

RESHAPING EUROPE IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD: CAN THE EU RISE TO THE CHALLENGE?

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ABSTRACT: Globalisation and the emergence of economic players such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) have led to predictions that US hegemony will quickly decline as a new world order emerges. With the European Union (EU) also facing a downgrading of its own status – as economic, political and cultural power shifts from west to east – now is the time to ensure the Union has a strategy in place to remain an influential global actor despite its lack of natural resources and member state sovereign debt arising from the 2008/9 economic crisis. Only concerted efforts at institutional future-proofing (or widening and deepening plus) by the EU and a global vision for the supranational body will ensure its survival and prosperity.

KEYWORDS: The EU, multipolarity, sovereign debt crisis, BRIC

INTRODUCTION

Using a deductive approach, we can say that the EU capitalised on the collapse of communism and the unfreezing of the old world order to extend its power and influence through accessions into Central and Eastern Europe. Can this causal theory be logically extended – to advocate the EU capitalising on globalisation through an extended international vision of institutional future-proofing – as we move towards a critical juncture? This article proposes exactly that, a completely re-conceptualised Europe.

In fact, the Treaty of Lisbon itself refers to 'bringing together external policy tools' to promote 'Europe as an actor on the global stage.'¹ Indeed, a Reflection Group led by Felipe Gonzalez (2010) published its report on the future of Europe looking forward to 2030 – beckoning politicians and policy-makers to craft a more energetic approach.² Gonzalez demands assertive leadership, in a 'wake-up call for Europe to respond to the changing global order', if the union is to avoid marginalisation. He recommends supranational

economic governance, transportable social rights, a long-term European defence vision and common strategic concept – imploring the EU to translate ‘its huge financial bargaining power into political leverage.’

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Using a world-systems approach, we can see that global power structures are changing as the baton is passed east in a potential Asian century. The EU needs to craft an intelligent place for itself in this new world order so that it can effectively cooperate and compete with the Asia-Pacific region and the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC).

For the purpose of this paper, EU protective widening and deepening measures – along with bolstered economic governance, strengthened military capabilities, improved policy competences and further democratisation of supranational bodies are classified as institutional future-proofing. A process already tentatively started by Lisbon ratification, the new permanent EU President and High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, and manoeuvring by the EU to achieve pseudo-state status at the UN.

Institutional future-proofing explains the causal relationship between EU expansion/integration and a new multi-polar world in line with globalisation and a downgrading of classical sovereignty via Europeanisation. Through review of existing literature and examination of primary and secondary data in this area, we can demonstrate support for the hypothesis.

THE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR DESPITE THE ECONOMIC CRISIS


Evaluating growing EU prominence in the areas of trade, climate change and agriculture as well the potential for a stronger euro reserve currency and the prospect of imminent accessions – there are positives to consider. We know that the magnetism of single market has worked well by incentivising countries to adopt EU norms.

Using multivariate analysis to explain institutional future-proofing – the dependent variable is defined as the requirement for further EU widening and deepening plus. The independent variables informing this need are the rise of the BRIC countries, the decline of US hegemony and the birth of a multi-polar world as well as globalisation, the 2008/9 economic crisis and EU environmental leadership

(see Info-Graph 1). There is already talk of a new treaty now to deliver the Europe 2020 vision, a European Monetary Fund (EMF) and supranational economic governance to follow the recent bailout plan for eurozone countries as well as eventual direct EU taxes.

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INFO-GRAPH 1. EU Institutional Future-Proofing



IV - independent variable, DV - dependent variable

The new European External Action Service (EEAS) might also allow the EU to become a conflict manager in global diplomacy. And the case for institutional future-proofing may, indeed, become overwhelming as time moves on and exogenous shocks – such as the end of US hegemony, another financial downturn, war, a natural resources crunch or quickened climate change – arise. The 2008/9 economic crisis has already created a crossroads of sorts. We can see that Eurobarometer data shows public opinion is favourable on accessions strengthening the EU (see Table 1).

TABLE 1.

SINCE 2004 THE EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGED FROM 15 TO 27 COUNTRIES. OVERALL, HOW WOULD YOU JUDGE THIS ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION?	
It has strengthened the European Union	48%
It has weakened the European Union	36%
Don't know/ no answer	16%

SOURCE: Eurobarometer 70 (2008, p. 62).

The Eurobarometer 70³ data also details how 72 per cent of citizens feel protecting the environment is an issue that should be pursued at a supranational level. Alongside trade, tackling climate change has allowed the union to construct an embryonic social identity. This could provide a base to boost linkages with citizens through further democratisation of institutions.

Data from questionnaires sent to all MEPs (see Table 2) shows that, although, there is a view that subsidiarity is not an outdated concept – there is an overwhelming belief that the EU’s strong performance as an environmental leader, for example, proves the supranational body should have greater authority on other major trans-boundary issues.

TABLE 2.

	EUROPHILE MEPs (from left-wing parties)			EUROSCEPTIC MEPs (from right-wing parties)		
	Agree	Disagree	No view	Agree	Disagree	No view
Does the EU’s strong performance as a leader on climate change and trade issues prove that the supranational body should have authority (over and above member states) on other major trans-boundary issues including tackling international terrorism?	100%			33.3%	66.6%	
Is subsidiarity an outdated concept in a globalised age?	100%				100%	

SOURCE: Fieldwork conducted in this research project consisting of questionnaires sent to all MEPs.

But how do we address imperfect institutional design? Major policy failures do exist such as the Common Agricultural Policy and Common Fisheries Policy. Internal conflicts over leg hold traps and the Tuna-Dolphin case have also shown the EU in a poor light, demonstrating clear examples of the contradictory environmental and trade priorities. Consensus, continuity and clarity should be the aims going forward. This research (Table 3) shows MEPs recognise the policy incoherencies which stymie the EU – although

tellingly, they reject any debate on repatriating powers to member states. We must now see the courage to match their conviction.

TABLE 3.

	EUROPHILE MEPs (from left-wing parties)			EUROSCEPTIC MEPs (from right-wing parties)		
	Agree	Disagree	No view	Agree	Disagree	No view
Does policy incoherence across Member states and directorates -generals stymie the EU's effectiveness?	66.6%	33.3%		66.6%	33.3%	
Should member states attempt to repatriate some powers previously surrendered to the EU?		100%		66.6%	33.3%	

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SOURCE: Fieldwork conducted in this research project consisting of questionnaires sent to all MEPs.

TABLE 4.

THE EU'S INTERNATIONAL ACTORNESS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS		
	Rational-choice institutionalism	Sociological institutionalism
Cohesion	Officially agreed upon common positions resulting from similar initial preferences, a trade-off, issue linkage, side payment or a voting rule that has made it possible to outvote an opposing minority	Shared norms and values leading to both procedural and substantive agreement among EU member states
Authority	Legal authority to represent the EU delegated to one EU actor, as stipulated in formal provisions	Authority based on acceptance by EU member states that their position is represented by a single EU actor
Autonomy	Actor representing EU can act relatively independently from the member states	Main decision-makers on the EU position and the EU's representative consider themselves European actors
Recognition	EU's representative is officially recognised as such and the EU (EC) is party to an international agreement or member of an international Organisation	Interaction by third states and non-states actors with EU instead of, or in addition to, individual member states

SOURCE: Groenleer & van Schaik (2007, p. 976).

In fact, some scholars argue that we are already witnessing a transition away from national sovereignty (see Table 4) to rational choice institutionalism and the EU rescuing member states by providing them with 'trans-national legitimacy'.⁴

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Historically, the EU advanced only when there was a disaster to act as a catalyst for change. And in interview – a think-tank director – insists: 'Fragile national governments have not come to terms with globalisation as a big phenomenon and societal transformation after the digital revolution. You see it in the decline of catch-all parties, the hollowing out of the bigger parties and the decline in trust of politics in general.'

For all its faults, the EU has the potential to tackle issues like drug-smuggling, people trafficking and corruption in new geographical areas if it attains processes of economic governance to match its existing mechanisms of political governance, which must also be improved.

SHOULD WE TACKLE THE EU'S DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT?

We can, without doubt, put forward the case that a more representative EU must address the democratic deficit, while expanding further to the south and east – and eradicating introverted institutional wrangling. For Eurasia has become a geopolitical axis as the supercontinent accounts for 60 per cent of the world's GNP and 75 per cent of energy resources – and the EU must ensure it has a key governance role. A sense of public space to provide legitimacy must appear through enhanced chains of accountability and electoral linkages.

Further inroads, beyond Lisbon, have to be made to nurture a European demos as the post-war permissive consensus ends. Meanwhile, MEPs are equivocally split along ideological lines (see Table 5) on the topic of EU democratisation.

TABLE 5.

	EUROPHILE MEPs (from left-wing parties)			EUROSCEPTIC MEPs (from right-wing parties)		
	Agree	Disagree	No view	Agree	Disagree	No view
Is it necessary for further democratisation of the EU to occur (to address the alleged 'democratic deficit') before another tranche of accessions?		100%		100%		

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SOURCE: Fieldwork conducted in this research project consisting of questionnaires sent to all MEPs.

As to left-right divisions as a solution, there is a highly-convincing argument for an injection of ideological politics, while creating a bigger media profile for the European Parliament and encouraging greater scrutiny of EU legislation in member states.

TABLE 6.

FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING AREAS, DO YOU THINK THAT DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE BY THE (NATIONALITY) GOVERNMENT, OR MADE JOINTLY WITHIN THE EU? (% JOINTLY WITHIN THE EU)			
	Eurobarometer (Autumn 2007)	Eurobarometer (Spring 2008)	Eurobarometer (Autumn 2008)
Fighting terrorism	81	79	79
Protecting the environment	73	71	67
Defence and foreign affairs	67	64	64
Energy	68	61	63
Economy	48	47	51
Agriculture and fishery	53	51	50
Health	33	33	37
The educational system	32	31	33
Social welfare	32	30	32
Taxation	30	28	29

SOURCE: Eurobarometer 70 (2008, 50).

Without further reforms, public perceptions of the EU will remain confused (see Table 6). Tellingly, a ComRes survey details the low regard in which MEPs perceive their constituents to hold them (see Table 7), perhaps due to the pseudo-democratic nature of the EP.⁵

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TABLE 7.

HOW DO YOU BELIEVE MEPs ARE PERCIEVED BY VOTERS IN YOUR MEMBER STATE (%)?					
	Total	European People's Party Group	Socialist Group	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Group	Independence Democracy Group
Very positively	0	0	0	0	0
Positively	36	48	33	0	17
Neither positively or negatively	39	32	52	36	0
Negatively	13	6	10	45	33
Very Negatively	11	13	0	9	50
DO YOU BELIEVE MEPs ARE MORE OR LESS RESPECTED THAN DOMESTIC LEGISLATORS IN YOUR MEMBER STATE (%)?					
MEPs are respected more	31	29	38	45	17
MEPs are respected less	55	61	43	36	50

SOURCE: Total Politics magazine (2009, January edition, 36).

As things stand, the supranational body receives a small degree of public support during periods of economic growth and suffers from deep unpopularity during financial downturns; an unsustainable position. Institutional future-proofing has the potential to overcome the gridlock that often results in lowest common denominator policies in Brussels whenever one member state in the council, a majority of commissioners or one of the main EP political groups decides to dilute legislation.

For, an empowered demos surely equals empowered politics – and the creation of a European civic identity is not a Utopian dream; it will just be a gradual process that needs encouragement.

Opinion among MEPs on the potential to create a European public space is marginally positive (see Table 8).

TABLE 8.


	EUROPHILE MEPs (from left-wing parties)			EUROSCEPTIC MEPs (from right-wing parties)		
	Agree	Disagree	No view	Agree	Disagree	No view
Is it possible to create a European public space or EU identity among the European population?	100%			33.3%	66.6%	

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SOURCE: Fieldwork conducted in this research project consisting of questionnaires sent to all MEPs.

At some point soon, the majority of the EP – and other EU institutions – must be able to conform to the majority of the people (see Info-Graph 2).

INFO-GRAPH 2. Radical View of Representative Democracy



SOURCE: adapted from Schmitt and Thomassen (1999, 15, fig 1.1).


**CONSIDERING SHIFTING POWER: FROM US HEGEMONY
TO A MULTI-POLAR WORLD**

With Goldman Sachs estimating that emerging BRIC economies now account for more than 15 per cent of global GDP while looking like they will be the fastest growth areas in the coming years alongside the Next Eleven including Indonesia and Vietnam, it seems the

world map of power has to be redrawn (see Table 9). The only certainty is that change lies ahead with the G20, potentially, needing to partner with a G150.

There is no choice but to harden and deepen the capabilities of intergovernmental organisations like NATO, the UN and the EU. The imperative is to do so with great sensitivity and transparency. For world-systems theorists tell us that cyclical power redistribution is inevitable (see Info-Graph 3).⁶

INFO-GRAPH 3.



SOURCE: Rennstich (2005, p. 227).

Although, the current global framework is held together by trade and commerce – the tensions are plain to see and diplomatic skirmishes between the likes of the US, Russia, China and India are regular occurrences.

TABLE 9.

PERCENTAGE SHARE OF GLOBAL GROWTH BASED ON IMF ANALYSIS AND FORECASTS			
	1990-2000	2000-2008	2008-2014
BRIC countries	32.2	46.3	61.3
G7 countries (US, UK, Japan, Germany, Canada, France and Italy)	41.1	19.8	12.8

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SOURCE: IMF.

Among Eurosceptic MEPs, there is a large degree of concern about the rise of China and some worries about the situation in the Middle East and Russia (see Table 10). Meanwhile, Europhile MEPs are true to their pluralist roots and show no concern about emerging nations.

TABLE 10.

	EUROPHILE MEPs (from left-wing parties)			EUROSCEPTIC MEPs (from right-wing parties)		
	Agree	Disagree	No view	Agree	Disagree	No view
Is China's emergence a threat to the EU - in economic, political and cultural terms?		100%		100%		
Is Russia's emergence a threat to the EU - in economic, political and cultural terms?		100%			66.6%	33.3%
Is the Middle East a threat to the EU - in economic, political and cultural terms?		100%		33.3%	33.3%	33.3%

SOURCE: Fieldwork conducted in this research project consisting of questionnaires sent to all MEPs.

The unthinkable bleak alternative to multi-polarity is an a-polar world (Ferguson 2004) - populated by waning empires, religious extremism and anarchy - should a hegemonic power vacuum be created by the failure of the EU and others to step up to the plate. And Europe's ageing demographic may eventually mean it has no

choice, but to extend its borders further to prevent decline. The EU must project a single voice of strength and tolerance – it must be a counterweight to any negative forces.

External events such as a-polarity or US withdrawal from NATO might push Europe to address its collective military deficit? So numerous are the potential forces of change that this seems almost a *fait accompli*. At the same time through the further internationalisation of norms, like a carbon emissions trading scheme stretching beyond EU borders, Europe can ensure its place at the top decision-making table. In relation to European military capability, MEPs do prefer NATO collaboration rather than an independent EU defence force (see Table II).

TABLE II.

	EUROPHILE MEPs (from left-wing parties)			EUROSCEPTIC MEPs (from right-wing parties)		
	Agree	Disagree	No view	Agree	Disagree	No view
Is it possible that the absence of a global hegemonic power will result in an a-polar, rather than multi-polar, world – meaning new non-state or non-supranational powers like Al Qaeda gain greater influence?	33.3%	66.6%		33.3%	33.3%	33.3%
Should the EU develop a practical as well as a notional defence force, using its leverage in a more confrontational way i.e. hard power to work alongside its soft power initiatives like the neighbourhood policy?	33.3%	66.6%		33.3%	66.6%	
Should the EU develop military capabilities through greater collaboration with NATO?	100%			33.3%	66.6%	

SOURCE: Fieldwork conducted in this research project consisting of questionnaires sent to all MEPs.

And to the Turkish dilemma. Turkey provides a geopolitical opportunity; by 2017 it could be the second fastest growing economy in the world. But some experts see Turkish accession taking up to 30 years due to migration and cultural issues, with Germany and

France continually raising membership thresholds. This attitude is borne out by the reaction of MEPs (see Table 12). There is support for enlargement to Croatia and Iceland, but for other candidates like Turkey there is no consensus across ideological divides.

TABLE 12.

	EUROPHILE MEPs (from left-wing parties)			EUROSCEPTIC MEPs (from right-wing parties)		
	Agree	Disagree	No view	Agree	Disagree	No view
Should Turkey be allowed to become a member of the EU?	66.6%		33.3%		100%	
Should Croatia be allowed to become a member of the EU?	100%			66.6%	33.3%	
Should Iceland be allowed to become a member of the EU?	100%			66.6%	33.3%	
Is Eurocentrism still a big problem in the EU?		66.6%	33.3%	100%		

SOURCE: Fieldwork conducted in this research project consisting of questionnaires sent to all MEPs.

Well, Turkey might not be willing to wait decades for European approval, preferring to turn away. Despite the short-term difficulties of fresh accessions – in terms of market competition and migration causing unemployment, lower business revenues and ethnic conflict – economic growth rates will be raised in the long term for both the EU and new member states.

With critical mass, the union can reap the full benefits of regional agency on the world stage. The extension of EU policy competencies – like multilateral environmental agreements – must be built upon with more courageous projects. The sooner such bravery is found, the more stable Europe’s position as a global actor will be.

AMBITIONS OF THE EU: INSTITUTIONAL
FUTURE-PROOFING

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2/2011 Looking ahead, the results from the questionnaires and interviews demonstrate that institutional future-proofing is not only desirable, but necessary (see Table 13). Without it, there is a real threat that the EU will fall victim to systemic collapse.

TABLE 13.

	EUROPHILE MEPs (from left-wing parties)			EUROSCEPTIC MEPs (from right-wing parties)		
	Agree	Disagree	No view	Agree	Disagree	No view
Can continued widening and deepening ensure that the EU achieves institutional future-proofing?	100%			33.3%	66.6%	
Is there a threat of systemic collapse of the supranational body if it fails to address the transition to a multi-polar world by extending its influence geopolitically?	33.3%	66.6%			66.6%	33.3%

SOURCE: Fieldwork conducted in this research project consisting of questionnaires sent to all MEPs.

As the world's energy resources all exist beyond EU boundaries, there is an urgent requirement to expand the union to countries that can facilitate oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea region and the Middle East (see Table 14).

TABLE 14.

	EUROPHILE MEPs (from left-wing parties)			EUROSCEPTIC MEPs (from right-wing parties)		
	Agree	Disagree	No view	Agree	Disagree	No view
As most natural resources – like oil and gas – lie beyond the EU’s borders, is expansion of Europe’s territory and the development of pipelines like Nabucco an economic imperative?	66.6%	33.3%		33.3%	66.6%	

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SOURCE: Fieldwork conducted in this research project consisting of questionnaires sent to all MEPs.

So grasping the nettle of change, Europe must collectively push forward in order to remain competitive, trigger economic growth and encourage high-value research and development within new industries such as green technologies. With more than 22 per cent of the world’s GDP, highly-rated healthcare systems, internet access in 65 per cent of households, esteemed environmental leadership and conservation, Europe’s promise is obvious for all to see.

Europe must be fearless in its ambitions through institutional future-proofing or risk becoming a peripheral power. Only enlargement and cementing the structures, powers and influence of institutions will ensure the EU’s partnership for peace with the new international players. This, along with financial management and new routes to natural resources, must be improved further to lead the way for others and establish Europe as a perennial global actor focused on consensus, continuity and clarity.

Looking to the decades ahead, it is clear – from the secondary data garnered from the theory reviewed and the empirical evidence gained through the primary data in this research project – that the supranational body cannot stand still as the rest of the world moves along at pace. It is highly important for the EU to embrace this brave new world of shifting geopolitical dividing lines – protecting its interests and institutions by demonstrating sanguine flexibility (as the casual links prove it did following the collapse of communism and the withdrawal of the US as an environmental hegemon).

Unless it does so, this century could be based on a G2 of America and China or G3 of the US, China and India, with the EU on the outside looking in and at risk of implosion or even domination by new colonial powers. Enlargement, like environmental leadership to tackle climate change (diplomacy, carbon taxes and emissions trading) and EU economic governance must come to be considered a vital foreign policy tool.

In addition, the euro needs to be ready to fill the void if the dollar loses its position as the world's premier reserve currency as a result of soaring US indebtedness following the turbulence caused by the 2008/9 economic crisis – as happened with the pound after the UK's expensive involvement in the First World War. We have seen other similar cycles of debt, resultant lower spending and hegemonic decline in Habsburg Spain, pre-Revolutionary France and the Ottoman Empire.

CONCLUSION

Only concerted efforts at institutional future-proofing through the celebrated heterogeneity of enlargement to new member states – especially Turkey and Balkan nations – and cementing the structures, powers and influence of supranational institutions will ensure the EU's partnership for peace with the largest key players (the US, China and India) if multi-polarity develops. The EU will need to protect itself through further widening and deepening, Europeanisation and a sure-footed collective defence capacity. For, the EU risks becoming a peripheral power in an Asia-Pacific Century, should the Union fail to defend its position as an innovative economic and technological player.

There are valid concerns over further enlargement, but they pale in comparison to the potential damage to the EU's status as a global actor should the supranational body turn inwards towards narrow national priorities. However gradual new accessions to candidates like Turkey are, they must be pursued with true commitment to gain critical mass, trans-national legitimacy and collective bargaining power to guard against external global threats. After all, Turkey has already been a European suitor for 50 years so dangling the rhetorical carrot of membership is no longer sustainable.

The extremely fluid EU has always evolved and must reshape its boundaries and powers once again to avoid becoming a spectator as geopolitical events unfold and fresh global power frameworks develop. Officials and politicians have to ensure that the EU's future transformation is outward-looking enough to force other international players to recognise its status as a global actor, without triggering accusations of a new Western imperialism by an overly powerful super-state. Member state sovereignty, the democratic deficit and mixed competencies can no longer be allowed to cause paralysis when it comes to policy-making, reforming institutions or rational choice institutionalism.

With its relatively impressive recent record on human rights and democracy promotion, Europe can speak with a constructive and powerful voice on the world stage for many years to come, if it so desires and the political will is found to achieve regional agency. Increasingly effective institutions and diplomatic skills will encourage the BRIC countries into deeper partnership with Europe while, in unison, maintaining the union's important links with the US as a key ally; against the backdrop of a new paradigm represented through multi-polarity.

Ultimately, the EU needs a world-wide vision based upon pluralism and diversity. Following the ratification of Lisbon, there is hope. The EU can move beyond mainstay common interests of peace, security and economic growth; if Europe's mid-term crisis is prevented from spiralling into long-term fatalism. Instead, the union will have to upgrade its economic, political, military, environmental and cultural capacity. It is long overdue.

If the Union fails to adopt an effective and cohesive cross-boundary stance to issues including military capability and natural resources scarcity, the evidence base indicates that the gap could instead be filled by neighbouring powers like China, India and Middle Eastern states as Western supremacy fades. The supranational body must also craft a European public space to replace the current mixture of divergent and confusing member state identities, despite the robust testing of its institutions resulting from 2008/9 economic crisis – which led some soothsayers to question the very future of the Union due to sovereign debt problems.

The EU needs to prove wrong those that say it can never move beyond mainstay common interests of peace, security and economic

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growth. The risk in not doing so is greater than the peril of showing limited desire for progress and seeing Europe's status as a global actor become no more than heritage in the new epoch. By preparing for the long and difficult road ahead through institutional future-proofing, the EU will be able to react rapidly and flexibly to the ramifications of a world no longer based on US hegemony, which we perhaps saw the beginning of the end of with the 2008/9 economic crisis.

Europe is currently the biggest trading partner of both China and Russia. These positions must be capitalised on, not lost, if the EU is to secure its financial, energy and military security and emerge from the 2008/9 economic crisis as a stronger force; there is no alternative but to act together with one voice as we reach this geopolitical critical juncture.

It is time for the rhetoric of collectivism to be matched by granular practical action from both member states and the supranational body at the same time as citizen engagement is pursued. The union will have push forward with lofty ambitions in terms of enhanced economic, political, military, environmental and cultural capacity.

A long-overdue redefinition of the EU's purpose in the 21st century is the only hope for boosting Europe's dynamism through high-quality universities, competitive companies, modern infrastructure, digital communications and low-carbon transport to solidify the often talked of knowledge-economy. Should the union put its own house in order, its shared norms and values can even be a model for other global actors to replicate.

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- 1 See *Treaty of Lisbon: Taking Europe into the 21st Century*, Europa Portal, 2009.
- 2 See *Reflection Group – Project Europe 2030: Challenges and Opportunities*, 2010.
- 3 See *Eurobarometer 70*, 2008.
- 4 M. Groenleer and L. van Schaik (2007), 'United We Stand? The European Union's International Actorness in the Cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol,' *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45:5, pp. 969-98.
- 5 See *Total Politics* magazine, January edition, p. 36, 2009.

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