

Extending *Aliran* Politics in Electoral Contest

An Insight of Indonesia's Democracy in the Post-2014

Ari Ganjar Herdiansah, Yusa Djuyandi, Widya Setiabudi Sumadinata

Aliran politics is an analytical framework that considered too simplistic and less accurately classifying the political axes of Indonesian socio-political structure. This article, however, shows that *aliran* still prevails in the form of politicization of identity that reflected in the post 2014. The analysis was constructed through scrutinizing Indonesia election dynamics with put an insight to the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial contest. Some interviews with several political party officials as well as civil society organizations activists and document study were conducted as the data collection method. The study reveals that the more integration of electoral contestation between local and national level had driven the polarization of political elites that in line with the ideology-based masses grouping. Despite the interest dimension was still prominent in which some Islamic parties and groups choose to opposed to their counterparts, the friction between Islamic groups and nationalists-secular was unavoidable. Considering the advantageous of the commodification of religious, ethnic, and ideological identities, the re-emerging of *aliran* could potentially be eminent in subsequent political contest.

Keywords: *aliran politics, Islamic party, election, identity politics.*



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Introduction

The political dynamics of post-authoritarian Indonesia show the paradoxical symptoms of democracy. On the one hand, the democracy has been running institutionally well as represented by a fair election, the freedom of the press, and the free of political participation. It also documented by some international institutions that listed the country as the third biggest democratic state. But on the other hand, the substantive value of democracy such as integrity, competence, and accountability are frail and leave the political process tend to be controlled by elites' interests. Most of the political parties are still possessed by distinct figures who depend on their charisma and cultural roots. To some extent the parties also linked to the oligarchs power (Winters 2013). Many officials are elected with the mixture of popularity among their roots and material source rather than displaying proper competence. As a consequence, the government remains weak and corruption is increasingly rampant. On the electoral competition, political elites the apparent mobilization of identity from the use of religious and ethnic symbols is still a way widely used by political elites to grasp votes. The development of post-2014 further strengthens the use of identity in various political contests. It drew the attention to explain why politicization and mobilization based on identity or *aliran* still prevail after the country undergoes two decades of democratization.

The conception of *aliran* refers to psycho cultural cleavage of Javanese people that often attached to socio-political categorization, which has long received criticism because it is considered as less accurate to portray the real political situation. Watson (2004) suggests that such conception is even totally irrelevant when using to analyze the 1955 election. In the post-authoritarian era, Azra (2004) sees there is no indication of political *aliran* in the 2004 elections. He concludes that the political dynamics driven by electoral competition in Indonesia is increasingly determined by interest factors, so the use of *aliran* is frequently not working anymore. The scheme of *aliran* is considered to be too simplistic to comprehend the complexity of the sociopolitical structure of Indonesia.

Nevertheless, this article holds that to some extent, the political conception of *aliran* is still relevant in explaining the political turmoil that intersects with the ideological base. The case that shows this symptom is taken from the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial event which involves demonstrations by various Islamic groups against one of the candi-

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dates, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), who regarded defiled Islam in their formal speech in September 2017. Based on that event, this article tries to clarify the question of whether the involvement of the actions of Islamic groups signifies the strengthening of the identity politics of puritanical Islam in practical politics? Then how can religious mass actions affect democratization in Indonesia? While these questions can open a critical view of the understanding of the relationship between religion and politics, the conception of aliran is used as a foothold to explain how the phenomenon of the emergence of Islamic groups that intersect with the political contest can have an impact on Indonesia's democratic transition. Discussion on the social bases cleavage based on aliran politics is used to criticism or adaptation to the situation (Geertz 1976: Ufen 2006). Furthermore, it will be explained about post-authoritarian Indonesian political competition which is characterized by party management that pivots the political elites and clientelism patterns that determine the pattern of cooperation and competition between parties before and after the election (Mietzner 2015). This article argues that the model of the competition of the political elite characterized by patronage relationships with ideological mass bases has reproduced the identity politics of Islamic groups, which in the study are referred to as the depoliticisation of Islamic aliran. In turn, the depoliticization of the Islamic aliran provides a political advantage for elites so they can access such means so that pattern can continue in any future political contestation.

This article begins with a discussion of how the pattern of the aliran influences on the political dynamics, especially in the post-authoritarian era. The study scheme does not apply the concept of aliran to political events without any criticism or modification. However, the discussion intended to show that the principle of aliran is not completely irrelevant. It is also important to note of how the form of political competition between parties is strongly shaped by the kind of cooperation and competition of the main elites. After the fall of Suharto, elites appeared to try to infuse their influence widely in economic and political life. Along with the electoral competition, where most large parties are dominated by political elites who are also concerned about control of resources, the axes of the elites are increasingly conical and result in sharper political contestation. The pattern of competition that correlates significantly between national-regional election governors Jakarta also contributes to such situation. Both discussions at-

tempt to show that the preservation of the aliran in Indonesia political contestation does not work naturally and reflecting the rise of Islamic politics, but is more determined by the elite competition to dominate the democracy cake.

The analysis of this article was constructed through interviews with several prominent Islamic organizations, Islamic parties, and review of political news related to the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial event. The search on the dynamics of aliran politics throughout Indonesian political history was made to show how the dimensions' political upheaval tend to involve the religious factors that are distinctive in this country. The opposition of political ideology which is carried by the friction of some elite also color the cooperation and political competition that happened. The analytical framework is performed descriptively-chronologically starting from the pattern of ideological cleavage since the New Order until post-2014. But the emphasis of the event is focused on the 2017 Jakarta governor election case, where the perception of religious defamation issues raises awareness of the political identity of the Islamic group.

This study assumes that the current Islam aliran on current political events that reflected in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial case are influenced by the form or characteristics of electoral contestation at both local and national levels. While some observers regard aliran politics as irrelevant due to the strengthening of the interest orientation of open electoral mechanisms, this study looks at electoral competition reflecting the struggle between political parties and not preserving aliran politics with a varied form. The various races taking place in such high frequencies have led to the polarization of elites who have certain practical ideological tendencies. The power-elite axes have connections with the ideological group at the root level. Post-New Order started the era of democratization in not only the sense of political freedom and fair elections but also the emergence of mass elites who try to control political resources. From elections, the elites begin to fall and pivot on some of the strongest elites. They were able to sustain their great influence through the number of votes that placed their cadres in political power. The decline in the number of large elites as a result of being thrown from election competition further heats up the competition and the increasingly intensive use of the roots of the masses.

The case of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial shows a situation that prompted the dynamics of the aliran was eminent in the form that can

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be observed. The protest movement by various Islamic groups in Jakarta during September 2016 to December 2017 was accompanied by political debates with strong religious nuances. An imaginary line can be drawn between the conservatives who want to apply Islamic values including in choosing leaders in the context of elections and liberals or progressive groups who regard it no longer important to question issues that intersect with religion in the realm of practical politics. The problem becomes complicated when Ahok performs a perceived blasphemy which was the result of his feud against political opponents. The context of the problem escalated until it threatened the stability of the government regime. Various Islamic groups have accused the government had stubbornly defending Ahok, while supporters of Ahok accused the protest movement activists as radicals.

This article intends to examine the issue of political dynamics in the post-2014 Indonesia, especially on the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial as an indication of elite factions to gain power in the institutional politics that directly or indirectly has preserved identity politics. The strengthening of terms such as radical Islam, intolerant group, NKRI, Pancasila describes that the feud is not only happening in the elite or institutional level, but also the cultural contest between different groups of orientation. Each of them tries to dominate the discourses so that the terms fit their meaning and identity. Interestingly, aliran friction does not take place between santri vs. abangan Islam as the definition of Geertz, but has taken a dynamic form. Thus, in the dispute, the Muslim santri were divided again based on the conservative degree, ranging from the most conservative to the liberal or progressive tendency. Islamic groups on the elite level there are many progressive figures tend to be on the side of Ahok-Djarot, while conservative groups tend to oppose it. These symptoms can not be separated from the electoral competition process that encourages the orientation of interests. That is, the political openness and the dynamics of elections have influenced the variation of political flow especially on the Islamic community.

Aliran in Indonesian Political Contest

Aliran politics was introduced as the theoretical framework of Clifford Geertz to explain the categorization of the Javanese people associated with the tendency of political behavior. Geertz sorts the Javanese into three categorical groups: santri, abangan, and priyayi. The santri is the people that study the teachings of Islam intensively and practicing Is-

lamic values and traditions in everyday life. The santri usually develop in Islamic educational institutions called pesantren. The abangan group represents people who, although originated mostly as Muslims, but chooses not to highlight the religious (Islamic) aspects of its social and political life. Abangans are more interested in adopting universal political ideas unrelated to religious thought, while the priyayi group represents the values of the Javanese aristocracy whose religious views still adhere to Hindu norms.

To understand how the conception of aliran can spread in the dynamics of Indonesian politics, it is necessary to review the historical aspect of aliran reproduction that until now still affect the division of the axis of political power. Based on the party classification using the aliran political scheme, the santri group is represented by the Islamic party. While abangan groups are often identified with the left secular party represented by the PKI. In the Old Order era, there were several prominent Islamic parties such as the Masyumi Party, the NU Party, the Islamic Shari'a Party and the Indonesian Tarbiyah Party. Since this period there has been tension between the Islamic group and the leftist (Sulastomo 2008).

The clash between the left-communist and the Islamists implies ideological division based on aliran finding its relevance. It should be noted, however, that the political struggle at that time occurred among the central figures representing ideological orientation tendencies, such as the communist of DN Aidit, Muhammad Natsir from the Islamists, Sjahrir from the socialist group, and Sukarno trying to combine them in the Nasakom. The deadlock of the ideological struggle and the worsening economic conditions had contributed to the continuing political turmoil, until the revolution of the PKI took place on September 30, 1965, which was later thwarted by the Army. Before the bloody revolution broke out, there had been a series of mass killings perpetrated by PKI militias such as those that occurred in Madiun in 1948. The repercussions of various Islamic groups against PKI elements later spread in East Java and Central Java from late 1965 to mid-1966 when the Army put down all PKI components to its roots (Roosa 2006).

In the New Order era, the decay of left-communist ideology gained legitimacy from government authorities. Suharto made the PKI and communism as a ghost that always threatened the ideology and unity of the state. The government regime instilled awareness of the citizens that the PKI was a latent danger that could arise at any time. The con-

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struction of the PKI image or the left-communist ideology as the greatest enemy of the state was reinforced by repressive actions against the people who indicated as PKI member and who had been in contact with the PKI, as well as the enactment of rules that isolated the family and descendants of the members. The former members PKI or people suspected of being close to the PKI were put in prison without clear court proceedings. Meanwhile, family members and their descendants were given a mark on the ID's card. They were not allowed to enter the occupancy and education freely. Books containing leftist thought, especially the Marx, Lenin, and Stalin were also not allowed to circulate. In this way, Suharto gave a clear message that there was no tolerance for those who sympathetic to left-communist ideology and his regime was capable of protecting the country from the hazardous communist threat.

However, Suharto's repressive actions against the leftist-communists did not mean to give way to the Islamists. The ones who supported Islamic politics also get almost the same pressure. They were not allowed to make movements that intersect with politics. Islamic groups were only recognized by the government as long as they work in the social and religious sphere or accord with the government agenda. The government considers Islamic politics as a threat from right-wing extremists who are supposed to establish an Islamic state. The source of ideas and roots of his movement came from Darul Islam/Islamic State of Indonesia (DI/NII). Various Islamic organizations, especially among students were closely monitored. Nevertheless, Suharto realized that Islamic elements have a strategic force for his power. In the final decade of his rule, Suharto tended to ally with Islamic forces in the face of opposition forces from both the pro democracy and some elements in the Army.

Suharto's step in suppressing extreme left and right forces actually could be seen a concept that is similar from Sukarno to unite all the components of ideology. When Sukarno attempted to accommodate all ideological aliran in the grand scheme of nationalism, Suharto emphasized a repressive approach to each of the extremes, both left-communist and Islam-right and forced all parties to be coherent with the government. The effort was further reinforced by the fusion of political parties into three parties in 1973 to control the opposition strengths. The Islamic parties were then incorporated into the United Development Party (PPP), while the secular left and Christian parties have been integrated into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). In

1985, efforts to uniform state ideology were made through the enactment of Law No. 5/1985 and Law No. 7/1985, in which the government required Pancasila as the sole principle for all political parties and civil organizations (Moesa 2007).

The Suharto action to press the left-communist and Right-Islam show that he regarded its ideological forces were capable of challenging his power. However, his effort of fusing political parties and the application of Pancasila as a single principle did not necessarily erase the potential of ideological forces. The opposition ranks were then perceived such actions as the manipulation to perpetuate power. Therefore, the resistance to the New Order regime was also accompanied by a critical view of ideological uniformity and the demand to recognize other political ideologies other than Pancasila. After Suharto resigned in 1998, the MPR enacted the MPR Decree No. XVIII/MPR/1998, concerning the revocation of MPR Decree No. II/MPR/1978 on Pancasila as a single principle. The spirit of abolishing the sole principle of Pancasila is to undermine the New Order's hegemony inherent in the symbols of the state. This political openness led to the proliferation of various organizations and parties that openly showed their ideological inclinations. The militant religious group expresses the symbols of Islam as a marker of the substance of the struggle to apply Islamic moral values in various aspects of people's lives. Some of them even openly declare themselves as militia or Laskar groups, such as Laskar Jihad and Laskar Pembela Islam. On the other hand, left-wing parties are also emerging, such as the People's Democratic Party (PRD) founded by leftist activists such as FX Rudi Gunawan, Andi Arief, and Budiman Sudjatmiko. Meanwhile, the movement of Islamists had developed cells on campus. In the late 1990s, some of them participated in great power in opposing the New Order regime and establishing a political party (Partai Keadilan). Political openness has provided a way for organizations and parties that want the struggle with an ideological expression as a means of mobilization.

In the post-authoritarian era, as hundreds of new political parties were established, they show a wide variety of ideological affiliations. In general, parties adopt a symbolic ideology between Islam and secular nationalism. However, the political conception of aliran certainly can not be applied directly. In the Islamic aliran, for example, there are various sub-streams ranging from formalist-oriented, substantialist to secularist (Mashad 2008). The formalist Islamic group explicitly states

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that Islam is the formal ideology of the organization, other than Pancasila. It shows their intention to run the government by the value of Islamic norms. Political parties that adopt this view include PPP, Justice Party (PK/PKS), Partai Nahdlatul Ummah (PNU), and PBB. Substantial Islamic groups have a view that is almost similar to the formalist Islam associated with the application of Islamic norms in socio-political life, except the establishment of Islam as an organizational ideology. They considered Islam not to be used as a political tool, but the basis of the values of the party's struggle. They include PKB and PAN. Both formalist and substantial Islamists are based on Islamic groups or groups, such as NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis, and Jamaah Tarbiyah. Meanwhile, the secular Islamic view does not exist in a party-based political party but is represented by civil society organizations such as the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) and liberal Islamic figures.

The secular nationalist party is represented by the Golkar Party and the PDI-P. However, since many Golkar Party cadres belong Islamic civilian organizations, such as HMI, this party tend to be friendly to the interests and aspirations of Muslims (Baswedan 2004). (Baswedan, 2004). The abangan class in the reform era may be identified with the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) consisting of the nationalist, leftist-socialist, and Christian component (Singh 2003). However, according to Liddle and Mujani based on opinion surveys in the 1999 and 2004 elections, the aliran politics no longer relevant to explain the voter behavior in the reform era because it is more determined by the leader figure than the party identification factor and sociological background. Of the total respondents in the survey, about 88 percent who voted for Megawati eventually voted for their PDIP party, 89 percent voted for Habibie to vote for Golkar Party, 95 percent chose Abdurrahman Wahid to vote for PKB, and 75 percent voted Amien Rais chose PAN. In the 2004 election, the survey results showed the same pattern, in which Yudhoyono who won the presidential election received support from 82 percent of Golkar Party voters, 78 percent of PPP voters, and even 29 percent of PDI-P voters. Based on the study, identification factors for leaders or elite figures have dominated voter decision. In other words, psychological factors determine political behavior more and show the aliran politics is no longer relevant to be used in analyzing elections (Permata & Kailani 2010).

However, based on a comparison study of the 1955 election results with 1999, King (2003) states there was a common pattern in which

voters are gathered in parties based on social and religious identity. Both elections, although differentiated for more than four decades, still show the similarity of Islamic party voters' preferences (PKB, PAN, and PPP) in 1999 with Islamic party voters in the 1955 election (Masyumi, Partai NU, PSII). Meanwhile, secular-oriented voters who in the 1955 election elect PNI and PKI could be represented by Golkar Party and PDIP voters in the 1999 election. The analysis of voter party preferences based on flow schemes was also carried out by Baswedan (2004) with the focus of the 1999 and 2004 elections. He sees that the principles of Islamist and secular ideology still colorized the character of the post-New Order party. But in general, all parties to the secular still adopt the aspirations of Muslims and the symbols of Islam with different degrees. He divides the secular orientation into two, namely secular inclusive and secular exclusive. The first term refers to a view that considers Islam and Pancasila compatible and the moral values of Islam, as long as it coincides with Pancasila and nationalism, deserve support in political schemes. While the last term, while still adopting a secular-inclusive view, they assess the adoption of Islamic moral values in government including the Islamization agenda that needs to be rejected. Both secular views are currently represented by two large secular parties namely Golkar Party which is friendly with Islam and PDIP that prevent the inclusion of Islam. Both analyzes imply that aliran schemes are still relevant to be used in analyzing electoral politics in Indonesia.

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***Aliran* in Electoral Dynamics**

This article argues that the aliran political schema still stands out in the context of political parties' configuration and the struggles of power competition, but is difficult to see in the context of events that require compromise. For example, in the 1999 presidential candidacy through the MPR, despite winning electoral status, PDIP failed to place Megawati's as president. This is due to some Islamic parties supported by the Golkar Party to build a joint force that carries Abdurrahman Wahid, from PKB, as president. Megawati was then appointed to be the vice-president. Megawati's blockade had a religious motive when the PPP says that women's presidents were unacceptable in Islamic theology because a hadith says leaders of men should take precedence. But beyond that, fears of the emergence of left forces as the ruling PDIP. Since 1994, there have been allegations to Megawati

that the PDI party has been infiltrated by communist elements (Eklof 2004).

In the subsequent development after the 1999 presidential appointment, almost all political forces are in the Abdurrahman Wahid government. However, Wahid's lack of synchronization with its supporting components in running the politics of government could not be overcome. Interestingly, several reasons still pertain to ideological issues. One of them was when Wahid opened the way of diplomacy with Israel and proposed to abolish MPRS XXV Tap of 1966 on the banning of the teachings of communism and Marxism. Both steps were strongly opposed by Islamic counterparts. Meanwhile, the other parties were feeling stifled by some Wahid government policies that ignore their political interests. After the impeachment, Megawati then appointed as president and her vice was Hamzah Haz, of the PPP, who had strongly opposed Megawati's candidacy as his theological reasons. The incident indicates that the interest factor of the elite and the ideological impulses of some parties is a factor in the friction of regime change.

In the 2004 presidential election, the party groupings in coalition increasingly showed no correlation with aliran politics. In the first round, there were five pairs of candidates, namely Wiranto-Solahudin Wahid (Golkar Party), Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi (PDIP), Amin Rais-Siswono (PAN), Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla (Democratic Party, United Nations, PKPI), and Hamzah Haz- Agung Gumelar (PPP). Interestingly, the candidates were dominated by prominent religious figures, such as Solahudin Wahid, Hasyim Muzadi, Hamzah Haz from NU, while Amien Rais was the chairman of Muhammadiyah. The configuration of Islamic leaders in the presidential election shows that Muslim representation is still strong in the context of elections, but melting with secular nationalists, like the Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi (PDIP-NU) and Amien Rais-Siswono (PAN/Muhammadiyah-aktor dari GMNI¹).

In the first round, the Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla and Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi outperformed other candidates by 33.57 percent and 26.62 percent. Ahead of the second round, there was a grouping of supporting parties on both candidates. At the ranks of Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi, there are PDIP, Golkar Party, PPP, PBR, PDS, PNI Marhaenisme, PKPB with a total vote in parliament 54.75 percent. While Yudhoyo-

¹ Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (GMNI) is civil society organization affiliated to Indonesian National Party (PNI) that known close to nationalist-left ideology (Wardaya 2009). After the reform, GMNI then affiliated to PDIP.

no-Jusuf Kalla only got additional support from PKS. Although PKB and PAN did not declare official support, their votes flowed to Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla (Pusat Penelitian Politik LIPI 2004). At a glance, it can be observed that the coalition grouping configuration is further away from the aliran conception. At the level of the elite, the dichotomy of santri-abangan has melted in line with the strengthening of the axis of interest. As seen in the Megawati-Hasyim camp that hopes to gain a voice from both Islamic and secular (Suryadinata 2005). On the other hand, Yudhoyono-Kalla set a strategy to gain mass support from traditional Islamic and modernist Islam, from PAN base, PKS, and using the influence of Abdurrahman Wahid (Mietzner 2009). Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla then won the 2004 presidential election by 60.62 percent and established a government composed of almost all large and medium-sized parties, except PDIP. The PDI-P positions that are outside the government were due to balance the government and the still freeze relation between Megawati and Yudhoyono in the post-election 2004.

In the 2009 election, the votes of Islamic parties were declined to 29 percent from 37 percent in the previous elections. According to Aspinall (2010), the electoral decline of Islamic parties in the 2009 election signifies the disruption of aliran politics. The strengthening of the mass media role and modern-creative campaign models has undermined voter behavior based on collective identity. Parties with strong collective identity images, such as the PDIP and PKB, experienced drastic decreases in votes. Another indication of the weakening of aliran politics is the success of parties that use strong personal charms, such as the Democratic Party and the Gerindra Party. The period of 2009 shows the revival of individual voter patterns that refer to candidate characters, no longer on ideological preferences and social identification. Yudhoyono-Budiono's victory was attributed to that factor, in which Yudhoyono's electability was firmly in various polls ahead of the 2009 Presidential Election (Firmanzah 2011).

The predictions of several survey agencies, such as the LSI and the National Survey Institute (LSN), said that Islamic political parties would lose their vote in the 2014 election (Dw.com 2013). Even some of them such as the PKS and PBB were not expected to be able to place their representatives in the DPR. Survey results from LSI in January 2014 show that PKS will only get 2.2 percent of the vote, while the UN is predicted to only get 0.7 percent of the vote. Several other Islamic

political parties, such as PKB's vote anticipated in the range of 4.1 to 5.1 percent, PPP is in the lowest range of 3.6 percent, PAN in the range of 1.7 to 3.2 percent (Kompas.com 2014c). From the LSI survey, Islamic political parties would not only be difficult to penetrate the top four positions, even some of them, such as PKS and PBB, are predicted to fail to enter DPR. Not to mention the PAN which is still threatened could not place his cadre in DPR because the bottom range of votes was still at 1.7 percent of the vote.

The prediction that undermined Islamic political parties was understandable. They were perceived as unable to manage public expectations and lost their ideological struggle. The interest of young voters for Islamic parties was also low (Kompas.com 2014b). However, on the other hand, some of the Islamic parties then still raise a sense of optimism about its capability to compete with other parties in the 2014 election. As Chairman of PPP, Suryadharma Ali, believed that his party would still performed to gain a sufficiently large votes in the 2014 legislative elections, which is about 12 percent (Tribunnews.com 2014). It was also prevail with the PKS, which the party suffered due to their leader, Luthfi Hasan Ishaq, caught by the KPK. They were predicted to lose a lot of votes. Through the fraction chairman in DPR, Hidayat Nurwahid, PKS responded that the fate of Islamic parties was not determined by the survey results (Viva.co.id 2013). The statement indicated not only a sense of optimism but also shows the existence of resistance to the survey results.

In fact, from the results of the 2014 General Election, Islamic based parties can reverse the survey prediction. As from the results of CSIS calculations that the five Islamic parties previously predicted would decrease, surprisingly their total vote rose to 32 percent from the previous 26 percent in the 2009 Election (Voaindonesia.com 2014). The PKB got the highest percentage, 9.04 percent, PAN occupies the next position with a total of 7.59 percent, followed by the PKS with 6.79 percent, the PPP with 6.53 percent, and the PBB with 1.46 percent (Kompas.com 2014a). The ability of Islamic parties to raise the vote results in 2014, despite getting negative news from the media as experienced by the PKS, shows the strength of the cadre base and the loyalty of the cadres in the political struggle. The ability of Islamic parties in managing the traditional Islamic mass base was carried out by maintaining political communication among pesantren, whether against kiyai or santri, as it was done by PKB or PPP. The management of modern Islamic mass

base is done by several other Islamic parties, namely PKS and PAN, these parties build communications among the campus community, in particular through Council of Mosque Prosperity (DKM) or other Islamic student organizations.

In political competition context, the vote of Islamic parties in 2014 legislative elections is considered to significantly influence political contestation in the post-2014, namely in the 2014 presidential election and Regional Head election (Pilkada). In the 2014 presidential election, the weakness of the PDI-P in exploiting the popularity of presidential candidate Joko Widodo to meet the presidential threshold of 25 percent of the vote nationally forced them to build cooperation with other parties that carries Jokowi. Although ideologically between the PDI-P and the Islamic parties are different, the strength of Islamic parties is believed to be able to provide significant votes support. However, the result of political communication built by PDI-P with Islamic based parties was succeeded only with PKB and some PPP which then support the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla in the 2014 Presidential Election.

From the description of the political dynamics and ideological base, although electoral politics increasingly distanced the analysis of aliran, it turns out that the aliran as a political reality can not be denied. In the Old Order era, the opposition between leftist-communist and right-Islam groups implied a clash of aliran. The bloody history of the PKI and other groups especially from the Islamic group was not easily eliminated in the collective memory of its supporters to this day. Discussions about the reconciliation of the PKI organized in the reform era have often ended in turmoil because it has always been vehemently opposed by Islamic and nationalist groups (Okezone.com 2016). In the New Order era, the agenda of communist decay and repressive acts against Islamists by the Suharto regime were the steps of the politicization of the aliran to gain total compliance. The New Order regime realized the potential of aliran orientation particularly between left-communist and right-wing Islam, still affecting political forces.

In the reform era, the rise of Islamist and left-based parties also shows that the ideological and sociological preference is still prevails. Although the current parties have been driven by pragmatic orientation, they are at the same time free from the use of identities and religious issues to attract voters' sympathy. The Islamic parties will continue to attempt to symbolize themselves, though not self-limiting, as representations of santri and pro-policy orientations toward

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the Shari'a or supporting Islam in politics (Pepinsky, Liddle, & Muhani 2012). In the contestation of the Presidential Election, in which the aliran politics are seen blurred, the elite has obviously made use of a particular aliran mass base to mobilize the vote. Mass bases like traditional Islam, modern Islam and secular nationalists are objects that often used by candidates. Thus, the aliran is not only prevailed in the realm of the support bases but also politicized by the elite who compete for power.

An Insight from the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election

To understand the map of political power in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial contest, we need to describe the events of the post-2014 election about identity politics. Towards the 2014 presidential election, there was a dynamic of Islamic groups supporting the presidential candidate. The first candidate, Prabowo-Hatta was supported by Gerindra Party, Golkar Party, PAN, PKS, and PPP (Suryadarma Ali camp). All these parties, except for Gerindra Party, have a Muslim support base. While Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla carried by the PDIP, Nasdem Party, Hanura Party, PKPI, and PKB that has the grassroots supporters of traditional Islam. The 2014 election results were later won by Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla. The separation of political support has in fact affected the mass support base of the government. During the 2014 Presidential Election campaign, it was not uncommon for issues raised about religious sentiments. Jokowi is often portrayed as an anti-Islamic figure, of Chinese descent, and comes from a PKI family. These allegations are a bad reflection of the country's leader figure from Islamic groups. Black campaign about Jokowi spread through various digital media like Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp.

After running the government, Jokowi-JK conducting political consolidation included with Islamic civil society organizations, especially the NU and Muhammadiyah. Some NU cadres filled the ministerial posts, such as Khofifah Indar Parawangsa, Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, Marwan Ja'far, Imam Nahrawi and Muhammad Hanif Dhakiri, Muhammad Nasir, Nusron Wahid (Tempo.co 2015). Meanwhile the cadre of Muhammadiyah who sat in Jokowi's cabinet were Nina Moeloek and Muhajir Effendy. The support of Muhammadiyah to Jokowi administration was not so great because Amien Rais attitude that often criticizes the government. Jokowi sought to neutralize the negative opinions of Islamic groups against him. In 2015-2017, Jokowi visited

some pesantren such as in Solo, Surabaya, Cirebon, Tegal, and Banten. Also, Jokowi attend the inauguration of the International Islamic University of Indonesia on June 29, 2016, a higher education institution that would be under the auspices of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Various measures indicate that Jokowi considers the importance of Islamic elements' support for the sake of maintaining political stability.

Consolidation of political parties was done by attracting parties outside the government. The PAN and the Golkar Party later joined a coalition of government supporters. Some of the two party cadres then fill the cabinet positions, such as Airlangga Haryanto (Golkar Party) as Minister of Trade and Industry, Sutrisno Bachir (PAN/Jokowi volunteer), and Asman Abnur (PAN). However, not all elements in the newly-joined party provide full political support for Jokowi. Some Golkar Party cadres and PAN still look critical of the government as the support agreements were in the hands of dominant elites, but do not necessarily reflect the aspirations of the cadres below. The totality of party support was visible in Jakarta 2017 governor's election contest, where although Golkar Party carries Ahok-Djarot, but many young cadres refuse the decision. The firmer position was shown by PAN which is more supportive of Anis-Sandi than Ahok-Djarot in the final round. They reasoned that there was no central government coalition agreement with the coalition in the local elections. However, the political consequences of their attitude had an impact on the position of PAN which increasingly shifted as an opposition party.

The 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial competition reflects the opposing forces at the national level. Although in the first round of the coalition split into three groups, namely the Agus-Silvy, Ahok-Djarot, and Anis-Sandi, but in the second round the coalition pattern resembles a map of power at the national level, the government support parties (PDIP, Golkar Party, Hanura, Nasdem Party, PKB, PPP) and parties who critical to the government (Gerindra Party, PAN and PKS). Particularly for the Democratic Party, just like its position at the center, in the second round of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial they also declare a neutral vote but in practice were inclined to support non-governmental ranks. The map of strength can also be drawn on elite shafts, comprising the axis of Megawati and Luhut Binsar Panjaitan located in the supporting line of Ahok-Djarot and Prabowo, Yudhoyono, Amien Rais, and Jusuf Kalla who are in the front of supporters of Anis-Sandi. The configuration is likely to last until the 2019 election.

The 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial is distinct from elections elsewhere. First, Jakarta is the capital of the country, with its status various issues and phenomena is often a subject of discussion at the national level. Exposure to such widespread and intense issues through mass media is a boon to those who win political battles. Victory in Jakarta provides a positive image and significant confidence for the party, its elite and candidates. Secondly, Jakarta has always been a political barometer for both the national and other regions. There is an assumption that those who can win elections in Jakarta have a great chance to win the presidential election. Jokowi's victory in Jakarta's 2012 governorship and 2014 presidential elections reinforces this assumption. Third, with the region's revenue reaching Rp.31 trillion, Jakarta became the center of attention of the parties to control and manage the province. Thus, the 2017 gubernatorial race becomes the arena of power contest of the main elites. Moreover, they are bound by the bigger interests of the 2019 election.

In the context of elite competition, the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial contains a dramatic political event. Ahok was initially Gerindra cadres that opted out after he had more support to Jokowi in the 2014 presidential election, whereas Prabowo as Gerindra Party chairman was dealing with Jokowi. In 2012, Prabowo had brought Ahok to accompany Jokowi in Jakarta and hoped Ahok could pave the way for Prabowo in the 2014 presidential election. Ahok's frontal step to supports Jokowi dragging Gerindra at the opposite position against PDIP. On the other side, Yudhoyono was seen fighting to increase the popularity of the Democrat Party, after the acquisition of their vote dropped from 20 percent in 2009 to 10 percent in 2014. His strategic way was putting his son, Agus Harimurti, as a candidate for Jakarta governor. At least, the tactic could provide a stage to Agus to be known in the national political arena. The less harmonious relationship between Yudhoyono and Megawati still have an impact on the political constellation after 2014, and the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial seems become political prestige arena between them.

The 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial event was not merely a political event, but it also intersects with social-religious turmoil. Before the contest began, the issue of racism regarding Ahok's as a Protestant and Chinese descendant had surfaced. The issues developed into bullets to bring down Ahok include a ban in choosing *kafir* (infidel) leaders and China's potential for dominance in Jakarta. On the contrary, the

stronghold of Ahok's supporters retaliated by declaring it was better to be led by a *kafir* but a mandate than by Muslims but corrupt (CNN Indonesia 2014). Then, Ahok himself proudly proclaims to be a *kafir* but not corrupt. Ahok's response to racism attacks was even wilder. When Ahok conducted his service in Kepulauan Seribu on September 27, 2016, he declared that he did not force people to vote for him in the 2017 elections and urge people not to be lied to by those who use the verses of Al-Quran (*al-maidah 51*). The word then became viral in cyberspace and instantly reap public reaction (Tirto.id 2016). On 7 October 2016, Habib Novel Chaidir Hasan of FPI reported Ahok on suspicion of committing a criminal act of religious humiliation. The reconciliation of the Islamic groups on the alleged blasphemy by Ahok increasingly intensive and widespread.

Various protests demanding legal proceedings against Ahok are not only conducted in Jakarta, but also in other areas, such as Medan, Surabaya, Tegal, Solo, and Sampit. In mid-October 2016, thousands of people from various Islamic civilian organizations took to the streets to denounce Ahok and urged the police to imprison him immediately. There were pros and cons in society to respond whether Ahok did blasphemy. The Ahok's protesters were convinced that Ahok's remarks, regardless of any context, have harassed the Koran, while others consider the comments to be inconsiderate of the Koran since he meant those who use the verses of the Koran to incite Voters. However, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) later claimed that Ahok had denounced Islam.

A larger and organized demonstration was held in Jakarta on Friday, October 14, 2016. The rally was coordinated by FPI with other Islamic organizations attended by more than ten thousand people. The demonstration, called the Islamic Defense Action, conducted a long march and rallied in front of Jakarta City Hall. The demonstrators demanded the police to process Ahok (Tribunnews.com 2016). Despite a major demonstration on October 14, 2016, Islamist groups were still dissatisfied and regarded the slow legal process due to be protected by the power. Then, the demonstration of the second Islamic Defense Action was held on 4 November 2016 that demanded the police to arrest Ahok and set him as a suspect in the case of defamation. The crowd gathered at the Istiqlal Mosque and moved to the police headquarters, the Merdeka Palace and the City Hall. They met every corner of the area of Horse Statue Roundabout to Medan Merdeka. Participants

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who followed the peaceful action came from various regions, such as from Bandung, NTB, Makassar, Palembang, Maluku, Madura, Surabaya, Lampung and Yogyakarta. The political actors and Islamic leaders enliven the Islamic Action 4II, such as KH Abdullah Gymnastiar aka Aa Gym, KH Ma'ruf Amin, and Habib Rizieq Shihab, KH. Cholil Ridwan (TAPI3), KH. Tengku Zulkarnain (Wasekjen MUI), Sukatsyah (United Islamic Community), Nur Diati Akma (PP Forsap FUII), Wirawan Adnan (GNPF), Abdul Rasyid (Ponpes Asyafiyah). The political leaders who were appeared were Amien Rais (PAN), Fadli Zon (Gerindra Party), and Fahri Hamzah (Vice Chairman of DPR).

The dissatisfaction from various Islamic groups was triggered by a series of different but influential factors in the political constellation. Long before the contestation of the gubernatorial election, Ahok did have problems with some Islamic groups who felt inconsistent with some policies, such as banning takbir-rally and sacrificial animal slaughter at public facilities. On the other hand, there were a handful of Islamic groups in Jakarta who are opposed to Ahok's authority on the grounds of ethnic and religious background. It can not be denied that in addition to them, there were also parties from political opponents who take advantage of the situation to reduce the image of Ahok in public, especially Muslim voters in Jakarta.

Various demonstrations against Ahok certainly affect the dynamics of competition in Jakarta. Though Ahok's political relation faces various problems, his performance as an incumbent in Jakarta gained appreciation from the majority of residents. From various surveys, the level of Jakarta citizens' satisfaction with Ahok's leadership was relatively high at the time. Based on a survey of Lingkar Survei Indonesia (LSI), in March Ahok electability was still the highest that is 53 percent (Viva.co.id 2016), while the survey results Saiful Mujani Research Center in October showed Ahok still superior with 45 percent (Kompas 2016). Although Ahok's electability tends to a bit decrease, as a candidate for governor, he was very dominant among other candidates. The result of Jakarta citizens satisfaction survey on Ahok performance conducted by Indonesian Poltracking Survey Institute revealed as much as 52.5 percent claimed satisfied with the performance of Ahok. Jakarta residents claim to be pleased with the development of Ahok. Increasingly affordable levels of health services, educational services with scholarships for higher education for those who have Smart Card Jakarta (KJP), and the construction of infrastructure or public facilities is increasing (Kompas.com 2016).

The conflicts between elites can be seen since Jokowi said that the Islamic Defence Action was ridden by political actors aimed at creating a political instability. Although not explicitly mentioned, these allegations later led to the Democratic Party when it was carrying the Agus-Silvy as a challenger Ahok-Djarot. Yudhoyono was being accused as an actor who rode a massive protest on 4 November 2016, then it later denied through a press conference at his residence (BBC Indonesia 2016). Allegations from the government side increasingly sharpened the problem. The Islamic groups did not accept that they are perceived as being driven by a certain political agenda. Along with the warming of the atmosphere that could potentially disrupt national stability, Jokowi perform political safari to the three major Islamic organizations: NU, Muhammadiyah, and MUI. Also, Jokowi also conducted several meeting with political figures including Prabowo, while meeting with Yudhoyono represented by Jusuf Kalla.

As protests against Ahok over allegations of religious blasphemy continued, Ahok-Djarot was deeply troubled. The survey results show the Ahok-Djarot electability tends to decline after the Islamic Defense Action on 4 November 2016. The results of a survey conducted by LSI stated that the Ahok-Djarot continues to decline every month. By March 2016 the electability of Ahok-Djarot was 59.3 percent, slumped to 49.1 percent in July, 31.4 percent in October, and declined drastically to 24.6 percent in November (Detiknews.com 2016). The survey also found that 89 percent of Jakarta residents knew about this case of blasphemy, but as many as 73.2 percents of respondents stated that the words in Ahok's speech were a mistake that could happen to anyone. Although the Ahok's electability declined, still he was the highest favorable candidates comparing to Agus-Sylvi as much as 20.9 percent and Anies-Sandiago 20 percent, while as many as 34.5 percents had not made any choice.

In the first round of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial race, the parties joined in the axis of Agus-Silvy (Partai Demokrat, PKB, PPP, PAN), Ahok-Djarot (PDIP, Golkar Party, Hanura, Nasdem Party, PKPI), and Anis-Sandi (PKS, Partai Gerindra). When drawn on the main elite axis, the first pair is identical with Yudhoyono, the second couple is represented by Megawati, and the third couple puts forward Prabowo's figure. Among the three couples, positions that often faced to face are between the first and third pairs of the second pair. However, the substance of discourse that was made the object of opposition is different.

The competition between Agus-Silvy and Ahok-Djarot emphasizes the comparison of the governmental success between Jokowi and Yudhoyono. While the competition between Anis-Sandi and Ahok-Djarot more about the issue of Ahok's rude characteristics. At the level of the mass base, supporters and sympathizers of Anis-Sandi tend to question the case of Islamic blasphemy by Ahok. The first round eliminated Agus-Silvy, but Ahok-Djarot, who was initially believed to have won one round had failed so they should fight against Anis-Sandi in the second round.

In the second round, PKB explicitly determines its support to Ahok-Djarot, while PPP experiences a split when it must decide who the candidate will be supported. PKB elites and mass organizations supporters argued that they chose Ahok-Djarot because the couple's performance has been proven and felt benefited by the citizens of Jakarta. Although they realize Ahok's actions have hurt many people, they believe that if Ahok continues his post as governor, the people will also benefit from Ahok's integrity commitment. One of the Ahok supporters' groups, the GPA, argues that during this time Ahok's policies have made a real contribution to its members at the lower levels. For example, a policy that garbage collectors are given a fixed salary by the Jakarta administration, which significantly helps members or their sympathizers. On the other hand, they did not want to be a row with the basis of Ahok's opposing masses, among others from HTI, FPI, and PKS groups. They saw these groups as radical and intolerant, so the victory of Anis-Sandi was feared could provide a free space for radicals in carrying out their actions. Based on these reasons, there was a picture that the friction between traditional Islam and puritanical Islam also colored the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial contest.

Another Islamic party that supports Ahok-Djarot was PPP. Although many ulama were opposed to Ahok, the elite of the party prioritized the interests of the organization. In recent years, PPP has been shaken by a conflict that has divided the party into two camps, the Romi and Djan Faridz camps. Each stronghold attempted to steal sympathy from the government regime to gain the legitimacy of stewardship. Their allegiance to Ahok-Djarot, even though aware of the great rejection of his constituents, was a much-needed decision by the party. Party solidarity was more important in the face of the 2019 election than serving constituents expectation. Although the PPP elite at the central level supported Ahok-Djarot, some PPP grassroots elites tend to support Anies-Sandi, including Bachtiar Chamsyah, Haji Lulung,

Mardiono, Ubaidillah Murod, Zarkasih Nur, Tahir Saimima, and Yudo Paripurno. They claimed that supporting Anies-Sandi is the necessity of choosing a leader of Islamic principles (Tirto.id 2017). However, the support of PKB and PPP elites was less in line with support at the mass base level. Historically and sociologically, the masses of the NU are indeed claimed to have a closeness with the PKB and PPP. The Kiai from NU would often become the bickering of both parties when entering the election (Rmol.co 2013). However, the votes of the Nahdliyin are quite open; this is at least can be seen from the tendency of some of the NU masses who in the elections of Jakarta are many who drop their votes on Anies-Sandi (Republika.co.id 2017b).

The emergence of the NU masses supported to the Anies-Sandi is also a key determinant of the victory of the candidates. Moreover, the NU mass in the second round was faced with choices related to the belief aspects and matters of the ummah. In addition to the ongoing wave of protests against Islamic blasphemy, Ahok has also been backed by PDIP that historically and sociologically not too close to the masses of Islam. So even in the second round of the Election of DKI Jakarta, the PKB elite and PPP declare their support to Ahok-Djarot, the masses below tend to choose the Anies-Sandi because they were considered as representatives of the ummah.²

Seeing the reason of majority NU masses who prefer Anies-Sandi because of religious and ummah factors, then it can be regarded as an option based on a sociological and rational approach. In the sociological approach, it is clear that the religious factor becomes one of the determinants of the emergence of the political behavior of the community in choosing a particular candidate. Whereas in a rational perspective, logical reasoning becomes the basis of voting consideration in the community. Although choosing religion-based proximity in many cases does not fall into the category of rational choice, but when referring to (Calvert 1994) view of the partisan rational choice theory, ideology and belief can encourage participation so the NU masses can also perceive into a rational choice category.

Not much different from the NU masses who chose Anies-Sandi, for the Muhammadiyah, Persis and FPI mass base they decision to

2 The coordinator of PASNU West Java, KH Fahrurrozi, said that his support gave to Anies-Sandi due representing vision, mission, and program which benefited the ummah, especially the Nahdliyyin in Jakarta. He assured that in Anies-Sandi commitment the ummah would be united (Republika.co.id 2017a).

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supported Anies-Sandi was also strongly related to religious factor. Although usually in the activities of political contestation they were formally positioning the organization in a neutral position, in the Jakarta election, the regional leader of Muhammadiyah, Edy Sukardi, fully supported the Anies-Sandi. The support was given because of his religious commitment and the character of its leadership who should be considered representative of the Muslim community and Muhammadiyah (Okezone.com 2017). The solid support of the Muhammadiyah base to Anies-Sandi was not only demonstrated through Muhammadiyah's organizational stance but also from the attitude of the political party close to it, PAN.

The tendency of Islamic mass base; NU, Persis, FPI, and Muhammadiyah to the Anies-Sandi signifies the validity of the Islamic aliran in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial. The emergence of Islamic intensification of aliran also seems even to find the momentum of its rise with the Islamic parties that managed to break some predictions by the relevant survey result that the Islamic parties would vanished in the 2014 election. Although some observers have assured the aliran politics is no longer relevant, but taking into account the ability of Islamic parties and communities to win the Anies-Sandi in the Jakarta, it is necessary to find that the Islamic aliran are still a significant political force.

In the second round, Anis-Sandi elected as the next jakarta governor. The defeat of Ahok-Djarot in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial became a point where the intensification of Islamic aliran manifested itself in a strong consolidation between Islamic-based political parties, Islamic civil organizations and the mass of Islam from other groups. The melting pot between the political interests and the awakening of the awareness to safeguard the interests of the ummah many Islamic elements then synergized in supporting the Anies-Sandi. The intensification of Islamic aliran may not have occurred if there were no things that could drive the various components of Islam to unite and defeated Ahok-Djarot.

From the phenomenon that is related to the high value of Islamic parties, it can be realized that the existence of them is still significant recently. However, the Islamic party itself can not be separated from the mass of Islam, where the Muslim masses sometimes associated with certain Islamic parties, this can be seen from the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial event. The Islamic masses affiliated with PPP and PKB preferring to support Anies-Sandi than to support Ahok-Djarot for an

ideological reason. It indicates that when the establishment of a joint issue between the mass base and the Islamic party encouraged the creation of Islamic aliran, the Islamic political party would be a platform for the political aspirations of the Islamic groups.

Although based on the categorization of aliran, the opposition of Islamic groups to Ahok as an incumbent candidate can not be simply described as a rivalry between santri and abangan groups. In the Ahok-Djarot camp, there are also components of Islam-based parties, PKB and PPP, and the civilian Islamic organization, GP Ansor cadres, which mostly supported Ahok in the second round. The main parties of Ahok-Djarot, among others PDIP, Golkar Party, Nasdem Party, Hanura Party, and Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) can not be said as abangan party, except the most secular PDIP known (Choi 2017). But on the other hand, the conglomeration of Islamic groups opposed to Ahok and their actions gave rise to a strong political identity atmosphere. The resistance against Ahok not only came from partisan supporters of opposition candidates, especially Anis-Sandi, but support also came from nonpartisan groups known far from the hustle and bustle of the election contest, such as HTI. Their involvement in the actions against Ahok was motivated more by the desire that Ahok would no longer be the governor of Jakarta than to act as an Anis-Sandi sympathizer.

*Extending
Aliran Politics
in Electoral
Contest*

Conclusion

The political dynamics of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election show that the aliran scheme is still applicable particularly in the context of political relations of ideological and social identity bases. However, the conception of aliran used by the development of the political situation. As has been the case in three periods of government regimes, from the Old Order to the reform era, Islamic aliran is not a monolithic, but there are some variants in it, ranging from oriented to the application of the Shari'a to the orientation of secularism. On the secular side, there are also some tendencies, from being friendly to Islam to rejecting the inclusiveness of religion in government. Aliran politics continues to survive in Indonesian social, political structure because of the intensification that is rolled by the elite. Although in the era of reform, the aliran politics is considered no longer relevant in line with the strength of electoral politics, this article sees the aliran politics prevailing in the sphere of politicization, especially the elite relationship with the ideological mass base. The phenomenon is prominent in the

2017 Jakarta governor election case, where the involvement of Islamic groups in protests against Ahok signifies the strengthening of the identity of puritanical Islam in practical politics. Various protests not only directed about blasphemy but also strengthen the discourse of the banning of kafir leaders who were cornering Ahok. Political battles in the realm of the mass base make the conservative Islamic group vis-à-vis the secular/progressive group. At the same time, political interests have struck a traditionalist Islamic elite with puritanical Islam.

The melting pot of religious issue of the Islamic mass base and practical interest can not be separated from the ideological and sociological factors that promote the awareness of the identity in the political sphere. Considering the significance of the Islamic mass base involvement in a political competition, this article holds that the intensification of Islamic aliran would be enacted by political actors in future contestation. Because in a democratic race, any approach can be taken to achieve victory as long as it does not violate the rules themselves. Nevertheless, the commodification of religion in politics must be avoided to maintain a healthy democratic life. The balance of relations between state, religion and politics is a commitment that must be sustained by the elites.



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