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Book Reviews

# Bahrain's Political Roundabout

*Mitchell Belfer (Editor in Chief)*

In February this year, to mark the third anniversary of crisis in Bahrain, the militant group the *Youth of 14 February* called for the occupation of the Pearl roundabout leading to the ambushing and killing of a police officer – dozens more have since been murdered and wounded in bombing attacks. Since 2011, commentators have obsessed over why violence erupted instead of *why violence erupted there*? So, what makes the roundabout (a.k.a the Pearl, a.k.a. the Lulu but actually the GCC roundabout) so important to the Youth? Why do they want to occupy it? They vaunt its former statue, they adorn their flags and logos with it, and are ready to die and kill for it.

Unlike Cairo's Tahrir Square, which is situated in the heart of the city and is a bustling urban junction, Bahrain's GCC roundabout is a bizarre location for demonstrations. It is not directly adjacent to more dense urban spaces that could keep a movement fed and reinforced. It is remote and typically does not act as a gathering place. Events planned for the roundabout have to be well organised in advance; it is only really accessible by car.

The roundabout is a traffic junction which butts the new financial harbour towards the tail of Government Avenue where most important governmental facilities are located and is the gateway to the villages along the north-western coast of Bahrain. Holding the roundabout severs the country and that was the main reason for its selection by Bahrain's opposition groups; they sought – under guidance from Iran's Hezbollah – more than a platform for demonstrations.

These indicate a very different set of reasons for the outbreak of hostilities in 2011. They certainly were not part of some ambiguous

set of democratic revolutions in the Arab world. Given the venue, coupled with the tactics deployed by al-Wefaq (politically) and the Youth (among others), it is likely that the roundabout escapade was an organised attempt to set in motion a series of events to ultimately bring Iran directly into Bahrain.

If it were not for the deployment of the GCC's Peninsular Shield force, Iran may very well have entered Bahraini territory. The dynamics on the ground were telling:

Firstly, demonstrations were called – approved by Bahrain's government – by opposition leaders from al-Wefaq and others. Once these were organised and people began to camp out on the roundabout, groups of the Youth were dispatched with weapons into the tent-city. At the same time, Iran lent operational support and, reportedly, dispatched members of Hezbollah from Lebanon to Bahrain. Then, according to a mid-ranking naval officer, two Iranian warships were spotted off Bahrain's north-western coast. The stage was set. All that was missing was the trigger. On 13 March, with the roundabout still teeming with people, the Youth initiated a campaign of violence in nearly a dozen locations around the country including at Bahrain University and the roundabout. The Youth had successfully hijacked the month-long festive demonstrations at the roundabout and plunged the country into an existential crisis. And it was not only the police and civil society that would suffer. The Youth were prepared to sacrifice Bahraini civilians – Sunni and Shia – in the crossfire.

This may shed light on a perplexing problem of the 2011 violence: why were the majority of demonstrators wearing sandals to demonstrations? Why were they ill-equipped to run away from the police if, for the better part of the previous month they had been engaged in tit-for-tat street battles with Bahrain's security forces and were publically and repeatedly warned that the roundabout was about to be cleared? Wearing sandals on 13 March 2011 meant that the bulk of demonstrators would be unable to evade police once violence commenced. This was intentional. The violence which targeted the police intended to illicit a harsh response so images could be captured and projected to force a foreign (Iranian?) intervention, as occurred in Libya, in support of "defenceless" demonstrators.

There were, of course, many in the crowds not wearing sandals. There were those who had come prepared and wore trainers and boots. They had organised transportation and medical staff (including ambu-

lances), were armed with weapons and a plan. When the clock struck 0800 on 13 March 2011, it was these hardliners that drew first blood, charged and attempted to lynch police officers and have graduated in their violence to acts of arson, assault and cold-blooded murder.

All this in the name of a roundabout?

The situation in Bahrain should act as a reminder of the misuse of symbols for the sake of realpolitik objectives. For Bahrain's civil society, the roundabout was and remains unimportant except for the daily commuters. Its significance has only been hoisted by the geopolitical swaggering of the Youth and their al-Wefaq and Iranian allies. However, the roundabout is only a roundabout and is not worth a single life. So, the next time the Youth declare a thousand martyrs to occupy a roundabout … well, how can you negotiate with them? It is beyond the pale of civilisation.

# Croatian International Relations Review

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
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# Research Articles

# The Fading Halo of Religious Elites

## A Comparative Study of the Effects of Religious Motivation on Nonviolence and Democratic Stability in Poland and Egypt

*Unislawa Williams*

Why has the democratic transition in Egypt stalled? The nonviolent nature of successful uprisings may be an important cause of the subsequent religious radicalisation and volatility of the new regimes. Nonviolent opposition can attract, and be sustained by, the involvement of religious elites. While such involvement can enhance the viability of a movement, it also builds the political capital of the religious elites, who can then influence the politics of the new regime. This is not a feature of Islam or of Middle Eastern or of North African politics, but of nonviolent movements more generally. This study tests the logic of the argument on the dynamic that took hold during the Polish transition following the fall of communism. Even in Poland, where the Western-style democratic model was highly popular and the international context was embracing, the support that the religious elites provided to the opposition translated into an active role for religion in the post-transition politics. Seen from this perspective, what appeared to be a religious radicalisation in countries such as Egypt may have actually been a temporary consequence of the nonviolent opposition. This is dubbed here as the "fading halo effect." While popularity built during the opposition decays over time, it reaches its apex when the nascent institutional structures of the new regime are being formed. As a result, the influence of religious elites may be difficult to limit later putting pressure on the democratic process. This may be one of the key reasons why the democratic transition in Egypt has stalled.

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## Introduction

*Unislawa Williams*

The "Arab Spring" appeared to be driven by democratic, or even centrist, mass protests concerned with unemployment, poverty, inequality and corruption.[1] Implicit in the media was the question of how, so soon after the Tahrir Square demonstrations, did it turn to religious radicalisation and Islam.[2] But while the popular media may have been surprised by the religious turn in the post-revolutionary politics, the scholarly community long-analysed the Islamist political movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and their role in nonviolent opposition to the deposed autocratic regime.[3] Despite this focus, few ready predictions existed as to what role these religious organisations would take on in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy.[4] This role, however, may have been shaped by the years of nonviolent opposition and may explain why the Egyptian transition to democracy has stalled.

This study argues that the chances of success of nonviolent opposition increase in cases when religious elites are involved. A religious call to action can build not only mass support for the opposition but also for its nonviolent means, the use of which has been shown to increase the chances of success.[5] It can motivate a public to face fears and persist in nonviolent opposition even in case of violent oppression. Religious elites are defined as people whose status enables them to influence religious norm-setting processes more effectively than the average believer – for example, members of the official clergy, the leaders of religious movements and sects, and influential missionaries.[6] Such elites legitimate a principled or a religious call to action. This call to action may not *sui generis* be nonviolent but it likely conforms to the characteristics of the opposition movement more generally. Hence, nonviolent opposition likely involves religious elites whose message also promotes nonviolence. Nonviolence is understood here to mean a commitment from the opposition to use nonviolent means of protest. But while the involvement of religious elites can enhance the success of nonviolence, it also alters the political landscape post-transition.

By becoming involved in the political process, religious elites affect how the public perceives the role of religion in the public sphere. Weak

public support for the democratic principle of separation of religion and state is not a feature of Islam.[7] However, it may be a feature of religiously encouraged and successful nonviolent movements, which may lead the public to view religious elites as politically effective and beneficial. However, as the memory of the repressive era, under which the political popularity of religious elites is built, fades and becomes a more distant political history, so does the political popularity of the religious elites, a phenomenon dubbed here the *fading halo effect*. Hence, transitions present a political opportunity for the religious elites but ones that also quickly dissipate. Anticipating the fading halo effect, religious elites are likely to push for the rules of the new regime to codify a role for religion and for religious elites quickly after the transition. Should they be successful, the rules of the new regime are likely to become increasingly unpopular and potentially even destabilising to the new regime. Hence, an extensive public role for religious elites may be popular shortly after the transition, but codifying that role into the foundational framework of the state may take away from the longer-term public support for the regime.

The subsequent section explores the logic behind the fading halo effect and shows why successful nonviolent opposition may produce states that are more religious in nature and often more religiously extreme than either their predecessor regimes or similar states that have emerged from a violent struggle. Most importantly, such involvement of religious elites may produce states that are more religious than even their own public supports, straining the democratic underpinnings of the new regime. To test the logic of the argument, the study explores the influence of the Catholic Church in promoting the nonviolent struggle against the communist regime in Poland. Research has underscored the importance of developing robust theoretical linkages between Middle East and other comparative cases, pointing to the East Central European transitions from communism as an especially fertile ground for comparison.[8] In fact, focusing on a state with a largely Christian population helps to isolate the logic of the argument from potentially conflating factors such as the role of Islam in the current transitions in the Middle East and North Africa.

The popularity of the Western-style democratic model of governance was particularly high in East Central Europe immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and arguably much higher than it is today in the "Arab Spring" states. In addition, the external environment at the

time was more conducive to the transition.[9] Despite the great interest in emulating the Western-style democratic model and supportive international context, Poland nonetheless transitioned into a form of governance that accepted a much more porous separation of religion and state than other democracies; a model that is increasingly criticized by the country's own public. The lessons from the Polish case help to explain the recent events in the Egyptian transition to democracy; specifically, why this seemingly centrist nonviolent movement turned to religious principles so quickly after the transition and why this religious turn may have destabilised the newly forged democracy.

## Religion and Nonviolence

Studies show that nonviolent protests can build sympathy domestically and abroad by appearing less extreme than violent ones.[10] However, perceptions that the new regimes may be more centrist can often be dismayed once the new governments are formed. At least with respect to international actors, the new regimes may not only appear extreme but even more extreme than their predecessors—albeit in a different way. Specifically, they appear religiously radical. One explanation for this lies with the motivations of the opposition engaged in nonviolence.

In conflicts that are violent in nature, religious elites have been shown to have an amplifying effect. In particular, de Juan and Vüllers argue that religious elites can play a mobilising role, making it more likely that combatants will be ready to kill and to die for the cause.[11] However, such involvement may not lead to an eventual success of the combatants' cause, since violent opposition rarely succeeds. Much more successful is nonviolent opposition.[12] In the context of nonviolent opposition, the role of religious elites is less well studied. However, religious elites involved in nonviolent struggles can also play an amplifying role.

Religious elites involved in nonviolent struggles can increase the likelihood that protesters continue to resist the regime peacefully even in case of oppression by the target regime. Studies show that the more true the protesters stay to the nonviolent tactics, the more likely these tactics are to succeed.[13] Hence, the involvement of religious elites increases the strength and durability of the nonviolent resistance, and as a result, it can significantly contribute to the success of the nonviolent

## Motivating nonviolent opposition may be easier if the government limits religious expression.

cause. Religious elites involved in nonviolent struggles may even play a role more critical to the success of the cause than their religious counterparts involved in violent struggles. Specifically, the motivational role of religious elites in nonviolent movements can strike a more popular note than analogous involvement in violent ones. Whereas in the violent movements that role is to legitimate killing, in nonviolent ones that role is to motivate peaceful resistance against oppression and even killing. Assuming that on average a person is more likely to be motivated by the second call, the involvement of religious elites may increase the chances of success of the opposition even in nonviolent cases.

In addition, a selection effect can make nonviolent oppositions that involve religious elites appear to be more successful than their more secular counterparts. Motivating nonviolent opposition may be easier if the government limits religious expression. Some portion of the public may be particularly motivated by a religious message. Such protesters are more likely to be spurred to action if they hold a grievance on religious grounds against the existing government. In effect, the less the predecessor authorities espouse religious principles, the more vulnerable they are to a religious critique and hence the more likely they are to be overturned by the nonviolent movements. On the other hand, the more the predecessor authorities espouse religious principles, the less vulnerable they are to a religious critique and hence the less likely they are to be overturned by the nonviolent movements. This implies that the more secular the oppressive regime, be it located in the Middle East and North Africa or elsewhere, the more likely it is to be toppled by a nonviolent opposition. And if we observe a successful nonviolent overthrow, it most likely includes the involvement of religious elites. This selection bias may suggest that the involvement of religious elites may be a common feature across a broad spectrum of successful nonviolent transitions.

However, the critical role of religious elites in the opposition also serves to accumulate their political capital. The public is likely to perceive their political involvement as effective and beneficial and hence, is also likely to support it post-transition. This public support may stand in sharp contrast to the democratic principle of separation of religion and state and may undermine the grassroots support for it. Such

principles may even be perceived as foreign or alien in the context of the most recent domestic politics. Rather than harbouring mistrust toward religious involvement in political life, the public may have a sense of gratitude for their participation. Hence, the public may even support more than continued political involvement and may be prepared to accept political measures that reward or compensate religious elites for their past oppression. In effect, religious elites are likely to emerge from nonviolent struggle wearing a halo of political popularity. However, this political popularity is likely fleeting. As the memory of the repressive regime fades, the political support for religious elites also begins to dissolve. This phenomenon is referred to in the analysis as a fading halo effect.

Anticipating the fading halo effect, religious elites have an incentive to push for a role for religion and for religious elites in the foundational structures of the new regime, thus preserving some of their present political influence for the future. By becoming involved in the foundational work of the new regime, the religious elites can help to ensure a continued legacy for their contributions in toppling the repressive government. The result is that the newly formed regime may be based on laws that support only a weak separation of religion and state. It may also include substantive clauses that are based on religious principles, legalising behaviour the religious elites support and prohibiting behaviour they condemn. It may include material advantages for the religious elites, such as restitution policies of property confiscated under the repressive regime and other key political measures. In sum, their fleeting popularity pushes religious elites toward making oversized demands that help enshrine their current popularity in the foundational framework of the new regime.

Furthermore, making such oversized political demands is made easier by the political savvy of the religious elites post-transition. First, the more politically active the religious elites are during the opposition, the more likely they are to know how to seek a political role and build popular support. Second, they often have a network of grassroots organizations that can make political activity easier. Third, they are likely to know who are the main political actors, what motivates them, and be aware of whatever political manoeuvring taking place. The result is that at the time when the new regime is taking place, not only do religious elites enjoy political legitimacy but also can effectively implement their political agenda. Whatever the effect of any one religion,

culture or tradition on the eventual shape of the new government, the nature of the nonviolent struggle itself can make the new government more susceptible to religious influence than it would be without the nonviolent opposition.

Nonviolent opposition movements may appear to lead to governments even more religiously extreme than their counterparts once engaged in a violent struggle. This can be partly explained with the low-success rate of the violent protests. With so few cases of new states liberated through violent struggle, the motivations that drive these movements can be more idiosyncratic than religious. Furthermore, even when religious elites are involved in successful violent struggles, their role may be perceived by the public as more problematic than that of their nonviolent counterparts. Again assuming that sanctioning killing is a harder sell for the public than resisting oppression and killing, religious elites involved in violent struggle may have a weaker claim to broad-based popularity and legitimacy. If they take an extensive role in shaping the new regime, that regime is unlikely to have broad public legitimacy, which hurts its chances of establishing democratic principles. In sum, if we observe a birth of a religiously extreme form of democratic regime, it likely emerged from a nonviolent struggle.

The degree to which the new democratic regimes that emerged from nonviolent struggles are religiously extreme can extend to other comparisons. First, these states are less likely than other comparable democracies to embrace a strong principle of separation of religion and state and may initially accept a more active involvement of religious elites in politics. Second, the extensive role of religious elites in politics is likely to contrast sharply with the predecessor regimes, likely to have been repressive of religious political expression. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the oversized role of religion is likely to contrast with what the country's own public may be willing to sup-

*Nonviolent opposition movements may appear to lead to governments even more religiously extreme than their counterparts once engaged in a violent struggle.*

port in the long-term, as the fading halo effect takes hold. This implies that the extensive role of religious elites in building the foundational structure of the new system ultimately may undermine the democratic stability of that system. Thus, the nature of the nonviolent protest can have implications for the shape of the newly formed regimes, as well as for the stability of the new democratic politics.

## The Nonviolent Resistance in Poland in the 1980's

The role of nonviolence in promoting transitions toward more religiously-oriented states is not confined to the "Arab Spring" or the Middle East and North Africa region. The same dynamic playing out in Egypt also took root during the Polish nonviolent struggle against the communist regime. The Catholic Church was not only supportive but active in the struggle, which lead to a broad public sense that it deserved to play a political role post-transition. It would be trite to argue that the new regime was more religious than its predecessor: the communist authorities it replaced actively strived to limit and even eliminate religious practice.[14] The new regime that had emerged post transition was, nonetheless, more religious than other comparable Western democracies.

By the 1980's, Solidarity was a deeply embedded oppositional force in the Polish political landscape.[15] A year earlier and shortly after his election as the first Polish pope, John Paul II visited the country, preaching to those who attended his masses not to be afraid. His message of human dignity and nonviolence resonated powerfully and was continually sustained by the Church throughout the subsequent struggle. The Solidarity movement organised nonviolent protests and numerous strikes, gaining broad public support and membership. To varying degrees, many founding figures in the movement have credited John Paul II for sparking and energising their resistance.

In response to the growing success of the nonviolent protests, the communist authorities declared martial law in 1981.[16] The state of emergency lasted for over a year and dramatically curbed civil liberties, outlawed Solidarity, and lead to the arrest of many of the Solidarity's members. As the communist regime became more oppressive, the role of the Catholic Church became more active, providing shelter to dissidents and to an unknown extent also financing to the movement. A defining moment of the era was a brutal murder of a famous Polish

priest, Father Popiełuszko, by the domestic security forces. Father Popiełuszko had grown to prominence, organising regular masses for the liberation of the country and prayers that were transmitted nationwide via Radio Free Europe. Like the religious elites more generally, Father Popiełuszko stressed nonviolence and human dignity. His murder galvanized the opposition and embarrassed the regime, significantly stripping it of popular support.

The Solidarity movement and the religious elites became increasingly intertwined through the opposition, which lasted for nearly a decade and persisted in its nonviolence. The movement contributed to the eventual ouster of the Polish communist authorities, who ultimately relinquished control peacefully in the late 1980's through a process called the Round Table Discussions.[17] The Round Table brought representatives from all sides to negotiate over the shape of the first free elections. Alongside the communist government officials sat leaders of Solidarity as well as Church representatives. Just like the Solidarity members, the Church became a foundational member in the new political order.

The first free elections were a resounding success for Solidarity, which took control over the government. Portraits of communist leaders were promptly replaced by crosses in various public spaces and offices. Church property, amounting to many tens of millions of dollars that had been confiscated by the communist regime, began to be returned, sometimes in the form of real estate, sometimes in the form of cash. In fact, the religious elites, though not exclusively the Catholic Church, would become singularly successful in the restitution process, while the cause of many other claimants would become tied up in courts or simply would fall by the wayside. The Catholic Church also took a prominent and visible role in social life, blessing new public buildings and providing representatives and speakers for nearly all kids of social or political gatherings and forums.

In 1993, the Polish authorities signed a Concordat with the Vatican, which was subsequently reaffirmed by the Polish constitution.[18] Among other points the agreement would require Polish authorities to provide Catholic religious education in public schools. It also reaffirmed financial obligations of the public sector toward the Church.[19] For example, it supported a fund called the Fundusz Kościelny, which made public resources available to the work of the Church, including missionary work, nunneries and monasteries. Public funds would be

available for projects such as renovations of Church properties and for Catholic education, from schools to seminaries and even departments of theology at the country's public universities. Taken together, the new Polish government committed to a significant and lasting financial obligation vis-à-vis the Polish Catholic Church.

The extent to which the role of the Church in public life in Poland contrasted with that of comparable countries was highlighted by the first post-transition Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, seen as the architect of contemporary Polish church-state relations. Mazowiecki would later describe his views on the separation of religion and state as a continuum, on one end of which countries, such as France, espouse complete separation, and on the other Poland espouses friendly/cooperative separation.[20] The principle behind the Polish model, according to Mazowiecki, was the sense that beliefs can affect citizens and as such are not confined to the private sphere. The moral support the opposition received during the communist era appears to have influenced the public understanding of good governance, which in turn played a role in shaping the post-transition state. This occurred in spite of what at the time of the transition was a high level of support among the Polish public for emulating the Western democratic model.

Today, however, the role of the Church in public life is increasingly controversial in Poland. Not only has the public become more secular, with somewhat declining (yet still high by European standards) religious attendance, while critics of the Church have also gained increasing prominence. Their criticism often returns to how much the Church benefited from the transition and the degree to which the state committed its resources to the Church over the long term. Many see the benefits that have flowed to the Church post-transition as unfair.[21] Hence, this more secular counter-response to the religious undertones of the Polish model of democracy may be seen as a consequence of the nonviolent process of liberation and it may shed light on the role of religion in the states affected by the "Arab Spring."

## Comparison with Egypt

The parallels between the Egyptian and the Polish opposition have not been made by academics alone.[22] In his visit to Poland in May of 2011, President Obama identified the country as an example for the Arab nations undergoing the political transition and urged these nations to

quickly put in place institutions that would codify democratic principles.[23] In fact, the new regime did not waste any time in drafting a new constitution. But the principles on which it was based in many ways drew from religious components. This common feature in both transitions bears further analysis. It shows that religious elites may enjoy an oversized political advantage immediately after the ouster of the repressive regime because of the motivational role they have played during the opposition period.

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood represented the largest and best organised opposition force to the authoritarian rule. Although it had a long and more radical history, by the time President Hosni Mubarak took office in the early 1980s the organisation was committed to nonviolence and to peaceful reform.[24] Their political objectives appeared relatively centrist and supportive of democratic principles. The exception was an unpublished policy document written by the Brotherhood's key leadership figures that argued Christians and women should be denied the right to run for the presidential office.[25] Despite its commitment to nonviolence, the political activities of the Muslim Brotherhood were largely suppressed by the state, sometimes brutally so.[26] The Mubarak regime prohibited the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in electoral politics, imprisoned key figures of the movement and even turned violent at times against them. In spite of the repression, the organisation enjoyed wide-spread support and political popularity and continued to be the key opposition group.

Immediately after the transition, the Muslim Brotherhood was poised to benefit the most of all the opposition forces, even though it played only a participatory role during the "Arab Spring" protests and largely stayed away from leading the uprising.[27] Despite the relatively demure role during the "Arab Spring" protests, the Brotherhood's history of long-standing opposition to the Mubarak regime meant that it was well-organized politically and well-known among the new electorate.[28] A key measure of their political popularity was their strong showing in the first free parliamentary elections in over sixty years, which were held in January of 2012. The Muslim Brotherhood won about 47% of the parliamentary seats (with the other Islamist parties winning the second largest share of about 25 per cent) – in sum, religiously linked parties won over 70% of the seats, a showing which was interpreted by the press as indicative of deep cultural conservatism of the Egyptian

public.[29] However, a deep cultural connection with Islam may not have been the only explanation for the strong showing.

The role the religious elites had in opposing the repressive regime may have been a key source of their political popularity post-transition. The extent to which such political popularity was derived from the cultural conservatism of the public would imply that popularity would remain relatively constant, while the extent to which it was derived from their role in opposing the repressive regime would imply it would decay over time. As the memory of the repressive regime would fade, so would the political popularity of those who opposed it. In fact, in the presidential elections that were held only a few months later, the Muslim Brotherhood did much worse than in the parliamentary elections. While the Muslim Brotherhood got 10 million votes in the parliamentary elections, in the presidential elections that number was halved—a showing that was bemoaned publically even by key figures of the movement.[30] The electoral support for Islamist party and its candidates would also continue to steadily decline through the year.[31] Nonetheless, Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood narrowly won the first free Presidential elections with 51.7% of the popular vote. Having taken office he resigned from the Brotherhood, per campaign promise to serve as the President of all Egyptians.[32] That commitment would soon be tested but it also highlighted the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood continued to be relatively moderate.

Their relatively moderate position did not limit the extent to which religious elites embraced a religiously motivated political agenda. By October 2012, the 100-member constituent assembly was deep at work drafting the country's new constitution. The most controversial points in the process had to do with the role of religion and religious elites in the new state. Specifically, the points discussed included women's rights and the rights of religious minorities, Islamic Shariah law, and the ways religious elites would be employed to adjudicate conflict between religious rulings and secular rights.[33] In boycott of the religious slant, the secular members of the constituent assembly, as well as Coptic Christians – together representing roughly a quarter of the assembly – withdrew from the proceedings.[34] Under the potential threat of its work being annulled by the courts, the assembly hurried to nonetheless pass the draft constitution – albeit in a more moderate form – and the President assumed emergency powers calling for almost an

immediate referendum on the draft. In December of 2012 the referendum was held and the draft constitution was approved.[35] However, the moves toward the passage brought about the return of mass rallies and protests.

Not only did the oversized role of religion in the public life ultimately prove unpopular, it also undermined the democratic transition. The political drama would increasingly be played out outside of the democratic context with supporters of President Morsi physically clashing with the opponents and supporters of democracy caught in many ways in between. The large role prescribed to the religious elites in the political life of the nascent democracy appeared to have not only galvanised criticism but was destabilising the democratic politics. Rather than wait for the elections to decide the competing claims, Egyptians would choose to express their political grievances again through street protests. The army stepped in, arresting Morsi and suspending the constitution.[36] In the months that followed the military forces brutally repressed the pro-Islamist rallies, killing protesters and the Egyptian courts outlawed all activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, confiscating the Brotherhood's funds.[37] In many ways, whatever extent the democratic transition had reached, it has been halted following the removal of President Morsi.

*Ex post* it may seem that the Muslim Brotherhood may have been short-sighted in pushing for an extensive role for religious elites in the public life. For example, it could be asked whether a narrower role would have been more acceptable to the other parties and hence could have preserved not only the political power of the Muslim Brotherhood but also the democratic regime that was slowly emerging. However, *ex ante* there is no reason to believe that the decision to seek an extensive role was not indeed optimal for the Muslim Brotherhood. Carving out a large political role for religious elites promised to be advantageous for years to come, whereas a political backlash that would threaten the continuation of the democratic transition was a risk, not a certain outcome. The extent to which that risk materialised may not necessarily invalidate the decision of Egypt's religious elites to include a strong role for themselves and for religion in the country's constitutional framework. Their strategy to do so quickly would put the other actors in the situation of *fait accompli*.

In this context, however, Obama's prescription to put in place a legal structure that would ensure democratic institutions in Egypt as quick-

ly as possible may have been exactly the wrong advice for democracy. To the extent that religious elites can benefit most from the success of the opposition right after the transition, putting a constitutional framework in place quickly can strengthen the hand of the religious elites and can shape the regime to their advantage. In effect, Egypt's quick transition to democracy bolstered the role of religious elites and undermined the longer-term stability of the democratic regime. A number of scholars would argue that the US's policy, as well as French and European policy in the region, is generally aimed at limiting the potential of Islamist ascendance to power.[38] Ironically, at least publically, the United States had promoted (perhaps unknowingly so) not only the ascendance of Islamist power but also destabilisation of the nascent democratic system. Furthermore, whatever the extent of the West's involvement in pushing for a quick transition, such transition has had long-lasting effects on the political life in Egypt and its prospects for democracy.

*Unislawa Williams*

## Discussion and Conclusion

This work argued that the nonviolent nature of opposition can be enhanced by active involvement of religious elites. Religious elites can strengthen the public will to resist oppression, particularly violent oppression by the target regime. This implies that *ceteris paribus* nonviolent measures are more likely to succeed in opposing relatively secular, authoritarian regimes because these governments are more susceptible to a critique forwarded by religious elites. In effect, authoritarian regimes that allow for religious expression are more resilient than their secular counterparts. This may perhaps explain why the more secular authoritarian regimes in the Middle East were more likely to have successful nonviolent revolutions than the less secular ones. The more secular authoritarian regimes that outlaw religious expression have left themselves open to a critique made by religiously-linked nonviolent movements. In effect, this study argues that religious elites can significantly influence the success of nonviolence, and nonviolence has been shown to be an effective strategy against the target repressive regimes.[39]

However, the involvement of religious elites in successful opposition movements also bears importantly on the post-transition politics because it implies that the governments that come to power as a result

of nonviolent opposition are more likely to take a religious turn. Furthermore, they are likely to include in the foundational framework of the new regime a role for religion and religious elites that in retrospect can have weak political support even domestically. This is because politically active religious elites, anticipating the fading halo of their popularity, are likely to push for a maximum role for themselves and for religion in the new state while their popularity is at its apex. As a result, the new regime may appear religiously extreme. This often contrasts with the perceptions of the mass-based opposition movements as democratic or as centrist.

In the Egyptian context, the fading halo effect may partly explain the initial religious radicalisation of Egyptian politics and the subsequent popular resistance against it. Within a year of the electoral success of Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, a new wave of protesters occupied Tahrir Square in Cairo. The common complaints were against the oversized role of religion in the new Constitutional framework and the overly strengthened role of religious elites in the public life. The extent of this opposition ultimately significantly destabilized the democratic forces slowly taking place in Egypt. But the fading halo effect does not imply that the new regimes will necessarily be unstable. The successful Polish democratic transition is a case in point. Whether the speed of the transition distinguished the depth of the home-grown resistance in the Polish case from the Egyptian one is an important question for future research.

The fading halo effect has policy implications as well. Shortly after the "Arab Spring," the US called for Egypt to quickly put in-place a democratic constitutional framework, presumably to preserve and affix the prevailing democratic mood. However, the rush to do just that in fact only bolstered the influence of the Islamist religious elites, who would clamber to secure a lasting legacy based on their oversized post-transition popularity. In general, a policy push for a quick transition may undermine the democratic mood, such as that which prevailed in Egypt following the 'Arab Spring' and that may prevail in future nonviolent transitions.

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# European Civil Society's Conundrum

## Public Spheres, Identities and the Challenge of Politicisation

*Karel B. Müller*

This work draws upon the novel theoretical framework of European civil society which is based on the complementary concept of civil society. It claims that relations between the Europeanised public spheres, political identities and the politicisation of the EU present an intricate and crucial conundrum of the European civil society. While applying such a theoretical framework this work interprets the Europeanisation of identities, public spheres and national polities as mutually reflexive processes. The well-respected concept of positive identity (Erikson) and the civil code of collective identity (Shils) are deployed in order to understand dynamics between the public sphere and identities trans/formations. Finally, the concept of active border is introduced as the key component of the European civil society, and as a vital nexus within the conceptual cluster of identity, the public sphere and the Europeanisation.

*Keywords: European civil society, European public sphere, European identity, Europeanisation, active border, EU*

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## Introduction

Both the EU's representatives (and the EU's documents) and many civil society scholars predominantly conceptualise a European civil society as interest groups and social movements (or, just as NGOs) operating in the European transnational context.[1] Disadvantages of such reductionist conceptualisation are plentiful, but first of all it suffers from

the lack of sociological dynamism and ignores a reflexive-like nature in relations between political institutions and social agency.

The aim of this article is to apply a novel theoretical framework of a European civil society. The theoretical background for that is grounded in the complementary approach towards the civil society concept (which is inspired mainly by Tocqueville's social theory and Giddens' theory of reflexive modernity), and which I have presented earlier.[2] To start with, I will summarise a robust normative perspective on the concept of civil society. On the silhouette of the outlined normative perspective I will draw the major institutional and socio-cultural preconditions of an emerging civil society in the (European) transnational context. I believe that this view is capable of grasping the issue in its complexity and explaining structural aspects of the problem, whilst taking into account the situation of specific social actors in its broader contextual framework.

In the second step I will discuss a particular aspect of the European civil society: reflexive relations between the construction of European public sphere, the formation of transnational identities and the politicisation of the EU. Relations between public sphere, collective identity and the claim of politicisation present an intricate and puzzling conundrum of a European civil society. Conventional approach towards relations between public sphere, collective identity and polity has been imbued by a sort of essentialism. Until recently, such approach has been very salient in European studies discourse and has utterly dominated laypersons public debates on European integration. It presumes that the formation of the transnational public sphere is the precondition for the emergence of a transnational (European) polity, and that the formation of transnational (European) collective identities is the necessary precondition for the emergence of transnational (European) public sphere. In other words, such approach contends that if there is no collective identity, there cannot be any public sphere and if there is no public sphere, there cannot be any democratic polity. This linear-like logic among "identities – public spheres – polities" has been particularly salient in discussions about, for instance, the so called democratic deficit, or the no-demos debates.

Utilising the theoretical background of the complementary concept of civil society, the main structural argument of this article asserts that Europeanisation of identities, public spheres and nation states are parallel and mutually reflexive processes. I reinforce the argument pre-

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sented and empirically supported by Thomas Risse that the formation of Europeanised public spheres and identities has been feeding from each other.[3] I believe that the Europeanisation of public spheres and identities could complement each other towards a more effective and accountable democratic governance in the EU. Furthermore, I defend and develop the argument which has been suggested by many scholars,[4] that a deeper politicisation of the EU could reinforce the Europeanisation of both public spheres and identities.[5]

To sum up, applying the complementary account of the European civil society, I will assert the four following hypotheses: 1) the formation of the European public sphere and the Europeanisation of public spheres in the EU are synergic and parallel processes; 2) the Europeanisation of public spheres is conducive for Europeanisation of identities, and porous active borders are the key component of these processes; 3) the Europeanisation of public spheres could be interpreted as a form of re/politicisation of public spheres in the EU; in other words the deficit of a single European public sphere is actually the deficit of public spheres in the EU; and 4) the politicisation of the EU could reinforce the Europeanisation of public spheres and collective identities.

## The Complementary Account on the European Civil Society

In order to follow the four above mentioned hypotheses, the complementary theory of European civil society is important for both theoretical and empirical analysis. This framework of analysis offers the broad sociological context in which questions about the Europeanisation should be discussed in order to identify and understand relations between identities, public spheres and polities' trans/formations.

Reconstructing Tocqueville's social theory we can find the four functional dimensions between civil society and democratic polity: defensive, participative, legitimising, and integrative dimensions.[6] These four functional dimensions are cited with various degrees of emphasis by all authors dealing with the issue of civil society; most distinctively by authors such as Taylor or Walzer.[7] Let us summarise these four dimensions.

Civil society should above all be capable of acting as a defence against the potential expansionism of political power. It is part of the European historical experience that every power, often in the name

of efficiency and the ability to mobilise itself, maintains a tendency to gravitate towards centralisation; this increases the risk of the abuse of power. This is where the defensive function of civil society comes into play.

A second dimension is the participative function. Civil society ought to facilitate the more effective involvement of citizens in the public sphere than established political parties. Broadly based civic participation may consist of the massive mobilisation of resources that is facilitated by the widespread dissemination of information and knowledge.

The legitimising function of civil society is based on the fact that civil society through its independence and autonomy creates the social resources for political power and provides democratic legitimacy to the government (or to the state). The power of the government is only legitimate when it is able to enjoy the trust of its citizens. The extra-political and independent status of civil society guarantees that political power is executed 'rationally'. Public opinion has a binding and normative character for political power. But in order to be able to form public opinion, civil society must constitute a relatively large structure within which social interests and priorities are consistently articulated, agreed upon, and verified.

The last, but by no means the least important expectation associated with civil society is the fact that, within it, relationships of affinity and loyalty are formed, and this is civil society's integrative function. Through repeated involvement in the workings of civil society citizens eventually come to realise that in order for their voice to be heard and their interests to be taken into account they need to join forces with others. This in turn engenders a sense of belonging to or affinity with an interest group. More broadly there then emerges a sense of belonging to a broader societal context and identifying with the given political system. Civil society creates room for the reproduction of shared symbols, values, and norms.

Inspired by Giddens' approach to an analysis of the nature of contemporary modern societies,[8] I define the functional dimensions in relations between civil society and the democratic state as depicted below in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Functional Dimensions in Relations between Civil Society and
Democratic Polity

In this figure the outer circle represents the whole of civil society, and the small circle around the centre represents the sphere of political power, i.e. the sphere of the control of information and social surveillance. The above mentioned functions of civil society can be plotted in the figure as follows: at the top end of the vertical axis (of "agency") there is the protective or defensive function, which is an analogy of the concept of 'negative freedom' (Giddens calls it emancipatory politics).[9] At the opposite end of the vertical axis is the participative function, which, conversely, corresponds to the concept of 'positive freedom' (corresponding to Giddens' 'life politics'). The legitimising function of civil society is at the right end of the horizontal axis (of "trust"), the entire right half of which indicates the mutual dependency and interconnectedness of civil society and the democratic polity. At the left end of the horizontal axis there is social integration, the value which expresses the fact that civil society is capable of reproducing and integrating itself as a society, but also illustrates the fact that civil society is integrated within the framework of a single political system.[10]

Silhouetted against Figure 1 it is possible to structure the concept of a European civil society. Four dimensions of civil society on a European level correspond to the following notions: along the vertical axis of "agency" these are (1) the European public sphere, and (2) mul-

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tilevel civil society, and along the horizontal axis of "trust" these are (3) multilevel (polycentric) governance, and (4) European identity. Each of these dimensions represents a vast research field which encompasses a cluster of problems and questions. The following Figure 2 suggests a conceptual interpretative framework for both a theoretical and empirical analysis of the dynamics and mutual relations between the above mentioned four dimensions. In the following, I will focus on the conceptual frameworks of the European public sphere and European identity as well as their links in relation to the sphere of political power and to the context of individual actors.

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Figure 2: Dimensions of European Civil Society



Sphere of European Publics *(hypothesis 1)*

Concerns about democracy are one of the most important reasons why we should care about transforming collective identities and public spheres in Europe in the first place. Democracy without a public and without shared sense of community of communication is most likely not a viable option.[11] Let us start with the first hypothesis, which asserts

that the formation of the European public sphere and the European-isation of public spheres in the EU are synergic and parallel processes.

It has been frequently argued and demonstrated that the "psychological existence" of the EU as an imagined community is still lacking, compared to well- established nation states. Nevertheless, there is plenty of empirical evidence that, particularly in the last two decades, the EU has seen some significant changes and shifts in the formation of its collective identity as well as in the transformation of its public spheres. Due to constitutional debates, issues of the Euro implementation, Eastern enlargements and the world economic and the Euro currency crises, the symbolic visibility of the EU, in addition to the media reporting on a "European common concerns" have increased significantly. As Koopmans and Statham research has shown, by comparison to national actors, European institutions and politics has been adequately visible.[12]

## A Conceptual Account of the European Public Sphere

Nevertheless, it seems true that the European public sphere is still rather weak and underdeveloped on the one hand, but on the other, there is little doubt that the last two decades have definitely "dissolved the marriage" between the state and its public sphere. Nation states have lost their monopolies in controlling flows of social interactions and creating a "meaningful" framework of communications. Furthermore, recent developments have even questioned the crucial role of the public sphere as the guarantor of political power being exercised in a reasonable and accountable manner.[13] Although main stream public opinion is not formed on the basis of critical deliberation, it still remains the major political force which is to be respected and looked after. The whole essence of democracy stands and fails with public opinion, which should not be taken for granted. We should not expect that public opinion simply exists (as an aggregate of private opinions). Rather, we need to ask how to treat the values of liberal democracy within the framing and shaping conditions and the processes of formation of public opinion.

The transformation of the nation state, which has been, as Stuart Hall pointed out,[14] a crucial system of cultural representation, is a part of the complex shifting between public and private spheres, or, as one could argue, a part of the decline of the public sphere. The claim for

the emergence of the European public sphere is nothing less than the claim for a new concept of the public sphere itself.[15] As Jeffrey Alexander put it:

> We need a new concept of civil society as a civil sphere, a world of values and institutions that generates capacity for social criticism and democratic integration at the same time. Such a sphere relies on solidarity, on feelings for others whom we do not know but whom we respect out of principle, not experience, because of our persuasive commitment to a common secular faith.[16]

I agree with Eriksen and Fossum who claim that arguments about the weakness of the European public sphere are usually imbued by an insufficient conceptual grasp.[17] Arguments about the existence or non-existence of the European public sphere are dependent upon the conceptualisation of the notion. Primarily we should not conceptualise the European public sphere as a separate entity. We should talk about the Europeanisation of particular and various public spheres,[18] as well as about an overarching European public sphere.

Social scientists recognise that the plurality of both conflicting and complementary public spheres has been the very essence of emerging public spheres from the early modernity.[19] Therefore, using the singular in relation to the public sphere is, to say the least, misleading. Public life in a pluralistic society cannot take place within a singular public sphere. That is the way Craig Calhoun suggests using the notion of a "sphere of publics" rather than "public sphere."[20] The same argument submits Nancy Fraser who asserts that the proliferation of public spheres' plurality should not be perceived as a dangerous sign of social cleavage, nor as a threat to democracy.[21] Mutual respect and recognition among actors from competitive public spheres and discourses, as Fraser convincingly proved while analysing the emergence of the feminist public, this meant "more" not "less" democracy.[22]

This argument is very relevant with respect to the conceptualisation of a European public sphere. Similar to the institutionalisation of political discussion at the nation state level, a European public sphere is only conceivable as an amalgam of multiple, multilevel, complementary, divergent and convergent public spheres, as a sphere of European publics. Such plurality of Europeanised public spheres does not rule out the emergence of an overarching public sphere on a supranational level, but such a public sphere should not be singled out as the only

sign of a European public sphere. The very principle of democracy implies the formation of public spheres around decision-making centres.[23] Major preconditions for such an overarching public sphere is, according to Fraser,[24] sufficient consensus about "expressive forms" and "persuasion protocol" which guarantee meaningful discussions and openness for agreements. Meaningful public discussion requires a shared framework of discursive environment, where conflicts and interests are represented and managed.

## An Operational Account of the European Public Sphere

More specifically towards normative dimension of the notion, Habermas operationalised a European public sphere as 'a public political sphere which enables citizens to take positions at the same time on the same topics of the same relevance.'[25] Inspired by him, Klaus Eder and Cathleen Kantner have formulated the following criteria of a European public sphere: there is a European public sphere if there are discussed the same issues at the same time with the same criteria of relevance (or, with the same frame of reference).[26] These criteria presume that a transnational European public sphere can be built through the Europeanisation of the various national media discourses. By "the same frame of reference" one means consent about conflicting interpretations of a given problem. This criterion corresponds with what Fraser calls as consensus about "expressive forms" and "persuasion protocol."[27] As Risse points out, we have to agree on what the problem is or, at least, which potential interpretations of the problem exist so that we know what we are talking about.[28] By the same criteria of relevance is not meant a European perspective based on a European identity, but a common interpretation of the problem that includes controversial opinions on the particular question.

As for the empirical research on the European public sphere which follows the above mentioned criteria, recent surveys indicate three firm outcomes: (1) that media reporting on "European affairs" in national media discourses has been until quite recently rather sparse, bleak and very often negative,[29] although (2) that the last 20 years showed that national media have not only increased their coverage of EU policies and events,[30] but they are, to a great extent, discussing the same issues at the same time and (3) that frames of reference and meaning structures did not vary much across national discourses.[31]

Following the Eder/Kantner criteria, we might conclude that sizeably increased salience of the EU affairs in the national media, as well as similarities in time and frames of reference indicate that the criteria for the Europeanised public sphere have been met.[32] Despite that, there have been ongoing concerns, as some authors rightly argued,[33] that political communication within the EU has suffered huge *mediatic deficit*, which maintains a great deal of civic ignorance and withdrawal from politics.[34]

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The multiple EU's crisis certainly has changed such minimal visibility of the EU since heuristic of the crisis naturally attracts much more media attention.[35] Although, as Neverla pointed out,[36] media prefer mediation of crises impacts over crises causes and remedies. Koopmans and Statham research which employed the innovative method of claims analysis shows, that the EU does not remain invisible but the sphere of European publics remains insufficiently inclusive.[37] Governments and media actors are grossly overrepresented, to the detriment of other interest groups. In the face of the on-going euro crisis, we may wonder whether these findings continue to hold.

Let us move towards the second hypothesis which asserts that the Europeanisation of public spheres is conducive for the Europeanisation of identities, and that porous active borders are the key component of these trans/forming processes.

## Europeanised Identities, Public Spheres and Active Borders *(hypothesis 2)*

Risse adds to the Eder/Kantner criteria of a European public sphere the third criterion with three indicators, and which takes up the debate about the relations between collective identities and the trans/formation of public spheres.[38] The first indicator of his criterion concerns the degree to which fellow European citizens are no longer treated as "foreigners", but as legitimate speakers. With respect to the normative dimension of the notion of public sphere, participant from over the border should not be treated as "foreigners" interfering domestic affairs.[39] Second indicator of his criterion suggests that actors should be able to operate within a common discourse and to form a common arena of communication which stretches across the porous borders of competing national discourses. The European public sphere assumes that actors treat each other as legitimate speakers in the many public

spheres within the EU as opposed to creating boundaries using self/ other distinctions. His third indicator concerns about framing the particular issues as common European problems. Such an emerging European community of communication refers to the development of a common European perspective on issues of European concern. It does not mean that speakers in the transnational public sphere adopt a neutral position above partisanship or that they agree on the issues at stake. It rather means that speakers refer to the EU, or Europe, as "us" and debating a particular issue as issues of common European concern.[40]

In terms of the empirical research following the above mentioned criterion (and its three indicators), there seem to be too few surveys to draw a robust conclusion. That opens doors for a more speculative approach. The older literature on public spheres assumed that identity is a precondition for its emergence. This argument is based on the essentialist assumption that citizens enter the public sphere with a formed identity, positions, and interest. If there is no collective identity, there cannot be any public sphere.[41] Such an approach underestimates the role of the public sphere in the re/construction of identities. It is reasonable to believe that public spheres constitute the site where identities have emerged and where they are being de/constructed and re/ constructed. People's positions, orientations and identities are formed, could be formed, and, as proponents of deliberative democracy suggest, should be formed within communicative interactions, while being confronted with a varieties of re/presentations of interests and opinions.[42] The Europeanisation of public spheres and the emergence of transnational identities (communities of communication) are fairly recent phenomena, which have followed rather then led the process of European integration.[43]

Following Risse's third criterion I would claim that the Europeanisation of public spheres is determined by emergence of *active borders*. Europeans need to learn how to treat both territorial and symbolic borders as specific cultural forms which enable to exercise and practise cross border communication. Such communication should allow for a better understanding of *difference* rather than constructing or reproducing it. *Active borders* should support and produce both public criticism and social integration without generating antagonism towards those from "over borders." In other words, active borders should treat such cultural encounters which support *unity in diversity* and avoids

*polarisation.*[44] Active borders should guarantee a common discursive space that allows the free re/construction of identities and the on-going cultural pluralisation. The concept of active border presumes the post-representational approach to culture, which is not something that is border lined, but permanently opens to the process of social self-creation, and which does not stress inside/outside dimensions.

With respect to the inside/outside (us/them) dimensions of identity, the concept of active border could as well be grafted upon the typology of Edward Shils,[45] which distinguishes the three codes of collective identity: primordial, sacred and civil. The active border is characterised by porous and permeable number of access points or channels, whereas the passive border is characterised by a communicational impermeability. While the primordial code of collective identity has borders, which are passive on both of its sides, the sacred code of collective identity implies the border, which is active on its outer side (inward) and passive on its inner side (outward); integration through assimilation is feasible. The assimilation entails adapting cultural forms and patterns, rather than diluting established practices and adhering to practices that are foreign to a given "inside" culture. Finally, the civil code of collective identity seeks to foster active borders on both of its sides (inbound and outbound).

Active borders determine a mutual communication and understanding of *others*, as opposed to passive borders that seduce to the stereotypical labelling, defining and preserving polarity. The concept of active border seeks for such cultural and institutional preconditions existing on both sides of a border which guarantee a shared discursive space for actors from both sides. The concept of active border claims to present a nexus which connects the reflexive dynamics between identities, public spheres and polities towards democratic integration, social criticism and public learning.

## Methods of Communication and European Positive Identities

The concept of European political identity (demos) is crucial for the understanding of the European public sphere. Following Risse's third criterion of Europeanised public spheres and the concept of active borders, it seems productive to employ into our conceptual cluster the concept of positive/negative identity.[46] In resonance with Risse's third

criterion I suggest that European identity should be primarily seen as a complex of multiple positive identities which encapsulates an attempt to overcome the biasness of national identities and consciousness.[47]

The EU's need for an active search for legitimacy could prove, after all, to be an advantage of the EU over national governments, which tend to rely on static social segments and nested collective identities.[48] National identities are, to great extent, defined as negative identities.[49] The EU should strive to maintain and foster the environment which allows the reflexive and open identity formation. It should foster a means of reducing pathological tendencies in the identity formation. European civil society could be defined as a niche providing these very resources, and creating chances for the open and reflexive identity formation based on the principles of competence and social integrity. Such situation could provide the method for creating European identities, which I suggest to perceive – with respect to an individual agency and a prescriptive (and dynamic) dimension of identity (aspirations) – rather than as a singular collective identity, as (strive for) multiple (and complementary) positive identities. Such conditions could work towards the de/re/construction of collective identities in Europe; and could work towards invoking the European identity in a stronger sense, if needed. Positive identities are most likely to work towards active borders and complementary inclusive identities and negative identities towards passive borders, exclusive identities and discrimination.

After all, such assumptions are echoed in some empirical research. Risse convincingly interprets the spread of Euroscepticism as a specific sign of Europeanisation itself; even most adamant opponents of the EU also take it for granted nowadays.[50] At the same time, the Europeanised identities come in "national colours" too, as they resonate with national symbols and narratives in many different ways. The Europeanisation of national identities in the elite discourse does not necessarily result in a uniform and homogenous European identity; it rather comes within elements of predominantly complementary and inclusive (positive) identities.[51]

Empirical research supports another assumption, and that is that Europeanised public discourse is showing a new transnational cleavage.[52] Rather than choose "the EU – yes/no," two different and competing visions of the EU stand out. On the one hand, there is a vision of *positive identity Europe;* open, inclusive and cosmopolitan Europe

that embodies the values of liberalism, enlightenment and discursive ethics. On the other hand there is a vision of *negative identity Europe* which is closed and exclusionary "fortress of Europe" which is based on the essentialist interpretation of the Christian heritage and forging a distinct European nationalism; such nationalism is less connected to the nation state and increasingly connected to the EU itself. This cleavage is increasingly visible in many member states and, according to Risse, is likely to structure the politicisation of European affairs in the future.[53]

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European integration generates winners and losers. On average, the winners have been the younger, the better educated, and wealthier and the more politically informed part of the population, their European identity is strongly correlated with cosmopolitan and other liberal values.[54] The winners were able to exploit the opportunities of transnational mobility and as a result, they identify with the EU. "Open" Europeans enjoy, treat and explore active porous borders of collective identities and discourses throughout their competence and communicative skills. On average the losers have been those who profit less from economic integration and find it distressing to handle the pressure of transnational markets, they were older and less educated, do not travelled very much and have less exposure to foreigners than the winners; "Closed" Europeans tend to guard and foster passive impermeable borders of their nested and stereotypical identities and discourses.[55] We may wonder, whether and how the economic crises in the EU is going to change positions and attributes of these "open" and "closed" Europeans .

Nevertheless, I claim that European identities shall not be conceived in conventional terms. The main characteristics of European identity should not be a definition of "borders" by creating the dichotomy of "us" and "them." In what sense identities could be comprehended as post-conventional? To build complementary, multiple and positive identities is feasible and imaginable only through specific methods of civil, multi- and transnational communication. As Giddens argues, in the condition of radicalised modernity civic engagement, communication and participation, which are recognised as fair and open, create crucial preconditions for strengthening and establishing bonds of belonging and solidarity, and therefore positive identities.[56]

The concept of European identity as specific means and rules of communication, dialogue and participation presumes a post-conven-

tional procedure-like concept of identity with a dominance of the civil code elements in collective identity; hence the claim of constitutional patriotism comes into play and its emphasis on the value of rules in the process of communication.[57] As Outhwaite puts it,[58] the procedures of not reaching consensus are as important (if not more) as the procedures of reaching consensus, and they should be recognised as a key factor of European political culture and as a decisive precondition to form a collective identity in any stronger sense. Simply, put the character of decision-making processes and of the processes within civil society, which are recognised by their participants as fair and open, matters more, in some sense, than the particular outcomes of these processes.

Since modern societies are featured by a complex reorganisation of time-space relations, it is more accurate to comprehend society as an open system of communication, rather than as an integrated social system of shared meanings and morals which is embedded in a local context. Societies are nowadays, first of all, communicating societies, networks of mobility, and flows and social communication.[59] Therefore identities, including European ones, should be understood as a project, whose main objective is active participation in the process of fair and open communication within spheres of European publics. Communication itself could (and should) be the main overarching defining characteristic of European identities, which resembles, as Stuart Hall brilliantly pointed out, "routes" rather than "roots."[60]

So far we have dealt with the first two hypotheses. I argued in favour of the claim that the formation of the European public sphere and the Europeanisation of public spheres in the EU are synergic and parallel processes, and that the Europeanisation of public spheres is conducive for the Europeanisation of identities. I introduced the concept of active border which plays the key role in these processes and creates a nexus between identities and public sphere transformations. Let us now focus on the 3rd and 4th hypotheses which assume that the Europeanisation of public spheres could be interpreted as a form of re/politicisation of public spheres in Europe, and that the politicisation of the EU could further support the Europeanisation of public spheres and collective identities in Europe.

## Politicisation, Public Spheres and
## Political Identities *(hypotheses 3 and 4)*

Although empirical findings suggest that we can observe a gradual emergence of the Europeanised public spheres which provide sites where the Europeanised identities are re/constructed,[61] according to many authoritative scholars in the field,[62] democracy in the EU, primary, does not suffer from the lack of a public sphere but from the lack of a political sphere.

*European Civil Society's Conundrum*

Reinforcing the argument about reflexive relations between Europeanised public spheres and political identity (demos), we can employ the phenomenological analysis of the dynamics between the public sphere and political identities under communist regimes in CEE.[63] Such interpretation offers some possible clues for understanding the intrinsic affinity between the public sphere and the formation of political identities.


## Is the EU Laggard in Political Modernisation?

Among the major deficits of the Communist regimes was the absence of the public sphere, which became a tool of social surveillance used by Communist parties. The public sphere presents the cornerstone of political modernity and a crucial structural precondition enabling the formation and re/presentation of political positions and identities.[64] Without the arena for political contention, articulating conflicting issues during Communism was confined to the private sphere only. This situation, as Sztompka argued, did not allow for the institutionalisation of mechanisms needed for the civil resolution of existing conflicts, which contributed to accumulation of social tensions and hampered the formation of adequate political identities.[65] The ultimate loyalty, or subversive attitude, towards the political regime was the only alternative for any political agency. With no public sphere accessible to them, people were unable to interpret experiences of their everyday life as politically relevant; therefore there was no room for the formation of political identities.[66]

Where this analysis leaves us with respect to the Europeanisation of public spheres and identities? It indicates two general tendencies. 1) The lack of Europeanised public spheres has not allowed the forming of cross border political identities, which 2) only stokes the fire of Eu-

roscepticism since people can only express either "ultimate loyalty" or "subversive attitude" towards an opaque technocratic machine of the EU. Simply put, the EU underperforms with respect to *political modernity*.[67]

In term of de-politicisation we have to bear in mind that the elitist approach towards integration has always been the norm and it has caused no problems as long as the "permissive consensus" was providing sufficient public support. The EU integration has never been an openly and publicly politicised project. Nevertheless, nowadays we may identify two crucial and mutually interconnected depoliticising forces within the EU politics. The first is related to its institutional design, the second, to the political culture of European elites.[68]

To start with the second, I agree with Risse that mainstream political parties are not well prepared for politicisation of the EU.[69] By leaving the politicisation of the EU to Eurosceptics, mainstream political parties are risking what they wanted to prevent – declining support for the EU. Controversies, discussions and polarised debates are part of vibrant public spheres, as long as speakers and audiences respect one another as part of a community of communication.[70] As for the first reason, as Jiří Přibáň argues,[71] the EU has been symbolically constructed as a civil alternative to ethnic nationalism. This became very obvious in the course of the Eastern enlargement. The EU 'politics of de-politicisation' has evolved into a set of institutional instruments for consensual national and international policy-making based on permanent negotiations and compromises. Consequently, political contention has been replaced by legal and bureaucratic procedures leaving little room for EU-scale democracy; this is why Přibáň critically calls the EU a legalistic project.[72] His analysis reveals that the European shift towards de-politicisation and technocratic legalisation that has been for the most of its history, appreciated by many as a major advantage of the EU, could be at the same time a very serious limitation, pitfall and shortcoming for its future and further democratisation.

Habermas himself pointed out in his famous book on Öffentlichkeit that the crucial precondition for the public sphere to emerge was the legal installation of permanent political opposition, which heralded the emergence of the modern political sphere.[73] Permanent political opposition served as guarantor of a vital and independent public sphere, which provided a public arena for articulating relevant positions, and created a reservoir of discursive, organisational and sym-

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bolic forms, which people could identify with. Political aspects of everyday life could then be transferred into articulated and represented political orientations and identities within the public sphere.

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Polarisation and contention are important preconditions for the emergence of Europeanised public spheres. European public spheres come into being when people discuss about (European) controversial issues. The politicisation of European affairs, analogously to identities and public spheres, is likely to take place through the Europeanisation of domestic politics.[74] EU affairs must become part of "normal politics."[75] Given the scale of de-politicisation within national public spheres (driven also by the tabloid media and political populism), the Europeanisation of domestic politics can be interpreted as a form of re-politicisation of public spheres in Europe. The re-politicisation of the public sphere should be facilitated and carried out through treating the active borders between diverse discourses and identities. As Vivien Schmidt described pointedly,[76] the EU suffers a democratic deficit from having "policies without politics", and the national states suffer from institutional incapacity by having "politics without policies", and this is not good news for European democracy and civil societies. This epitomises a crucial incongruity between localities where mass politics and political mobilisation take place and where decisions are made.[77]

This situation fosters extreme polarisation of "ultimate loyalty" on the on hand, and "subversive attitude" on the other. This extreme polarisation of public opinions in Europe support the formation of passive borders, and this is furthermore exacerbated by the absence of swinging dynamics between government and opposition, which epitomises a rejuvenating capacity of any democratic polity to maintain public trust and to reduce civic discontent or frustration. As Hix put it, in a democracy when voters are dissatisfied with their situation they do not blame the whole system, but the incumbent government.[78] On the other hand, the EU citizens who disagree with EU policies do not manage to identify a governing and responsible coalitions, or any other political subject which could replace it; therefore they have only one option – to blame the EU as the whole.

Many social scientists support the argument that neutralising the politics of unanimous consensus presents a major obstacle to further democratisation of the EU, and it stifles the emergence of media and a public sphere at the same time.[79] Politicisation of the EU would enable re/presentation of conflicting arguments and interests which would

bring the attention of the media and help to reduce the above mentioned deficit of information and political communication.

In other words, without a proper political sphere and arena of political contention in the EU we cannot expect a strengthening of Europeanised public spheres and political identities. And without Europeanised public spheres, relevant social conflicts cannot be properly re/presented and institutionalised. This undermines possibilities to hold on to democratic decision making, and to form a democratic political will beyond the nation state. Without such preconditions, we only risk the growth of social pressure, and that political orientations and identities will only be formed in the extreme positions of acceptance or resistance. After all, the available data show,[80] indeed, that such extreme positions are common among EU citizens. In the face of the current euro crisis, both visibility and contention of EU affairs seem more prominent than ever, and it still remains to be seen whether and how the dynamic of euro crisis impacts relations between public spheres, polities and identities trans/formation in Europe.

## Conclusion

The main argument of this paper asserts that the Europeanisation of identities, the Europeanisation of public spheres and the Europeanisation of nation states are to a great extent parallel and mutually reflexive processes which have been feeding from each other and could complement each other towards a more legitimate and effective governance in the EU. Building the European framework of democratic governance, developing the European public sphere and encouraging the European identity/ties (demos) formation are intrinsically connected processes. The *novel* concept of European civil society also suggests that the democratic deficit of the EU has both institutional and socio-cultural aspects which affect each other in reflexive relations. This framework of analysis offers the broad sociological context in which questions about the Europeanisation of public spheres and identities should be discussed in order to interpret and understand relations between identities, public spheres and polities' trans/formations.

The concept of active border (which is both normative and analytical) was interpreted as the key component for the formation of European civil society. The active border allows synergic trans/formation of public spheres and identities in order to construct the civil code of

collective identity. The civil code is based on common discursive space which works towards democratic inclusion and public learning, and which fosters positive and complementary identities. The Europeanisation of domestic politics, public spheres and political identities, and the politicisation of EU affairs seem to be not only reflexive and complementary processes, but also desirable from democratic point of view. When the public sphere is lacking and the political sphere is opaque, the citizens, deprived of the chance to adopt any precise political orientation, can only regard the political regime with growing disengagement and distrust, which can contribute to the construction of passive borders. Empirical findings suggest that we can observe the gradual emergence of Europeanised public spheres which provide sites where Europeanised identities (including the sceptical ones) are constructed.[81] Although such development remains uneven, the EU seems to be the community of communication in the making. Further politicisation of the EU might deepen these tendencies although it remains to be seen how much of the politicisation the EU can absorb in order to keep containing vicious forces of ethnic nationalisms. Furthermore, thorough interpretation of preconditions supporting and treating active borders remains an important task for both theoretical analysis and empirical research.

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## Notes

1   Ruzza, Carlo and Emanuela Bozzini (2008), 'Organised Civil Society and European Governance: Routes of Contestation,' *European Political Science,* **7**:3, pp. 296-303.
2   Müller, Karel B. (2006), 'The Civil Society-State Relationship in Contemporary Discourse: A Complementary Account from Giddens' Perspektive,' The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 8:2, pp. 311-330.

3   Risse, Thomas (2010), A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identi-
    ties and Public Spheres. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.

4   Habermas, Jürgen (2001), The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays.
    Cambridge: Polity Press. See also Hix, Simon (2008), What is wrong with
    the EU and how to fix it. Cambridge: Polity Press.

5   I am aware of a dilemma between collective and individual identity which
    has been addressed by many scholars including myself (Müller, Karel B.
    (2007), 'Search for a European Identity – Psycho-Sociological Perspective.
    An Attempt at Agency Approach,' *Central European Journal of International
    & Security Studies* 1:1, pp. 100–112. Collective identity could be understood
    as an overlap of individual identities. Nevertheless, identity is always a part
    of subjective identity (unless we talk about ascribed or inflicted identities).
    By overstating the notion of collective identity we are at risk of the meth-
    odological nationalism. In this paper I try to combine both perspectives.
    When emphasizing an individual agency context I talk about identity,
    when stressing a structural context I refer to collective or political iden-
    tity, although it is often impossible to take these two contexts analytically
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    day. See Müller (2006).

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    117. See Walzer, Michael (1991), 'The Idea of Civil Society Disent,' Spring,
    pp. 293-334.

8   Giddens, Anthony (1990), The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge:
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9   Giddens (1990).

10  For more detailed interpretation see Müller (2006).

11  Taylor (1990).

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    www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/RECONWorkingPapers.
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    vid Held and Tony McGrew (eds), Modernity and its Futures, p. 292. Cam-
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    tique of Actually Existing Democracy,' in Craig Calhoun (ed), Habermas
    and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, pp. 109-142. MA: MIT Press.

16  Alexander, Jeffrey (2006), The Civil Sphere. Oxford, NY: University Press, p.
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18  Koopmans, Ruud (2007), 'Who inhabits the European public sphere? Winners and Losers, Supporters and Opponents in Europeanised Political Debate,' European Journal of Political Research 46:2, pp. 183-210. See also Risse (2010).

19  Habermas, Jürgen (1996), Between Facts and Norms: Contribution to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. See also Fraser (1999).

20  Calhoun, Craig (1995), Critical Social Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 233.

21  Fraser (1999), p. 126.

22  Fraser (1999), p. 124.

23  Tocqueville (1968).

24  Fraser (1999), p. 123.

25  Habermas (1996), p. 306.

26  Eder, Klaus and Cathleen Kantner (2000), 'Transnationale Resonanzstrukturen in Europa: Eine Kritik der Rede vom Öffentichkeitsdefizit,' in Maurizio Bach (ed) Die Europäisierung nationaler Gesellschaften: Sonderheft 40 Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, pp. 306-331. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.

27  Fraser (1999), p. 123.

28  Risse (2010), p. 19.

29  Kaitatzi-Whitlock, Sophia (2007), 'The missing European public sphere and the absence of imagined European citizenship – Democratic deficit as a function of a common European media deficit,' European Societies 9:5, pp. 685-704. See also Neverla, Irene (2007), 'The Birth of a European Public Sphere Through European Media Reporting of Risk Communication,' European Societies 9:5, pp. 705-718, or Trenz (2008).

30  Koopmans and Statham (2010).

31  See Risse (2010), see also Trenz (2008).

32  Risse (2010), p. 136.

33  Golding (2007). See also Mörä, Tuomo (2008), 'Ideals of European Public Sphere and the EU Journalism,' Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 3:23, pp. 86-98.

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42  Offe, Claus (2011), 'Innovation of Liberal Democracy: Can Deliberation be Institutionalised?,' Czech Sociological Review 47:3, pp. 447-472.

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46  The concept was introduced by Erik Erikson whose lifelong research shows that the common strand in human nature consists in striving for an (positive) identity based on two elements. The first is competence in productive, social, and personal relations. The second rests on a sense of integrity within a sensible world of meaning. The inability to assert our competence and to be an integral part of a community causes the identity crises. See Hoover, Keith (1997), The Power of Identity. Politics in a New Key. Chatham. N.J.: Chatham, p. 66.

47  For more see Müller (2007).

48  Eriksen and Fossum (2000).

49  Gellner, Ernest (1998), Nationalism. New York: New York University Press.

50  Risse (2010).

51  Risse (2010), p. 85.

52  Risse (2010) chapter 3.

53  Risse (2010), p. 245.

54  Pichler, Florian (2009), 'Cosmopolitan Europe: View and Identities,' European Societies 11:1, pp. 3-24. See also Risse (2010), p. 61.

55  Risse (2010), p. 91.

56  Giddens (1990). p. 156.

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66  Müller and Skovajsa (2009).

67  This comparison does not in any way imply that one can interpret the normative likelihood between communist regimes and the EU. The parallel made of these two very different systems merely seeks to interpret certain structural (and very interesting) similarities of dynamics in determining

formation of the public sphere and collective identities in these two otherwise very essentially different political regimes, similarities that can be in generic terms described as deficit of political modernity.

68  See Hix (2008), and Risse (2010), p. 245.
69  Risse (2010), p. 240.
70  Risse (2010), p. 248.
71  Přibáň (2007).
72  Přibáň (2007).
73  Habermas (1989).
74  Risse (2010), p. 246.
75  Risse (2010), p. 238.
76  Schmidt, Vivien (2006), Democracy in Europe. The EU and National Polities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 5.
77  Risse (2010), p. 227.
78  Hix (2008).
79  Such as Hix (2008),  Mörä (2008), Přibáň (2007).
80  Risse (2010).
81  Risse (2010).

# Clientelism Within the Arabian Gulf States and Beyond

## A Comparative Study

*Mahmood Ghaffar*

Clientelism is a widespread phenomenon, often resulting from pre-existing socioeconomic conditions such as inequalities, government dominance over the economy, and deficiencies in political institutions. State formation ushered vote buying into clientelistic behaviour and reinforced brokerage systems. This work synthesises the existing literature to examine theoretical aspects of clientelism and its applications in four regions, while providing comparative frameworks. A key conclusion is that each individual country exhibits distinct clientelistic, brokerage and vote buying behaviour, yet stays within fundamental parameters of the phenomenon.

## Introduction

State formation is an enduring task. Its purpose is to improve institutional efficiencies and set policies and standards for development. Yet, certain cultural and societal tendencies persevere that could affect development. Clientelism, is a social structure where exchanges of services occur among a patron, an entity of higher social status, and clients, who are of lower status, remains intact within contemporary settings. While state formation yielded new institutions and bureaucratic processes, it also affected the clientelistic behaviour and its mechanisms. The purpose of this article is twofold: first it briefly recounts some

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theories of clientelism and second, it relates applications of the social phenomenon from around the world, with emphasis on comparing clientelistic systems. This work begins by describing the fundamental concepts of clientelism; by noting formations of the relationships and mechanisms. Additionally, the work recalls factors that induce clientelism, with reference to specific socioeconomic conditions.

*Mahmood Ghaffar*

Outlining the factors that influence clientelism provides a fundamental context for comparative analysis. Once general principles of clientelism are understood, then recounting clientelistic systems in South East Asia, Africa and South America eases the basis for comparative analysis. Furthermore, by studying regional examples of clientelism readers may appreciate the prevalence of the social phenomenon and its augmentation due to cultural characteristics.

The selected time frame of each regional examination is the period following state-formation. Emphasising contextual analysis in this period – especially with the introduction of electoral competition – provides valuable insights on clientelistic dynamics in changing environments. Lastly, this work examines clientelistic behaviours in the Arabian Gulf states. The social phenomenon is not only prevalent in the noted region but also intricate in form and practice. The discovery of oil and subsequent establishment of welfare states furthered clientelism dynamics and penetrated societal relations in the Gulf States. Introducing elections in the Arabian Gulf states resulted in familiar global clientelistic behaviour.

The work concludes that clientelism reacted to developments because of state formation and the introduction of elections. Factors permeating clientelism are social inequalities and divisions (including ethnicity and gender), low productivity and competition for state resources. Instances of vote buying increases if countries witnessed clientelism. For instance, political sympathies in Southern America are more likely to influence vote-buying behaviours than other regions. The introduction of elections widened patrons' client base, as competition for new state resources intensified. Omitted demographics from clientelistic systems often attempt to seek legitimate alternatives. In Benin, women and youth are typically omitted from clientelistic systems. Their frustration catalysed efforts to vote for electoral candidates who run campaigns based on policy platforms rather than resource redistribution. Vote buying in the Arab Gulf states is far more lucrative compared to other regions, yet less intricate in its organisational

efforts. The Gulf States demonstrate an intricate application of clientelism, as personal relations necessitate accomplishing bureaucratic tasks, engaging in economic activities and socioeconomic progression. Prior to examining applications of clientelism, understanding its principles and theories is required.

## Theoretical Framework of Clientelism

According to Scott, political experiences in the developing world can be categorised into two models: the horizontal and primordial models. The former is based on the Marxist notion of class conflict to help explain a nation's efforts at modernisation following colonialism. This model was most effective in analysing social changes occurring in rural areas. The primordial model emphasises identity dynamics, such as ethnicity, religion and language, as the primary source of societal conflict, where isolated groups compete for power. Nonetheless, both frameworks were inadequate in analysing political activity in the developing world, where clientelism is susceptible.

Informal power-groups are located at the centre of political activities in the developing world, where patron-client factions utilise instrumental social ties that characterise political processes. Typically, patron-client structures consist of a main power figure (patron) that can provide economic incentives and security to his personal followers (clients); in return, the patron can expect loyalty and personal assistance from his clients. For example, if a patron intends to run for political office, he could ask his clients to campaign on his behalf in familiar areas.

Patronage systems advance personal exchanges within patron-client ties. Prior to national independence in the developing world, patronage systems were traditional and limited in scope. Usually, involving patrons' direct control over property and clients' provision of labour and other rent paying services in return for basic needs. However, for informal groupings to remain relevant the institutionalisation or the means of indirect exchanges that safeguard an individual's security, wealth and status suffer. In other words, patron-client ties replace deficiencies in state institutions, laws and shared values.

Personal exchanges are fundamental in patron-client ties. Scott argued that such transactions underpin patron-client relations, and allow

these ties to exceed traditional kinship systems, where social hierarchies were previously limited to identities such as ethnicity and religion. Although, the patron is the primary beneficiary from the relationship, mutual reciprocity does exist. As benefits move upward within social networks in authoritarian relationships, patron-client ties allow benefits to move downward towards clients as indicated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Reciprocity in Patron-Client Ties

The direction of the arrows indicates the flow of benefits. Regardless of the presence of reciprocity, the patron typically is the recipient of increased benefits in the relationship. The exchange of benefits differentiate patron-client ties from authoritarian and coercive relationships, where little reciprocity occurs.

Although reciprocity does exist within patron-client relationships, there is potential for coercion as well. Introducing coercion within a patron-client relationship increases the probability for a loss in patron legitimacy and thereby reducing the capacity for affective bonds. In some instances, explicit coercion is not necessary; instead, legal institutions and their convictions may act as a coercive mechanism. Institutionalising coercive mechanisms is only possible if the patron ascends to a prominent state position, whereby their influence extends to the judiciary. Incumbents can legally exert pressure to their clients through legal channels, as opposed to traditional threats and other forms of personal punishment.

Although coercion might appear common in patron-client ties, it often narrows the scope and hinders the durability of the relationship. There are key discrepancies between patron-client ties and relationships of pure coercion, where the latter may not be able to link individuals of different socioeconomic status.

Expanding or introducing coercion in a clientelistic relationship will affect bargaining dynamics, primarily by reducing the patron's reciprocity to their clients.

Instances exist where coercion does not affect clientelistic relationships, such as clients that have no patron alternatives, especially if the latter directly controls their means of subsistence. In contrast, state modernization allowed clients to enhance their bargaining position.

## State Level Clientelism

State formation ushered new developments within clientelistic dynamics. Traditionally, clientelistic mechanism were limited to community or locale levels, thus resulting in a homogenous clientele with limited in ethnic and social diversity. There are four important transformations in patron-client relationships following state formation: (1) improved client's bargaining position with a patron, where client's resources could be utilised for electoral campaigns; (2) promoted vertical integration of patron-client structures from communal level to central government; (3) assisted in the creation of new patron-client pyramids and politicized old ones; (4) contributed to the survival of opposing patron-client pyramids found at communal levels. Patrons observing such transformations identified novel opportunities.

One opportunity was the introduction of electoral competition. Engaging in political elections provided access to valuable government resources, which are crucial in sustaining patrons. Although the benefits that came from competitive elections were evident for patrons, clients also gained new political resources, such as wielding individual votes and campaigning volunteerism to improve clients' bargaining position. Clients that have little to offer patrons are capable to providing voting services for their patron, thereby empowering, in varying degrees, clients to turn their votes in their favour.

Furthermore, elections caused patrons to become more dependent on social approval from their client networks, as clients' approval determines their fate at the polls. In this regard, coercion is no longer a viable option for patrons to utilise as competition among patrons intensified, thereby necessitating patrons to maintain local power, thereby theoretically improving clients' bargaining position.

In addition to voting, clients have other new capacities to exploit. Clients may provide political services such as canvasing or act as political agents for patrons, which may create additional patron-client linkages as presented in Figure 2.

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Figure 2: Multi-tiered Patron Client Ties

Clients assuming the role of political agents essentially engage in brokerage activities. Moreover, clients seeking services and resources from a patron must transact with brokers.[1] The role of brokers will be further discussed in the subsequent sections.

## Regional Examples of Clientelism

Although many Western political scientists have attempted to classify political experiences in the developing world along traditional models of association and conflict,[2] clientelism left a resonating impact within political processes and structures in Asia, South America and Africa.

The "political office" introduced new state resources such as public funds, employment and decision-making capabilities while elections incentivised patrons as a means to develop and safeguard their clientelistic interests. Naturally, their clientele networks provided the starting point for patrons seeking support for political office. Patrons depended on vote buying within their clientele networks as means to improve their chances of electoral victory. Some instances necessitat-

ed sophisticated organisations to facilitate vote buying endeavours. The usual targets of vote buying organisations are low-income rural voters, as seen in Argentina and Taiwan. The latter epitomised vote buying organisations, where political parties assume the patron role and provide favoured districts and individual clients with government resources and employment in return for political support.[3] While this arrangement appears straightforward, the operation is meticulous and costly.

Vote buying organisations are machines powered by multiple cogs. In order to determine successful vote buying campaigns, the following factors are required: (1) campaign managers with intimate knowledge of the local consciousness; (2) campaign brokers utilising trusted social networks; (3) a sizable budget; (4) mechanisms to avoid vote-buying redundancies; (5) judicial protection, which evidently depicts the complexity of the electoral fraud.[4] Taiwan's experience refined vote buying to its subtlest details.

Vote buying campaigns begin with political parties setting-up branches in townships and employing campaign managers familiar with the local population. Campaign managers attempt to influence their staff which, in turn, rely on their personal relations with town constituents to ascertain their votes.[5] While Taiwan utilises personal relations as an instigator of vote buying operations, Argentina implements a similar system, with the addition to gauge vote selling likelihood. Argentine campaign operatives rely on personal relationships and intricate observational techniques to deduce whether a vote was sold. Methods for operatives to estimate a person's likelihood of selling their vote include observing their target's participation at political rallies, voting polls and their eye-contact behaviour with campaign operatives.[6] Furthermore, interpersonal skills are fundamental to run successful vote-buying organisations, especially for campaign brokers that must penetrate individual Taiwanese villages, as they represent the day-to-day operative for vote buying campaigns.[7]

Brokers are the grease that help cogs move. They leverage their social ties with individual towns to buy votes. In Taiwan, trust and brokers are inseparable. They are the preferred means to defeat secret ballot voting, avoid embezzlement and reduce vote buying redundancies.[8] In addition to trust, Taiwanese brokers must intelligently address the needs of constituents and purchase their votes without negatively affecting social ties. While Argentine brokers adhere to similar needs,

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they can rely on political sympathies for vote buying appeals. Histor-
ically, low-income demographics developed affinity for the Peronist
party, which succumbed to limited generational effects, rendering the
demographic an ideal target for the party.[9] Therein, brokers can im-
prove the odds of vote buying by making political ideological appeals,
a unique trait to their Taiwanese counterparts. While brokers are in-
deed important for vote buying operations, time management is also
crucial.

Cogs must turn in synchronicity; the same applies for vote buy-
ing operations. Taiwanese politics epitomises the advantages of time
management in such operations, where budgeting necessitates timing
considerations. Typically, Taiwanese campaign managers measure tar-
get vote buying rates for each district, in order to avoid wastefulness
and insulting voters (such as offering meagre hand-outs).[10] In contrast,
targeted voters of Argentinian vote buying operations are likely to be
dependent on hand-outs (maybe in the form of agricultural equipment
and products),[11] resulting in an advantageous bargaining position for
brokers. Once these rates are calculated, timing factors in. Embezzle-
ment often occurs if the last monetary transfer arrives late or before
polling, witnesses are necessary to monitor each monetary transfer;
illustrating that timing is a key determinant for successful vote buying
activities.[12] However, without judiciary assistance, vote buying organi-
sations can be vulnerable.

Judicial protection ensures vote buying continuity. Personal rela-
tions are the essence of attaining said form of protection. In Taiwan,
political incumbents, typically, establish close connections with the
judiciary and provide protection when called upon; however, if an in-
cumbent is voted out of office, then previous judicial protection ar-
rangements are lost as well.[13] Thereby, incumbents are motivated to
remain in political office, as it ensures continued access to state re-
sources, which judicial protection safeguard. Other methods include
face-to-face communication and reducing paper trails,[14] if these meas-
ures prove successful then judicial protection becomes a 'last line of
defence.' Although similarities in vote buying systems are evident, they
still tend to vary from region.

Benin exemplifies the African vote buying experience. Factors un-
derlining clientelism and vote buying are similar to other regions,
which will be discussed in the subsequent section. Typically, African
voters prefer candidates that engage in private transfers rather than

public policy platforms, revealing the propensity of clientelism in elections.[15] Men are typically the primary recipients of private transfers from patron incumbents, including public employment opportunities.[16] Unlike Argentina, where gender and generational discrimination were not as apparent, Benin witnessed an unprecedented response from those excluded from clientelistic systems.

Generally, clientelistic redistribution in Benin excludes women and youth. Because of their omission, youth and women are receptive to public policy messages.[17] This behaviour demonstrates foundations for democratic development, as it could imbed society with a culture of democracy.[18] While incumbents redistribute state resources to their clients, women are concerned with health and social programmes.[19] Therefore, exclusion from clientelistic systems may enhance social conscientiousness and mobilise support for public policy programs. Typically, voters in Benin believe incumbents to be more credible at delivering goods than challengers; that belief is compounded if the incumbent influences distributive policies.[20] While gender and generational exclusion supports pursuit of alternative political economic models, conditions that influence clientelism suggest the issue deeply rooted.

## Factors Influencing Clientelism

Clientelism thrives in socioeconomic disparities. The four factors that influence clientelism are: (1) low productivity and socioeconomic inequalities, (2) social and ethnic divisions, (3) large state economic policies and (4) political participation surpassing the development of political institutions. The following section will further investigate the root factors of clientelism as means to better comprehend the social phenomenon.

### *Low Productivity and Socioeconomic Inequalities*

Clientelism is a symptom of socioeconomic disparities. Singer, clarified poverty's role in clientelism in addition to other identified factors like weak democratic institutions, short democratic experiences and large state economic presence facilitating redistributive transactions.[21] Each dimension has potential remedies to curb clientelistic behaviour by correcting economic deficiencies, yet correspondingly the dimen-

sions can be exploited to guarantee the continuation of the redistributive model. Therefore, analysing the root causes of clientelism is appropriate.

Socioeconomic inequalities allow patrons to identify and acquire clients. Robinson and Verdier (2003) note that at 'low income level clients' political allegiance is cheaper to buy with employment offers.'[22] For incumbent patrons, clientelistic redistribution is both attractive and effective in gaining support during elections, especially if they can make credible offers to clients, as opposed to non-clientelistic opponents. The latter can either provide narrow clientelistic offers or operate on potentially less successful policy platforms. If social inequalities compound with low productivity and poverty, then symptoms of clientelism arise, creating further disparities, thereby increasing clients' dependency on patrons.[23]

State-level redistribution, based on personal connections, reveals clientelistic prevalence. The reallocation of state employment and resources reinforce deficiencies in productivity, thereby, allowing incumbent patrons to control economic affairs without pressures to reform. With this in mind, patrons are committed to prolonging clientelistic systems by stagnating economic reform and productivity.

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### Social and Ethnic Divides

Ethnic divisions and clientelism go hand-in-hand. In fact, such divisions permit clientelism to thrive.[24] At the communal level, ethnicity facilitated the identification of primordial groupings creating simple patron-client links. A patron begins seeking clients from his immediate community where personal relationships are central within the ties. As a patron's resource-base grew, so did his redistributive ability, allowing him to transcend multiple communities and ethnicities for potential clients. Although ethnic divides were essential in simple clientelistic structures, its impact receded with emergence of resources following state formation as patrons expanded their client bases and intensified patron competition for clients.

Communal clientelistic redistribution transferred to a national scale. State resources and electoral competition further intensified favouritism and reinforced familiar clientelistic behaviours. Ethnic-based parties are more likely to emerge when political competition derives itself from patronage systems.[25] Therefore, patrons that are unsuccessful in

expanding their client base are likely to continue ethnic favouritism through political competition, guaranteeing a monopoly of government resources and fomenting further ethnic divisions.

## Competition for State Resources

Clientelism is also prominent among states with holistic approaches to the management of economic affairs. Specifically, if political incumbents are able to directly influence the distribution of state resources, then clientelism will be further reinforced on a national level.[26] While this notion may not be an underlying symptom of clientelism, it reveals a consequence and evolution of the social phenomenon through control of state resources via elections.

Patrons rely on promises and favouritism in electoral campaigns in order to determine success. Client voters expect that incumbents they vote for will deliver state resources based on personal individual ties,[27] thereby indicating the stakes involved for patrons and clients alike in electoral competition. Although state formation introduced electoral system in some regions, practice of clientelism evolved.

## Political Participation Exceeding Development

Younger democracies are more prone to clientelistic behaviour than developed ones. Huntington argued that when political participation surpasses political institutionalisation, it results in unstable democratic experiences.[28] Stable democracies involve electoral competitors operating on policy platforms, campaign promises and accountability to constituents in order to gain credibility. In contrast, such attributes are in their infancy in younger democracies and political competitors may seek smaller groups of voters or patrons who, in turn, can make promises to his clients.[29] Thereby, younger democracies facing deficiencies in political institutions are susceptible to clientelism, which may influence policy-making processes.

Political competitors are likely to become brokers of patrons in young democracies. This is due to their reliance on patrons and the likelihood that state resources will service narrow clients than the broader public.[30] Electoral competitors have no choice but to seek patrons in order to appear as credible candidates to voters, however, this results in surrendering policy influence. Moreover, the situation

reinforces difficulties in developing political institutions necessary to advance democratic practices where political candidates operate on policy platforms.

## Clientelism in the GCC States

Clientelism remains socially relevant in many parts of the world. The six member states that comprise the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) continue to experience the social phenomenon. However, the GCC states practice alternative forms of clientelism compared to the other regions. Clientelism was deeply rooted in the noted region and stipulated as part of a social contract, as opposed to being a reaction to deficiencies in political institutions, while the discovery of oil and gas evolved the socioeconomic model. The post-oil period reinvigorated social contract talks in GCC states contract and reinforced clientelism.

### *Post-Oil State Formation in the Arabian Gulf*

Oil and gas reshaped state-society relations in the Arabian Gulf. The wealth that resulted from mineral extraction in the region realigned bargaining positions among ruling families and citizens. In addition, revenues from oil funded various institutions and organisation that helped modernisation efforts resulting in establishing rules and governments and the advent of the welfare states.[31] Essentially, these processes reformulated the social contract. The welfare state required allegiance to the state – or ruling establishment. Yet in contrast, the discovery of oil permitted social mobility and established direct relations between ruling families with its citizens.[32] The emergence of the welfare state pronounced two elements key to the understanding of contemporary clientelism in the Gulf. First, realignment of social relationships, where individuals can compete with traditional tribal-centric social dynamics. Secondly, state resources resulted in new forms of loyalty, as citizens would compete for their access.

   Public sector employment is integral to welfare states. State employment guaranteed citizens with job and income security. In fact, growth in public employment is a means of state redistribution of oil revenues.[33] In this regard, public employment is a natural symptom of

welfare systems, in addition to provision of free education and health services. However, there are severe consequences to such employment policies. Bulging state administrative channels may reach to a point of inaccessibility. This common scenario in the GCC states exasperate simple tasks by ineffective formal channels, while providing opportunity for some to exploit.

### Clientelism and the Role of Brokers in the GCC states

The GCC states, to varying degrees, exhibit clientelistic behaviour. Ordinarily, clientelism thrives in states where imbalances of resources between state and society exist.[34] State-societal imbalances broaden when redistributive policies render state channels redundant. Therefore, intermediaries in such imbalances serve as missing links between the state and citizens.[35] Missing links between state and society assume the role of brokers. These individuals have personal connections to state apparatuses able to efficiently process tasks and procure services that would otherwise be unattainable.

Brokers assume a prominent role in Gulf welfare states and are markedly different from their traditional counterparts by the sheer variety of services they offer.[36] In addition to contacts in inaccessible administrations and influential individuals, brokers offer pragmatic solutions as well. They may offer acquiring important information, expediting commercial registrations, booking instructors for driving licenses, facilitating menial application processes.[37] Therein, Gulf brokers offering variety of services demonstrate monetization prospects. State-level clientelism in the Arabian Gulf created ideal environments that proliferated the uses of brokers, which can be considered as clientelistic systems within a larger one. Thus, heavy commercialisation of Gulf brokerage is a unique trait from other examples of clientelistic behaviour, in addition to the variety of services and forms of brokers. Variety is the spice of life when it comes to Gulf brokerage. While their counter parts in Asia and Africa typically assumed roles such as mediators and lobbyists for political entities, Gulf brokers, on the other hand, operated within usually legal frameworks to facilitate everyday tasks. Traditional Gulf brokers were usually sheikhs of royal families who acted as gatekeepers with direct access to high-level royal individuals, who have access to coveted resources.[38] Traditional brokerage branched out beyond royal family members. Individuals within traditional merchant families, personal secretaries and advisors of influen-

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tial peoples could be gatekeepers, as long as access to individuals who controls or influences important resources are maintained.[39] Although gatekeepers represent a traditional class of brokers in the Gulf, new forms of the role appeared in welfare states systems.

Trails of breadcrumbs can be useful in a maze. Especially when that maze is a brimming bureaucracy frustrating simple processes, a unique situation compared to other regions. The paper pusher, or Mu'aqqib, who knows their way around a bureaucracy can expedite petty administrative processes and is important facilitator of day-to-day processes. Such services include expediting rubberstamping processes, acquiring visa transfers and extensions and leaking and trading administrative documents.[40] Paper pushers invest considerable time and resources to establish relationships within immigration and customs administrations and labour agencies,[41] epitomising brokerage monetisation.

Gulf paper pushers also service the private sector. Private entities strive to gain insights and knowledge to successfully bid for government business in the Gulf and seek local solutions.[42] Some private companies employ "government relations" staff, specialising in accessing various government agencies that directly deal with independent Mu'aqqibs.[43] It is evident such measures directly correlate to consequences of welfare state systems and provide opportunities for Mu'aqqibs to exploit. In fact, without the facilitation of Mu'aqqibs, typical administrative tasks would stagnate. While paper pushers specialise within the realm of administrative processes, another form of brokerage operates within a different field.

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### Contractual Brokers

Competition for state resources resulted in creative opportunities. Contract brokers expand upon the functions of paper pushers. Their primary services include provision of exclusive information for bureaucratic decisions and government contracts; usually conducted by well-connected local firms targeting foreign or less-connected companies.[44] Such business activities reflect Gulf business culture, as personal ties are a necessity. In fact, contract broker engage in a variety of fields.

Gulf brokerage extended beyond exclusive information and personal connections services. Recently, the most lucrative venture is visas for expatriates. GCC labour markets are heavily regulated. Businesses must get permission to "import" foreign labour through government-granted visas (or labour permits); additionally, expatriate workers are unable

to transfer between employers without the consent of their current sponsor.[45] These circumstances provide brokers with an opportunity. Thus, "free visa" trading has sprouted as result of weak labour administrations.

The term "free visa" is misleading. The process involves a sponsor receiving excess labour permits, due to a combination of personal connections and questionable documentation processes, two skills commonly employed by brokers.[46] "Imported" labourers are then resold through informal markets via "free visas" to other employers who could not access formal labour bureaucracies,[47] thereby, exemplifying both the brokerage skill sets and their creative monetization efforts.

## Private Sector Clientelism

Theoretically, the private sector is independent from its public counterpart. However, in the GCC states, the private sector is closely intertwined with the state. Structurally, Gulf private sectors are suited for patronage, where highly diversified and influential family-owned conglomerates are prevalent.[48] Relations between merchant families and political elites are historic in nature. Such families built extensive relationships with local elites granting them access to high-level decision-makers.[49] In fact, some state policies institutionalised patronage by instilling the agency system.

The agency system is an institutionalised practice in the Gulf business environment. Retainers and government contracts incentivise and directly reward Gulf merchant families who serve local sources seeking to fulfil imported goods or services[50] through the agent system. Correspondingly, Gulf elites can monitor economic developments from foreign entities while allowing individual state elites to provide privileges to selected clients with little oversight. In this regard, individual state elites act as intermediates as they continue to engage and develop their own clientelistic network. Furthermore, local agents can steer investment decisions of foreign partners to the potential benefit of patrons.

The presence of Gulf merchant families in the private sectors is reminiscent of historical engagement with elites. Merchant families gained security for their economic activities while political elites benefited financially and ensured their loyalty.[51] The GCC states with large economic bases permitted merchant families to gain government con-

tracts for a variety of projects, due to the mentioned historical ties.[52]
Furthermore, these dealings suggest that GCC private sectors are intrinsically linked to the state.

GCC private sectors were primary state recipients during the oil boom period of the 2000s. Hertog correlated the impact of state spending and size of business activity. The expansion of GCC business activity is primarily derived from public expenditures both directly, through large government spending, and indirectly, via expenditures on public salaries increasing consumption levels in the economy.[53] This translates into a direct association between both sectors. The association is attributed to a deficit in private (international) demand for services provided by GCC private sectors,[54] thereby, reinforcing private sector dependencies on public expenditures. Map below illustrates state the percentage of state spending in non-oil GDP for GCC and other notable states.

This map indicates an overall strong presence of GCC state activity in private enterprises. While GCC private sectors consist of unique attributes resulting from welfare state behaviour and government spending, other familiar forms of clientelism prevalent in the world also occur in the GCC states.

**Non-oil GDP**

Share of government spending in non-oil GDP across GCC states

Kuwait
**75%**

Iran

50

Bahrai n
**38%**

Persian Gulf

Saudi Arabia
**75%**

55

Qata r
**55%**

25

Oman
**60%**

0        150        300 Km

Source: Hertog (2011), Naturalearth

United Arab Emirates
**32%**

## Vote Buying in Kuwait: An Example

Vote buying may be as old as the ballot box itself. The act of vote buying is both prevalent and a meticulous operation in Africa and Eastern Asia. The phenomenon is evident in the oldest parliamentary experience in the Arabian Gulf region. Kuwait's parliamentarian history dates back to 1963 and its experience led to prolonged periods of crises. Kuwait's domestic political turmoil is rife with electoral fraud.

Kuwaiti vote buying mirrors the affluence of its people and the estimated cost of purchasing one vote in Kuwait ranges between $1000 to $10000 (USD)[55] and there have been reports that some women can be enticed to sell their votes in return for designer handbags.[56] The cost of vote buying in Kuwait is staggering compared to other noted regions; however, the essence of the electoral fraud is the same. Kuwaiti authorities continuously attempt to curb the illicit practice. The Gulf state attempted to moderate electoral fraud by reducing the number of voting districts from 25 to five, thereby diminishing the effect of vote buying.[57] Islamic religious figures have also attempted to thwart vote buying by issuing edicts (fatwas) forbidding it.[58] The involvement of religious figures indicates the prevalence of the vote buying in Kuwait and measures needed in order to deter the fraudulent activity.

## Conclusion

The emergence of clientelism is a direct result of socioeconomic deficiencies. The phenomenon thrives in conditions of productivity deficiencies, social disparities and competitive environment for access to state resources. Traditional patron-client dynamics were initially limited to land ownership and serfdom dyads, where bargaining power skews towards patrons. Yet, as clientelism reached national levels, once untouchable patrons began competing amongst themselves for new resources.

State formation paved the way for new opportunities for patrons to seize. Government institutions and state resources slowly replaced traditional land-labour clientelistic dynamics. However, in certain cases, patrons required electoral victory in order to access state resources. This slightly skewed bargaining power towards clients, as their votes elicited patrons to accommodate their improved bargaining status. However, candidates running election campaigns on policy platform may ostracise themselves, as incumbent patrons are perceived as more

credible in delivering resources to specific districts. Clientelistic behaviour in election is not only global in nature, but also diverse.

Although clientelism is a global phenomenon, individual countries imprinted unique characteristics on it, especially with the introduction of elections. Vote buying in Taiwan necessitated well-run organisations. Utilising influential brokers accustomed to specific villages enhanced vote buying success rates, in addition to meticulously timed payment methods to ensure funds are not wasted. Argentina's vote-buying experience reveals that political sympathies go a long way. Clients are willing to cast their vote to certain political parties due to ideological sympathies, even if the party's policies adversely affect them. In Benin, women and youth usually remain outside patron-client relations, therefore they likely to respond positively to policy platforms messages, as a solution to their exclusion. While clientelism is global, some regions culturally depend on it for leadership legitimacy, thus normalising the practice in society.

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Clientelism in the GCC states is deeply rooted within its social fabric. The phenomenon operates on a daily basis, where certain administrative procedures stagnate without it. Following the discovery of oil and national independence resulted in the formation of welfare state systems, to varying degrees, which evolved existing state-society dynamics. GCC states provided free healthcare, schooling and education in addition to guaranteed public employment, in return for support and loyalty, a familiar clientelistic arrangement. In fact, public employment caused the sector to burgeon, further hindering administrative accessibility. In this instance, welfare states derived another layer of clientelism.

Brokers are synonymous with the GCC states. Prominent merchant families assumed this role prior to the discovery of oil. These families pledged their loyalty to ruling tribes who in turn, provided protection of their economic activities. In a contemporary setting, brokers provided less socially connected individuals with access to inaccessible state channels, tipped off companies for government decisions and provided foreign businesses with expertise to engage in local economic activities. Vote buying also occurs in the Arabian Gulf states. Kuwait's experience with the fraudulent activity mirrors of its affluence and adheres to the same objectives of the fraudulent act.

Although clientelism is a global phenomenon, distinct properties are evident. Vote buying occurs in all of the noted regions. All exam-

ined regions required, to various degrees, social familiarities for the activity. In Taiwan, vote organisational efforts are necessary, due to potential judiciary and financial risks involved. Ideological appeals go a long way in Argentina, political sympathies are often ingrained in its vote buying behaviour; while in Kuwait, cash hand-outs and luxury goods suffice. The role of brokers vary globally; brokers are vote buying organisational intermediaries in Taiwan, while in the Arab Gulf region brokers provide practical uses for less-connected individuals and companies.

Contrasting clientelism illustrates its worldwide prevalence. The phenomenon is evident in almost all continents each containing individual traits. The welfare states that comprise the GCC evolved their clientelistic behaviour. The discovery of oil led to overflowing state coffers, where competition for said resources ensued. This competition embedded additional layers of clientelistic behaviours, via brokers, within an already clientelistic welfare state!

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# 'I am Georgian and therefore I am European'

## Researching the Europeanness of Georgia

*Natia Mestvirishvili and Maia Mestvirishvili*

'I am Georgian and therefore I am European.' These words spoken by the late Georgian Prime Minister, Zurab Zhvania, in front of the Council of Europe in 1999. During the speech, he expressed Georgia's EU aspirations and outlined the country's foreign policy agenda for the next decade. Since the Rose Revolution (2003), Georgia has significantly deepened its ties to the EU. A number of foreign policy achievements such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy have demonstrated Georgia's progress towards its potential of future EU membership. However, little is known about the societal changes that have occurred against the background of such formal, inter-elite cooperation. Nationwide public opinion surveys commissioned by the Eurasia Partnership Foundation and conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Centres (CRRC) in Georgia (2009 and 2011) identified the following trends: 1. Public attitudes towards the EU are overwhelmingly positive and most Georgians strongly support EU membership, 2. There is a slight shift from survival values to self-expression values with regard to the relationship between society and state. Compared to 2009, the 2011 survey data shows that Georgians have taken a more active view of citizens' responsibilities, and 3. Despite their remarkable enthusiasm for the EU, national identity remains more profound for Georgians than a European identity. This work examines such points analytically.

*Keywords: Georgia, European Union, Public Attitudes, Value Change, Identity*

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## Introduction

On 27 April 1999, when Georgia became a member state of the Council of Europe, the chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly, Lord Russell-Johnston, addressed the Georgian delegation with the following words: 'Georgia, welcome back home!' Since the Rose Revolution in 2003, European integration has acquired new momentum in Georgia. The Georgian government loudly proclaimed its European identity and made EU membership its main goal. Through a number of international formal agreements Georgia has significantly deepened its relations with the EU.

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The cooperation between Georgia and the EU began in 1991 when Georgia gained independence. During the first few years this cooperation consisted of the EU providing humanitarian assistance to Georgia. Later in the 1990s the EU expanded its aid through technical cooperation such as the Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States Program (TACIS) that facilitated Georgia's social and economic development.[1] In 1999 the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Georgia entered into force and provided the legal framework for wide-ranging cooperation aimed at increasing political dialogue, consolidating democracy, promoting trade and investment, as well as developing a market economy in Georgia. After the Rose Revolution, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) included the EU's eastern and southern neighbours, and in 2006 the EU and Georgia agreed upon an action plan as a part of the ENP.[2]

According to a typology provided by Schimmelfenning and Scholtz, the ENP is classified as a low-credibility association policy due to two main reasons.[3] First, the partnership is devised by the EU as an alternative for accession and thus excludes a membership perspective for the ENP countries. Second, it does not set high political standards for participation and its political conditionality component is quite weak. In 2007, the Black Sea Synergy – a regional initiative – was introduced to facilitate coordination between countries in the wider Black Sea region in key sectors such as energy, transport, environment, mobility and security.[4] In 2009 the EU launched the Eastern Partnership (EaP), which, unlike Black Sea Synergy, aims at bringing its participating countries closer to the EU and allows for deeper integration in the areas of institution building, visa agreements, free trade, energy security and regional development. However, while EaP is designed to allow participating countries to deepen their ties with the EU, it does not imply any promise of EU membership.[5]

Even though the Georgian government has been trying to move toward EU integration, little is known about changes in mass-orientations that have occurred against such political 'Euphoria' in Georgia. While talking about the progress Georgia has made on its way to European integration, this study looks at the population's attitudes, values and identities related to the process of European integration. What does it mean for Georgia to have European integration as its main foreign policy goal? Is this goal supported and shared from bottom up? What are Georgians' attitudes towards the EU and how do their values and identities follow Georgia's political desire to obtain EU membership? To address these questions, this paper presents and analyses results from two waves of a nationwide public opinion survey entitled 'Knowledge and Attitudes toward the EU in Georgia' conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Centres (CRRC) in 2009 and 2011.[6]

This work proceeds as follows: the first section focuses on public attitudes towards EU membership. The second section looks at the value changes that have occurred over the past years.[7] The third examines the extent to which Georgians claim European identity.

## Georgians' Attitudes towards the EU: Strong Support, High Trust and Optimism

Public attitudes towards the EU are overwhelmingly positive and most Georgians strongly support EU membership. Attitudes towards the EU have become more positive over the past two years. Georgian attitudes towards the EU can be characterised as strong support, high importance, high trust, great optimism and positive perceptions.

*Support:* According to a 2011 survey, 88% of Georgians think Georgia should be in the EU, up from 81% in 2009. On a similar question asking how people would vote if there were a referendum on joining the EU, 80% said they would vote for membership. Moreover, many Georgians are positive that Georgia's membership in the EU is widely supported by their co-nationals, and under half of the Georgian population thinks EU member states and citizens would support this move. 70% of Georgians think that majority of Georgian citizens support Georgia becoming an EU member state, and 35% think a majority of European citizens would like Georgia to join the EU (only 11% think that Europeans would not like Georgia to join the EU and 54% do not know). Simi-

larly, 41% of Georgians are positive that all the EU member states would like Georgia to join the EU, 8% do not think so and 50% do not know.

*Importance:* 89% of Georgians think that strengthening ties with the EU is very or rather important for Georgia. This falls above NATO (84%), US (83%), Russia (80%) and other neighbouring countries. Additionally, NATO and the EU are considered as the most important international organisations for the country by 66% and 55% of Georgians, respectively. 41% of Georgians (34% in 2009) agreed that EU membership was more important for Georgia than joining NATO (only 23% disagree and 36% do not know). When asked which organisation should Georgia join first – the NATO or the EU, in 2009 both organisations received almost equal support from the Georgian public (34% said Georgia should join NATO first and 37% – EU). Compared to 2009, in 2011 more

| Table 1. How much do you trust or distrust...? (%) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Fully trust | Rather trust | Neutral | Rather distrust | Fully distrust | DK | RA |
| Religious institutions | 74 | 14 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Army | 50 | 26 | 12 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 0 |
| Police | 40 | 27 | 16 | 7 | 7 | 3 | 0 |
| President | 32 | 23 | 18 | 9 | 11 | 6 | 1 |
| EU | 22 | 29 | 22 | 6 | 4 | 16 | 1 |
| Banks | 21 | 25 | 25 | 7 | 8 | 14 | 0 |
| Ombudsman | 20 | 24 | 27 | 7 | 4 | 17 | 1 |
| UN | 20 | 26 | 24 | 7 | 5 | 17 | 1 |
| Healthcare system | 18 | 23 | 35 | 11 | 11 | 2 | 0 |
| Local Government | 16 | 23 | 27 | 13 | 9 | 11 | 1 |
| Media | 13 | 19 | 40 | 14 | 7 | 6 | 1 |
| Government | 13 | 21 | 29 | 16 | 12 | 9 | 0 |
| Courts | 12 | 17 | 24 | 13 | 14 | 19 | 0 |
| Parliament | 12 | 22 | 28 | 15 | 14 | 9 | 0 |
| NGOs | 8 | 16 | 26 | 13 | 7 | 29 | 1 |

Georgians thought Georgia should join the EU first (46%) and overall, vast majority of Georgians (89%) thought that the support of the EU for Georgia is important.

*Trust:* According to 2011 data, 51% of Georgians fully or rather trust the EU.8 This falls after religious institutions (88%), the army (76%), police (67%) and president (55%) and just above courts (29%), media (32%), government (34%), parliament (34%), ombudsman (44%), UN (46%) and banks (46%) (Table 1).

*Optimism:* Over half of Georgians (58%) believe that Georgia will be prepared to join the EU in 10 years or less. In 2009, 31% of Georgians thought Georgia would be prepared to join the EU in 5 years or less. This share increased to 38% in 2011, which indicates that Georgians are now even more optimistic about their country's potentiality to become an EU member state. Similarly, approximately 1/3 of Georgians think Georgia will actually join the EU in 5 years or less and 19% think this will happen in 5-10 years. Only 9% believe Georgia will get EU membership in more than 10 years and 2% think this will never happen. These results indicate that people are highly optimistic about Georgia potentially joining the EU in the future. However, in spite of such widespread optimism significant numbers are still unsure about when Georgia will be ready to join or will actually join. 31% do not know when Georgia will be prepared to join the EU and this share increases to 37% when they are asked when Georgia will actually join the EU.

*Perceptions:* Georgian perceptions of the EU have changed little since 2009 and remain largely positive. 17% of Georgians have a very positive perception and 35% have rather positive than negative perception of the EU. Only 5% have rather or very negative perception of the EU. Georgians also believe the EU to be a benign institution; 79% of Georgians think the EU is a democratic institution and 76% say that it is a source of peace and security in Europe. Additionally, 70% of Georgia's population believe that the EU promotes democracy and economic development in countries outside EU. Moreover, 29% agree that the EU threatens Georgian traditions, in contrast to 47% who disagree with this statement. Likewise, only 20% believe that the EU is a new form of empire and 54% reject this opinion.

Georgians also tend to believe that the EU supports Georgia for mutually beneficial reasons; over half of the adult population (65%) think that the EU supports Georgia to have stability in its neighbourhood or

to have stability for oil and gas transport (60%). When asked whether the EU supports Georgia in order to subordinate it, a plurality (45%) disagrees and 24% agrees which indicates some scepticism about the EU's true intention in Georgia.

Overall, Georgians' attitudes towards the EU are overwhelmingly positive. Georgian people look forward to joining the EU and believe that this is going to happen in a few years. Trust towards the EU is high and people's perceptions of the EU are overall positive. Moreover, the Georgian public believes that the EU support is of high importance for their country.

| Table 2. To be a good citizen, how important would you say it is for a person to…? (%) [11] | | Important | Not important | DK | RA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Support people who are worse off | 2009 | 97 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| | 2011 | 97 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| Protect traditions | 2009 | 95 | 4 | 1 | 0 |
| | 2011 | 95 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Obey laws | 2009 | 91 | 5 | 3 | 1 |
| | 2011 | 94 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Vote in elections | 2009 | **86** | 9 | 4 | 1 |
| | 2011 | **92** | 4 | 3 | 1 |
| Form own opinions | 2009 | **83** | 8 | 9 | 0 |
| | 2011 | **92** | 2 | 5 | 1 |
| Be critical towards the government | 2009 | **52** | 29 | 17 | 2 |
| | 2011 | **66** | 19 | 14 | 1 |
| Work as a volunteer | 2009 | **48** | 32 | 19 | 1 |
| | 2011 | **58** | 28 | 13 | 1 |
| Participate in protests | 2009 | **30** | 46 | 22 | 2 |
| | 2011 | **55** | 30 | 14 | 1 |

## Value Change: A Shift towards a more 'European' Way of Thinking

For Georgians, the 'return to Europe'[9] has another very important but less researched aspect; the symbolic return to the world of European

political values which include: freedom, democracy, justice, solidarity and prosperity. Thus, striving towards Europeanness not only means obtaining EU membership, but also (and more importantly), sharing European political values and identity.

Views regarding the relationship between state and people are central if we are to understand Europeanness of Georgia. According to theories about political culture, individuals play a crucial role in democratization by taking an active role in the process and engaging with the state. As Inglehart and Welzel have shown, people's values and beliefs play a crucial role in a country's democratisation.[10] This study looks at how Georgians view citizens' responsibilities and how their perceptions of good citizenship have changed in the past two years. Social values are quite static and two years is a short period of time to examine change over time. However, the data indicates that Georgians have taken a more active view of citizens' responsibilities in 2011 when compared to 2009.

In the survey, people were asked to consider the level of importance of certain activities or values in order to be a good citizen. The data shows that some values related to citizenship remain more or less unchanged and highly important while others have slightly changed and became more important in the past two years (Table 2). Supporting people who are worse off than themselves, protecting traditions and obeying lows, importance of which remained almost unchanged in the past two years, can be considered as more traditional values linked to survival. While last five values in the table are more similar to Western values linked to self-expression, autonomy and participation. These latter values are gradually changing and gaining more importance for Georgians. Since 2009, there has been an increase in the proportion of Georgians who think that voting in elections, forming their own opinions independently of others, being critical towards the government, and working as a volunteer are important for good citizenship. In addition, the number of people who think that participation in protests is important for a good citizen nearly doubled in 2011. By observing these trends one can notice that the values which remain unchanged as well as those that changed differ from each other by the degree of effort they require from citizens.

Despite some slightly increasing progressive views regarding the relationship between state and society, it is important to note that Georgia remains a deeply socially conservative country when it comes to

certain social values. This puts it at odds with many populations within the EU. This work cannot fully discuss this aspect of Georgia-EU comparisons, however it is important to note that conservatism towards particular social issues continue to set Georgia apart from EU member states even though Georgians' political attitudes and Western-leaning ideals are different. For example, half of Georgian population thinks that a woman bearing a child without marriage can never be justified. 64% think that women having sex before marriage can never be justified (while this percentage figure drops to 33% when the same question is asked about men), and the vast majority (90%) of Georgians think that homosexuality can never be justified (Table 3). Even though values related to women having sex or bearing a child without marriage are slightly changing to a more liberal orientation, other values such as tolerance of homosexuality remain unchanged.

| Table 3. How justified are the following activities? (%) | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Always justified | Some-times justified | Never justified | DK | RA |
| Woman bearing a child without marriage | 2009 | 3 | 27 | 63 | 6 | 1 |
| | 2011 | 6 | 36 | 50 | 6 | 1 |
| Woman having sex before marriage | 2009 | 1 | 14 | 78 | 6 | 1 |
| | 2011 | 6 | 22 | 64 | 6 | 1 |
| Homosexuality | 2009 | 1 | 3 | 90 | 5 | 1 |
| | 2011 | 1 | 3 | 90 | 5 | 1 |

## National Identity versus European Identity

Understanding European identity means examining the relationship between a common European identity and numerous national identities. On the one hand, some scholars such as Carey argue that these identities are contradictory and a stronger feeling of national identity produces a lower level of support for the EU as a project.[12] On the other hand, most analysts today hold another point of view, defining the relationship between national and European identities as associated and coexistent. They understand postmodern identity as a dynamic and multiple structures in which independent and partially contradictory sub-identities are related to one another and support a sense of coher-

ence.[13] As Meehan writes, a multiple identity 'allows different identities to be expressed and different rights and duties to be exercised'[14] and implies that one does not need to give up one's national identity to adopt a European one.

| Table 4. In the near future do you see yourself as..? | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Country | European only | European and Nationality | Nationality and European | Nationality only |
| Italy | 5 | 9 | 60 | 25 |
| Spain | 5 | 8 | 58 | 27 |
| Luxembourg | 10 | 11 | 47 | 27 |
| France | 6 | 10 | 53 | 27 |
| The Netherlands | 1 | 7 | 53 | 38 |
| Belgium | 8 | 11 | 39 | 40 |
| EU15 | 4 | 8 | 45 | 41 |
| Germany | 4 | 8 | 39 | 45 |
| Denmark | 2 | 6 | 44 | 46 |
| Portugal | 2 | 3 | 48 | 46 |
| Austria | 4 | 7 | 34 | 53 |
| Greece | 1 | 4 | 40 | 55 |
| Finland | 1 | 3 | 41 | 55 |
| Ireland | 2 | 4 | 37 | 56 |
| Sweden | 1 | 5 | 34 | 60 |
| United Kingdom | 2 | 4 | 27 | 64 |

Source: Standard Eurobarometer survey no. 53, 2000, Fig. 6.3

Empirical results from the Eurobarometer indicate that the majority of Europeans declare having both a national and a European identity, demonstrating that they consider both identities to be compatible (Table 4).[15] These findings support the multiple identities theory according to which identity cannot be analysed in terms of a zero-sum game meaning that European identity does not imply the substitution of other identities.[16] Even the Treaty of Maastricht does not ask the citizens to choose *either* a national identity *or* a European one. Title I, Article F states that, 'The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy.'

According to CRRC data in 2011 over half of Georgians (59%) agree with the sentiment of Zurab Zhvania's famous phrase: 'I am Georgian, and therefore I am European.' Interestingly far fewer Georgians identify themselves as European. Only 16% of Georgians identify as both Georgian and European, whereas a large majority (60%) identify as their own ethnicity only (Table 5).

| Table 5. How do you identify yourself? As ... (%) | | |
|---|---|---|
| | 2011 | 2009 |
| Only (respondent's ethnicity) | 60 | 60 |
| (Respondent's ethnicity) and European | 16 | 13 |
| (Respondent's ethnicity) and Caucasian | 14 | 10 |
| Caucasian | 6 | 9 |
| Other | 4 | 6 |
| DK | 1 | 1 |

Comparing the results with the data from the Eurobarometer, it becomes evident that European identity is much more profound in most of the EU countries than in Georgia. Even though the differences between the EU countries are great and most people even in the EU do not regard themselves as exclusively Europeans, in 9 out of the EU15 member states (unlike in Georgia) the majority of people say that they feel European. In another words, Georgia is clearly set apart from the most EU countries where mixed identity prevails.[17]

These results do not support Carey's theory according to which strong sense of national identity weakens the support for EU. The Georgian case demonstrates that it is possible to maintain a strong sense of national identity while expressing strong support and enthusiasm for European integration. One potential explanation of this fact can be that the importance of EU membership for pressing problems such as national security, economic and territorial integrity are of top priority for Georgians (Müller, 2011). For them, the EU holds a promise of security and democracy and is positively perceived and strongly supported. These concerns outweigh the threat of losing national identity.

Finally, CRRC data suggests that identity is a more static variable than attitudes or even values.[18] Thus, it might not be surprising that Georgian attitudes and values have slightly changed in a pro-European way in the past years, while a strong sense of national identity remains unchanged.

## Conclusion

The survey on Knowledge and Attitudes towards the EU offers interesting insights about societal processes that take place against the background of Georgia's political 'Euphoria.' While the formal, elite-to-elite cooperation does not hold promise for Georgia obtaining EU membership in the near future, Georgian society remains highly enthusiastic and optimistic about joining the EU. Georgian attitude towards the EU can be described as high trust, importance and optimism, as well as strong support and positive perceptions.

On the other hand, value changes related to 'Europeanisation' in Georgia is not as straightforward as Georgian attitudes towards the EU. This is expected taking into account the short period of time (two years) in which such changes are examined. Yet the data still suggests some important trends indicating that mass values and beliefs related to citizenship are gradually changing in a liberal direction while other traditional and conservative social values remain unchanged, thus setting Georgia apart from EU member states. The difference between Georgia and the EU countries becomes even more evident with respect to European identity. In spite of strong support for Georgia becoming a EU member, and widespread agreement with Zurab Zhvania's famous phrase, Georgian national identity remains the prevalent sentiment in Georgia.

These results suggest that changes related to Europeanisation in Georgia have occurred mainly on an attitudinal level and partially on the level of political values and beliefs. However, changing identities as well as some traditional beliefs that are deeply rooted in Georgian culture takes more time and may be increased together with the credibility of cooperation between Georgia and the EU.

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## Notes

1   The European Union External Action Service (EEAS), *Summary on EU-Georgia Relations*, 2010. Available at: <http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/eu_georgia_summary/index_en.htm> (accessed 25 April 2012).

2   The EU-Georgia Cooperation Council, 'EU-Georgia Action Plan,' *European Commission Official Web Site,* 2006. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/pdf/enp_action_plan_georgia.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2012).

3   Frank Schimmelfenning and Hanno Scholtz (2008), 'EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange,' *European Union Politics*, 9:2, pp. 187-215.

4   The Commission of the European Communities, 'Communication from the Council to the Council and the European Parliament: Black Sea Synergy, A New Regional Cooperation Initiative,' *European Commission Official Web* Site, 2007. Available at: <http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/com08_823_en.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2012).

5   Commission of the European Communities, 'Communication from the Council to the Council and the European Parliament: Eastern Partnership,' *European Commission Official Web Site*, 2008. At: <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com07_160_en.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2012).

6   The first survey was carried out between 26 July and 07 August 2009 and resulted in 1683 completed interviews; the second survey was carried out between 07 and 18 July 2011, and had 1818 respondents. Both surveys employed multistage cluster sampling. To draw the sample the country was divided into three macro-strata: capital, urban and rural. Afterwards, 102 clusters were selected throughout the country. The target population of the surveys comprises Georgian-speaking adult citizens of Georgia (excluding Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Interviews were conducted face-to-face by trained interviewers in the homes of respondents. The margin of sampling error is ±4 percentage points and the error attributable to random effects or sampling is ± the margin of error with 95% confidence. Further information about these surveys are available at: <http://crrc.ge/research/projects/?id=18> and <http://crrc.ge/research/projects/?id=38>

7   Even though this is a very short period speaking in terms of value structure changes, some insights still provide valuable information regarding the direction of specific value changes.

8   According to the Caucasus Barometer 2011, trust in the EU is higher in Georgia compared to Armenia and Azerbaijan. 46% of Georgians fully or rather trust the EU, while this share decreases to 37% in Armenia and to 22% in Azerbaijan. The percentages of Georgians trusting the EU are slight-

ly different in these two surveys. This can be explained by the fact that the target populations for both surveys were different. The survey on Knowledge and Attitudes towards the EU included only the Georgian-speaking population, while Caucasus Barometer includes all Georgians (Georgian, Armenian and Azeri speakers).

9   Using the language of 'return' is based on Lord Russell-Johnston's phrase cited in the introduction.

10  Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (2010), 'Changing Mass Priorities: The Link between Modernisation and Democracy,' *Perspectives on Politics*, 8:2, pp. 551-567.

11  Respondents were asked, 'To be a good citizen, how important would you say it is for a person to...?' The answer options shown in this figure were collapsed into two categories (important and not important) from 'not important at all, rather not important than important, rather important than unimportant and very important.'

12  Sean Carey (2002), 'Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?' *European Union Politics*, 3:4, pp. 387-413.

13  Wolfgang Kraus (2000), 'Making Identity Talk: On Qualitative Methods in a Longitudinal Study,' *Forum: Qualitative Social Research - Online* Journal, 1:2. Available at: <www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1084/2367> (accessed 25 April 2012).

14  Elizabeth Meehan (1993), 'Citizenship and the European Community,' *The Political Quarterly*, 64:2, p. 185.

15  European Commission, *Eurobarometer: Public Opinion In The European Union, Report Number 53,* Brussels: European Commission, 2000.

16  Stefania Panebianco (1996), *European Citizenship And European Identity: From The Treaty Of Maastricht To Public Opinion Attitudes.* No. 03.96. JMWP, December 1996. [Working Paper].

17  Questions asked by CRRC and EB are slightly different that might affect the answers. CRRC asked Georgians: 'How do you identify yourself? As...' and gave 8 optional answers to choose from: Only [Respondent's ethnicity], [Respondent's ethnicity] and European, Only European, Asian, Caucasian, [Respondent's ethnicity] and Asian, [Respondent's ethnicity] and Caucasian and Other. EB asked its respondents: 'In the near future, do you see yourself as..?' And gave four optional answers: European only, European and Nationality, nationality and European and Nationality only.

18  Time trend analysis of EB data shows that feeling European is a very static variable with very little changes from one measurement to the next. Standard Eurobarometer survey report number 53, Spring 2000: 82, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb53/eb53_en.pdf>

# Deconstructing and Defining EULEX

*Vjosa Musliu and Shkëndije Geci*

Hailed as the greatest European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission to date, the European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) has been oscillating between fulfilling its mission statement crafted in Brussels, while managing the controversial ethnic expectations of the local population in Kosovo. Because of its imposed "status neutral," in its three years of deployment in Kosovo, EULEX is considered to have been preoccupied with keeping a low profile, remaining invisible and not taking stances in an otherwise politically unsettled territorial entity amid acute ethnic cleavages. While it is considered as an important example to test the EU's vertical and horizontal consistencies, EULEX's ambiguous legal status has had its own implications; how EULEX seeks to maintain its coherence within Kosovo with its headquarters in Brussels. With most of its work dedicated to its Press and Information Office, in articulating and setting forward communication in three different languages and aiming three different (to say the least) audiences, its journey is still that of seeking legitimacy and popular support. This work examines EULEX from a critical perspective.

*Keywords: EULEX, Kosovo, coherence, EU, the Western Balkans*

## Introduction

This work problematises and deconstructs the EU mission in Kosovo by focusing on its legal, political and identity-related dimensions. Initially sought as a mission with a mandate derived from the EU, due to internal divisions within the EU in relation to Kosovo's declaration of independence – among Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia and Spain – EULEX ended up being deployed under UN auspices. Since then the mission has had its proverbial hands full attempting to understand its legal and political identity while remaining "neutral" regarding Koso-

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vo's independent status. This ambiguity has led to numerous functional and operational problems with the mission itself that are hampering its legitimacy.

Numerous studies have focused on EULEX's controversial personality in Kosovo, its differentiated discourse and its legitimacy among the population in Kosovo; two of them, Peters' article and KCSS report are especially relevant to this article. This research however, brings a Derridian deconstructionist approach to EULEX's discourse and embedding it to further ESDP studies. In a more meta-theory level, this work sets forward the problematising of EULEX on the poststructuralist account of Derrida to eventually conclude with an explanation as provided by the Regional Security Complex Theory.

A poststructuralist approach will be undertaken to understand and analyse the EU's rule of law mission in Kosovo, primarily by focusing on its official discourse on the pursuit of deconstruction as conceptualised by Derrida. Focus is paid to the politicisation of language used in specific EULEX texts such as: press releases, official documents and speeches. Additionally, a number of interviews with Kosovo's elite have been conducted in relation to how EULEX is perceived in the field.

Before deconstructing EULEX's discourse, it is important to discuss deconstruction per se, its epistemological facets and above all the way it is conceptualised in this work. As many other poststructuralist approaches/methods/techniques, deconstruction is among the most misunderstood, not only because of its non-deterministic, non-static epistemology but also because of the very nature of systematised positivist approaches that it is viewed in opposition to. According to Cilliers, 'we no longer have to fight against a cruel positivism but at the same time there seems to be a growing resistance against theoretical positions which emphasise the interpretative nature of knowledge.'[1] As a result, most of the academic work following interpretivist methods, usually begin with a "defensive" part – explaining how are these approaches in relation to what the positivists call valid – and objective scientific inquiry.

## Deconstruction in General

Because deconstruction is a highly personal and intimate intervention, different authors provide different explanations on its epistemological foundation as well as methodological characteristics. Derrida once ex-

plained that although he had been given numerous occasions to define deconstruction, he still maintains that

> deconstruction isn't a theory, a school, methodis, even a discourse, still less a technique that can be appropriated – at bottom – what happens or causes to pass. It remains then to situate, localize, determine what happens with what happens when it happens.[2]

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For Cilliers, deconstruction argues for the irreducibility of meaning; meaning and knowledge cannot be fixed in a representational way, but they are always contingent in the contextual. The context itself isn't transparent but has to be interpreted instead. In his essay 'The Dialectics of Realist Theory and the Eurocentric Problematic of Modern Discourse,' Hostettler explains deconstruction as a disclosure of various kinds of contradictions by giving us discourse and discipline as historical categories and with Derrida developing the technique of writing pointing out the internal contradictions and limits of modern discourse.[3]

Derrida says that to deconstruct is to reverse hierarchy. For me, in a broad, yet insufficient explanation, deconstruction seeks to ally with the marginal, with the "non-mainstream," with the absent, with the oppressed. It seeks to scrutinise discourse and text to unravel struggles of power and the dynamics of dominance. I agree that it is not an approach/technique/method – it is more of state of mind. Deconstruction turns upside down our Abrahamic conceptualisation of being, living and existing, the phallogocentric discourse and logic of attribution, the politicisation of race, gender, sexuality, democracy, Western imperiality and superiority. By claiming that there's nothing out there, or there's nothing beyond text, it dissolves the static deterministic knowledge – that is unable to see that there is actually "something there."

## Deconstruction at Work ... Understanding EULEX

This work commenced from a meta-theoretical discussion of the epistemological paradigm of the mission, and tries to produce a more narrowed analysis of the missions discourse and the particular concepts germane to the context. This section deconstructs discourse gathered from EULEX's main documents throughout 2009-2011 (press releases, speeches, official documents). Particular attention has been given to the press releases in English and its' differences in language as text

and meaning in comparison to the ones in Albanian and Serbian. According to Peters, strategic communication is crucial for the success of civilian and military crisis management operations. He notes that 'Domestic publics have to be convinced that the operations are worth pursuing, and the publics in the countries where the operations take place have to be persuaded to support the missions' objectives.'[4]

In naming Europe, Derrida refers to a 'new figure of Europe,' or the Europe to come rather than EC[5]; in a similar fashion he talks about democracy as the democracy to come – but one which is never there, never here, never present. This is its essence insofar as it remains: not only it will remain 'indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and future, but belonging to the time of the promise [...]'[6] The installation of the EU mission in the Western Balkans in general – and particularly with its peculiar forms of post-modernist sovereignty (or the inversion of sovereignty as David Chandler calls it[7]) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo – brought a number of democracy promotion institutions, rule of law structures and human rights mechanisms as materialization of the European integration project. For the past 15 years these structures have been given forward as the only, indubitably sole project for these countries, homogenising this way the choice of discourse and action. According to Derrida, 'as soon as there's production, there is fetishism, idealisation, automatisation, dematerialisation and spectral incorporation. Fetishism has the ability that ideas generated by capitalist relations turns them into something like religion.' It is important to highlight here that by repeating the democratic standards and rule of law project under the EU's integration pendulum – "European project," without clarifying them as concepts – has led to the fetishising of the "European project" for Kosovo. By this logic, deconstruction can, among other things, be read as a rethinking of Western philosophy, or as a rhetoric of textuality and absence.[8] Phiddian reminds that

> Deconstruction becomes a method for discovering the oppressed others beneath phallogocentric discourse. It is used as hermeneutic of suspicion, as an instrument for unpicking the structures and rhetoric of racism, patriarchy, psychological repression, class.[9]

*Trying Horizontal Coherence*

Much of the literature concerning the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) suggests that the EU is still struggling with problems

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of consistency, and many scholars remain sceptical about the capability of the EU to ever become a coherent actor. For instance, Sjursen and Nuttall note that the EU, as a global actor, suffers from coherence problems both vertically and horizontally. Problems of vertical coherence may occur when the foreign and security policies of individual member states do not fit together with policies decided at the EU-level. On the other hand, problems of horizontal consistency are linked to the EU's involvement in various external activities that used to belong to the various pillars.[10] The case of EULEX Kosovo is interesting for attempting to foster horizontal coherence and for trying to function amid strong vertical incoherence among some of its member states in relation to the mission. In our case however, it is argued that more for sticking to the traditional implementations of coherence as effectiveness, in the case of EULEX coherence in discourse and mandate would potentially lead to greater legitimacy for the mission.

First, this work will see how EULEX, as a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission, seeks to build on the coherence of the EU as an external actor in Kosovo with other EU institutions which do not necessarily retain similar mandates. The changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty sought to enhance the consistency in action/discourse so that the EU can speak with "one voice." According to Peters, the characteristic of EULEX in being the largest civilian mission ever launched under the CSDP has provided a chance for the EU to consolidate its actorness on the international stage, which influences how EU foreign policy is perceived by others.[11] This is particularly evidenced in the EULEX's discourse on the so-called 'technical dialogue' between Pristina and Belgrade; one of the most important diplomatic projects of the EU in its policy for the stabilisation of the Western Balkans.

In contrast, the initiation of the dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade has been *defined* as a technical dialogue where both parts would negotiate about technical issues such as regional cooperation, freedom of movement and the rule of law. Such negotiations have been proven to be intrinsically political in their nature due to the political and contested sovereignty between Kosovo and Serbia. Despite claiming its mission to be of a purely *technical* nature, EULEX signals its readiness to be actively involved in traditional political issues. Additionally, EULEX makes frequent statements on the visa liberalisation process, or the dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade mediated by the EU. The dialogue itself is hailed internally (EULEX) as successful while being measured against European values.[12] The manner the values of dialogue appear in

both EULEX's discourse and at the EU in Brussels, gives the impression that more than being appreciated for its intrinsic political and practical significance, the dialogue is important because it carries a European value, and as such brings the region close to where the "hub of values" is situated. Furthermore, terms such as "the EU," "EULEX," and "European" are used interchangeably—as being in full congruence with one another. A note of protest addressed in EULEX's discourse for the 'barricades in Kosovo's north' seems to be an equal concern for "EU's" and/or "European" interests, thus giving the impression that not only there is an indisputable line of coherence and action between EULEX – the EU – and some broader European agenda. Consider the following as an example: '[...] grenades were thrown at EULEX police officers and at the [...] direction of police officers from the European Union and [...] these actions keep the region away from European values.'[13]

## Back to Vertical Inconsistency

Problems of vertical coherence may occur when the foreign and security policies of individual member states do not fit together with policies decided at the EU-level. Before delving into the explanation of the discourse, it is important to understand the ontological (if I may) problems of EULEX in Kosovo, from where its' vertical incoherence derives. While initially planned as an EU rule of law mission whose mandate is derived from the ESDP, arrangements with EULEX's deployment changed at the last minute. With Kosovo's authorities declaring a unilateral declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, tensions rose within the EU as Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Romania and Slovakia announced that they would not accept Kosovo's independence without a new UNSC Resolution. As Papdimitrou explains, without a new UN Resolution, the launch of EULEX faced huge challenges in terms of its precise legal status and policy objectives and noted that the 'key question in this regard was whether EULEX would fall under the UN Resolution 1244 (which preserved Serbia's territorial integrity) and as such, could not be seen to serve the objectives of the Ahtisaari's Plan – the blueprint of Kosovo's declaration of independence.'[14]

Due to such internal EU opposition, EULEX climbed under a United Nations' umbrella and adopted "status neutral." This formula was a compromise that would, first, equally appease all member states and assure their support for EU's greatest ESDP mission to date; second so

that no reference would be made towards Kosovo's declaration of independence to prevent to questioning by Serbia and Kosovo's Serbs of EULEX's legitimacy; and finally EULEX positioned itself to neither be in favour of, or opposition to, the declaration of independence with the Albanian majority. In this way, EULEX "downgraded" its self-ascribed presence from an activist position supported by the Ahtisaari Plan (for supervised independence) to a technical mission on the rule of law as "status neutral."[15]

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According to Papadimitrou, this altered mandate produced mixed results on the EU's actorness in Kosovo. Apart from setting EULEX in a defensive "mode" – where in each circumstance it has to identify its neutral position – later it will be shown that most of its work and energy is spent in maintaining a "status neutral" discourse and the amortisation of questions on who the mission really responds to. In their critical discourse analysis of EULEX, the Kosovo Centre for Security Studies (KSCC), argues that due to the diversity of audience, 'double standards' are applied by EULEX which is apparent in their discourse which deploys dual denominations (e.g. Prishtinë/Pristina, Border/Boundary), and even addressing Kosovo institutions according to the UNMIK designation (e.g. PISG); or, in some cases using the full state designations (e.g. Ministry of Justice).[16]

Peters (rightly) argues that the EU's communication for EULEX retained three relatively distinct target groups: 1. the EU's publics, 2. Kosovar Albanians and, 3. the Serbian community in Kosovo and Serbia itself. The strategies of communication towards these three groups vary considerably, as their attitudes towards the deployment of EULEX are fundamentally different.[17] This work discuss, below, how these double/triple standards of communication undermine the legitimacy of the mission. Being the most extensive greatest ESDP mission to date, and carrying tremendous responsibility for maintaining or projecting the EU's credibility, EULEX carefully crafts and articulates its discourse towards different publics and audiences. It's Press and Information Office is one of the largest departments in its headquarters in Pristina.

First, it is interesting to see to what extent, and in what way, the EU's discourse is directed to its own publics. Missions like these require the moral, political, financial support and legitimacy from the EU members. In this respect, the inflationary discourse of EULEX promoting European values, democratic standards and libertarian freedoms to Kosovo (as an entity which is not endowed with the former) seems more

*Following the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the successive wars during the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Europe has emerged as the paramount project for the successive states to emerge in the 20th century in the wider region.*

of discourse for the EU's domestic political consumption. In its programme reports, annual and quarterly reports, EULEX mentions that Kosovo is plagued by corruption, inefficient rule of law systems and other problems, such as with organised criminal elements. Saussure, for instance, whose ideas have influenced a number of post-positivist discourse theories, argues that languages are systems of differences. He notes that '(n)o word has a meaning in itself, but rather acquires its meaning in relation to and especially in distinction from other words.'[18] This means (he adds) that when I assert that something is red, I am at the same time implicitly asserting that it is not blue, green, white (etc). Therefore, by asserting that '[Kosovo] is plagued by corruption and organised crime,' by implication it is asserted that it is not "democratic" or efficiently governed according to the rule of law. Derrida argues that 'Western imperialism is deeply related to its philosophical thought, which is traditionally based on the ideology of binary opposites such as man vs. woman, spirit vs. matter and nature vs. culture.'[19] At the same time, Kagan argues that the transmission of the "European miracle," vis-à-vis the rest of the world, has become Europe's new mission civilisatrice. Europeans have a new mission borne of their own discovery of perpetual peace, which is based on the Western European principles of modernity – democracy, the rule of law and human rights – and ultimately draped as the EU integration miracle for the Western Balkans.[20] Following the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the successive wars during the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Europe (used interchangeably with the European Union) has emerged as the paramount project for the successive states to emerge in the 20th century in the wider region (re: Central and Eastern Europe).

Another critique, by Randazzo's, suggests that a mission's discourse of sovereignty as responsibility is loaded with references to the locals' inability to self-rule as justification for an extensive presence and, basi-

cally, external control.[21] This type of paternalistic responsibility, is not borne from the recognition of having, in certain cases, exacerbated existing conflicts with past colonial endeavours (re: Rwanda, Somalia, etc), but rather from a more arrogant position of authority which dismisses the locals' self-governing abilities as "insufficient" and "problematic." The actual practice of intervention has been characterised by the establishment of norms such as human rights, minority rights and international order and prosperity.[22] The reinforcement of such norms serve the purpose of acting as mere justification for the persistent international presence in, ostensibly, independent states, such as Kosovo.[23]

## Inconsistencies Within

In studies of the ESDP, EU external relations and, to some extent, EU enlargement, there's a constant trajectory of seeking "coherence" for the EU. Especially in EU external relations, coherence has become the problem and the solution of a myriad political, policy and identity problems. There is an implicit/explicit inference that coherence translates into effectiveness. Derrida would say there has been a fetishisation of coherence in evaluating and assessing the EU's performance. On one hand, EULEX and the EU may be regarded as trying to reach horizontal and vertical coherence; the impression is as though EULEX and the EU are in full compliance with one another and, additionally, even policy areas not necessarily related to one another (education, security and human rights policies) are uniformly shared by EULEX and the EU. On the other hand, EULEX is inconsistent with its own coherence in Kosovo while maintaining different communication with different stakeholders.

When discussing the Kosovo Albanian Public, Peters suggests it is the most pronounced communicative challenge for EULEX due to the high expectations that the Kosovar Albanian public holds both for the mission and the EU more generally. Kosovo's elite and public discourse articulated in the media (media monitoring) is critical for what they call EUELX's inefficiency to deal with the problems they have been invited to solve.[24] Sentiment within the Kosovo Albanian community lodges in the idea that EULEX will manage to tackle Kosovo's chronic problems (i.e. Northern ethno-nationalist issues and high levels of corruption), meanwhile EULEX seeks to amortise these expectations;

reasserting that it's mandate is technical rather than political. Peters observed that the main slogan on EULEX's website is 'supporting local ownership' in order to underline that the Kosovo government bears the main responsibility for the country.[25] To date, EULEX has not managed to deploy to Kosovo's northern parts, which are inhabited by ethnic Serbs. Since the end of the conflict in 1999, Kosovo's authorities have not been able to extend national jurisdiction there either.

Yet, the problem is related to the politics of statehood and identity rather than simply a problem which can be downgraded to locals' expectations on the mission, per se. Due to it's still unfinished status in terms of the Westphalian principles of sovereignty, elements pertaining to statehood can easily become a butterfly effect for the Kosovo Albanian target group. This target group is more challenging for EULEX precisely because the former has to be excruciatingly vigilant that its discourse retains "status neutral" of the mission and yet does not jeopardise the "conceptual independent" or "almost fully independent" Kosovo. For instance, regarding the political unsettled disputes, EULEX takes into account the current border issues of Kosovo vis-à-vis its neighbours, and they use both terms "Border" and "Boundary" simultaneously as to include both perspectives, that of Kosovo (striving for territorial sovereignty and insisting on the usage of the term border) and Serbia (which does not consider to be bordering Kosovo, insisting on the terminology of boundary).[26] In a similar fashion, EULEX refers to the International Border Management (IBM) concept which explicitly uses Integrated Border Management. However, EULEX has also coined a new profile of Kosovo Police Officers – namely the Kosovo Border Boundary Police (KBBP) which, according to the structure of KP 16 and the Law on Police, is a designation or structure that does not exist.[27]

Regarding EULEX communication towards Kosovo Serbs and Serbia, the mission sets forward the discourse that while being a Kosovo mission would not eventually result in side-lining them from their future *in* Kosovo. In addition, EULEX works to earn Serb trust that the mission is in their interests by repeatedly stating that 'EULEX works to bring law and order for all people of Kosovo,' that EULEX 'promotes a multi-ethnic Kosovo.' Most programmes, which tend to be technical in nature, are metamorphosed into its discourse for having an "added value" (another widely used, yet unclear term) the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo and are usually read through an ethno-political lens. This ends up producing different effects for the target groups, particularly for those

who live in Kosovo. Chandler argues that the EU's promotion of good governance has done little to promote democratic political processes both in Kosovo and Bosnia and, as such, the populations there are seen as the 'bearers of human rights – rather than as "citizens" with rights of political equality.'[28] For instance, projects focused on the returnees from the previous conflict rather than promoted for their intrinsic value that the right to return to you own land as a guaranteed human right, are hailed as another standard of a multi-ethnic Kosovo; putting minorities or communities at the epicentre.

Another example is the process of decentralisation which, rather than being promoted as a process of bringing governance closer to citizens by dispersing the decision making mechanisms, the discourse has hailed it because it would 'empower local ethnic communities' to have their own small centres of governance, and that eventually adds further to the creation of a multi-ethnic Kosovo. Over 92% of Kosovo's population are ethnically Albanian, 4% are Serbian and the rest a mixture of Roma, Turks, Gorani and Croats.[29] In relation to the EU's legitimacy in Kosovo, this downgrading of human rights into minority rights – which is often translated into the rights of Serbs – has generated counter-currents among (mainly) the Albanian population. First, the inflationary discourse to factorise the idea of multi-ethnicity in a rather homogenous demographic state, for the Albanian majority, turns it into a politically motivated agenda. For this reason, decentralisation was singled out as being among the most misunderstood processes by Kosovo's public precisely because the EU identified it as a project to give rights to minorities and empower Kosovo's multi-ethnic figure rather than as an efficient mechanism of governance that is beneficial to all the citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin. Second, while most of this discourse – as well as projects – are related to the Kosovo Serbs due to the conflict paradigm, other minorities have been marginalised.

When it comes to EULEX's communication to Serbia, and to a lesser extent to Kosovo Serbs, Buzan and Waever's Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) offers some explanation. The former is a novel approach for analysing how EULEX, as an EU mechanism within a state, can affect or play a role in the security dynamics within a security region. RSCT has the ability to expand and incorporate non-traditional discourses into the structural debate. Theoretically, it deals with regional security in an inclusive approach that involves a number of international rela-

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tions theories such as constructivism and neorealism. Buzan employs constructivism in the sense that certain security situation is not taken for granted but where each factor is thoroughly analysed while maintaining a neorealist approach in its anarchic views. RSCT maintains that 'most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones,' therefore security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters.[30] According to Buzan and Wæver, penetration occurs when a state outside a RSC associates with a state inside the RSC, in this RSC's are linked together, but remain exclusive. In this analysis, EULEX represents an external actor penetrating a state (Kosovo) and dictating, or contributing to, the security dynamics of the region. Buzan and Waever argue that for the Balkan development, external actors were crucial. They claim that 'power differentials in combination with geography allow external actors to shape the developments in the area. This defines the Balkans as potentially a part of the EU-Europe RSC.'

As indicated, in the northern part of Kosovo EULEX has not deployed as a result of its ambivalent mandate and the general incoherence of the EFSP. This failure may be attributed to the UN's mismanagement under UNMIK. Nevertheless, the situation in northern Kosovo remains a cause for security concern unless the existing parallel structures are dismantled and rule of law institutions begin to function under the mentoring and support of EULEX, as in other parts of Kosovo. The role of EULEX, therefore, is crucial in the northern part of Kosovo in order to eliminate organised criminality, political and legal vacuums and establish a functioning rule of law institution. Any other scenario, such as partitioning this part of Kosovo – which could provoke the redefinition of borders given the ethnic composition of neighbouring states – would produce tremendous consequences for the security dynamics of the region. According to RSC theory, security interdependence is more intense among the states inside a certain RSC than with states outside of it. Buzan claims that security is a 'relational phenomenon;' in order to understand national security properly, the surrounding pattern of security interdependence should be understood in the first place.[31] Two important factors are the enmity and amity among units. These include established relationships between states (over time and relating to certain issues), ranging from resolving border disputes, to political ideology and the establishment of long-term historical bonds

(in this contextual political and historic realm, analysis on the relations between Kosovo and Serbia, Kosovo and Albania and Kosovo and Macedonia).[32]

The European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for transformation and is motivated by EU considerations of regional and international stabilisation. There are a number of opportunities derived from the EULEX mission: it supports Kosovo on its path to greater European integration in the rule of law area, it supports the visa liberalisation process, it supports the Pristina-Belgrade dialogue (facilitated by Brussels), it continues to concentrate on the fight against corruption and works closely with its local counterparts to achieve sustainability and EU best practices in Kosovo. EULEX prioritises the establishment of the rule of law in the north. By this token, the successful implementation of the mandate of EULEX, as a key mechanism of EU, can affect positive changes in the security dynamics of the region.

## Instead of a Conclusion

Notwithstanding its legal and political constraints, EULEX's presence in Kosovo is defined by inaction and avoidance. Selecting to remain neutral in an otherwise politically and ethnically tense environment, EULEX is, most of the time, situated not to act or take sides but rather to stick to its job description—that is working on enhancing the rule of law. In relation to this, Zaki Laïdi argues that power 'is conceived and experienced less and less as a process of taking over responsibilities, and more as a game of avoidance.'[33] This is also the basis of Chandler's criticism as he notes that all state-building efforts of today are characterised by a lack of a clear political goal or vision, which leads to the rejection of the responsibilities that the use of power would normally entail.[34] However, stretching to reach the high expectations of Kosovo Albanians, EULEX works closely with what are established as Republics' of Kosovo institutions (government, Customs, Ministry of Justice) coping, this way, with the Kosovo Albanian's "satisfaction" (i.e. legitimacy). On the other hand, the politicising of technical and political policies into the realms of ethnic minority rights and the maintenance of a multi-ethnic society, EULEX keeps its neutrality and seeks legitimacy from Kosovo Serbs as well. While it will be presumptuous to conclude

that EULEX's unitary communication with all its relevant publics would ultimately make the mission more effective, at this stage of the mission, giving single, unambiguous and unequivocal messages could be a stepping stone to increase its legitimacy.

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## Notes

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2   Jacques Derrida (1992), 'Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority,' in M. Rosenvelt and DG Carlson D. Cornell (eds) (1992), *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, New York: Routledge, p. 31.

3   Nick Hostettler (2004), 'The Dialectics of Realist Theory and the Eurocentric Problematic of Modern Discourse,' in John Michael Roberts and Jonathan Joseph (eds) (2004), *Realism, Discourse and Deconstruction*, London: Routledge, p. 192.

4   Severin Peters (2010), 'Strategic Communication for Crisis Management Operations of International Organisations: ISAF Afghanistan and Eulex Kosovo,' EU *Diplomacy Papers*.

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6   Ibid, p. 177.

7   When talking about the state formation in the Western Balkans, Chandler argues that rather than representing a collective political expression of Bosnian interests – expressing self-government and autonomy – Westphalian sovereignty in the terminology of state-builders. The Bosnian state plays a central role in the transmission of EU policy priorities in their most intricate detail. The state here is an inversion of the sovereign state. The Bosnian state is an expression of an externally-driven agenda. This way, Chandler argues, Kosovo and Bosnia are phantom states (a simulacra); but definitely not fictional creations.

8   Robert Phiddian (1997), 'Are Parody and Deconstruction Secretly the Same Thing?' *New Literary History*, no.4, p. 680.

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# Changes in Turkish-Israeli Relations

## Implications for the Regional Security Environment

*Gabriela Özel Volfová*

This work looks at how changes to global, regional and national political landscapes played a role in shaping Turkish-Israeli relations and how this, in turn, affected regional security and development in the Middle East. Specifically, I illustrate how Turkish political actors from the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) have responded to structural changes taking place in the Middle East, a region that has witnessed a decrease in US hegemony and a major political reshuffle caused by the Arab revolutions. While Turkey safeguarded Western and NATO interests in the Middle East until recently and maintained a close alliance with Israel, it changed its attitude towards the latter after a series of ill-fated events such as the Israeli attack on the Mavi Marmara flotilla carrying humanitarian assistance to Gaza which resulted in the loss of life. Recent rapprochement between Turkey and Israel is explained by both actors' re-discovering common security interests in their neighbourhood, namely peace in Syria and energy interdependence.

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## Introduction

Turkey has puzzled many Western observers by improving its foreign relations with Muslim countries to what has been perceived as being detrimental to the country's pro-Western orientation. Articles abound

in both the media and academic circles which attempt to gauge this new Turkish foreign policy orientation, with some suggesting that Turkey has "left the West," a point attributed to the victory of the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the 2002 elections. Others are more analytically nuanced and point to Turkey's continuing efforts to secure membership in the EU or allowing the NATO anti-missile radar system to be placed on its territory, thus professing Turkey's aim to be part of the Western security architecture. This article focuses on changes to Turkish-Israeli relations, which are regarded as symptomatic of the changes to Turkish foreign policy more generally.

Turkey's so called 'shift of axis,' reducing its alliance with Israel in favour of enhanced relations with other Muslim states in the region, is accounted for. However, before doing so, a proper context needs to be developed. This work proceeds as follows. First, an examination of the rationale behind the creation of the Turkish-Israeli strategic partnership in the 1990's takes place. This will assist in explaining the gradual – and eventual degradation of their alliance since many of the seeds of discord were already present before the election of the AKP. This work also addresses the implications this crisis in bilateral relations is likely to produce on the general security of the Middle East in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Finally, this work analyses the motivations behind recent diplomatic rapprochement between the two estranged allies and impacts it may have on the economy of the region. In short, this work should read as an analytical examination of nearly three decades of Turkish-Israeli relations in an ever-evolving and dynamic region.

## The Origins of the Turkish-Israeli Strategic Partnership

Turkey recognised Israel in 1948 and was, for many decades, the only Muslim country to have formal and friendly relations with the Jewish state. Despite strategic cooperation throughout the Cold War, the transformation of Turkish-Israeli relationship into a distinct strategic alliance occurred in 1996 with the penning of a comprehensive agreement on military cooperation.[1] While there are certainly a variety of explanations for such changes, two themes stand out as being of higher priority. Firstly, Turkey was interested in safeguarding its Western credentials – it had been trying to do so since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923[2] – and, as Nachmani argued,

Turkey's repeated rejection by the West and Europe provides the context for Turkey's interaction with Israel [...] both countries, in defiance of their geographical location, nurse Western aspirations and rule out integration into an Islamic Middle East. They find that their Western character and their usefulness to Western ends have both been placed in doubt by termination of the Cold War; they collaborate so as to survive as Western societies.[3]

Secondly, the Turkish-Israeli alliance was meant for the former's domestic political consumption. It was the Turkish military that negotiated and ultimately signed the alliance protocols to demonstrate to the Islamic government of the time [under the premiership of Necmettin Erbakan] that it was them who had the upper hand in deciding Turkish policy matters, not the religious politicians. Additionally, Jung noted that Israel provided military technology for Turkey's ambitious national defence industry needed to protect itself against pending and perceived internal and external threats from radical Islam and Kurdish separatists.[4] As Benli Altunışık pointed out,

During most of the Cold War, Turkey had a limited influence in the Middle East. Turkish foreign and security elites defined the region as unstable and conflict-ridden and thus tried not to get drawn into the Middle Eastern swamp.[5]

The only opening Turkey made towards its regional neighbours was Israel. According to Bir, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces from 1995 to 1998 who negotiated several landmark Turkish-Israeli military agreements, establishing formal ties with Israel sent a message to the international community about Turkey's plan to align itself with the West.[6] According to Inbar, the Turkish-Israeli strategic partnership in the 1990s was mainly based on cooperation in the national security sphere, common perception of the region as hostile and a shared sense of otherness. Both Turkey and Israel, Inbar notes, were status-quo powers in the region who aimed at enhancing their deterrence capability *vis-à-vis* Arab countries in the region by creating a synergy of military might which, at the same time, 'enhanced each country's defensive posture.'[7] Both countries felt it necessary to combine their forces to fight regional isolation and to deter potential war-making directed against them, be it from irredentist groups seeking secession and creation of their own state (e.g. Kurds and Palestinians) or from states such as Syria, Iraq and Iran.

Turkish-Israeli cooperation was also based on sharing intelligence, participating in joint military exercises and securing deals in the defence industry.[8] However, as Minasian argued, these military trainings were conducted to indicate that the alliance was to serve as a deterrent against making war against each of them since both Turkey and Israel possessed enough military power to provide for their own security.[9] For Turkey, the alliance with Israel had the additional plus in that the Jewish lobby in the United States supported Turkey against the Armenian lobby, which tried to push the US Congress to adopt a law on the Armenian genocide.[10] As for Israel, securing friendship with a Muslim country decreased its feeling of loneliness and vulnerability in the region. Inbar further notes that ties between Israel and Turkey reinforced the perception of Israeli military might, which mitigated Arab ambitions to remove Israel from the map.[11] For Israel, the alliance with Turkey also meant that it could train on a territory with similar geography to Iran and could thus prepare itself for an eventual war. The alliance kept other Muslim countries, in the region, in check and preserved the regional status quo, which in turn, served the American interests of preserving stability in the region. Turkish-Israeli alliance in the 1990s should therefore be seen as a continuation of Turkey's role during the Cold War.

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## Changes to the Definition of Threats

1999 was a landmark in Turkey's history for several reasons. First, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) guerrilla leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was captured in Kenya after being extradited from Syria, which had been providing aid and sanctuary to PKK since 1984.[12] It has been suggested that the military alliance between Turkey and Israel helped resolve the Turkish-Syrian crisis[13] in that Syria became more responsive towards Turkey.[14] On the domestic front, the Turkish-Israeli alliance was justified as being useful and necessary for Turkey's domestic security. However, after the Kurdish leader was put in jail, Turkish threat perceptions began to change.[15]

Second, in that same year, a 7.6 magnitude earthquake hit the Izmit region in the northwestern part of Turkey. It came as a surprise to many that Greece, Turkey's enemy since the Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922), offered Turkey rescue and relief support. In the aftermath of the earthquake, Greece stopped blocking the EU accession process with Turkey,

which eventually paved the way for Turkey's EU candidate status at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999. This decision sparked enthusiasm for political, economic and social transformations in Turkey. Part of this political transformation required that the military's role in Turkish politics be limited. The 1990s, coined as the decade of the Turkish military, thus came to an end as the officers' weight in shaping the foreign and security agenda of the country became severely restricted. Also, the role of the National Security Council (NSC), the military's arm in politics, was limited by legislative changes introduced by the AKP in 2003. The decrease in the role of the military in Turkish domestic and foreign policy has largely been driven by Turkey's will to conform to EU reforms. Larrabee (rightly) pointed out that the fall in generals' power in Turkey has led to both broadening and softening of Turkish foreign policy:[16] softening in a sense of using more diplomatic and soft power in its relations with neighbours, in line with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's doctrine of 'zero problems with neighbours,'[17] and broadening in a sense that the Turkish policy-making is now open to other actors from the sphere of civil society and/or business organisations who are able to demand a more human rights-based foreign policy or more trade-oriented foreign policy, respectively. Kösebalaban has called this as the 'privatisation of Turkish foreign policy,'[18] when the traditional state actors, such as the political elite and the military, had to make space for civil society and business representatives who began to assert themselves as new actors in both domestic and foreign policy decision-making.

## The Second Gulf War - the First Sign of Turkish-Israeli Estrangement

While Turkey, under President Turgut Özal, supported the First Gulf War (1991), mostly because of the country's efforts to secure a role for itself in the post-Cold War era,[19] the country refused to support the US in 2003. Prior to the US-led invasion of Iraq, there were massive anti-war demonstrations in Turkey and the Parliament decided not to allow American troops to use Turkish bases for launching attacks against Saddam Hussein's regime forces. This decision signalled that Turkey was on a strategic quest to strike a more autonomous foreign policy.[20] Since Israel supported the 2003 War in Iraq, the first signs of the Turkish-Israeli friction can thus be traced to this period.

According to Kösebalaban, the Iraq War negatively affected relations between Turkey and Israel because Turkey perceived Israel as close to Iraqi Kurdish groups, hence to PKK terrorists.[21] Kibaroğlu argued, in a similar vein, that while Turkey has been wary of any sign of independent Kurdish state formed in northern Iraq for repercussions it could have on its territorial integrity, Israel favoured such an autonomous entity, which would enhance its security by keeping a check on Iran. He further argued that Turkish-Israeli relations have suffered from Israel's trying to befriend Kurds of Northern Iraq in its search for allies among non-Arabs in the region.[22] Inbar disagrees with this notion that Israel has been promoting Kurdish independence for its own interest, as both Jerusalem and Ankara need a stable Iraq to serve as a counter-balance to Iran.[23] However, Turkey itself is now enjoying rather close political and economic relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq (mostly to secure oil contracts and build infrastructure there), not seen since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire some 100 years ago.[24] Relations with Iran have also improved due to trade and Turkey's energy needs.

## The End of the Turkish-Israeli "Remarkable Tie"[25]

Besides different Turkish and Israeli approach to the second Gulf War, Kardaş and Balcı have also made a direct link between the limited role of the Turkish military and the strained Turkey-Israel relations:

> It is not surprising that we are seeing the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations to an all-time low, simultaneously with the recent fall of the military tutelage in Turkey, which was the architect of the alliance in mid-1990s.[26]

However, the first open crisis in Turkish-Israeli relations appeared when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stormed out of the January 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos after criticising Israeli President Shimon Peres for Israeli operation Cast Lead in Gaza. Erdoğan's outburst in Davos sprang, apparently, not only from his pro-Palestinian sentiments but more importantly, from the feeling of injured honour[27] since Ankara was not informed about the planned Israeli attack on Gaza although Israel had been conducting peace talks in Ankara only a week before. Erdoğan claimed that Israel was 'very good at killing people,' while the Israeli right wing press likened Erdoğan to a 'hypocritical neo-Ottoman pasha, irresponsible and dangerous.'[28]

The second major rift occurred between the two countries in the aftermath of the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident when several Turkish citizens, travelling on a convoy of ships with humanitarian aid to Gaza, were killed by Israeli soldiers. The subsequent Palmer Report, which justified the Israeli action as self-defence, and Israel's refusal to apologise to Turkey and pay compensation to families of dead victims, sent Turkish-Israeli relations down the drain. According to Goren, the Turkish demand for apology was perceived in Israel as humiliating. He notes that

> The Israelis did not understand the significance of the flotilla event for Turks. While Davutoğlu labelled the incident as Turkey's 9/11, Israel dismissed the incident as an event used by Erdoğan to humiliate Israel and to improve Turkey's standing in the Arab and Muslim world.[29]

As a countermove, Turkey suspended joint military exercises and senior Israeli diplomats had to leave Turkey. After four years of strained relations between the two formal allies in the Middle East, a new sign of normalisation of relations could be perceived. On 22 March 2014, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu called Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan to apologise for the deaths of Turkish citizens during the raid on the Mavi Marmara flotilla. A month later, on 21 April 2014, the first round of rapprochement talks began in Ankara, focusing on compensation Israel is to pay to families of nine Turks killed during the incident.[30] Davutoğlu went so far as to call the Israeli apology 'a historic step, a historic success.'[31] According to Netanyahu, Israel's efforts to ease the relations were motivated by concerns over Syria's chemical weapons. He said that the two countries should resume communication as both border Syria, now in the midst of a civil war. [32]

Rubin has not shared this new optimism, though. [33] He argued that Turkey's hostility towards Israel was likely to remain in place as long as the ruling AKP, which has allied itself with other Islamic forces in the region, remained in power. Szymański also opined that due to divisions in the Israeli government, a coherent policy towards Turkey will be hard to implement, which, in turn, will make improvements in Turkey-Israel relations more difficult to achieve.[34]

Yet, bilateral economic relations, especially in the energy sector, seem to have ignored this political standoff. Israel is considering building a 500-kilometre long pipeline to carry natural gas from its newly found Leviathan gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean via Turkey to global markets. In the words of Turcas CEO Batu Aksoy,

Turkey remains the safest energy corridor for Israel to sell its gas to global markets...we are talking about something that is more than a pipeline, something that can be a remedy for lingering political clashes with Israel and its neighbours.[35]

In a similar vein, Oxford energy expert Sara Hassan noted that these new gas reserves found in the region could become a means for future cooperation, including Egypt and Palestine, which Turkey may want to play a role in.[36] In view of another energy expert from the London-based Global Resources Corporation consultancy Mehmet Öğütçü, Turkey knows that should the gas project go on without its involvement, it will be very difficult to play a significant role in the Eastern Mediterranean energy trade.[37]

## Turkey's New Neighbourhood Policy: 'Neo-Ottomanism'?

Turkey has recently wielded an increasingly strong regional power status in the Middle East. This has largely been due to its active economic and diplomatic policy but also due to a power vacuum resulting from an incoherent European strategy towards the Arab Spring countries and a discredited American policy in the region following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to Bengio, Turkey is trying to fill the vacuum for regional leadership left by the Arab revolutions.[38] As Popp noted,

Erdoğan is showing the West that Turkey currently dictates the rules of the play in the Middle East....he is pursuing a strategy that observers are describing as 'Neo-Ottomanism', making his influence felt far beyond Turkey's own borders....in the crisis-riddled region, Erdoğan, like a sultan, is increasingly setting the agenda.[39]

Davutoğlu, in articulating Turkey's foreign policy approach, emphasised the concept of 'strategic depth,' which endows Turkey with a historical and geographical identity that predisposes it to play an active role in the region previously under the domain of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, Turkey sees itself as morally responsible to act on the region's behalf.[40]

In view of the above, Schleifer explained the reasons behind the stalemate in Turkey-Israel relations in the following way:

The paths have diverged. What you have left is two countries with different visions currently for their position in the region. Turkey wants to build a more unified region with more

open borders that ultimately helps trade and ultimately helps Turkey see itself as a regional leader. Israel sees itself as isolated in the region, increasingly threatened and increasingly concerned with security issues... The outsider status that once drew Turkey and Israel together into an alliance during the 1990s has changed as Turkey has grown economically and established closer political ties with Arab neighbours.[41]

If one adds the limited role the Turkish military now plays in domestic and/or foreign policy, mainly as a result of the EU-driven democratisation process, there is little wonder that the alliance between Israel and Turkey has deteriorated. Furthermore, the current political elites no longer define the region as hostile and dangerous; a view previous Kemalist elites used to share with their Israeli counterparts. Instead, they perceive the region as full of economic and political opportunities, which they believe will help Turkey increase its regional power status. However, Turkey's close relations with regional Islamists, be it the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood or the Palestinian Hamas, as well as its support to various Sunni-linked jihadist groups operating in Syria, has somewhat tarnished the country's politically clout in the region.

Other observers have ascribed the downfall in Turkish-Israeli relationship to the orientation of Turkish foreign policy towards Islamic countries. Lapidot-Firilla has, for instance, argued that Turkey's shifting away from Israel should be seen in the context of Turkey's changing self-perception *vis-à-vis* its neighbours and the rest of the Muslim world and due to its self-proclaimed responsibility to serve as a protector of Palestinians, if not of all Muslims.[42] This resonates with a claim that Turkey is pursuing a 'Neo-Ottoman' foreign policy in the region. It is true that the electoral victory of political Islam in Turkey in 2002 has contributed to Turkey's quest for regional influence. According to Aras and Polat,

Turkey's immediate neighbourhood is now perceived as an area of opportunity. This outlook has been made possible by the new geographic imaginary, which represents Turkey's new regional profile as a civil-economic power. The new policy attitude put an end to the need for internal and external enemies...it marks a remarkable break from the old imagination and it is now on trial in regional politics.[43]

While Israel continues to view its neighbourhood as hostile, Turkey, at least until the Arab Spring, has approached the region as a place of

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economic and diplomatic opportunities where it could pursue its, now somewhat defunct, 'zero problems with neighbours' policy.

As part of this new foreign policy, Turkey has established closer economic links with Iran and Syria and distanced itself from the Western sanctions on Iran which aimed to punish the country for trying to acquire a nuclear weapon. At the same time though, Turkey, as a member of NATO, has agreed to host an early-warning radar system in Kürecik near the city of Malatya in the south-eastern part of the country, much to Iran's displeasure. While Turkey and the US experienced a cooling of relations in the aftermath of the 2003 War in Iraq and Turkey felt uncertain about its role in the Western security architecture once the Soviet threat disappeared, it has been suggested that Turkey's value to NATO security has increased as Middle Eastern states with anti-Western stance, such as Iran, have started developing missile capabilities.[44] This, together with Turkey's anchor in Western organisations such as the OECD and the Customs Union, should suffice to counter arguments claiming that Turkey has abandoned the West in favour of the East. For instance, a high-ranking Israeli officer reasoned that behind Turkey's 'axis shift' has been, among others, Ankara's failure to secure EU membership.[45] There are also voices from within Turkey which blame the current Econo-Islamism[46], a doctrine based on mixing business and religion, on Ankara's move towards Islamic countries.

In Szymański's view, although the Islamic-ideological profile of the ruling AKP is not negligible when it comes to its anti-Israeli stance, it is noteworthy that previous governments reacted to Israel's Middle Eastern policies in a similar manner and that AKP's critical position on Gaza intervention is shared by the opposition.[47] Kösebalaban shares Szymański´s view, saying it would be wrong to blame AKP for the anti-Israeli mood in the country. The fact is that Turkish public opinion is even more critical of Israel than the government would like it to be.[48] For instance, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the centre-left

Republican People's Party (CHP) voice stronger criticism against Israel than the Islamic AKP. Kösebalaban illustrates how Erdoğan had to rebuke critical voices in a parliamentary debate on border de-mining project between Turkey and Syria that was to be given to an Israeli company.[49] This should serve as an indication that it is not the Islamic party which is leading the anti-Israeli rhetoric though it is well aware of its potential to gain popularity at home as well as among Arabs.

It should be emphasised that although Turkey has changed its attitude and policies towards the Middle East, it would not be able to pursue such an active policy in the region were it not for the change of perception of the Arab countries towards their former rulers. A survey conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Association (TESEV) in 2011 confirmed that Arab perceptions towards Turkey have changed. The survey on "The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East" indicated that 78 per cent of people in the Middle East believed Turkey should play a greater role in the region and 75 per cent thought that Turkey should play a mediating role between Israel and Palestine.[50] In contrast, Israel was perceived as the biggest threat to regional security by 47 per cent of respondents.[51]

In the new Arab discourse, Turkey is no longer perceived as the 'violent suppresser of Arab nationalism' or 'the cruel and despotic power addict devoid of any cultural refinement.'[52] The Turkish image in the Arab neighbourhood improved after AKP came to power in 2002, especially when the Turkish Grand National Assembly refused to allow Turkish soil for deployment of US army to launch an offensive against Iraq.[53] Turkey's EU membership bid also improved Turkey's image among the Arab peoples in that they never believed that a Muslim country could become part of the EU and they came to see Turkey as a country whose synthesis of liberal economy, religious government and democracy should be emulated.

However, as Turkey's "European destiny" remains uncertain, the country has decided to put its stake in an ambitious and uncertain project of integration with its Eastern neighbours and pragmatic reasons might have been behind, too. The Middle East holds one of the world's largest proven resources of natural gas and oil. Since Turkey wants to establish itself as an energy corridor between the Middle Eastern producers and European consumers, it will have to re-build economic and political ties with countries where energy stocks are located, and that means re-establishing good relations with Israel.

## Economic Foundations of the New Turkish Foreign Policy

It is perhaps unquestionable that one of the most significant reasons behind AKP's electoral victories, the last one being in the local elections on March 30, 2014, could be attributed to its economic success. After overcoming the 2000-2001 banking crisis, the country's average growth rate was at 6% in 2002-2010, reaching 9.2% in 2010 and 8.5% in 2011. Per capita income rose from $3,500 in 2002 to $10,500 in 2011. Turkey is now the 17th largest economy in the world.[54] Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs, who coined the acronym BRIC to denote the big emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China, has included Turkey in MIST, a second tier of economic rising stars, alongside Mexico, Indonesia and South Korea.[55] On the other hand, the EU markets stagnate due to the protracted economic and financial crisis. Turkey, which has been oriented mostly towards the EU and whose economy is growing, now needs to find new markets to export its goods. At the same time, Turkey needs energy resources to feed its booming industry, which means that Turkey cannot afford to jeopardise relations with such countries such as Iran, Russia or Israel, for that matter, who are Turkey's (current and future) primary importers of natural gas and oil.

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It seems a misjudgement to claim that Turkey has turned away from the West (i.e. Israel) in favour of the East due to the Islamisation of its foreign policy. Proponents of international political economic approaches to Turkish foreign policy have pointed out that since the global economy has shifted from North-West to South-East and that BRIC countries have become "the global trade game-setters after the Cold War,"[56] Turkey has logically re-aligned its economy along the South-East nexus as well, without, however, abandoning its pro-Western axis.[57] What that means is that Turkey has succeeded in getting its foot in the Middle East where it now has significant economic interests. The country signed a number of free trade agreements with Iran, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan.[58] Turkish companies have moved production to the region, invested in the local infrastructure[59] and regional markets are flooded with Turkish goods ranging from textiles, food, chemical, automotive and agricultural products. Cooperation in the economic sphere has also been made possible due to transformation of Turkey from a military-security state to a trading state.[60] Due to this new self-understanding, Turkey is now able to imagine other than military solutions to regional problems by focusing on bilateral trade, for instance. Still, Germany (i.e., the EU) remains a key trading partner

for Turkey, which gives support to Oğuzlu's observation that 'the AKP adopted an ideology-free approach towards Turkey's economic policies at home and abroad.'[61] Similarly, Cockburn opined that

> Iraq is Turkey's biggest export market after Germany but the EU's relationship with Turkey remains crucial. It is by far Turkey's largest trading partner and the main source of its foreign investment. Turkish options in the Middle East are deceptively alluring, but not necessarily very rewarding.[62]

Cockburn further claims that Turkey might be feeling a bit too over self-confident about a region that is highly unstable, as the on-going civil war in neighbouring Syria demonstrates, which is why it should not abandon its EU anchor.

## Regional Implications of the Turkish-Israeli Crisis

It has been suggested that Turkey and Israel have a different reading of the opportunities and risks associated with the Arab Spring. While Israel perceives it as a threat posed by rising Islamisation of the region, Turkey sees it as an opportunity to play a central role in the region by showcasing that Islam and democracy can co-exist. Turkey has tried to project a soft power image based on economic cooperation and diplomacy by engaging in third-party mediation (i.e. trying to broker a peace agreement between Israel and Syria in 2010). Despite severe disruptions in economic and political relations with some Arab countries such as Syria, whose refugees in the aftermath of the civil war fled to Turkey and cross-border trade came to a halt, Turkish ruling elites continue to view trade and economic cooperation as panacea for peace and security in the region. In their foreign policy, they seem to be applying a neo-functionalist approach based on the expectations

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that economic cooperation will eventually spill over into the political realm and that integration of states in the region will prevent a conflict among them.

Given the current state of affairs in the region, it is a big question mark whether such a model can actually work. As Cook said, 'in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is the king,'[63] meaning that given the lack of a coherent EU or US policy towards solving the Mid-East crises, Turkey is left to its own wits to deal with the situation, and its meddling in the Syrian civil war by siding with the jihadist Sunni forces against the Alawite-led government of President Assad is, frankly, no wise choice for a country which once prided itself on 'zero problems with neighbours' and which wanted to serve as a model for the Arab countries.

Among the examples of Turkey's efforts to promote security in the region, Aras mentions the initiative of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) to establish an industrial zone on the border between Israel and Gaza. According to Aras, the so-called 'Industry for Peace' initiative is an example of new geographic imagination on the part of the Turkish political elites who view trade as solution to all problems in the region and who expect that the wealth ensuing from such initiatives will eventually lead to peace in the region.64 As noted by Inbar, Peres shares the same liberal economic approach to international relations, i.e. that economic trade rather than military force should shape relations among states. According to Inbar, Peres shares the same vision of an economically integrated region.[65] It is therefore optimistic to believe that with such a leader at the helm of Israeli politics, Turkey and Israel could find a common language regarding their approach towards security in the region.

Strong criticism of Israeli policy towards Palestinians, which is able to earn Turkish policy-makers applause both at home and in the Arab neighbourhood, may in the long run seem counterproductive to the efforts of civil society taken towards rapprochement between Israel and Palestine. As Ahmedi remarked, 'Israel is certainly a useful punching bag for Turkey in its pursuit of domestic and regional popularity.'[66] However, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is unthinkable if Turkey does not keep Palestinian and Israeli leaders on equal footing, so to speak, and does not refrain from such diplomatic mishaps as extending a warm welcome to leaders of Hamas.[67] Without disregarding the AKP's sense of solidarity with the people in Gaza, it seems as

if the Palestinian issue was a useful instrument in gaining popularity for the party. Many authors have emphasised that improvement in relations between Turkey and Israel will depend on the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is therefore in Turkey's best interest to try to tune down its criticism of Israel to be able to play an effective and efficient role as a regional peacemaker, if indeed, it still has such aspirations. In a similar vein, Turkey should act wisely and try to adopt a neutral standing between Israel and Iran and try to urge both Tehran and Jerusalem to downplay the nuclear threat discourse they like to engage in. In a similar vein, Turkey should refrain from meddling in the internal Syrian affairs and from pursuing sectarian politics in the region, which could very well turn against its own interests.

As Bengio argued, 'given Iran's and Hamas' unflinching opposition to Israel's existence, Turkey's support for them cancels out, in effect, its alignment with Israel.'[68] The feeling of deepening isolation since relations with Turkey got strained may have also corroborated Israel's perception of the Iranian nuclear threat. Szymański rightly pointed out that the dissolution of trust between the two former allies has negatively impacted on the Middle Eastern stabilisation efforts. The limitation of Turkey's role of a facilitator in talks between opposing sides had the effect of reducing the already small group of countries capable of playing such a role.[69] According to a senior Israeli government official, 'Israel does not want to see a further deterioration in the relationship with Turkey as deterioration in the relationship serves neither side's interests.'[70] Consequently, if Turkey wants to present itself as a credible conflict broker, it has to make an effort and have, if not cordial, then at least a working relationship with Israel in order to resume peace talks to resolve the Palestinian issue. If Turkey keeps antagonising Israel and *vice-versa*, the result will not be peace and security in the region (a win-win scenario) but more of a Cold War situation where two regional powers are trying to yield more power at the expense of one another (a zero-sum game). This is not the approach either Turkey or Israel should follow if peace and security is truly on their minds rather than ideological or economic self-interests.

## Conclusion

This article addressed changes in Turkish-Israeli relations from the perspective of changing Turkish foreign policy, which was also seen as

a response to international as well as domestic political and economic transformations. It has been shown that the post-Cold War era has presented Turkish decision-makers with new opportunities, namely expanding to Middle Eastern markets and playing third-party arbiters in regional disputes. Democratisation of state-society relations in Turkey in the late 1990s inspired by Turkish motivations to become a member of the EU has led to opening of the foreign policy agenda to other than state actors, i.e. to civil society and business organisations at the expense of the military. Scholars have thus spoken about 'the privatisation of Turkish foreign policy,' which resulted in broadening of the foreign policy agenda not solely along the military security objectives but also along economic needs and human rights.

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The political rhetoric of common threats used by the military elites in charge of Turkish foreign policy in the mid-1990's as a legitimisation strategy to justify a strategic alliance with Israel disappeared due to a new geographical imagination, which led Turkish political elites to re-integrate their country into its Muslim neighbourhood. In other words, once the rhetoric of common regional threats was found to be counter-productive to Turkey's economic interests, Israeli alliance seemed unnecessary. Combined with the uncertain membership in the EU, with a discredited Western policy in the Middle East and with Turkish economy boosting, Ankara felt it no longer needed to align its foreign policy solely along Western lines and tried to strike a more independent and autonomous course of action.

In a hopeful tone, Bengio suggested that regional uncertainties created by the Arab Spring could prove to "be a catalyst for renewed rapprochement"[71] between Turkey and Israel as both have been negatively affected by the instability and economic losses in Libya, Egypt and Syria. However, there have not been any significant steps taken by either Turkey or Israel to try to mend fences or engage in a more friendly political rhetoric towards each other until very recently, when Israel promised compensation to Turkish families whose members died in the Mavi Marmara incident. The pipeline diplomacy can also be attributed to this recent rapprochement as Israel will soon need to start extracting and exporting its natural gas to European markets via Turkish territory. Turkey, to sustain its economic growth, will need to diversify its natural gas imports in order to lessen its dependence on Iranian and Russian gas. Also, Turkey's rhetoric of being a bridge between East and West, which has been put on the back burner for a

while, is now being invoked again by references to Turkey's pivotal role in the energy trade between Europe and the Middle East.

Furthermore, if Turkey is to play any meaningful role in brokering peace between Palestinians and Israelis, it must approach both sides on a neutral basis. The anti-Israeli card, which appeals to regional popular sentiments, is a short-sighted strategy. Israel should not be seen as a liability but as an asset to Turkey, which strives to act as a crisis-manager in the region. Turkey should capitalise on the strategic partnership it enjoyed with Israel in the 1990s and on closer ties it now enjoys with Iran and try to tune down the Cold War deterrence rhetoric since nuclear escalation between Israel and Iran would certainly benefit no one.

Lastly, AKP's increasingly authoritarian style of governing that sparked a country-wide domestic protest movement in summer 2013 has shown that the Turkish model, once hailed for its ability to successfully combine Islam, democracy and capitalism, has also somewhat eroded. If Turkey does not want to lose its regional clout altogether, it may do well to remember its soft power policy practiced prior to the Arab revolutions when it tried to broker local skirmishes and promote regional economic integration and this will require, among others, mending fences with its estranged former allies.

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## Notes

1    Turkey signed a Customs Union with the EU the same year.
2    For a more detailed account see: Ali Balcı and Tuncay Kardaş (2012), 'The Changing Dynamics of Turkey's Relations with Israel: An Analysis of Securitization', *Insight Turkey*, 14:2 and Dietrich Jung and Wolfgango Piccoli (2000), 'The Turkish-Israeli Alignment. Paranoia or Pragmatism?', *Security Dialogue*, 31:1.
3    Amikam Nachmani (1998), 'The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie', *The Middle East Quarterly*, 5:2, pp. 19-29.
4    Dietrich Jung (2005), 'Turkey and the Arab World: Historical Narratives and New Political Realities,' *Mediterranean Politics*, 10:1, p. 11.

5   Altunışık (2008), p. 42.
6   Çevik Bir and Martin Sherman (2002), 'Formula for Stability: Turkey Plus Israel,' *The Middle East Quarterly*, 9:4, p. 23.
7   Efraim Inbar (2001), 'Regional Implications of the Israeli-Turkish Strategic Partnership,' *Middle East Review of International Relations (MERIA)*, 5:2, p. 4.
8   Turkey was able to buy the state-of-the art military equipment from Israel that other Western countries were unwilling to sell to Turkey.
9   Sergey Minasian (2003), 'The Turkish-Israeli Military and Political Co-operation and Regional Security Issues,' *Iran and the Caucasus*, 17:1/2, pp. 316-317.
10  Minasian also notes that the Jewish lobby in the US actively supports Turkish routes of the oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian, see Minasian (2003), p. 323.
11  Inbar (2001), p. 10.
12  Idris Ahmedi (2011), 'Why Turkey No Longer Needs Israel' available at: <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10095/why-turkey-no-longer-needs-israel> (accessed 12 April 2012).
13  In Turkey's view, Syria harboured PKK terrorists; in Syria's view, Turkey was responsible for Syria's loss of the Hatay province and for building dams on the Tigris-Euphrates Rivers, which resulted in water shortage.
14  Minasian cites Çevik Bir (2003), pp. 317-318.
15  The Turkish military-bureaucratic establishment had until then suffered from the so-called Sèvres syndrome, i.e. 'the perception of being encircled by enemies attempting the destruction of the Turkish state.' See Dietrich Jung: 'Turkish Foreign Policy and Its Historical Legacies', available at: <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_07-09/jung_sevres/jung_sevres.html>, (accessed March 24 2012). The Treaty of Sèvres was signed between Turkey and the Allies in the aftermath of the First World War, which delineated the borders of the modern Turkish Republic.
16  F. Stephen Larrabee (2010), 'Turkey's New Geopolitics,' *Survival*, 52:2. The Turkish military is no longer considered untouchable in Turkey and its image has been seriously tarnished by the recent Ergenekon affair, in which top-ranking Turkish officers have been put on trial for trying to plot a coup against the AKP.
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18  Hasan Kösebalaban (2010), 'The Crisis in Turkish-Israeli Relations: What Is Its Strategic Significance?' available at: <http://mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/crisis-turkish-israeli-relations-what-its-strategic-significance?print> (accessed 13 April 2012).
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54  'Economic Outlook of Turkey,' available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/prospects-and-recent-developments-in-the-turkish-economy.en.mfa> (accessed 28 April 2014).
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65  Inbar (2001).

66  Ahmedi (2011).

67  Israel continues to perceive Iran as an existential threat mostly due to the latter's rhetoric of wiping Israel off the map.

68  Bengio (2010).

69  Szymański (2010).

70  Ivan Watson, Yeşim Comert and Kevin Flower (2011), 'Turkish PM Announces Additional Sanctions on Israel,' available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/09/06/israel.turkey/index.html> (accessed 27 April 2012).

71  Ofra Bengio (2011), 'Upheavals in the Middle East: Cause for Rapprochement between Turkey and Israel?' *The Moshe Dayan Center Tel Aviv Notes*, 5:9, available at: < http://www.aftau.org/site/DocServer/TANotes_Upheavals_Bengio_2.pdf?docID=14905> (accessed 7 April 2012).

# Book Reviews

# Managing the Undesirables

## Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government

*Reviewed by Wendy Booth*

According to a 2012 report by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 'an average of 3000 people per day became refugees in 2012, five times more than in 2010.' The number of refugees, worldwide, now stands at approximately 15.4 million. These figures are startling. Discovering effective ways to assist refugees, whatever the humanitarian crisis, is a matter of urgency. As the author of *Managing the Undesirables*, Agier's aim is to describe and create an understanding of humanitarian governance.

Agier is an anthropologist, and his work is essentially an ethnographic account of his visits to refugee camps, mainly in central and western Africa, during the period 2000 until 2007. It provides an account of people's lives in the camps, including a number of interviews, and the difficulties faced by the stateless, particularly in regards to the power exerted over their lives by the UNHCR and the NGOs which provide humanitarian assistance. Agier states that his main aim is to open up further paths for ethnographic inquiry 'in one of these new imagined spaces which a few decades ago no one would have imagined could figure among the legitimate terrains of anthropology' (p.134). His affiliation with Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders) enabled Agiers to access to the camps and closely examine the situation of the refugees located within their territory.

The work tackles the complexities associated with displaced persons and provides a raw account of the issues faced on the ground. It is particularly useful, from an anthropological perspective, including with regard to human rights. Problems that arise from the absence of recognition and lack of citizenship also make the book useful to those interested in the politics of identity and recognition. The book provides a straightforward account that brings the central problems to the fore in an easily understandable manner, with a focus on the day to day problems faced, such as the apathy that results from being dependent on humanitarian aid, with Agiers describing refugee camps as 'waiting rooms' (p. 72); a state that the majority of refugees find themselves in sometimes for months but more often for years.

The power that humanitarian organisations wield over displaced persons is clearly described, from the labelling that occurs on entering the camps, 'a hierarchy of misfortune' (p. 213), to decisions about who exactly should receive plastic sheeting, and the distribution of food packages. This information meets the objectives that Algiers set out to achieve at the start and provides interesting reading and a thorough insight. However, it does, at times, seem overly descriptive, as well as short on solutions and more in-depth theoretical arguments.

It is inevitable that the provision of aid and what form this should take will be contested and face criticism. One of the most poignant points that Agiers makes is regarding the politics within the camps, and perhaps more importantly outside the camps, by the UNHCR and NGOS, with the camps described as places of 'extra territoriality' (p. 71) and '(z)ones of exceptional rights and power, where everything seems possible for those in control' (p. 82). There is a striking contrast between the public perception of humanitarian aid and the impunity which organisations have, for example with regard to the forced return of displaced persons now urbanised after war and sometimes decades away from their homeland, yet expected to go back to their original lives as farmers (p. 120).

The book is essential in the context of the current debate on refugees. Perhaps the most worrying factor flagged up is 'the impunity of those in charge' (p. 155), and the way that privatisation is entering the field of humanitarism. Moreover, the post 9/11 era 'strangely resembles science fiction, but permits the effective global application of an imperial police force, with humanitarianism as its left hand' (p. 206). These issues are mentioned in the latter half of the book, and result

in a desire for further elaboration. While Algiers describes instances where refugees themselves have carried out protests or elected leaders from among themselves as representatives within the camp, it is ultimately these powerful exterior forces which will determine the future of refugee camps and the status of displaced persons; as Agiers coins it 'managing the undesirable' and controlling the fate of those who 'are viewed, simultaneously or alternatively, as vulnerable and undesirable, victims and dangerous' (p. 201). *Managing the Undesirables* provides a good starting point for these issues, which is the main objective of Agiers, yet the issues at play need to be delved into more deeply, for example the idea of integrating displaced persons into existing towns and cities, which is usually more cost effective; or indeed, deciding what to do when long term refugee camps evolve into townships—a point made in the book. In addition, further ethnographic research is required, as his research terminated in 2007 and is largely centered on Africa. In sum, the book is a highly commendable ethnographic account that is easy to follow and provides a significant contribution to the current crises of the humanitarian movement.

# Rules for the World

## International Organizations in Global Politics

*Reviewed by Jelena Cupać*

International relations scholars have rarely tackled the subject of international organizations outside of the paradigmatic question imposed by the neo-neo debate about the nature and possibility of cooperation among states. In this regard, Michael Barnett's and Martha Finnemore's book *Rules for the World* may be viewed as an attempt to break away from these preset research questions of the disciplinary debate. The book successfully manages to unpack the black box of international organisations by going beyond the input of states' interests and attempting to offer a set of coherent theoretical accounts for analysis of the behavioural autonomy of these organisations. The authors posit that 'we can better understand what IOs *do* if we better understand what IOs *are*' (p. 9). This reasoning leads them to suggest that IOs are nothing more than bureaucracies, like all other organisations. The rest of their theorising is directed by this supposition, but before paying more attention to it, it is important to highlight that this type of analysis is hardly novel; there exists a well-developed body of scholarship in sociology, organisational theory and political science that examines the role of bureaucracies and Barnett and Finnemore are not shy to borrow heavily from it. Nonetheless, it would be a great injustice to regard *Rules for the World* as lacking a valuable contribution. Accordingly, this book represents one of the first theoretically developed attempts

to view IOs as polities whose behaviour is steered by bureaucracies.

Barnett and Finnemore reject explanations that regard the behaviour of IOs as a mere function of the member states' interests and make the case for their behavioural autonomy and authority in the international arena. As suggested, the concept of bureaucracy assumes central stage in their argument. Bureaucracy is regarded as a unique social form which develops a distinct organizational culture. Drawing considerably on Max Weber's explorations, the authors posit that the autonomy, authority and power of bureaucracy is derived from claims to rationality, or in other words, from their tendency to structure action in terms of means and ends (p.116). Furthermore, their autonomy is exercised through the production and diffusion of impersonal rules and norms that, in turn, frame the problems in particular way and as such play a significant part in constructing the reality of world politics. More importantly, bureaucracies construct the social world in such a manner as to make it amenable to their intervention.

From this short summary of Finnemore and Barnett's main arguments, it is clear that they largely subscribe to a constructivist theoretical paradigm. Even though, the labelling is hardly ever fruitful for the development of the theories and science in general, some minor weakness regarding this issue should be pointed out. Although the argument about the construction of social reality is *par excellence* a constructivist argument, Barnett and Finnemore conceive it in a highly instrumental manner. This is because they see particular ways of constructing reality as a process aimed at maintaining the authority and power of IOs in the realm of world politics and can almost be conceived of as the rational choice behaviour on the part of these organisations. In this regard, their accounts are better conceived of as a theoretical framework rather than a developed theory, which opens up possibilities for further theoretical specifications and development.

The third, fourth and fifth chapters of the book are dedicated to case studies of the developments in the International Monetary Fund, UNHCR and the UN Secretariat in the case of Rwanda's genocide. In a truly gripping manner Barnett and Finnemore depict the process of development and change of these organisations. They show how their organisational cultures and procedural routines affect the way they frame the problems they deal with which, determines the character of their actions. As an illustration, how the UN Secretariat's decision to define conflicts in Rwanda as a reciprocal civil war due to the cul-

ture of 'institutional ideology of impartiality' (p. 123), rather than an on-going genocide prevented them from prompting fast, or for that matter, any substantial action. Similarly, they demonstrate how the emergence and the insistence on 'repatriation culture' (p. 74) led the UNHCR to put people in danger by returning them to their not yet safe homes. In general, however, these case studies should not be viewed as hypothesis testing. In the spirit of the interpretative method of those theorists that adopt a constructivist theoretical paradigm, Barnett and Finnemore prefer to provide a 'thick description' of the historical developments of these organisations. That said, even though this method is very useful in allowing the reader to track down the change, which was one of the aims of the authors, at certain moments if falls short of fully capturing the previously made arguments about autonomy, authority and power of the IOs.

In the concluding chapter, Barnett and Finnemore take up a normative question on the subject of legitimacy of an expanding global bureaucracy. They ask if we should regard an all-encompassing bureaucratic expansion as a generally good thing. Liberated from the normative pressure that liberal institutionalists have when demonstrating the usefulness of international organisations in encouraging cooperation among states, they offer as set of balanced normative propositions. Therefore, they acknowledge that these organisations are important international players that undertake useful tasks and goals that transform the character of global politics, but their cost and problem of legitimacy should by no means be overlooked.

*Rules for the World* is a short but indispensable book for all those studying international organisations and for those who wish to know more about global governance without adopting a dominant state-centric approach. In it Barnett and Finnemore open up space for reshaping and enlarging the research agenda for the study of these significant international relations' entities by managing to break away from the same old drama of the neo-neo debate. While the book tells us a few new things about bureaucracies *per se*, the deployment of this concept in the study of IOs sheds light on certain aspects of their behaviours which would otherwise be hard to spot. Also it is important to note that the authors manage to demonstrate that IOs are more than mere tools of their member states, but also that they are not simply servants for the global common good.

## Notes

1   See: Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2004), *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*, Cornell UP and Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore (1999), 'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,' *International Organization*, 53, pp. 699-732.

# Gender and International Relations

## Theory, Practice, Policy

*Reviewed by Kateřina Krulišová*

Gender and International Relations: "friends or foes"? The topic of gender is one of the most contested subjects in current IR studies and, when applied to IR's most hotly debated topics, there is no consensus among scholars, not least feminist scholars, about what gender actually is, how it should be applied and politicised/securitised. Undoubtedly, the literature on the topic is growing fast and may cause a great deal of confusion among students of IR, mainly for its incomprehensiveness.

The disagreement over what gender actually is or may be, and theoretical and practical discontent on how to apply gender when it comes to IR is reflected in Steans' book entitled: *Gender and International Relations: Theory, Practice, Policy*. Clearly, the author does not attempt to clarify the study of gender but rather provides a clear overview of the existing concepts and alternative thoughts on a wide spectrum of International Relations and Security Studies issues.

The two opening chapters provide a theoretical account of gender and Feminist International Relations in a clear, and simultaneously, a very comprehensive manner, with an essential literature guide for further reading, not only highlighting the core feminist academic publications, but also critiques of these by non-feminist scholars. For a student of International Relations, these two chapters are enough to paint a vivid picture as to what gender may mean at various times and

spaces of the blurred and disappearing lines between personal, political and international arenas.

After the theoretical introduction, special topics, such as the state, nations and citizenship; human rights and sexuality; peace and violence; peacekeeping and global governance are reviewed and explained. Undoubtedly, Steans succeeds in providing a clear and accessible gendered view on such topics, although these sometimes lack coherence and the reader might find her/himself lost in the divide between problem-solving and a critical theories as well as in the relevance of the empirical data provided.

The theoretical strength of the book is clearly visible in Chapter 7, called 'Telling Stories,' where the author introduces the concepts of critical theory, constructivism, and the method of deconstruction in a perfectly comprehensive, yet easily understandable manner; "friendly" even to students often previously confused about those theoretical concepts. Her account of gender archetypes, warrior heroes and monstrous tales, together with the politics of the visual, is truly eye-opening and force the reader to revisit everyday media and popular culture "discourse" on gender relations and realities.

Overall, Steans provides both students and scholars with a very helpful tool for understanding gender in the study field of International Relations. Not only is she able to easily explain the core concepts of the theoretical gender debate, she also provides case studies, some notoriously known, others quite novel, to demonstrate the importance of the study of the gender "problem" for students of IR. Also, she offers excellent reader`s guide and is surely welcomed by academics and students alike, new pedagogical tools and features in her suggestions of seminar activity provided at the end of each chapter. Despite that the book may at times seem too shallow for more advanced readers of gender, its accessibility and comprehensive coverage of the most basic concepts, and above all, theoretical clarity, should be regarded as its true value-added.

# Liberal Terror

*Reviewed by Lukáš Makovický*

Given the number of recent, quality, poststructuralist accounts of the War on Terror (de Goede, Dillon and Reid, Elden, Graham), why should one pay attention to Brad Evans' new book, *Liberal Terror*? There is no short answer, but if one were to give such, it would include the expressions 'complex,' 'carefully thought out,' and 'setting new academic standards for nomad theorising.' To paraphrase one of the book's core intellectual influences, Gilles Deleuze, Evans takes the readers on a journey. Take into account the globally spread fear and insecurity, in spite of us living in, arguably, the most secure of times, the popularity of apocalyptic imaginary in an Age of Reason, or the increasing turn to pre-emptive security practices, whether speaking of drone strikes, military interventions and extra-legal politics in democracies committed to state sovereignty and the rule of law. To use a metaphor, for Evans, as others, all of this renders the prevailing imaginaries and explanations of the world suspicious and constitutes a 'desert of the Real,' to borrow from a well-known Slovenian theorist. Like a nomad, Evans takes the travellers across this desert, moves from theme to theme, from theory to theory and from example to example, oftentimes through seemingly bizarre movements from Enlightenment philosophy through speeches of Bush and Blair to discussing advances in counter-insurgency strategies in a single chapter. At the end of the book the reader-traveller is left with a superb knowledge of the desert and a feeling there is always something more to discover, more to contemplate, more to do, as the desert has a life of its own. Perhaps the most telling is chapter 4, titled 'On Divine Power,' which turns the thinker of liberal peace, Immanuel Kant on his head. In contrast with some recent works, Evans does not hesitate to contextualise and give textual support to claims that Kant's

project has a structure of a theodicy that seeks to answer why is there evil in the world. For Kant, while humans are born innocent, evil enters the world once humans take action and haunts the presence since universal reason is unattainable (p.119). So is peace. But, according to Kant, we still need to aspire towards such universalism of a society that forces progress upon its subjects. For Evans however, this is to say it is always from a conception of evil that a universal good is assembled, never the other way around, ironically exploring how it is the hunt for monsters that makes up the possibility for a *future* good order that casts doubt on contemporary world's very *present* reality: 'Humanity is realised only by the wars that are fought in its name' (p.105). It is against this horizon that the global ambitions of liberalism try to set up a secularised image of Providence, which has its own set of implications. Evans, for example, shows how, for Milton Friedman and others, the prospect of a free society and liberal virtues set aside egalitarianism, which was never a liberal virtue, nor more than a hopeful by-product (p.126). And, in chapter 3, for example, it is an exploration of the theories of network society and complexity, which, for Evans only complicates, but does not negate such a Kantian dictum – the imaginary of fear is distributed and naturalised inside society, so that the security-speak only intensifies practices of risk, insurance and resilience that force the society to return to "normal:" 'for the liberal subject everything changes, so that everything remains politically the same' (p.75), no matter how ridiculous it should be for a social scientist to think that terrorists and violence came from Mars. To give an example, a revision of four terrorist biographies in the UK shows that there have been histories in wealthy and poor families that some had education, some not, some were exposed to radical Islam, some not and some had criminal records, while others did not (p.93). The point is that the Kantian evil of choice got transformed into an impersonal mechanism of complex emergence: 'all randomness is potentially evil and all intentionality potentially disastrous' (p.174-175), neglecting the core ethical question of particularity. Hence, chapters 1 and 5 build on the linkages between resilience and environmental terror, in particular by highlighting how the liberal view that the state is obsolete now gets translated into the very fabric of security governance with implications for the political utility of catastrophe—suffering is now seen as an opportunity for resilient individuals to adapt, so that the ever more pressing problems related to ecology, population growth or natural

resources are decoupled from the social fabric of liberal governance, making the world's poor a threat to be pacified, if not eliminated, instead of cared for (p.18, p.140, p.174). Evans' book draws a bleak picture, but as many points scattered throughout the book and the last chapter argue, little is lost as post-structuralism, in its less vulgar versions, offers a different ethical promise – all of this is ever more an invitation to look for events that trigger alternative worlds, for a political philosophy that de-naturalises such a temporal structure that makes liberal terror possible and for a yet stronger call demanding the impossible, all this making Evans' work a deep well of ideas for twenty-first century security thinking.

# Culture and Foreign Policy

## The Neglected Factor in Intetnational Relations

*Reviewed by Marek Neuman*

In his book *Culture and Foreign Policy*, Wiarda's point of departure is the recognition that US foreign policy often pays insufficient attention to the many expressions of (political) culture that can be found in the various countries the State Department has established relations with. Wiarda's contribution to the understanding of US foreign policy could not come at a more critical time; the debate of American unilateralism, of the frequently criticised *one-size-fits-all* model, is as vivid today as one decade ago when it was revived in the aftermath of Washington's decision to invade Iraq.

Building his argument, the author first introduces the Rostow-Lipset model of development through which, according to him, the United States' long out-dated and culturally insensitive foreign policy needs to be read. In what follows, Wiarda divides the world into six distinctive cultural regions – Europe, Russia, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa – before introducing the reader to the political culture of each. In what turns out to be very carefully crafted chapters, the reader learns the gist about the region in question. For instance, readers learn that the Europe of today continues to be divided along 'social, economic, regional, religious, and political fault lines.'[1] That Russia – once again asserting its role within the international arena – should be treated with greater respect for her own way of "doing business." That

Asia, with her unique entrenched value system originating in the Confucian tradition, stands apart from all the other regions, giving rise to her own Asian model of development. That the Middle Eastern countries have had only limited 'contact, interchange, and cross-cultural connection'[2] with the Western civilization (and where they did, this usually took the form of Western imperialism or colonialism). Similarly, also in Latin America, the 'traditional culture of the [colonial] past still hangs heavily over the present and future.'[3] Finally, we discover that in Africa, political culture is still characterised by the old habits of 'patronage, personal loyalty to a clan leader, and special favouritism for family and tribal members.'[4] With this knowledge in mind, the author assesses the present approach the State Department has taken towards each of these culturally distinct territories, only to be assured that – yet again – that Washington fails to adopt a strategy that would duly recognise the many existing cultural differences.

As such, Wiarda's contribution could be valuable not only to scholars of us foreign policy, but also to its practitioners as each chapter concludes with several policy recommendations that – if implemented – would most likely change Washington's course. Unfortunately though, the one aspect of American foreign policy that the author criticises the most – its universalism – came back to haunt him. Throughout the book, the reader cannot help but notice that Wiarda's own analysis is rather ethnocentric. He is intrigued by the question whether Russia can be integrated into the West or whether she is permanently 'fated'[5] to be a separate civilization, provoking us to believe that the latter was only the second best option. And, while the author's description of Eastern Europe as a 'peripheral no man's land' characteristic for its 'bloated bellies in the children, illiteracy, disease, malnutrition, [and] malformed babies,'[6] indicates a somewhat distorted picture of the – admittedly – poorer parts of Europe, his portrayal of the Islamic societies of the Middle East only reproduces the stereotypical image of illiberal regimes so popularly referred to in the West.

Similarly, reading the individual chapters, we at times wonder whether the author has not adopted a somewhat idealistic – and at times even naïve – reading of us foreign policy. Put simply, us foreign policy certainly cannot be equated with development policy and external democratisation! While those remain key aspects of Washington's external policy orientation, there are others. Yet, these are somewhat side-lined in Wiarda's analysis; we are left with the impression that it is

*always* in the American foreign policy interest to develop and democratise the remaining regions in the world, while we know that in fact US foreign policy preferences are much more diverse.

Despite these points of caution, Wiarda's book is a valuable contribution to the academic debate on cultural sensitivity within foreign policy making. Still, while he calls on US policy makers to adopt a more diversified approach towards the outside world, he ultimately commits the same fallacy of oversimplification by treating the six cultural regions homogeneously, not paying enough attention to intra-regional diversity. Yet, the question of whether this can be prevented – whether a more nuanced analysis within such a holistic framework even would be feasible – emerges. In view of this, then, *Culture and Foreign Policy* should be seen as laying the stepping stone for further, more tailored, research addressing the – undoubtedly – relevant question of the role of culture within foreign policy making.

## Notes

1    Wiarda, Howard J. Culture and Foreign Policy: The Neglected Factor in International Relations (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013): 21.
2    Ibid.,: 87.
3    Ibid., : 101.
4    Ibid.,: 121.
5    Ibid.,: 16.
6    Ibid.,: 28.