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Crisis Mismanagement and the European Parliament

Mitchell Belfer

There is an air of dread across Europe. The outbreak of the Novel Coronavirus (re: COVID-19) has sent Italy into national quarantine with Spain and France a short sprint behind. The rest of the EU, Switzerland, Norway and the UK are bracing for their turn, enacting a series of restrictive measures to cushion the impact of one of the most aggressive coronaviruses in living memory. While this global health pandemic unfolds, other crises continue to lap at Europe's frontiers: acts of human vandalism continue to occur along the Turkey-Greece border as Ankara uses refugees to press Brussels into supporting its brewing conflict with Russia, Syria and Iran for the city of Idlib. Armenia then ambushed Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno Karabakh, killing two. The Houthis in Yemen have committed untold crimes against humanity while Iraq slides back into civil war and Iran cremates away the evidence of its own coronavirus outbreak and its basij militia terrorises its people. All in all, Europe has its hands full—or at least it should.

Despite this heavy foreign affairs agenda, or perhaps because of it, the European Parliament seems unable to set the right agenda or address the right problems. This week's — or even this year's — Rule 144 debate on alleged 'Breaches of Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law,' illustrates this well. On the agenda: China, Turkey and *Bahrain*. Actually, only Bahrain is under EU scrutiny; the Chinese case is of a Swedish citizen imprisoned in the country and the Turkish case — it does not even name "Turkey" for fear of offending Ankara — concerns the 'imprisonment of Osman Kavala.' So why Bahrain? What make this small island state so central to the European Parliament as to include it on the plenary agenda? The answer to this has less to do with Bahrain and more to do with European Parliamentary jockeying.

The European Parliament's seven political groups: the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), European Peoples Party (EPP), Renew Europe (RE), European Conservatives and Reformers (ECR), Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA), Identity and Democracy (ID), European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) essentially play a game of tag each month to set the agenda for the plenary and add topics to debate under Rule 144. They use countries and issues around the world to gain leverage over each other within the institution and its many delegations and committees. When issues are too 'hot,' like Iran's downing of Ukraine International Airlines PS752, the European Parliament simply glosses them over and deflects with less polarising issues. This helps explain why the 2020 debates have focused on Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria, human rights abuses in Burundi (January), Guinea's (Conakry) protests and child labour in the mines of Madagascar (February)—certainly important issues, but hardly front-and-centre in the European political imagination.

The practice of deflecting comes at the expense of debating issues that directly impact Europe and European citizens. This is a public secret. The Members of the European Parliament may be ideologically driven in their political lives but tend to shy away from making a foreign policy difference because that often means making a personal investment of their most sacred resources: time and energy. So, instead, they defer to their staff to act on their behalf, draft resolutions and amendments and advise on voting. This implies the loss of the MEP's agency and the acquisition of agency for the advisors. Given that advisors are not elected representatives, they have much more freedom of action than their MEPs—and they use it. For the most part, advisors play a constructive role and truly support the mission of their MEP. There are, however, exceptions. Occasionally, individual or Group advisors impart their own biases on the decision making process which can have a lasting impact on European relations to third countries.

Enter Bahrain.

It has long been curious that Bahrain — among the most politically open, religiously tolerant and socially engaged countries in the Middle East — is hauled up under the Rule 144 (previously Rule 135) spotlight with disproportionate frequency. Many Europeans would struggle to find Bahrain on a map and even more remain unaware of basic facts of the country. So why the obsession? The answer lies in the same wrangling noted above. In this case, key members of the S&D advisory staff

have, essentially, selected Bahrain as a scapegoat to punish its regional allies — notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — without the blowback and polarisation that would come from directly pressing Riyadh or Abu Dhabi. Bahrain is, after all, a small state. Far too often, events that push very negative images and perpetuate disinformation about Bahrain are held within the chambers of the European legislature despite the fact the country continues to enjoy an impressive array of positive bilateral relations across the Union. This practise has to change. The European Parliament has become accustomed to treating Bahrain instrumentally and, in doing so, is expending its time and energy undermining, rather than supporting, an ally. This will produce a residual effect: allowing intra-Group competition to taint EU relations to Bahrain (and other third countries) and illustrating inconsistencies in European international affairs. To eliminate that discrepancy, MEPs need to take back the reigns of foreign policy making and to better coordinate their Brussels policy priorities with those articulated at home or risk a Europe of versions and with it the inability to manage real international crises and pursue European interests.

Editor's Analysis

Articles

Thinking of Russia

Finnish Neutrality after the Cold War and the Influence of Russian Neighborhood on Finnish Cooperation with NATO

Lucie Zimmermanová, Zdeněk Kříž, Eva Doleželová

In recent years, Finland has closely cooperated with NATO and Finnish politicians emphasize that Finland may consider joining the Alliance at any point. However, this step is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Russia's aggressive actions abroad disconcert Finland; as this article shows, even after Russia's war with Georgia and the breakout of the crisis in Ukraine, the situation is not deemed serious enough by the Finns for them to risk a serious deterioration of relations with their eastern neighbor. Rather than crossing the interests of Moscow, whose perception of the world Finland has been able uniquely to understand thanks to its historical experience, the country opts for a more complex, yet also safer, path of balancing between ever-closer cooperation with NATO, and maintaining the status of a non-member country.

Keywords: Finland, Russia, neutrality, military non-alignment, NATO.

When US President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, met briefly in Helsinki in July 2018, the Finnish president, Sauli Niinistö, told CNN that he sometimes wondered why people called his country neutral as he didn't feel neutral at all.[1] 'A major task

for Finland will be to update its public profile [...]. As seen by the USA and Russia, Finland is no longer a "neutral" country, but an established member of the West, even if it is not a NATO member', noted the website of the public service broadcaster *Yle*, before the presidential summit.[2] 'Finland is an EU member and clearly belongs to the West [...] Finland thus is not a neutral country. Not anymore', wrote the largest-circulation Finnish daily newspaper, *Helsingin Sanomat*, in a commentary on the event.[3] The facts confirm these statements: Finland's political leaders regularly participate in the top-level talks of NATO member states (and President Niinistö even takes part in the alliance's summits); Finland is involved in NATO military exercises, and in recent years has established close military cooperation with the USA and Sweden. In government documents and speeches abroad, Finnish politicians emphasize that the door to NATO remains open and that the country reserves the option to consider its accession to the alliance at any point.

Finland no longer wants to be considered a neutral country – and given the above, it should not be. At the same time, it adheres closely to the policy of military non-alignment. The difference between the two concepts rests in the measure of its activity in the international system and in the linkage of the country's security policy with the security structures of its allies and alliances. The term 'military non-alignment' can be understood as a subspecies of neutrality that is exclusively linked with security policy and non-membership of military organizations, without thereby limiting cooperation in other areas and on other platforms. Finns emphasize that they belong to the West, and indeed since the end of the Cold War the country has firmly embedded itself in Western structures. Describing their country as neutral can offend Finns, as it foists upon them a Cold War era geopolitical perspective, when Finland straddled the West and the East and sought to maintain an optimal balance between considering Soviet interests and pursuing an independent foreign policy. On the other hand, despite much closer cooperation than before, so far the Finns have refused to join NATO, and we believe this is because of Moscow's disapproval.

The impact of Finland potentially joining NATO is a key topic of scholarly works that address the idea. Although authors have differing views on what the ultimate consequences of such a decision would be, beyond considering the financial and military commitments the expected reaction of Moscow is among the fundamental reasons why

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experts say that Finland should not seek membership in the foreseeable future.[4]

Antti Sierla and Aurélie Domisse have argued that, despite Moscow's disapproval, Finland's accession to NATO might help the dialogue between Russia and the West, thanks to the country's particular historical experience with its Eastern neighbor.[5] Such optimism is rare. Experts generally agree that Finland's accession to NATO would mean a serious deterioration in Finno-Russian relations. They do not, however, anticipate a military intervention by Moscow. The main arguments for these conclusions are the following: Russia's economic relations with the EU are too important to jeopardize; historically the relations between Helsinki and Moscow have been good; and Finland's membership of NATO would act as a deterrent.[6] Kari Möttölä argued that it would only make sense to join the alliance if the country were under threat. As long as there is no direct security threat, there is no need to provoke Russia.[7] Magnus Nordenman too does not expect Finland to join NATO in the near future.[8]

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Zdeněk Kříž

The security situation in the region has changed, particularly after two acts of Russian aggression: the war in Georgia and the crisis in Ukraine. These events have disconcerted the Finns, as shown by the short-term fluctuations in the otherwise long-stable public opinion with respect to NATO, closer cooperation with the alliance and the USA and recognition in official government papers of the worrying changes in the security environment. Despite this it is unlikely that Finland would seek NATO membership in the near future. The country's military non-alignment has become such an integral part of Finnish strategic thought that neither the Russo-Georgian war nor the crisis in Ukraine has pushed the Finns towards genuine consideration of membership. Paradoxically this is because Finland increasingly sees Russia as a security threat. So far, the Finns have not seen the potential gains from joining NATO as outweighing the risks of a sharp deterioration in their relations with the eastern neighbor. Proceeding from its historical experience, Finland has adopted a strategy of considering Russian security interests when deciding the future avenues of its own security policy.

The first section of this article analyses military non-alignment as part of Finland's strategic thought and observes its transformations on three events that affected the country's security situation: the end of the Cold War, the Russo-Georgian war and the crisis in Ukraine. The

second section presents the strengthening of military cooperation between Finland and NATO, as well as between Finland, Sweden and the USA. The third section is dedicated to the Russian position on Finnish security policy and Finland's factoring in of Russian security interests. In the conclusion the article once again asks why, given that Finland cooperates closely with NATO, the country has not yet joined, and presents our answers to this topical question.

Military non-alignment as part of Finland's strategic thought
From neutrality to military non-alignment
Finland emerged in 1917 by emancipating itself from tsarist Russia. The main principles of its interwar policy were liberal democracy, sovereignty and, in the end, neutrality. The last was not entirely a matter of free choice, as had been the case with other Nordic countries: Finns desired foreign security cooperation that would anchor them more firmly to the West. However, prior to World War II they failed to establish relations with a great power or to build a security alliance – but not for want of trying.[9] During the 1930s, then, following the model of their closest ally, Sweden, they embraced a purely pragmatic neutrality. In the Finnish situation of the time, neutrality largely meant counterbalancing Russian influence. However, Finland failed to maintain an independent policy. In November 1939, it was attacked by the Red Army and drawn into World War II, out of which it emerged after much rigmarole as a former ally of Germany, vanquished by the Soviet Union.

During the Cold War Finland sought to act as a neutral country. Decisions about its foreign and security policy were nonetheless dependent on the Soviet Union. Finnish foreign policy was adjusted by the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union signed in 1948. In this treaty the parties pledged not to create or become involved in any alliance directed against the counterparty. In practice, throughout the Cold War this wording permitted the Finns only one foreign-policy line: neutrality. What was most important for Finland was the preamble to the agreement, in which the Soviet Union recognized Finland's determination to remain outside great-power conflict – this was explicitly requested by the Finnish delegation.[10] Finnish politicians viewed this formulation as the Soviet recognition of Finland's neutrality.[11]

The termination of the agreement in March 1992 meant that Finns regained full sovereignty and opened the path towards a new inter-

pretation of neutrality. After a long discussion that unfolded against the background of making Finland's accession to the European Communities compatible with the principle of neutrality, in 1992 the government defined Finland's foreign policy strategy as a combination of independent defense and military non-alignment.[12] This implied a significant shift in strategic thought as a whole. Finns decided officially to step out of the grey zone or no man's land, where they had been throughout the Cold War as part of the so-called Finlandization, and openly to avow Western political structures.[13] Finland did not express an interest in joining NATO in the early 1990s,[14] but in 1994 signed up for the Partnership for Peace program. Its involvement was intended to strengthen Europe's security and the country's determination to participate only in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations was explicitly noted.[15] Throughout the 1990s, the Finns consistently strengthened their relations with NATO and became involved in several of its crisis management operations.[16] At the same time they repeatedly emphasized in international forums that though they were not seeking membership at that time, they would like to have the option in the future.[17] Finland's close cooperation with NATO confirmed the shift in the country's policy from neutrality to military non-alignment.

Military non-alignment in the context of the Russo-Georgian war
Before the Russo-Georgian war, Finland's accession to NATO was not on the table. There was not much support for it among the political parties or Finnish citizens. Political leaders tended to emphasize the negative aspects of accession. From 2006, only the National Coalition Party (*Kansallinen Kokoomus*, abbreviated Kok.) – the strongest pro-Atlantic force in Finnish politics – openly supported accession.[18] The president of Finland at the time, Tarja Halonen of the Social Democratic Party of Finland (*Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue*, SPD), who by virtue of her office exerted strong influence over Finnish foreign policy throughout her mandate from 2000 to 2012, strongly opposed accession.[19] Her position chimed in with the popular mood. In 2002, nearly 70 percent of Finns said that the country should not join the alliance.[20] The accession of the Baltic countries to NATO did not cause a shift in popular opinion in Finland. In 2004, 65 percent of the population agreed that the policy of military non-alignment should be maintained.[21]

Although the Georgian crisis revived the Finnish security discussion, it did not bring new arguments. On the one hand, the crisis was used to emphasize the urgency of a clear decision about the country's relationship with NATO. On the other, political parties did not become more involved in steering the social debate, nor in shifting popular opinion towards support for accession.[22]

An official government report on Finnish security and defense policy from 2009 did not consider increased tension or aggression in neighboring areas impossible, but also did not anticipate direct military pressure or aggression against Finland. The report noted the findings of the Parliamentary Security Policy Monitoring Group which concluded that the foundations of Finnish security policy needed no substantial change. The document also stated that "from now on, strong grounds exist for considering Finland's membership of NATO. As regards a decision on possible membership, broad political consensus is essential, and it is important to take public opinion into consideration."[23]

The approach taken by Finnish parliamentary parties was unchanged by the Georgian crisis. The National Coalition Party continued to be the main supporter of the country's joining NATO, while center-left parties took a negative stance towards participation in military alliances.[24]

As far as public opinion was concerned, there was a sudden decrease in the number of opponents to Finland's joining NATO in 2008, but the number of supporters did not increase; rather it was the number of the undecided that did. The numbers of those for and against membership were about equal: about a third of those polled thought that Finland should join NATO, while a third was against. The remaining third did not know with which opinion to side.[25] Opinion polls do not indicate significant shifts in popular opinion of Russia or security in the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian war. The Finns started to view the long-term prospects of security somewhat more negatively. A third of the population thought that the security situation over the next ten years would become 'more threatening' to Finland – in 2007, 22 percent expressed this view. More than half thought that the situation would remain the same and only 6 percent thought it would improve. Those who expected a deterioration were then asked about the causes of increased security threats; most answers were linked with Russian military activities, including the Georgian crisis (but also included

fears of Russia arming, nuclear weapons and Russia's relations with the Baltic countries.)[26]

If the Georgian crisis stimulated Finnish politicians to think about NATO accession, public opinion remained consistent – in 2009 the number of those opposing it started to increase again – and the official government line on defense and security did not change much in the subsequent years. A 2012 government report on security and defense policy noted that Finland was not a member of any military alliance and emphasized that defense cooperation did not imply any change in the fundamental security strategy.[27] After a brief scare caused by Russian aggression in Georgia, Finland decided to stick with military non-alignment. Joining NATO remained a purely theoretical option.

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Military non-alignment in the context of the crisis in Ukraine

The crisis in Ukraine, the increased military presence of Moscow in the Baltic and more and more conspicuous Russian activities in northern Europe – from maritime incidents to airspace violations – disturbed Finnish politicians across the board.[28] Security policy became a chief issue of campaigning prior to the 2015 parliamentary elections, but rather than NATO membership it was the increases in the defense budget that were discussed. A coalition government emerged out of the election, consisting of three parties: the centrist, liberal Centre Party of Finland (*Suomen Keskusta*, Kesk.); the populist and nationalist True Finns (*Perussuomalaiset*, PS); and the center-right National Coalition Party.[29] The True Finns, who strongly criticized the EU and NATO, obtained the posts of foreign and defense ministers in the new government.[30] 2017, about half of the PS members of parliament, who tended to be more conservatively-minded, split off (including the two ministers) and founded a center-right Blue Reform party (*Sininen tulevaisuus*, Sin.)

Today, the left-wing SPD is the strongest party of the opposition. Of the government parties, only the National Coalition Party supports NATO accession openly, but does not make the issue its priority.[31] Also supporting accession in parliament is the Swedish People's Party of Finland (*Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue*, abbreviated RKP in Finnish and SFP in Swedish), which has few seats.[32] The overwhelming majority of parliamentary parties continue to oppose Finland's accession to NATO, most often citing popular disapproval of the idea.[33]

Despite the events unfolding in the region, the center-right government has so far stuck to the policy of military non-alignment. The most recent Finnish government report on defense policy of July 2017 noted that following the conflict in eastern Ukraine the security situation in Finland's neighborhood deteriorated and military tensions in the Baltic increased. On the other hand, improvements in military readiness and the increased defense budgets of the states in the region were seen as positive. The document articulates Finland's current relationship with NATO as follows: 'Finland is a country which does not belong to any military alliance. It carries out practical cooperation with NATO and continues to maintain the option to seek NATO membership'.[34]

An analysis of the anticipated security situation of Finland over the next two decades (Defense Perspectives in the 2030s), published in June by the Finnish Ministry of Defense, makes similar points. Tensions in the region have increased. The use of another state's force against Finland cannot presently be ruled out, nor can one assume that were a conflict to flare up near its borders, Finland would be able to avoid it. In this respect, Finland seeks close international cooperation in providing security to northern Europe and the Baltic region.[35] The document emphasizes the increasing significance of international cooperation for Finnish national defense capabilities. In a long-term perspective, it describes these partners as the most important: the EU, NATO, NORDEFCO, Sweden and the USA, and, by extension, all EU and NATO member countries. Finland will largely use its partnership with NATO to reinforce its own defenses. The analysis argues that Finland's potential joining of NATO will depend on several factors: Finland's evaluations of its own security situation; the alliance's willingness to admit new members; and the results of an analysis of the evolving international security situation by member countries.[36] Russia is not explicitly mentioned as a factor impacting the Finnish decision about NATO accession.

Focusing now on public opinion, the position of most Finns has been to maintain military non-alignment even after the Russian aggression in Ukraine, though opinion polls show a slow increase in the proportion of the undecided and a decrease in the number of opponents to Finland's joining NATO. Between the Georgian war and the crises in Ukraine, the opponents of accession stood at 70 percent of the population, a proportion that decreased to 60 percent after 2014. By contrast, the number of voices supporting Finnish membership of

NATO jumped by nine percentage points in 2014, though remaining a minority position. It decreased gradually over the following years.[37] However, most Finns would agree with membership if their political leaders were unified in supporting it.[38] According to an autumn 2017 poll by the Ministry of Defense, more than 60 percent were against, 22 percent were for and 17 percent had no opinion on Finland's NATO membership.[39] A survey by the largest-circulation Finnish daily newspaper, *Helsingin Sanomat*, in November 2017 had 59 percent of respondents against joining NATO; 22 percent supporting membership in the USA-led military alliance; and 19 percent not yet decided.[40] In another poll, by the public-service broadcaster *Yle* in December 2017, 53 percent of Finns were against their country joining NATO, 19 percent were for and nearly 28 percent were undecided.[41] More recent data by the dailies *Uuusi Suomi* and *Iltalehti* offer similar figures: 20 percent of the polled supporting Finland's joining NATO, 50 percent against, 30 percent with no opinion. However, if the president were to recommend accession, 42 percent of the last poll would support the decision.[42]

Evolution of public opinion as concerned with maintaining military non-alignment was subject to the same trend. After the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, the support for this foreign-policy line decreased (from nearly 70 percent in 2014 to less than 60 percent in 2015), but it was still supported by more than half of Finns and the numbers of those against were minimal.[43]

The presidential election held in January 2018 was an important indicator of public opinion as well as of the state of the security-policy debate in Finland. The only presidential candidate openly supporting joining NATO was Nils Torvalds (RKP). He placed last, taking 1.5 percent of the vote, while the incumbent, Sauli Niinistö, was declared the clear winner in the very first round. Incidentally, the turnout was the lowest since the introduction of direct election, testifying to the fact that most Finns wished for continuity in security policy, i.e. rejected joining NATO while maintaining close security cooperation with the alliance, the EU and especially Sweden, as well as keeping an active dialogue open with Russia.[44]

The development of military cooperation between Finland and its Western partners

In matters of security, Finland cooperates widely – both bilaterally and multilaterally. The Finns combine an assertive, yet careful, foreign pol-

icy towards Russia with close cooperation with NATO, while at the same time developing security collaborations with other countries and organizations outside the immediate structures of the alliance. Matti Pessu of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) has gone as far as to question whether Finland still is a militarily non-alignment county, given the substantial strengthening of the networks of its bilateral relations since the crisis in Ukraine.[45]

Finland chiefly cooperates with Sweden and the United States. Multilaterally, the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) platform is important. Last but not least, the Finns cooperate with the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy.

The evolution of military cooperation between Finland and NATO
Finland started to cooperate with NATO in 1994, having joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP). At a 2014 NATO summit in Wales, Finland took a step to deepen its collaboration by joining an individual program, thus becoming an "Enhanced Opportunities Partner." In 2017, the modus was extended for another three years.

Since the mid-1990s, Finland has participated in NATO joint exercises and in its operations: IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, K-FOR in Kosovo and ISAF/Resolute Support in Afghanistan. The Finns are also involved in the training and education of NATO soldiers and in special innovative platforms such as Strategic Airlift Capability, Smart Defense and NATO Response Force.[46]

Finland's top leaders take part in meetings concerned with security in the Baltic region and northern Europe in the "29+2" format (NATO member states plus Finland and Sweden) and President Niinistö goes to alliance summits. It is sometimes hard to tell where the boundary between NATO members and non-members is, when one looks at Finland.

The evolution of military cooperation between Finland, Sweden and the USA
Military cooperation between Finland and Sweden has a long history. In recent years its importance has increased, as the security situation in the region, viewed from the points of view of the Finns and Swedes, has deteriorated. The countries also cooperate in respect of NATO: for Finland, there would be little point in joining the alliance if Sweden were not to do so as well, as geographically the former country would

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be practically cut off from other member countries. The importance of Finno-American relations in the domain of security is also growing. The support granted by the USA to Finland has long been one of the chief arguments of Finns who press for their country to join NATO. While Finns will not find the resolve to join the alliance for some time yet, they have decided to build closer links with the USA without any delay.

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In early 2014, the then minister of defense, Carl Haglund, described strong bilateral relations with the USA and an active partnership with NATO as the two crucial security collaborations Finland had.[47] The effectiveness of this approach has been confirmed by security experts Stefan Forss and Pekka Holopainen, who described strong security cooperation among Nordic countries, supported by US security guarantees 'in whatever form they may take', as key to stabilizing the security situation in the Baltic after the crisis in Ukraine.[48] In this respect, since the outbreak of the crisis, the discussion about Finland's security policy has followed the main argument by the proponents of NATO membership, employed ever since the early 2000s: close cooperation with the USA.

Finland has responded to the unrest created by Russian military activities outside their own territory by enhanced cooperation with partners from abroad. Since 2016, the Finnish and Swedish air forces have held extensive exercises together.[49] For the first time in 15 years, in summer 2017, a bilateral meeting between the presidents of the USA and Finland took place when Sauli Niinistö visited the White House. One of the main matters under discussion was security.[50] In autumn 2017, Defense Minister Jussi Niinistö (Sin.) announced a plan to undertake large-scale military maneuvers in Finland – to which partner countries of the region as well as the USA would be invited – and described the official justification for the exercises as follows: 'It is important for the defense forces to have the preparedness to accept international assistance if we are faced with a crisis'. Sweden almost immediately confirmed that it would take part. However, the project is still at the planning stage and the maneuvers will take place in 2020 at the earliest.[51]

In November 2017, the defense ministers of Finland, Sweden and the United States met in Helsinki to discuss the options for closer collaboration between their countries. As they all already had bilateral agreements, their meeting was about giving their cooperation a concrete shape in view of the contemporary security situation in the Baltic.[52]

Subsequently, in May 2018, a Trilateral Statement of Intent was signed. The document's aim is to enhance three-way cooperation in defense, including strengthening 'the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO'.[53] The statement is not legally binding. Finnish Defense Minister Niinistö denies that it is a preliminary step towards NATO accession.[54] Rather, it is a declaration of foreign-security belonging of the two Nordic countries, as well as of the US security interests in the Baltic Sea region. According to Salonius-Pasternak, a Finnish security expert, the statement creates the conditions for a greater US presence in Finnish and Swedish security issues. In practical terms, it will also facilitate the conduct of joint military exercises.[55] The signatories make no effort to hide the fact that the statement is a response to Russia's aggressive foreign policy.[56]

Russia, Finland and neutrality
Russia's position on the shifts in Finnish military policy
NATO enlargement has long been seen in Russia as a process that is incompatible with Russian security interests. The coming together of Finland and NATO and discussion about Finland possibly joining the alliance have long been viewed negatively in Russia. In 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said in this context that 'were Finland to join the anti-Russian actions', Russia would have to respond adequately.[57] In July 2016, Vladimir Putin declared that if Finland joined NATO, a re-positioning of Russian armed forces would follow.[58] In the same year an expert commission concluded:

> Russia will attempt to thwart any move by Finland or Sweden to join NATO. The historical record of previous NATO enlargements, despite the fact that Finland is not viewed by Russia in the same light as Ukraine or Georgia, indicates that political and economic reactions may be strong, even harsh, notably during the transition phase. Even while stopping short of the use of force, specific counter-measures would be difficult to predict.[59]

This Russian position has remained essentially unchanged since 2016. During his August 2018 visit to Finland, President Putin repeated that Russia disapproves of Finland's getting closer to NATO.[60] Overall, the Russian approach towards Finland can be seen as a combination of two strategies: one of intimidation, the other of reassurance; rather than an application solely of the reassurance strategy.

Generally speaking, Russia considers Finland's possible NATO membership a 'red line' and makes its position quite clear. This is not a purely military question. Russia has invested a lot of political capital in the 'containment' of Finland's potential NATO membership, and if Finland were to join the alliance it would be a political defeat for Russia of the first magnitude. Yet it seems that Russia has many fewer reservations about enhanced cooperation between NATO and Finland, military cooperation included, as long as the country does not actually join NATO. Bergquist, Heisbourg, Nyberg and Tiilikainen believe that the Russian strategy that aims to prevent countries joining NATO – a strategy that is based on intimidation rather than reassurance – is counterproductive today but is fully in keeping with the historical Russian and Soviet political culture.[61]

Thinking of Russia

Finland's considerations of Russian security interests

Our main argument is that Finnish strategic thought has embraced the practice of considering Russian security interests to such an extent that Finland's abandonment of military non-alignment (and hence also joining NATO) are very unlikely. The Finns learned to anticipate Russian responses to their own security policy during the Cold War, when a policy of placating a suspicious Kremlin helped them to maintain some space to maneuver in at least some policy areas and retain a degree of sovereignty. Presumably, the effort not to provoke Russia was one of the reasons the Finns did not consider joining NATO in the 1990s, as the same motive can be discerned behind the Finnish decision to remain outside the alliance today.

The Finns have also addressed the Russian question in official government reports on defense and security. A 2012 report noted that Russia's foreign policy, and also its domestic developments in terms of democracy and the transformation of its armed forces, impact the security situation in Finland's vicinity as much as Finnish foreign policy. The government pointed out the Russian understanding of NATO enlargement as a political and military issue. From the viewpoint of Moscow, enlargement weakens its efforts to achieve a multi-polar international system, and threatens the Russian sphere of influence.[62] In a 2016 report, Finland's increasing disquiet over Russia's aggressive policy was expressed as follows: 'The security policy environment of Finland, a member of the Western community, has transformed. A more tense security situation in Europe and the Baltic Sea region

will directly impact Finland. The use or threat of military force against Finland cannot be excluded'.[63]

Although the document described NATO as a 'stabilizing influence in the Baltic Sea region', a decision about Finland's membership would require extensive debate and careful consideration of all the consequences.[64]

The most recent Finnish government report on defense policy, dated July 2017, noted that the strategic importance of the region has increased. There has also been increased military activity in the Artic, as the Kola Peninsula is a place of strategic importance for Russia, which keeps its nuclear weapons there. The Finns see Russia's activities as serving its efforts to reinforce its great-power status and to establish a security regime based on spheres of influence. It proved that Russia is able to reach strategic decisions quickly and does not hesitate to use military force to achieve its objectives.[65]

Finland responds to Russian activities by cooperating more closely with its partners, especially Sweden and the USA, but also NATO. It does not, however, intend to take the decisive step of seeking full membership of the alliance for now. One of the factors informing Finland's careful approach is its important energy cooperation with Russia. Finland imports nearly two-thirds of its primary energy sources and Russia is the most important supplier. Finland takes active measures to improve its energy security and to increase its self-sufficiency, but this is a long-term process that could give the country significantly greater energy independence by 2030 at the earliest.[66] Even the most vocal advocates of NATO accession have to pay heed to public opinion, which remains opposed to the idea, largely due to fears over the Russian response. In a 2016 opinion poll, most of the Finns who rejected NATO accession cited their country's proximity to Russia as a justification for their response. They thought that membership of the alliance would be an unwarranted provocation.[67] However, most Finns view military cooperation with NATO and the USA positively.[68] They see Russia not just as the reason that joining NATO would not be a sensible decision for their country, but also as the main threat from which their cooperation with the alliance and the USA should defend them. A poll by the dailies *Uuusi Suomi* and *Iltalehti* published in June 2018 revealed that nearly half of Finns support more training of their armed forces with their USA and NATO counterparts as a measure against "possible Russian threat."[69]

The fundamental line of Finnish foreign policy is to maintain good relations with the East, to gradually strengthen links with the West, and to keep the largest possible space for maneuvers. The crisis in Ukraine has spurred a discussion as to whether this line can be maintained.[70] Some experts believe that in the contemporary situation it is military non-alignment that best serves Finnish interests;[71] others see the potential enlargement of NATO in Scandinavia as an important strengthening of the alliance.[72] As we have shown above, the prevailing opinion among scholars and politicians alike is that Finland's accession to NATO would be too risky, as it would imply a severe cooling of relations with Moscow, at the very least. 'The Russians made it quite clear that when they look across the border now, they see the Finns. If we were in NATO, they would see enemies. That's their position,' is how President Niinistö summed up the Russian view of Finland's potential membership of the alliance in an interview with a *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* journalist in September 2018.[73]

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Conclusion

Having sought neutrality for several decades, after the end of the Cold War Finland embraced a policy of military non-alignment. This reinterpretation of the traditional understanding of neutrality has allowed the country to become openly involved in the West's political, economic and military structures, without thereby provoking Russia too much.

We believe that Finland's consideration of Russian interests and of the Russian interpretation of the security situation on its western border is the main reason why Finland opts for this difficult balancing act, involving ever closer cooperation with NATO and the USA; maintaining NATO non-member status; and emphasizing that the option of joining the alliance is always there. The experts and public opinion alike believe that joining NATO would be too risky. Few think that it would result in an outright military conflict, but given the historical contact and contention between Finland and Russia, even the risk of a sharp deterioration in relations with the neighboring power is just too great – even more so at a time when, by adopting modern forms of non-direct combat, Russia is working to destabilize democracy in Europe and beyond.

Russia's actions in Georgia, Ukraine and the Baltic region disturb Finland. However, thanks to their historical and geographic proximity,

the Finns have a unique understanding of the Russian perception of the world, and hence their response so far to their increasing feeling that their security is under threat has not been a proclamation that they would seek NATO membership – an approach that might make sense to some in the current situation. Instead of openly embracing a strong defense structure, they carefully build links with individual partner countries, or focus on groups such as NORDEFCO that are more palatable to Russia.

On the other hand, cooperation between Finland and NATO is closer than ever. The Finns participate in training military personnel and exercises with member states; share information; and have access to decision-making processes thanks to '29+2' format meetings. Finland is represented in the alliance's peace-keeping missions and has a permanent mission to NATO in Brussels; the head of state participates in the annual summits of the alliance. Indeed, an uninitiated observer might be surprised to learn that Finland is not a full NATO member. Some experts even question whether Finland can still be considered a militarily non-aligned country.

Finland's political leaders, however, do not question that. Emerging out of Finnish attempts at neutrality in an environment that was strongly deformed by its proximity to an ideologically entirely incompatible superpower, military non-alignment has embedded itself firmly into Finnish strategic thought. For decades, a policy of considering Russian interests when formulating their own security policy has paid off for Finland. So far there has not been a big enough shock in the international arena for them to want to change any of it.

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Multiculturalism and Community Building in Urban Europe

Mark Kleyman

In the years lasting back to 2015 Europe has been faced with an unprecedented influx of migrants. In most cases they seek refuge from civil wars and dictatorships that devastate many countries across North Africa and the Middle East. As a consequence, migration is becoming an increasingly urgent issue of many public and scholarly debates. In this context, the crucial problem is what type of multicultural society every European country and the EU in general want to be. This problem is particularly acute in urban areas where most Europeans live and most of the migrants permanently stay. The article contributes to drawing upon the theoretical framework for the analysis of socio-cultural and socio-psychological factors that could have an impact on the emergence of multicultural urban communities across Europe; at the same time, it attempts to break with the rhetoric of multiculturalism which still prevails in public and scholarly debates. This analysis is deployed in order to understand the (possible) influence of the ethical principle of solidary personalism on the emergence of practices directed toward the creation or enhancement of multicultural communities within the European cities.

Keywords: Europe, migration, multiculturalism, solidary personalism, urban community, community building.

The article aims to provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of socio-cultural and socio-psychological factors which could have an impact on the emergence of multicultural urban communities across Europe. At the same time, it focuses on discussing the (possible) ways to minimise the negative consequences of Europe's migration crisis, which is an increasingly urgent issue of many public and scholarly debates. In searching for the ways out of the current situation, the EU's top representatives often put an emphasis on developing policies and practices of multiculturalism, but the problem is how such policies and practices are often understood and implemented. After the 1940s and 1950s, when much attention was paid to culture as an important element of understanding societies, for decades the role of cultural values and attitudes was largely ignored by scholars and politicians alike. This situation inevitably resulted in widespread cultural relativism which presupposes that all cultures are intrinsically good. From this perspective, any culture and any cultural praxis could be recognised as morally acceptable if actually cultivated by some social group.[1] As an example, if sexual and gender-based violence could be a common practice within some social groups forming a majority within certain urban districts, ruling authorities would consequently shape tolerant attitudes towards losing control over such 'no-go areas'. In Stanley Fish's sense, such attitudes can be regarded as a result of boutique multiculturalism, which means a superficial fascination with the Other.[2] As Gary Olson puts it, boutique multiculturalists 'exoticise the culture of the other, turning it to a trendy object of their own pleasure, entertainment, and consumption'.[3] To describe such attitudes, Bojan Žalec introduces the term *leveling multiculturalism*,[4] because, in fact, this approach presupposes leveling every culture in a sense of superficial admiration for other cultures. However, such attitudes do not entail the recognition of the equal status of every culture; they are shallow and patronising at bottom, as boutique multiculturalists always regard other cultures from the perspectives of their own cultural values. Consequently, they fail short in the case when a distant stranger, or a briefly visiting stranger, or a passing-by stranger becomes a next-door neighbour who shares the streets, public facilities, workplaces and schools.[5]

Yet the situation, which has considerably challenged the development of cities across Western Europe from the 1990s onwards, is increasingly underpinning a major renewal of interest in culture appearing among scholars and practitioners alike. It was then becoming clear

that 'values shape human progress. [...] Our most pressing issues are profoundly cultural in nature. We try to address them, but without an appreciation of how deeply culture determines our worldviews, we can only grope and fumble'.[6] Therefore, in Fish's sense, there is an urgent need of rejecting boutique multiculturalism and supporting strong multiculturalism.[7] A major difference between boutique multiculturalism and strong multiculturalism lies in the latter's recognition of the value of difference in and for itself.[8] The main research question is thus how such recognition can be utilised for building urban communities in the period of mass influx of migrants to Europe.

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As Will Kymlicka argues, many immigrants do best, both in terms of psychological well-being and sociocultural outcomes, when they are to interlink their ethnic and / or religious identity with a sense of belonging to a host culture. Such 'integration orientation' is often opposed to either an 'assimilation orientation' or a 'separation orientation'.[9] The assimilation orientation presupposes that immigrants must abandon their ethnic identity and adopt a new national identity. As it seems, this inevitably maintains the traditional hierarchies with a strong division to a superior and inferior cultures. Conversely, a separation orientation assumes that one must renounce the new national identity and maintain their ethnic identity. In practice, this hinders the process of integration and thus entails the emergence of a new racialised underclass flocked in urban 'no-go areas'. The main research question revealed in this study is thus of how such integration orientation may be supported by a distinct social climate within a particular urban community.

The article begins with the analysis of the challenges posed by the migration crisis to the stable development of Europe. It continues with the critical evaluation of the different attitudes towards multiculturalism within the EU, with the special emphasis on the 'tolerance of the non-tolerant' conundrum. The next part attempts to answer the question of how the ethical principle of solidary personalism may contribute to supporting integration orientation and building multicultural urban communities across Europe. The concluding part presents the main research findings; at the same time, it specifies the strengths and weaknesses of the study.

The research methodology employed in this study is qualitative, that is, the study is based on the desktop research methodology, which largely involved extensive review of related literature to explore, dis-

cover, identify and deeply understand the mechanisms for resolving and managing conflicts and disputes on the issues of migration and its impact on the development of urban communities across Europe. Several scholarly works and media reports were reviewed and analysed to collect data on the effect of migration on urban community building. The study is based on the critical analysis of new in-depth insights and knowledge about the problems of multiculturalism, tolerance and urban community building with specific reference to a particular situation in contemporary Europe. The possible solutions identified and discussed might lend support to building multicultural urban communities across Europe. However, the study recognises that these findings cannot be generalised.

Europe's dilemma over migrants

Over the past 30 years, the hitherto rather homogeneous Western European states have been experiencing a dramatic influx of immigrants. Though numbers are sharply down from their 2015-16 peaks because of a 2016 EU agreement with Turkey, new border fences in the Balkans, and a 2017 bilateral arrangement between Italy and Libya, tens of thousands of people are still trying to reach Europe. The underlying factors (first of all, extreme asymmetries in living standards which are considerably aggravated by permanent civil wars, human rights abuses by dictatorships, and whatever flows from it, e. g., growing political instability and insecurity) that have led to more than 1.8 million migrants coming to the EU member states since 2014 have not gone away.[10] Therefore, most observers believe it is only a matter of time before the number of arrivals picks up significantly once more.[11] The current situation is increasingly producing a strong, though invisible, division line between the West (i.e., the 'frontline' Southern Europe's states and the welfare Northern 'destination' countries bearing the heaviest burden of the inflow of migrants) and the East (namely, the 'hardline' Central and Eastern European states, for instance, Hungary and Poland refusing to accept any migrants at all).

The main problem is that the stable development of contemporary Europe is in principle impossible without massive immigration. Though the total population in the EU is projected to increase from 511 million in 2016 to 520 million in 2070, the working-age cohort (people aged between 15 and 64) will decrease significantly from 333 million in 2016 to 292 million in 2070. These projected changes in the popu-

lation structure reflect assumptions on fertility rates, life expectancy and migration flows.[12] Due to the low birth rates and population aging, long-standing communities are disappearing and the social burden on the young is becoming unsustainable. These processes increasingly affect Eastern and Western European countries alike, regardless of their past experience and cultural backgrounds. Therefore, sooner or later even the 'hardline' states will inevitably be in need of adopting large numbers of immigrants. The case of Japan, which so far has the strictest rules on immigration among the developed countries, demonstrates how the growing concerns about the labor shortage brought on by the low birthrate and subsequent loss of productive-age workers could add urgency to modify the legislation.[13]

At the same time, as Hyppolyte d'Albis argues, despite the fact that immigration brings significant costs for host countries, over the period from 1985 to 2015 one finds no statistical evidence suggesting worsening of economic conditions in Western European countries, whether in terms of standard of living, unemployment or public finance. On the contrary, after several years, there may be a slight positive effect as immigrants granted permanent residence take up employment and contribute actively to the economy of their host countries.[14]

To put it simply, today's Europe is increasingly faced with a dilemma: on the one hand, there is an urgent need of growing immigration; on the other hand, the fact that many migrants fall short when starting to live in an open and democratic society is becoming a major concern in all countries across Europe.

The EU's top officials often emphasise the need of developing policies and practices of multiculturalism as a way of solving the dilemma over migrants.[15] However, this inevitably reveals the question of how these policies and practices are often understood and implemented. For instance, from the mid-1970s onwards the goal of enabling the preservation of minorities and creating a positive attitude towards the new officially endorsed multicultural society among the majority population became incorporated into the Swedish constitution as well as cultural, educational and media policies.[16] However, the results of such policies are distinctly controversial. For example, a 2017 study by Lund University demonstrated that social trust was lower among people in regions with high levels of past non-Nordic immigration than among people in regions with low levels of past immigration; at the same time, the erosive effect on trust was more pronounced for recent im-

migrants from culturally distant countries. [17] This tendency cannot be regarded as a uniquely Swedish attribute. Immigration and terrorism remain citizens' top concerns all across the EU, and the debate about the refugee crisis often took place almost amid an absence of refugees, as, for example, in Central and Eastern European countries.[18]

Is there an intrinsically good culture?

It seems likely that this situation can be regarded as a consequence of boutique multiculturalism widely accepted by many politicians within the EU. As Bauman argues, boutique multiculturalism is exactly what all the global consumerism attributes mean.[19] Purveyors of this superficial brand of multiculturalism appreciate, enjoy, sympathise with, and recognise the legitimacy of cultures other than their own, and, from this point of view, every culture really seems to be intrinsically good. At the same time, as Fish suggests, these people inevitably stop approving such a superficial approach towards multiculturalism when they take seriously the core values of the culture they have to tolerate.[20]

From this point of view, every culture is similar to the well-known Nozick's tank.[21] Being a result of the thought experiment, this tank is an experience machine in which individuals can make unrealistic, pleasurable experiences. In so doing, they think that all their wishes have been fulfilled and they live the life they desired at most. In other words, such a machine makes all wishes intrinsically good. In this context, urban 'no-go areas' can be compared with Nozick's machine in which people are separate from the legislation of a host country. According to **Žalec**, cultural relativism and, then, leveling multiculturalism are inevitably interlinked with nihilism and instrumentalism. Nihilism can be regarded as a settled way of thinking and feeling which is grounded on refusing to acknowledge any cultural difference. As a consequence, nihilistic subjects cannot perceive a particular cultural tradition as unique. As nihilism is practically impossible, it inevitably transforms into some kind of instrumentalism.[22] Instrumentalist attitudes presuppose that a particular person (or a particular culture) cannot be a goal, but (at best) merely a means. Consequently, in fact leveling multiculturalism rejects liberal principles and respect of human dignity, which are crucial elements of the European cultural identity.[23] In other words, from the perspective of leveling multiculturalism there is no need to cultivate the distinct European identity because the European culture is as good as any other culture. At the same time, as

Larry Siedentop argues, the European culture is unique, as it is rooted back to liberal attitudes that, in return, are of Christian origin.[24]

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As it seems, the current situation provides empirical evidence to criticise the main premises of leveling multiculturalism. If we suppose that any culture is intrinsically good, the refugees, who flee, for instance, from the terroristic Islamist groups or the oppressive regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, would choose the neighboring Arab countries as their main destination. Some of these states, such as, for example, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, provide high standards of living. For example, according to the annual World Bank's report, in 2017 the gross domestic product per capita was estimated as 20,760.9 USD for Saudi Arabia, 40,698.8 USD for the United Arab Emirates and 63,505.8 USD for Qatar, to compare with 18,613.4 USD for Greece, 44,469.9 USD for Germany and 53,442.0 USD for Sweden.[25] The affluent Arab states increasingly attract labour migrants from many countries. Nevertheless, despite distinct cultural (and administrative) barriers, most of the refugees deliberately choose Europe as their main destination. Therefore, we cannot consider the economic reasons as the main factor which boosts the mass influx of refugees to Europe. These refugees are attracted, perhaps unconsciously, by the distinctive traits of the European culture, as in Europe they mostly seek for security and respect of human rights. But, in return, the very idea of the respect of human rights can be regarded as a unique characteristic of the European cultural traditions, which is rooted back in Christianity.[26] At the same time, the principles of tolerance, respect of human rights, equality and participation were not always the attributes of the European culture. Europe had passed through a long way of violence before; as a result of many adjustments, reconciliations, dialogues these principles became the core values of the European societies. On the other hand, as John Esposito argues, 'too often coverage of Islam and the Muslim world assumes the existence of a monolithic Islam in which all Muslims are the same'.[27] In this sense, the Islamic culture is often presented as violent and warlike. According to Esposito, such a view is naive and unjustifiably obscures important divisions and differences in the Muslim world.[28] It seems likely that the concept of the invention of tradition, which was made prominent in the eponymous 1983 book edited by British scholars Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger,[29] could promote the pathway to understanding this situation. Despite the fact that this concept hides serious ambiguities

(for example, it is often not possible or useful to distinguish between 'genuine' and recently 'invented' traditions, as both are intrinsic parts of a distinct cultural heritage), the term 'invented tradition' has some explanatory potential. For instance, it enables us to assume that any cultural tradition is a social invention and not some primordial characteristics. As it seems, this premise could enhance our learning and understanding of the issues of radical Islamism and Islamophobia in today's Europe.

The political assassins who attacked the French newsmagazine *Charlie Hebdo* on 7 January 2015 proclaimed that they took vengeance on those who published the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. Yet, the fact that the caricatures considered offensive to Muslims were published by this newsmagazine (and earlier by several Danish and Norwegian newspapers) may be regarded as an attempt to protest against leveling multiculturalism, which often resulted in tolerance of the non-tolerant, as well as an attempt to defend the main principles of European liberalism. The motto of *Je suis Charlie (I am Charlie)* encompassed millions of people across Europe to protest the massacre of terrorists. These protests reminded us of the necessity to insist that all immigrants must accept the legitimacy of state enforcement (and, in the EU's case, supra-national enforcement) of liberal principles.[30]

Nevertheless, this situation inevitably poses the following question: can the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad be regarded as a proper way to protest against 'tolerance of the non-tolerant'?

According to Ayan Hirsi Ali, the vast majority of Muslims are currently torn between fundamentalists and terrorists on the one hand and the reformers on the other.[31] The problem is thus that by choosing the way of protest that is overtly offensive to all Muslims against the terrorist massacre, we could push Islamic communities towards fundamentalists and terrorists. In fact, when accepting the publication of such cartoons as a possible way of protest, we inevitably assume that the Islamic culture as such is intrinsically bad. Paradoxically, this position has a similarity with leveling multiculturalism. Both positions may be regarded as the opposite sides of the same coin, as they consider any culture as a homogenous entity (either intrinsically good or intrinsically bad). Both points of view are based on the idea that every person is determined with characteristics which he or she automatically inherits from his or her native culture.[32] In reality, however, a particular group is not predetermined and unchangeable; instead, it inevitably

represents phenomenal forms of human diversity and plurality which open up different perspectives on the world and which any person can freely form and transform as part of his or her human conditions.[33] As Erich Fromm argued, in a world in which violence in every form seems to be increasing, every culture can provide a support for human destructiveness while advocating violence against all regarded as 'bad' or 'wrong'.[34] Consequently, as Anthony Appiah puts it, any culture as such can be equally 'good' and 'bad'. [35] In this context, we should not reduce the issue of radicalisation and terrorism in Europe merely to the phenomenon of radical Islamist ideology.[36] For example, immediately after the terrorist attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011 the media affirmed that this was committed by Islamist fundamentalists, but soon it was discovered that 77 people, many of whom were under the age of 18, were killed by a 32-year-old Norwegian, who decided that the practices founded in the idea of tolerance and multiculturalism threatened Europe, and a 'right' of defending the European culture would justify any means of obtaining it. [37] The 2017 German federal elections, Austrian legislative elections and Italian parliamentary elections, and the 2018 Swedish parliamentary elections saw gains by fringe populist parties running an openly xenophobic platform. The possible way to stop this anti-democratic wave is to acknowledge that in any culture (including the Islamic culture) we must search for the elements which contribute to the autonomy and flourishing of individuals and support them.[38] At the same time, we should oppose the idea that there is no opportunity for a person to choose his or her own way of accepting or rejecting cultural values of his or her mother culture.

On the contrary, from the perspective of strong or, in Will Kymlicka's sense, liberal multiculturalism,[39] the personal freedom of choice is of primary importance.[40] In this context, we should, to some extent, tolerate the intolerant, but, at the same time, we must impose zero tolerance to the violations of human dignity in any form. For example, people who choose Europe as a place of permanent residence should realise that domestic violence (which is so common for many cultures, as it was a common practice in pre-modern Europe) cannot be justified in a sense that it is an inherent attribute of a particular culture; it will be inevitably considered as a criminal offence. In other words, democracy can be based mostly on accepting the universal truth of human dignity being a goal by itself. Among other things, this means zero tolerance to violence in all its forms. In this context, from the perspec-

tive of strong multiculturalism the freedom of speech (in our case, the right of publishing any caricatures) can be restricted only in the case if someone overtly propagates and defends violence and crimes against humanity (such as in the case of Holocaust denial and the crimes of Stalinism). In such a case, we distinctly need to accept the enforcement of liberal principles; however, such enforcement must be absolutely incompatible with violations of human dignity (such as prisoner abuse and torture that are commonly in use, for instance, in Putin's Russia increasingly turning back to Gulag).

Solidary personalism and community building in urban Europe

The rule of law directed toward defending human dignity and human rights can be thus recognised as bedrock of building multicultural urban communities in Europe. At the same time, this cannot be effective without creating social climates which could foster open-mindedness towards different cultures and national traditions. Social climates can be considered a medium for transmitting and enforcing important social values in the city's everyday life;[41] at the same time, while building a community, beliefs are at the base of that community. The key beliefs are regarding ethics, core values, human rights and diversity. These beliefs are included in the social goals that particular social groups (for instance, urban neighborhoods) have to accomplish.[42] A social climate includes a set of social attitudes which specify the shared perceptions of what constitutes ethical behaviour, and the process of how ethical or moral issues will be dealt with. In this context, the problem of how the prevalent moral norms could help bridge the gap between different cultures is now gathering unprecedented momentum.

In searching for the possibility of dialogue between the persons who share different cultural traditions, Albert Schweitzer supported the idea that the European identity is liberal and of Christian origin. At the same time, he pointed out that the history of Europe provided many examples of massacre and violence of human rights. Albert Schweitzer believed that ethical values which could underpin the ideal of true civilisation had to have their foundation in deep thought and be world- and life-affirming. He therefore embarked on a search for ethical values in the various major religions and worldviews accessible to him. Finally, he decided that the only thing the people around the world are really sure of is that they live and want to go on living.[43] Consequently, the principle of the Reverence for Life, which is rooted back

not only to Christian humanism, but also to non-Western religious thought, in particular, the Jain principle of *ahimsa* (non-violence), can be regarded as an inherent part of Europe's cultural heritage and, at the same time, a result of critical rethinking of Europe's cultural traditions. Today this principle may form an ethical background for searching the foundations of universally valid ethics for building urban communities across Europe. [44]

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The idea of the Reverence for Life is in some respects interlinked with the ethical principle of solidary personalism. The term *solidary personalism* was firstly introduced by Bojan Žalec.[45] He presupposes that people are in principle equal regarding their right to cultivate their singularity or individuality, regardless of their cultural and / or religious backgrounds. The main aim of a personalist is flourishing of every person. At the same time, the aim of adjective 'solidary' is to stress the relational and participatory nature of a person.[46] As Žalec states, persons are essentially relational beings and must be treated in their concrete situation and historical perspective. Solidarity means not just a kind of economic solidarity but, at the same time, mutual participation of persons on their lives including all their aspects. The central moment of such solidarity is intellectual solidarity,[47] the participation on the experience of the other.[48] Yet it is crucial that we should recognise that there are limits of inter-personal solidarity: According to Žalec, '[s]olidarity – participation in the life of the other – can however be only partial. The belief that we can reach total participation is dangerous and destroys approaching of the other as the other [...] and provides contexts for instrumentalisation and manipulation'.[49] In other words, it is impossible to regard any other culture from the perspectives of one's own cultural values. Consequently, solidary personalism provides a background of criticism of boutique or leveling multiculturalism based upon the idea that every culture is intrinsically good, as well as upon the ignorance of the historical context and the current situation in which a distinct culture forms, exists and develops. Based upon the ethical principle of solidary personalism, we thus can develop a framework for strong multiculturalism.[50]

However, such practices should be developed and established merely through the dialogue between all concerned parties. As it seems, urban communities where people from different cultural, social and / or religious backgrounds do the things that allow them to sustain livelihoods and develop their place of living together may provide settings

for such dialogue. Leadership, geography, history, socio-cultural characteristics and socio-economic status are all traditionally used to explain success of community building and its well-being. In return, it is impossible without forming a sense of community. As Karel Müller argues, in multicultural settings the sense of community should be based on a particular kind of social identity which is characterised by porous active borders.[51] The concept of porous active borders presupposes that the social identity should be principally open for any cultural experience. However, in contemporary Europe's context, such cultural experience should be in favour of the European liberal tradition, which is of Christian origins. Such identity, or, to say more precisely, its inside / outside (us / them) dimensions, may be regarded as a crucial factor that specifies the way a tradition of a particular city is perceived. This assumption is in many respects based on the theoretical concept of social identity complexity that refers to an individual's subjective representation of the degree of overlap perceived to exist between groups of which a person is simultaneously a member.[52] Given the recognition that urban residents inevitably belong to multiple social groups with multiple corresponding social identities, an important question to be addressed is how individuals combine these group identities when they define their subjective in-groups. More specifically, do multiple group memberships lead to more inclusive or less inclusive in-groups, when compared to single group identities? In Müller's sense, it is accurate to comprehend a contemporary urban community as an open system of communication, rather than as an integrated social system of shared meanings and morals, which is embedded in a local context. Societies are nowadays, first of all, communicating societies, networks of mobility, and flows of social communication. Therefore, social identity should be understood as a project whose main objective is active participation in the process of fair and open communication within various spheres of local affairs. Communication itself could (and should) be the main overarching defining characteristic of social identities, which today resembles, as Stuart Hall argued, 'routes rather than 'roots'.[53] In this regard, it is possible to distinguish between active and passive borders of social identity. The active border is characterised by numerous channels providing contacts with outside cultures, and thus fosters the emergence of social identity complexity. Under these circumstances, particular ideas and practices from the outer cultures are adopting and adapting to a definite city's context. In such

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a case, any cultural tradition can be considered not as somewhat dogmatic and inflexible, but as a factor that fosters intercultural dialogue. On the contrary, the passive border of social identity is marked with a communicational impermeability based on the stereotypical labeling, defining and preserving polarity of 'us' and 'them'.[54] In such a case, any cultural tradition tends to produce strict individual obedience to commonly shared rules, both formal and informal, without any doubt about their legitimacy. Hence, any alternative worldview, as well as the ways of creating something new, is opposed. Urban neighborhoods become the inflexible guardians of traditions, which are unalterably opposed to every sort of personal and / or group deviation from the socially accepted type. This vision is based on the essentialist interpretation of the distinct cultural heritage and forging an identity which is characterised by passive borders.

In this context, social climate within a particular place can play a crucial part in forming social identity complexity. If social climate within some urban neighborhoods fosters intolerance and even aggressiveness towards any form of 'otherness', it tends to impact the emergence of passive borders of closed, nested social identity. On the contrary, in the case when social climate motivates urban inhabitants to be tolerant and open towards outer cultures, alternative ways of thinking and lifestyles, this inevitably results in the emergence of active borders of social identity (and, then, social identity complexity). In any respect, social climate within urban neighborhoods is considerably impacted by formal and informal knowledge of the genesis, nature and structure of the traditions formed within a particular place and those bringing by the newcomers. Genuine and recently established traditions are thus 'invented' alike in the sense that the knowledge of both is socially constructed and embedded into a particular narrative forming a distinctive social identity and social climate within a particular community. In Benedict Anderson's sense, this knowledge is often used for the purpose of forming 'imagined communities'.[55]

As it seems, the case of contemporary Russia provides an example of how a particular narrative can be constructed for the purpose of forming a special kind of social identity. Many people, both in Russia and abroad, think that the Russian culture is based exclusively on the long-standing patterns of submission to authoritarian or totalitarian rule and military power. At the same time, little is known about the democratic stream of Russia's cultural heritage. For instance, the case

of the medieval Veliky Novgorod republic demonstrates how strong and sustainable traditions of grassroots democracy were embedded into a local context. Much later, *zemstvo*, or local self-government established in the 1860s, succeeded in solving in the proper way many problems of general education, medical service and public welfare. Generally speaking, the Russian culture fostered Leo Tolstoy's idea of eliminating the 'big state' and developing a 'big society'. Yet the knowledge of these facts is not embedded into the predominant narratives mainly due to the attempts of the authorities to construct a closed, exclusive identity of 'besieged fortress Russia'. This became especially evident after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, when Putin's regime has gone beyond the purely authoritarian type and embraced many features of the neo-Stalinist totalitarian dictatorship. As a result, the state controlled media widely uses the warlike Stalinist rhetoric when narrating the story of Russia's past and present. For instance, like under Stalin, Putin's propaganda glorifies the oppressive rule of the Tsar Ivan the Terrible who initiated the mass terror (oprichnina) in the second half of the 16th century. One can observe this also at a particular city's level: in autumn 2016 the monument to Ivan the Terrible was erected in the city of Orel in Central Russia, and this action was supported by many top officials at the national level. This example likely demonstrates how particular one-dimensional and oversimplified identity can be violently defended. To overcome the current trend of rising xenophobia and other forms of social exclusion, which extends far beyond Russia›s boundaries, the narratives about the particular city's past and present should oppose any reductionist division of people according to their nationality, ethnicity, class, religion, and the similar that inevitably entails diasporisation and ghettoisation of urban neighborhoods. At the same time, one should narrate the true stories about the cultural traditions of the host city and the cultures of all national and religious group that reside in this place. In so doing, in every culture, in accordance with the ethical principle of solidary personalism, one should search for the elements which are in favour of openness to change, meritocracy, social equality and universalism, lower importance of conservatism and power values and higher tolerance for diversity crucial for the emergence of social identity complexity. Such narratives, which are increasingly created and disseminated through global networks and social media, could motivate people to utilise a wide variety of practices directed towards creation or enhance-

ment of stable, culturally and ethnically diverse urban communities.[56] These practices may include, for instance, taking care of the elderly, helping the people with special needs, emerging crime fighting tools, the implementation of 'green-smart' solutions in creating public spaces, urban agriculture, housing and transport networks, or larger-scale efforts such as mass festivals and building construction projects that involve local participants rather than outside contractors. Such activities could facilitate civic engagement and collective action and have a positive effect on the quality of relationships among the citizens of multicultural community. In his book *Bowling Alone* Robert Putnam refers to this as social capital which creates a sense of belonging thus enhancing the overall health of a community.[57] This is especially crucial for migrants, many of whom came to Europe from dictatorships, and, as a consequence, they do not believe in a success of bottom-up initiatives and common actions interlinked with democratic, non-violent methods of solving major social problems. Therefore, one should narrate about the constructive potential of such procedures and thus persuade these people to participate in policymaking, first of all, at the community level. In other words, one should motivate the people of different cultural backgrounds to *create together* the place where they live in. In this context, from the perspective of the ethical principle of solidary personalism one could critically re-evaluate the existing concepts of urban creative milieu which can play a crucial part in community building in urban areas.

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As Landry states, a creative milieu is a place where 'face-to-face interaction [among a critical mass of entrepreneurs, intellectuals, social activists, artists, administrators, power brokers or students] creates new ideas, artefacts, products, services and institutions and, as a consequence, contributes to economic success'.[58] At the same time, 'in contrast to the more venerable innovative milieu construct that initially focused on creative interaction among workers and between firms and research institutes to examine innovation and economic competitiveness, members of the creative class seek to imbue creativity in all aspects of their lives'.[59] According to Florida, creative professions differ from all other professions in the fact that they base their work on defining issues, finding their solutions, while employing the existing knowledge in a new and innovative manner.[60] In this context, while a 'weak definition' of creative milieu[61] requires that unobserved interaction attracts a diverse set of creative people to creative places, a 'strong

definition' of creative milieu[62] posits that interaction across the diverse creative domains produces an innovative milieu which increases the dynamism of the local economy.[63] In this regard, creative economy is defined as the sum of economic activities arising from a highly educated segment of the workforce, which encompasses a wide variety of creative individuals.[64] In John Howkins's sense, creative economy comprises advertising, architecture, art, crafts, design, fashion, film, music, performing arts, publishing, software, toys and games, TV and radio, and video games.[65] Some scholars argue that education industry, including public and private services, is also forming a part of creative economy. There remain, therefore, different definitions of the sector.[66] At the same time, the attempts to divide all the professions into creative and non-creative inevitably result in a distinct elitism of creative class theory.[67]According to Peck, the contemporary creativity strategies barely disrupt extant urban policy orthodoxies, based on interlocal competition, place marketing, property- and market-led development, gentrification and normalised socio-spatial inequality. This has the effect of elevating creativity to the status of a new urban imperative.[68] Hence, to overcome the inherent weaknesses of creative class theory,[69] and to break with the rhetoric of creativity distinguishing the scholarly literature which still prevails in the field, one can notice that in a summary of research into creativity Michael Mumford suggests that 'creativity involves the production of novel, useful products'.[70] Creativity can also be defined as the process of producing something that is both original and worthwhile or characterised by originality, expressiveness and a person's imagination.[71] In this sense, creativity cannot be regarded merely in terms of economic effectiveness and one's professional or, moreover, class affiliation. Creative milieu can thus be considered as a set of formal and informal institutions supporting an individual or a group of people in thinking and acting creatively, regardless of one's professional, social and / or cultural status. In this regard, the issues of social identity complexity play a crucial role in the emergence of creative milieus within urban communities. Therefore, the critical urban theory,[72] which is rooted back to Henri Lefebvre's claim to the 'right to the city', i.e., a right to change ourselves by changing the city,[73] can provide an alternative theoretical framework for the creativity studies from the perspective of solidary personalism. In this sense, building multicultural urban communities should motivate people in every place to obtain their right to work creatively upon developing

a 'city for people, not for profit'.[74] At the same time, strong multiculturalism based upon the ethical principle of solidary personalism can foster the emergence of creative milieus within urban communities, as it can play a crucial part in introducing contrasting views and challenging existing assumptions.

Conclusion

Every developed country no longer has to decide whether it wants to become a multicultural society. In fact, it made that decision, perhaps unconsciously, years ago when a country decided to be a full participant in the emerging global economy. Developed states confirmed that decision when they decided to actively recruit foreign migrants to meet the economic and demographic needs of a fast-growing society. At the same time, every democratic state has a moral obligation to provide asylum for the people fleeing persecution by dictatorships. In this context, every European country today is faced with a difficult decision: what type of multicultural society does it want to be?

As a matter of fact, Europe is increasingly in need for strong multiculturalism. It presupposes that there are neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad cultures. In all cultures we should search for the elements which are in favour of non-violence and respect of human dignity. Strong multiculturalism may be most needed in times when many immigrants are perceived as illegitimate, illiberal, and burdensome.[75] Proactive policies to promote a true 'integration orientation' within multicultural urban communities require a lot of adjustments, reconciliations and dialogues, and the ethical principle of solidary personalism could provide a (possible) background of that. From the perspective of solidary personalism, one-dimensional simplifications of social identity inevitably produce a reductionist division of people according to their nationality, ethnicity, class, religion, and the similar.[76] We should thus create conditions in which people are allowed to step out from their original cultures, to link up within new social groups, with new cultures which might be even essentially opposing to their cultures of origin.[77] For the purpose of establishing porous, active borders of social identity we should narrate the stories on the culture of the host city and the cultural traditions of the newcomers. Such stories should foster collaboration among different ethnic, social and religious groups aimed at creating a stable urban community within a particular city.

The article has limitations, as it attempts to present merely a theoretical framework of the further research in the field. As a matter of fact, there is an urgent need to undertake primary research of the best practices and shortcomings in building multicultural urban communities across Europe. This study should be based on representative and statistically reliable data in order to deepen the insight into the impact of various narratives and common actions on creating multicultural urban communities. In this context, the empirical study should be ideally based on using several different, yet complementary, research methodologies.

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The Impact of Smart City Model on National Security

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Smart cities could help overcome traditional problems of big cities, such as pollution, traffic congestion and administrative corruption. They can stimulate economic productivity, accommodate population growth, and make lives more convenient, but at the same time, they raise many security threats to national security.

Daily life needs in smart cities are based on information and communication technologies. Houses, infrastructure, transportation, communication, government services, as well as commercial and industrial services, etc. are controlled by smart systems dependent upon artificial intelligence and the Internet of things[1]. If these services are targeted by a successful cyber-attack, the consequences in that case would be unaffordable to national security and to people's lives.

This article seeks to analyse the impact of smart cities on national security, and it comes in three main sections. The first one defines smart cities and its different models, the second one analyses the impact of adopting the smart city model on national security, and the conclusion tries to provide some recommendations of how to decrease national security risks in the smart city.

Keywords: smart cities, national security, cyber security.

Introduction

Many countries around the world have adopted smart city models which depend on cloud storage platforms, Internet of things and artificial intelligence systems, with the aim of improving the quality of live

for its citizens, opening new opportunities for economic development, and making the best use of available resources.

In smart cities, infrastructure such as communication systems, transportation systems, power stations and all government services are dependent on information communication technology. However, this gives rise to particular fears and threats. For instance, cyberattacks on the city's infrastructure can mean ending the lives of large numbers of people in a matter of no time, in the event the cyberattacks target airlines, railways, self-driving cars, hospitals, automated bascule bridges or traffic lights. This is an immediate threat to the country's national security.

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Apart from this, smart cities can be targeted by different kinds of cybercrime, such as cyber scams, piracy, blackmail and online sexual harassment. Credit cards, bank accounts, and the financial sector, not only of the smart city but also of the entire country, can be threatened by cyber-attacks. The situation becomes all the more dangerous during conflict or war, if the state has been targeted by its enemies or rival regional or international powers, as cyberattacks in this case would be a lethal weapon targeting smart cities and highly affect national security.

Consequently, many countries are changing their national security strategies so that they should encompass such concepts as cyber power, cyber deterrence and cyber conflict[2], to protect all the potential targets in the event of cyber warfare.

The 'smart cities' concept is relatively new, associated with the emergence of smart growth in the 1990s, and it was first used by academics primarily concerned with urban planning, with the aim of describing the rejuvenation of urban infrastructures through incorporating communication and information technologies into them[3]. Technical dimensions took precedence as the prime concern was finding the optimal way to incorporate information and communication technologies in urban planning.

Despite the widespread popularity of the concept, there is no clear-cut definition of what a smart city is[4]. This lack of agreement on what a smart city is has much to do with the existence of many terms likely to be mistaken for synonyms of the term 'smart cities' (e.g. intelligent cities, digital cities, virtual cities, etc.). In fact, the term 'smart' is opted for simply because it covers technical, social, architectural and economic dimensions.

Smartness is mainly based on the integration between technical dimensions (i.e. devices, systems, sensors and artificial intelligence), social dimensions (i.e. interpersonal relationships) and physical planning (as related to the technological constituent). Intelligence, by contrast, exclusively has to do with the technical aspects pertaining to developing systems and applying machine learning, so that machines can make autonomous decisions, hence the term 'artificial intelligence'. As for the term 'digital city', it refers to the broadband communication services incorporated in the infrastructure so as to facilitate communication between citizens, government and businesses. Therefore, all intelligent systems are digital by default. Finally, the term 'virtual city' refers to the physical/virtual dichotomy, regarding the city as composed of a physical component, which, in turn, consists of systems, devices and infrastructures, and a virtual component, namely, the virtual space which acts as a medium joining all the different elements together. It is noteworthy that the term 'smart city' covers all the concepts and elements (i.e. systems, infrastructures, and Internet) in addition to the individuals, the essence of the smart city. The term also covers the social and urban dimensions[5].

The smart city is not characterized by technology and information knowledge only, it also characterized by certain unique social features, one of which is its social infrastructure, which consists of intellectual capital and social capital. Another is its environment, which encourages innovation through enhancing education, learning, acculturation, knowledge, human relationships, policies and laws, and supports human intelligence and urban development processes in general.

The following are the main criteria and dimensions of smart cities:
- A smart city depends on high technology, which helps connect individuals, information and city components efficiently, hence the city's sustainability, the innovativeness and competitiveness characterising trade in it, and the high quality of life in it[6].
- A city becomes smart when all the available resources and technologies are systematically used to develop the urban centers so that they should become integrated, habitable and sustainable[7].
- A smart city is typically equipped with information and communication technologies, which provide citizens with services in digital and electronic forms[8].
- The underlying concept of smart cities is that of multi-dimensional development. Information and communication technolo-

gies are simply mechanisms or tools for facilitating the development process in the state[9].

- A smart city is not all about modern technology; it must provide its inhabitants with the highest quality of life, and create opportunities to make life patterns more harmonious so as to achieve development for those who live in it[10].

- A city is smart when investment in human and social capitals and in the structure of the traditional means of communication (i.e. transportation) and modern means of communication (i.e. information and communication technologies) contributes to enhancing sustainable economic development and achieving a high quality of life. This is achieved through effective management of natural resources, which, in turn, is brought about by teamwork, commitment and cooperative, participation-based management[11].

- A smart city functions in an ambitious, creative way. This applies to its economy, population, governance, mobility, environment and lifestyle, and depends on the positive participation of able, enlightened, independent citizens in the decision making process[12].

Fig 1. Cohen Smart City Wheel

Study framework and methodology:

This section presents a Smart City model that the article builds upon. It is a framework developed by Boyd Cohen called the 'Boyd Cohen Wheel'[13], the model encompassing the various elements of smart cities, indicated in chart No (1), which has gained wide acceptance in academic circles as a model for studying smart cities. It was translated into many languages, such as French, Swedish, Dutch and Spanish. According to Cohen, the elements of a smart city are the following[14]:

1. **Smart Economy:** The smart economy is characterized by a high degree of creativity, manifest in employing advanced technologies in industrial production, modernizing services and accelerating production and industrialization processes through depending on machinery. It also depends upon incorporating the national economy into the global economy and revitalizing the smart city's economy so that it can live up to competition. The main requirements for creating a smart economy are entrepreneurship, innovation, productivity, and local and international solidarity and cooperation.

2. **Smart Transportation:** This means improving the quality of transportation services inside the city, as well as enhancing the traffic sector and related surveillance processes. This can be achieved through utilizing modern technologies, such as using surveillance cameras and electronic monitoring techniques. Applications which analyze information immediately should also be used, so that the right decision can be arrived at in the right time. In addition, different means of transportation should be available inside the city, including public transportation, private sector transportation, environment-friendly cars, autonomous cars, as well as bicycles.

3. **Smart Environment:** The first step to creating a smart environment is the clean urban planning of the city. This depends upon utilizing information and communication technologies and monitoring techniques in distributing public areas and green areas around the city. It also has to do with choosing styles of building that would achieve the utmost degree of efficiency, effective management of natural resources, reducing gas emission, and cleaning water canals and activating them so as to achieve sustainability. The indices of a smart environ-

ment are: green buildings, clean energy, and balanced urban planning.

4. **Smart People**: The citizen is an important element of the process of development in the smart city. In fact, the ultimate goal of making cities smart is improving the quality of life for the citizen. The citizens of a smart city are typically well-educated and open-minded towards the Other. They also accept difference and enjoy a high degree of personal flexibility. They should be encouraged to take part in the decision-making processes in the society of the smart city, using social platforms and their different channels. The indices of a smart citizen are innovation-based education, a culture of acceptance and openness, and giving priority to creativity and uniqueness.

5. **Smart Life:** This means improving the environment and the quality of life for the citizens, and can be achieved through encouraging the citizens to connect with one another efficiently and enhance the way they manage their surroundings (e.g. their houses, personal belongings, companies, businesses, etc.) through depending on the Internet of things and Internet-based social platforms. This would create a lively, healthy and happy lifestyle.

6. **Smart Government:** Technology in the smart city enhances connections inside the government itself, as well as between the different government organs, the government and the citizens and the government and the different state sectors (commercial, social, etc.). The government services and any information citizens need can be accessed through the Internet. This enhances government accountability and transparency and facilitates data availability. It also makes it easier for the government to respond quickly to the society's needs.

It is worth noting that Cohen model has one strong weakness, which is that it does not include Smart Energy (Smart Grids) as an element, while the Smart Energy and Smart Grids are critical to National Security.

Also, there are several paradigms and approaches that tried to analyze and understand smart cities before Cohen. One of them was introduced by The Center of Regional Science in Vienna University, which focused on six different elements for a city to be smart[15]:

- **Smart Economy,** fully digitalized systems characterized by Innovative spirit,

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- **Smart People,** have a certain Level of qualification and are interested in learning,
- **Smart Governance**, that depends on digital democracy,
- **Smart Mobility,** that depends upon transport infrastructure and logistic services,
- **Smart Environment,** based on effective management of resources and achieving sustainability,
- **Smart Living** depending on achieving security and a high quality of life.

Another paradigm provided by Professor Nicos Komninos depends on the following four components[16]:

- infrastructure including electricity and internet networks necessary for founding a city which is based upon knowledge and information,
- using the internet and digital technology in changing the style of living and working in the city.
- incorporating communication and information technologies into the infrastructure of the city.
- making information and communication technologies available for the citizens so as to enhance creativity, education and learning.

However, as mentioned before, this study adopts the Cohen Wheel model, which seems more recent and comprehensive regardless of its limitations.

The relationship between the smart city model and national security

Smart cities are classified into different models in the light of four criteria - each model has a direct impact on national security. The first of these is the kind of technology used in the smart city, which can be either closed source technology that can only be developed by the company that created it, or an open source technology that any developer or programmer can work on. The second criterion is the agent(s) contributing to the process of building the city whether it is the government or the private sector alone or the private sector in collaboration with civil society, working in accordance with a government strategy. The third is the nature of the sector that the city in question serves. This can be a specialized sector, such as the energy sector, or general sectors of the city, targeting the population

as a whole. The fourth, and last, criterion is the "construction type"; while some smart cities are built from scratch, others are simply old, "classical" cities that have been turned into smart ones. They are indicated in chart No (3).

1. Technology used in the smart city:
Two kinds of cities can be identified in this respect. These are:

A. Closed source smart cities:
Cities that are built and developed by only one company, such as IBM or Cisco, so that no other company can further work on these cities, unless it cooperates with the company that "originated" them. The originating company does not make the information it receives from the sensors in the city available to the programmers and developers, and so they are not allowed to develop new technologies or contribute to innovations of any kind to the city. The company also does not allow the platforms used in running the city to share data with the platforms of other companies. In other words, the system that the company uses to operate the city it creates is also its own creation, and is typically a completely homogenous, closed system that never accepts any technologies from outside the protocol designed by the company[17]. A case in point is Songdo, a smart city built by Cisco in South Korea, specialized in serving the trade and business sector[18].

B. Open source smart cities:
Open source technology is that which can be developed and updated by more than one company, or individual. New technologies can be accepted by the system. A case in point is the FIREWARE initiative, a non-profit European initiative funded by governments, international organization, and top communication companies in Europe. The aim of the initiative is to develop sensor devices and systems and introduce them on a wide scale into the countries of the EU. The systems herein mentioned are open source systems; the information collected in the city is made available to the developers via public API interfaces, which helps them develop smart technologies and solutions for the city. Different sectors of the society would take part in the process of planning, founding and developing[19]. Among the cities that adopted this technology are New York and Barcelona[20], the latter of which placed second in the rankings of smart cities in 2016[21].

It is noteworthy that open source cities cost less, compared to closed source ones, as far as systems and technologies are concerned. The reason is that maintenance and development are not the responsibility of one company, but instead everyone's. This makes it possible for more than one company to take part in developing the city, and the cost is paid by the sector that needs maintenance or developing.

Instead of having to continue dealing with one company regardless of cost, the government can choose from different offers. Individuals can take part in building the city, through buying the systems most affordable to them (and compatible with the standard specifications of the city), installing and using them wherever they like[22], without having to ask for the help of one company that monopolizes the processes of installing and operating systems.

This model is supported by some international non-profit laboratories and organizations, such as the Public Lab (short for the Public Laboratory for Open Technology and Science), an international community of researchers and programmers engaged in developing open source applications and tools with the aim of making them available to all researchers all over the world so that they can also take part in developing, testing and experimenting with them. Fab Lab Barcelona goes so far as to making it possible for the citizens to take part in the processes of developing and testing, with a view to enhancing citizen participation and developing the concept of the smart citizen. This is achieved through the use of DIY techniques (where DIY is short for Do It Yourself)[23].

The smart city model according to technology used has a direct effect on national security. Closed source smart city models raise questions regarding security and privacy, from one side the city developer in this model is one company who owns the operation systems, and so has access to all of the information of the cities, knows where is the weaknesses and from where the danger can come. From another side it could also leave a backdoor to have illegal access to information when needed.

Another concern arises if the developing company is not from the same country (which usually happens). In that case, the relationship could subject to the influence of other international actors. This doesn't mean that open source smart city model is better - although it is characterized by more transparency as it involves making designs and codes available for everyone, the availability of designs, codes, and

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Fig 2. Smart city models

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information could make it very difficult to prevent hacking and digital piracy (see Fig 2).

2. Agents participating in building the city:
According this criterion, smart cities can be classified into three stake-holders:

A. Government:
Smart city development often requires involvement of a government body to make deliberate choices and engage in city challenges in the most effective way[24]. It has the legal authority, financial resources, and the strategic vision needed in the development process. It also encourages the private sector and civil society to fulfill the construction of the smart city.

A. Private sector construction:
Where the private sector primarily means the top technology companies in the world, which are capable of building the city and providing all its technological requirements, such as real-time traffic control systems, crime detection and prevention systems, security cameras, networks, communication lines and environmental information systems[25].

B. Civil society participation:
Citizens, civil society and academic society cooperate with the private sector in building, developing and managing smart cities. This is achieved through enabling programmers, pirates and developers to innovate and experiment in the city, and present solutions and suggestions. Thus, managing the smart city becomes some sort of collaborative work, where everyone has his/her fair share of responsibility[26].

This type of smart city makes it possible for small companies, civil society organizations, universities, and government institutions to launch initiatives that can accelerate the process of changing the city in question into a smart city. For example, the efforts of university teachers and students can be directed towards developing technologies, software and devices in university laboratories that can be useful to the change process.

But this model also brings national security concerns - the agents participating in development process will have to deal with massive quantities of sensitive data collected from both individuals and sensors, which can be misused by them or by third parties and affect national security directly.

3. Purpose of building a smart city:
A smart city can be a millennial city that serves all the individuals in the society, or specialized/sectorial city, which serves specific sectors in the country such as the energy sector:

A. Millennial cities:
These are either cities originally built to be millennial cities, or cities turned into millennial cities. They provide the daily needs of all those who permanently reside in them. Examples of these are Singapore and New York. It is noticeable that we are talking here about real cities inhabited by citizens involved in natural human activities.

B. Sector cities:
These are cities built with the aim of serving a certain sector (industrial, commercial, etc.). People, therefore, do not permanently live in them. Such cities cannot accommodate a large population in the first place; they are built with a view to provide a suitable environment where a certain sector can exercise innovation and creativity. A case in point is PLanIT Valley, a Portuguese smart city specialized in IT technology and the Internet of things[27].

   This type of smart city lacks the 'human feel' of traditional cities. This is, in fact, one of the main criticisms of it; human beings are the essence of the city, and their welfare should be the ultimate goal, or else the city would lose its raison d'être[28].

   A cyber-attack on the millennial city could affect large number of people. Also adopting sectorial smart city model that is the focus of specific sectors like energy or communication could be a real threat because the whole sector could be affected, resulting in huge damage.

4. Construction type of smart city:
Some cities are originally built as smart cities; others are traditional cities that are turned into smart ones:
A. New cities:
These are cities built from scratch, on a vacant, uninhabited plot of land. It is built either by the private sector or by both the private sector and the civil society. It originates as a smart city, capable of fulfilling certain purposes. An example is Masdar, an Abu Dhabi-based smart city.

B. Legacy cities:
Some legacy cities are turned into smart cities. A case in point is Manchester in the UK, and Monterrey in Mexico[29]. In such cases the existing lifestyle, as well as the existing infrastructure (e.g. buildings, roads, services, etc.) should be taken into consideration, so that the technol-

ogy used should be suitable for the city's status quo. In that case some variabilities and gaps could be left unintentionally, resulting in a national security risk.

Applying the "Cohen" model to national security risks and threats:

When applying the "Cohen" model for smart cities to national security, several risks arise:

1. Smart Economy Risk The dilemma that different needs of everyday life in

• Direct Economic risk through hacking banking and financial systems: Depending on smart technologies is a double-edged weapon as far as banking and finance systems are concerned. On the one hand, these systems facilitate financial transactions and transfers between accounts. This has a positive impact on investment and development. On the other hand, hacking these systems is a blatant threat to the stability of the financial transactions, which detracts from the city's ability to achieve one of its most important goals, contributing to improving the economic situation in the country and achieving development.

As smart cities are primarily economic and financial centers, pirates' success in hacking their banking and financial systems would result in transferring billions of dollars from various clients' accounts in a matter of seconds. Apart from the economic loss, the transferred money may be used in financing illegal activities or terrorism, which means that another national security threat can be added to the list[30].

• Indirect Economic risk resulting from losing confidence in the economic and financial sector:

Hacking anything has economic consequences. A study by Oliver Wyman has found that cybercrime will cost $1 trillion annually by 2022[31]. *Harvard Business Review* expects that the next economic crisis will not come from financial shock, but from a cyber-attack that causes disruptions to financial services capabilities, especially payments systems, resulting in a loss of confidence in the global financial services system[32].

2. Smart Transportation Risk

• Manipulating traffic and transportation systems:

Transportation systems have become more digitalized, with a wide range of data flowing across systems, tracking and monitoring both

Fig. 3. Applying "Cohen" model for smart cities on national security

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digital and physical networks. As more devices, control systems, and transportation means are connected online, more disruption to physical assets is possible because of a cyber-attack[33].

• Smart and self-driving vehicles control over:

Targeting the GPS- upon which planes, self-driving cars and different vehicles greatly depend- or hacking the traffic system and manipulating traffic lights, for instance, can result in serious consequences; in addition to human casualties, the movement of traffic in the city can be paralyzed, let alone the economic losses that can result. Losses would be even heavier if the targets were power and gas stations, as life in the city mainly depends on energy[34].

3. Smart Environment Risk

• Technical problems in software and devices:

A smart city is primarily a technology-based city. Essential to its existence are software, cables and devices, all of which, unfortunately, are liable to damage, defects and jamming.

• Physical destruction of systems:
The reasons could be technical, but they can also be environmental. Damage can be caused, for instance, by temperature change, natural disasters or intentional intervention with the aim of destroying the city's smart system. Another reason is defects in the city's software or in the communication networks, the wireless Internet or the GPS. This would of course paralyze life in the city[35].

4. Smart People Risk
A smart city can face nontraditional threats, like the attempts to change the value system of a city so as to turn it into a cosmopolitan system meeting resistance on the citizens' part. This can result in division among the citizens, who would be afraid for their privacy and freedom
    • The emergence of new types of crimes:
Technology is always a two-edged weapon. It is true that it can be in humanity's service but it is also true that it can be threatening and destructive. Total dependence on technology in smart cities can lead to a rise in the numbers of certain crime types, such as online harassment and blackmail. It may also result in the emergence of crimes not known before. For instance, 3D printers can be used, either by ordinary people or by terrorists, in making weapons. They can also be used in forging products (and therefore infringing intellectual rights or counterfeiting antiques[36]. Additionally, commercial drones can be equipped with weapons or bombs and programmed to attack people or civil aircraft, or to violate people's privacy by taking their photos[37].
    • The possibility of societal resistance to change:
Smart cities attract the best minds in all fields, either from the country where the smart city is built or from other countries. In fact, attracting them is the real goal behind building the smart city. However, the citizens of a traditional, relatively homogeneous, city may not at first accept the idea that their city, in the process of changing into a smart city, would be home for people from different cultural backgrounds. These changes are likely to meet resistance, notably in societies where the nationalist spirit is strong. Foreigners taking the important posts in the city can provoke nationalist feelings and lead the citizens to reject the new cultures. However, it is noteworthy that such a threat is more likely to occur in traditional cities that are changed into smart cities, whereas smart cities which are built from scratch (where they

are no natives who would adopt xenophobic attitudes to foreign cultures) would not likely face such a problem.

5. Smart Life Risk
   • Hacking the Internet of things:

Internet of things devices are typically popular in smart cities, being used in institutions, sensors, companies, houses, restaurants, cafes and even streets. They are, in short, indispensable in smart cities. Despite their great importance, these devices constitute a threat to the smart city's security; they are present throughout the city; they are all connected to the Internet, but they are not particularly very well secured. Therefore, if they were hacked through viruses, worms and Trojans, they would immediately turn into a 'smart' army that can destroy the critical infrastructure, including banks, power stations, dams, hospitals and communication systems. They can also paralyze financial and banking services, and all government services. Even more dangerously, they can destroy the Internet itself[38].
   • Targeting Artificial Intelligence Systems:

Smart cities depend on AI technologies, such as robotics systems, in factories, companies, stores, automated answering systems, self-driving cars, and drones. If these systems were hacked, self-driving cars, for example, could be re-programmed to run people over, and it would be extremely difficult to know who the perpetrator was. Similarly, drones and robots can be re-programmed, at least in theory, to kill and destroy. It is not difficult to see why hacking these systems can be one of the most serious dangers which humans can face[39].
   • Hacking cloud storage platforms:

Cloud storage platforms are among the centers used for managing smart cities; they are where all the information coming from the sensors all over the smart city, and from the many government institutions, are stored. Different pieces of information are linked so as to enhance the decision-making processes and reduce the technical support cost. Despite its many advantages, these storage clouds raise many questions that have to do with security. Were they hacked, much sensitive information concerning the country and its citizens would be disclosed, with dangerous consequences.
   • Violating people's privacy:

The privacy of individuals is one of the controversial issues concerning smart cities. The citizens' data, digitized and stored on smart phones,

clouds, etc., are always in danger of violation from inside the city or from outside it, either by organized crime groups or by other countries. Credit card information, GPS information, biometric data, medical data, etc. are always available for the companies that operate the smart city. Besides this, people may feel uncomfortable because of the security cameras that would meet them wherever they go, hence the classical question: must we jeopardize people's security to protect their freedom or must we restrict their freedom to ensure their safety?[40]

6. Smart Government Risk

• Targeting critical infrastructure and government assets:
A smart city's infrastructure depends on smart technologies that require uninterrupted Internet connections. These technologies are used in power stations, petroleum refineries, nuclear reactors, chemicals factories, hospital systems, finance and banking services, communication and transportation systems, traffic, radio and TV broadcasting services, navigation, air navigation and satellites. Targeting these systems only takes minutes but can cause heavy casualties[41].

The US Department of Homeland Security broadcasted a video of a staged cyberattack on a power grid in which a computer virus was used. The virus was able to tamper with the power frequency. As a result, the power grid eventually exploded. Most critical energy sectors, such as electricity, petroleum, dams and nuclear power stations use Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, which are huge computer systems for controlling main power stations. If these systems were hacked the consequences would be catastrophic[42].

All government services in the smart city are potential targets for such threats, as they are based on the smart government model, where citizens can use all services and do all transactions via smart phones and the Internet. Targeting these services means paralyzing government services and institutions, which would be catastrophic to millions of citizens[43].

• Jeopardizing democracy:
The fact that all data would be in the hands of the smart city's managers can constitute a serious threat to democracy. The local, or the central, government, enjoying full access to citizens' data, would be able to have full knowledge of their interests, attitudes, preferences and priorities through analyzing data. This means that power and authority would be monopolized by those who have control over this data. This

is likely to endanger democracy as this information can be used in manipulating elections in favor a certain candidate, which is a dire threat to the integrity of the electoral system[44.]

In addition, governments of other countries may begin online propaganda campaigns to influence the citizens. Russia, for instance, was accused of helping Trump to win the American presidential elections against the Democratic candidate Hilary Clinton by funding a publicity campaign with the aim of making people vote for the Republican candidate.

In the end, smart cities would be more appealing to cyber criminals and cyber terrorism to conduct their operations, the harm that can be expected as a result from a cyber-attack on a smart city conducted by state or non-state actors can affect directly the state national security. The confidentiality, integrity and availability of all governmental and private services can be threatened. In addition, privacy and individual personal freedom could be affected. The quality of life that the smart city aims to achieve would be at risk, and new national security strategies that can deal with this kind of new threats are needed.

Conclusion
Smart cities represent a lifestyle totally based on making use of such unprecedented technological developments as artificial Intelligence systems, the Internet of things and big data, with the aim of having high quality of life for people. However, they create several threats to national security, which make the smart city model questionable from security perspective. At the same time, governments could reduce the security risk to smart cities through adopting some measures, and then making the best use of the smart city mode. These measures can be achieved through three different levels which work together:

A. The technical level:
This is most complicated, costly, and dangerous level, and includes plans, systems, and resources that cooperate to achieve state resilience and flexibility in cyberspace. It involves the following:
   • Developing tracing and offensive capabilities:
The first element in deterring an adversary in cyberspace from threating a smart city making the adversary realize that you are able to find him, follow him, and strike back more fiercely, regardless of the type of

adversary (state, terrorist group, criminal organization, or individual). This could be achieved by developing tracing and offensive capabilities which simultaneously allow you to find and punish your enemy.

• Broad scope of early warning systems:

Employing large number of sensors and early warning systems could help discover an attack before it fulfills its goal. These sensors and systems could be used in critical infrastructure and government e-services because they form the most important targets for attacks within a state. The cost of such an initiative would be expensive, but is nothing compared to the damage that could be levied by a sophisticated cyber-attack.

• Spare traditional networks and backup data resources:

Critical infrastructure should function properly at all times, even when targeted by cyberattacks. To achieve this, another conventional and manual network could be established as a backup network so that if the state fails to contain the attack, it can move to the spare network. Diversifying backup data resources is also essential; in the event of data damage, the state would still be in possession of the source. But we should realize that having several backup data resources could form a point of weakness unless we also increase data security by implementing different layers of security and data encryption.

• Transforming from "network security" to "environment security":

It is not sufficient to simply secure the network to protect critical institutions and infrastructure from penetration; the entire environment must be secured which includes everything surrounding the network such as buildings, minds, behaviors, and procedures.

B. The political level:

States can protect their interests in cyberspace by establishing alliances, signing agreements, and sharing information. Smaller or less secure states could join in alliance with highly-secured states and big security companies, to form an alliance that would defend their cyberspace interests. Additionally, regional and international military alliances and organizations can develop their own goals and strategies to also operate in cyberspace. Agreements on information-sharing between security and intelligence agencies within and among nations is also important to increase tracing and attribution capacities within cyberspace.

C. The societal level:

Every member of society is responsible for helping secure that society. Everyone should be aware of the threats stemming from cyberspace as well as how to address them and reduce the amount of damage associated with cybercrimes and cyberwarfare. This could be achieved through education and social awareness. It is increasingly important to provide cyber education at schools and create a talented generation capable of dealing with cyber threats. Tech companies should also fulfill their social responsibility to teach individuals how to make the best use of their technology and avoid any negative aspects. Mass media should also focus on cyber security topics in order to warn people of cyber threats not only from an operational standpoint, but also from a technical one.

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"What should students take from my classes? The ability to ask the right questions."

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Ethno-Religious Identity and Intergroup Relations

The Informal Economic Sector, Igbo Economic Relations, and Security Challenges in Northern Nigeria

Nsemba Edward Lenshie

Nigeria operates a multidimensional and complex system in which ethnicity and religion have found expression in a competitive environment to exclude other groups. This study aims to examine how ethnicity and religion underlie the hostility and violence in the economic relations between Hausa-Fulani and Igbo people in northern Nigeria. Using documented evidence, the study argues that economic relations between Igbo people and Hausa-Fulani ethnic group have remained unpalatable since the 1960s, and it is associated with the gregarious, assertive and domineering nature of Igbo people in the informal economic sector of northern Nigeria. Democratic revival in 1999 generated new dynamics of ethnic and religious intolerance against Igbo people, especially with the violent transformation of Boko Haram since 2009. Boko Haram violence not only scuttled businesses, but also led to the destruction of lives and properties in which Igbo people incidentally have been victims in most parts of northern Nigeria. Despite the security challenges Igbo people have remained to continue with their businesses in northern Nigeria.

Introduction

As Robert Kaplan noted in 1994, Nigeria today has become increasingly ungovernable due to ethnic and religious cleavages. The northern Nigeria Muslims are worried about the dominance and control of southerners in the economic sector of northern Nigeria.[1] Egohosa Osaghae credited the Igbo people as an ethnic group which have dominated the informal economic sector in Nigeria. In northern Nigeria, since the 1970s, Igbo people have dominated informal economic activities in the enclaves of Kano and other parts of the region.[2] Similarly, Tony Osborg affirms that the Igbo people are the drivers of the indigenous manufacturing sector of the economy with little or no patronage from the government of Nigeria, yet they immensely contribute to non-oil sector revenues in contemporary Nigeria.[3]

Juwon Orugun and Akeem Nafiu revealed empirically that over 74 per cent of investments in Lagos are owned by the Igbo people; the Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani and foreign investors share the remaining 26 per cent.[4] In monetary terms, they have investments worth about 300 trillion naira in Lagos, 600 trillion naira in Abuja, 10 trillion nairas in Kano and Kaduna States, and over 5 trillion nairas in Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, and the Plateau States, respectively.[5] Globally, the Igbo people are reckoned as one of the most enterprising ethnic groups in Nigeria. Since the end of a three-year-long brutal civil war in 1970, they returned to settle almost in every part of northern Nigeria for business purposes. It is believed most enclave communities in northern Nigeria cannot survive without the entrepreneurial presence of Igbo people. There is the feeling that no non-indigenous people are safe in any community in northern Nigeria without Igbo people inhabiting it.[6]

The Hausa-Fulani ethnic group and Igbo people have a long history of economic relations. Haruna Suleimuri revealed that economic relations between Hausa-Fulani and Igbo people, for example, resulted in the cattle trading community at Umuahia in Abia State in about 1895.[7] Economic relations between these ethnic groups further strengthened and expanded under colonial rule,[8] when Igbo people massively migrated to other parts of the country, especially northern Nigeria where colonial activities were concentrated. After independence, economic relations between these ethnic groups became unpalatable.[9] During

this period, the northern political class started becoming afraid of Igbo economic dominance in the region.

In the early 1960s, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of Northern Nigeria was quoted describing the Igbo people as '...more or less a type of people, whose desire is mainly to dominate everybody. If they go to the village or a town, they want to monopolise everything in that area. If you put them as a labourer, within a year, they will try to emerge as the headman of that labour camp, and so on'.[10] Deducting from the statement, some people believed that Bello expressed hatred against Igbo people,[11] while other people believed that it was rather a description of their doggedness in competitive fields of human endeavours.[12] Whether or not the statement was misunderstood, it generated fear, hatred, and hostility against Igbo people.

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The Hausa-Fulani people expressed concern over economic dominance by Igbo people in northern Nigeria. This translated to the northernisation policy, enforced by the regional government of northern Nigeria. Simply put, it was an indigenisation policy aimed at excluding people whose origin was not from within northern Nigeria. However, from every ramification, the policy favoured northerners (Hausa-Fulani Muslims) over other Nigerians generally. In an interview by a foreign media, Bello was quoted as saying: 'In fact, what it is, is a northerner first. If you can't get a northerner, then we take an expatriate like yourself on contract. If we can't then we can employ another Nigerian but on contract, too'.[13] From this context, Nigerians whose ethnic homelands were not within northern Nigeria could not merit employment in the service of the northern regional government. Also, he was quoted speaking of Igbo people in 1953, that:

> We cannot fight to dispense off white masters only to be ruled by new black masters called Ibo. Even here in the north, they run the post office, railways, civil service and they have taken up all the shops we create. Call them Ibo, but you can also call them Zionists, but we shall not relinquish the estate of our fathers to such wretched people who have never had an administration before.[14]

Since the informal economic sector was opened to all, the Hausa-Fulani could not do otherwise. The Igbo people have penetrated and overtaken the enclave economies of Hausa-Fulani people in northern Nigeria. This was enhanced by the associational economic structure developed by Igbo people, which was not readily a part of the prac-

tice among the Hausa-Fulani people. The consequences were ethnic revulsion and hostility against Igbo people.[15] Isaac Albert states that perceived economic deprivation and frustration among Hausa-Fulani people in Kano led to violence against Igbo people, where many were killed and their investments burned and/or looted.[16] Similarly, Kate Meagher affirms that their dominance in the informal economic sector at many times triggered ethnic riots in northern Nigeria.[17] Political instability associated with ethnic misgivings led to a coup and subsequently, a civil war. After the civil war in 1970, they returned.[18]

About five decades after the civil war, Igbo people have continue to confront similar security challenges they confronted during the pre-civil war period in northern Nigeria, because of the perception that they have monopolised profitable sectors of the economy to the disadvantage of Hausa-Fulani Muslims.[19] Jibrin Ibrahim argues that the vibrant informal economy sector controlled by Igbo people have always enabled them to fix prices unilaterally on commodities purchased by Hausa-Fulani people. They drain off their money and reduce them to utter poverty and street beggars.[20] Kate Meagher also states that the vulnerability of Igbo people to violence stems from their successes in businesses such as auto parts and building materials amongst others.[21] With the enforcement of Sharia law in 1999 and Boko Haram violence since 2009 the security situation in northern Nigeria deteriorated.[22] The current insecurity in northern Nigeria reminds Igbo people of their bitter experiences before and during the civil war.[23]

Fundamentally, the quest of this study is to understand how Igbo people have fared with Hausa-Fulani people while doing businesses and the security challenges they confront in northern Nigeria. This article is structured into five sections. After introduction, the first section is to understand the intersection between ethnicity, religion and intergroup relations in Nigeria. The second section is about Igbo people, their migration and economic relations outside their enclaves. The third section discusses the experiences of Igbo people in the informal economic sector, their economic relations and the ethnoreligious aggression they confront. The fourth section examines how ethnoreligious identities play out in the Igbo economic relations with the Hausa-Fulani people and their experiences with the Boko Haram violence in northern Nigeria. The fifth and final section is the conclusion and recommendations.

Understanding ethnicity, religion, and intergroup relations in Nigeria

Studies by Fearon and Laitin are instructive to understanding the consequences of deploying negative ethnic and religious identities in intergroup relations. Between 1945 and 1999, they identified about 58 civil wars, averaging 51 per cent of the civil wars across the world accounted for by manipulation of ethnic and religious identity.[24] Ethnic and religious manipulations remain eminent in most parts of Africa.[25] Ethnicity and religion are the most ferocious variables of intergroup relations in Nigeria. Nigeria is a country with more than 250 ethnic groups, speaking over 500 languages with the Igbo spoken dominantly in the southeast, Yoruba in southwest and Hausa and Fulani languages dominating the northern Nigeria, respectively. Christianity and Islam are two major religions evenly divided between the north-south territories of Nigeria.[26] To Osaghae and Suberu, Nigeria is deeply divided along the fault lines of ethnicity and religion.[27]

In the political arena, ethnic and religious groups are mobilised by political elites as powerful instruments to achieve certain goals, which could be for their interests, cronies, ethnic and/or religious groups.[28] Osaghae puts it aptly that in Nigeria ethnic identities or differences are mobilised in the events of competition, conflict, and cooperation.[29] The same situation applies in the case of religious mobilisation. Often, scarcity of resources and the closing in of competitive social, economic and political spaces, group marginality and grievances based on ethnic and religious identities, greed and competition for resources, as well as inherent primordial sentiments or hatred, mutually and exclusively reinforces negative mobilisation of ethnic and religious identities in Nigeria.[30]

Fundamentally, ethnic and religious mobilisations were early in the politics of Nigeria. What today constitutes Nigeria previously consisted of diverse ethnic groups and settlements organised in the forms of caliphates, kingdoms, chiefdoms, nations, and communities with varying political and religious arrangements. The scramble and partition of Africa amongst colonial powers altered the existing ethnic and religious organisations and led to the introduction of new social, economic and political structures to serve some specific colonial interests. Toward the end of colonial rule in Nigeria, while struggling for independence, the various ethnic and regional political classes mobilised separately to agitate for independence. Political consciousness amongst these peo-

ple was based on ethnic and religious identities. The pattern of political organisations and speeches from leaders of major political parties in the Nigeria's First Republic were indications of the crystallization of Nigeria along dangerous ethnic and religious fault lines.[31]

Although religion was not as important as ethnicity to the political classes of southern Nigeria, it was a major determinant of intergroup relations in northern Nigeria. After independence, ethnicity and religion became central factors in policymaking and implementation during the First Republic in Nigeria. Barely eleven days after independence the *Parrot Newspaper* of 12th October 1960 alleged that Bello stated: 'the new nation called Nigeria should be an estate of our great grandfather Othman Dan Fodio. We must ruthlessly prevent a change of power. We must use the minorities in the north as willing tools and the south as conquered territory and never allow them to rule over us and never allow them to have control over their future'.[32]

In the same manner, Nnamdi Azikiwe was reported to have stated in 1953 that: 'You may ask me to agree that if the British left Nigeria to its fate, the Northerners would continue their uninterrupted march to the sea, as was prophesied six years ago? ...the Eastern Region has never been subjugated by any indigenous African invader. ...the Easterners will defend themselves gallantly, if and when they are invaded'.[33] He was quoted earlier in 1949, as saying:

> It would appear that God has specially created the Ibo people to suffer persecution and be victimized because of their resolute will to live. Since suffering is the label of our tribe, we can afford to be sacrificed for the ultimate redemption of the children of Africa. ... Is it not historically significant that throughout the glorious history of Africa, the Ibo is one of the select few to have escaped the humiliation of a conqueror's sword or to be a victim of a Carthaginian treaty? ... Instead, there is a record to show that the martial prowess of the Ibo, at all stages of human history, has rivalled them not only to survive persecution but also to adapt themselves to the role thus thrust upon them by history, of preserving all that is best and most noble in African culture and tradition.[34]

The foregoing assertions pride the prowess of Igbo people in competitive market environments, not only in northern Nigeria but also across the country and Africa at large. The pattern of regional, ethnic and religious-oriented political rhetoric amongst politicians, es-

pecially in northern Nigeria, contributed to violent conflicts. In most circumstances, it was the Hausa-Fulani Muslims against other ethnic groups, particularly those considered as migrants in northern Nigeria. Sir Obafemi Awolowo was critical of the northern elites for percolating violent conflicts, thus:

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> There has, of late, been a good deal of sabre-rattling in some parts of the country. Those who advocate the use of force for the settlement of our present problems should stop a little and reflect. I can see no vital and abiding principle involved in any war between the North and the East. If the East attacked the North, it would be for revenge pure and simple. Any claim to the contrary would be untenable. If it is claimed that such a war is being waged to recover the real and personal properties left behind in the North by Easterners two insuperable points are obvious. Firstly, the personal effects left behind by Easterners have been wholly looted or destroyed and can no longer be physically recovered. Secondly, since the real properties are immovable in case of recovery of them can only be using forcible military occupation of those parts of the North in which these properties are situated. On the other hand, if the North attacked the East, it could only be to further strengthen and entrench its position of dominance in the country.[35]

In effect, northern Nigeria has remained a major problem to the Nigerian statehood, and the actions of the people called northerners have continued to be deleterious on the pattern of intergroup relations, particularly between Igbo people and Hausa-Fulani Muslim in contemporary Nigeria. After the civil war, no lesson was learned as in 1978 the Hausa-Fulani Muslim representatives to the Constitutional Review Conference continued the old trend of promoting religious identity. At the conference, they wanted the extension of Sharia law beyond family law. This was protested by the Christian delegates. A compromise was, however, reached to establish Sharia courts in States with a majority or significant Muslim population and the Sharia law should be restricted to Muslim family and inheritance.[36]

In the 1980s, particularly in northern Nigeria, ethnic and religious violence have become unprecedented. This period witnessed ethnic and religious crises, particularly the Maitatsine crisis in Kaduna, Kano, Plateau, and the defunct Gongola States (now, Taraba and the Adamawa States). The return to civil rule on 29 May 1999 brought new dy-

namics in the manifestations of ethnic and religious violence. Since 2002, northern Nigeria has been experiencing ethnic and religious violence, mainly between Hausa-Fulani Muslims and the Christian population in northern Nigeria. Because ethnicity and religion have politicised, every conflict in northern Nigeria finds interpretation in that context. The consequences of modelling every conflict to take ethnic and religious dimensions have been deleterious for intergroup relations in Nigeria.[37]

The Igbo people, migration and economic relations

The Igbo people consist of an ethnic group which speak Igbo as their native language. They populate southeast Nigeria called the Igbo land. Historically, Igbo people have developed entrepreneurial skills before imperialism and colonialism were implanted in Nigeria. In the Igbo land, specific families were associated with some specific entrepreneurial skills, such as hunting, farming, blacksmithing, basket weaving, fishing, and other related artisanship. Because of different skills, it was easy for Igbo people to engage in trade relations amongst themselves within respective communities, across communities, and with other communities outside the Igbo land. Chinua Achebe's fictional works captured the reality of entrepreneurship and contempt for indolence among Igbo people in the Igbo land during the pre-colonial era.[38]

In the Igbo land, serious attention was given to young people to ensure their future was not compromised. The elders encouraged young people in seeking entrepreneurial skills and specializations in areas of comparative advantage. As part of the effort, the apprenticeship system was developed and sustained through which young people received training under tutorship of the elders in trades of their own choice. The apprenticeship system has defied decades of challenges confronted by Igbo people in Nigeria. The successes recorded by Igbo people in Igbo land was determined by the number of young people successfully trained, graduated and supported to be self-propelling, self-reliant and self-dependent.[39]

The apprenticeship system in Igbo land had reached the zenith before the period of the trans-Atlantic slave trade in Nigeria. With trans-Atlantic slave trade, the dynamism of economic relations in Igbo land transformed to meet new ends. The Aro Igbo people recognised as one of the industrious Igbo sub-group became arrowheads in slave trade system by relating with the Europeans along the coastal belt up

to 1901.[40] With the establishment of British Consuls at the Bights of Benin and Biafra, and at the Oil Rivers, the slave trade system suffered serious setbacks, because Igbo land had become a protectorate under the United African Company.[41]

The pre-capitalist economic system in Igbo land declined remarkably under colonial rule. Okwudiba Nnoli posits that the industrial revolution in Europe contributed immensely to the decline as young Igbo people shifted attention from concentrating on their pre-capitalist economic system to the colonial economy. More so, agricultural activities in the Igbo land also declined due to soil depletion. This situation forced young Igbo people to migrate out of Igbo land.[42] The pattern of migration amongst Igbo people was non-linear. Dmitri van den Bersselaar revealed that "in 1921, only 3,000 Igbo people were resident in northern Nigeria, while their number rose to 12,000 in 1931. In 1953, the number of Igbo people in northern Nigeria was estimated at 127,000, while over 57,000 were living in the west, almost 32,000 in Lagos and 10,000 in neighbouring British Cameroon (administrated as part of Nigeria)."[43]

In the 1950s, the number of Igbo people in northern Nigeria was far more than their population in the west, Lagos and British Cameroon combined. The population of Igbo people in northern Nigeria was on the increase up to 1967, but fell drastically, if not totally during the civil war.[44] Recent studies by Okwudiba Nnoli puts the population of Igbo people at 30 per cent, signifying that since the end of the civil war, relatively few Igbo people returned to northern Nigeria.[45] Those who returned consisted of main returnees, progenies of returnees and a few other people who have never been to northern Nigeria. Several decades after the civil war, Igbo people are still treated with contempt, hostility and hatred, and often, they suffer violence in northern Nigeria.

Northerners, particularly Hausa-Fulani Muslims consider Igbo people as strangers despite their long period of residence and economic contribution in northern Nigeria.[46] Generally speaking, the stranger is not native. Native are indigenous people whose ethnic homelands are traceable to the regions where they reside. The stranger and native questions are political identity questions and they relate to politics of place, space, and identity. Mahmood Mamdani posits that native finds belonging to a place, space and identity defined ethnically within an ancestral area they call their own. Ancestral areas endow the native with the customary right as an indigenous group. The stranger is a set-

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tler and has no customary home, authority and right within the community of residence.[47] Therefore, Igbo people from every ramification were not to enjoy equal rights with the natives in northern Nigeria.

To Toyin Falola, native and stranger identities never existed, instead, it was colonialism that created such classifications through the divide and rule system in Nigeria. The post-colonial state in Nigeria constructed administrative, social and political systems based on ethnic and religious distinctions. It also introduced the logic of indigene and non-indigene to exclude other ethnic groups in Nigeria. As it was throughout the country, in northern Nigeria not only were other Nigerians the non-indigenous population, they were residents in stranger quarters called *Sabon Gari* to separate them from the indigenous population. Falola further stated that the practice of distinction based on ethnicity and religion did not only render integration difficult but also created suspicion and hatred directed at the stranger population in northern Nigeria.[48] In the same way, it negatively affected the informal economies between the Hausa-Fulani ethnic enclaves and Igbo people resident in *Sabon Gari*.[49] The lack of linkages brought untold social and economic hardship to both Igbo people and Hausa-Fulani Muslim population in northern Nigeria.

Okwudiba Nnoli states that during the Second World War there was pervasive scarcity, inflation and food rationing, which also seriously affected the economic relations between Igbo people and Hausa-Fulani Muslims. The result was the increasing level of competition in trade, job seeking, and residential quarters. Later, it generated ethnic and religious rifts between them due to the prominence of Igbo people in the informal sector of the economy in northern Nigeria.[50] To Hausa-Fulani Muslim people, the Igbo people had cultivated a possessive attitude, taking over nerve centres of trade and commerce in most cities of northern Nigeria. Therefore, they were capable of dislodging the Hausa-Fulani Muslims economically and politically, and of course religiously, should they not be prevented by any means.

Like with the control of the informal economic sector, political radicalism led by the likes of Azikiwe constituted serious challenge to northern political class during the eve of independence. Azikiwe's radical-liberal nationalist bloc encountering the Bello's conservative nationalist bloc reinforced political contradictions in Nigeria. The northern political class felt they were politically disadvantaged, they decided to boycott the 1945 general strike considered to have been championed

by the Azikiwe's radical group. The behaviour of the northern political class led to riots with deleterious effects on Igbo people in northern Nigeria and also affected inter-regional trade between southeast and northern Nigeria.[51]

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Informal economic sector, Igbo economic relations, and ethno-religious aggression

The dominance of Igbo people in the informal economy and civil service of northern Nigeria warranted their description by Bello, as a people always expressing domineering spirit in a competitive environment. The Hausa-Fulani Muslim people could not compete favourably with Igbo people. Bello felt as a counter it was necessary to raise the consciousness of the people of northern Nigeria, particularly the Hausa-Fulani Muslims to take up the responsibility to control whatever they perceived to be rightfully their possessions. The anxiety expressed over Igbo people dominating the informal economic sector in northern Nigeria was not without some political undertones.

The struggle for political power at the centre and the continuous desire by Hausa-Fulani Muslims to exercise hegemony over non-Hausa-Fulani people in northern Nigeria was attributed as a reason for the manipulation of the people's sentiments, which usually finds interpretations and expression in religious identities. The sentiments of the people were directed particularly at the Igbo people, whom Bello describes as the 'new black masters'. Contrarily, Frances Pritchett describes some of the outstanding qualities of Igbo people and contradictions that eventually capped with the civil war.

According to Pritchett, there followed an outmigration of Igbo from the crowded southeast into the more sparsely populated Muslim north. Generally, the Igbo had embraced western education while the northerners (Hausa-Fulani) had resisted it. The northerners viewed with distaste this perceived invasion by their industrious southern countrymen. Thus, with a series of ineffectual leaders rushing to grab power at the centre, and an overly aggressive military eager to step in, the political situation exploded with a military coup in the late '60s. A horrible massacre of Igbo people then took place in the north. Those who survived fled south to the homeland, where a secessionist movement, known as the *Biafrans* (sic) arose under the leadership of Odumegwu Ojukwu, *declared for themselves the Republic of Biafra, that* federal government crushed *between 1967 and 1970* (sic).[52]

After the civil war Igbo people returned to northern Nigeria based on the promises by the General Yakubu Gowon's regime. Three basic reasons explain why Igbo people returned to northern Nigeria. Firstly, the civil war has rendered them losers of everything; they needed to be rehabilitated to find new means of livelihood. Secondly, before the civil war Igbo people have invested heavily in northern Nigeria, they needed to reclaim their investments, if they were intact, and thirdly, they needed to re-establish their foothold on the informal economic sector of northern Nigeria. As applauded was the federal government policy to reintegrate Igbo people in Nigeria was, the Hausa-Fulani people did not again treat Igbo people as equals – a people they collectively struggled, negotiated and secured for the independence of Nigeria from the British colonial rule on 1st October 1960.

The integration programme was received with mixed feelings amongst Igbo people. However, it was an alternative never to forgo, given the effects of the civil war on their livelihood. As part of the integration program, Haruna Poloma stated that:

> General Gowon declared a general amnesty to all Biafran troops, which exonerated them from prosecution for treason and other war crimes and offences (no victor, no vanquished). Many soldiers who fought on the Biafran side were reabsorbed into the federal armed forces after the war. An opportunistic review of the career progression of a few of the reabsorbed officers, which remains a matter of public record today… General Gowon's compassion, mercy, and kindness were not limited to fighting soldiers alone. He undertook the resettlement of displaced persons and rebuilding physical facilities in the east. Ex-Biafran civil servants, who were in the public service at the regional level, were permitted to report to their new States for reabsorption, while those at the federal level were also eligible for reabsorption into the federal service if they so desired. Each returning civil servant in the east received salary advance as "mercy pay" along with three weeks leave to enable them to settle down after the war.[53]

Federal government's benevolence was not much appreciated because Igbo people felt the entitlements paid to them never corresponded with the losses incurred during the civil war. Only 20 pounds was given to each of them, without considering their respective social, economic and political status and losses each suffered as a result of the civil war.[54] Ken Nnamani chronicled that:

In a sampling survey of 5,000 persons conducted by the Ony-iuke Tribunal of Inquiry, a total number of losses estimated at over 9 million (Nigeria) Pounds were recorded. Of this amount, landed property such as houses numbering 2,607 amounted to £4,154,652, while the cost of 586 vehicles amounted to £435,851. Added to this figure is the cost of stock-in-trade valued at £2,046,522, cash worth £741,784 and personal effects estimated at £1,644,709. In Kano alone, where the highest number of Igbo people lived, about 2,000 houses situated in Sabon Gari ("stranger quarters") with an average value of £4,000 each amounted to 8 million Pounds. The loss of personal effects in the same Kano was estimated at £3.2 million. Documented evidence also shows that Igbo people owned 7 large chemist shops valued at £70,000. The value of hotels including stock and equipment was valued at £180,000. Off License Beer Parlours and over 150 provision stores were valued at £50,000 and £75,000, respectively. Furthermore, according to documented evidence taken from Traders' Union Membership in Kano, about 10,000 stalls valued at £30 million were also lost.[55]

Unfortunately, most Igbo people who were in the civil service of northern regional government returned only to discover their positions were occupied by northerners. The regional government found no need to reinstate them but preferred to regard them as people who voluntarily resigned their appointments.[56] Suffice to state that amidst several unresolved problems, northern extraction in Nigeria military continued to rule after the civil war. Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe identified some specific consequences suffered by Igbo people after civil war to include:

- Seizure of the multi-million Igbo capital asset in Igwe Ocha/Port Harcourt and elsewhere.
- Comprehensive sequestration of Igbo liquid asset in Nigeria (as of January 1970), bar the £20.00 (twenty pounds) doled out to the male surviving head of an Igbo family.
- Exponential expropriation of the rich Igbo oil resources from the Abia, Delta, Imo, and Rivers administrative regions.
- A blanket policy of non-development of Igbo land.
- Aggressive degradation of socioeconomic life of Igbo land.
- Ignoring ever-expanding soil erosion/landslides and other pressing ecological emergencies particularly in northwest Igbo land.

- Continuing reinforcement of the overall state of siege of Igbo land.[57]

Many Igbo people (because of the poor treatment they received) decided to abandon the civil service of northern Nigeria and concentrated on entrepreneurship. To enhance their entrepreneurship, Igbo people strengthened their market structure in Onitsha, Anambra State and industrial base at Aba in Abia State. This market structure and industrial base grew to become industrial economic hubs in Nigeria. The strategy reinforced their control of the informal economic sector in northern Nigeria.[58] Acknowledging the control of the informal economy sector and contribution of Igbo people to revenue generation in Kano, Kabri Tsakuwa stated that if Igbo people had remained in southeast Nigeria, 'only God knows what Kano would have become'.[59]

Ethno-religious identity, Igbo economic relations, and Boko Haram violence

Since 1999, northern Nigeria has significantly become a hotbed of security challenges. The dimension of security challenges in contemporary northern Nigeria is defined mainly by religious identities. Violence led by an Islamist group called Boko Haram remains one of the major security challenges northern Nigeria is facing. Although it emerged in 2000, Boko Haram became violent in 2009 when its leader Sheikh Mohammed Yusuf was killed by Nigeria Police Force. It transformed into a more deadly jihadist group when Dr Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (a Christian from the Ijaw minority ethnic group) was elected president in 2011.[60] Boko Haram has ideology and operational tactics similar to the Maitatsine of the 1980s that killed many people in Kano, Kaduna, Gombe and Gongola States.[61] The emergence of Boko Haram coincided with the introduction of Sharia law in Zamfara State by the former Governor, Alhaji Ahmed Sani Yerima (now, Senator of the Federal Republic of Nigeria). The sect started operating originally from Damaturu, Yobe State before moving to Maiduguri, Borno State in northeast Nigeria.

The imposition of Sharia law and subsequently, the emergence of Boko Haram have been perceived as the creation of the northern political class to protest political marginality in the power equation and regional economic marginality since 1999 in Nigeria. Martin Uadiale asserts that:

The ascendancy of sharia was used as a bargaining chip by the north, which was losing political influence and relevance in the Nigerian federation. To reassert the region's influence, its dominant class employed Sharia as a negotiating chip for a new national pact among contending national forces. One of the triggers of Sharia advocacy in some northern Nigerian States was the resentment of being at the periphery of Nigerian politics and its power configuration. There was a time when the northern political leaders held powerful political positions in Nigeria and others when the northerners accepted their economically marginal position. However, with the federal elections of 1999, the balance of power shifted to the south without a marked transformation in the economic marginality of the north. Hence, the politics of Sharia advocacy were part of a protest against regional economic inequalities in Nigeria.[62]

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A widely held opinion is that the cause of Boko Haram violence is a high level of mass poverty in northern Nigeria.[63] In this connection, Susan Rice asserts that poverty has the potential of not only putting a country at high-risk of insecurity but also put faraway countries at similar risk.[64] Taking poverty as a unit of analysis, the UN Global Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index in 2017 showed that 46 per cent of Nigeria's population lives below the national poverty line. Northeast Nigeria where Boko Haram operates is one of the worst parts of the country with poverty indices scaling 76.8 per cent.[65] In 2010, the National Bureau of Statistics rated the northwest and northeast as geopolitical zones with the highest poverty indices. The northwest poverty indices stood at 77.7 per cent while the northeast poverty indices stood at 76.3 per cent, respectively.[66]

Consequently, the prevalence of insecurity in northern Nigeria is justifiable. No matter its plausibility, poverty thesis cannot sufficiently explain the security challenges of Boko Haram type in Nigeria. It is pertinent to ask why northern Nigeria is the poorest region in Nigeria. The region has produced some of the richest military and political elites in Nigeria, majority of these people Hausa-Fulani Muslims, constituting the few people who have governed the country for over three decades. Majority of them while in control of government plundered the national resources, yet northern Nigeria is still the poorest. It is rather conceivable that both northern military and political elites are

responsible for the poverty and insecurity in the region for political and economic gains. Senator Shehu Sani stated that Boko Haram violence has made some powerful people in Nigeria and abroad 'war entrepreneurs.'[67] In Nigeria, 'war entrepreneurs' consist of the governing and non-governing elites, who make merchandise of security issues in Nigeria. The governing elites serving as war entrepreneurs benefit from 'security vote' (which is not accounted for to anybody or institution) and from international humanitarian assistance from their respective states. The non-governing elites who serve as war entrepreneurs, only benefit from contracts such as the supply weaponry and war machinery. Because of the benefits they make usually at the expense of their people, they do not want security challenges to be mitigated. War entrepreneurs abroad consist of Nigerians in the diaspora, foreign governments, and State actors and violent non-State actors in and from other countries. They benefit directly or indirectly from the contracting weaponry to the State or rebels in exchange for valued resources. The resources which they benefit can be in kind or the form of cash or psychological satisfaction of natural craves for war, or as a way of exhausting the regime in power. Because of the enormous benefits war entrepreneurs get, they will always make war difficult to mitigate in Nigeria. This explains why Boko Haram insurgency has survived more than a decade despite counter-insurgency operations in Nigeria.

Religious fundamentalism is another factor plausible for understanding the Boko Haram violence in northern Nigeria. Bala Usman noted that because of how deeply religious fundamentalism is entrenched, it has become hostile to democratic progress in Nigeria.[68] The impact of Boko Haram violence is greatly felt among the people in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram rendered President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan's administration ungovernable and contributed to his defeat in the 2015 presidential election. The United Nations Human Rights Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) revealed that Boko Haram violence has killed almost 100,000 people and has uprooted about 2.4 million people, of which over 1.9 million people are displaced internally in northeast Nigeria.[69]

The Boko Haram violence has been feared much among Christians, especially the Igbo people. Many native Christians and moderate Muslims have been killed by Boko Haram. In many circumstance, Igbo people are victims of the Boko Haram violence in northern Nigeria,

Table 1. Islamic fundamentalist attacks on Christians in northern Nigeria

S/No.	Year	Frequency of Attacks (FOA)	Percentage of FOA
1	2014	53	17.67
2	2013	37	12.33
3	2012	75	25.00
4	2011	69	23.00
5	2010	18	06.00
6	2009	04	01.33
7	2008	02	00.67
8	2007	04	01.33
9	2006	07	02.33
10	2005	05	01.67
11	2004	12	04.00
12	2003	04	01.33
13	2002	08	02.67
14	2001	02	00.67
	Total	300	100.00

Source[74]

for example they have witnessed their economic activities halted, businesses looted, worship centres attacked, and eventually, their people killed by the Boko Haram insurgent group. With regards to Boko Haram attacks on Christian worship centres, Benjamin Maiangwa and Ufo Uzodike noted that 'often in the incidences, the Igbo people who attend the majority of Pentecostal and Catholic Churches were the primary target'.[70] The National President of National Union of True Igbo Movement (NUTIM), Dr Samfo Nwankwo complained of the killing of Igbo people by Boko Haram insurgent group, especially the Madalla Christmas bombing.[71] Because of the killing of Christians by the Boko Haram insurgent group, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) asked the former US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton in 2012 not to visit Nigeria. According to CAN:

> Out of the 137 religious-motivated violent incidences tracked, 88.3 per cent were attacks on Christians, 2.9 per cent were attacks on Muslims, attacks on security agents were 4.4 per cent, sectarian clashes were 2.2 per cent and extra-judicial killings

were 2.1 per cent. The US Terrorism report of 2011 indicates a total of 136 terrorist attacks in Nigeria. It is inconceivable; therefore, that Muslims were the primary victims of a Jihad group whose intent is to Islamize Nigeria. This year 2012 alone, there have been 49 insecurity incidences of which 80 per cent have targeted Christians.[72]

Similarly, the Religions for Peace website revealed a total of 300 attacks by Boko Haram on the Christian population in northern Nigeria between 11 September 2001 and 24 September 2014.[73] The attacks by Islamic fundamentalists, including Boko Haram violence on the Christian population, are presented in table 1 showing the year, frequency of attacks and the percentage of attacks undertaken by the Boko Haram insurgent group.

The data in Table 1 is reduced graphically in figure 1 to show the seriousness of attacks by Islamists fundamentalists. The graphic presentation shows that the frequency of attacks started becoming high in 2010 and reached the peak in 2011 and 2012. There was a fall in the rate of attacks in 2013. However, the violence against Christians substantially increased in 2014 with different magnitude of impacts across the States in northern Nigeria. The data on the attacks of Boko Haram insurgent group on Christians exclude destruction of properties and the impact of the violence on the economies of Christians in northern Nigeria.

Figure 1: Level of attacks by Islamists on Christians in northern Nigeria

Source[75]

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
Corinne Dufka and David Cook asserts that although the basic goal of Boko Haram has been to create a Caliphate in Nigeria with Sharia as its governing principle, it shifted focus to attack Christian population as one of the core value of its violence. Boko Haram violence, as David Cook explains, is divided into three categories:

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> 1) attacks against local Christians in Boko Haram's core oper-ating area of Borno and the Yobe States and the adjacent State of Bauchi; 2) major suicide operations or bombing attacks of high-profile Churches in Jos in Plateau State and the capital of Abuja; and 3) minor operations against Church or para-Church personnel throughout the north and "middle belt" regions of Nigeria. These operations represent a fairly major shift in the goals of Boko Haram, which are still squarely Nigeria-focused, and represent the opposition of certain elements of the Mus-lim north to the spread of Christianity in the region.

According to Dufka, besides religious dimension of Boko Haram violence, ethnic group identity also forms the core basis of Boko Haram operations.[76] Also, Cook agrees that ethnicity also explains in part the pattern of Boko Haram violence. Amongst the people of southern Nigeria, the massive population of Igbo people spread across northern Nigeria is opposed by the Hausa-Fulani Muslims, Boko Haram insurgent group and other extremist groups.[77] Over the years there has been resentment against Igbo people for their role in the spread of what Cook describes as 'aggressive proselytization of Christianity'.[78]

Boko Haram perceives the spread of Christianity as being responsi-ble for the marginalisation of Muslims and the undermining of the ef-fort to create an Islamic State.[79] This perception is widely held among Hausa-Fulani Muslims in northern Nigeria, and it explains why Chris-tian population and their worship centres, particularly Catholic and Pentecostal Churches where the majority of Igbo people worship are often attacked during religious crises.[80] Emeka Umeagbalasi report-ed over 510 Igbo people were killed by the Boko Haram insurgents in different parts of northern Nigeria between January 2011 and January 2012.[81] The attacks on Igbo people are presented in table 2. Suffices to state that although in several Boko Haram violence, not all Igbo people were victims or their properties exclusively singled out for de-struction, but incidentally, they constitute a larger victim population segment.

Table 2: Some Boko Haram attacks involving Igbo people in northern Nigeria

S/no	Date of incident	State of incident	Incident and casualties
1.	8 January 2011	Plateau State	Boko Haram attacked and killed about 1000 people at the Dilimi and Bauchi Road, Jos. In the incident, about 400 Igbo people were killed.
	16 June 2011	Abuja, FCT	Boko Haram suicide bomber with the intention of killing the Inspector General of Police, Hafiz Ringim was intercepted by a Policeman of Igbo ethnic group at the entrance of the Nigeria Police Force headquarters in Abuja. He died in the process.
2.	25 September 2011	Niger State	Gunmen entered the Madalla market, killing five traders of Igbo ethnic group, who could not recite the Holy Quran.
3.	22 December 2011	Niger State	Six Igbo people were killed by the Boko Haram along with several other Christian worshipers attending a mass at the St. Theresa Catholic Church, Madalla in Suleja, Niger State on the eve of Christmas.
4.	25 December 2011	Niger State	Boko Haram attacked worshipers on Christmas Day at St. Theresa Catholic Church, Madalla, Suleja in Niger State, killing several worshipers and injuring many of them. About 50 Igbo people were killed in the incident.

5.	5 January 2012	Gombe State	At one of the Deeper Life Bible Church services in Gombe state, Boko Haram attacked worshippers. In the incident, about eight Igbo people were killed among several members of the Church.
6.	5 January 2012	Adamawa State	About 16 Igbo people were murdered at the Christ Apostolic Church, Yola in Adamawa State. On the same day, Boko Haram killed 27 additional Igbo people who were mourning their death.
7.	6 January 2012	Adamawa State	Boko Haram gunned down 12 Igbo people holding a community meeting in Mubi, Adamawa State.
8.	11 January 2012	Yobe State	Suspected members of the Boko Haram at a filling station in Potiskum, Yobe State, opened fire on a commuter van full of Igbo passengers leaving the north. Four of the passengers killed were Igbo people.
9.	16 January 2012	Borno State	Boko Haram attacked and killed five Igbo people in their homes in Maiduguri, Borno state.
10.	3 June 2012	Bauchi State	A group suspected to be Boko Haram attacked Christian worshipers, killing 15 people, 8 of which were Igbo people.
11.	17 June 2012	Kaduna State	Boko Haram killed over 50 people in a suicide mission. About 31 Igbo people were killed in the incident.

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12.	8 August 2012	Kogi State	Boko Haram attacked a Church in Okene, Kogi State, killing several Igbo people among other worshippers.
13.	3 October 2012	Adamawa State	Boko Haram attack in Mubi town in Adamawa State killed 46 people; about 26 were Igbo people.
14.	18 March 2013	Kano State	Boko Haram killed 80 people and about 65 people were injured in a bus bombing. Substantial numbers of Igbo people were killed and injured in the incident.
15.	6 July 2013	Yobe State	Boko Haram carried out a school shooting killing 42 people. About 24 people killed in the incident were Igbo people.
16.	29 September 2013	Gombe State	Boko Haram attacked College of Agriculture, Gujba in Gombe State. 18 out of 40 students killed in the incident were Igbo people.

Source[82]

It is also noteworthy that Boko Haram also attacked State institutions, which attracted the attention of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan to declare a state of emergency in Borno, Plateau, Yobe and Niger State, respectively. The insurgent group proportionately reacted by declaring a three-day ultimatum for Christian population to convert to Islam or leave the northern Nigeria.[83] The non-Muslim population, particularly Igbo people were parts of the primary target of the Boko Haram insurgent group. In reaction to the state of emergency, Monica Mark stated that Boko Haram declared their intent to extend their frontiers to other parts of Nigeria to prove their military capability to Nigeria government.[84] With the declaration accompanied by action, many Igbo people started leaving the region to return to Igbo land. Some of the Igbo people relocated to dominantly Christian-populated States within northern Nigeria, while other Igbo people demonstrated resilience by staying back despite the violence. The Boko Haram vio-

lence crippled effective economic relations in northern Nigeria. The insurgent group created an acute obsession and prejudice toward Muslims and Islam among non-Muslim population in Nigeria.

In today's northern Nigeria, Igbo people are a vulnerable population. Their vulnerability stems from the fact that they are not only Christians, but an ethnic group which possess great entrepreneurial skills and dexterity with which they edge-out the Hausa-Fulani Muslims in the informal economic sector of northern Nigeria. This assertion is affirmed by Alhaji Mohammad Sa'ad Abubakar III, the Sultan of Sokoto, when he stated that Igbo people are vulnerable to violence, but not because they belong to the Igbo ethnic group. They are attacked by miscreants because they are entrepreneurially skilful. In most circumstances, it leads to the burning of shops and looting of their properties.[85] In 2016 a Christian Igbo businesswoman was beheaded over accusations of blasphemy against the Holy Prophet of Islam in Kano State. The accusation was found not to be true. The Muslim man was a shop owner next to hers in the market, and practically, was not happy with her business prowess in the competitive marketplace. The beheading of the woman was acted based on Islamic religious injunction, but the cause of consequences was strictly economic pursuit of her business neighbour. Religion was used to eliminate her control of the business environment which he considered an albatross to his business as a Muslim and perhaps an indigenous group in Kano State.[86] Several similar incidences have been evident in most Muslim dominated States in Nigeria.

Although religious manipulation is prevalent in motivating conflicts in northern Nigeria in which Igbo people fall victims, their ethnic identity also exacerbates their security challenges in the region. This is sustained by the civil war memories in which Igbo people were the major actors and victims.[87] Several decades after the civil war, the situation has not changed remarkably for Igbo people, who are still experiencing ethnic hatred, hostility, and violence in every sphere of human endeavours in contemporary Nigeria. The Hausa-Fulani people find Igbo people not worthy of gaining their trust, let alone entrusted with political and economic power in Nigeria. The intolerant experiences of Igbo people have continued despite their unrivalled contribution to the **non-oil sector revenues in** Nigeria.[88] This climate of ethnic intolerance explains why Igbo people always resort to pan-Igbo nationalism and secessionism in Nigeria.[89]

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Conclusion and recommendations

The article has examined the experiences of Igbo people in northern Nigeria. The investigation affirmed that Igbo people substantially populate the northern Nigeria. They also control and contribute to the informal economic sector of the region, with positive impacts on the non-oil sector revenues of northern Nigeria and Nigeria at large. The control of the informal economy and the enormous contribution of Igbo people in northern Nigeria have been marred by intertwining security challenges since the end of civil war. Several decades after, particularly with democratic revival in 1999, Igbo people started to grapple with similar security challenges. Although the magnitude of the challenges differs in contemporary time, they have not been without negatively affecting their economic relations and continuous resilience in an atmosphere of social, economic and political uncertainties in northern Nigeria.

With Boko Haram violence since 2009, the experiences of Igbo people have become more prevalent. In the tides of Boko Haram violence and other related insecurity, Igbo people have remained entrepreneurially skilful and resilient in their businesses in northern Nigeria. They are still exercising dominance in the informal economic sector of northern Nigeria. In an atmosphere of ethnic and religious cleavages, Igbo people are concerned about the ethnic and religious prejudices, hostility and violence they have continued suffering in different parts of northern Nigeria. The security situation Igbo people confront reinforces the pro-Biafra secessionist movement in contemporary Nigeria.

In this context, both States and Federal Governments are required to do more in terms of security governance as it is their primary responsibility to protect lives and properties of the people. Government must also engage in national reconciliation process and habitual re-orientation across the country to educate and inculcate the spirit of inter-ethnic and inter-religious cohesion, receptiveness, acceptability and tolerance among Nigerians. The roles of traditional rulers, religious elites, and community leaders are paramount in abhorring the ethnic cleavages and religious animosity among subjects and followers to achieve the prospect of national integration. Rather than feeling that Igbo people are exploiting and dominating the economy of northern Nigeria, the northern Hausa-Fulani Muslims should view their economic relations with Igbo people as one that is capable of contributing to the revenues and development of the enclave communities in the region.

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Contemporary Legal Issues of Ensuring Food Security in the Post-Soviet Space (in Terms of Russia)

Aleksey Pavlovich Anisimov, Nina Vladimirovna Mirina, Anatoliy Jakovlevich Ryzhenkov

The article deals with theory and practice of ensuring food security in the Russian Federation in the context of the UN recommendations and achievements of legal thought of foreign countries. Food security is considered as a guarantee of sustainable development of agriculture located at the junction of three types of national security: economic, social and environmental. The authors prove the need to distinguish between the categories "food security" and "food independence", arguing in favor of giving preference, at the national level, to the human right to food through both production of domestic agricultural goods and their import from other countries. Stating the consequences of the food sanctions imposed by Russia against other countries which are negative for itself, the authors propose their lifting with the suggested complex of measures to develop Russian agriculture.

Keywords: food security, climate, GMOs, right to food, UN.

Introduction

The legal category "food security" is directly connected with such human rights as the right to adequate nutrition and the right to life without hunger in compliance with the International Covenant on Eco-

nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, as well as other documents of the UN. The human right to nutrition provides a clear basis for defining legal duties of states and other subjects in terms of the fight against global hunger and is a means of ensuring compliance with these duties, both at the national and international levels[1]. The category "food security" is closely related to the issue of ensuring social justice, which implies development of appropriate measures at the national and international levels, adjustment of economic, environmental and social policies of national governments[2]. Emergence of the term "food security" was caused by the grain crisis of 1972-1973, when overproduction of food in developed countries went hand in hand with hunger in the third world countries. It was then that the issue of food security went beyond national borders and was discussed by the world community for the first time[3]. In December 1974, the UN General Assembly endorsed the International Commitments on Food Security in the World developed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN, which already mentioned a number of important definitions of a general nature[4].

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Exactly from this moment (although the task of ensuring food security is entrusted to national governments), we can observe the increase of the coordinating role of the UN (especially the FAO), which is aimed at development of a common strategy to solve this issue. This issue is solved both due to framework agreements aimed at implementation of the sustainable development strategy and through development of more specific measures dedicated to certain areas of ensuring food security, for example, of women, children or other social groups. A situation where in the future no one will suffer from hunger or insufficient food is perfect from the point of view of the UN. For this purpose, it is necessary to provide all people on the Earth with permanent access to the necessary amount of food, which will require increase of its production through technological breakthroughs, adequate financing, reduction of food losses and other necessary measures. However, at the moment achievement of these goals remains a long-term perspective.

As noted in the UN General Assembly Resolution of December 19, 2017, "The right to food", up to 45 per cent of the total number of children who die every year before the age of 5 die from malnutrition and hunger-related illness. In addition, according to the FAO estimates, about 815 million people in the world suffer from chronic undernu-

trition owing to the lack of sufficient food for the conduct of an active and healthy life.

The current situation is a direct consequence of failure to accomplish the tasks of food security, although the Earth could produce enough food to feed all its inhabitants.

In this regard, it is necessary to intensify the efforts of all states of the world, including their local government bodies and civil society institutions, to develop a new food security strategy based on the UN recommendations, but at the same time taking into account the national specific character of a particular country. To ensure adequate nutrition, it will be necessary to create sustainable and sustainably developing, balanced food systems in each country of the world.

One of the elements of such sustainability is due attention of governments to issues of rational use of natural resources and environmental protection, the relevance of which increases significantly under current conditions of global climate change. Settlement of these issues returns the questions about the role of GMOs in securing the right to food and food security, as well as reasonability of adopting the concepts of "food sovereignty that replace the task of providing food to the population" in individual states of the world (including Russia), to the agenda of international and national discussions.

From this perspective, in the first part of this article we will consider the role of international public law in coordination of the efforts of national states (in terms of Russia) in ensuring food security, including the prospects of this influence on the content of national legal acts; in the second part we will analyze Russian and international discussions about the concept and components of the concept of food security. Finally, in the third part of our article we will give a number of recommendations for adjusting the food strategy in Russia.

1. International legal regulation of ensuring food security and its influence on national law

Several dozens of international instruments having different legal force and adopted in different years, including within the UN framework, are dedicated to issues of ensuring food security in some or other contexts. In its most general form this list should include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which implies that every person has the right to such a standard of living that is necessary to maintain his or her health and well-being, including food; the Universal Declaration

on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition; the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which stipulates widespread elimination of hunger, ensuring food security, improvement of nutrition and promotion of sustainable development of agriculture. Provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Rome Declaration on Nutrition and the Framework for Action adopted in Rome on November 21, 2014 also has had a significant influence on development of the international legal concept of food security. This list of international instruments is not exhaustive; however, it allows formulating several theses on the main areas of ensuring food security at the international level.

First of all, attention should be paid to the interconnection of the task of ensuring food security and exercise of human rights, mainly, the right to food, which is constantly underlined by the UN, as well as addressing food security issues in the context of sustainable development. Within the framework of the first approach, attention is paid to the fact that the right to food is the right of every individual, alone or in community with others, to have physical and economic access at all times to sufficient, adequate, nutritious food, in conformity with, inter alia, the culture, beliefs, traditions, dietary habits and preferences of individuals, that is produced and consumed sustainably, thereby preserving access to food for future generations[5]. Within the framework of the second approach, social, economic and environmental components of food security are underlined in the international documents[6].

Declaration in a number of the UN documents of the necessity to eradicate extreme poverty by 2030 is one of manifestations of the recent trend, so that all people of the Earth could exercise the right to a basic standard of living due to the success of the fight against hunger and malnutrition. In this regard, it is proposed to devote resources to developing rural areas and sustainable agriculture and fisheries, supporting smallholder farmers, especially women farmers, herders and fishers in developing countries, particularly least developed countries[7].

Despite the fact that it is the states that have primary responsibility for their national food security, the UN documents quite clearly regulate the mechanism of guarantees of exercise of the human right to food, including recommendations for states to refrain from applying any unilateral economic, financial and trade measures not in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations that impede the full achievement of economic and social devel-

opment, to eliminate and prevent introduction of trade restrictions and emergence of distortions in world agricultural markets.

The work of the FAO on creation of a trust fund for providing support to measures in the area of nutrition aimed at promotion of the efforts of governments to fulfill the assumed obligations is equally important. This fund will become the main tool for distribution of non-target and partially target contributions. It will help to perform mobilization of resources for the needs of state programs aimed at creation of favorable conditions for improving nutrition, introduction of sustainable food systems ensuring a healthy diet, as well as to promote attraction of investments and development of trade with the purpose of improving the quality of nutrition, etc. Along with financial guarantees, there is also work on development of organizational guarantees aimed at implementing subparagraph "o" of paragraph 14 of the Rome Declaration on Nutrition and intended to make the Committee on World Food Security the main intergovernmental multilateral global forum on nutrition issues.

Therefore, only collective efforts of all countries of the world will make it possible to eliminate root causes of lack of food security and malnutrition, in particular, poverty, inequality and lack of access to resources and the possibility to carry out income-generating activities.

This is important since it becomes increasingly difficult for many current food systems to provide citizens with sufficient, safe, diverse, and nutrient-rich foods ensuring a healthy diet because of restraints caused by the resource shortage and deterioration of the state of environment, as well as unsustainable production and consumption patterns, food loss and food waste. Unfortunately, in a number of countries of the post-Soviet space the emphasis is placed not on provision of citizens with the necessary amount of high-quality and safe food but on the formal aspect associated with establishment of the percentage of food produced directly in this country. For example, in the Republic of Kazakhstan, food security is considered achieved if consumers are provided with domestic food in the amount of at least 80% of annual consumption with consideration of the social and demographic structure of the population, traditional peculiarities, etc[8].

In Russia, the Doctrine of Food Security of the Russian Federation of 2010 proposes to determine, as a criterion for assessment of the state of food security, the proportion of domestic agricultural, fishery products and food in the total volume of commodity resources of the

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domestic market of the corresponding products, and this proportion has the following threshold values: grain – minimum 95%, sugar – minimum 80%; vegetable oil – minimum 80%; meat and meat products (in meat equivalent) – minimum 85%; milk and dairy products (in milk equivalent) – minimum 90%; fish products – minimum 80%; potatoes – minimum 95%; edible salt – minimum 85%. In this Doctrine, we can clearly trace the thought about the need to gradually reduce the "dependence of the domestic agro-industrial and fisheries complexes" on the import of technology, machinery, equipment and other resources, including food.

Therefore, the Doctrine places the main emphasis in achieving the goals and objectives of food security not on quantity and quality of food, not on development of trade and international cooperation, but on consideration of self-produced quantity of food calculated as a percentage of the total amount of food available in the country.

The discrepancy between the goals and objectives of food security declared by the UN and implemented in Russia has clear doctrinal ground resulting from many years of discussions. For example, some authors note that adoption of this Doctrine means the beginning of a new stage in the life of the country, "food self-sufficiency", and approve this[9]. Other supporters of this concept use a somehow different term mentioned in the Doctrine itself, "food independence"[10].

Followers of this concept, speaking about the need for self-sufficiency of the country in relation to the main types of domestic food, believe that decline of domestic production is a sign of a threat to or even loss of food security, and they require to strengthen support measures for Russian agricultural goods producers by limiting the possibility of food import[11]. Therefore, supporters of this theory do not make a clear distinction between the categories "food security" and "food independence". At the same time, this group of scholars notes a number of differences between, first, nations that have the possibility to feed their people by any means, and, second, nations that have the possibility to feed their people with the use of their own resources. A country that can feed its people under any external impact will have sufficient stability to act with maximum independence. Such a state is difficult to intimidate or coerce from abroad. However, a number of countries in the world already suffer from lack of food security (Madagascar).[12, 13]

Supporters of the concept of "self-reliance" are opposed by the views of opponents who understand food security as general security of the

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domestic food market implying the ability of the state to provide its population with a sufficient amount of safe food not only on the basis of national production but also with active use of advantages of international trade. In terms of this approach the issue of food security comes down only to filling the food market, without setting a goal to limit external supplies of food products. Accordingly, the key objective must be to provide the population with food both with the use of domestic resources and import deliveries (in case of lack of the necessary production volumes in the domestic market). Therefore, on the one hand, the country must develop foreign economic cooperation in this area, and, on the other hand, within the framework of food security, give preference to domestic producers[14].

We share the latter approach based on rules of international law and the UN recommendations, and we believe that the best guarantee of international trade and food supplies will be the country's peaceful policy. Russia has to legislate a direct connection between food security and the right to food (within the spirit of the UN resolutions) and shift the focus from the goal of complete food self-sufficiency at any price towards saturating the domestic market with high-quality and healthy food, both of own production and imported from other countries, with establishing guarantees of the right to food for vulnerable groups of population. All this does not impede development of national agriculture of Russia at all and does not exclude continuation of these discussions.

2. Discussions on ways to ensure food security and their applicability for Russia

2.1. Concept and components of food security

At the moment in legal science of countries of the post-Soviet space there are still discussions on what exactly should be understood as "food security" and which role it has in the system of related legal categories, including the category "economic security".

Initially the concept "food security" was enshrined in the Model Law of October 16, 1999 "On Food Security", which was adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in which national food security is defined as a state of economy that ensures food independence of a country and guarantees physical and economic availability of food for the entire population in the amount necessary for an active and

healthy life. Afterwards this definition of "food security" was expanded by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of January 30, 2010 No. 120 "On Approval of the Doctrine of Food Security of the Russian Federation", according to which "food security of the Russian Federation is a state of the country's economy that ensures food independence of the Russian Federation, guarantees physical and economic availability of foods complying with the requirements of the legislation of the Russian Federation on technical regulation for every citizen of the country, in the amount that is not less than rational norms of consumption of foods necessary for an active and healthy lifestyle".

Therefore, in both of the official documents the main emphasis is placed on "food independence", that is the ability of the state to independently provide itself with products, and the second aim is availability, quantity and quality of food. The existing doctrinal definitions either reproduce in whole or in part this official definition or propose particular additions thereto.

For example, within the first approach, V. V. Demyanenko believes that "food security" is such a state of economy that guarantees physical and economic availability of food for the entire population in the amount necessary for an active and healthy life[15].

Within the second approach, a number of additions and specifications is proposed for the official definition. For example, the first group of scholars believe that food security is "the ability of a state to guarantee satisfaction of needs for high-quality ecologically clean food at such a level at which normal living of the entire population is provided on a national scale"[16]. Therefore, this "environmental" approach pays special attention to issues of quality and safety of food, which seems quite reasonable in terms of the need to reduce the negative impact of waste of agricultural production on nature and pollution of air, soil and water bodies by its products[17, 18].

Other its followers pay attention to the need for additional consideration of "food culture" of peoples of the Russian Federation[19] (thus going beyond the Doctrine and borrowing the recommendations given in the UN resolutions), or in addition to "physical and economic availability" mention "social access to high-quality and safe foods"[20]. We should separately mention the point of view analyzing "the state of the international community being protected from threats associated with the lack of physical and economic access to a sufficient amount of safe food aimed at ensuring sustainable development"[21, 22]. Therefore,

there is a traditional set of components of food security (physical, economic access, safety of food), but at the same time its aim is highlighted – ensuring sustainable development, which is uncommon.

In the course of discussion of the question about the concept of food security, the question about its "levels" often arises. Some authors consider food security as a hierarchical system, which is divided by subject into global, national, regional and household food security. At the same time, they argue in favor of the conclusion that improvement of the food policy should be aimed at strengthening the economic independence of subjects of the Russian Federation with shifting the center of gravity in solving food issues to their level[23].

L. N. Deineka distinguishes another list of food security levels: world (global), mega-regional, national, regional and at the level of an individual person, family, social group[24]. V.A. Dadalko distinguishes the following food security levels: individual (of person); localized (of household); local (of city, district, municipal entity, free economic zone, biosphere territory); territorial (of region); regional (of two and more subjects of state formation); national (of state)[25]. Fully agreeing that in a federal state the subjects of the federation should participate in solving food security issues much more actively (than now), yet it should be noted that, based on international recommendations of the UN and the established national practice, distinguishing the "lower level" of food security (of person, family, social group) is not reasonable, since food provision of individual citizens is only a consequence of the food policy of the state and the international community. Distinguishing the local level is also debatable due to the limited ability of the Russian municipalities to influence the food policy. In addition, the purpose of distinguishing the "biosphere territory", where wildlife is present, is not clear at all. It will be more reasonable to be limited to distinguishing three levels: international, national and regional.

There is also no unanimity of opinion regarding the issue of the role of food security in the system of other types of national security. For example, legal scholars of Kazakhstan suppose that food security is a part of economic security[26]. Many Russian scholars share this opinion too[27]. At the same time, other Russian scholars note that food security, on the one hand, is a "subsystem" in the system of economic and national security, and, on the other hand, it has its own scope and integrity. This is why food security is understood as provision, resistant to negative internal and external impact, of the entire pop-

ulation with food in the required amount, with the necessary range and quality[28].

Therefore, food security is an independent variety of national security located at the junction of economic, environmental and social security. Like it is unacceptable to overestimate the significance of the environmental factor (although Russian scholars do this) within the framework of the concept of sustainable development[29, 30], the economic factor must not be given priority in the concept of food security. All the components of this security given above are important in their own way. Implementation of the concept of food security involves physical and economic access of population of a country (taking into account the regional peculiar features of consumed products) to high-quality foods available in the necessary amount, which is one of the requirements for the country's transition to implementation of the concept of sustainable development. We strongly believe that the main emphasis in implementation of the concept of food security must be placed exactly on this but not on the amount of goods produced by the country itself outside the context of their quality, which does not exclude the need for development of own agrarian production, system of trade, creation of reserves, etc.

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2.2. Influence of global climate change on ensuring food security

The effects of global climate change are often discussed both in the UN and by legal scholars [31, 32, 33], and this issue is directly related to issues of ensuring food security. Agriculture, one of the main sources of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, contributes to climate change, and climate change threatens global food production, increasing frequency and severity of droughts, floods and hurricanes, reducing crop yields and imposing additional load on limited water resources[34]. Today production of goods in agriculture remains an underestimated and poorly understood aspect of the issue of global climate change, though it is noted that work of tractors, trucks, use of fertilizers, production of electricity in agriculture make up to 9% of the total contribution to climate change from the point of view of CO_2 emissions, though as a percentage of all global greenhouse gas emissions, direct CO_2 emissions from exactly agricultural activity are only about 1.4%[35].

It is no coincidence that par. 8 of the Rome Declaration of the UN on Nutrition of 2014[36] recognizes the need to respond to the effects of climate change and other environmental factors affecting food se-

curity and nutrition, especially the quantity, quality and diversity of produced food, by taking appropriate measures to eliminate adverse effects. Climate change is the biggest threat to developing countries, where persistent droughts and extreme weather events, land degradation, sea level rise, coastal erosion, ocean acidification and retreat of mountain glaciers pose a greater threat to food security than in developed countries and undermine the efforts aimed at poverty eradication and sustainable development[37]. This is why adoption of measures to mitigate effects of climate change and adapt to them is one of the most urgent global priorities for all countries of the world including Russia.

In this regard, all countries of the world will have to make efforts to support application of agricultural methods with consideration of climatic factors, including agroforestry, conservation farming, water saving, use of drought-resistant and moisture-resistant varieties of plants and rational animal husbandry, and to establish and strengthen relations among scholars, legislative bodies, entrepreneurs and those who finance science, technology and innovation, as well as to take measures to increase resilience of vulnerable groups and food systems, paying special attention to adaptation to climate change as one of the main issues and tasks facing all farmers and food producers including small farms[38]. At the national level, attention should be paid to protection of rights of indigenous peoples (for example, Indians), whose traditional lifestyle is affected by climate change[39].

The main issue here is that, first, it is impossible to recover damages caused to agricultural production due to climate change (draughts, floods) because it is difficult to prove the causal relationships between activity of an industrial facility producing greenhouse gas emissions and an occurring natural disaster. The existing judicial practice in the USA does not recognize this dependence[40, 41]. There is no such judicial practice in Russia and all other countries of the CIS at all. In world science, it is noted that global climate change leaves two main survival strategies to mankind: a strategy of adapting to climate change and a strategy of mitigating such effects. "Climate mitigation" is the result of anthropogenic intervention aimed at reducing sources or decreasing greenhouse gas emissions.

In its turn, "adaptation" is a regulator of natural or social systems in response to actual or expected climate change or its effects, which mitigate harm or provide new beneficial opportunities. Measures to

mitigate effects of climate change are often preventive because they address the sources of climate change, while adaptation is created as a measure to respond to effects of an already changed climate. A number of climate change mitigation options can be identified: energy production with less greenhouse gas emissions than traditional fossil fuel; technologies for removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere; land use, agriculture and forestry methods that reduce greenhouse gases in the atmosphere[42].

In its turn, the strategy of adapting to adverse effects of climate change may manifest itself in award of grants by the state for breeding of new drought-resistant plant varieties; subsidizing installation of new irrigation systems (for example, drip irrigation); development of new pest control products and new technologies for combating soil salinization; acclimatization of new species of flora and fauna; introduction of new economic models of employment of population affected by drought. Moreover, it is necessary to create a mechanism of protection of rights of environmental refugees, develop the healthcare system due to emergence of new diseases, etc.

However, implementation of these strategies, for example, for Russia is complicated by two groups of factors. First, the environmental legislation of Russia (in contrast to, for example, Kazakhstan) does not know such an object of protection as climate. Accordingly, measures to mitigate or adapt agriculture to effects of global climate change can not be developed. Second, the strategy of "self-reliance" excludes the possibility of establishing international cooperation, winning international grants for research and its joint implementation with members of the scientific community of other countries. Meanwhile, we should note that, though the effects of global climate change for agriculture of Russia are regularly studied by the leading Russian research centers (Moscow State University, RANEPA and other ones), their results are extremely poorly used by public authorities of all levels when adopting management decisions aimed at ensuring sustainable development of Russian agriculture.

2.3. Ensuring food security in the context of discussions on production of goods using GMOs

According to experts, in order to feed the world's population, the number of which will reach 9.1 billion people by 2050, it will be necessary to increase production of agricultural goods by 70%[43, 44]. One of possible

ways to solve this issue is to use the latest biotechnologies, the most famous of which using GMO technology. Today development of this type of technology is the subject of fierce and lengthy discussions. All scholars, regardless of science, express their concern about safety of GMO technology. For example, many Russian doctors do not exclude the possibility of growth of diseases of the digestive system in Russia not only because of poor-quality food but also as a result of increased consumption of products manufactured using GMOs[45]. Other scholars worry about harmfulness and danger of using transgenic organisms in agriculture and food industry. Genetically modified food has a new combination of genetic material obtained by methods unusual for breeding methods; the consequences of human consumption of such food are unpredictable, which requires production of ecologically clean products[46].

It is also stated in official documents. For example, the Doctrine mentioned above several times refers to the need to exclude uncontrolled distribution of food products manufactured from genetically modified plants using genetically modified microorganisms and microorganisms having GM analogues (par. 12).

In Russia (as in many other countries of the world), commercial production of agricultural goods using GMO technology is prohibited (though research is allowed), which is substantiated by its potential threat for the future mankind. Another point of view is that biotechnologies are an effective means to protect people from hunger and diseases. Today about two dozen transgenic plant cultures are grown in the USA, Canada, China and other countries: potatoes and corn resistant to insect pests, varieties of vegetables and fruits with an extended shelf life, soybean resistant to herbicide for weed control. They have developed a variety of rise that is genetically improved due to beta-keratin, which turns into vitamin A in the body, as well as another transgenic modification of rice characterized by an increased iron content. Their lack in the body can cause mental retardation, blindness, and even death, and genetically modified rice helps to deal with the problem of the deficiency of these trace elements. However, the long-term effects of consumption of such products are still little studied. Danger of GM foods is often associated with a negative influence on the environment. It is assumed that a transgenic crop may be unsuitable for local bees, or, on the contrary, attractive for a particular type of caterpillars, they can multiply and upset the balance of the ecosystem.

In a number of countries of the world, genetically modified foods are prohibited or there are requirements for mandatory indication of their presence among ingredients of products. This is why the EU countries are very cautious about genetic engineering and impose bans on the food that can cause adverse effects for human health. In the USA, there are also some restrictions, but they arise only when harm to health is proven in court[47].

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According to many experts, influence of the majority of types of GMOs on ecosystem processes is of an indirect nature, it is the result of changes in the management strategy but not a consequence of direct impact of GMOs. In this regard, there is an urgent need to conduct fundamental environmental and agronomic research to study impact of GMOs on ecosystem processes in order to assess such possible impact. It is this knowledge gap that lies between European cautious and American biotechnological approaches to regulation of use of GMOs in production of agricultural crops[48].

Fully supporting the idea of the need for additional research on effects of using GMOs in agriculture, let us express a number of constructive considerations.

1. In order to feed mankind, which continues increasing, on the available (or even reducing) agricultural lands, it is necessary to make a technological breakthrough allowing gathering more crops from the same areas. Other options can be connected only with expansion of tillage due to natural ecosystems, including through deforestation. Today the scientific community does not offer other options for increasing yields besides use of GMO technology. Prohibition of GM foods in a number of countries does not have any scientific basis and may be due to the purpose of fighting more successful competitors.

2. All officially registered cases of harm caused to health of citizens or nature took place not because of the use of achievements of genetic engineering as such but because certain companies producing agricultural genetically modified foods applied the corresponding technology in a wrong way. Accordingly, genetic engineering is a manifestation of scientific and technological progress that cannot be prohibited. Regulation of use of genetic engineering technologies should, in our view, be considered in the context of the balance of private and public interests, the purpose of which is to find a compromise rather than general

prohibition of all modern technologies of genetic engineering. This is why instead of banning GMOs, it is more reasonable to develop internationally recognized rules and regulations for management of GMOs, which should respect the interests of the business using genetic engineering technologies in agricultural production and society at the same time without exposing human health and the state of the environment at real or potential risks.

3. Lands under cultivation constantly reduced during the last years of reforms in Russia. Thus, in order to solve the food issue in Russia, there is no need to develop new areas that have not been used as arable before upsetting the natural ecological balance. It is sufficient to use lands previously used for agricultural production in the coming years. This will allow providing the market with ecologically clean products, which, in contrast to agricultural products containing GMOs, have a much higher price. Therefore, today it makes no sense to ban production and consumption of products containing GMOs in Russia – economic prerequisites should be created for growing and consuming ecologically clean products (there is objectively everything necessary for it), which will allow making a significant contribution to ensuring food security.

3. Ways to enhance legal regulation of ensuring food security in terms of Russia

At the moment, at the regulatory and law enforcement levels, Russia implements a concept within the framework of which the main purpose of ensuring food security is production of agricultural goods using domestic capacities, with prohibition or restriction of food supplies from some other countries.

This approach can be found in Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of August 6, 2014, No. 560 "On the Introduction of Certain Special Economic Measures in the Interest of Ensuring the Security of the Russian Federation" (as amended on July 12, 2018), which contains an order for the Government of Russia to make a list of foreign goods the country of origin of which is the USA, the European Union countries, Canada, Australia and the Kingdom of Norway, and establish restrictions on foreign economic operations on them as a measure in response to sanctions imposed on Russia after the annex-

ation of the Crimea. It was assumed that such measures could provide import substitution by means of increasing production of Russian agricultural goods, raw materials and foodstuffs, which would support agricultural goods producers of the Russian Federation. In pursuance of this Decree, the Government specified a list of prohibited imported products, which included poultry and cattle, pork, fish and other seafood, milk, dairy products, vegetables, fruit, nuts, sausages, cheese. Attempts of members of civil society to appeal against these legal acts with the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation did not result in success, since the consumer protection legislation does not provide for their right to contest regulatory acts, especially if they are not subjects of the relations to which they apply[49].

Here, two questions arise: first, if the countersanctions imposed by the Russian authorities against foreign goods producers were effective, and, second, what measures to ensure food security of Russia in the context of the UN recommendations must look like.

Answering the first question, we should note that introduction of a ban on the import of food from a number of leading European countries and the USA (without any transitional period) led to several consequences. First, since the beginning of 2014 food prices have increased in the country by 14.9% on average. As the reasons for the growth of prices, we should mention the weakening of the ruble and the cost increase leading to the higher transportation cost and customs duties, as well as lack of competition and monopolies in the food market. As a result, in 2014-2016 the share of expenses on foodstuffs in the structure of expenses for end consumption of households grew from 28.5 to 33.5 % on a national average, and this share exceeds 40 % in the rural area. In most Russian regions, the share of expenses on food in the aggregate expenses for end consumption of population comprises from 35 to 50 %[50].

Second, the restrictions on import of products to Russia from a number of foreign countries did not strengthen the positions of domestic agricultural producers. As a result, there was just a redistribution of import flows: now Russia buys products not in Europe, but in Turkey, Argentina and Brazil. And if sanctions were imposed against Europe, then new quotas for supply of meat and vegetables were opened for Brazil[51]. In addition, the quality of the products coming to Russian markets from such countries is not always high[52]. Moreover, no matter what the volume of investments in Russian agriculture is,

the situation will not change quickly. There is a natural, biological cycle: in order for gardens to appear, they must first be laid out, and only in 4-5 years it will be possible to harvest apricots, plums and so on. As a result, in 2015 the share of the aggregate import from countries of Latin America exceeded the share of the EU countries, the main partners of Russia before: in 2014, import from these countries amounted to 19.3 % and 29.5 %, respectively[53].

Third, there is information that, instead of high-quality European and American agricultural products, the market received low-quality Russian and foreign products (for example, milk) made using palm oil (import of which to Russia, after the Government of the Russian Federation introduced "countersanctions", for example, only in January – November 2018 increased by 24% compared to the same period last year)[54]. Meanwhile, there is noteworthy data about harm of palm oil to human health[55]. As a result, this is one of the reasons why an increase in the incidence of diseases among the population is registered in Russia.

Fourth, the decision of the Russian authorities to destroy "sanctioned" products caused an ambiguous reaction of the population. One part of it adheres to the point of view that the Russian Federation, to the full extent, has the possibility to provide its population with all the necessary foodstuffs without involving supplies from abroad. Another part is an obvious opponent of disposal of foodstuffs, as burning products is a real crime, especially in a country where a sufficiently large part of the population is hungry and lives below the poverty line. For example, according to a sociological survey, which was conducted by Levada-Center, about half of the citizens of Russia are opponents of destroying sanctioned products[56] that could be transferred to orphanages, the army, schools, etc.

Fifth, there has been no "rapid growth" of Russian agricultural production. For example, according to official statistics, in 2017 all farms collected 21708 thousand tons of potatoes, or 96.6 % of the level of 2016; 2682 thousand tons of fruit and berries, or 87.8 % of the level of 2016[57]. The gross yield of agricultural crops in farms of all categories also notably decreased in 2017 (for example, in the Central Federal District 87.8 % of the yield in 2016). Cattle production in 2017 comprised 98.6 % of 2016, though there is a slight increase in milk production (101.3 % of 2016)[58]. Therefore, we can observe or either decline in production or not very significant growth, which has quite clear reasons related to the system crisis of economy of the Russian Federation.

As the key issues of import substitution in the agro-industrial complex, Russian experts point out the low investment activity and attractiveness (investors have uncertainty about duration of the embargo), lag in technology, underdeveloped infrastructure, low diversification, lack of effective competition in the domestic market, insufficient level of financial stability of goods producers and low efficiency of market regulation in the field of the agro-industrial complex[59].

Answering the second question about what should have been done (instead of banning the import of high-quality European and American foodstuffs) to ensure food security of Russia, we note that such measures could include enhancement of land improvement[60], restoration of disturbed lands[61], correction of the civil legislation making it difficult to take into account the risk-related and seasonal nature of contractual relations with agricultural goods producers[62]. Moreover, among these measures, we should point out tax mitigation, availability of credits, marketing possibility, holding back the factors that can destabilize the situation (fight against monopolies, fight against crime)[63], creating a favorable climate for investments and innovations, constant modernization of production, raising the professional level of rural workers[64], estimating environmental costs of agricultural production and taking measures to protect land, water and soil (which will allow exercising both the right to food and a healthy environment)[65]. Along with the abovementioned recognized measures to ensure food security, it is necessary to use also the possibilities provided to us by science and technology of the 21st century, in particular, to use biotechnologies (including GMOs), nanotechnologies in agricultural production more widely, as well as to develop a legal mechanism of consideration of food needs of socially vulnerable groups of population, including women, children and indigenous small-numbered peoples. Exactly these measures are necessary to ensure sustainability and food security of Russia.

A number of measures implemented by the Government of the Russian Federation deserve approval and support, including development of digital technologies in agriculture, provision of agricultural goods producers with budget financing (subsidies) from the state on a repayable and non-repayable basis, and development of the system of reserves. Therefore, without changing the available model of the Russian economy there is no point in expecting some or other qualitative changes in the area of ensuring food security.

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Conclusion

Food security of a country is a component of national security characterizing the degree of exercise of the human right to food in the country and achievement of goals of sustainable development, guaranteeing physical and economic availability of high-quality and safe foodstuffs for citizens, in the amount necessary for a healthy diet.

Advantages of this definition consist in consideration of international recommendations as well as avoidance of narrow economic perception of the goals and objectives of ensuring food security in the Russian Federation or another country. Ensuring food security is a strategic social and economic goal for any state. When solving this task in Russia, it is necessary to clearly distinguish between "food security" and "food independence". While the first category characterizes the degree of provision of population with quantitative and qualitative foodstuffs, their physical and economic availability and safety, within the framework of the second one, the emphasis is placed on "import substitution", that is a percentage between goods produced in the country and imported ones. In the Russian Federation, the main emphasis of public authorities is placed on ensuring food independence to the prejudice of goals and objectives of ensuring food security. In our opinion, availability of imported foodstuffs itself does not pose a particular threat to national security (a much greater threat comes from systemic corruption, poverty, bureaucracy or the destruction of ecological systems). When determining priorities, it is necessary to rely on provisions of Article 2 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, according to which recognition and protection of human rights is a duty of the state. This is why the authorities need to rely on the priority of the human right to food but not on the desire to take revenge on the EU countries or the USA for the sanctions imposed in 2014, limiting the rights of Russian citizens to consumption of high-quality foodstuffs from the leading countries of the world. The artificial restriction of the competitive environment led to entry of the products in the Russian food market that could not have appeared there before in the competitive environment. This led to deterioration of the quality of foodstuffs and an increase in their price. Thus, lifting of food sanctions imposed by the President of the Russian Federation as soon as possible is in the interests of the Russian population, these sanctions have reduced the level of guarantees of human rights in Russia.

Undoubtedly, one of the priorities of the food policy in Russia must be development of agriculture, which will be possible in case of changes in the credit and tax policies, ensuring the rule of law and justice, increasing guarantees of rights of owners and tenants of agricultural lands, improving the environmental situation in the country. Most of the other measures taken in Russia today by the state to ensure physical and economic availability of food for population, create strategic reserves, develop transport and trade networks, food quality standards, etc. do not cause any objections and deserve full approval and support. Food security is one of the guarantees of sustainable development of agriculture, it is located at the junction of three types of national security: economic, social and environmental. This balance must not be disrupted, just like for ensuring sustainable development. Russia has to take more part in international division of labor exporting some types of foodstuffs (wheat) and purchasing other ones (fruit, meat), without politicizing trade and economic relations. Ensuring food security can be achieved only by economic methods, which will allow creating conditions for development of the national agrarian sector through successful competition of rural goods producers, with the understanding that this task can be solved only due to the efforts of the entire international community.

In order to achieve food security at the international and national levels, it is necessary to revise the existing negative attitude towards agricultural goods produced using biotechnologies (GMOs), as well as to develop a system of measures that takes into account the effects of climate change. At the moment, GMOs are completely prohibited in the Russian Federation, and the climate is not an object of environmental legal protection. Special mention should be made of the need for consideration of the UN recommendations by the Russian Federation in terms of measures of food protection regarding the interests of vulnerable groups of population.

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NGOs in Global Governance

Securing Role through Engagement at the United Nations?

Case Study – Global Policy Forum

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What is the role of NGOs at the United Nations, and, by extension, in global governance? With limited possibilities to measure it directly, this article adopts discursive analysis as an innovative approach to the issue. Analysis of three texts by Global Policy Forum represents an important insight into the question and a tool for further research. It shows that despite the relative increase of their participatory rights at the UN, NGOs seem to realise approaching a point of saturation in what they may demand from the UN in terms of their access and moderate the tone of writing accordingly. Drawing on Global Policy Forum's example, the article argues that NGOs at the UN appear to have transformed from entities begging for more access to its more equal partners. Most importantly, the article represents a blueprint for further research of role of actors in the international system.

Keywords: United Nations, non-governmental organisations, role, discursive analysis, Global Policy Forum.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) use different ways to enhance their global role, but engagement in intergovernmental organisations seems to be gradually standing out among them. Especially

with the emergence of global governance, intergovernmental organisations are becoming the centre of global policymaking in which not only governments participate, but increasingly also other stakeholders. This is especially true for the United Nations (UN), which is considered by some scholars[1] as the heart of global governance.

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With gaining ground in global policymaking, NGOs prove that not only are they not prepared to act solely as implementers and observers of governments' decisions, but that they do not even need the governments to present their ideas on the global stage. Instead, NGOs participate at the UN and other intergovernmental organisations directly and use it also as leverage to strengthen their role further. In terms of their power within the UN, NGOs still lag behind states, yet their numbers and participatory rights are on the rise.[2] But is their influence at the UN also rising? What is the role of NGOs within the UN, and, by extension, in global governance?

The issue of the role of NGOs at the UN has been solved only partially so far. Most studies have limited themselves to a mere description of historical and/or current access of NGOs to the UN, or some of its structures.[3] Other studies operate with the notion of NGO role at the UN in an even more simplistic manner.[4] A more analytical approach to the question has been taken by scholars interested in role of NGOs in a particular UN body and/or issue area.[5] This study, however, aims at assessing the role of NGOs at the UN in a broader perspective, which goes beyond a mere summarisation of smaller-scale studies[6] and overcomes some uncertainties regarding the causal relationships from which the smaller-scale studies derive the role of NGOs.

To do so, I eschew trying to estimate the proportion of NGOs' contribution to UN outcomes and employ instead a method of discursive analysis developed by Fairclough,[7] through the perspective of which I analyse a selected body of texts on NGO access to and participation at the UN. A detailed discursive analysis allows me to better analyse the mutual (power) relations between NGOs and the UN, but also evolving self-perception of NGOs, both of which can be important indicators of the NGO role within the UN.

Though the main aim of the article is to present an alternative approach to measuring of the role of NGOs at the UN as a methodological concept, it does so in a practical way. It applies the approach to three carefully selected texts co-authored by an NGO called Global Policy Forum (GPF). In such a way, not only can I show the way how to

perform the analysis by using this approach, but also test the feasibility of this alternative approach and its capacity to bring results.

I begin this article by examining the existing literature on the role of NGOs at the UN. On the basis of this brief overview, I clarify the way in which I propose to approach the issue. After elaboration of the methodological apparatus, I turn to empirical data and present results of the discourse analysis to demonstrate what the GPF texts on NGO access to and participation at the UN can say about the role which NGOs achieve at this organisation. I conclude by discussing the results and evaluating the employed approach.

Methods: How to measure the role of NGOs at the United Nations?

Most studies on the role of NGOs at the UN remain mere descriptions of their status (participatory rights) at the UN. Only recently, some scholars have tried to take the study further to analyse the role of NGOs vis-à-vis other stakeholders by assessing the merits of NGOs at outcomes. This approach, inspired mainly by institutional theories, seems to be the only logical way to measure the role. However, such an approach does not allow for studying the role of NGOs at the UN in this broad perspective, and even in smaller-scale studies it encounters non-negligible difficulties. Decision-making processes at the UN are usually too complicated to allow for identifying the share which individual actors have in the final forms of decisions, or their mere existence. Decisions at the UN are generally adopted by its member states, but there are many aspects which influence their decision-making and it is practically impossible to trace them.[8] Even NGOs are influencing states and their representatives in many different ways, from advocacy at home governments to direct confrontation at the UN premises, sometimes in different directions (influence by NGOs of diverging views). Consequently, their overall contribution to what is finally adopted is practically unmeasurable. It is also difficult to distinguish what has actually been achieved by NGOs from to what extent the final outcomes simply correspond to their preferences.

I base the alternative approach to this issue on constructivist ideas which pay more attention to social construction of (power) relations. In this perspective, 'role' can be understood as a result of discourses through which identities, social roles and mutual relations are constructed.[9] The approach of social constructivism enables the study of

the role of NGOs at the UN beyond what is institutionally prescribed to them, to assess also the socially constructed component of the role in line with the integrated version of role theory, and to assess the role also in relation to the role of other actors (cf. Stryker and Statham).[10] The use of discursive analysis helps me to assess the role of NGOs at the UN without trying to directly analyse their real contributions to UN outcomes.

I define the role of NGOs at the UN as a position which NGOs achieve at this organisation. This concept is somewhat similar to the idea of influence but it is wider in that it does not necessarily limit itself to what NGOs achieve at the UN in terms of their share in decision-making, for it also includes perception of their importance for the organisation.[11] The notion of role is also close to the concept of power, for it reflects, to some extent, the relative distribution of power in the relationship. In this regard, added value of the analysis of discourse lies also in its capacity to discover some signs of power that are hidden in or behind the discourse. According to Fairclough,[12] discourse is a 'place where relations of power are actually exercised and enacted'. Generally speaking, analysis of discourse has the power to reveal power and with that also roles of more and less powerful social actors on whom the discourse elaborates.

In this study, I focus on analysis of discourse on NGO access to and participation at the UN. Even though some elements of the socially constructed role of NGOs at the UN can be found in other texts as well, texts on NGO access to and participation at the UN directly construct them. The question of NGO access is a determinant for assessing their role at the UN. Not only could we hardly speak of any role if NGOs were not present at the UN, but their presence and visibility are the actual reasons why we consider a possible role for them in the organisation. At the same time, however, it is not possible to deduce the role of NGOs simply from the width of their participatory rights at the UN.[13] That would imply the assumption that access of NGOs to the UN is something for what they fight themselves, whilst the other actors, be it member states or the UN secretariat, are pushing for the opposite, i.e. for restriction of NGO access to the organisation. This would completely overshadow reasons for which the UN is willing to open itself.[14] Rather than focusing on advancements in access mentioned in analysed texts, it is important to concentrate on how the discourse is built and what kind of role for NGOs can be derived from it indirectly.

It is thus not only the question of content, but especially of format of the discourse.

With this in mind, I employ the discourse analysis approach developed by Fairclough.[15] Fairclough proposes focusing discourse text analysis on twelve areas: (1) social events of which the analysed text is a part; (2) genres used in the text; (3) text's orientation towards difference; (4) intertextuality; (5) use of existential, propositional and value assumptions; (6) predominant semantic and grammatical relations between sentences and clauses; (7) substance of exchanges presented by the text, speech functions and grammatical mood; (8) use of discourses; (9) ways of social events representation; (10) style of the text; (11) use of epistemic and deontic modalities and (12) expressions of evaluation.

I conducted this detailed discourse analysis for three texts authored or co-authored by Global Policy Forum, an NGO which has promotion of NGO participation at the UN as one of its main objectives. I explain the choice of texts in the next section. After having analysed each of the texts separately according to the points above, I made a comparison of the three texts for each of the twelve areas and finally, I drew some conclusions on the role of NGOs at the UN from consideration of the findings across these areas. The research question which I have pursued through this analysis can be formulated as follows: How is the role of NGOs at the UN formulated in their discourse on access to and participation at the UN?

Choice of texts

As the Fairclough's[16] discourse analysis approach demands deep, thorough and very comprehensive study of each piece of the analysed discourse, I have chosen three shorter texts for my analysis (see Table 1). These three texts are elaborated, or at least co-authored, by NGO called Global Policy Forum (GPF) and published on its websites.[17]

GPF is an NGO that has been very active in promoting access of NGOs to the UN since the early 1990s, when the issue arose, and remains one of its main proponents till now.[18] GPF claims to be 'an independent policy watchdog that monitors the work of the United Nations and scrutinizes global policymaking [and promotes] accountability and citizen participation in decisions on peace and security, social justice and international law'.[19] GPF's texts have been chosen for the efforts that GPF makes to ensure access of NGOs to the UN. GPF does not seem to have a special interest in any particular area of the work

Table 1. Texts Analyzed

	Title	Type	Authorship	Primary Addressee	Date	Length (in pages)	Specification
1	NGOs and the United Nations	report	GPF	GA (through the UNSG)	June 17, 1999	extract around 3, (total 28)	in reply to the request for inputs to the UNSG's report on NGOs at the UN
2	Paper on NGO Participation at the United Nations	letter	GPF + 7 NGOs	GA (through its President)	March 28, 2006	slightly over 1	reply to the request by the GA President for comments/inputs on UN/NGO relations
3	Letter by NGO Working Group to the UN Secretary General	letter	NGO Working Group on UN Access (GPF as co-convener)	UNSG	January 18, 2011	about 3	reaction to previous correspondence from 2010 initiated by the Working Group

Source of data: Global Policy Forum (https://www.globalpolicy.org/).

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of the UN than that of promoting its openness to those who are in-
terested in. It is important to stress here that GPF has also established
the Working Group on Security Council, which is a successful story
of making the Security Council relatively open to NGOs.[20] As such,
development of the GPF discourse, though not necessarily reflecting
the position of all NGOs, can be considered broadly representative of
the overall NGO discourse on their access to and participation at the
UN and serve well as a basis for assessing the role of NGOs at the UN.

I have decided to choose the three texts from three different peri-
ods of time. The historical comparison makes it possible not only to
discover potential changes in the GPF discourse in time but also to
compare the three discourses to three different social situations on the
background of which they were made. I have chosen the three time pe-
riods according to relative frequency of texts by GPF published at that
time[21] while considering the fact that these correspond to important
moments (explained below) in development of the issue of NGO access
to the UN. The three texts were chosen on the above-explained basis
independently of their content and form.

The first analysed text is an extract from a 28-page-long report by
GPF *NGOs and the United Nations*. It was prepared in reply to request
for inputs to the UN Secretary General's report on NGOs at the UN.
The text is dated 17 June 1999. At this period of time, discussion on
NGO access to and role within the UN was very intense for it was still
soon enough after adoption of the ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, which
had aroused many expectations among NGOs. Given the length of the
text, I have limited the focus to 'Introduction', which comprises three
chapters. The reason of this choice of extract is mostly practical – the
text is not available in its full length (only 15 pages) and according to
the content, subsequent parts should only elaborate in more detail
what is already briefly mentioned in this extract.

The second analysed text is the *Paper on NGO Participation at the
United Nations* elaborated by GPF in co-authorship with next seven
NGOs (Eurostep, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, North-South Institute, So-
cial Watch, Third World Institute, WEDO and World Federalist Move-
ment). The text is dated 28 March 2006 and is addressed primarily to
the President of the General Assembly (GA). The text reacts but is not
limited to the issue of the newly born[22] UN Human Rights Council,
a UN body in which many NGOs have had a vital interest (hence also
the second selected point of time).

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The third text is a letter by NGO Working Group on UN Access, of which GPF was a co-convener, to the UN Secretary General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon. The letter is dated 18 January 2011 and reacts to previous correspondence from 2010. The main theme of the letter and the wider correspondence are perceived negative changes to NGO access to the UN caused by the Capital Master Plan (a six-year renovation project of the UN compound, 2008–14). The issue elaborated in the text presented another important moment in the NGOs' cause.

The first text, *NGOs and the United Nations,* is published on the GPF website with a label marking it as 'a comprehensive and critical report that reviews recent progress and problems of NGOs at the UN' and has been prepared as an 'input to the second report of the Secretary General'. The text is a part of a much longer chain of social events going from Decision 1996/297 (accompanying the ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 that has established new accreditation rules for NGOs) through the first to the second UNSG report (to which this text is an input) submitted for consultation to the GA. It is worth mentioning that while the text by GPF has 28 pages in total, the whole report by the UNSG has only around 22 pages, out of which one and half pages are devoted to recommendations by NGOs.[23] The analysed text by GPF is primarily addressed to the UNSG, but also to the wider NGO community and the broad public. According to its preface, the aim of the text surpasses its primary purpose of the input to the UNSG report to become a document stimulating further discussion of the matter. Its purpose, stated in the preface, is to speak 'frankly' and 'plainly identify' problems of NGOs at the UN and offer solutions to them.

The second analysed text is also addressed primarily to the UN General Assembly, although this time in a more direct way, through the GA President. The text takes on a form of a letter to the GA President and represents a reply to his request for comments and input on UN/NGO relations. The text, having eight NGOs as authors, is co-authored by GPF. Its length only slightly exceeds one page. It is clearly structured into an introductory paragraph and ten numbered paragraphs, each of them representing one recommendation. Despite being an input on UN/NGO relations, the text does not conceal 'calling for improved NGO access and participation at the UN'. One of the reasons behind the timing of this text seems to be the transformation of Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council that happened by the time of its writing and was heavily discussed by NGOs for their inter-

est in the field of human rights and efforts to catch the opportunity of the transformation and get as broad participatory rights in the body as possible from its very beginning. This hypothesis seems to be confirmed by the fact that the issue of Human Rights Council appears second on the list of ten recommendations which create the body of the text, while the first point is rather general in nature.

The last text is presented by GPF as *A Letter from the NGO Working Group on UN Access* [of which GPF is a co-convenor[24]] *to the Secretary General Ban Ki-moon*. The text is another step by GPF in its long-term effort to provide NGOs with better access to and rights and privileges within the UN system. The letter is dated 18 January 2011 and is about three pages in length. There was similar correspondence between the Working Group and the UNSG in 2010, to which the letter refers. Both letters are mostly focused on the UN Capital Master Plan, which seemed to be the greatest concern of the group at that time and the main motive for the correspondence. The analysed letter of 2011 represents a delayed reaction to unsatisfying reply by the UNSG (dated 30 March 2010) to the previous letter dated 22 February 2010. It summarises what has been achieved since the last UNSG letter on the basis of 'recommendations' that the UNSG had made in that letter. However, the letter is clearly aimed at showing that more has to be done. The Working Group might have decided to send this letter at a point where it did not see another way forward than to make its cause at the highest level again. The timing may also coincide with the beginning of the year, considered a time of New Year's resolutions and hopes for better results during the upcoming year.

Some differences between texts can be expected automatically. Not only are they elaborated in different periods of time and by a slightly different authorship, but they also take on different forms and have somewhat different aims – to inform how NGOs at the UN work vs. to react to specific problems. However, this does not mean that they are incomparable, especially not if these differences are taken into consideration. Moreover, they also have many common features. All of the texts are at least co-authored by GPF and published on its website (which means that they are addressed also to the wide public); all deal with the question of NGO access to and participation at the UN and have a top UN official as the primary addressee. Rather than complicating comparisons, different social contexts on the background of which the texts have emerged will allow me to show how the GPF discourse

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on NGO access to and participation at the UN was shaped by them and how it might have influenced their next development. Putting it differently, the choice of the texts may prove useful for identifying changing power relations between NGOs and the UN (and its member states) and with that also the role of NGOs at the UN.

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Results

I have analysed the selected texts using the twelve focus areas identified as a basis for discourse text analysis by Fairclough.[25] Besides a couple of similarities, comparison of the three texts according to these criteria (see Table 2) reveals an important number of differences in analysed traits. However, these must be assessed cautiously and in relevant larger social contexts, for some of the differences may be caused by a slightly different form of the text, its primary addressees, aim and authorship.¨

To start with similarities in analysed attributes, all the three texts are monothematic – they use only one discourse, which could be labelled as 'discourse of (NGO) participation'. They are focused mostly on activity (rather than knowledge) exchange and on getting results. Their purpose is to show the view of NGOs (other views are largely suppressed) and use it in a way to get for them the best treatment at the UN as possible (in terms of access or participation rights). To achieve this, the texts use many propositional assumptions pointing to the importance of NGOs for the UN, as well as many value assumptions and other expressions of evaluation. To persuade readers (mainly UN representatives), the authors show strong commitment to the truth (by using assertive statements).

However, development of the role of NGOs at the UN can be read namely from the differing traits. The most striking differences were revealed from analysis of semantic relations, social events representations, modalities, styles, assumptions, evaluations, and to some extent also in discourses (see Table 2).

In terms of semantic relations (relations between meanings of consecutive sentences and clauses), all three texts use mostly the elaborative type. This serves primarily to make recommendations made by NGOs clear. The use of elaborative (rather than temporal) relations in the third text's part summarising past meetings of NGOs with UN representatives is surprising. It proves that authors rather picked up only what their counterparts agreed to, probably in order to make an

Table 2. Results of the Discourse Text Analysis

Analyzed areas	Text 1	Text 2	Text 3
Social events	input to the report by the UNSG	letter to the GA	letter to the UNSG (reacting to previous correspondence)
Genres	reports, expositions	expositions	reports, expositions
	interactions oriented at getting results; only partly at arriving to understanding (of positions/concerns of NGOs) - ultimately also to get results (instrumental rationality)		
Difference	suppressing differences		
	opposite views/actions denied as misunderstandings	openly one-sided	sophisticated in hiding one-sidedness, focus on "commonality"
Intertextuality	referring only to some legal instruments		no reference to other texts, except for the previous correspondence and one "borrowed" phrase; voices of others in form of agreement/acknowledgement
Assumptions			
- existential assumptions	drawing on globalization and global governance discourse		changing policies and procedures at the UN, consensus, understanding, "NGO community"
	"common interest", "UN", "Southern NGOs"	"changing interest", "reform of the UN", "Southern NGOs"	

- propositional assumptions	NGOs are very important for the UN (and the whole global system - texts 1 and 2) to work effectively		
	UN makes efforts to consult NGOs worldwide; informal and ad hoc arrangements & vague provisions not ideal	UN Secretariat and State delegations are not always attuned to NGOs and their participation at the UN	consensus regarding the issue of NGO participation at the UN is emerging; needs of NGOs are diverse; problems are systematic
- value assumptions	high number, incl. all proposals and recommendations; desirability of more opportunities for NGOs at the UN		
	desirability of more open UN, better access to information & documents, long-term participation of NGOs	desirability of formal role for NGOs in the GA, fund to assist Southern NGOs, high-level person in UNSG office	concrete proposals
Semantic relations between sentences/clauses	predominantly elaborative relations; relative frequency of contrastive/concessive relations	predominantly elaborative relations, additive relations	many elaborative relations, even in the part about past meetings - to show what is necessary to do, what was agreed to
Exchanges, speech functions and grammatical mood	focus on activity exchange; primary (ultimate) speech function - demand (even in "descriptive" part of the text); "metaphorical" relations - demands in form of statements; grammatical mood declarative	almost exclusively demands (focus on activity exchange); grammatical mood declarative	hybrid between activity (mostly) and knowledge exchange (justification for demands); mix of statements and demands; "metaphorical" relations - demands taking forms of statements

Discourses	monothematic; discourse of (NGO) participation, framed in globalization (neoliberal) discourse		monothematic; strong discourse of (NGO) participation - as something established
Representation of social events	activity salience over social actors who on occasions suppressed or backgrounded (nominalizations, process nouns), social actors mostly classified; time and place circumstances almost non-present; mix of more and less abstract representations; abstract "taken-for-granted truths" of importance of NGOs (texts 1 and 2), text 3 less abstraction		
- processes	mix of material, mental, verbal & relation processes	exclusively material representations of processes	density of verbal and mental process representations
- social actors	"they" usually for NGOs; surprising use of "we" at the end; NGOs activated even when something done to them	only one pronoun; UN and its parts mostly as active (recommendations aimed at the UN)	"you" for the UNSG, "they" for Under-SGs, "we" for the authors, NGOs in the third person, but one "we" rather for NGOs in general; "false" activation of Under-SGs
Styles	author as "neutral", "impartial" observer; text formulated already as the UNSG report to which it should be an input	co-authorship by 8 NGOs; authors as protagonists of the text; NGOs in 3rd person but clear identification	collective authorship and identification expressed by "we" pronouns; formal; repetitions; NGOs as equal partners
Modality	epistemic modality almost non-existent - strong commitment of authors to the truth, assertive statements		
- epistemic modality	especially assertive statements about the role of NGOs	mainly assertive statements about the role of NGOs	perceived assertiveness of statements moderated

- deontic modality	a few deontic modalities, strong commitment to obligation/necessity, demands also hidden in statements	demands mostly modalized, but also ı prescription and ı proscription; commitment to obligation rather high	high deontic modality, expressed commitment to obligation rather low, but real commitment important (deadline-setting)
Evaluation	many evaluative statements (on importance of NGOs, harm caused to them), other forms non-evident	mainly statements with deontic modalities and assumed values (NGOs as positive, unhappiness with some arrangements)	many assumed values (mostly embedded in what authors propose), statements with affective mental process verbs

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impression of broad support for their demands and to show promises which the addressee's subordinates failed to fulfil. A similar 'manipulation of voices' can be found through analysis of intertextuality (references to other texts and voices) where voices of others in the third text take on only a form of agreement with or acknowledgement of authors' proposals (deliberately picked up phrases from conversations).

Analysis of social events representation (i.e. how different social events are represented – through syntax, use of vocabulary, word classes, etc.) shows most differences in relation to how social actors have been depicted. All three texts talk about NGOs in the third person, but some identification of authors with them is obvious, especially in the first text. Some inclinations of authors to speak on behalf of all NGOs were, however, detected also in the case of the third text. Despite the aim of authors to show that they distinguish between 'NGOs' (in the third person) and 'the Working Group' (or 'we'), there are two examples that blur this distinction. These are the phrase of 'Nothing about us without us!' and the sentence 'we hope that this concept will prompt the Secretariat to genuinely consult with NGOs in the design, implementation and review of all decisions that affect us'. While in its first part, the sentence makes again the point of distinction between 'we' and 'NGOs', the second half of the sentence blurs this distinction for it speaks about 'decisions that affect us', by which decisions that affect NGOs in general are meant. Based on this evidence, it seems that the authors still probably have some tendency to speak on behalf of all NGOs, but do not feel empowered to do so in an open way, at least not in communication with the UNSG. It is also noteworthy that the first text often activates NGOs (giving them the form of grammatical subject) even where it describes what has happened to them. This might be done with the intention of accentuating their suffering rather than the act itself. The third text, for its part, activates the UN side only in processes of agreeing with authors (I call this a 'false' activation).

In terms of modality (use of epistemic and deontic modals), it is very interesting that all three analysed texts are characterised by strong commitment of authors to the truth (i.e. statements are assertive, with almost no epistemic modality), but differ greatly in terms of commitment to obligation/necessity. Use of deontic modalities varies greatly, going from low (text 1) to high (text 3). The first text includes some deontic modals (e.g. 'the UN community should develop a long-term vision'), but most of the demands are rather hidden

in what appears more as statements. The choice of expressions (it is imperative, must, etc.) makes the commitment of the first text to obligation/necessity almost as strong as the commitment to truth. The second text is made of a set of recommendations which can be classified as demands and thus examined in terms of deontic modalities. One of the headings of the ten recommendations prescribes ('Consult with NGOs Worldwide') and another one proscribes ('Do No Harm'), while the text of the individual recommendations is modalised – saying what 'should' be done. The degree of commitment to obligation expressed by deontic modalities within demands can be classified as rather high, representing something that is required. The demands in the third text are rather highly modalised. There are no prescriptions or proscriptions in the text at all. However, the high deontic modality of the third text may be partly instrumental – to make the authors not look too prescriptive – for their commitment to importance of their demands is expressed differently (e.g. by deadline-setting for proposals). But the third text is sophisticated also in moderating the perceived assertiveness of its statements. This is done primarily by use of introductory clauses to statements, such as 'they agreed that'. Not only can they put some legitimacy to what is proposed, but the necessity of using 'would' instead of 'will' in the past clauses that follow also moderates the perceived assertiveness of the text without lowering the degree of the commitment to the truth. A similar result is achieved through use of noun phrases.

In terms of styles, the first text's analysis reveals efforts of the author to be seen as a neutral observer. By doing this, he might want to show his impartiality to the UNSG so that he considers the text reliable and non-partisan. But it seems that there is also some tendency of the author to write the text as if it was already the UNSG report (rather than just an input). Both the length of the text but also the use of the pronoun 'we' in the final part of the extract (referring to either people in general or GA members) seem to confirm this speculation. The third text's style shows some signs of awareness of strengthened roles for NGOs at the UN. It talks about 'NGO participation at the UN' as something already established and common (discussing rather ways how to improve it rather than the mere concept), uses the phrase of 'consultation with NGOs' (which evokes that NGOs are experts from which the UN should learn) and proposes 'negotiation of consensus solutions in advance' by which it makes clear that NGOs are at least 'equal' partners

to the UN with which it should negotiate consensus rather than just try to take into account their views, if at all.

Discussion

Cross-assessment of the results of discourse analysis of the three selected texts on NGO access to and participation at the UN authored by GPF has revealed several observations. First, it has shown that NGOs have probably achieved a point of saturation in what they may demand from the UN. At least GPF seems to be becoming aware of that they have already achieved probably the maximum possible in terms of participatory rights for NGOs at the UN. Second, there is a clear moderation of tone of the texts over the years, which may be, to some extent, related to the first observation. Third, and not less importantly, realisation of a larger interest among NGOs in the issue of access to and participation at the UN seems to be taking place.

Saturation in NGO demands

Referring to what I label as 'saturation', it is important to stress that while the first text is obviously soaked by the mood of post-1996-ECOSOC-resolution enthusiasm and expectations, the later texts are increasingly modest in their demands and in confidence of writing. Even though all three texts are aimed at getting results, the exigencies differ substantially. Despite the missing part with recommendations, the analysed introductory excerpt of the first text and the high number of points dealing with problematic issues in the rest of the available part already make it clear that the author demands many improvements for NGOs, although not necessarily that directly as the second text. The second text is modelled as a set of open recommendations (demands), but it is more modest in that it limits itself to ten points. More importantly, the very first recommendation reads 'Do No Harm' which, as a proscription, shows a strong commitment of the authors to necessity (low deontic modality) but does not ask for any new rights or privileges for NGOs. The other recommendations do, but just such formulation of the first recommendation can be interpreted as at least a partial recognition of approaching saturation. The third text is even less assertive. It addresses primarily the only concrete problem linked to the UN Capital Master Plan. Even though the letter informs us that it has been accompanied with a written summary of more proposals (and it is not clear whether they also aim only at this issue), it is

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evident from the text that the authors do not aim at gaining new rights for NGOs but rather at redress of certain problematic arrangements. Its motto 'Nothing about us without us' shows that the main demand of the letter is for the UN to consult NGOs in case of changes that may affect them rather than to make the next changes that NGOs want.

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The decline in expectations and extent of demands is evident also from wording of these demands and their time framing. While the first text explicitly asks for more 'access' and even 'new levels of participation' for NGOs, the second one speaks rather of desirability of 'strengthened' participation of NGOs at the UN which may be read as a desire to strengthen what already exists rather than to create something new, which the first text suggests. The third text, for its part, requests the UN 'to genuinely consult with NGOs in the design, implementation and review of all decisions that affect [them]', i.e. not even to strengthen anything rather than to avoid possible worsening of the NGOs' situation. In terms of timing, the first text speaks of need for a vision for 'ten, twenty or even thirty years', whilst the third one is mostly focused on near future (of the upcoming year of 2011). Its shorter time horizon focus is accentuated by the fact that it includes only short-term proposals. This time framing of demands shows a move from strategic broad proposals to more tactical and narrower issues redresses.

Persuasion that NGOs cannot expect any revolutionary changes in their further position at the UN (what the first texts hoped for) can also be one of the reasons why the third text abandons the global governance discourse and assumption of the changing UN presented in previous texts. The third text is more modest also in the way that it does not include the sentence on importance and indispensability of NGOs for the UN (and the whole world) that appeared in the same wording in the first two texts, nor any other form of such explicit praise for NGOs.

Moderation of tone of writing

Certain decrease in self-confidence is evident also from moderation of tone of the texts. While in the first text, the UN was depicted almost as an antagonist to NGOs (the text explicitly lists problems that the Secretariat has caused to NGOs), the second text refrains from any explicit evaluative statements about the UN and the third one even accentuates the emerging consensus and understanding between the UN and NGOs. The fact that the emphasis on consensus does not re-

flect strong satisfaction of NGOs with their arrangements at the UN but rather declining self-confidence of the authors is evident in the fact that even the third text still evokes the existence of two 'sides'.

The language in which demands are formulated is also a very important proof of changes in the overall discourse. Whilst the first text mostly focuses on claiming of what *is* the case, the second one says what *should be* the case and the third one is mostly about what the authors *hope for*. The difference has to do with questions of modality. While all three texts are rather assertive as it concerns their statements, the third one is quite successful in trying to moderate its perceived assertiveness by use of introductory clauses and noun phrases. Nonetheless, the greatest difference between the texts concerns their deontic modality. Even though it seems that the authors share a strong commitment to importance of not only what they say but also of what they demand, the openly presented commitment to obligation and assertiveness of demands decline over time when the three texts are compared.

But the decrease in NGO assertiveness and in the scope of their demands does not mean that the power of NGOs and hereby also their role at the UN are diminishing. The texts show rather the contrary. Even though the demanding approach persists, the texts point to problems of non-advancement rather than any regression. Contrarily, some elements of the rising power of NGOs at the UN can be detected. One of them is linked to the question of NGO access to the UNSG. While the first text complains about their impossibility to contact him, the third text is itself a part of conversation with him. Next, whilst the first two texts represent an input which was searched for by the UN, the third text was initiated by the group of NGOs. This is closely linked to one of the ways which Fairclough[26] considers a proof of exercise of 'power in discourse'. Since it is firstly the UN who sets up the nature and even the timing of interaction with NGOs, whilst later the NGO Working Group acts in an autonomous way, it is possible to claim that the power balance between the UN and NGOs seems to change in favour of the latter.

Given real advancements in NGO position at the UN (rather than any backslides), a conclusion can be made that the observations above are not a sign of growing social distance between the UN and authors (or NGOs for whose rights the authors fight). Instead, it seems that the authors are simply becoming aware of the fact that the existing social

distance cannot be reduced as much as they might have originally believed.

Acknowledgement of lack of mandate to represent all NGOs

Furthermore, GPF seems to be getting to acknowledge the fact that it is not the only one or the first amongst more organisations that fights for participatory rights of NGOs at the UN. In the beginning, GPF might have been driven by its initial enthusiasm as well as by its early success of establishing the Working Group on UN Security Council. This is why it could tend to 'write the full report' in 1999, while later on it did not try to solve things in such a complex manner but presented just their work. In fact, the third text even openly admits the diversity of NGO needs.[27] Moreover, unlike the first text, the latter two texts are written in co-authorship of more NGOs. The last one is even written by an established NGO Working Group connecting NGOs with a similar interest (UN access) though not necessarily the same ideas of how to achieve it (which is more likely to be the case of the group of NGOs signed under the second text).

This is closely linked to the observation about the personal identification of the authors with their texts. The first two texts are written in the third person, talking about NGOs as 'they'. Even though the author of the first text is trying to look like a 'neutral' observer, despite the use of the third person, he has tendency to speak on behalf of NGOs. He writes mostly about what NGOs do, or what is done to them, but he also expresses their experience, feelings and thoughts (e.g. 'NGOs are disappointed', 'NGOs feel', 'NGOs were also alarmed'). In the second text, NGOs are mostly passivated (figuring as objects rather than subjects in grammatical terms), so it is not obvious whether the authors have tendency to speak on behalf of them or not. Contrarily, the third text is written mostly in the first-person plural. Despite speaking about NGOs also in general, the authors are making it clear that they do not want to be seen as speaking on behalf of all NGOs (although the internal inclination is still present to a certain extent).

Recognition of diversity of NGOs and their opinions and needs can also be a reason why the authors, who suppress differences in all three texts, are trying to hide this practice in a more sophisticated way in the third text. Shortening and better structuring of texts are another proof of this realisation (as the authors are not the only ones who have something to say about the issue, they must be brief).

Professionalisation and/or adaptation?

However, most of these changes in writing, which show increasing sophistication, may also be to some extent a sign of the professionalisation of GPF and development of its art of writing. It may also be the case that in the covered time period, GPF learned to utilise the style of writing which is internal to the UN. At the UN, the discourse can be partly influenced by some intra-institutional rules, or at least some existing practice to which all adjust their discourses – and this can be especially true for NGOs who are eager to show that they are familiar with the UN apparatus and that they are an integral part of it. They have learnt that they need to be concise and precise so that anyone listens to them, that they must sound formal, not to pretend to be more than what they are, show concrete proposals rather than general long-term visions without clear paths of how to achieve them and build their position rather step by step in order not to arouse fears of their growing power and assertiveness.

Conclusion

In this article, I present discourse analysis as an alternative approach to studying the role of NGOs at the UN. Since the role of NGOs at the UN can be hardly measured in terms of their share in UN outcomes, due to both diversity of factors by which these outcomes are influenced and the diverse and often subtle ways in which NGOs make their part, discourse analysis emerges as an interesting tool to show at least some tendencies in development of the role of NGOs at the UN. This approach is based on a turn from purely institutionalist views on the issue to larger considerations of capacity of discourse to socially construct but also reflect on relations between individual actors and their roles.

To show the approach in a practical manner and to test both its feasibility and capacity to bring results, the article has presented its application to three texts on UN access to and participation at the UN authored or co-authored by Global Policy Forum, an NGO which has the fight for more participatory rights for NGOs at the UN as one of its main missions. Both the author (GPF) and its texts have been chosen independently of expressed attitudes towards the analysed issue. The selected texts come from different time periods (1999, 2006, 2011) so that a historical comparison could be made and possible trends in development of the discourse (and hence also the role of NGOs at the

UN) discovered. To analyse the texts, I have adopted the approach developed by Fairclough.[28] I consider this approach a useful tool not only because of its focus on the field of social science, but also because of the simple fact that choice of a concrete approach in advance to the real analysis of texts can limit the potential bias of a researcher.

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By employing this approach practically, some important observations have been revealed regarding the role of NGOs at the UN, which can serve as a basis for further research. Firstly, they have shown that there seems to be a kind of saturation in what GPF feels that it may demand for NGOs from the UN in terms of their access and participatory rights. Secondly, it seems that GPF is becoming aware of the fact that more NGOs are now interested in not only the mere work of the UN but also the way NGOs are treated at the organisation. Thirdly, in spite of the real advancements of NGOs, GPF is taking on a more moderate tone in communication with the UN. Some professionalisation in its discourse can also be observed.

All of these findings are closely linked to the question of the role of NGOs at the UN. The most important finding is the revealed process of saturation of NGO demands or at least realisation of this process by GPF. The analysed texts have shown that GPF is increasingly aware of the fact that the current situation of NGOs at the UN will not be subject to substantial changes anymore. The saturation may also be the reason for the dissolution of the Working Group on UN Access.[29] At the same time, however, it seems that the position of NGOs at the UN has been strengthened. In earlier times, it was a problem accessing the UNSG (the first text makes this clear) and it was possible to address him only upon his own request (for inputs), while correspondence with him has become a common matter over the time (it is the case of the third text and the social events of which this text is a part). Moreover, earlier inputs written upon a request seem to be replaced by a more proactive approach from the NGOs side. This is clear proof of lowering the social distance between the UN and NGOs and of the relative power imbalance. Also, the relations between NGOs and the UN have improved – from those characterised as antagonistic to more cooperative relations as in between understanding partners. The analysis has also shown that there is a greater diversity of NGOs who seem to be active in promoting NGO participatory rights at the UN than before.

In conclusion, this practical exercise has indicated that the role of NGOs at the UN seems to be somewhat strengthened from the turn of

the century. From the perspective of GPF, NGOs appear to have transformed from entities begging for more access to more equal partners. The example of GPF shows that NGOs also seem to have started to act as such. They communicate in a more formal and sophisticated way and try to address rather concrete issues and focus on tangible results rather than to follow idealistic dreams and shout for nearly the same treatment which the governments have. This 'sobering-up' means moderation not only in content of demands, but also in assertiveness and tone in which they are formulated.

The findings of this analysis serve not only as an insight into the mere issue of the role of NGOs at the UN, but, above all, they are themselves an evaluation of the employed approach, which this article presents as a new, alternative way of how to understand the issue. So far, the role of NGOs in intergovernmental organisations has been assessed primarily on the basis of estimation of NGOs share in these organisations' outcomes. However, I show in this article that even the best estimates do not have to be reliable reflections of reality. Even scholars whose focus goes beyond comparing the outcomes with NGO preferences (which may be rather a coincidence than necessarily a proof of influence) to analyse also the activities leading to these outcomes may find it difficult to assess the overall influence of NGOs – especially because of their diverse interests and different tactics they use to exercise it.

One of the alternative approaches to assess the influence and more generally the role of NGOs is discursive analysis. The use of discursive analysis approach for assessing the role of NGOs at the UN assumes that relations between actors and their respective roles are socially constructed. Discourse not only does socially construct the role of NGOs at the UN[30] but can also depict it. The demonstration analysis of three texts authored by GPF has proved the capacity of discourse analysis to reveal signs of power (hidden in or behind the discourse) that constitute the power relations between NGOs and the UN and the role which NGOs play within the UN. The historical comparison has helped me to show how this role embodied in the GPF discourse evolved over the years.

Even though further research is needed to justify these preliminary findings on the role of NGOs at the UN and to fully understand the issue, the article represents an important step forward as it shows an alternative way to examine it. It has also proved that this approach

is workable and can generate important observations. Yet to understand better the role of NGOs at the UN and its possible implications, a widening of the presented study would be advisable. The presented approach can be used for adding the perspective of next NGOs but also that of the UN representatives and of member states to the overall picture. Despite its proven capacity to bring results and to overcome difficulties faced by other approaches, it is also important to admit that the discourse analysis is itself just one of many perspectives which can hardly uncover all issues at stake. As such, it is recommended not to renounce searching for new ways of dealing with this important issue, which could enrich the findings obtained in previous studies and also those achieved through the method presented in this study.

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Endnotes

1   See, for instance, Kenneth Anderson (2011), "'Accountability' as 'legitimacy': global governance, global civil society and the United Nations,' *Brooklyn Journal of International Law* 36(3), pp. 841-90; Thomas G. Weiss, D. Conor

Seyle and Kelsey Coolidge (2013), *The Rise of Non-State Actors in Global Governance: Opportunities and Limitations*, Broomfield: One Earth Future Foundation; Bruce Cronin (2002), 'The Two Faces of the United Nations: The Tension Between Intergovernmentalism and Transnationalism,' *Global Governance* 8(1), pp. 53-71.

2   Peter Willetts (2000), 'From 'Consultative Arrangements' to 'Partnerships': The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN,' *Global Governance* 6(2), pp. 191-212.

3   See, for example, Chadwick F. Alger (2002), 'The emerging roles of NGOs in the UN system: From Article 71 to a people's millennium assembly,' *Global Governance* 8(1), pp. 93-117; Claire Breen (2005), 'Rationalising the Work of UN Human Rights Bodies or Reducing the Input of NGOs? The Changing Role of Human Rights NGOs at the United Nations,' *Non-State Actors and International Law* 5(2), pp. 101-126; Dianne Otto (1996), 'Nongovernmental Organizations in the United Nations System: The Emerging Role of International Civil Society,' *Human Rights Quarterly* 18(1), pp. 107-141.

4   They either derive the role of NGOs from simple presence of an idea promoted by them – e.g. Wendy Guns (2013), 'The Influence of the Feminist Anti-Abortion NGOs as Norm Setters at the Level of the UN: Contesting UN Norms on Reproductive Autonomy, 1995–2005,' *Human Rights Quarterly* 35(3), pp. 673–700; or they focus rather on ways how to boost the NGO role – e.g. Barbara Gemmill and Abimbola Bamidele-Izu (2002), 'The Role of NGOs and Civil Society in Global Environmental Governance,' in Daniel C. Esty and Maria H. Ivanova (eds.) Global Environmental Governance: Options & Opportunities, New Haven, CT: Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy, pp. 77-100; Lucia Nader (2007), 'O papel das ONGs no Conselho de Direitos Humanos da ONU,' *Sur. Revista International de Direitos Humanos* 4(7), pp. 6-27.

5   See, for instance, Ann Marie Clark, Elisabeth J. Friedman, and Kathryn Hochstetler (1998), 'The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison of NGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women,' *World Politics* 51(1), pp. 1-35; Sara Edge and John Eyles (2015), 'Contested Governmentalities: NGO enrollment and influence over chemical risk governance rationales and practices,' *Environmental Policy and Governance* 25(3), pp. 188-200; David Humphreys (2004), 'Redefining the Issues: NGO Influence on International Forest Negotiations,' *Global Environmental Politics* 4(2), pp. 51-74.

6   As two examples of these efforts see Bob Reinalda (2011), *The Ashgate research companion to non-states actors*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub. Co.; Peter Willetts (2011), *Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics: The Construction of Global Governance*, New York: Routledge.

7   Norman Fairclough (2003), *Analysing discourse textual analysis for social research*, London: Routledge.

8   On this issue see, for instance, Rachel Brett (1995), 'The role and limits of human rights NGOs at the UN,' *Political Studies* 43(1), pp. 96-110.

9   On the socially constructive capacity of discourse, see, for example, Ruth Wodak et al. (1999), *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*, Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press, p. 8.

10 Sheldon Stryker, and Ann Statham (1985) 'Symbolic Interactionism and Role Theory' in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (eds.) The Handbook of Social Psychology, 3rd ed. New York: Random House, pp. 311-378.

11 The criterion of self-perception was used as a complementary tool e.g. in the study by Andreas Dür and Dirk De Bièvre (2007), 'Inclusion without Influence? NGOs in European Trade Policy,' *Journal of Public Policy* 27(1), pp. 79-101.

12 Norman Fairclough (1989), *Language and power*, London: Longman, p. 43.

13 On complexity of the relationship between NGO participation and influence see Charlotte Dany (2014), 'Janus-faced NGO Participation in Global Governance: Structural Constraints for NGO Influence,' *Global Governance* 20(3), pp. 419-436; Sara Edge and John Eyles (2015), 'Contested Governmentalities: NGO enrollment and influence over chemical risk governance rationales and practices,' *Environmental Policy and Governance* 25(3), pp. 188-200.

14 For detailed study on this issue see Jonas Tallberg and Christer Jönsson (eds.) (2010), *Transnational Actors in Global Governance: Patterns, Explanations, and Implications,* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

15 Fairclough (2003).

16 Fairclough (2003).

17 James A. Paul (1999), 'NGOs and the United Nations: Comments for the Report of the Secretary General,' *Global Policy Forum*, June, available at <www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/images/pdfs/ngos_and_the_united_nations.pdf> (accessed 15 August 2017); Eurostep et al. (2006), 'Paper on NGO Participation at the United Nations,' *Global Policy Forum*, 28 March, available at <www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/177/31756.html> (accessed 13 July 2017); NGO Working Group on U.N. Access (2011), 'Letter from the NGO Working Group on UN Access to the Secretary General Ban Ki -moon New York,' *Global Policy Forum*, 18 January,available at <www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/images/pdfs/S-G_letter_on_UN_access_Jan_2011.pdf> (accessed 17 August 2017).

18 Among the proves of its salience in the matter until these days it can be noted that its website is among the top results displayed by Google search engine when the combination of 'NGOs' and 'the United Nations' is entered in the searching line.

19 Global Policy Forum (2017), 'About us,' available at <https://www.globalpolicy.org/about-gpf-mm.html> (accessed 23 April 2017).

20 The Working Group on Security Council, founded in 1995, is an NGO forum at the UN intermediating regular interaction of NGOs with Council members at the highest level.

21 Years 1999 and 2006, when the first two texts were published, are along with the year of 2005 the years of the most important reports (co-)authored by GPF as the section of its website devoted to the issue of 'Relations between NGOs and the UN' suggests. The year of 2011, when the third analyzed text is dated, is among the top recent years in terms of the number of GPF's articles on access of NGOs to the UN and their mutual relations.

22 The United Nations Human Rights Council was established by the resolution of the General Assembly (A/RES/60/251) adopted on 15 March 2006.

23 Even though NGOs' recommendations are ranked as last in the SG report, they have been given the most space (1,5 pages compared to 1 page devoted to member states' recommendations and a half page for recommendations by UN specialised agencies and intergovernmental organisations). Moreover, they touch upon most of the issues dealt with in the analyzed text by GPF.

24 The group was established in 2009 with the aim to advocate 'for a positive and open partnership between the United Nations and NGOs'. It was regrouping NGO representatives who had been 'active over many years on access issues', mostly those based at the UN headquarters in New York. As of September 2011, the Working Group comprised 13 representatives of 12 organisations (GPF had 2 members, its executive director and a program coordinator), at the time of the letter writing, it had just nine members. As of 2016, the Working Group did not exist any longer.

25 Fairclough (2003), pp. 191-194.

26 Fairclough (1989), p. 45.

27 It speaks about 'diversity and range of needs of members of the international NGO community'.

28 Fairclough (2003).

29 The information about dissolution of the Working Group was confirmed by e-mail from Soon-Young Yoon, First Vice-President of the Conference of NGOs in consultative relationship with the UN (CoNGO), organisation which was convener of the Working Group.

30 This finding is useful not only for scholars, but also for practitioners, be it representatives of NGOs, international organisations or their member states, for whom it is important to realise the power which their

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Book reviews

Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars

Reviewed by Jasmina Ameti

'Why do some civil wars end, and stay ended, while others reignite?' This is the central question that *Securing the Peace,* by Monica Duffy Toft, poses. In addressing the question, the book discusses advantages and disadvantages of terminating a war by negotiated settlements, and absolute military victory of a government or a rebel group, or ceasefires and stalemates. Based on a statistical analysis of war recurrence, the author argues that, even though negotiated settlements are the most desirable methods to terminate civil wars, they are also more likely to cause a re-ignition of conflicts in the long-term, because, generally speaking, they largely ignore the issue of deep reform of contested institutions. By illustrating different cases of conflicts, such as those raging in El Salvador or the Republic of Sudan, Toft concludes that it is necessary to revise the most common approaches to conflict resolution in order to establish a long-lasting peace and, in doing so, she suggests that victories depend on the level of order maintained by governments in the post-war period.

 The content of the book is well structured in nine chapters. They include introduction to the topic of post-war stability, securing the

peace, termination of civil wars, discussion around the theory of mutual benefit versus mutual harm, a statistical analysis of war recurrence and longer-term outcomes. Later, the book moves on to discussing in-depth case studies of El Salvador, Uganda and the Republic of Sudan. The central argument of the analysis is that a crucial part of ending civil wars is rooted in the establishment of hybrid strategies to ensure the strength of settlements. In its theoretical part, Toft draws the theory of mutual benefit and mutual harm as the most important of such hybrid strategies. The theory revolves around the existence of simultaneous mechanisms guaranteeing benefits to break the fighting and promising harm for resuming the fight. Toft's subsequent statistical analysis shows that termination of civil wars by negotiated settlements poses a major vulnerability to durable peace because of their lack of mutual benefit and mutual harm mechanisms. By contrast to negotiated settlements, Toft argues that, while civil wars ceased by military victory have a negative impact on civil liberties, they are more likely to guarantee durable peace because they guarantee harm to those who continue with violence.

Based on an analysis of 129 civil wars through which Toft claims that settlements reduced the likelihood of achieving long-lasting peace, she analyses the reasons why negotiated settlements have the tendency to erupt in another series of violence. The author argues that, while the content of agreements is, of course, key this is not, reportedly, the most decisive feature as to why some agreements fail. Signed agreements need not only strong content but also the support of all parties involved in the actual conflict. A third party's assistance to negotiated settlement tend to increase the probability that war will re-emerge, because their facilitation to negotiations may overshadow the credibility of the involved parties. In addition, in states where violence is terminated but then war is followed by injustice or abuse, the breakout of new civil wars can be expected. Only when negotiated settlements are employed to develop institutions with power-sharing characteristics, negotiated settlements have higher chances to guarantee peace in the long-term than military victories, the author argues. If those settlements are not solid enough, they might not be the best method to secure a regime of democracy following a civil war.

This review will not focus on the cases of El Salvador or Uganda, but rather the Republic of South Sudan, the world's youngest country, in which a resurgence of political instability (possibly generating re-

newed insurgency) was observed in January 2019, only three months after the last negotiated settlement was signed. The book suggests that it is not easy to identify what the best possible means to ensure lasting peace in Sudan are, due to the fact that Sudan has been under a civil war for eleven of its more than fifty years of independence. Based on Toft's findings, the Sudanese wars have been based on differences in race, language, negotiation, religion and other regional divergencies, as well as rooted in the leaders' inability to conduct meaningful negotiations. Despite the rough path of negotiations, the Addis Ababa Peace Accord was signed in 1972 to end the First Sudanese Civil war. However, the settlement strategies were more focused on the factions' opposition of each other's rule, rather than on the termination of the war's root causes. Based on the author's conclusions, the agreement failed because it could not directly identify the question of southern autonomy and it was lacking appropriate provisions for resolution of the opposing intentions of the factions. Toft's analysis implies that, by signing the agreement, the factions left the responsibility of collective security to two different armed forces in the southern region. She suggests that stability and democracy persist in states where the security sector remains symmetrical instead. Toft's analysis, moreover, suggests that the agreement did not formally recognise southern requests and the demands of South Sudan for autonomy which also contributed to the failure of the settlement. Finally, while, according to Toft, negotiated settlements have a significant impact on prospects for the level of democracy and the quality of peace, this assumption does not necessarily reveal their impact on prosperity. In her understanding, the Sudanese settlements have had little impact on improving the level of prosperity in the country, as poverty and economic inequality remain key root causes for conflict today.

Overall, the author argues that negotiated settlements based on a benefit-harm structure increase prospects for peace. The author concludes that in most cases, third-party guarantees are not the best option for civil war terminations. Overall, this book is a scientific contribution reflecting on civil war terminations and providing well-documented details about their possible outcomes. However, while Toft's analysis provides an in-depth background of what has happened in the history of civil wars, the volume certainly leaves a lot of room for fresh research on how to concretely deal with post-war reconstruction in a way that prevents conflicts' re-ignition.

Near Abroad: Putin, the West and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus

Reviewed by Javadbay Khalilzada

It is unimaginable that in the 21st century a powerful country could invade a neighboring country and annex part of its territory simply because it does not like its neighbor's politics. Though there have been some anti-terrorist and regime-change operations by powerful countries like the United States in failed states like Afghanistan or despotic ones like Iraq, the U.S. did not officially annex the countries it occupied. However, as Gerard Toal, political geographer, discusses in his book, *Near Abroad: Putin, the West and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus*, in the 21st century Russia has twice engaged in unwarranted military intervention with its neighbors, Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. This is the question Toal tries to answer: why does Russia invade its neighbours? The whole book illustrates the post-Soviet and some historical developments in the mentioned countries to understand why the events which led Russia invaded its neighbors occurred. Toal believes that instead of classic geopolitics, critical geopolitics gives a broader picture to comprehend developments in the Caucasus and Ukraine and the conflict between these regions and Russia.

The book consists of eight chapters and an introduction. The introduction explains the term 'near abroad' and why Moscow uses this phrase at the international stage. In this context, 'near abroad' is a Russian concept that was introduced to define its post-Soviet regions and its sphere of influence. Adopting such a phrase unintentionally implies acceptance of Russia's primacy in those regions.

Following the collapse of the USSR, Russia tried to define itself in the context of Western civilization, however subsequent developments have illustrated that Russia is still the same age-old enemy of the West at a civilizational level (pp.4-7). Thus, the author defines the Ukrainian conflict as a 'civilizational choice' (p.212).

The author states that there are two generally accepted answers to the question of why Russia invades its neighbours. The first is that Russia invades its neighbors because it follows an imperialist policy towards them, classic geopolitics. The second, less explicitly debated in public, in media and foreign policy, is a "realist theory approach," Russia sees enlargement of NATO threat to its security. However, Toal states that these explanations are insufficient and he argues that a critical geopolitical approach provides a richer understanding of such conflicts and Russian invasions. By illustrating the 'illusion of transparency' of liberal storylines, the author effectively compares how liberals contradict themselves when they defend the sovereignty of states. Regarding the realist approach, using Mearsheimer's arguments, Toal states that realist assumptions are stuck in geopolitical determinism and a static outlook on world politics.

Instead, according to the author, cultural belonging and the identity of nations and decision makers could be a more effective way of understanding the policies of actors. Both the West and Russia have constructed their own stories about political developments in the region. But the construction of stories changes according to the narrator. The Western desire is to liberate 'captive nations', while Russia's aim is to protect co-ethnic and compatriot communities from 'fascist' nationalists. This duplex should be regarded during the policy making towards the region.

In the second chapter, the author discusses the collapse of the USSR, the trauma that member states have experienced, and new realities that Russia faces in the region. The chapter begins with how Putin describes the trauma of the collapse of the Soviet Union for Russians, and it continues by narrating historical developments. The author ex-

presses how Russian political decision makers and intellectual circles reacted and assessed Russia's international role after the collapse of the USSR. Toal states that Russian decision makers tried to make Russia an assertive, great power, at least in the post-Soviet region (p. 80). This means that Russian politicians could be seen as revanchist (p. 88), or, in other words, that they were not satisfied with influence only inside their borders. The West's intention to enlarge its sphere of influence towards the post-Soviet regions is the cause of conflict between Russia on the one side, and Georgia, Ukraine, and the West on the other.

The subsequent chapters illustrate the empirical bases of the question. In chapters three, four, and five the study examines post-Soviet Georgia, in the context of the West and Russia. Eduard Shevardnadze's cautious policy towards Russia, followed Mikheil Saakashvili's ambitious policy believing that the West will rescue Georgia from bullying empire (p. 128) even if it must confront Russia. Expansion of NATO seemed in this context as "rescue fantasy" of captive nations and enhance overall security and stability in Europe (p.97). Toal states that to legitimize their action both sides constructed storylines. Russia presents behavior of Georgia and Ukraine, as genocidal towards minorities, specifically the people of South Ossetia and the Russians that live in Ukraine. It presents its invasion of Crimea as rescuing people from fascism and declares that Crimea was illegally gifted to Soviet Ukraine (p. 227).

Chapters six and seven discuss the crisis of Ukraine, between the West and Russia. The Western world supported mass protests and the will of the Ukranians. However, Russia sees Ukraine as a little brother and a historical part of Russia (p. 227). For this reason, Russia launched the Novorossiya Project, but it failed to take hold. The invasion of Crimea was presented as rescue mission (p. 216) by Russia. However, by conquering Crimea, it lost Ukraine and Ukrainians.

All in all, Toal's book is valuable contribution to our understanding of recent political developments and remind us not to assess events as black and white. The book illustrates in detail how things have developed and the narratives of both sides. Moreover, the study also illustrates how geopolitical boundaries can change and local disputes could become global. Instead of a *thin geopolitical* approach, Toal puts forward a *thick geopolitical* understanding of spatial relationships and in-depth knowledge of places and peoples (p. 279).

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