

State Failure and Security in a Post-Westphalia Era¹

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Introduction

A current trend in International Relations (IR) suggests that challenges to the international system are of a post-Westphalia character. These *new* challenges are caused by the gradual decline of the state as the *only* authoritative player on the international relations and security chessboard. A shift in focus is evident since the classic domain of state prevalence – security – is now likely to fall into the hands of new actors. As a result, several states and regions dotting the international community are defined by, de-facto, cases of weak and failing polities owing to eroding institutions of governance. Examples of failed states demonstrate that the failure of the State, as a key player in contemporary IR, to fulfil its duties in political processes, in most cases, leads to humanitarian crises. Thus, in order to prevent related tragedies, there is a pressing need to scrutinize the links between state failure and security, if we are to assume that it is the State which is vested with the responsibility to safeguard its citizens. Moreover, the examination of the prism that distorts state rule is necessary to account for the new possible global threats that state failure\collapse may bring. This can demonstrate how poor governance – on a local level – and, eventually, state failure are transferred to a higher level of threat hierarchy.³ For the purpose of exploring this issue it is important to address the question: how state failure influences security in a post-Westphalian international environment?

A preliminary hypothesis is that the modern security configuration in an underdeveloped region poses challenges to governance. In its turn, poor governance tends to generate sustained internal conflict(s) within the states of the

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³ See R. Rotberg, *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, (Princeton University Press), 2004; S. Eizenstat, J. E. Porter and J. M. Weinstein, “Rebuilding Weak States,” *Foreign Affairs* 84, 2005; and C. Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*, (Cambridge University Press), 1996.

region. This provokes a spiral of internal violence, which may be viewed as a threat to the existence of sustained states in diverse and changing security environments and could, through the process of contagion, spread to other regions.

In this regard, an important issue raised in this research is based on providing a correlation between governance inefficacy and the low sustainability of state(s), from which practical implications to the assessment of the states' capacities in the post-Westphalia era may be derived. The analyzed case of Somalia reflects a growing need for realist assessments to adequately view patterns of governance in underdeveloped countries in underdeveloped regions.

State Failure in Post-Westphalia Conditions

The concept of state failure has attracted the attention of IR scholars since, at least, the early 1990s with the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. In nearly two decades since those series of acute changes to the nature of IR, the issue of failed states remains unresolved. This poses a new challenge to scholars, given that the new system of international relations – a post-Westphalia system – is yet to fully emerge and be properly assessed.

In fact, the issue of state failure has been viewed as a local phenomenon with little significance to the wider global political environment. However, an almost 20-year period of unsuccessful attempts to resolve, or to create a viable theoretical (and practical) framework to address this issue, necessitates a review of the occurrence of state failure, the impacts of such failures and identify some of the more prevailing trends.

Previously, state failure was circumscribed to a more history-laden approach where chronologies of failure were demonstrated and analysed according to historical narratives. Various policy-implications were offered to address this problem, however none was properly implemented.⁴ Currently, several new scholarly approaches to understanding state failure are being developing.

Examples of the emerging scholarship may be found in the indexes of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation and the World Peace Foundation. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance offers empirical data on trends in, as the title suggests, African governance from 2000–2008, and presents a cumulative set of indexes of governments' performance in Africa, by, for instance compiling a hierarchy of failed states on the African continent and highlighting areas of state failure. According to the authors of the index, it

uniquely defines “good governance” as the delivery of key political goods, which we specify in terms of five categories, fifteen sub-categories, and

⁴ See A. Yannis, “State Collapse and its Implications for Peace-Building and Reconstruction,” *Development and Change* 33:5. pp. 817–835.

fifty-eight sub-sub-categories ... this definition is comprehensive and common to all countries. Good government means the supply of those core political goods, whatever the culture and whatever else the government might undertake. The delivery of those core political goods can be measured with basic figures and statistics on poverty, infrastructure, the free and fairness of elections, the absence of war, and so on.⁵

As the authors of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance explain, the index “assesses national governance against 57 criteria. The criteria capture the quality of services provided to citizens by governments.”⁶ The outcome of the calculations performed by the authors of the index is presented in the form of a ranking chart for all African countries. The governance assessment criteria are “divided into five over-arching categories which together form the cornerstone of a government’s obligations to its citizens namely: 1) Safety and Security; 2) Rule of Law, Transparency and Corruption; 3) Participation and Human Rights; 4) Sustainable Economic Opportunity; 5) Human Development.”⁷ The authors stress that the “(i)ndex of African Governance is unique ... in a number of key ways. First, it is one of the few to measure ‘governance’ broadly defined. Most other work focuses on *components* of good governance—peace and security, the rule of law, corruption, political participation, human rights, sustainable development, etc.”⁸

In a complimentary vein, the Fund for Peace Organisation (est. 1957), offers an annual Failed States Index, which covers governance performance in all countries of the world from 2005. This index provides a mathematically-based approach to assessing state failure, based on a number of formulas, which allows for calculating and visualizing the existing situation in terms of state failure, the prospect of failure among various countries, and to contrast these with cases of countries with low potential for state failure. The calculation of this index is based on assessing social, political and economic indicators:

Social Indicators (I-1); Mounting Demographic Pressures (I-2); Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating complex Humanitarian Emergencies (I-3); Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia (I-4); Chronic and Sustained Human Flight; Economic Indicators (I-5); Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines (I-6); Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline, Political Indicators (I-7); Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State (I-8); Progressive Deterioration of Public Services (I-9); Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights (I-10);

⁵ “Special Paper 1,” *Ibrahim Index of African Governance*.

⁶ “Background Briefing,” *The Mo Ibrahim Foundation* available at: http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/index-2008/pdf/english_briefing_note.pdf, p. 1.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ “Special Paper 1,” *Ibrahim Index of African Governance*.

Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State” (I-11); Rise of Factionalized Elites (I-12); Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors (I-13).⁹

To contextualise this index, in 2008 the highest ranking of state failure was accredited to Somalia, which had total of 114.2 points, and the lowest ranking was Norway with a total of 16.8 points. This ranking allows scholars to visualize the so-called *red zone* countries; those with the highest prospects for state failure (currently 35 countries) and make comparisons between them on the series of indicators noted above.

There are however certain drawbacks to this emerging index-based approach. A prime shortcoming seems to be the impossibility to use these indexes for making an overview of failed states from a dynamic and/or regional perspective. The problem is that the number of analyzed country-cases in these indexes varies over time, and thus the position and rating of a given country may differ each year. For example, the Failed State Index includes data from 2005–2008 while the Index of African Governance contains data from 2000 to 2008, with reports and rankings for 2000, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 available. This carries a potential of misjudgement, partially acknowledged by the authors of the indexes who stress that: “(s)cores for each country cannot be compared meaningfully year to year, but may unfortunately be interpreted in that way by those who do not fully understand the Index methodology.”¹⁰ Given these drawbacks, the indexes, however consistent, are not flexible enough to allow an assessment of state failure as a regional phenomenon.

Another approach to state failure may be derived from International Law. In international legal terms, paradoxically, the term ‘failed state’ is not officially recognized. However, there is a growing debate over whether it is possible to recognize *any* political or territorial unit as a state if it does not correspond with the basic UN provisions for the declaration of an independent state. In the UN’s tradition, a self-governing territory was recognized as an independent state if it adhered to certain criteria such as: proven possession of a defined territory, retaining a permanent population and effective government capable of entering into relations with other states, independence, and sovereignty.¹¹ Moreover, international legal practice has a long-established, though not always consistent, tradition of recognizing seceding entities as newly-created states.¹²

⁹ For example see: www.fundforpeace.org.

¹⁰ “Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Measurement, Methods, and More,” *The Moe Ibrahim Foundation* available at: <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/index-2008/papers/>.

¹¹ Y. Crawford, *The Concept of Statehood in International Law*. pp. 37–89.

¹² *Modes of the Creation of States in International Law*, Chapter 9. pp. 375–421.

From the perspective of recent international law, failed states pose a challenge to the established system of recognition of states as system units. Moreover, the international legal system is unable to cope with this phenomena as there is no mechanism for withdrawing of the status of the state from a given unit even if it later, after gaining recognition, fails to meet the agreed upon criterion of states. This problematic was acknowledged by Herbst (1996) who suggested applying a mechanism of ‘decertification’ to de-facto failed states. Herbst argued that

(d)ecertification would be a strong signal that something has gone wrong in an African country, and that parts of the international community are no longer willing to continue the myth that every state is always exercising sovereign authority.¹³

This procedure could enhance a multidisciplinary approach, allowing scholars to consider structural factors, which have long been ignored in analyzing state failure. Herbst notes that

(u)nfortunately, the international community, in its response to state failure in Africa, has refused to acknowledge the structural factors at work, despite mounting evidence that the loss of sovereign control is becoming a pattern in at least parts of Africa.¹⁴

Additionally, there is a line of reasoning which views state failure as a process, inherent in the global political system that also contributes to state formation. Along these lines Doornboos suggests that

(d)epending on one’s understanding of ‘collapse’ and the political dynamics that give rise to it, it is indeed conceivable to regard collapse as part of processes of state reconfiguration and formation.¹⁵

This understanding begs the question of applicability. For example, can this reasoning be applied to actual cases of failed states such as post-collapse Somalia? The question is whether it is possible to regard the emerging self-proclaimed entities on the territory of former Somalia as states, and therefore legitimate actors, within the international system with effective internal governing structures as “the right to be a state is dependent at least in the first instance upon the exercise of full governmental powers with respect to some area of territory.”¹⁶

In cases of failed states, a tension between two fundamental principles of international law is present. On one hand, the principle of international recogni-

¹³ J. Herbst, “Responding to State Failure in Africa,” *International Security*, 21:3, 1996/7, pp. 120–144.

¹⁴ Ibid. pp.120–144

¹⁵ M. Doornboos, “State Collapse and Fresh Starts: Some Critical Reflections,” *Development and Change* 33:5. p. 798.

¹⁶ *The Concept of Statehood in International Law*. p. 46.

tion – and the corresponding right of self-determination – provides an official opportunity for a territorial and political unit to proclaim its independence, and seek international recognition. In case of failing or failed states, where certain territorial units seek secession from a failing entity (or ‘dissolving’ state), in legal terms,

the secession of a self-determination unit, where self-determination is forcibly prevented ... will normally be reinforced by the principle of self-determination, so that the degree of effectiveness required as a precondition of recognition will be much less extensive than in the case of secession.¹⁷

This presents another potential threat to regional security, as in conditions of state collapse there is a strong tendency for fragmentation, which tends to lead to localised spirals of violence.

On the other hand, international law protects the principle of territorial integrity of the state “at least so far as external use of force and intervention are concerned – though not to the point of providing a guarantee.”¹⁸ Possessing formal ownership of territory does not support declarations of self-proclaimed entities to simply be regarded as states, as the effectiveness of governance is regarded as a key criterion of a state. In other words

(t)erritorial sovereignty is not ownership of but governing power with respect to territory ... (t)he right to be a State is dependent at least in the first instance upon the exercise of full governmental powers with respect to some area of territory ... (t)he requirement that a putative State have an effective government might be regarded as central to its claim to statehood. ‘Governance’ or ‘effective government’ is evidently a basis for the other central criterion of independence.¹⁹

As an outcome of such international legal tensions there is no clear understanding of the norms that are applicable to cases of failed states and “there is no longer one single test for secessionist independence.”²⁰

In cases of countries facing ensuing civil strife the notion of *belligerent recognition* may be applicable. This is relevant

(w)here a secessionist movement had achieved a certain degree of governmental and military organisation, issues of responsibility ... impelled a certain de facto recognition of the situation even though the conflict was continuing ... By virtue of recognition of belligerency third States were entitled to maintain strict neutrality between the parties to the conflict and the insurgents achieved a separate though temporary status.²¹

¹⁷ *Modes of the Creation of States in International Law*. p. 383.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 384.

¹⁹ *The Concept of Statehood in International Law*. pp. 46, 55–56.

²⁰ *Modes of the Creation of States in International Law*. p. 384.

²¹ *Ibid.* p. 380.

In this sense, state failure opens a certain window of opportunity for providing security at local levels: if *belligerent recognition* is granted to a warring local entity that processes a sustainable level of governing capabilities it may produce a degree of political stabilisation on the ground. This may be seen as a step to ending political violence and bringing about a negotiated settlement between the different parties involved.

There is an additional point related to legality and state failure which needs to be presented to provide deeper understanding of the phenomenon namely:

It is necessary to distinguish unilateral secession of part of a State and the outright dissolution of the predecessor State as a whole. In the latter case there is, by definition, no predecessor State continuing in existence whose consent to any new arrangements can be sought ... The dissolution of a State may be initially triggered by the secession or attempted secession of one part of that State. If the process goes beyond that and involves a general withdrawal of all or most of the territories concerned, and no substantial central or federal component remains behind, it may be evident that the predecessor state as a whole has ceased to exist.²²

In the case of Somalia (as a failed state), a number of self-proclaimed but diplomatically unrecognized political units are present; some of which have been exercising, *de facto*, political control over their self-defined territories for several decades. The cases of Somaliland and Puntland, and to a lesser extent, Maakhir and Galmudug, serve as valid examples. To date, none of these have been internationally recognised (*de jure*). The exercise of power over such territories and, as a consequence, the construction of relative (if local) security, is largely dependent on the establishment of new sub-state actors within the general configuration of a failed state. These sub-state actors in Somali are represented by ethnic clans and networks, which may be considered patronage-based local elites. Prior to presenting an in-depth analysis of Somalia (as a failed state) it is useful to examine the distinction between several state and non-state actors as a precursor to investigating the particulars of Somalia's state failure and how its populace copes.

State and Non-State Actors

Patronage-Based Elites

Currently, socio-political and economic elites conduct activity in a new global configuration, defined by an emerging post-Westphalian international system. The present state of international affairs suggests changes and challenges

²² Ibid. p. 390–391.

posed by the gradual decline of states as actors monopolising international exchanges.

The (supposed) post-Westphalian era has created new frameworks for elite-based actions and there is now greater fluidity in the global economy and less state mechanisms to centralise and control international trade. In developed economies, this new configuration has contributed to the expansion of the role of political and economic elites, while in underdeveloped economies, the situation is not as obvious since the structure of industries and markets are still largely dependant on the state as a regulator of economic transactions. Markets in the latter are more traditional and personal interactions tend to be more important than arbitrary rules. Evidently, the type of economic and political elite largely depends on the regime type in place and the regime's preferred form of governance – including the main actors allowed to participate – which heavily influences the economic life of the state.

In underdeveloped economies, major economic subjects – elites – conduct their economic activity under strong influence of the system of interactions, which is typical for traditional societies. In these economies, patronage-based elites play the role of key economic and political actors on both the economic market and the political arena.

Globalisation increases elites' competition and widens the prospects of modernization in these economies. Governments are induced to “maintain the ‘opening’ of these societies, develop the economy and thus limit the regulating capacity in a country.”²³ However, this entails a potential fragmentation of a weak state because, as Doornboos noted in many post-colonial African states “their survival as independent states would have come to a halt had it not been for the international recognition of their sovereignty.”²⁴

Africa is associated with particular political and economic development mechanisms. One of the key differences between Western and oriental economies is visualized in the tradition of recruiting the ruling elite through political parties' competition. Political parties in Asian and African societies are often formed on the basis of a ‘patron-client’ relationship, which excludes the consideration of parties' political platforms and manifestos. The political relations between parties are substituted by a system of personal and often family, or relative-based relationships between leaders and party members.

The internal security configuration of underdeveloped states remains under strong influences from clientelism, which may be defined as a dissemination of ethnic, religious, clan-based, family-based and other liaisons into the political sphere. Clientelism remains one of the basic principles of the recruitment of

²³ K. Kaiser, “Globalisation as democracy problem” *Internationale Politik*, 4, 1998.

²⁴ See: M. Doornboos, “State Collapse and Fresh Starts: Some Critical Reflections,” *Development and Change* 33:5, 2002. p.809; and R. Jackson, *‘Quasi-States’ Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

elites in underdeveloped countries (such as Somalia). Political and economic tradition still plays a key role in these societies. In countries of Africa in general the process of state-building has never been accomplished according to Western standards. As a result, it is these countries where all mistakes and miscalculations of governance are most visible as organisational structures in such societies are often based on authoritarian principles where key political leaders create a ruling ‘presidency clan’ – an informal network of professional politicians and businessmen who hold key posts in a government.²⁵

Internal security provisions in such states are often haunted by problems of power distribution and lack the institutional frameworks for arbitrarily regulating the rights and responsibilities of different organs of governance and citizenry as a means of constructing a secure, internally stable polity able to effectively grow economically to the benefit of all segments of society. While it should be noted that the early post-colonial period witnessed the creation of the ‘bureaucratic’ state (in newly independent, post-colonial states); some institutions were indeed formed in a bid to enter the international economic system and make structural adjustments to internal political and economic hierarchies. However, political elites largely failed to adequately address issues of power sharing, and power transference, which are crucial additives for constructing reflective and sustainable states. Indeed, throughout much of the developing world, inept political elites were substituted according to ‘presidential’ whims and, in a climate of political survival, ruling cliques sought to enhance their governing positions and encouraged patronage-based elites – on the basis of personal, clan relationships – were loyalty superseded all other commitments.²⁶ Clans represent a type of patronage-based elite and it is clear that political parties – in many failing states – are formed on a *patron-client* relationship, where political platforms are secondary to the sentiment of the ‘in’ group and political parties represent and are manifestations of certain clans. Political relations *between* parties are thus defined by inter-personal and often family- or relative-based relationships between leaders and party members.

In this ostensibly post-Westphalian system, patronage-based elites may act as alternatives to more market-based and their influence on a states’ economic development may be both positive and negative though is closely connected with political transformation. In failed states, patronage-based elites may act as alternative elites, or alternative market players using power vacuums, and the

²⁵ See: W. Zartman (ed), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, (Lynne Rienner), 1995.

²⁶ Coyne defines Somali clans as being ‘determined by patrilineal descent and membership can be as large as several hundred thousand members. Within the larger clan structure, smaller groups, known as diya (paying) groups, also exist. See: C. Coyne, “Reconstructing Weak and Failed States: Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2, 2006. p. 347.

lack of state-imposed regulations, to establish new conditions for the economic and political environment.

Non-State Actors in a Failed State Case: a Local Example

Before turning to the case of Somalia, it is important to present another set of actors operating within a state, particularly a failed state. These are non-state actors, which in contrast to patronage-based elites noted above; tend to shy away from assuming direct political control over a state and seek to control certain key elements of the former state.

The emerging post-Westphalian system may be characterised by the ambiguous role of some non-state actors whose impact have rarely been assessed as they function within failed states and it is important to examine their behaviour, aims and ambitions, to reveal reasons for their emergence and their actual and potential impact on the internal dynamics of failed states.

In the Horn of Africa, since the 1990s, various radical organisations have spread and intensified the scope of their activities. Historically, countries proximate to the Horn maintain relationships to the Islamic Middle East and since the 1990s the influence of radical organisations has widened as a result of a regional power vacuum following the collapse of the USSR (including the subsequent end of the Soviet-Afghanistan conflict), the stalemate in the Iran-Iraq war, détente and peace negotiations in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the US-led ‘liberation’ of Kuwait. Since those events, business groups from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Malaysia have increased their investments to the Horn in the areas of mining, and food-stuffs. Along with heightened investments, a massive project based on the construction of mosques was undertaken, helping to consolidate Islam’s influence in traditionally non-religious regions. After the Ethiopia-Eritrea war (1998–2000), both countries were financially exhausted and required international reconstruction assistance. This inspired diplomatic offensives – directed at the Islamic world – for loans and direct investment. As a consequence, Ethiopia had to adopt a confessional policy and several Muslim organisations were revived or created. These included the “Supreme Council on Muslim Affairs” and the “Regional Association of Muslim Scholars,” among others. At present, these organisations operate as a network of non-state actors on sub-state levels, and aim to widen the presence of Islamist organisations in all regions of the country. For instance, in the Afaria region of Ethiopia (close to the Ethiopian-Somali and Ethiopian-Kenyan borders) a prolonged stand-off, between Tigrai-Amhara organisations (Tigrai Liberation National Front and Afar Liberation Front), continues to simmer.

Other significant radical organisations include Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya, Islamic Front for Oromo Liberation, National Front for Liberation of Ogaden, Oromo Liberation Front and the Muslim Brothers. These organisations aim to create an Islamic Republic of Oromia in the border region of Ethiopia, Kenya

and Somalia. The government of Ethiopia has taken political, economic and military measures to weaken the activities of the Oromo Liberation Front however; the government fails to adequately limit the radical activities of other 'Fronts,' as these organisations have exhibited attempts to unite their efforts.

The impact of radical Islamic organisations in the Horn of Africa may be seen through several faucets:

1. The consistent geographic expansion of 'Islamized' regions,
2. Providing financial support to local radical Islamic organisations,
3. The fast-track transformation of Muslim communities into extremist organisations,
4. The incorporation of Sharia-based law in Muslim communities to the detriment of state-imposed law,
5. The increased lobbying of Islamist activists in government.

These organisations aim to provoke local Ethiopian (radical) Muslim communities to open, violent confrontations with other communities. The activities of such radical organisations are often well-coordinated: for example, in early 2002 (January) the followers of the Oromo Liberation Front staged localised clashes in the towns of Harar, Nazret and Addis-Ababa. As a result, 3 people were reported dead and 100 wounded only in Harar.

An internationally-active radical organisation, Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya, has a history of involvement in the African Horn. This organisation, which acts as an independent non-state actor in the region, coordinates its activities with local radical organisations (including fronts, supporting the activity of Oromo, Afar and Tigray political groups) and with Somali military and political groupings. Along with Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya there are other non-state radical organisations, which promote extremism from their bases in Somalia, such as Al-Majmaa al-Islam, Al-Sunna ba al-Djamaa and Ansar al-Sunna.

The activities of such organisations demonstrate the potential challenges faced by neighbouring states. It is reasonable to expect that in conditions of continuing civil war and political instability in Somalia, the potential role and impact of radicalized organisations will gradually increase. The contagion and deployment of non-state actors – re: violent radicalized organisations – may contribute to worsening the conditions in Somalia and other African Horn states, thus enhancing the prospect of a regional failure.

The Case of Somalia: 1990–2009

As noted, in war-torn Somalia, the substitution of elites by clans in both economic and political spheres reveals acute economic and political challenges. In fact, this substitution has contributed to the process of state failure by creating a parochial mechanism of resource distribution:

In the Somali case, it was the inability to accommodate conflicting interests, often articulated on a clan basis, and the instrumental use to which the state apparatus was put in the pursuit of this inter-clan violence, that caused the disintegration of the fragile system. For all its repressive qualities, the Somali state had a relatively weak presence within the society, which meant that it could all the more easily collapse and be thrown off when inter-clan conflict and repression came to a head.²⁷

In Somalia, in 1991–1999, patronage-based elites had applied for international financial and humanitarian aid on behalf of the state of Somalia. International funds and agencies provided the requested aid to these recipients; however, there was no outcome in terms of development of the country. As the United Nations Development Programme does not assess the Human Development Index for Somalia, it is difficult to consider exact data of aid inflow and redistribution of foreign aid between the leading clans in former Somalia.

Between 1991 and 1993, recipients of international aid distributed these resources between different clans according to the clan hierarchy. The extensive scale of this ‘distribution’ is obvious, since the whole Somalian society is based on a hierarchy of ethnic clans. Practically the entire amount of international aid went to clans, which formed the patronage-based elites in Somalia. These elites used the power vacuum, which was created in conditions of state failure, to establish a scheme of acquiring international financial aid without providing any warrants.²⁸ As credits and loans to Somalian agencies have thus been abstracted from state guarantees, the investment climate in the country has deteriorated. Major international investors abandoned the country, and eventually the majority of international assets were withdrawn. This led to the decrease of social spending and, as a result, the level of poverty soared.

The political configuration of state failure is largely triggered by the creation and development of independent proto-state units, which claimed authority over several territories of Somalia. This was partly endowed by the government of former Somali Republic in 1960, when “political affiliations quickly developed along clan-based lines (...) (t)he majoritarian parliament created a set of incentives that led to constant struggles where clans would attempt

²⁷ M. Doornboos, *State Collapse and Fresh Starts: Some Critical Reflections*. Development and Change 33(5) 797–815 (2002), Blackwell Publishers, USA, p.801; see also M. Doornboos, J. Markakis, 1994, “Society and State in Crisis: What went wrong in Somalia?”, in M. A. Salih, L. Wohlgemuth (eds) “Crisis Management and the Politics of Reconciliation in Somalia”, pp.12–18, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

²⁸ N. Piskunova. *State Failure: Local Phenomenon or Global Trend? On Crisis on Somalia 1990-2008*,” *Cosmopolis Political Studies Journal*. №3 (22) 2008, pp.79–87, Moscow, Russia/pdf and summary available online at www.cosmopolis.mgimo.ru.

to form coalitions and then create disputes among other clans in order to control a majority.”²⁹ In 1991, Somalia’s northern territories (former British Somaliland) claimed independence. In the north-eastern parts of Somalia, the Majeerteen ethnic clan claimed independence for the autonomy of Puntland. In 2002, south-western Somalia also declared autonomy (these territories included Bay, Bakuul, Jubbada Dexe, Gedo, Shabeelaha Hoose, and Jubbada Hoose), and in 2006, the creation of an independent Jubaland was declared.³⁰ All these independent units were created by clans, or patronage-based elites, which also established limited markets for the exchange of goods and services on these territories. Some of these attempts were rather successful, and they were noted in the Report of the Secretary-General of the UN as prerequisites for ‘calm conditions’ amid the ‘chaos and anarchy’ found in the rest of former Somalia.³¹ One of these successful attempts was Somaliland, which “while not recognized by any foreign government as a legitimate state, (...) has remained stable with the creation of a constitution.”³²

An ensuing standoff between Somaliland and Puntland, fostered by competition for power and resources between patronage-based elites, results in the status-quo of non-recognition of either of these units (as states) on the international level. A territorial dispute, spawned by struggles for power, is actually developing into a full-scale war with new political entities emerging.³³ This creates an additional security threat to the region, as what is seen in these circumstances is in fact a “process of state-building which appears consistently to exacerbate instability and armed conflict.”³⁴

Both sides claim the provinces of Sanaag and Sool as part of their respective territory. The conflict commenced in 2003 when Puntland took control of Sool’s provincial capital, Las Anod. In April that year, both sides engaged in

²⁹ C. Coyne. *Reconstructing weak and failed states: foreign intervention and the nirvana fallacy*, *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2006), 2, p. 348.

³⁰ These acts were made public by the representatives of corresponding entities, and received media coverage. See reports on announcing of independence of these units on web-resources www.somalilandforum.com; <http://www.waltainfo.com>; <http://www.irinnews.org/IRIN-Africa.aspx>; www.somaliwatch.com, www.alertnet.org, www.panapress.com, www.hmbasha.net, www.hmbasha.net, www.geeskaafrika.com, www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/focus_magazine/index.shtml, www.geeskaafrika.com/igad2020_9dec05.html, www.channelafrica.org/portal/site/channelafrica/, www.channelafrica.org/portal/site/channelafrica/.

³¹ See Reports of the Secretary-General of the UN S/2001/1211, December 19, 2000, paragraph 34, and S/2001/1201, October 25 2002, paragraph 55, Special Report of the Secretary-General no.4/2000, (2000) OJ C 113/1, Paragraphs 82–83. These reports are available at resource www.un.org.

³² C. Coyne. *Reconstructing weak and failed states: foreign intervention and the nirvana fallacy*, *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2006), 2, 349.

³³ See *CONFLICT BAROMETER 2007*, p. 31, Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2008.

³⁴ K. Menkhous. *State collapse and the threat of terrorism*, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, p. 18.

skirmishes in the province of Sanaag, which later declared its independence from Puntland as well as its allegiance to the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, forming the autonomous entity of Maakhir.

However, the territory of south-eastern and southern Somalia, where the majority of the population is concentrated, remains in political and economic chaos, sustained by competition between patronage-based elites. In structural terms, this territory is a 'vacuum of power,' with no elements of sustained governance even in local communities. In this way, patronage-based elites, which control local communities, prevent investments in these territories and restrict normal business and political interactions with the wider international community.

The activation of non-state actors, such as clans (patronage-based elites) and radicalized religious organisations in newly created proto-state units has contributed to the absence of a unified central government in Somalia for the past 10 years. The interim (Transitional) government tries to control parts of southern Somalia from its capital in Baidoa, however, it is not deemed legitimate by the majority of Somalians. In this situation, the future of security configuration in Somalia remains an open question. However, at this stage it is evident that new developments, demonstrated by Somalia, shows the rise of new actors and trends, which may have an influence on the process of state-building in these territories. It is visible that the current condition of state failure remains a threat to the system of regional inter-state system, given the conditions of the emerging post-Westphalia order.

Conclusions

Despite a growing need to address the current trends of political and territorial development in situation of state failure, there is a lack of a multidisciplinary approach that would merge existing views on state-building under conditions of negative security. As demonstrated with the case of Somalia; self-proclaimed territorial and political entities may exhibit a potential for advancing to self-governance. However, these attempts are hindered by negative security, largely an outcome of ensuing civil strife.

The supposed post-Westphalian period imposes new challenges to the process of state-building under negative security configuration. The role of non-state actors, both internal and external, is intensified by instability caused by inter-clan warfare. On the internal (sub-state) level, patronage-based elites attempt to substitute the authority of the state (in managing security). On the external level, the rise of radicalized non-governmental organisations provokes additional violence and thus contributes to the chaotic situation.

These trends carry both positive and negative consequences not only for the failed state, but to the region in general. A positive consequence may be

the development of new forms of statehood with patronage-based elites being the pioneers of the process. A negative consequence may be the intensification of activities of radicalized organisations, which may hinder the process of stabilization of political situation in this region.

Finally, a situation of the complicated process of initial state building in situation of a negative security environment of a failed state may be viewed as first and unique attempt to create states in post-Westphalia era as a result of state failure. This calls for a response by scholars of IR, which could offer a theoretical understanding of these real-time practical developments.