How the 2004 and 2007 EU Enlargements Weakened the CFSP and CSDP

A Socio-Economic and Geopolitical Analysis

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From its very beginnings, defence and security related issues were a major concern of EU policy. However, it was the demise of the USSR in the early 1990's and the end of the Cold War that – between 1998 and 2004 – gave a major push to the evolution of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). These changes, combined with the expansion of the EU as a result of the rapid accession to membership of many new countries, spawned the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and propelled it forward in concept and operation as "European Foreign Policy" under which the EU has conducted more than 20 civilian and military missions. However, closer economic and security analyses from suggests the EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 weakened its CFSP and CSDP and that future enlargement is only likely to dilute resources further while at the same time introducing new threats with which the EU will have to contend.

Keywords: EU, CFSP, CSDP, Geopolitics, Westphalian international relations, European Security Strategy

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CFSP and CSDP: An Introduction

From its very beginning, defence and security related issues were a major concern of EU (or its antecedents) policy. The origin of the Europe-

an Union (EU) can be traced to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the early 1950s and one of its principal objectives was to reduce the capacity for war between France and Germany as a result of integrating the production and supply in these basic materials of modern industrialised warfare. The European Atomic Energy Community was also set up in the 1950s, not only for cooperation in developing nuclear energy, but also to monitor and control the spread of fissionable materials and technology. Both organisations were folded into the European Economic Community (EEC) the forerunner of the European Union under the Treaties of Rome, signed in 1957 and coming into force on 01 January 1958.

The original six members of the "EU" were the Western European nations of France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) and in 1973 were joined by Denmark, Ireland (Eire) and the United Kingdom. Norway had originally applied to join the EEC in 1962 and resumed its negotiations along with these other three countries in 1970. However, a referendum held in that country in 1972 subsequently produced a majority vote (53.5 %) against accession. Greece joined in 1981, followed by Portugal and Spain in 1986. With the exception of periods of some degree of military dictatorship in Greece, Portugal and Spain (although in the case of the latter two countries, being an overhang from pre-WWII right-wing regimes very much conditioned by the international politics of that period) all of these countries had enjoyed long experience of democratic political institutions; respect for human rights and the rule of law; and a free market economy (though most had witnessed periods of greater or lesser public ownership and/or government controls and regulation of their economies).

As these were, and are, the guiding principles that drive the expansion and integration of the EU, it follows that the incorporation of all these countries into the EU was a relatively painless exercise. Austria, Finland and Sweden joined in 1995 (Norway had again voted against accession by a 52.2% majority in a referendum held in 1994). However, it should be remarked that the absorption of Austria and Finland would probably not have been possible had it not been for the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the ending of the Cold War since until then, although enjoying a kind of neutral or "No-Man's-Land" political status, these countries were nevertheless very much

within the Soviet 'sphere of interest' despite not being occupied or members of the COMECON group of the Soviet Union's Eastern European satellites (although Finland had "Observer Status" with it). This is important because the collapse of the Soviet Union and ending of the Cold War posed threats as well as opportunities for the EU in the sphere of defence and security as these potentially unstable and formerly communist countries emerged as new independent sovereign states. While the former East Germany became part of the EU as a result of its merger with West Germany the position of other countries was not nearly so easy to rationalise and indeed, German Reunification was only achieved at massive economic and financial cost both nationally and internationally.

In the light of the ending of the Cold War, a European Council was held in Copenhagen in 1993 at which the criteria for membership of states seeking to join the EU in the future were agreed encompassing the guiding principles referenced above, as well as the willingness to fully accept the obligations and intent of the EU, including the aims of political, economic and monetary union. Thus it was this Copenhagen Conference that determined the conditions to be met by future candidate countries in order to be granted EU membership and under which ten countries (in addition to Austria and Finland that had earlier joined the EU in 1995, but which had also previously existed under the Soviet shadow) were admitted as full members of the European Union in 2004. Seven of these ten countries were either former Soviet republics or satellites: the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and the Eastern European countries of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (the latter two having formerly been the country of Czechoslovakia). One – the Balkan state of Slovenia – was an ethnic spin-off from the dissolution of the former socialist country (though relatively autonomous of Soviet control) of Yugoslavia. Two were Mediterranean island nations, both having strong British connections although less than in former times: Cyprus and Malta. Similarly, these were followed in 2007 by two other former Soviet satellites, Romania and Bulgaria, bringing the number of EU member states, at that time, to 27, with a combined population in round figures of 500 million inhabitants or 7.3% of the world population.[1]

CFSP and CSDP: An Evolution

The Treaty on European Union, often referred to as the Treaty of Masstricht established as one of the key pillars of the EU the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) encompassing foreign policy and military matters and which was a further development of an earlier attempt to codify European political cooperation under the Single European Act of July 1987 that had been the first major revision of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. This very much represented the idea that the EU's CFSP should reflect the same guiding principles as those that had conditioned its membership (and enlargement) criteria discussed above. The Office of High Representative for the CFSP was created in 1999 with the role of coordinating EU foreign policy which was further strengthened under the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and retitled The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy which post was then occupied by (Baroness) Catherine Ashton.

A European Security Strategy was first issued at about the same time as the 2004 enlargement of the EU and has since been further developed and refined. Following from earlier discussions to develop a common European approach to defence and security issues, it took the position that in the light of the post-Cold War World, large-scale external aggression against any member state was highly unlikely and in this context highlighted the EU's main CFSP concerns.[2]

These included: terrorism (especially linked to religious extremism and viewed as not only coming from outside the EU's borders – such as Al Qaeda – but also as an internal threat from potentially culturally and economically disaffected and alienated recent foreign immigrants); the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDS), including nuclear, biological, and chemical; overspill from regional conflicts, especially near to the borders of the EU; failed states (such as Somalia) and the chaos of post-conflict states (such as Libya post-2011) that could lead to waves of refugees; organised crime with cross-border trafficking in drugs, illegal immigrants, weapons, women and counterfeit goods representing a major external threat to the EU's internal security and that has close links with all the above.[3]

As pointed out under the European Security Strategy document, the EU has sought to be prepared to respond to these threats in a number

of ways.[4] For instance: after 9/11 it adopted a European Arrest Warrant; took steps to target the financing of terrorist activities; and entered into an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the US. As referenced above, the EU had pursued policies against nuclear proliferation over many years and took further steps to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with measures to tighten export controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit procurement of fissionable material, while at the same time seeking universal adherence to and strengthening of multilateral treaties governing nuclear issues and tightening inspection and verification provisions.

To help deal with regional conflicts, the EU and its members have intervened in a number of cases to restore peace and protect civilians and, so far as is possible, institute plans to reconstitute failed states. One example is the intervention in the former Yugoslavia to prevent a return of ethnic-cleansing and restore good government; to foster democracy and help indigenous authorities deal with problems of organised crime.

Unlike the danger posed to Western Europe from the USSR and its Eastern European allies between 1945 and the ending of the Cold War period in the 1990s, the challenges the EU faces to its security are no longer viewed as simply military and therefore have to be addressed by a variety of different approaches; often being a combination of methods and responses although sometimes including the use of military assets, depending on the nature of the issue. For example, tight export and customs controls, as well as applying economic and political pressure and in some case sanctions on suspect states, is used to prevent the previously referenced problem of seeking to prevent the proliferation of WMDs. Additionally, all the usual elements of intelligence, police, legal, military, socio-economic and political methods may be mobilised to combat terrorism. In the case of failed states, while the EU recognises that military intervention may be needed to restore order, in the aftermath of any such action, various forms of aid will almost always be required to deal with the likely subsequent humanitarian crisis. In the case of failed states, the EU also seeks to assist towards the political process that will always be required to find a lasting solution to any regional conflict, yet understands that the use of military peace-keepers and the establishment of an effective police force are still almost always needed in post-conflict phases, as well as socio-eco-

nomic development and administration to help in the restoration of normal civil government in the longer term.[5] The CFSP and CSDP are seen as being particularly well suited and aimed towards addressing these issues. Additionally, the EU is concerned with establishing security in its neighbourhood and thus on its borders and as such is particularly concerned with the politics of the Mediterranean area, including the Middle East.

Despite concerns about defence and security over the 40 or so years of its earlier development, before the 1990s there were very few tangible examples of external EU involvement in the field of defence and security and:

> Any notion of an autonomous EU role [i.e. outside NATO] in the field of security (let alone defence) was virtually unthinkable for most of the 1990s. Yet between 1998 and 2004 the evolution from an essentially 'civilian' notion of the CFSP towards a European Security and Defence Policy seemed almost to portent a revolution in the concept and operation of a 'European Foreign Policy.'6

However, its evolution and development was driven by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ending of the Cold war and that Europe appeared to no longer be an area of major concern for the US as it switched its strategic attention to the Arab Gulf, the Middle East and Asia. It also presented the problem of potentially bankrupt, chaotic and lawless states on the EU's eastern and southern borders.

Additionally the traditional Westphalian reading of international affairs that had kept states from interfering in the internal affairs of others providing one party had not actually been attacked or disadvantaged in any way by the other, were deemed as no longer seeming to apply in the new World of globalisation and the dangers of rapid international security contamination, not to mention a heightened international view of collective responsibility for humanitarian issues. The 1998 St. Malo Meeting between UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and France's President Jacques Chirac in 1998 can be viewed as very much as the 'crossing of the Rubicon' in this respect.

Soon after the Anglo-French Accord, the EU introduced what was known as the Helsinki Headline Goals named from the location at which discussion on these issues took place between member states. The main proposal was to put in place the capability to rapidly deploy

50,000-60,000 troops with the ability to maintain this battle-group (of all arms) in the field for one year. However, this objective has never been completely achieved and indeed, has always been short of airlift and sealift capability, as well as many essential arms and munitions and weapons and support systems that could only be supplied through NATO, as well as lacking headquarter facilities and coordination and common command structures and funding agreements.

Some negotiations have taken place between the EU and NATO on resource sharing, but it is fair to say that this has never been a very comfortable relationship and in particular the US (very much dominant) component of NATO has always been suspicious regarding EU military action. This is because of the perceived plethora of politically-motivated and varying degrees of commitment quite apart from issues concerning combat-zone effectiveness (although it is fair to say that it sometimes suits the diplomatic purposes of the US if not so much pragmatic military considerations, to have either the EU involved or even taking the initiative on certain international crises e.g. Libya in 2011).

These difficulties notwithstanding, from the perspective of the EU, a major revision was needed to take place in what constituted defence and security issues in response to the new post-Cold War era in international relations and therefore how foreign policy would henceforth be interpreted. Thus evolved a major component of CFSP in the form of the CSDP under which the EU has conducted more than 20 civilian and military missions.

Missions

A brief summary of continuing or completed operations include:

- A civilian mission aimed at the improvement of security at Juba International Airport in the World's newest country of South Sudan (2012-2015),
- A military mission to train Somali security forces of the Transitional Federal Government (2010-2015),
- A European Naval Force to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Indian Ocean (2008-2014),
- A police mission in Afghanistan aimed at contributing to the establishment of sustainable and effective civilian policing (2007-2013),
- A regional training mission aimed at strengthening the maritime ca-

pacities of eight countries in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean to combat piracy through developing appropriate military, legal and socio-economic infrastructure (2009-2014),

A civilian crisis management mission aimed to provide integrated training activities for Iraqi professionals working in the country's post-Saddam Hussein era criminal justice system (2005-2013),

Advice and assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo security authorities interlaced with the promotion of policies that are compatible with human rights, as well as principles of good public management and the rule of law (2005-2012),

A military operation to Bosnia and Herzegovina aimed towards the stabilisation of the country and to assist it in making progress towards its possible integration with the EU. (2004-14),

A mission aimed at the reform of the Congolese national police including its integration and interaction with the justice sector (2005-2012),

A mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina to support the reform of the police forces and in particular consolidate local capacity and regional cooperation in the fight against major and organised crime (2003-2011),

The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo which is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the CSDP and is also part of a broader effort undertaken by the EU to promote peace and stability in the Western Balkans and many believe (though still a politically-sensitive issue) to possibly move Kosovo towards statehood and eventual membership of the EU (2008-2014),

An autonomous civilian monitoring mission in Georgia to contribute to the stability of the country and the surrounding region following the conflict between Georgia and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which subsequently received Russian support and are still occupied by it despite remaining legally part of Georgia (2008-2012),

A monitoring mission to help effect the Israeli-Palestinian Authority Agreement by providing third-party assistance on movement and access at the Rafah border crossing in Gaza (2005-2012),

A mission to establish sustainable and effective policing arrangements and training in the criminal justice sector for the Palestinian territories (2005-2012),

A border assistance mission to the Republics of Moldova and

Ukraine to support capacity building for border management and customs to prevent smuggling and trafficking of goods, weapons, drugs and people on the whole Moldova-Ukraine border, including the border between Ukraine and the separatist Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova as Moldovan authorities are unable to be present there due to the continued presence of Russian military forces (2005-2012),

A military operation in support of humanitarian operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya; although it could be argued that this went well beyond its original mandate and actively assisted regime change (2011-2012),

Supporting the reform of the security sector in Guinea-Bissau (2008-2010),

A military operation aimed at the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2003),

A military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to support the elections process (2006),

A police mission in Kinshasa province in the Democratic Republic of Congo to help the National Police keep order during the transition to democracy, particularly during the electoral period referenced previously (2005-2007),

A civilian-military action to support the African Union's enhanced Mission to Sudan/Darfur (2005-2007),

A military bridging operation in eastern Chad and the north-east of the Central African Republic to protect refugees and displaced populations as well as permit the safe movement of international and local personnel engaged in the delivery of humanitarian aid (2007-2010),

A mission to monitor the implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement that had been fighting for self-rule of this Indonesian province, including the decommissioning of armaments held by the latter and removal of the military and para-military police forces of the former, with the advent of local elections and a move towards a degree of regional autonomy (2005-2006),

A military operation in Macedonia to help create a stable and secure

environment in the central Balkans beset as it was with inter-ethnic conflict and fleeing refugees following the dissolution of the former Republic of Yugoslavia and to help contribute towards the establishment and stability of this new country (2003),

Two advisory missions to advise Macedonia's police on border control, public order and accountability and combating corruption and organised crime (2003-2006),

A Rule of Law mission to Georgia to mentor and advise Ministers, senior officials and central government bodies on challenges in the criminal justice system and to assist the overall reform process towards building a democratic state (2004-2005).[7]

Enlargement

It might well appear that the EU has an extremely broad and proactive CFSP and much of this is effected through an active and effective CSDP that has been bolstered as a result of the collective political objectives and through the pooling of the resources of 27 member states (as of 2007) as suggested by the fact that in 2004 the combined EU (then 25) member states defence expenditure stood at an estimated US$ 208 billion, equivalent to just over 50 per cent of that of the USA[8].

However, closer analysis invites two questions: (1) did the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 really strengthen or indeed, could they have weakened its CFSP and CSDP and (2) are these policies and their resulting application as an effective realisation of EU power as they are represented to be by those who extol the defence and security benefits of a politically integrated EU?

The 2004 EU enlargement added another 74.43 million to the combined population of its then members of 393.26 million; an increase of almost 20%. The addition of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 added a further 29.51 million people representing a total increase in the population of the EU by 103.94 million or 26.43% in four years![9] However, in these same four years, the combined economies of the 12 new members of the EU in 2007 added only 7.59% to its total GDP[10]!

It is clear from these figures that on a purely numbers basis alone, the indigenous defence and security issues and needs brought by the new member states would not even be balanced by the additional economic resources they contributed and therefore, would be likely to be

a net drain on the existing resources of the EU available for CFSP and CSDP activities prior to enlargement.

In fact, when turning to economic data for defence spending the position was even worse. In 2004, the addition of the defence expenditure of the 10 new member states added less than 5% to the overall defence expenditure of the then existing EU and over two-fifths of this was contributed by Poland, leaving the other nine to account for little more than the defence expenditure of Sweden.[11]

On the basis of manpower contribution the picture appears to be a little better with the 10 new members having added almost 20% to the total armed forces of the EU in 2004.[12] However, this figure is deceiving. First, Poland alone was responsible for almost 52% of this net gain and many of the troops are not equivalent to the professional, highly-trained and well-equipped soldiers of for instance, the British Army, Navy and Air Force, but mainly inadequately armed and often short-term conscripts having little more than skills in drilling and the use of small-arms. Additionally, many of the new states lacked either naval or air assets or both; not to mention heavy and/or high-technology armour, artillery and weapons-systems, as well as logistics, information-gathering and communications material.

The situation in 2014 is little changed with if anything the percentage of their GDPs allocated to defence expenditure rolled back across the EU member states in general and the thirteen new members (with the accession of Croatia) joining since 2004 in particular, as the worldwide economic recession and especially the continued troubles in the Eurozone. Indeed, in July 2012 even the UK announced its intention to reduce the size of its army by 20,000 soldiers (resulting in the loss of 5 battalions including such iconic names as "The Green Howards") as well as plans for major cuts across its armed services as a whole. Despite making commitments to new weapons systems such as two new-generation aircraft carriers, the first of which (HMS Queen Elizabeth) was launched for further fitting-out and sea-trials in July 2014, major economic concerns still pose possible constraints. Such concerns relate to the equipping HMS Queen Elizabeth with its full complement of jet-fighters; the schedule for completion of the second Carrier; and provision of sufficient Royal Navy escort vessels for the Carriers.

In addition to the need to provide defence and security for the additional (almost) 110 million population of the EU added since 2004, let alone project and protect beyond its frontiers, its land area increased

in size with enlargement by over one-third or the equivalent of over 13 times the size of the UK.[13] Additionally, the physical location of some of the new entrants in 2004 and 2007 extended the EU's frontiers towards regions of potential security problems and the new countries brought with them their own historical and political issues to add to the EU's existing defence and security issues.[14]

The Legacy of the CFSP and CSDP

The Czech Republic has been cited by international police agencies as a major trans-shipment point for southwest Asian heroin as well as a minor transit point for Latin American cocaine being distributed into Western Europe. Additionally, it is a local producer and regional distributor of synthetic illicit drugs such as 'ecstasy' as well as harbouring organised crime in sex trade trafficking. There is also a quite vitriolic dispute with Austria which is seeking the closure of the Soviet-era nuclear plant in Temelin which is close to the latter country's borders.

Estonia is also an important trans-shipment point for cannabis, cocaine and opiates as well as locally-produced synthetic drugs into Western Europe as well as the gambling business having been developed to boost economic activity, provide jobs and government revenues becoming a home for money-laundering. Politically there still exists tension with Russia as Estonia continues to press for a realignment of its borders based on the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty.

Very similar to the Czech Republic although considered to be an even bigger problem, Hungary is also cited by international police agencies as a major trans-shipment point for southwest Asian heroin as well as a transit point for Latin American cocaine entering into Western Europe. It is also a major producer of feedstock chemicals for the manufacture of synthetic illicit drugs and is a home to organised crime. Hungary also has disputes with some of its neighbours regarding the use of resources related to the Danube, including water-rights and hydro-electric power generation.

Latvia has many of the same problems as its Baltic neighbour Estonia with the addition of being a centre for counterfeiting, prostitution and the trans-shipment of cars stolen in Western Europe. Latvia still has disputes with Russia regarding the treatment of ethnic Russians still living within its now sovereign territory as well as in regard to Maritime boundaries with its Baltic neighbour Lithuania due to con-

cerns about potential offshore oil and gas deposits.

As might be expected, Slovakia shares similar problems with regard to crime as its former 'other-half' did prior to its "Velvet divorce" from the Czech Republic and an on-going dispute with Hungary as referenced above.

Poland shares many of the same crime-related problems as the other former Communist states of Eastern Europe, but because of its economic base is probably an even bigger producer of illicit synthetic drugs, as well as having a major problem combating illegal immigration and trade along its long border with the corruption-rife former Soviet republics of Belarus and the Ukraine.

In addition to drug-related crime, Slovenia still has some outstanding land and maritime border issues with neighbouring Croatia although these were largely resolved as a precursor to the latter's forthcoming accession to the EU as its 28th member state in 2013.

Cyprus was a former British colony that became independent in 1960. Due to its geography it is a major concern as a transit location for heroin and hashish, particularly from Turkey and Lebanon, as well as being a centre for money-laundering due to relatively loose oversight of offshore money transactions. However, the major security issue revolves around the Turkish-Greek ethnic divide of the island's population that erupted in outright hostilities in 1974 and its subsequent division into two halves and a 1,000 strong UN peace-keeping force maintains the border zone in between. When Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 it was curiously allowed to do so even though the required standards for entry were suspended for the north (Turkish part) of the island. Cyprus is still an outstanding and major issue for defence and security for Turkey as well as colouring the latter's relationship with Greece and therefore, its solution would be a necessary step prior to Turkey's potential membership of the EU. The fact that Turkey is an important ally of the USA, particularly with regard to security in the Middle East and Caucus Region and that the UK still maintains military bases in Cyprus, further complicates matters for the EU in regard to this country. Turkey's opposition to Cyprus has also been evident in recent years regarding the latter's unilateral allocation of oil & gas exploration rights around its shores and in agreeing maritime boundaries with Lebanon. With the economy and indebtedness of Cyprus in the same relatively poor state as that as its neighbour Greece (despite

being absolutely much smaller) the security situation is only likely to further deteriorate.

Until recently the tiny island nation of Malta did not bring any immediate defence and security issues, other than small-scale smuggling of hashish from North Africa. However, in recent times it has become a major half-way-house destination for illegal immigrants seeking to enter the EU from impoverished and war torn North Africa and especially since the overthrow of President Gaddafi in Libya.

Romania is a major trans-shipment point for southwest Asian heroin into the EU and its banks, currency-exchange houses and casinos provide considerable opportunities for money-laundering. Romania has significant disputes with the Ukraine over the ownership and administration of certain Danube islands; maritime boundaries in the Black Sea; and the latter's plans for a canal link between the Danube through Ukraine to the Black Sea.

Bulgaria has all the same crime-related problems as Romania, but the scale and reach of its organised crime is probably far greater. An 'unholy alliance' of some of its former communist-regime intelligence personnel and local mafia-type criminal gangs has created one of the major sources of trafficking in drugs, people (especially in the sex trade), weapons and counterfeit and/or smuggled and/or stolen goods and created a new major and violent crime-wave in the Balkans and southern Europe.

Croatia of course, was not part of the 2004 and 2007 enlargement, but similar considerations relate to the EU's most recent member state and which has also brought its own particular security issues. Croatia was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until after WWI in 1918 when the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes formed a new country, known after 1929 as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After WWII (during which time many Croats actively sided with Nazi Germany within the puppet Ustasha State) Yugoslavia became a federal state which although communist, under the strong rule of Marshal TITO, was relatively independent of the Soviet Union. Declaring its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, it took four years of sporadic, but often bitter fighting before occupying Serb forces (as well as most of the ethnic Serb population) were cleared from Croatia. Under UN supervision, the last Serb-held enclave in Eastern Slavonia was returned to Croatia in 1998. The country joined NATO in April 2009 and the EU in July 2013. With

such a history it is hardly surprising to have numerous inherited international disputes, such as: with Bosnia & Herzegovina over several small sections of the boundary related to maritime access; with Slovenia over sovereignty rights in Pirin Bay and various villages, as well as in the Adriatic Sea (although, as already referenced above, in 2009 Croatia and Slovenia signed an arbitration agreement to define their disputed land and maritime borders, which led to Slovenia lifting its objections to Croatia joining the EU). Additionally, Croatia is seen as a major access point via land from the Balkans for the transit of illicit drugs, such as Heroin from Asia; and Cocaine via maritime shipments from South American, to Western Europe.

The fact that all member states are required to implement the provisions of the 1985 Schengen Agreement (with the exception of the UK and Eire who have opted out of some) since it was absorbed into EU law in 1999 under the Amsterdam Treaty has led to the elimination of internal border controls and as a result created a field-day of opportunity for criminal elements from the post-2004 membership countries to penetrate Western Europe.[15]

While the European Naval Force operating in the Indian Ocean to suppress piracy (particularly emanating from the failed state of Somalia) purports to be a joint taskforce from 26 of the member states, in fact the majority of military assets have been supplied by the traditional maritime powers of Western Europe (for example France, Spain, Netherlands, UK etc.) with the contribution from the post-2004 members being negligible. For example: a small coastguard team from Estonia operating on-board a German frigate and even one officer provided by Lithuania to the onshore operational headquarters is referenced as a token means of increasing EU member involvement.[16]

The EU operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad and the Central African Republic have largely been carried out by French and Belgian forces that as a result of colonial antecedents and language ties, have unilaterally maintained a continuing political and economic 'sphere of interest' in these regions, regardless of EU membership and despite both completed and on-going assistance missions conducted under the EU's CSDP there were reported to have been almost 4 million deaths from insurgency, counterinsurgency and general lawlessness in the DRC between the mid-1990s and the middle of the first decade of the 21st century and which regrettably is continuing in the second decade.[17]

EU involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have all been part NATO led operations and depended little on contributions from the new post-2004 members (although there was small contingents of particularly Polish troops deployed in a non-combatant role in the latter). This of course, introduces a major aspect of EU CFSP and particularly CSDP. As touched on above, without access to significant NATO assets EU forces would have great difficulty in projecting force beyond their frontiers (or even in some cases within their borders). While the EU has negotiated with NATO to be allowed to utilise resources, it is still very much a contentious issue, particularly with the US which is highly suspicious of multi-polity arrangements and as already remarked, frequently disparaging concerning their military effectiveness. The EU has even found it difficult to reach agreement between its own members regarding the permanent commitment of some of their national military assets to a standing EU combined-arms taskforce and has also failed to even get fixed commitments as to a minimum percentage of their GDP that each member state is prepared to contribute to their own defence spending.

EU involvement external to its borders has also in some cases given rise to creating their own new security threats and/or political disputes. For example, EU involvement in Kosovo that has been linked with the de facto independence (though some might say semi-colonial status) of this former Yugoslavian (and still technically Serbian) province has invited tension between Balkan states and especially with Russia. Likewise, the recent (June 2014) Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and particularly the Ukraine which looks towards full integration (and possibly also NATO membership – in a move towards this eventuality in July 2014 the U.S. Congress passed a bill, whereby Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia can obtain the status of allies of the U.S. even without full membership of NATO) can only add to the EU's security overhead.

The addition of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 again brings up the contribution of post-2004 states to overall military spending referenced above. However, in 2010 the 2004 and 2007 entrants together contributed only 7.29% of total defence spending by all EU member countries. Again, if Poland is taken out of the calculation then this contribution is reduced to 4%! It is small wonder that the larger economic and military powers within the EU are highly reluctant to aggregate (one might say dissipate) their defence capability into an EU

force. The UK, France, Germany and Italy (ranked in that order) are the four big military spenders of the EU and Britain alone accounts for 22.33% of the whole of EU defence spending and three times as much as the combined post-2004 and 2007 new member states put together (Poland included)! In the same year (2010) military spending by the US was more than 2⅔ times as large as that of the EU, accounting for 4.8% of its GDP compared with 1.61% of the 'EU's GDP' (while some countries, such as the UK at 2.56% of GDP, spend more than this average many – and especially the post-2004 entrants – spend a significantly smaller percentage of their GDP on defence). It must also be recalled that EU defence spending is spread over 28 armies, 24 air forces and 21 navies; many with different types of equipment, command structures, operational and combat procedures, traditions and standards and, not least, languages! Politically, sovereign control over military and defence assets is likely to be the last area that the government any member state will be willing to surrender to common EU control and especially for those countries having a military tradition such as the UK and France, which though absolutely small in relation to the US, are still relatively heavy-hitters in international terms.[18]

Conclusion

While the EU's record in security areas such as combating organised crime and terrorism and the illegal trafficking (of all kinds as discussed above) and money laundering with which it is associated seems to be laudable, it would be very hard to argue against the fact that the post-2004 (and especially the post-2007) enlargement of its membership (and borders) has in fact significantly increased its exposure to these problems as well as diluting the capacity to control them. Though tasks such as humanitarian actions relating to conflict prevention and peace-keeping, crisis management and providing military and police advice and guidance on state-building and governance infrastructure have achieved some success, they have had considerable short-comings in regard to the military component required for their success and again, the EU enlargement since 2004 has hardly added any capacity while at the same time introducing new dangers.

The EU has been described as 'economic giant but a political dwarf.'[19] However, since the ultimate political and military power of any nation or alliance is dependent on its economic base and, in 2011, the

EU-27 was the World's biggest economy with a GDP of $15.39 (USD) trillion, surpassing even the US with a GDP of $15.04 (USD) trillion on first consideration this might suggest that the EU would not only be a significant but a growing international presence in security and military international power projection.[20] However, just as the impact on the EU of the post-2007 economic recession has been exacerbated by its too-rapid and more so poorly controlled enlargement, as discussed above this has also weakened its CFSP and CSDP and additionally, the two (economics and security) are interlinked. Plans for future enlargement are only likely to dilute resources further while at the same time introducing new threats with which to contend, not least being the possible membership of Turkey that would bring European frontiers to the very borders of the world's hottest trouble spots in the Middle East.

Seven years on, the author can both concur and reinforce the conclusion of Brown and Shepherd (2007)[21] that the post-2004 enlargement has meant 'the likelihood of the EU fulfilling what states such as France view as its destiny as a counter-balance or alternative pole to the US, is ever more unlikely' and failing to get the balance right between pre-existing [pre-2004] commitments and the process of enlargement 'will ultimately undermine not only the EU's sense of security, but also its longer-term credibility as a security actor.'

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Notes

1 Giampaolo Lanzieri (2009), '*Population and Social Conditions*,' Eurostat, European Commission, p. 1, available at: <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-QA-09-047/EN/KS-QA-09-047-EN.PDF> (accessed 29 September 2013).

2 Jochen Rehrl and Han-Bernhard Weisserth (2010), '*Handbook on CSDP: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union*,' Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Repub-

lic of Austria, Vienna 2010, p. 106. This document is available at: <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/csdp_handbook_web.pdf.> (accessed 29 September 2013).

3 Rehrl and Weisserth (2010), pp. 106-107.

4 Ibid, pp. 109-111.

5 Ibid, pp. 110.

6 Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (2005), *International Relations and the European Union,* Oxford UP, p. 180.

7 '*CFSP*' available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/foreign-policy?lang=en> (accessed 29 September 2013).

8 This is derived from data cited in Hill and Smith 2005 p. 187, taken from '*The Military Balance 2004-2005*,' The International Institute of Strategic Studies, Oxford UP, 2004).

9 For the compiled population figures for individual EU member states, see: '*EU Country List*,' at: <http://www.eucountrylist.com> (accessed 29 September 2013).

10 Compiled from GDP figures for individual EU member states for 2007, see: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_European_Union> (accessed 29 September 2013).

11 Compiled from data cited in Hill and Smith p. 187.

12 Ibid, p. 187.

13 Compiled using individual country data presented in *The World Factbook*, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Washington D.C., 2012.

14 Source (among others): *The World Factbook*, Ibid. 2012,' pp. 176, 179, 212, 300, 379, 424, 528, 541, 594 and 597.

15 Sources: *The World Factbook*, 2012, p. 101 and Misha Glenny (2009), *McMafia: Seriously Organised Crime*, Vintage Books.

16 Source: *Operation Atalanta*, at: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Atalanta> (accessed 29 September 2013).

17 New York Times, 30 July 2006.

18 Compiled from data on European military spending in 2010, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_the_European_Union> (accessed 29 September 2013).

19 Alexis Vahlas (2011), reported in *The Express Tribune*, 28 April 2011.

20 Compiled using individual country data presented in *The World Factbook*.

21 David Brown and Alistair J. K. Shepherd (2007), *The Security dimensions of EU Enlargement: Wider Europe Weaker* Europe, Manchester UP, pp. 219 and 220.