

Search for a European Identity – Psycho-Sociological Perspective (An Attempt at Agency Approach)¹

Karel B. Müller²

Contextualising the Problem

One of the basic dilemmas in the social sciences is how to bridge the gap between the agency approach, which refers towards a context of individual agents, and the structural approach, which refers towards the complexity of a social structure (Giddens 1991). In this article I offer an account of European identity from the agency approach perspective. I presume that in order to understand the process of collective identity formation we must, first of all, deal with the context of individual agents. Furthermore, the very distinction between collective and individual identity is problematic since each identity is essentially subjective and collective identity is always a part of individual identity. Separating these two concepts as analytical tools could be, according to my opinion, malignant and counter-productive. It is important to follow the structural approach of (European) identity formation, nevertheless the perspective (or context) of individual agents has been, in ongoing debates on European identity, the European demos and the EU's search-for-legitimacy, vastly overlooked and neglected. In my opinion, the context of individual agents has to be taken into account, if we want to deal successfully with the problem of European identity on a (more abstract) structural level. Furthermore, we should try to search for links between both researches perspectives. This is, according to my view, the only way to deal with such complex issues and to avoid rather naive and simplified findings.³

¹ The article was prepared as the part of the research programme “*Governance in context of globalised economy and society*” (MSM6138439909) at Faculty of International Relations, University of Economics in Prague.

² Dr. Karel B. Müller, is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Economics in Prague. He may be contacted at: mullerk@vse.cz.

³ Referring to a context of individual agents I prefer to use the word *European identities*, in order to emphasise the multiplicity and complementarities of identities, when I refer to a structural level I put the singular (*European identity*).

I argue that European identity should be, first of all, understood and pursued as a process of fair communication and as a search for positive identities. At the same time I admit that the quest for strong European political identity (a sense of belonging and self-understanding of Europeans) is a relevant and upwardly important question. In particular with respect to a current transformation (crisis) of national states which instigates the necessity to form a transnational framework of governance to increase political readiness and institutional capacities to tackle risks of globalising modernity (Beck 1992). This is relevant in relation to the EU's decision-making procedures and its need to apply the mechanism of majority vote more often. The lack of a collective self-understanding among Europeans makes the applicability of such a mechanism very limited, hence the political capacities of the EU (consequently of Europeans) are very constrained. Here I accept the communitarian argument that democratic decision-making processes can only take place when the individuals of a given polity consider themselves as members of one society; e.g. if they share bonds of common identity (Taylor 1995). Only under such a condition is the political system resistant against a tendency towards fragmentation. A common identity guarantees the loyalty of those whose interests were not reflected in the political systems output. Furthermore, the lack of a European public (demos) does not allow the exercise of a transparent and accountable democratic political power on a European level (Pérez-Díaz 1998).

The question of European identity has primarily both theoretical and practical relevance and is part of the wider problem of the legitimacy of the EU. The EU's need for an active search for legitimacy could prove to be, after all, the EU's advantage over national governments, who tend to rely on static social segments and take the existence of national states for granted (Eriksen, Fossum 2000). At the same time it is not an exaggeration to claim that there is a demand for strengthening the EU's legitimacy among Europeans themselves.⁴ With respect to the EU's legitimacy, it is important to emphasise that it is not, and never was, a singular-term category, but rather a plurality of legitimacy codes has always been the case during integration processes. As Eriksen and Fossum's (2004) analysis shows, in the European public discourse there is to be found three specific types of legitimisation - utilitarian, cultural and procedural⁵ – and I support their suggestion that only a contextual combina-

⁴ Not only the EU officials but public opinion across the EU countries also calls for stronger EU's political capacities, at least in some areas. The last Eurobarometer survey shows that two out of every three citizens (25 EU countries) wish that the Union pursued a common foreign policy, and even three out of every four support a common defence and security policy (Standard Eurobarometer 66/autumn 2006).

⁵ In the *utilitarian strategy* the EU is predominantly perceived as a problem solving entity. The *cultural strategy* emphasizes the need to deepen the collective identity of Europeans, since the EU is primarily seen as a value-based community. The *procedural strategy* stresses the need to develop the EU into a community, which is founded on civic rights and democratic decision-making procedures. Eriksen and Fossum (2004) suggest that in particular the first

tion of all three types of legitimisation could provide a satisfactory alternative for the legitimacy crises of the EU. In addition to that, we should bear in mind, as convincingly Tocqueville (1968) already showed, that legitimacy crisis is to a certain extent inevitable and a permanent problem of any democratic polity.

We have to stress that Europeans have inherited a wide range of European cultures (including political cultures) which encompass a variety of visions of an integrated Europe and a variety of legitimising strategies traditions. In despite of this, an overlapping consensus seems to be found in defining European diversity, its institutional protection and further development, as a major building block of European unity, and thus European identity. This argument is supported by followers of Habermasian concept of “constitutional patriotism”, which is seen as a major inclusive mechanism allowing a formation of relations of solidarity and general reciprocity among Europeans across national contexts (Habermas 2001b). At another level, many others oppose that it is not at all clear how Europeans will succeed in making a positive virtue of their diversity (Delanty, Rumford 2005). I suggest that examining the phenomenon of European identity formation from the context of individual agents could prove to be a productive and innovative approach which could shed a clearer light on these complicated issues and might increase our understanding of such entangled phenomena as the European polity and its legitimacy, emerging European identity and the European public.

Collective versus individual identity

Many authors distinguish between collective and individual identity, or between the collective and individual dimensions of identity (e.g. Calhoun 1994, Taylor 1989). At first glance it seems quite obvious that European identity is a collective identity or a collective dimension of identity. On closer inspection we find that both identities (and its dimension) are bound together and both are a part of personal, subjective identity. The collective dimension arises, manifests and transforms itself when experiencing cultural differences, e.g. in a situation when I cannot successfully apply other dimensions of my identity. For example, we can imagine that in being a member of an ethnically dominant

strategy is becoming very problematic due to the expanding diversity of the EU. The second strategy, although strongly historically embedded, could turn the Union into an exclusive fortress of (Western) Christianity with insufficient capacity for a wider social and political inclusion; social rigidity seems to be the major drawback of this second strategy. The third strategy appears to envision, according to Eriksen and Fossum, the most viable alternative; nevertheless its salient normative connotations do not allow it, in the short term, to become the prevalent feasible option. The authors argue that the varieties of the EU's (political) cultures resonate with the need to understand the EU in terms of its plurality of various legitimising strategies. The contextual pursuit for achieving equilibrium between the value-based and procedure-based foundation of the EU presents, according to me, the most plausible and attractive option.

group one does not encounter different cultures so often, as being a member of an ethnically non-dominant group. Hence, the collective identity of ethnic minorities is stronger as well as the bonds of solidarity and loyalty. On the other hand, the members of dominant ethnic groups do not show such strong mutual solidarity and loyalty. Let us pose the important question: Why do we have the need of collective identity at all? It is because collective identity is the manifestation of individual identity and the need to identify ourselves with something as abstract as national identity is the consequence of crisis of individual identity (Cohen 2000).

Collective identity could be understood as an overlap of individual identities (Appiah 1994). When we research collective identities we deal with the serious problem of dialectics between a subjective identity and a socially recognised (or inflicted) identity. By using the notion of collective identity we are at risk of cementing a fake hypostasis (Berger and Luckman 1999). The category of collective identity could work as a kind of scenario which reproduces embedded cultural patterns and stereotypes (Appiah 1994), and therefore creates an obstacle in the open and reflexive process of identity formation. We are getting into the trap of the methodological nationalism which consists of fostering national stereotypes, foreclosure, and mutual ignorance, hence conserving group antagonism and ground for potential conflicts (Lesaar 2001: 181).

When talking about collective identity we have to realise that collective identity is not a “thing”, a “real entity”, let alone a “static entity”, but it is a kind of theory, a concept or analytical tool, something like the lens of camera, through which we perceive and interpret reality (Melucci 1996: 77). As Appiah (1994) argues, there is not a clear borderline between the multicultural policy of recognition and the policy of coercion. Exploring the question of European identity, national identity and their mutual relationships create a serious methodological challenge for the social sciences. Since national identities have become our “second nature” we need to foster multicultural dialogue and literacy in order to develop and maintain political and civic communication across Europe (Habermas 1996). The dilemma facing the collective identities across Europe comprises the fact that both the recognition and the rejection of national identities cause certain barriers towards reflexive and open identity formation.

What is identity? (Erikson’s theory)

Identity is like our health, it disconcerts us only when it is threatened (Pitch 1993: 82). What is identity? Human identity is very contextual, very structural, dynamic, and is a multiple social and psychological phenomenon. Each identity has a tendency both towards internal division and towards merging into a higher category of primary identity (Calhoun 1994: 27). The main sources of our identities are families, friends, colleges at work or school, and only after

that comes into play more abstract identification with an “imagined community” (Anderson). Each identity consists of features both fictional and real, and reflects both our moral aspirations and our experiences with the “life world”. It has both a static and a dynamic dimension (Melucci 1996). It depends on a given situation and a type of human activity which factor of identity prevails. Changes in our environment and our activities might cause changes of both forms of identity and contents of those forms. I give you an example. If I am abroad I often unconsciously defend Czech culture, whereas if I am in the Czech Republic, I am usually very critical towards Czechs. It might be caused by the fact that when I am abroad to be confronted with Czechness means to look at myself, whereas in the Czech Republic it means to look at others. Simply put, particular dimensions of our identity come into play only when other dimensions fail.

I have drawn inspiration from Hoovers (1997) theory of identity formation which is based on the lifelong research of Erik Erikson (1963, 1968, 1974, 1982), which, I argue, is crucial for our topic of collective (European) identity. Erikson’s concept of identity has been validated in more than 300 studies. It provides a reliable perspective on how political processes and policies can foster the development of identities. Erikson’s central proposition, generated from extensive clinical research, is that the common strand in human nature consists in striving for an identity based on two elements. The first is competence in productive, social, and personal relations. That is why, when asked who we are, most of us answer in terms of what we do - our vocations, avocations, and statuses that are attached to them. The second identity element rests on a sense of integrity within a sensible world of meaning. So, when pressed further about identity, we describe how we are situated in social context: as believers in a religion, natives of a certain region etc. Both competence and integrity involve transactions between the self and society. Competence must be both achieved by one’s effort and validated through social recognition. Identity grows and is nurtured or frustrated in a complex bonding of self and society (Hoover 1997: 19-21).

Erikson’s theory has been hugely criticized for its individualism and for ignoring biological and gender differences, which in fact create crucial limits in developing our competence and integrity. Feminist critics have been stressing that Erikson’s theory fails to differentiate gendered components in human development adequately. Without the capacity for relational mutuality which helps to break stereotypical patterns of socially inflicted identities, we cannot assert competence and social integrity and freely de/construct our own identities. Consequently, according to Hoover (ibid: 25), it is important to add to competence and integrity an additional element of identity formation, mutuality. Contemporary research suggests it is critical for all.

Erikson distinguishes between positive and negative identity. Negative identity usually manifests itself by exploitation and pseudo speciation and

Erikson considers it as a pathological phenomenon in identity formation. There are two, usually connected levels of negative identity, negative typing of oneself or others. Negative identities are very common among ethnic minorities which identify themselves against members of dominant cultures. This reinforces mutual antagonisms or intergroup aggression. The long term consequences of negative identity formation are usually hatred, frustration and lack of self-esteem. Pathology of such identities comprises the fact that it leads to destructive social and political consequences. As Erikson observes, *“once we have learned to reduce the other - any living human being in the wrong place, the wrong category, or the wrong uniform - to a dirty speck in our moral vision, and potentially a mere target in the sight of our gun (or our soldiers), we are on the way to violating mans essence, if not his very life”* (quoted from Hoover 1997: 33).

Identity formation is never straightforward. There is always a tension between positive and negative identities. The risk of composing negative identities is always present. Everyone is shadowed by negative identities that threaten and confuse daily life but the key is to have the means of coping with, or mastering the urge to give in to the negative typing of oneself or others. Identities could be in a complementary or discriminatory relationship and Erikson (ibid: 76) analyses discrimination (and chauvinism) as a source of pathology in identity formation. Identity, when formed by the victimization of others, is pathological. Dynamics of pathological identities could vary, but mostly they lead to violence and strife for dominance. The non-neurotic nature of positive identities, on the other hand, consists of skills to assert competence, integrity and mutuality. Such identities generate feelings of self-mastery and ego gratification (ibid: 33).

National versus European identities

As the analyses of modern nationalism have proven, national identities are to a great extent defined as negative identities (Luhmann 1971: 60). Hoover (1997: 40) suggests that the opportunity of direct state intervention into identity forming processes is being opened by the crises of identity. Usually it has a pathological nature of stereotypical identity formation and it substitutes a lack of personal confidence and maturity, and leads towards negative identities formation. Such a type of politics of identity has, sooner or later, a problem with its legitimacy since negative identities present shaky and unreliable sources of civic loyalty. Being loyal to something (a political authority) only because it is different from something else (another political authority), means that loyalty suddenly fades if that “something else” is not present or threatening enough. Fostering civic loyalty then requires active seeking or generating a “something else” and to exercise what is nowadays being called “politics of fear”.

Identity formation is a way to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity. The inability to assert our competence, to be an integral part of a community, and

to build the bonds of mutuality, causes the identity crises. Identity crises might lead - striving for functional “psychosocial equilibrium” (Erikson) - to stereotypical identity formation, foreclosure and pseudo speciation, which, as Marcia (1997) suggests, makes individuals more gullible and mouldable by demagogic political agitation, and more susceptible towards dependency on authoritarian leaders. The politics of fear creates distrust, and in order to sustain its power it has to germinate “fake enemies”, hence to support and to reinforce pathological elements in identity formation: pseudo speciation, exploitation, and negative identities. As long as pathological forms penetrate into politics, identities become adverse towards differences, and differences start to destroy identities themselves. Every political authority which tries to abuse and exploit human desperation and confusion without trying to offer reasonable solutions, will always be very unstable and of quite limited duration. Crisis of identities bring about both the rise and the decline of such a political authority. National identities have many pathological elements and the consequences of those elements reached in the last century, due to modern technological development, an unimaginable catastrophic scale. A similar, but slightly more radical, diagnosis is expressed Tom Nairn (quoted by Anderson 2003: 243):

“Nationalism is pathology of modern historical development; it is as inevitable as an individual neurosis, ensued by similar substantial ambiguity encompassing the latent possibility to turn into insanity. It grows from dilemma of confusion (for society an equivalent of infantilism), which most of the world suffers from, and which is in the fact incurable.”

Hoover (1997: 72) suggests that a source of legitimacy of any political authority should be sought in reducing the pathological elements in identity formation processes. The main objective of any government should comprise not in bribing its citizens by material benefits, but in creating a suitable environment for individual development and for an open and reflexive positive identity formation, which is based on competence, social integrity and mutuality. Positive identities usually lead to mutual recognition, to attenuation of inter-group conflicts, to reinforcement of a sense of belonging, and to self-gratification (Hoover 1997: 66). Identity formation takes place primarily in civil society, rather than through the state or economy. As Alan Wolfe (1989) finds in comparing social conditions in Scandinavia and the U.S., wherever the state, or the market, takes over essential life functions from civil society, social conditions deteriorate.

I have already mentioned that the EU’s need for an active search for legitimacy could prove to be an advantage of the EU over national governments, which rely on nested identities of national states which are being perpetuated by an institutional machinery of social supervision and control of information, and which are still embedded in national contexts. Nevertheless, as Ulrich Beck (1992) argues, European unity must be considered as an attempt to

both affirm and alleviate European national intricacies. The transformation of national identities should be envisaged, to cite Gellner (1997), as a process of de-nationalisation, e.g. affirmation of the cultural dimensions of national identities and the attenuation of their pathological elements. The project of European identity does not mean a loss of national identities, although we can expect the attenuation of national identities and reinforcement, or the rise of other forms. National identities are social constructs, hence they could be de/re/constructed. This is, from a constructivist point of view, happening anyway. As Habermas (2001a: 75) argues, we have to reject the traditional image of a multicultural dialogue as a dialogue of ‘ultimate totalities.’ He proposes a dynamic image of an ongoing construction of new modes of belonging, new subcultures and lifestyles, a process kept in motion through intercultural contacts and multi-ethnic connections. The latest anthropological research proves the validity of such a presumption. Globalisation does not cause neither homogenization, nor break down of collective identities. Reacting to the homogenizing pressure of a material world culture, new constellations often emerge which do not so much level out existing cultural differences as create a new multiplicity of hybridized forms (ibid).

European integration – a chance for positive identities

I suggest that European identity should be primarily seen as a complex of multiple positive identities, as a new enlightenment project, indeed, which encapsulates the attempt to overcome the biasness of national identities and national consciousness. The EU and European civil society should strive for maintaining and fostering an environment which allows the reflexive and open processes of identity formation. Erikson’s theory shows that the process of socialization and the process of developing our own competence and integrity inevitably encompass the crises of identity, which sooner or later confronts everyone. With respect to the complex and reflexive dynamics of identity concept, no one possesses a single, entire and utterly harmonic identity (Calhoun 1994: 27). Europe is and will be an environment dealing with identity crises, which will be accompanied by the threats of potential pathologies found in identity formation. Therefore, EU policies and politics have to actively foster the means of reducing these pathological tendencies and help to form positive identities. European civil society could be defined as a niche providing those very sources, and creating chances for an open and reflexive identity formation based on competence, social integrity and mutuality. The maintenance of reflexive skills and personal development is to be understood as a lifelong process. Such a situation could provide a method (and substance) for creating European identity, which I suggest to conceptualize - in the context of an individual agency and with respect to a dynamic (prescriptive) dimension of identity - rather than a singular collective identity, as a (strive for) complementarities of multiple positive identities. Such conditions could work to-

wards the open de/re/construction of collective identities in Europe; and could work towards building European identity. Positive identities are most likely to work towards complementary identities, and negative identity towards discrimination.

Although a structural account on the European identity debate is not the aim of this article, let me put forward one remark considering a linkage between the agency and structural approaches. Making a rigid distinction between identity as an aspiration and identity as a reality is not, regarding its subjectivity and reflexivity, possible. This, by the way, significantly constrains any empirical survey of (collective) identities. A healthy and balanced identity should be the result of equilibrium between fiction and reality, between its dynamic and static dimensions (Melucci 1996). European identity – with respect to a social structure and regarding the static (descriptive) dimension of identity – should be based on both political and cultural criteria, and Europeans should try to combine with subtle sensitivity the cultural and civic code of collective identity. Here, I concur with the already mentioned position of the Habermasian concept of “constitutional patriotism”. I believe that through peaceful conflict resolution and democratic citizenship we can provide abstract rule of law-mediated solidarity between “strangers” or “others.” (For cultural/civic codes of collective identity, see Shils 1975). It is important to mention that identity formation necessarily involves difference, which constitutes the edges (borders) of one’s identity. The affirmation of these edges is the critical political aspect of identity formation which implies the potential for discrimination. The civic code of collective identity formation deals with the problem of “borders” (and therefore collective identity) by not stressing or emphasizing it explicitly (Shils 1975); hence the civic code is well suited for fostering an environment, which is favourable for the formation of positive identities.

European identities as a process of communication

I agree with Outhwaite (1999) who suggests that European identity cannot be conceived in traditional conventional terms, like national identities. The main characteristics of European identity cannot be a definition of “borders” by creating the dichotomy of “we” and “others”. If European cultural specificity consists of cultural diversity, then a European identity necessarily remains (in a certain sense) unclear. Outhwaite calls conventional national identity atavistic identity, post-national identity must be a post-conventional identity.

In what sense could identities be comprehended as post-conventional? To build complementary, multiple and positive identities is feasible and imaginable only through specific methods of civic and multicultural communication. Giddens suggests (1991) that in the condition of radicalised modernity civic engagement, participation and communication, which are recognized as fair and open, create crucial preconditions for strengthening and establishing bonds

of belonging and solidarity, and therefore positive identities. The concept of European identity as a means of communication, dialogue and participation presumes a (non-conventional) procedure-like (procedural) concept of identity with a dominance of civic code elements in (collective) identity formation, hence an emphasis on the value of rules in the process of communication. As Outhwaite (1999) puts it, the procedures of not reaching a consensus are as important (if not more important) as the procedures of reaching consensus, and they should be recognised as a key factor of European political culture and as a decisive precondition to form a collective identity in any stronger sense. In other words, the characters of the political processes and of the processes within civil society, which are recognised by their participants as fair and open, matters more, in some sense, than particular outcomes of these processes.

More than common values, communication itself is creating important sources for the formation of bonds of belonging and solidarity. As a parallel to political processes we can see a deeper transformation of social relations and societal systems, when social interactions are ‘lifting out’ from local contexts and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space (Giddens 1991). Since radicalised modernity is featured by a complex reorganisation of time-space relations (Rifkin 2004), it is more accurate to comprehend society as an open system of communication, rather than as an integrated social system of shared meanings and morals which is embedded in a local context. Societies are nowadays, first of all, communicating societies, networks of mobility, flows and social communication (Castells 2001, Delanty 2003). Therefore identity, including a European one, should be comprehended as a project, whose main objective is the active participation in the process of fair and open communication. Communication itself could be (and should be) the main overarching defining characteristic of European identities.

Conclusion

The aim of this article has been to contribute to the debate on European identity from a psycho-sociological perspective. I have followed the agency approach and tried to consider the formative processes of European identity within the context of individual action, using the psychological concept of identity as a crucial analytical tool. The article has drawn inspiration from Erik Erikson’s psychological theory, which analyses negative national identities as an outcome of a dominance of pathological elements emerging during identity formation processes. Unlike negative identities, sound positive identities are founded on social competence and social integrity. Furthermore, positive identities could be formed and reaffirmed only in dynamic and vital social contexts, which employ active participation and effective communication skills and experience. Moreover, positive identities work towards complementarities of identities; negative identity, on the contrary, towards discriminatory relations between identities.

Since European identity should be comprehended as a set of multiple complementary identities, the prevalence of positive elements in identity formation processes is to be seen as a major precondition for European (post-conventional – unlike national) identity formation. This is not to say that national identities must vanish in order to form European identity. Nevertheless, European identities can be formed and strengthened only if both the EU and European civil societies will work towards the attenuation of discriminatory tensions among national identities, and providing sufficient preventative means, against the dominance of pathological elements in processes of identity formation.

In the condition of radicalised modernity every positive identity is a multiple, dynamic and contra-factual social and psychological phenomenon, which is being constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed throughout the whole of human life. Thus European identity cannot be an exception. Hence, fair and ongoing communication and participation seem to be both a precondition, and the best method and defining feature of sound – dynamic, inclusive and balanced – European identities. Therefore, in the future we have to pay more focused attention to the cluster of social and political institutions, which could be labelled as an (emerging) European public sphere, or better, as a sphere of European publics. Phenomena such as the role of historical memories and narratives, new forms of civil society, political socialisation, civic education, and the role of media etc. must be dealt with by innovative approaches in order to achieve a better understanding of significant elements affecting the processes of identity formation in the European context.

Bibliography

- Anderson, B. (2003). "Pomyslná společenství", in M. Hroch (ed.), *Pohledy na národ a nacionalismus*. Praha: Slon, 239-69, [Imagined Community].
- Appiah, K. A. (1994). "Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction." In *Multiculturalism: Examining "The Politics of Recognition."* An essay by Charles Taylor, with commentary by Amy Gutmann (editor), K. Anthony Appiah, Jürgen Habermas, Steven C. Rockefeller, Michael Walzer, Susan Wolf. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 149-164.
- Beck, U. (1992). *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Berger, P. and Luckman, T. (1966). *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Calhoun, C. (ed) (1994). *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*. Cambridge, Massachusetts/Oxford: Blackwell.
- Castells, M. (2001). *The Internet Galaxy. Reflection on the Internet, Business, and Society*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen, A. (2000) *Signifying Identities – Anthropological Perspectives on Boundaries and Contested Values*. London: Routledge.
- Delanty, G. (2003). *Community*. London/NY: Routledge.
- Delanty, G. and Rumford, Ch. (2005). *Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and Implications of Europeanization*. London: Routledge.
- Eriksen, E., O. a Fossum, John., Erik. (2000). "Conclusion. Legitimation through deliberation", in E. O. Eriksen a J. E. Fossum (eds), *Democracy in the European Union. Integration Through Deliberation?* London/NY: Routledge, 256-69.
- Erikson, E. (1963). *Childhood and Society*. New York: Norton.
- Erikson, E. (1968). *Identity: Youth and Crisis*. New York: Norton.
- Erikson, E. (1974). *Dimensions of a New Identity*. New York: Norton.
- Erikson, E. (1982). *The Life Cycle Completed: A Review*. New York: Norton.
- Habermas, J. (1996). *Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Habermas, J. (2001a). *The Postnational Constellation. Political Essays*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Habermas, J. (2001b). "Why Europe Needs A Constitution", *New Left Review* 11, September-October, 5-26.
- Hoover, K. (1997). *The Power of Identity. Politics in a New Key*. New Persey: Chatham.
- Gellner, E. (1997). *Nationalism*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Giddens, A. (1991). *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Lesaar, R., Henrik (2001). "Semper Idem? The Relationship of European and National Identities", in Martin, Drulak (ed.) (2001). *National and European Identities in EU Enlargement*. Prague: Institute of International Relations, 179-94.
- Luhmann, N. (1971). Sinn als Grundbegriff der Soziologie, in J. Habermas a N. Luhmann *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 25 – 100.
- Marcia, J. E. (1997). *Ego Identity: Research Review*, in K. Hoover, *The Power of Identity: Politics in a New Key*. Ney Jersey: Chantham, 85-122.
- Melucci, A. (1996). *Challenging Codes. Collective Action in the Information Age*. Cambridge: University Press.
- Outhwaite, W. (1999). *Toward a European Civil Society*. Paper from the conference "Uncivil Dimensions of Civil Society", which took place in November 1999 at The University of Wales (Bangor), accessed 3. 11. 2004 from (www.zmk.uni-freiburg.de/Online_Texts/outhwaite_european_civil_society.htm).
- Pitch, R. (1993). "Disturbed Identities: Social and Cultural Mutations in Contemporary Europe", in Garcia, S. (ed.), *European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy*. London: Pinter.
- Pérez-Díaz, V. (1998). The Public Sphere and European Civil Society, in J. Alexander (ed.), *Real Civil Societies*. London: Sage, 211-238.
- Rifkin, J. (2004). *The European Dream*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Shils, E. (1975). *Center and Periphery. Essays in Macro-Sociology*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Taylor, Ch. (1989). *Source of the Self*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Taylor, Ch. (1995). *Philosophical Arguments*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Tocqueville, A. de (1968). *Democracy in America*. New York: Doubleday.
- Wolfe, A. (1989) *Whose Keeper? Social Science and Moral Obligation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.