

Linking DDR and SSR in Post-conflict States: Agendas for Effective Security Sector Reintegration

Atsushi Yasutomi¹

Introduction

Many experts agree on the importance of coordinating disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR). But many also point out that little such coordination has actually been done. Despite this, few studies have been made to determine concretely how the coordination should take place. This article focuses on the two security sector institutions – the armed forces and the police forces – in which the DDR and SSR efforts are most mutually affected. Some former combatants, disarmed and demobilised, choose to be recruited in the newly-constituted military and police as an alternative occupation. Thus, restructuring these institutions will require the appropriate design and implementation of DDR and SSR, so that the former combatants will be suitable and well-utilised in those security forces. This article suggests that conducting more effective reintegration of the demobilised former combatants into the security sector institutions – calling it the *security sector reintegration* – is one of the most effective measures to better coordinate DDR and SSR.

What is DDR, and what is SSR?

According to the UN's Integrated Operational Guide to DDR Standards (IDDRS), DDR seeks to create security and stability in post-conflict environments, and to start recovery and development, by getting the former combatants to comprehensively disarm and providing them with opportunities for sustainable social and economic reintegration into civilian life.² The disarmament

¹ The author is a recipient of the Norwegian Research Council Programme 2007–08 and currently based at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway. He can be reached at atsushi.yasutomi@gmail.com.

² United Nations, *The Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)*, 2006, p. 24.

process includes the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunitions of combatants. Demobilisation is a support for the formal and controlled discharging of active combatants from armed forces and/or other armed groups, leading to a reinsertion process where combatants receive assistance (e.g. short-term education, medical services, clothes, food, etc.) during demobilisation but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Through the reintegration process, combatants receive support toward gaining sustainable employment and income. This usually takes place in communities at the local level over a longer time span.³

Security sector reform is a more dynamic and comprehensive task. Many states after civil wars lack the structures and mechanisms necessary to ensure the physical security of its people and the country itself. Norms and orders to maintain security are absent. Security sector institutions like the armed forces and the police no longer serve the function of protecting the people but, instead, often threaten them with robbery, human rights abuses, and other criminal acts. Security sector reform in the post-conflict situation therefore attempts to reverse these situations. Post-conflict security sector reform has three major objectives. Firstly, it (re)builds security sector institutions more efficiently and effectively. Security sector institutions here refer to those institutions that possess a legitimate monopoly on the use of force for the purpose of providing security to the people. They may include the armed forces, the police force, paramilitary groups, border patrols, and private security companies, amongst others.⁴ Typically, in the early stages of security sector reform, it eliminates the sources of any possible resurgence of violence, particularly through DDR of both state and non-state combatants.⁵ In many cases, the first SSR task for post-conflict peace support operations is the construction of security sector institutions from scratch, as in Afghanistan and East Timor, or the reconstruction of the already existing institutions while incorporating some demobilised former combatants, as in South Africa and Angola.⁶ Longer-term SSR agendas include measures to downsize the armed forces, recompose the balance of the staff and officers depending on the complexity of ethnicities, tribes, and gender in a given post-conflict state. Modernising their weapons, and eliminating excess weapons and ammunitions to increase effectiveness and prevent misuse accidents, can

³ Ibid., p. 25; Colin Gleichmann et. al., *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Practical Field And Classroom Guide* (Stuttgart: GTZ/NODEFIC/PC/SNDC, 2004): 15.

⁴ The OECD's Guidelines on Security System and Governance Reform defines security sector reform as the following: [it] includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework. OECD, *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice* (2000): 16.

⁵ Michael Brzoska, "Introduction: Criteria For Evaluating Post-Conflict Reconstruction And Security Sector Reform In Peace Support Operations," chap. in *Security Sector Reconstruction And Reform In Peace Support Operations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007): iii.

⁶ Ibid.

also be included in these agendas. Training and education on command and control are crucial for making security forces more efficient, so that given orders are correctly delivered to and implemented by the ranks on the ground, and the information on the ground is appropriately delivered back to the higher ranking officers. The second major objective of post-conflict security sector reform concerns the state's ability to control those security sector institutions under democratic civilian oversight. The goal is to ensure that the forces do not become repressive institutions intervening in politics, the economy and society, and to prevent them from monopolising the use of force against the people. The main actors involved in this cluster of reform are: the Ministries of Defence, Interior, and Justice; the parliament; civil society organisations (CSOs) like NGOs; and the media. Reformers aim to strengthen their abilities to ensure transparency and accountability to the people about the forces' expenditures, actions and policies. The third major objective is to ensure that the norms and order prevail throughout the state; this way security can be maintained. It deals with judicial reforms, including rewriting criminal laws, modernising courts and prisons, increasing the numbers of judges and prison staff. It also promotes transitional justice, which includes prosecuting former war criminals and violators of human rights. Ensuring good governance is still another task that belongs to this group; this includes implementing measures against corruption and strengthening civil society and the media to oversee wrongdoings that threaten peoples' security. Comparing the major goals of DDR and SSR, we can conclude that DDR is part of larger processes of SSR.

Why DDR and SSR Do Not Easily Interact

Despite the acknowledgement of an important linkage between the two, DDR and SSR often do not interact effectively. There are many reasons for this. Firstly, the immediate objectives are different. DDR's objectives are to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate former combatants. The main actors are predominantly external military experts in disarmament and demobilisation, and development experts for reintegration. The subjects are state and/or non-state combatants. DDR is more likely to be conducted in a shorter period of time, particularly the disarmament and demobilisation tasks required to meet the urgent needs of eliminating violence and creating immediate stability in the region. Indeed, DDR programmes and their practitioners are often overwhelmed by various urgent demands for immediate stabilisation efforts, and as a result issues related to the rule of law, police and military reforms tend to become lower priorities, or are even pushed outside of the realm of DDR agendas altogether.⁷

⁷ Michael Brzoska, "Embedding DDR Programme In Security Sector Reconstruction," in *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi (eds.) (London: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) / Transaction Publishers, 2005): 104.

By contrast SSR aims at constructing effective and efficient security sector institutions under democratic civilian oversight. This requires a wide variety of internal as well as external actors to carry out the broader reform agendas in a number of institutions. These reforms obviously require a much longer period of time. Secondly, there is a wide difference in the public perceptions of DDR and SSR. DDR is well-known, visible and relatively well institutionalised. Since the 1990s international involvement supporting DDR has been active and seen in the media. Such actions include, for instance, the collection and destruction of weapons, the establishment of cantonment camps and caring for child- and women-soldiers. These are obviously visible to the public. Studies of DDR's past good and bad practices are well-developed, as shown in recent work, such as the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) and the UN Integrative DDR Standards (IDDRS).⁸ These studies have institutionalised DDR operations in various post-conflict states to make them more coherent and effective. On the other hand, SSR is not well-known and somewhat vague. As it is still a comparatively new concept, the meaning has not been well-established, and the interpretation (of what SSR is) differs among the various levels of practitioners and decision-makers alike. Because of the dynamics of its reform agenda, and because of the novelty of the concept, SSR's aims seem very broad and vague. Even the term "security sector reform" is often not well-accepted even amongst the policy-making bodies at the international level. One officer in the European Council's ESDP, located in the Operations and Planning of Civil Crisis Management, understands Security Sector Reform as an "uncomfortable and confusing concept as it catches all extremely broad elements of the post-conflict security."⁹ Furthermore, SSR operations are not as well-institutionalized as DDR. While the operational handbook for the standardisation of SSR has been developed by the OECD DAC¹⁰, there is still a strong need to collect data from past practices and to analyse them to come up with more effective and coherent standardised operations.¹¹ These gaps in public perception, approaches and methods between DDR and SSR make it even hard to coordinate in their policies. Finally, there is a lack of studies on how the two may be coordinated. While much research has been made on DDR's practical issues and their effects on peacebuilding, a very limited amount of research has been done about DDR's implications on various reform agendas covered by SSR.¹²

⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden, *Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration: Final Report*, 2006.

⁹ Author's interview conducted on 4 October 2007, Brussels.

¹⁰ OECD DAC, *OECD DAC Handbook On Security System Reform: Supporting Security And Justice* (OECD/DAC, 2007).

¹¹ Alan Bryden, "Linkage Between DDR And SSR – Understanding The DDR-SSR Nexus: Building Sustainable Peace in Africa," *Second International Conference On DDR And Stability in Africa*, Kinshasa, Democratic Republic Of Congo 12–14 June 2007 (OSAA/DRC) Issue paper (June 2007): 5.

¹² Michael Brzoska, op. cit., "Embedding DDR Programme in Security Sector": 109.

Security Sector Reintegration as a Linking Point

Security sector institutions, particularly armed forces and police forces, are two of the major areas where the efforts of DDR and SSR mutually affect each other most. While many demobilised combatants return or are resettled in local communities in civilian life, some do choose (or have no other realistic alternative but) to be recruited into the armed forces, the police, and other security forces (e.g. paramilitary, security companies, etc.). Security sector reform deals with these security sector institutions, constructing or reconstructing them to function effectively and efficiently under democratic civilian oversight, and these institutions involve the former combatants. DDR needs to be planned and designed so that those former combatants recruited in the security sector institutions are able to function appropriately. SSR at the same time needs appropriate planning and implementation strategies to reconstruct these forces, while taking into consideration the presence of former combatants, as their peculiar war background may well require additional measures of accommodation. This particular linking point, where the demobilised former combatants are recruited into the security sector institutions – which this article is calling *security sector integration* – can be one of the more useful ways to evaluate how effectively the DDR-SSR linkage is made. (chart 1) Thus, examining how the *security sector reintegration* can be strengthened can help directly and indirectly enhance coordination between DDR and SSR.




Chart 1. DDR and SSR

The *security sector reintegration* can be seen in many post-conflict states. As in Burundi, Angola, and elsewhere, very often former combatants who have been disarmed and demobilised find themselves unable to obtain any sustainable occupations, particularly because the post-conflict domestic economy has been devastated. They often find that going to the security sector institutions is the only realistic alternative for longer-term paid occupation.¹³ As observed in East Timor and Afghanistan, new security forces could not be simply constituted from “nothing” but had to depend upon former combatants joining up to start with.¹⁴ Former combatants generally have at least some qualifications for handling weapons and, in some cases, heavy vehicles (e.g. trucks), as well as working in dangerous situations where extra physical strength is required. These talents should be useful at least for some periods of time for some parts of security sector institutions.¹⁵ Moreover, if they are trained properly, these talents may be utilised for assisting operations, including DDR and weapons collection from civilians. Likewise, again assuming they have the proper training, they can also patrol and serve at checkpoints along national borders, to protect against illicit weapons trafficking.¹⁶ During the training, there may also be an increase in the bonds amongst the former combatants, helping mutual acceptance and reconciliation.¹⁷ Inclusion of former enemy soldiers in the police structures may reduce their sense of alienation from society, and by legitimising their status and functions, they may be able to gain the public trust and security from the state, eventually discouraging them from rearming for fresh aggressions.¹⁸

Nonetheless, there are many challenges. First and foremost, there is a risk of including former combatants with record of war crimes and other human rights violations. Inclusion of such recruits would not only undermine the function of the institutions, but also deepen the mistrust of local residents against the security forces. Secondly, inclusion of former military men and women in the police force requires more extensive knowledge and skills. Police officers are required to be equipped with some legal knowledge and the skills necessary for communicating with local residents. Such qualifications for the police service

¹³ Reto Rufer, “Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR): Conceptual Approaches, Specific Settings, Practical Experiences”, *Working Paper*, The Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF)(Geneva: 2005): 58.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Michael Brzoska, op. cit., “Embedding DDR Programme in Security Sector”: 102.

¹⁶ Jeremy Giniher, “Support For DDR and SSR After Conflicts in Africa: Lessons Learnt And New Agendas In Africa, Conflict prevention, management and reduction in Africa” Paper 3, A joint project of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and the Centre for International Cooperation and Security (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2007): 11.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Charles T. Call, “Competing Donor Approaches To Post-Conflict Police Reform,” *Conflict, Security and Development* Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2002): 103.

are not obtainable from the military; indeed, the military methods and skills are not simply applicable to the police service.¹⁹

Perspectives from DDR

Disarmament

Weapons Stockpile Management

Small arms and light weapons collected during the DDR programmes need to be secured so that they will not be recirculated back into armed groups, criminal networks, or individuals. In some cases, if the destruction process has to wait until political, technical and financial decisions have been finalised, the weapons will be temporarily stored.²⁰ Failures in weapons (and ammunition) stockpile management can undermine security sector reforms in a number of ways. The proliferation of leaked weapons would give combatants a chance to rearm and thus increases the risk of fresh civil unrest. An increase in illegal weapons would also allow spoilers – individuals attempting to obstruct peace-building activities for fear of losing their privileges (money, position, etc) enjoyed during the past conflict – to arm themselves and blackmail reform-minded domestic actors and external actors. Moreover, stockpile management failure would also arm civilians and former combatants, contributing to an increase in crimes including robbery, sexual assaults and violence against children. This would further deepen mistrust between the local community members and former combatants. Furthermore, the greater availability of illegitimate weapons would place a larger burden on the police. Particularly in situations where a police force is undergoing reconstruction—requiring new training and education, as well as the modernisation of weapons and logistics—the additional burden of controlling illegal weapons could undermine the police reforms.

For the same reasons, weapons leaking from the armed forces and police must also be prevented. As observed in Namibia, some weapons collected during the DDR programmes were reallocated to the new armed forces and the police force.²¹ In cases like Afghanistan, small weapons for the police were provided by the former Warsaw Treaty Organisation states (e.g. Hungary) and other countries.²² While serviceability problems with those weapons (due to

¹⁹ OECD DAC, OECD DAC Handbook On Security System Reform: Supporting Security And Justice (OECD/DAC, 2007): 175; Bryden, “Linkage Between DDR And SSR”, op. cit.: 141; Brzoska, “Embedding DDR Programme In Security Sector”, op. cit.: 104.

²⁰ Colin Gleichmann et. al., *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*, op. cit.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Cyrus Hodes and Mark Sedra, “The Search For Security In Post-Taliban Afghanistan”, *Adelphi Paper 391* (Routledge/International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), October 2007): 65.

low maintenance and standardisation problems) have been pointed out,²³ in countries where the force command and control structures are still fragile, the storage and transfer of weapons and other equipment can be badly managed, and those service weapons could be an easy target for internal spoilers trying to leak them from the forces. Weapon registration is one strong measure against this. As in Cambodia, the large-scale registration of military and police weapons in a database would limit unauthorised transfers, and therefore improve comprehensive safe storage management.²⁴

Civilian Disarmament

While former combatants who were party to the past conflicts are subject to DDR processes, other armed groups and individual civilians are often left out. Experiences in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo show that the DDR programmes were unable to get armed groups – who had also been significant players in the past conflict – to disarm comprehensively.²⁵ DDR has not been able to provide sufficient incentives for comprehensive disarmament for various reasons. Distinguishing between civilians and combatants is in some cases difficult, as observed for instance in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Haiti, and elsewhere. In Angola and Sierra Leone, “combatants” included the soldiers from the national army and the opponent rebel groups, whereas in Eritrea and Ethiopia they were the soldiers from the two warring national militaries.²⁶ However, in other cases it is usually difficult to draw a line clearly identifying former combatants from others, including part-time warriors and other armed groups. The latter groups tend to be ignored, and thus remain outside the targets of DDR programmes.²⁷ Moreover, disagreements between donor actors over their mandates and the availability of funds have made civilian disarmament difficult to pursue comprehensively. Development agencies often view the issues related to small arms and light weapons as outside their mandates and too sensitive.²⁸ As a result, weapons reduction often remains integrated neither in DDR nor in post-conflict recovery programmes under development agencies. Additionally, in many regions, possession of arms is considered as a status symbol and represents a symbol of community belonging. Moreover, those weapons are often not registered and not subject to handover to DDR. Under such social circumstances, it is even difficult to promote civilian disarmament, at least in a short period of time.²⁹ Therefore, a long-term strategy

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Colin Gleichmann et. al., *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*, op. cit.: 42.

²⁵ Jeremy Ginifer, “Support For DDR and SSR After Conflicts in Africa”, op. cit.: 8.

²⁶ Robert Muggah, “Emerging from The Shadow of War: A Critical Perspective on DDR And Weapons Reduction In The Post-Conflict Period,” *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (April 2006): 199.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Colin Gleichmann et. al., *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*, op. cit.: 39.

must be developed for the comprehensive reduction of weapons. These programmes need to work in parallel with, as well as after, the DDR programmes, so that armed groups and individuals, as well as former combatants who have failed to register in former DDR processes, are all included as the subject for disarmament. Community sensitisation and education about the dangers of small arms and light weapons could promote disarmament at the individual levels. Promoting traditional leaders (e.g. local, tribal, or spiritual leaders in local communities) can be useful in encouraging civilians and armed groups to give up their weapons.³⁰

The implications of civilian disarmament on security sector reform are similar to those in weapons stockpile management. A greater availability of weapons, particularly at the civilian level, increases the risk of a resumption of armed conflict. It also increases the burden for the police, customs, and border control, who need to patrol against the illicit transfer of SALW, further delaying police reforms. Moreover, an absence of, or a delay in, the reduction of weapons in armed groups and individuals will keep the local communities' mistrust high against the armed forces and police.

Demobilisation

Planning and implementation for the demobilisation process would affect the efforts of security sector reform positively or negatively depending upon who (what type of soldiers) and how many former combatants should be the targets for DDR. Generally, all active members of the armed forces and armed groups that were party to the past conflict could be the target for the demobilisation process; however, distinct target groups are identified for selection particularly when the armed forces are not completely disbanded after the conflict.³¹

Decisions about the size and types of demobilisation form a part of peace negotiations; however, these decisions are more likely to reflect the immediate pressures to realise post-conflict stabilisation with the limited time and resources available. Crucial questions – e.g. as to what type and size of new security forces will be made; who would be recruited into the forces; and whether and how the forces could function corresponding to the needs of a given post-conflict situation – are often neglected in the discussions, as they are viewed as beyond the DDR mandates and thus later priorities.³² Agreement on the number and type of soldiers retained or demobilised may satisfy the shorter-term objectives of DDR but may indeed become counter-productive to the security sector reform projects.³³ This is because military and defence planners are usually left out of the peace negotiations. They, however, can provide crucial technical

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., p. 45.

³² Brzoska, "Embedding DDR Programme In Security Sector", op. cit.: 101.

³³ Ibid.

advice as to how many and whom to demobilise, so that the security sector reform can be carried out more effectively.³⁴ It is particularly crucial that DDR is carried out in such a way that the losing side(s) of the warring parties are subjects for demobilisation. Decisions as to which people are demobilised and which retained in the armed forces are largely a reflection of the decision of the winning parties. However, their decisions about the size and the nature of post-conflict security forces will naturally and unilaterally be driven by their political and military interests and reflect the need to maintain their power.³⁵ Worse still, the winning sides are likely to maintain the most loyal and skilful soldiers and eliminate those disloyal, sick, and injured soldiers. In this way, the soldiers in the winning parties are being mobilised rather than demobilised.³⁶

Reintegration

The reintegration process is the component of the DDR in which the former combatants receive support to prepare for civilian life and, for some, are recruited in the newly-constituted security sector institutions.

Among a number of measures within the reintegration process, strengthening the reconciliation of former combatants with the community members would most affect the efforts of SSR. The reconciliation process promotes broad acceptance of former combatants in the local communities in which they are to be resettled after demobilisation. Former combatants usually have difficulty being accepted in the communities after the conflict because of recent war memories. Reconciliation programmes provide support for their acceptance; such measures may include, *inter alia*, providing both the former combatants and the local communities accepting them with opportunities for dialogue, education, spiritual and ritual ceremonies to help forgiveness, joint work such as school construction (providing a symbolic opportunity for shared community building). One of the measures to promote social reintegration is ritual ceremonies in the local communities. Some former combatants have confessed to their wrongdoings and received forgiveness from the community; cases in Sierra Leone for example demonstrate some effective results for both the soldiers and the community.³⁷ In Uganda ex-combatants were washed in goat milk, a symbolic act of cleansing of the past atrocities, in order to be accepted in the community.³⁸ Another crucial measure is to sensitise the community members to the acceptance and return of the former combatants. In Sierra Leone, for example, radio work sponsored by the UN Missions there (UNAMSIL) provided

³⁴ Ibid., p. 98.

³⁵ Bryden, “Linkage Between DDR And SSR”, op. cit.: 15.

³⁶ Brzoska, “Embedding DDR Programme In Security Sector”, op. cit.: 102.

³⁷ Jeremy Ginifer, “Support For DDR and SSR After Conflicts in Africa”, op. cit.: 49.

³⁸ Author’s interview at the Norwegian Defence International Centre (NODEFIC), 10 October, 2007.

information to the local residents on issues like tolerance, justice, forgiveness and peace to help reduce both their trauma and prejudices.³⁹

Difficulties do remain in implementing social reintegration, however. Firstly, the communities had difficulty forgiving the former combatants' atrocities, but those reconciliation events were carried out because of the insistence of external actors. Community members do go through with the reconciliation process simply because external actors insist, but indeed they find it difficult to easily forgive the former combatants' past atrocities. Moreover, the community's stereotype of former combatants is such that they expect the former soldiers to behave like trouble-makers.⁴⁰ This makes it difficult for the reintegrated soldiers to narrow the social and psychological gaps, even if the soldiers do wish to reconcile. This further dissociates both groups from each other.⁴¹

Despite these challenges, this social reintegration would play a particularly significant role for more effective "security sector reintegration." The former combatants who are recruited into the armed forces and the police would serve in the local communities where contacts with the local population are unavoidable. This is particularly the case for the police forces, whose interactions with the local residents are vital for their everyday operations.

Perspectives from Security Sector Reform

Building Integrity and Solidarity within Security Sector Institutions

Developing the integrity and solidarity of the newly-constituted forces with former combatants is critical but has proven to be difficult. Examples show the difficulties of reintegrating the demobilised former combatants into security sector forces and maintaining integrity and solidarity as one national unit. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, attempts were made to integrate some former demobilised former combatants into an integrated national army, but these elements started to clash with other units within the national army, while still another group started to act as an independent unit and continued to attack the Eastern part of the country.⁴² In South Africa, groups of black soldiers in reconstituted national armed forces (SANDF) raised tensions and weakened the solidarity of the forces when they voiced complaints about favouritism involving white officers.⁴³ Furthermore, in East Timor, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) gave a freehand to the FDTL (East Timor's defence force) High Command in decisions for the recruitment of the

³⁹ Jeremy Ginifer, "Support For DDR and SSR After Conflicts in Africa", op. cit.: 49.

⁴⁰ Kathleen M. Jennings, "The Struggle To Satisfy: DDR through The Eyes Of Ex-Combatants In Liberia," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April 2007): 204.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Jeremy Ginifer, "Support For DDR and SSR After Conflicts in Africa", op. cit.: 12.

⁴³ Ibid.

demobilised soldiers of the former guerrilla force of FALINTIL. This included deciding who would join the FDTL or go to recruitment training programmes sponsored by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). This created a tensions within the FALINTIL groups as well as within the FDTL.⁴⁴

The reasons for the difficulties are manifold. Firstly, the financial cost is too large to reintegrate former combatants into security forces. While inclusion of demobilised former combatants into the security sector could be a viable tactic to reduce the threats to security and stability otherwise posed by those former combatants, the temporary absorption of large numbers of personnel will put significant pressure on the national budget because their salaries need to be paid during their services.⁴⁵ This causes a lack of resources and personnel available to support more sustainable measures to initiate education and training, as well as other logistic support, to foster the integrity and solidarity as one national unit.

Secondly, political and social rivalry is unavoidable when former combatants are reintegrated into the security forces. Thus, blindly integrating the former opposition parties or enemies into the newly-constituted or reformed police forces could easily heighten internal tensions. The UN's CIVPOL (civilian police) in East Timor recruited 350 former Indonesian National Police (POLRI) officers into the newly-formed East Timorese police forces (PNTL) after only four weeks of transitional training, and even several senior positions were filled with by the former POLRI officers. The inclusion of the POLRI officers – opponents in the eyes of the East Timorese – has created political issues in the East Timorese society.⁴⁶ A lack of clear human resource analysis and recruitment policy for police forces would contribute to domestic instability. In Afghanistan, the creation of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) was made up largely by the demobilised former combatants, but the disproportionate ethnic balance between the more numerous Tajiks and the fewer Pashtuns caused the Tajiks to virtually take control of the ANA, making it difficult for the Pashtuns to be recruited into the military. This imbalance heightened the ethnic tensions and prevented the formation of solidarity and *esprit de corps* as a national military.⁴⁷

Thirdly, newly constituted security forces often fail to set up clear missions and strategy and, as a result, they are misled and confused. Typical of such confusion is mixing up the tasks of the armed forces and the police forces.

⁴⁴ Ludvic Hood, "Security Sector Reform In East Timor," chap. in *Security Sector Reconstruction And Reform In Peace Support Operations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007): 61.

⁴⁵ Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme, Position Paper: *Linkages Between Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Of Ex-Combatants And Security Sector Reform* (MDRP (available at: www.mdrp.org), October 2003): 4.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁴⁷ Cyrus Hodes and Mark Sedra, "The Search For Security In Post-Taliban Afghanistan", op. cit.: 65.

The armed forces – legitimately employed against enemies on the borders – cannot be mixed with the police to fight against criminals and take part in other functions maintaining domestic order because the size of the force that the military use outweigh the capacity of the police, and in any case doing so is against the 1949 Geneva Convention.⁴⁸ Moreover, such a situation would blur the distinction between internal order and external security. This would exacerbate the risk that the military would dominate the police or even take the police under the military control.⁴⁹ This is clearly contrary to what security sector reform would want to see. In Afghanistan an earlier plan to reorganise the eight policing regions, which reflected the ethnic composition of the country, was inappropriately reduced to five regions in order to conform with the military command structure. However, this modification crossed ethnic lines; the police serving in the areas of different ethnicity found it difficult to carry out their duties.⁵⁰ In El Salvador, the Peace Agreement called for the establishment of a new National Civilian Police (PNC) with a new organisation, new officers and new training mechanisms to separate from the earlier military domination. The military, however, continuously resisted cooperation in the rebuilding of the police. The military not only refused to hand over to the police the former military academy as well as weapons, vehicles and other equipment, but it also continued to appoint the PNC’s senior officers with former military officers.⁵¹ These dangers would only be multiplied if the demobilised former combatants were reintegrated into the newly-constituted armed forces and the police forces. In such confusion they would miss opportunities to receive appropriate technical and educational support from external actors. Moreover, in such a military-police power confusion, the demobilised former combatants could increase tensions between the military and the police.

Setting Clear Recruitment Criteria

Clear criteria for reintegrating former combatants must be established. Recruitment for the *security sector reintegration* needs to include at least two important elements: screening perpetrators of human rights violations and other war crimes from the past conflicts, and the basic literacy and numeric knowledge of the demobilised former combatants.

As pointed out earlier, many former combatants may have a record of serious human rights violations and war crimes from the past conflict. In many

⁴⁸ Nicole Ball and Michael Brzoska, *Voice And Accountability In The Security Sector*, Paper 21, Bonn International Center for Conversion, BICC (Bonn: BICC, July 2002): 34.

⁴⁹ Rama Mani, “Contextualizing Police Reform”, *Security, The Rule Of Law And Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 1999): 11.

⁵⁰ Tonita Murray, “Police-Building In Afghanistan: A Case Study Of Civil Security Reform,” *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 14, No. 1 (2007): 118.

⁵¹ Rama Mani, “Contextualizing Police Reform”: 13.

post-conflict states, police forces who have committed serious human rights violations and war crimes have often been cut off from the population and have functioned more like military contingents, protecting the interests of the oppressors, not those of the citizens.⁵² In Nepal, the armed forces were protecting the interests of the King rather than the security and interests of the people and the democratic government, and their record of human rights violations against the people are of serious concern for the security sector reform of today.⁵³ In Haiti, and elsewhere, the police forces have traditionally served as tools of repression rather than as the protectors of the citizens.⁵⁴ Inclusion of the demobilised former combatants who have such records may undermine the construction of the new security forces. In many cases, states are unable to exercise institutional control over individuals in the security institutions as their organisational structures for human resource management are heavily damaged after conflict. The personnel are not given clearly defined roles, and it is not often grasped who are in which functions. Under these circumstances, it is useful to conduct a census and identification programme to provide all members of the armed forces and the police with registration and ID cards.⁵⁵ This information is useful not only for identification and training; such registration also allows the institutions to screen for any record of human rights violations. And if any fresh violations occur, spotting individuals in the security forces would be easier. As discussed below, proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of war criminals, in cooperation with the judicial sector, is vital in eliminating unqualified candidates.

Basic literacy and numeric skills are important for the “security sector reintegration.” This is particularly true for the police forces, where education in legal and other police duties is crucial. But illiteracy of the former combatants has sometimes disturbed the reform efforts. An experience in Afghanistan shows that only 20 percent of the recruits to the Afghan police could read and write, and this low number slowed the progress of the police education and training.⁵⁶ At the same time, external actors need to be aware of the potential dangers of recruiting with “western” standards. The CIVPOL in East Timor selected candidates who spoke some English where the English language in the community was not crucial; moreover, it also relied too much on “western” questionnaires and interviewing techniques for police recruitment. In effect, the qualification for the East Timorese police forces became doubtful.⁵⁷

⁵² William G. O’Neill, “Police Reform In Post-Conflict Societies: What We Know And What We Still Need To Know,” Policy Paper The Security-Development Nexus Program (New York: International Peace Academy, April 2005).

⁵³ Dhruva Kumar, “Police Reform And Military Downsizing,” in *Policing In Nepal: A Collection Of Essays*, Saferworld (September 2007).

⁵⁴ Timothy Donais, “Back To Square One: The Politics Of Police Reform In Haiti,” *Civil Wars*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Autumn 2005): 271.

⁵⁵ DAC, *OECD DAC Handbook On Security System Reform*, op. cit.: 167.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

⁵⁷ Ludvic Hood, “Security Sector Reform In East Timor”: op. cit.: 53.

Training and Education

In connection with the issues of recruitment criteria, the appropriate training and education of former combatants need to be designed strategically to lead to a longer-term rather than temporary reform. The East Timorese national police received training for three months at the Police Academy in Dili and six months of field training, but this proved to be too short to adequately prepare the officers, and those field training programmes were criticised as unstructured and incoherent.⁵⁸ The same evaluation also pointed out that a lack of expertise in recruitment and training led to various shortcomings in the selection of the police cadets, and the selection was even marred by the pressure that the recruitment needed to be completed within an unrealistically short time limit.⁵⁹ The police training programmes in Afghanistan also proved to be difficult in certain respects; it was difficult to provide education in classrooms in the hot summer and cold winter; there were difficulties using the typical Western educational techniques like group discussions and scenarios; there were difficulties from the use of police terminologies the Afghan police never learnt before; and even translators were inexperienced.⁶⁰ These recent experiences suggest that there is much room for restructuring the ways in which training and educational programmes correspond to the needs of a given post-conflict state.

This is crucial for the *security sector reintegration*; their proper training and education provide vital information and skills suited to help the new military and police serve the people. As pointed out above, knowledge of laws and communication skills for the police officers would be one of the most important required skills for new candidates. Cultural and social aspects can be another important element; long-term education and training designed to foster inter-ethnic and inter-religious dialogue and coexistence might help reduce tensions amongst different ethnic and religious groups within the security forces. Such a programme could also help reduce social and ethnic tensions created between the former combatants in the security forces and the local community members.

Building Oversight Mechanisms

Security sector institutions like the armed forces and police are the bodies that monopolise the legitimate use of force. They should be controlled and managed under civilian oversight so that their activities and policies are transparent and accountable to the people. It is wrong and dangerous to presume that the newly-constituted national authorities after conflict always make the right decisions about the size, composition, and budget of the security sector institutions.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 54.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 52.

⁶⁰ Murray, "Police-Building In Afghanistan", op. cit.: 119.

Rather, there is always the potential risk of their protecting the interests of the institutions instead of those of the people. Indeed, the policies for these issues cannot be imposed from above, but must be made with a broad participation of the people.⁶¹ Building a mechanism of transparency and accountability for the security sector institutions is therefore the foundation both for effective oversight and sanctions for misbehaviour.⁶² The prime objective is to oversee activities of the military and the police against civilians, including violation of human rights and other abuses of power, because such actions are typically observed in unreformed, authoritarian and developing security forces.

Building Confidence between Local Community and Security Institutions

Building confidence between the security sector institutions and the local community members is one of the measures to promote oversight. Because of the officers' misbehaviours in the past conflict, they have in many countries a very negative image. The community members see the forces as a threatening factor rather than as a provider of security. They observed that many soldiers and police officers were low-skilled workers who were corrupt and dealt with the transfer of illegal weapons, drugs, and other materials. In effect, there has been persistent mistrust between the forces and the community members. The newly-constituted security forces must regain the trust of the population.⁶³ For this purpose, local communities need to be given opportunities to voice their concerns about their needs and expectations in connection with the roles of the new security sector institutions, so that they are more likely to support and accept the changes and the new installations of their activities.⁶⁴ Likewise, the former combatants may also address their own concerns about settling in the community. For the police forces, strengthening community-based policing programmes can also help increase trust between the police and local communities. Community-based policing – the police working in partnership with the community – can help increase the confidence between the two parties through addressing and solving various community security problems together. It can also serve to create opportunities for weapons collection programmes and short-term amnesties for those surrendering arms,⁶⁵ thus reducing the sources of threats in the community in cooperation with the local police officers.

Furthermore, building local ownership at the institutional level also promotes an oversight mechanism. Bitter lessons from experiences in East Timor

⁶¹ Alan Bryden, "Shaping The Security Governance: Agenda In Post-Conflict Peacebuilding," in *Security Governance In Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi (eds.) (London: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) / Transaction Publishers, 2005): 263.

⁶² Ball and Michael Brzoska, *Voice And Accountability In The Security Sector*, op. cit.: 44.

⁶³ William, "Police Reform In Post-Conflict Societies", op. cit.: 2.

⁶⁴ Bryden, "Linkage Between DDR And SSR", op. cit.: 20.

⁶⁵ OECD DAC, *OECD DAC Handbook On Security System Reform*, op. cit.: 169.

demonstrate that there was a lack of training in enhancing local capabilities to oversee the defence forces. The UNTAET's office of the national security advisor did not train a single East Timorese civil servant to assume any responsibilities related to the East Timorese Defence Forces. This heavily weakened the civilian oversight of the armed forces in this state.⁶⁶ The same thing could be said about the establishment of the East Timorese Police, the PNTL. Because UNTAET failed to involve East Timorese political leaders and civil society organisations in the police service's institutional development, any discussions on the PNTL's development remained out of reach of the civilians.⁶⁷

Civil Society Organisations

Civil society organisations (CSOs) have three major functions with regard to enhancing security sector reform; to demand changes in their policies and implementation; to monitor them; and, to provide technical input for improvement. CSOs exert their influence in such areas as defence policy, expenditure and procurement policies, the size and structure of the security forces.⁶⁸ They may include independent researchers, think tanks, human rights watchdog groups, women's organisations, etc that serve as a source of independent information on and analysis of legislation, policies, and current events for the public, government and other audiences. Their efforts could provide a potential alternative source of information and analysis to the decision-makers.⁶⁹ The media have a similar function as CSOs. They play an important role in communicating ideas, providing information, and posing questions on the development of security sector reform. One of the best practices of the CSOs affecting security sector reform took place in Mozambique. The media and local NGOs' ran large campaigns that revealed the protests of local peoples about the human rights abuses and misconduct of the police; this contributed to reducing such abuse.⁷⁰ In Sierra Leone, CSOs made proposals to the government on how to manage the process of reconstructing the armed forces by widely circulating photos of recruit candidates who are suspected of human rights violations. While many problems remained concerning their methodology and the limit of the implementation, the government accepted these proposals to a positive degree, thus reducing the risk of fresh human rights violations by the former combatants.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Ludvic Hood, "Security Sector Reform In East Timor": op. cit.: 61.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 57.

⁶⁸ Ball and Michael Brzoska, *Voice And Accountability In The Security Sector*, op. cit.: 54.

⁶⁹ Caparini, "Enabling Civil Society In Security Sector Reform", op. cit.: 73.

⁷⁰ Yonah Seleti, "The Public In The Exorcism Of The Police In Mozambique: Challenges Of Institutional Democratisation," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 2000): 363.

⁷¹ Ball and Michael Brzoska, *Voice And Accountability in the Security Sector*, op. cit: 56.

Parliamentary Oversight

Parliamentary oversight refers to measures by the parliamentary committee responsible for issues of internal security and home affairs to control the security forces, including the size of the forces, the structure, the roles, the missions and the budget. Parliamentarians are expected to examine and report on policy initiatives (such as defence planning, reorganisation of the armed forces proposals on which equipment to purchase) that are put forward by the defence and other security-related ministries. They are to conduct inquiries into issues of special concern regarding defence and security issues. These functions enhance transparency and scrutiny of the forces and the national authorities that manage them, thereby encouraging public trust and action on reform issues.

Challenges for effective parliamentary oversight are many. A lack of appropriately skilled parliamentarians may make it difficult to conduct inquiries and evaluations of these issues. Dysfunctional parliamentary committees would allow the related ministries to provide a “free pass” to the legislature without lawmakers examining the prudence and the possible effectiveness of such policies. Legacies from past conflicts hinder the parliamentarians’ role in security sector reform. In many post-conflict states, the executive body reigns supreme particularly in the ministries of defence and interior. Consequently, bureaucrats maintain a culture of secrecy and often neglect the legislative body. On the other hand, in the legislative branch there is a tendency to oppose executive power even when it comes to insignificant matters.⁷² This may result in a clash between the two bodies, making it difficult to proceed with security reforms. Assisting parliamentarians to acquire necessary skills is a time-consuming task, and so is eliminating the legacies so deeply-rooted among the executives.

Coordinating with Judicial Sections

Restructuring military and police forces must be accompanied by judicial reforms. Modernising laws, training judges, lawyers and prosecutors, rehabilitating courts and prisons are all vital measures to ensure the rule of law.⁷³ These judicial reforms are important to ensure punishment for any misconduct of the military and police officers, and to strengthen the domestic security by reducing the risks of war criminals and other human rights aggressors being left unpunished and remaining a threat to the people. Delays in the judicial reforms in Haiti, for example, caused an expansion in the culture of police impunity, criminal activity and corruptions in the country.⁷⁴

⁷² Willem F. van Eekelen, *The Parliamentary Dimension Of Security Sector Reform* (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Working Paper No. 120, May 2003): 60.

⁷³ G. O’Neill William, “Police Reform In Post-Conflict Societies: What We Know And What We Still Need To Know,” *Policy Paper*, The Security-Development Nexus Program (New York: International Peace Academy, April 2005): 3.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*: 284.

Conclusion

Studies on the nexus between DDR and SSR are yet to be developed. Despite widespread agreement amongst scholars and practitioners that the two operations are closely linked and the results mutually affect each other, an examination of what components are having which effect and to what degree is still needed. Given this circumstance, this article has attempted to address some points to help us better understand where and how the linkages should be strengthened. This article has focused on the two major components of the security sector institutions, namely the armed forces and the police forces, where such interactions are most significant. In post-conflict states, some of the disarmed and demobilised combatants do choose (or in many cases have no other realistic alternatives otherwise) to be recruited in the newly-constituted armed forces and the police. Depending on the situation of the past conflict and the peace agreements afterwards, the military and police could either be restructured from scratch or by reforming the existing structures, while integrating some demobilised combatants. Whichever form is taken, restructuring security sector institutions, particularly the armed forces and the police, does involve the demobilised former combatants. This reintegration – calling it *security sector reintegration* – is an unavoidable element in DDR and SSR, and it is the linking point between the two where better coordination must be made. DDR plans and implementation strategies must correspond to the needs that SSR designs for restructuring the new security institutions over a much longer time spectrum. Necessary modifications include involving more defence and military experts in deciding who and how many to demobilise; enhancing disarmament in civilians and armed groups not covered by the DDR process; and strengthening social reintegration programmes so that the former combatants can be better accommodated in the local communities where they are (re)settled. Likewise, SSR plans and implementing strategies cannot ignore the fact that the prime subjects of the security institutions (i.e. military and police) include the demobilised former combatants, thus requiring us to know how they would or would not be qualified and beneficial, or not, for the newly-constituted security institutions. Establishing and maintaining the integrity and solidarity as a national military and police is a priority so that the demobilised former combatants could be well-integrated in these reconstituted security services. For that to be effective, the appropriate recruitment criteria and training programmes need to be further enhanced to prevent future violations of human rights being committed by their members. Building an oversight mechanism to monitor the activities and policies of the security forces is vital so that the restructuring of the security forces and the national authorities that govern them can be monitored by civilians. This way, any concerns can be addressed in the evaluation and scrutiny of the progress of reform, including that of *security sector reintegration*.

The agendas suggested here in search of a better nexus between DDR and SSR are by no means exhaustive, but rather meant to propose some key points that any evaluation will have to start with. This study needs more extensive research, including more detailed field studies in various post-conflict settings. Further studies, therefore, on the better coordination between the two operations are needed, as the failure to do so would risk undermining the sustainable reconstruction of the security sector as a whole.

Bibliography

- Ball, Nicole and Michael Brzoska, *Voice And Accountability In The Security Sector*, Paper 21, Bonn International Center for Conversion, BICC (Bonn: BICC, July 2002).
- Bryden, Alan, "Linkage Between DDR And SSR – Understanding The DDR-SSR Nexus: Building Sustainable Peace in Africa," *Second International Conference On DDR And Stability in Africa*, Kinshasa, Democratic Republic Of Congo 12–14 June 2007 (OSAA/DRC) Issue paper (June 2007).
- Brzoska, Michael, "Embedding DDR Programme In Security Sector Reconstruction," in *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi (eds.) (London: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) / Transaction Publishers, 2005).
- Call, Charles T., "Competing Donor Approaches To Post-Conflict Police Reform," *Conflict, Security and Development* Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2002).
- Donais, Timothy, "Back To Square One: The Politics Of Police Reform In Haiti," *Civil Wars*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Autumn 2005).
- Ginifer, Jeremy, "Support For DDR and SSR After Conflicts in Africa: Lessons Learnt And New Agendas In Africa, Conflict prevention, management and reduction in Africa" Paper 3, A joint project of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and the Centre for International Cooperation and Security (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2007).
- Gleichmann, Colin, et. al., *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Practical Field And Classroom Guide* (Stuttgart: GTZ/NODEFIC/PC/SNDC, 2004).
- Hodes, Cyrus, and Mark Sedra, "The Search For Security In Post-Taliban Afghanistan", *Adelphi Paper 391* (Routledge/International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), October 2007).
- Hood, Ludvic, "Security Sector Reform In East Timor," chap. in *Security Sector Reconstruction And Reform In Peace Support Operations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).
- Jennings, Kathleen M., "The Struggle To Satisfy: DDR through The Eyes Of Ex-Combatants In Liberia," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April 2007).
- Kumar, Dhruva, "Police Reform And Military Downsizing," in *Policing In Nepal: A Collection Of Essays*, Saferworld (September 2007).
- MDRP, Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme, Position Paper: *Linkages Between Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Of Ex-Combatants And Security Sector Reform* (MDRP (available at: www.mdrp.org), October 2003): 4.
- Mani, Rama, "Contextualizing Police Reform", *Security, The Rule Of Law And Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 1999).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden, *Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration: Final Report*, 2006.

- Muggah, Robert, “Emerging from The Shadow of War: A Critical Perspective on DDR And Weapons Reduction In The Post-Conflict Period,” *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (April 2006).
- Murray, Tonita, “Police-Building In Afghanistan: A Case Study Of Civil Security Reform,” *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 14, No. 1 (2007).
- O’Neill, William G., “Police Reform In Post-Conflict Societies: What We Know And What We Still Need To Know,” Policy Paper The Security-Development Nexus Program (New York: International Peace Academy, April 2005).
- OECD DAC, *OECD DAC Handbook On Security System Reform: Supporting Security And Justice* (OECD/DAC, 2007).
- OECD, *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice* (2000).
- Rufer, Reto, “Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR): Conceptual Approaches, Specific Settings, Practical Experiences”, *Working Paper*, The Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF)(Geneva:2005).
- Seleti, Yonah, “The Public In The Exorcism Of The Police In Mozambique: Challenges Of Institutional Democratisation,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 2000).
- United Nations, *The Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)*, 2006.
- Van Eekelen, Willem F., *The Parliamentary Dimension Of Security Sector Reform* (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Working Paper No. 120, May 2003).
- “Introduction: Criteria For Evaluating Post-Conflict Reconstruction And Security Sector Reform In Peace Support Operations,” chap. in *Security Sector Reconstruction And Reform In Peace Support Operations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).
- “Shaping The Security Governance: Agenda In Post-Conflict Peacebuilding,” in *Security Governance In Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi (eds.) (London: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) / Transaction Publishers, 2005).