrorism, in terms of reducing the risks of terrorist obtaining weapons of mass destruction. The contemporary terrorism threat and the likelihood of terrorists getting access to weapons of mass destruction make the contribution significant and timely.

Chapter five looks at the role of private non-state actors in global aviation security, such as the global airline association IATA. The aviation case study demonstrate how private sector involvement might contribute to the fight against terrorism and the chapter highlights the fact that the managing of global transnational security risks needs to be extended beyond merely states alone to incorporate a range of non-state actors public and private at global, national and sub-national levels.

Chapters four and five are presented as empirical studies along with justified explanations as to the selection of the cases under investigation. Chapter five is quite innovative in the sense that it approaches civil aviation as an issue for global governance and demonstrates that global terrorist risk to aviation security demands a global response to manage it. Thus, it reinforces the importance of non-military aspects which have so far been underestimated. Interestingly, the authors are concerned with initiatives developed outside the UN framework which constitutes a distinctive feature of the book. The final chapter highlights some of the implications associated with the “other war” on terror and the legality implications that may arise from it.

The book contributes to the policy and academic debates on the war on terror and it could be of interest to students of international relations and political studies. It has a clear layout and is written in an accessible manner for students and academics alike. This is an innovative book in its approach and subject matter and offers a fresh perspective on issues generally overlooked by the literature.

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INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION

By Paul F. Diehl and J. Michael Greig, Polity, 2012,
ISBN 9780745653310

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REVIEWER: MARTINA BOHATOVÁ

Since violent conflict typically produces death, destruction suffering and misery, and given that nearly all international political and social actors laud the use of violence – though tend to use it regardless – the use of mediation for conflict resolution is among the most significant tools. Indeed, over the last decades, mediation has played a vital role in ending decades-long civil violence, enduring rivalries and interstate conflicts; hence the volume of research on this topic has steadily been expanding. Greig and Diehl's work: *International Mediation*, effectively summarises a chunk of the contemporary literature, deploys systematic data analysis and case studies and therefore have constructed a solid contribution to the field.

The book is divided into six chapters; each logically connected to the previous and subsequent chapters, providing readers with a strong flow of information that reinforces the arguments presented throughout.

The first substantive chapter – which also serves as the work's introduction – seeks to answer what mediation is, how it is used to manage conflicts in the international system and how it differs from other conflict management approaches. To do so, Greig and Diehl, attempt to explain the phraseology connected to mediation by evaluating some of the key terms such as: conciliation, consultation, pure mediation and power mediation. Attention is also paid to goals of mediation and the role of mediation in different stages and phases of conflict such as pre-violence, armed conflict, after a cease-fire and following a peace agreement. This chapter is concluded with a discussion of historic mediation efforts, the Oslo Accords and those embarked on to solve the Beagle Channel Dispute, which act as an empirical anchor.

Chapter two deals with changes to mediation over time, emphasising its frequency and explores the geographic areas where mediation is most commonly applied. To do so, Greig and Diehl deploy

Bercovitch's International Conflict Management and the Correlates of War Project datasets. The collection begins immediately following WWII and extends through until 1999, during which some 2632 mediation attempted, in 333 different conflicts, have been attempted. Given the extensiveness of such research, it is fairly certain that conclusions drawn may be considered as representative.

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The third chapter investigates those who provide mediation to conflicts and seeks to understand the interests (actual or needed) for third parties to expend its energies helping to resolve a conflict. Greig and Diehl focus on states, international organisation, non-governmental organisations, individuals and also cases where multiparty mediation is prioritised; balancing the pros and cons of each. This chapter is concluded with two case studies: mediation in the Burundian Civil War (1994-2005) and in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

The subsequent chapter (4) is devoted to successes and failures of mediation. Instead of paining in broad strokes, Greig and Diehl are concerned with the different stages of the mediation process: getting to the table, achieving some type of agreement and the implementation and durability of settlements. This chapter also finishes with empirical cases; this time on the development of MHS during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and the external intervention (and MHS) during the Bosnian War.

Chapter five looks at how mediation attempts are sequenced in relation to each other as well as other conflict management approaches and how peacekeeping operations influence the effectiveness of mediation. Key factors that affect settlement durability are also addressed here. The case Cyprus is deployed in this chapter.

Finally, the concluding chapter explores some challenges for further research and identifies problems that retaining an *ad hoc* system of mediation produce. Greig and Diehl explore several dimensions of the mainstream definition of mediation and provide readers the intellectual space to form their own opinion. Yet, towards the end of such definitional work they articulate their own approach as an extension of peaceful conflict resolution which involves an outsider – an individual, a group or an organisation – and which is non-coercive, non-violent and non-binding and usually developed on an *ad hoc* basis.

Greig and Diehl assume that states continue to be dominant in

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international relations and hence are providers of mediation—especially the US, UK, France and Russia. However, they do not omit the role of international organisations such as the UN, African Union, Organisation of American States, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Arab League. Additionally, not only the activities of non-governmental organisations such as the Catholic Church, the International Red Cross and the Quakers but also the activities private individuals with significant experience in governance, leadership in religious organisations or key positions in international organisations are evaluated. Regarding the motivations behind mediation, Greig and Diehl believe that humanitarian motives, national and organisational interests are the main engines behind third party involvement.

This book is broadly appealing to students, scholars and the interested public; it is replete with theories, reinforced by adequate case studies to facilitate greater – and more comprehensive – knowledge of the subject. Readers will surely appreciate the work's graphical layout, its contents enables easy navigation while appropriate appendixes include mediated conflicts with the start date and also number of total mediation efforts in the monitored period 1945-1999 certainly add an important exclamation point to this highly readable and informative text.

POWER IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER: THE US, RUSSIA AND CHINA

By Martin A. Smith, Polity, 2012,
ISBN 9780745634715

*Book
Reviews*

*REVIEWER: JAMES WHIBLEY
(VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON)*

Despite its status as a fundamental concept in International Relations (IR), defining or analysing how power works eludes many scholars. Martin A. Smith, a senior lecturer at the Sandhurst Royal Military Academy, provides a helpful guide to understanding how power operates and how states can undermine or strengthen their own power through the policy choices of leaders. Furthermore, by examining the recent foreign policies of the US, Russia, and China the book contributes an original analysis of the application of power and the future of the international order.

The book's two theoretical chapters analyse the different perspectives on how to understand power and what resources comprise power. Smith examines the concepts of power put forward by range of scholars across many decades, commenting on the works of Parsons, Dahl, Morgenthau, and Mearsheimer. Smith does not merely summarise each perspective however; he clarifies how states can use power and adds an intelligent analysis about the limitations of each author's conception of power. The book's central theoretical argument is that power is ill-defined and under-theorised in IR. Smith believes the best understanding of power comes from a sociological approach; viewing power as a social and relational construct. While Smith concedes power has a basis in the possession of material resources, power also exists within a framework of established norms, laws, and rules that shape state action (p. 11). Smith also provides a succinct discussion of networked power, raising doubts about the ability of communications technology to erase power imbalances between state and non-state actors, while admitting the usefulness of viewing power as a function of interactions and relationships.

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The book contends that power lies dormant until consciously activated by state leaders. Therefore, states can be more or less powerful than material resources suggest, depending on, 'the effectiveness and skill with which their leaders can harness their possession of relevant resources to achieve desired ends through interaction with others' (p. 14). Thinking about power as more than the sum of economic and military power is crucial for the effective use of diplomacy and Smith makes a convincing appeal for leaders to consider how the use of hard power affects perceptions of states legitimacy.

Building on this procedural view of power, Smith makes his own conceptual addition to the literature by distinguishing between "inferior" and "superior" power. The latter exists when an exercise of power leads to intended or preferred outcomes, while the former results from a voluntary act that has unintended, negative consequences (p. 16-17). The distinction between each type of power is useful, providing greater nuance and clarity to assertions about whether a policy represents deterioration in state power. Smith also deserves praise for contributing a more precise and nuanced view of Nye's concept of soft power, correctly asserting that the ideas underlying soft power are not without precedent in the literature. Moreover, Smith rescues the term from conceptual fuzziness by clearly delineating what counts as an exercise of soft power and the limitations to its use as a policy tool.

The case studies of US, Russian, and Chinese foreign policy from the 1990s to the present comprise the rest of the book. Despite many others having heavily scrutinised the Bush Administration's foreign policy, Smith is able to supply an original analysis that explains why the administration was indifferent to accusations that its policies were destructive to US international legitimacy. Nevertheless, Smith notes the ability of the Bush Administration to learn from experience and revert to a multilateral approach, while illustrating the necessity of maintaining international legitimacy, even under conditions of unipolarity.

The Russian case also provides a novel analysis, informing readers about the debate over multipolarity within Russia and recounting the almost total collapse of soft power in modern Russian foreign policy. The chapters on China's future foreign policy are particularly noteworthy for their even-handed approach to assessing Chinese power. Smith neither denies the growing presence of

China on the global stage nor exaggerates the risk China poses to the current international order. While the empirical chapters are valuable for providing a better understanding of each state's foreign policy, Smith underutilises the inferior/superior conception of power introduced at the book's opening, only briefly mentioning how either concept leads to a better understanding of the actions of Russian and Chinese leaders. The book's conclusion does go further in to exploring theoretical and policy implications of Smith's work, but is lamentably brief.

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The book employs a wealth of research, marshalling evidence from a number of secondary sources for a multi-disciplinary approach that synthesises analysis from sociology, political science, and philosophy. Despite the lack of original research, the book presents its evidence in a convincing manner and deserves to attract interest for skilfully including many classical and non-western thinkers in its analysis. The book is also highly up to date, including analysis of actions taken by the Obama administration and the recent events concerning the Arab Spring.

The book will be of use to scholars at any level but may especially appeal to students, as the book avoids overloading the reader with academic jargon and clearly defines terms and concepts. The book also remains very readable throughout and follows a similar structure in each chapter, creating a coherent argument. Despite any shortcomings, *Power in the Changing Global Order* is a valuable contribution to a literature that often fails to employ important terms with precision and serves as an important argument for the abiding nature of US power.

RESEARCH ARTICLES
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NOTES

