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Negotiating the Common Agricultural Policy: A Critical Appraisal of Franco-German Intra-Alliance Rivalry

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Abstract

Any exploration of the power dynamics that underly the Franco-German tandem can surely benefit from the insights that the creation of the Common Agriculture Policy provides. The purpose of this article is to ascertain which government achieved its objectives more fully during the negotiations between France and West Germany leading up to the creation of the CAP, and to determine how those greater successes might be explained. This is achieved by applying discourse analysis and utilising actor-centred constructivist theory for rationalisation. While not entirely unsuccessful in reaching some of its objectives, the West German government had to deal with conflicting interests between ministries, overly influential lobbying groups, and ineffective coordination. The French side in the negotiations benefitted from more focused leadership, pursuing shared common goals under a cohesive strategy, in which their use of discourses proved decisive.

Introduction

Any exploration of the power dynamics that underly the Franco-German tandem can surely benefit from the insights that the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy provides. Not only did the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) represent a new phase of European integration following the Treaty of Rome but it would also receive the largest share of the European Community's budget for decades to come. Given the relevance the creation of the CAP holds for the foundations of the Franco-German tandem and the shape of European integration from the 1960s to the present day, a re-visit of the CAP's origins is long overdue.

Why did the CAP negotiations lead to results so conducive to French interests, such as favourable cereal prices and the Luxembourg Compromise? Is it enough to assume that the West German side simply acquiesced to all French demands in order to secure better conditions for its manufactured goods in target export markets? Although securing favourable market conditions for West German exporters was a priority, this article argues that it was a trade-off that cost the West German government more dearly than entirely necessary. This article puts forward the proposition that the reasons for such positive outcomes for the French lie not only with French negotiating expertise but also lie with significant inadequacies on the West German side. France held two advantages over West Germany during the negotiations. Firstly, it strategically used brinksmanship and the element of surprise in the negotiations. Secondly, it was cognisant of and benefitted from the lack of cohesion on the West German side, a result of the serious conflicts of interest which the chancellorship could not remedy. Furthermore, France's strategic advantage was further strengthened by West German conflicts of interest.

The existing literature on these negotiations has yet to systematically explain why the West German side in the negotiations experienced such grave difficulties in achieving a cohesive position. A deeper analysis into the causes of the West German government's fragmented approach in the negotiations is required to fully understand the gap in negotiating outcomes between France and West Germany. The aim is to investigate the comparative effectiveness of French and West German politicians and officials during the negotiations in reaching their stated goals. Overall, the West German government proves to have performed poorly for several reasons. Conflicting interests between ministries, overly influential lobbying groups and ineffective coordination being chief among them. Decisive leadership and shared common goals unite the French side in the negotiations.

Two cases within the CAP negotiations are selected for analysis, based on their similar trajectories and outcomes. The cases are the negotiations on the common cereal price and the negotiations on the financing of the CAP/the ques-

tion of qualified majority voting, resulting in the 'Luxembourg Compromise'. Both cases will exhibit the same causal mechanisms linking causes to outcomes, the first causal mechanism being the setting of a trap, and the second being the springing of a trap. The first case demonstrates a marked increase in Franco-German tensions and showcases Ludwig Erhard's inability to outmanoeuvre the French government in the negotiations or to reconcile the conflicting priorities of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Foreign Office. It also showcases Erhard's vacillation, as he first prioritises his promises to West German farmers and their representatives to resist changes to the West German cereal price (while promising the opposite to the French government), in order to ensure his party's re-election. Despite the dire domestic political consequences, he is then forced to accept changes to the cereal price due to the French government's sudden ultimatum that it would cease participation in the European Community unless a common cereal price was agreed.

The second case also demonstrates how the French government used the element of surprise and brinksmanship (this time embodied by the 'empty chair crisis') to their benefit. However, this case not only demonstrates how France again outmanoeuvred the West German government but also the Commission as well as all other members states. Although the proposed switch from unanimous voting to qualified majority voting for the CAP went ahead, the resulting 'Luxembourg Compromise' severely weakened qualified majority voting in practice, adding so many caveats that the French government could easily maintain its level of influence over how the CAP would be shaped. The 'Luxembourg Compromise' also ensured France's leverage on the Commission through the Council, which would directly limit the power of the Commission by requiring it to seek approval before engaging in any meaningful activity involving policies or proposals.

This article is based on the premise of actor-centred constructivism (also known as strategic constructivism). The premise is that actors are constrained in their actions by the rules and expectations of their environment and their own roles in institutions as well as their own compulsion to act according to their own constructed identities. The discourse of participating actors is selected to outline the course of events in the two cases. The discourse is then categorised to identify whether it is intended for strategic utility. If strategic utility is identified, it is further categorised into discourse for the purpose of deceptive reassurance (setting a trap in the negotiations) and discourse for the purpose of issuing a form of surprise ultimatum (springing the trap). The two common causal mechanisms, setting the trap and springing the trap, are then identified in both cases, providing common linkages between causes and outcomes. The discourse analysis and process tracing substantiate the assertion that West German representatives performed less successfully than their French counterparts due to

innate limitations imposed by their narrow roles in institutions, the boundaries and expectations of their environment as well as how they were compelled to act according to their own constructed identities.

Current state of literature

In recent years a considerable amount of scholarly literature (from various theoretical perspectives) on the EU's CAP has examined its impact on biodiversity (Cole et al. 2020), environmental impacts in general (Borrelli & Panos 2020), nutrition and health (Walls et al. 2016) and especially on the CAP reforms of the last two decades (Dermikol 2020; Barnes et al. 2016; Lovec 2016). Despite the abundance of research carried out on such aspects of the CAP, an actor-centred constructivist approach to analysing the policy's original preparation and creation has been largely neglected.

However, it must be noted that key studies have already provided detailed insights into the CAP's background, negotiations and creation. Germond's (2014) analysis of how the Comité des organisationes professionelles agricoles and the Comité général des coopératives agricoles enabled national producer organisations to continue protecting their interests by federating at the European level demonstrates these committees' considerable influence on agricultural policymaking. Furthermore, Patel's work (2009) utilised archives to examine not only the CAP but the relation between the state and agricultural policy in a broader historical context.

Patel also provided greater elaboration on key interest groups, such as the Deutscher Bauernverband (German Farmers' Association, DBV), which was a key factor in the German domestic political scene at the time of the CAP's creation (Patel et al. 2019; Patel 2011). Additionally, Warlouzet's challenge (2009) to the long-held perception that the CAP's creation was both a triumph for Charles de Gaulle and for EEC institutions cast doubt on federalist, supra-nationalist and neo-functionalist interpretations of events (e.g. Keeler 1990; Muth 1970).

Some of the scholarly literature focusing on the creation of the CAP has dealt with the fundamental issues that French and West German governments had to contend with domestically and the resulting positions they took during negotiations over the creation of the CAP (Knudsen 2011; Webber 1998). Moravcsik (2000) details the importance of the CAP for France, as a surplus agricultural producer and exporter, while West Germany was an importer, more interested in maintaining high support prices to help its less competitive farmers.

Malang and Holzinger (2020) point out that, while France sought the trade liberalisation of agricultural commodities with modest support prices, West Germany would only accept such liberalisation on condition that there were high common support prices. Malang and Holzinger observe that high common

support prices were eventually adopted as the CAP's basic strategy to support European farmers, thereby resulting in higher prices for European taxpayers and consumers as well as at the detriment of third countries.

Despite the insight this provides, in terms of a broad overview of the negotiations as well as detailed explanations of relevant evolving domestic pressures, a systematic attempt to critically assess the relationship between discourse and political outcomes in combination with a comparative assessment of relative French and German successes is absent. Nevertheless, this literature (e.g. represented by Moravcsik) reaches a consensus over the basis of the reasoning behind the CAP's creation.

This consensus acknowledges the trade-off between Germany's lack of enthusiasm for the CAP, combined with its desire to see a customs union established, and France's insistence on the CAP's creation before the customs union could go ahead. However, not everyone has reached the same consensus. Milward (1999) views this as a widely held myth that should be 'laid to rest', arguing that France did not join the Community merely to solve agricultural challenges at home (Parsons 2003) and was just as concerned with modernising its manufacturing base and taking advantage of something like the customs unions.

Additionally, Ludlow (2005) characterises Charles de Gaulle's comment to his agriculture minister, Edgard Pisani, that a common agricultural policy was owed as compensation to France due to the risks France was undertaking in the industrial and commercial fields as a major oversimplification. Nevertheless, this article deals primarily with the negotiations for the CAP's creation, rather than the creation of the Community as a whole. Moreover, the trade-off between France's need to resolve its agricultural issues and West Germany's need to find favourable market conditions for its manufactured goods is a substantial part of the background to the negotiations between the two states.

Previous literature has acknowledged the fact that West German or French fundamental interests during the negotiations prior to the CAP's establishment were not significantly altered by the development of supranational institutions (Germond 2010; Moravcsik 2000; Hendriks 1988), as this article also argues. Indeed, Hendriks (1988) also focused on the disparity between domestically stated goals and outcomes. However, an actor-centred constructivist approach involving discourse-immanent critique has not yet been applied to determine which country's elites best served their nation's interests during these negotiations.

Theoretical and methodological framework
Actor-centred constructivism and EU policymaking
While the selection of the cases follows the methodological approach of interpretive process tracing, the theoretical basis for this analysis follows actor-centred

constructivism. This theoretical perspective is present in the literature regarding more general EU policymaking. Indeed, at the EU-level, framing an issue in a manner that wins the broadest possible support among the actors concerned, along with the construction of widely acceptable compromises on the issue, has been put forward as the best way of explaining the incremental creation of the European single market (Jabko 2006).

Furthermore, actor-centred constructivist literature has sought to explain why convergence of thinking on so many EU policy issues has come about (McNamara 1998, 2006; Blyth 2002; Parsons 2002; Meyer & Strickman 2011; Clift & Woll 2012; Verdun & Zeitlin 2018; Zeitlin & Vanhercke 2018). The actor-centred constructivist perspective on EU policymaking has been identified as particularly useful for understanding both the complexity of policymaking and the issues surrounding legitimation (Saurugger 2013). However, rather than at the general EU-level, this article utilises actor-centred constructivism at the state level to explain the degree of success French and West German representatives obtained through the CAP negotiations.

March and Olsen (1998) make a distinction between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequentialism, by pointing out that the latter merely regards structures and actors as separately constituted. This would reflect the materialist view, in which changes in an actor's environment lead to the modification of their interests. In contrast, the logic of appropriateness enables the conceptualisation of the co-constitution of structures and actors (Saurugger 2018). Actors are constrained by their structures' rules, and act according to what they deem to be legitimate and in the way they are expected to within these structures. They are compelled to act in accordance with their identity and their role in the political community as well as follow the practices and expectations of their institutions (March & Olsen 2004).

Accepting that a political community has certain constructed expectations about the behaviour for an actor's given identity or role (Jepperson et al. 1996) is how the logic of appropriateness, and thus an actor-centred constructivist approach, enables more nuanced reflection on the boundaries within which the actor can operate. Understanding the co-constitution of structures and actors and the limitations on action they create, in conjunction with the identification of actors' practical strategies, can help explain why the two states' representatives perform with varying degrees of effectiveness.

The sub-optimal performance of West German representatives in the CAP negotiations should be understood within the framework outlined above. This article puts forward the following theoretical assertions regarding the West German and French governments during the CAP negotiations. Firstly, the effectiveness of West German representatives' actions was limited by their insti-

tutional structures. Significant institutional bodies narrowly focused on a discreet set of priorities, some of which being incompatible with others, e.g. the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Economics Ministry and the Chancellor's office. There was little in the way of overarching central control during the CAP negotiations, as the Ministry of Agriculture was nominally in charge and was generally at liberty to ignore the concerns of other ministries.

Secondly, in the prelude to the main CAP negotiations, the West German government demonstrated qualms in asserting its interests too forcefully in the European Community. This is honestly and openly expressed by Adenauer (see statements 3.01 and 3.03). West Germany needed the European Community for foreign policy reasons (as a platform for its legitimacy in the post-war West) as well as it needed the common market to be formed for its own economic interests (favourable market conditions for its exports). The third theoretical assertion is that French representatives were able to mobilise ideas more consistently in their discourse, both domestically and inter-governmentally.

Strong leadership from de Gaulle and a cohesive approach from France's ministries ensured that French goals were broadly achieved to a satisfactory level. In short, France had fewer structural limitations to contend with during the CAP negotiations. Indeed, by analysing the frequency of discourse categorisations in tables 3 to 5, it is clear that French representatives were more likely than their West German counterparts to use threatening statements (see *category C* below) that yielded favourable results. This is due to not being hemmed in by the same limitations and qualms the West Germans were subject to.

Ideas and discourse

To sum up actor-centred constructivism's understanding of what ideas are, they may be considered as subjective claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships or the normative legitimacy of certain actions (Parsons 2002). Actor-centred constructivism posits that actors' worldviews, which provide their cognitive background, are also used in actors' strategies to achieve their objectives. The ideas and social norms of actors not only represent the environment the actors are embedded in but are also the tools the actors choose to use. Therefore, ideas should be understood from the perspective of both constitutive logic and causal logic (Saurugger 2013). When ideas are mobilised to attain certain goals, they may be expressed through discourse. Consequently, it is necessary to define discourse. As with actor-centred constructivism's above definition of ideas, discourse can be considered as socially constituted and socially constitutive as well as linked to argumentation about validity claims, such as truth and normative validity (Reisigl 2017).

Although the above definitions of ideas and discourse may appear interchangeable, the difference between them is that discourses are instrumentalised ideas, i.e. the expression of ideas mobilised in order to achieve a goal. However, for the purposes of this analysis, it is necessary to then categorise discourses according to their intended outcome. By doing so, discourses can be assessed for their effectiveness. In turn, this enables an assessment to be made on whether actors were able to achieve what they intended. Thus, a conclusion can be drawn on whether representatives of France or West Germany performed the most effectively during the CAP negotiations.

This article observes the two negotiation cases through the actor-centred/strategic constructivist lens. This theoretical perspective holds the view that actors are constrained in their actions by the rules and expectations of their environment and their own roles in institutions. They are compelled to act according to their own constructed identities. With this theoretical perspective in place, discourse is then analysed to ascertain how successful it was in achieving desirable outcomes for the actors in question. The sequence of steps in discourse analysis and process tracing are as follows:

Firstly, an assessment of whether the specific piece of discourse is an expression of ideas, or that it indicates the instrumentalisation of ideas, i.e. the discourse is used in a strategic sense. If the discourse is an honest expression of ideas, it falls into category A – 'intended to state the simple truth'. Secondly, if it is determined that the discourse was intended for strategic purposes, the discourse is then identified as category B, - 'intended to deceive or reassure under false pretences', or category C, 'intended to threaten'.

If the discourse does not utilise itself for strategic means, it falls into category A. This will be self-evident, as the discourse is uttered in a candid moment between colleagues or counterparts. The speaker either comments on a situation as they see it or openly expresses their thoughts on an issue. In this case, no strategic utility in the discourse can be identified. However, category A discourse is still relevant to the negotiations, as it contextualises actor-centred constructivism's main points, i.e. the constraint on action caused by the rules and expectations of actors' environments; the actors' worldviews, which provide their cognitive background, and their compulsion to act according to their own constructed identities.

Discourses are categorised as possessing strategic utility if they contribute to a desirable outcome for that party. As previously stated, category B discourse is used to deceive the other party. Practically, this means a trap is set for the other party. If the other party is successfully deceived, the trap is 'sprung' and the next step in the strategy is undertaken. Category C discourse, representing the next step in the strategy, is a form of ultimatum, forcing the other party into a compromise far less desirable than they had foreseen making.

Thus, discourses are determined as category A if they have no strategic utility. Discourses are determined as categories B or C if they have strategic utility. Category B discourse deceives the other party by making reassurances that no hostile reaction or undesirable outcome will result, i.e. trap setting. Category C discourse forces the other party to compromise to an unexpected and undesirable extent, i.e. springing the trap. Discourses are categorised as B or C according to the course of events that follow these discourses. Category B discourses are followed by the other party duly taking a position that will unexpectedly and suddenly be condemned as completely unacceptable according to the speaker that gave the original reassurances. Category C discourse precedes the forced compromise of the other party.

The discourse analysis identifies concrete strategies and developments in the two cases, pointing toward common linkages between causes and outcomes in both cases. That is, the setting of a trap, the first causal mechanism, and then the surprise ultimatum and brinksmanship of second causal mechanism (springing the trap). These linkages, or causal mechanisms, confirm the assertion derived from actor-centred constructivism, that the West German side in the negotiations operated in, and were limited by, the boundaries and expectations of their environment and their roles in institutions as well as their own constructed identities. These causal mechanisms also clearly identify a two-step strategy successfully used by the French in both cases.

As mentioned above, the two cases selected for analysis (the common cereal price and the financing of the CAP/the question of qualified majority voting) both exhibit the same causal mechanisms linking causes to outcomes. In line with interpretive process tracing, the linkage between the two cases is the following sequence: the cause - France identifies an undesirable prospect for its preferences in the CAP; causal mechanism 1 (setting the trap) - France eventually gives the impression to others (West Germany, the Commission or other member states) that there is no need for concern; causal mechanism 2 (springing the trap) - France takes sudden action that puts the cohesion or functionality of the European Community at stake; the outcome - France prevents the undesirable prospect.

In the common cereal price case, the cause is the French government's identification of the West German strategy of delaying the setting of a common cereal price. Causal mechanism 1 (setting the trap) is the French government (after repeatedly threatening the West Germans of the serious consequences of their delay tactics) reassuring their West Germans counterparts that there was no urgency in resolving the matter. Causal mechanism 2 (springing the trap) is the French ultimatum to stop participating in the European Community if the common agricultural market was not organised as had been agreed. The outcome is

the West German government being forced to agree to the setting of the common cereal price and being forced to immediately increase domestic agricultural subsidies by approximately 1 billion DM to compensate West German farmers. This situation not only jeopardised farmers' electoral support for the CDU but also caused deeper division between the Chancellor and the Ministry of Agriculture, along with the German Farmers' Association (DBV).

In the financing of the CAP/the question of qualified majority voting case, *the cause* is the French government's awareness of the Commission's plan to increase the budgetary powers of the European Parliament, thus enhancing the supranational nature of the CAP, along with the identification of the threat that proposed qualified majority voting might pose to French influence in shaping the CAP. *Causal mechanism 1* (*setting the trap)* is a Franco-German bilateral agreement, outlining how the West German government would limit the expansion of the European Parliament's competences in regard to the Commission's proposal and delay the transfer of control over revenues from import duties to the Community. In return, France would not push for finalisation of the CAP's budget at the forthcoming Council meeting and might concede to a one-year timeframe for the budget, rather than the five years they originally preferred.

Causal mechanism 2 (*springing the trap)* is the unexpected and sudden French boycott of the Council and other European institutions for the next six months (the 'empty chair crisis'). *The outcome* is a set of compromises (the Luxembourg Compromise) that severely weakened qualified majority voting in practice, with states being able to use a veto on any topic considered important to their national interests. The Council could delay a vote if a state complained its national interests were at stake and resolution could only come about through a unanimous agreement on a decision. The Council would directly limit the power of the Commission, requiring the Commission to seek its approval before engaging in any meaningful activity involving policies or proposals.

Initial positions

On the West German side, official primary sources such as Akten der Bundesrepublik (1963-1965), were particularly useful in providing insight into discourse between figures in the West German Government as well as between the West Germans and their French counterparts. The most comprehensive and insightful sources for the French side of the negotiations come from Alain Peyrefitte's (government spokesman and Minister for Information) two volumes of C'était de Gaulle, providing great insight into the President's thinking and strategies at the time. At the preliminary stage of the CAP negotiations, discourses were selected to establish the positions and intentions of both governments. For the two cases (the common cereal price and CAP financing/the question of QMV), discourses

relevant to key interactions between both parties as well as discourses establishing key ideas and positions within one camp were selected for analysis.

The discourses are obtained through a selection of primary sources, such as Commission or Council publications, government releases and published collections of discourses. The most fundamental choice to make regarding discourse materials is the selection of key political actors for discourse analysis. The selection of the main political actors for discourse analysis in this article (see Table 1) is partly based on seniority in this policy area, i.e. heads of government and positions associated with ministries of foreign affairs and agriculture, as well as actors who make statements impactful enough to induce an international or domestic reaction.

Therefore, the statements of ambassadors, government spokespersons and other relevant figures are also featured. This selection, however, requires a secondary measure. Actors are only selected for discourse analysis if a record of their discourse is available, and their discourse has an observable direct impact on the negotiations' proceedings, or if their discourse provides insight into the constructed structural background of their political community. This might be related to an actor's role or perceived identity, or reflect relevant dominant ideas, practices and expectations understood within the political community.

Table 2 represents a combination of events directly related to the CAP's creation as well as events external to the CAP's creation that nonetheless impact decisively on both parties' negotiation strategies. With these events in mind, the timeframe is further informed by taking into account the most important rounds of negotiations. As will be observed, bilateral tensions concerning issues related to the CAP will build from round to round. It is also instructive to view statements from both governments that illustrate the nature of national positions before the Commission published the final draft of its CAP proposals in June 1960. The timeframe of discourse analysis will span from 1957, the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Rome, to 1965, the negotiations leading to the Luxembourg Compromise.

Adenauer's initial position on the CAP is clearly outlined in statements 3.01 and 3.03. His commitment to European integration, and to Franco-German relations in particular, override any specific European policy concerns. The aforementioned statements present two important conclusions. The first being Adenauer's awareness that West Germany could not be seen to 'lead' European integration. Statement 3.01, from negotiations with Guy Mollet on the Treaty of Rome in 1957, is further supported by his admission to the French ambassador in Bonn that he intended to play the role of junior partner to France, due to Germany's role in the Second World War. He stated to the ambassador that as Germany could not play a leading foreign policy role in the foreseeable future,

France would have to take over this role while Germany provided all its support, thereby realising foreign policy ideas only indirectly via France (Webber 1998).

Adenauer's submissive position is likely to have bolstered de Gaulle's determination to maximise France's agricultural interests through the CAP without fear of significant resistance from the West German government. This confidence is demonstrated by statement 3.02. De Gaulle's belief that the CAP was a justifiable demand, given the risks French industry might face if a customs union would go ahead (Ludlow 2005), reflects French expectations and the idea of entitlement to West Germany's acquiescence on this issue. Statements 3.02 and 3.07 also reflect de Gaulle's perception that his role was to be the driving force in the coming negotiations, determining the character and direction of the CAP, while imposing his will on the West German negotiators.

Regarding other statements prior to June 1960, the French Foreign Office displays a broadly positive response to the Commission's draft proposal in statement 3.05, which dramatically contrasts with the West German Ministry of Agriculture's earlier reaction to the draft proposal (statement 3.04). Even at this early stage, the differences between positions on the CAP within the West German government are quite evident. These differences within the West German government would become starker as CAP negotiations proceed. Statement 3.04 clearly references the close relationship between the Ministry of Agriculture and the DBV. Schwarz consistently prioritised the interests of the DBV in his role as Minister of Agriculture in his efforts to court the DBV's support.

He regularly consulted with the DBV on CAP-related issues before attempting to coordinate with other elements of the West German government (Knudsen 2011). Crucially, the Ministry of Agriculture would continue to hold positions in future CAP negotiations that would seem to run counter to the positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Economics Ministry and the Chancellor's office. First and foremost, Schwarz perceives his main role as representing the DBV's interests, prioritising this role over the broader policy objectives of the West German government. He is acting within the institutional framework of the Ministry of Agriculture, which is inextricably linked to the DBV's expectations and demands. This problem is something that French negotiators would have to contend with on a regular basis, making agreement frustratingly difficult to reach (see Pisani's comment, 4.15).

Establishing the common cereal price

Negotiations over the common cereal price saw a marked increase in Franco-German tensions, largely due to the wide divergence between the average prices in the two domestic markets. The Commission's 1960 CAP proposal had failed to concretely define what the average price should be. However, by November 1963,

a common cereal price was proposed by the Agricultural Commissioner, set at the mid-point level between West Germany's relatively higher average price and France's lower average price (Webber 1998).

The previous month had seen the installation of Ludwig Erhard as West German Chancellor and, although he had initially approved of a quick solution to an average cereal price, by April 1964 he was committed to blocking the setting of the average price for the time being, despite his previous reassurances to the contrary to the French government (statement 4.09). This position is certainly linked to the domestic political concerns of his party, the CDU (Webber 1998). The promise he made to farmers in the party (statement 4.04) prior to his appointment as Chancellor would have to be kept if he wanted to be sure of a victory in the upcoming federal elections in September 1965, as he alluded to in statement 4.16. Erhard's position is further confirmed in consequent public declarations (statements 4.07 and 4.08).

Even as far back as 1960, Schwarz, addressing fellow ministers (statement 4.01), voiced the DBV's concerns over the implementation of a CAP average cereal price set lower than the West German average. He also reminded them of Adenauer's promise to the DBV to maintain the existing arrangements established under 1955's protectionist Agricultural Law and of the fact that once the CAP's common cereal price was set, the West Germans would not be in a position to make changes to financially support their farmers. Schwarz's position, in combination with Erhard's stance, directly counters the broader economic and political objectives of the West German government as an international actor.

The degree to which Erhard and Schwarz are limited in their action can perhaps be explained by the CDU's need to secure the next election by placating the DBV. Schwarz's position regarding the institutional norms of his ministry, which imposed certain expectations and limitations on his scope of action, has already been outlined. However, Erhard's position might be considered more complex, involving higher stakes. He is concerned with his own political survival as chancellor, as well as his party remaining in government after the election.

The broader concerns surrounding the government's overarching goal of securing a customs union, seem to be, at this stage, postponed as a priority until the election can be won. Erhard's concern for his short-term political survival indicates a marked difference in how he views his own role. In contrast to Adenauer, Erhard prioritises more mundane domestic political concerns over the role of ensuring further European integration or nurturing the Franco-German relationship. The chancellor's office also provides less executive central control over its ministries, making coordination a more difficult task than appears in the French case.

De Gaulle's position, as laid out to Erhard in statements 4.02 and 4.10, must have made the threat posed to West German manufacturers and to the general fate of the Community vividly transparent. Statement 4.03 sees de Gaulle unperturbed by the prospect of France not participating in a future common market. Nevertheless, the domestic pressures on the French government to find an external solution to the unsustainable and growing financial burden it faced due to the systemic problems of its agricultural sector can hardly be dismissed. Therefore, statement 4.03 cannot be taken at face value.

Both sides seem to have used the resolution of the common cereal price issue as a bargaining point. Whereas the French used West German consent to the setting of the CAP's average cereal price as a condition for their cooperation in creating a coherent Community position for the GATT Kennedy round (statements 4.02, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13 and 4.21), the West Germans used French cooperation on the GATT negotiations as a condition to West German consent on setting the average cereal price (statements 4.05 and 4.06).

Foreign Office colleagues Schröder and Lahr shared the objective of maximising West German exporters' interests through the GATT and the eventual introduction of a European customs union for manufactured products. Their strategies are framed by the priorities and expectations of the Foreign Office. The interests of German farmers where not a high priority for them, which contrasts with Schwarz's position. Alongside the intention to leverage French cooperation on the GATT negotiations, it is necessary to be conscious of how the 1965 elections forced the West German government to delay a decision on the cereal price. This consideration was something shared by all CDU politicians seeking to retain their government positions.

West Germany's delay in approving the setting of the CAP average cereal price could not go on indefinitely, as the risk of a French refusal to cooperate over the GATT Kennedy round was too great. The Council had decided in 1962 that the average cereal price could only be adopted unanimously by December 1965. After such time it could be only adopted through a qualified majority vote. Despite the possibility of perhaps having more influence over a unanimous decision, the government opted to delay until after the election in September 1965 and after the transition to qualified majority voting in December.

After this transition period, any resulting average cereal price setting could be blamed on the fact that the government had tried its best on behalf of West German farmers but had been outvoted by the other five member states (Webber 1998). It is not clear if statement 4.19 was simply an attempt by Schröder to explain to the French why the delay had taken place or whether Schröder was simultaneously explaining the reason for the delay and implying that a solution would certainly be reached once qualified majority voting was introduced.

The West German government's strategy, at least that of the Chancellor and the Foreign Office, therefore, shows some signs of acting in bad faith to the DBV, the farmers in the CDU as well as West German farmers in general. The blocking tactics used also considerably frustrated the French. Statement 4.17 indicates de Gaulle's perception of the West German government being seriously split (especially between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Foreign Office) as well as his frustration at how the new Chancellor had vacillated from one position to another on reaching a cereal price agreement. Still, at this early stage in Erhard's chancellorship, it seemed de Gaulle believed that Erhard would not risk provoking the French into taking drastic action (see statement 4.14).

From the French side, a surprising change in their approach to the deadlock over the cereal price occurred. After repeatedly threatening the West Germans of the consequences of delaying a decision on this matter, de Gaulle, in May 1964, then reassured the West Germans that there was no urgency in resolving the situation (see statement 4.18). However, this transpired to be a ploy to exacerbate the situation for the West Germans and increase pressure on them to decide on the cereal price. De Gaulle promptly changed his position again and his government's declaration (see statement 4.21) in October 1964.

This ultimatum also put Erhard under pressure from domestic political actors. Predictably, calls to resist the French ultimatum came from the Ministry of Agriculture, the DBV and farmers in the CDU. These calls were added to by the CDU's coalition partners, the Free Democratic Party. Erhard also faced significant pressure to acquiesce to the French demands from pro-European integration elements in his own party, with Adenauer being chief among them. The Foreign Office also called for the government's acquiescence, conscious of the risk posed to the GATT Kennedy round. Erhard bypassed Schwarz and began negotiating with the DBV. It demanded an immediate increase of approximately 1 billion DM in agricultural subsidies as compensation for allowing Erhard to meet French demands (Webber 1998).

Although Erhard had ultimately decided to prioritise foreign policy over domestic concerns at this juncture, his government still had to go through difficult negotiations with France at Council negotiations. Moreover, the West German government had decided to stipulate that the price for soft wheat could not go below 440 DM. As negotiations in the Council floundered, the Commission proposed a package deal to break the deadlock, which Schmücker (the Economics Minister) accepted, with Erhard's approval, while Schwarz was absent from the discussions. Schwarz and the DBV then tried and failed to get the government to back out of accepting the package deal (Webber 1998). Erhard's behaviour indicates he perceives his role as a pragmatic manager, rather than holding his predecessor's constructed identity as an inspirational leader unbound by practical concerns.

This represents a humiliating four-fold failure in the West German strategy. Firstly, the government failed to delay a decision on the cereal price until it could blame qualified majority voting for not being able to reach a desirable outcome for West German farmers. Secondly, the CDU-dominated government had jeopardised its chances of electoral victory in September 1965 by losing control the cereal price issue, causing serious consternation among the DBV, farmers in the CDU and West German farmers in general. Thirdly, the French, having succeeded in pressurising the West Germans to make a decision on the cereal price prematurely (according to the timeframe of the West German strategy), could now see how divided the West German government was. Lastly, de Gaulle would now perceive the new Chancellor as vacillating and untrustworthy. At the national level, de Gaulle is broadly unchallenged by his government colleagues, and the French farming lobbies only wish him to maximise his successes in the CAP negotiations. After the West German government's humiliation, de Gaulle's identity as a key political figure in the Community is further bolstered at national and European levels.

CAP financing and the question of qualified majority voting

In January 1962, the Council had decided that a new formula for financing the CAP would be determined by June 1965. In the meantime, the CAP had been financed from national contributions. This system had worked in France's favour, as it paid in 25% of the budget but benefitted from 85% of the expenditure, due to the large amount of its exports to non-member states (Akten 1965: 1101). In December 1964, the Council asked the Commission to submit proposals for a new mode of financing by April 1965. The Commission proposed placing revenues from import duties directly under the control of the Community. Although the Commission was aware of de Gaulle's reluctance to accept more supranational aspects in the CAP, the Commission estimated that France would accept the strengthening of the supranational dimension as long as CAP financing continued to allow France to be a net beneficiary (Webber 1998).

The Commission also believed that the French presidential election in December 1965 would play a role in persuading de Gaulle to act in such a way that would not alienate French farmers by refusing further progress on the CAP (Lacouture 1993). It seems the Commission grossly underestimated de Gaulle's opposition to the supranational aspirations in the proposal and the risks he was willing to take to oppose them, even if his response could endanger the CAP, the Community's future and his own political fate. Statement 5.06 demonstrates his scorn of how the Commission miscalculated his likely reaction to the proposal. His government immediately rejected the proposal. They were also displeased that the member states had not been consulted beforehand and that the European Parliament saw the proposal before the Council (Peyrefitte 1997).

According to the proposal, it seemed that West Germany would be a net contributor to the budget. In line with Schröder's strategy to synchronise progress in agriculture with other issues, e.g. the GATT Kennedy Round (see statement 4.06), the government was careful not to give long-term concessions to France without French cooperation on the Kennedy Round (Webber 1998). West Germany's attitude to the CAP financing proposal can be summed up in statement 5.08. The French wanted the new financial regulation in place by June 1965 and the West Germans wanted more time for getting concessions from France. The West Germans suggested that if the French wanted the CAP budget agreement to take place within a month, then the timespan of the budget would have to be reduced from the original five years (Webber 1998). Statement 5.15 follows on from this position.

Further discussions followed prior to the Council meeting, this time producing more substantial progress. A bilateral agreement resulted, outlining how the West German government would limit the expansion of the European Parliament's competences in regard to the Commission's proposal and to delay the transfer of control over revenues from import duties to the Community. France would not push for finalisation of the CAP's budget at the Council meeting and might agree to a one-year timeframe for the budget, rather than the original five years (Newhouse 1972: 263; Akten 1965: 1102).

The West Germans were perhaps surprised to discover that France had decided to boycott the Council meeting and blamed West Germany for refusing to deal with the agriculture component of the CAP proposal first and by supporting the increase in the powers of the European Parliament. The West Germans believed that, despite the agreement reached prior to the scheduled Council meeting, de Gaulle had instructed his Foreign Minister to declare the discussions a failure (Akten 1965: 1114). Starting in July 1965, the 'empty chair crisis' (the French boycott of the Council and other European institutions) would continue for six months.

This time France was the isolated party in terms of its opposition to the growing supranational nature of the CAP. The scope of France's opposition may have been even broader than just rejecting the proposed additional supranational element within the CAP. However, statement 5.03 implies that de Gaulle feared how qualified majority voting in the CAP might hinder French attempts to guide decisions in its preferred direction, as the unanimous voting system had made possible in discussions prior to voting and through using the right to veto.

France certainly tried to seek assurances concerning how the CAP would be financed, as statement 5.01 indicates. However, given the frequency with which de Gaulle expressed his wish to eliminate qualified majority voting altogether, this objective must be seen as the priority. Not only did de Gaulle and the Min-

ister of Foreign Affairs express this intention to colleagues (statements 5.02, 5.03 and 5.12) but de Gaulle frequently stated this in public in very forthright terms during press conferences, making it clear to the French and the broader European public (statements 5.07 and 5.09).

By 1964 and 1965, de Gaulle had given up any illusion of being able to deal with Erhard in a straightforward manner, as statements 5.04 and 5.14 demonstrate. However, de Gaulle ultimately believed that France had more leverage than West Germany and that the West Germans had no other option than to make sacrifices to keep the European integration project on track, as their foreign policy and economic interests depended on it (statement 5.10). As previously discussed, this West German predicament had been confirmed by Adenauer himself (statements 5.01 and 5.03). West German politicians had by this point reached the conclusion that acquiescence under the pressure the 'empty chair crisis' generated would not be wise and that five member states should show a united front against de Gaulle on this issue (statements 5.05, 5.11 and 5.13).

The deadlock was finally broken by the Council during discussions in Luxembourg in January 1966. The 'Luxembourg Compromise' can broadly be seen as victory for de Gaulle. Although qualified majority voting was not 'destroyed' as de Gaulle had originally intended (statement 5.03), it was severely weakened in practice. De Gaulle's inter-governmental interpretation of European integration was served well by the fact that this compromise insisted on a state being able to use a veto on any topic considered important to its national interests. Even more significantly, even when qualified majority voting was used on a decision, the Council could delay the vote if a state complained its national interests were at stake.

The situation could only then be resolved through a unanimous agreement on a decision. The Council would also directly limit the power of the Commission, requiring the Commission to seek its approval before engaging in any meaningful activity involving policies or proposals (European Council 1966; Roederer-Rynning 2017). Considering West Germany would have preferred a more supranational path for European integration, in the hope that France's influence in the Community's decision making might be reduced to some degree, the 'Luxembourg Compromise' was not an entirely desirable outcome.

The performance of national representatives
Applying discourse-immanent critique to the discourses of all the selected political actors reveals interesting findings, not only by tallying inconsistencies and contradictions but also by logging statements that have some positive validity. The effectiveness of certain political actors can be gauged here, in terms of how successfully they use their discourse. Not all of the statements can be included

in this assessment, as statements to government colleagues, or observations of facts or statements of opinion do not necessarily impact on the political landscape.

However, those statements not included in the table below are still valuable in understanding the perceptions that inform the decisions governments made during the CAP negotiations. What have a more measurable impact on the political landscape are statements of intent and statements intended to achieve a certain outcome. The statements are intended for external audiences, e.g. politicians from other states and domestic actors external to the government, such as interest groups. Therefore, discourses in the following table are categorised as being statements of intent (fulfilled, unfilled or partially fulfilled). Additionally, statements intended to create a desired outcome in the actions of others are included.

As Table 6 demonstrates, French political actors performed more effectively than their West German counterparts. In fact, from the many examples of discourse included in this work, West German politicians failed to fulfil even one stated intention fully. However, there are three not entirely negative outcomes from West German statements. Adenauer was partially correct when he said that West Germany would not prevent the implementation of the common market, although it indirectly jeopardised the common market through provoking extreme reactions from France during the CAP negotiations (statement 3.03).

Schmücker was partially correct when he stated West Germany would only accept the CAP financing proposal in exchange for progress in other areas, although the progress was not achieved at the desired pace or under the desired conditions (statement 5.08). Erhard was successful in persuading the farmers who were members of the CDU to support him in his bid to become Chancellor (4.04), although this statement was also false because he eventually did make decisions without and against them, in order to resolve the cereal price problem.

In fact, Erhard figures more frequently than any other politician from either country in delivering unfulfilled or false statements. Therefore, he can be considered not particularly effective in serving the interests of West Germany in the CAP negotiations. However, the multitude of dynamics at play in domestic politics that Erhard had to contend with made his job hard to perform. When he came into office as Chancellor, the Ministry of Agriculture was not coordinating with the ministries of economics or foreign affairs, and the DBV was a serious domestic political actor with considerable power to wield, even against a Chancellor. The interests of the farmers in the CDU also had to be taken into account. The economic and foreign policy factors, especially issues related to the GATT Kennedy Round and establishing a customs union for industrial products, would often have to override other considerations.

The politician that can be considered the most effective from either country in the CAP negotiations, in terms of his discourse, is de Gaulle. The one statement of intention that is revealed as false is, most likely, deliberately delivered falsely (statement 4.17). In this case, he reassured the West German Foreign Office that France could wait for West Germany to decide on the cereal price issue. When he suddenly changed his mind, as mentioned above, this was the first step in a ploy to add more pressure on the West Germans to make a decision on the cereal price earlier than they intended. This falsehood had a predetermined purpose that led to a French success. This is why statement 4.17 also appears in the table as achieving a desired outcome. His other statements of intention in Table 6 are either fully or partially fulfilled. Many of these statements were threats, although it cannot be said that they were always simply empty threats. What can be said is that de Gaulle's preferred method of negotiation with West Germany over the CAP was of a highly coercive nature.

Conclusion

French representatives were more autonomous on their domestic society, and hence had more coherent positions that the German representatives. This also enabled them to be more powerful in negotiations. This analysis very much corresponds to the interpretation that would stem from liberal intergovernmentalism, considerably more than from actor-centred constructivism. The author basically describes domestic interests, and shows how they were linked to the positions of national representatives, and also to the outcome. On the other hand, s/he does not identify any substantive ideas that would be promoted by actors and limit political possibilities (see above).

The French government's more cohesive approach to the CAP negotiations can be explained, in some part, by de Gaulle's role in the political community. As president, he had a considerable array of tools at his disposal to wield his power and guide the government in one unified direction. His purpose was clear and immediate: to obtain maximum advantages from the CAP in order to solve the problem of the growing and unsustainable agricultural subsidies burden on the French national budget. However, his mission was undoubtedly made more viable by the nature of his role and identity, co-constructed by the political community and by himself. He was, in effect, given political licence to act in the negotiations as he saw appropriate, and this seems to have matched with the appropriateness-related expectations of the political community.

Another advantage over de Gaulle's West German counterparts was the fact that there was no serious and immediate conflict of interests between ministries. This was not the case for the West German government. The primary focus for overarching West German interests was the eventual creation of the cus-

toms union and a satisfactory result from the GATT negotiations. Counter to those interests, Schwarz's Ministry of Agriculture led the West German side in the CAP negotiations, effectively jeopardising the objectives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Economics and Technology. The comparative weakness of the chancellor's office and the resulting lack of coordination between ministries is a crucial disadvantage for the West German side in the negotiations. The blame for the perceived indecisiveness of Erhard's chancellorship can to some extent be apportioned to this institutional disadvantage, thereby indicating the limitations Erhard faced due to the structure in which he could operate.

Schwarz perceived his own role and related set of expectations in accordance with the constructed norms and practices of his own ministry and aligned his ministry's interests with the DBV. The resulting dissonance within the West German government led to many setbacks, the humiliation emanating from the French ultimatum in October 1964 over the cereal price being chief among them. It indicates that while the relevant figures in the French government identified with their broader political community, therefore being able to share a more inclusive set of common ideas, norms, practices and expectations, West German politicians seemed more bound to the narrower set of ideas, norms, practices and expectations from their particular institutions.

Further research on this issue of Franco-German intra-alliance rivalry might benefit from an investigation into temporary coalitions within the founding six, such as the cooperation between the Dutch and French on some issues and the West Germans and Dutch on others. The limited timeframe of this analysis only intends to facilitate a better understanding of the role the early foundations of the CAP played in Franco-German intra-alliance rivalry. An investigation into the contemporary CAP would surely bring additional insight into how the dynamics have since changed within the Franco-German tandem.

The CAP negotiations observed in this article exemplify the rivalry between France and West Germany at a particular point in time. The coercive methods used by the French government, mostly at de Gaulle's instigation, highlight a lack of concern about how a less than perfect display of unity between the two countries might be construed by the wider international public. However, both nations were very serious about protecting their existing interests, such as those of West German farmers, or obtaining valuable future advantages, as the CAP can be construed for France in general. However, this is just one policy area, and similar rivalries at this intensity between France and West Germany were harder to find in other areas.

Nonetheless, this article has aimed to demonstrate how intra-alliance rivalry can be manifested. The Franco-German tandem of today is perhaps more careful

to conceal friction between the two governments and avoids leaving rivalries too open to public scrutiny. However, the fact that the two nations have managed to secure individual interests in certain areas and make compromises in others while generally keeping European integration on track is a considerable political achievement.

Appendix

Table 1. Key French and West German political actors selected for discourse analysis

France	
Charles de Gaulle	President
Maurice Couve de Murville	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Edgard Pisani	Minister of Agriculture
Olivier Wormser	Head of the economic and financial service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Roland de Margerie	Ambassador to Bonn
Alain Peyrefitte	government spokesperson/Minister of Information
West Germany	
Konrad Adenauer	Chancellor
Ludwig Erhard	Chancellor
Werner Schwarz	Minister of Agriculture
Gerhard Schröder	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Rolf Lahr	State Secretary (Permanent secretary to the Foreign office)
Kurt Schmücker	Minister for Economics and Technology
Manfred Klaiber	Ambassador to Paris

Table 2. Key events within and impacting on the CAP's creation

25 March 1957	Signing of the Treaty of Rome
8 January 1959	Charles de Gaulle comes into office as French President
30 June 1960	Commission's CAP proposals CAP submitted to the Council of Ministers
1961 to 1962	Negotiations on the organisation of the common agricultural markets
1962	Introduction of the CAP
17 October 1963	Ludwig Erhard comes into office as Chancellor of West Germany
1964	Negotiations on the common cereals price
1964 to 1967	GATT multilateral trade negotiations
23 March 1965	Commission presents proposals for the financing of the CAP
1965	Negotiations on the financing of the CAP and on Qualified Majority Voting
September 1965	West German federal election
1 July 1965	The 'empty chair crisis'
December 1965	French presidential elections

Table 3. French and West German statements on initial positions

	political actor	statement	discourse category
3.01	Adenauer to French Prime Minister, Guy Mollet. (1957)	The importance of maintaining good and close relations with France and the promotion of the European integration process, due to geopolitical and foreign policy reasons, has to take precedence over differences on concrete policies (Küsters 1982).	A
3.02	De Gaulle to Adenauer. (1958)	I will keep France in the Community only if a common agricultural policy is realised (Maillard 1995).	C
3.03	Adenauer to de Gaulle. (1958)	Although German opinion is hostile to a common agricultural policy, we promise to act in such a way that Franco-German differences over agriculture will not prevent the implementation of the common market (Maillard 1995, 1991).	A
3.04	Schwarz in West German press conference. (1959)	The draft proposal is incoherent and badly written. I have no comment on the draft proposal but that my ministry will only take a position after careful examination and coordination with the economics and finance ministries. During these consultations the Deutsche Baurenverband (DBV) will also be included (HAEC/BAC 1967).	A
3.05	Couve de Murville (1960)	The Commission's draft should be taken as basis for discussion. It takes account of our interests to the extent that it assures, during the transition period, a preferential outlet for our agricultural products and that it responds to our concern of imposing a reform that is beneficial and not too tough on the agricultural economy of our country (Direction des affaires economiques et financières 1960).	A
3.06	De Gaulle to his press spokesman, Alain Peyrefitte. (1961)	Widespread rural unrest is a potential second Algerian question on our own soil (Hendriks 1988; Peyrefitte 1994).	A

| 3.07 | De Gaulle to Adenauer (1961) | The Community will be imperilled if French demands for the integration of agriculture into the common market are not met (Hendriks 1991; Maillard 1995). | C |

Table 4. French and West German statements on the common cereal price

	political actor	statement	discourse category
4.01	Schwarz in West German inter-ministerial meeting (1960)	There is a fear that an accelerated implementation of the common price level for agricultural products will have serious social and economic repercussions for the sector. The DBV estimates that German agriculture will lose 1.3 billion DM in income if the Community common price level is set at the average Community price level. Adenauer promised the DBV's president that the government would hold on to the Agricultural Law. The Commission's proposal does not specify the future common grain-price level. The common grain price will be set at a low level, leading to lower incomes for German farmers. One has to realise that the Bundestag and the federal government will then not be in a position to make agricultural decisions for the support of German agriculture in the future (BAK 1960).	A
4.02	De Gaulle to Erhard (1963)	Germany should accept a common cereal price as quickly as possible, otherwise there will be no Franco-German agreement over the Kennedy Round and the Community itself will be jeopardised (Akten 1963).	C
4.03	De Gaulle to Peyrefitte. (1963)	France has existed for centuries without the common market; it can live without it (Peyrefitte 1994, 1997).	A
4.04	Erhard to farmers in the CDU/CSU parliamentary party (1963)	I will not take any decision against or without you (Gerstenmaier 1981).	B
4.05	Lahr to ministerial colleagues (1963)	An agreement to common cereal prices is our last trump card to play should we give our consent against assurances in other areas of integration (PAAA 1963).	A

4.06	Schröder to ministerial colleagues (1963)	The government will bend to French pressure for further progress on the CAP only if France cooperates in launching the Kennedy Round of GATT trade liberalisation negotiations. Between these sets of two issues there is a non-negotiable interdependence (Akten 1963).	A
4.07	Erhard to Bundestag during his first speech as Chancellor (1963)	The German price levels will be defended (von Beyme 1979).	B
4.08	Erhard in government declaration (1963).	I will be a fair administrator of the interests of German Agriculture (Hohmann & Schröder 1988).	B
4.09	Erhard to Prime Minister, Georges Pompidou (1963)	Germany will not pursue a tactic of delay (regarding the next round of agriculture negotiations) (AN 1963).	B
4.10	Roland de Margerie to Erhard (1963)	Paris will delay the Kennedy Round of GATT talks until Germany fulfils its obligations in the agricultural sector (AD/MAE 1963a; AAPD 1963a).	C
4.11	Couve de Murville to Klaiber (1963)	A postponement or even a failure of the present agricultural negotiations in Brussels would have the most serious consequences for the Common Market (AAPD, 1963b).	C
4.12	Wormser to Commission President, Walter Hallstein (1963)	France will distance itself from the Common Market if the outstanding regulations are not approved by the end of the year (1963) (AD/MAE 1963b).	C
4.13	Roland de Margerie to Erhard (1963)	The non-adoption of the agricultural regulations by the end of 1963 will severely alter Franco-German relations and cast doubt over France's participation in the Common Market (AAPD 1963c; DDF 1965).	C
4.14	De Gaulle to Peyrefitte. (1963)	Erhard may not want to start his chancellorship as the one who broke up both the Common Market and the Franco-German Treaty (Peyrefitte 1997).	A

4.15	Pisani to government colleagues (1963)	When we, my colleague Schwarz and I, are in agreement, everything is fine. If not, the whole machine is jammed (Peyrefitte 1997).	A
4.16	Erhard to Dutch political leaders (1964)	It would be political suicide to accept a common cereal price before the 1965 federal elections (Akten 1964).	A
4.17	De Gaulle to Schröder. (1964)	There is no German government, but only opposing currents (Peyrefitte 1997).	A
4.18	De Gaulle to Lahr (1964)	France is not in a hurry over the cereal prices issue (Akten 1964).	B
4.19	Schröder to Couve de Murville (1964)	The government is in a very difficult situation because of the imminent elections. The cereal price is a decision that the government cannot simply decree but requires the farmers' support (Akten 1964).	A
4.20	De Gaulle to Peyrefitte. (1964)	Schröder is the man of the Anglo-Saxons. He has only one idea: to counter me (Peyrefitte 1997).	A
4.21	Peyrefitte in government declaration. (1964)	France will stop participating in the European Community if the common agricultural market is not organised as has been agreed (Peyrefitte 1965).	C

Table 5. French and West German statements on CAP financing and QMV

	political actor	statement	discourse category
5.01	De Gaulle to former-Chancellor Adenauer. (1964)	Without common financing of such a policy and faced with increased competition from firms in other Community member states, French industry will be too heavily burdened with the cost of supporting French agriculture (Peyrefitte 1994, 1997).	A
5.02	Couve de Murville to ministerial colleagues (1964)	On an issue like the common cereals price, a big member state such as Germany could not be outvoted (Freisberg 1965).	A
5.03	De Gaulle to Peyrefitte. (1964)	What has to be destroyed above all else is the majority vote (Peyrefitte 1997).	A
5.04	De Gaulle to Peyrefitte. (1964)	If we can't do anything with him, we have no reasons ... to neglect the good relations that we can establish with the East. Why should we restrain ourselves? It will never go very far ... of course, but, who knows, it can get Erhard worrying. It is always useful to have a means to worry one's partner (Peyrefitte 1997).	A
5.05	Lahr to ministerial colleagues (1964)	De Gaulle is counting on the others' greater zeal for Europe. He who loves more strongly is at a disadvantage - an old experience (Lahr 1981).	A
5.06	De Gaulle to Peyrefitte. (1965)	They thought that we would accept the extravagant powers of the Commission and a federal budget, since we wanted so much to see the agricultural financing regulation adopted. They thought that they could catch us like that and that we would be afraid of the peasants, or of the next election (Peyrefitte 1997).	A
5.07	De Gaulle in press conference (1965)	This (relating to the Commission's 1965 proposal) technocratic, stateless and irresponsible arena (de Gaulle 1970).	C

5.08	Schmücker to the Council of Ministers (1965)	For the German government, it would accept the CAP financing proposal only in exchange for progress in other areas of the Common Market (Akten 1965).	C
5.09	De Gaulle in French press conference (September 1965)	I want to prevent the introduction of qualified majority voting in the council to pre-empt any unfavourable changes (for France) being made in the CAP....This is an opportunity to get rid of all this mafia of supranationalists, to liqui-date majority voting and return to an organised cooperation among the Six that would restrict Brussels (Marjolin 1986; Peyrefitte 1997).	C
5.10	De Gaulle to Peyrefitte. (1965)	Germany could not do without the Common Market and would therefore end up giving in to me (Peyrefitte 1997).	A
5.11	Klaiber to Foreign Ministry colleagues (1965)	The 'empty chair crisis' is designed to broker a compromise that takes into account as widely as possible French agricultural interests and the political conceptions of General de Gaulle (PAAA 1965).	A
5.12	De Gaulle to Peyrefitte. (1965)	The objective is a formula restoring the right to veto on an essential question (Peyrefitte 1997).	A
5.13	Klaiber to Foreign Ministry colleagues (1965)	Any sign of weakness towards de Gaulle would be likely to raise the cost of the concessions that the five would have to pay to secure France's return (Akten 1965).	A
5.14	De Gaulle to Peyrefitte. (1965)	The Germans have forgotten quickly. You can-not count on them. They had been my big hope. They are my big disappointment (Peyr-efitte 1997).	A
5.15	Erhard to French Prime Minister, Georges Pompi-dou (1965)	No long-term agreements on agricultural policy can be reached before summer 1966, by which time the issues of interest to Germany will also have to be resolved (Osterfeld 1992).	C

| 5.16 | Lahr in Luxembourg negotiations (1965) | Germany intends to link the CAP financial regulations, progress on the GATT multilateral negotiations, the adoption of decisions at least in principle on common prices, and the completion of the common agricultural market to the simultaneous entry into force of the free movement of agricultural and industrial products (Lahr 1966). | C |

Table 6. Assessment of discourse outcomes

Performance Measures	France	West Germany
Statements of intent fulfilled	De Gaulle 3.02, 3.07 Roland de Margerie 4.10, 4.13 Wormser 4.12	
Statements of intent unfulfilled or false	De Gaulle 4.18	Adenauer 3.01 Erhard 4.04, 4.07, 4.08, 4.09, 5.15 Lahr 5.16
Statements of intent partially fulfilled	De Gaulle 4.02, 5.09 Couve de Murville 4.11	Adenauer 3.03 Schmücker 5.08
Statements achieving desired outcomes in others	De Gaulle 4.18 Peyrefitte 4.21	Erhard 4.04

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Double Marginalisation of the Communist Party: Ukraine's Decommunisation and the Russian-Backed Rebellion in Donbas

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Abstract

The article explains why the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) became marginalised during the insurgency in Donbas despite its ideological closeness to the rebel cause. The KPU was a popular pro-rebel party during the rebellion, but sharing the rebels' ideological background doesn't automatically mean the party will profit from the insurgency to expand or retain a share of power in rebel enclaves during the rebel state-building efforts. The KPU officials welcomed the protests against the new government in Kyiv and the onset of the anti-Ukrainian insurgency under the Russian patronage in the Donbas. Still, even despite this open support, the party descended into marginalisation.

Introduction

The Russian-backed insurgency in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces had a local vocal ally among the structures of the Communist Party of Ukraine (*Kommunistychna partiya Ukraiiny*, KPU), the second most popular political party in the Donbas after the dominant Party of Regions (*Partiya rehioniv,* PR). The KPU had been the main pro-Russian political party in the Ukrainian political system since the early 1990s. It had functioned as a legitimate political party with representation in the parliament since the first parliamentary elections in independent Ukraine held in 1994.

The party with political representation in regional and national elected political bodies may play a significant role in an insurgency. Still, it may also be relegated to political insignificance and marginalisation on both sides of the conflict. The concept of double marginalisation is tested in the case of the Communist Party of Ukraine. The party was caught between a rock and a hard place with the onset of the Russian-supported insurgency in Eastern Ukraine. The KPU regularly won up to 25 percent in their strongholds, where the insurgency broke out, but the party has been marginalised in the rebel-held territories. The Ukrainian authorities banned the party due to its support of the anti-Ukrainian insurgency during Ukraine's decommunisation process.

After explaining the party's marginalisation, the ideological background and its closeness to the insurgency in Donbas are explained. The participation of the Communist Party in the anti-Ukrainian insurgency in Donbas follows. The last parts of the text discuss the impacts of the marginalisation for the Communist Party in both the domestic political system and on the rebel-controlled territories. I use Ukrainian spelling for people with Ukrainian citizenship, including local rebel leaders and names of the organisations registered in Ukraine. Russian spelling is used for pro-Russian secessionist movements and rebel groups for better authenticity.

The process of the party's double marginalisation in a rebellion

In this text, political marginalisation is defined as the act or process of relegating relevant political actors to an unimportant, irrelevant or powerless position. I measure the marginalisation of the KPU by its position in both the Ukrainian political system and rebel-controlled territories. It means that with the onset of the insurgency, the party is not able to retain its representation in the parliament as it loses the votes in its strongholds that are under the control of the rebels, while the party faces the legal consequences from the support of the insurgency (banning, legal prosecutions).

Preexisting social ties often serve as the initial basis for insurgencies. Before a rebel group takes up arms, some members may have been involved with a polit-

ical party or social movement, but in the case of the marginalised political parties in territories under rebel control, I expect that such a party won't be invited to the rebel governance, defined as a 'governance system', which refers not only to the structures that provide certain public goods but also the practices of rule insurgents adopt (Mampilly & Stewart 2020; Mampilly 2011: 4; Péclard & Mechoulan 2015). Despite the party's embeddedness in the pre-existing social networks and institutions, it fails to participate in creating local rebel institutions. The party undergoing the process of political marginalisation fails to reconfigure, appropriate and convert for the new functions of insurgency (Staniland 2021: 149).

I introduce the concept of the double marginalisation, when the relevant political organisation or party with pro-rebel sympathies is marginalised in all territories held by rebels and the government. The marginalisation in rebel-controlled areas might result in the ousting of the party, or its successor's subjects, from any decision-making and share from the spoils of the insurgency. Their leaders are exposed to physical violence and intimidation by the rebel authorities, who engage in social service provision, diplomacy and local governance, trying to pursue legitimacy. As a precaution, rebel authorities may decide to sideline any potential competition to their governance, including other parties and movements, especially when rebels follow the authoritarian model of the administration. Rebels may even organise elections as a part of a broader, local-level legitimation strategy that can be used alongside rebel social service provision to cultivate local support (Cummingham, Huang & Sawyer 2021). In this case, political parties in the process of double marginalisation are expectedly not allowed to participate in these elections.

Simultaneously, the domestic state can marginalise the party close to the rebel political cause. Its candidates and supporters might be harassed, threatened, arrested or even murdered. Having a link with rebels, often denounced as 'terrorists', automatically marginalises such a party in the electorate's eyes (Musil & Maze 2021). Repressions against the pro-rebel political parties or organisations are part of the counter-insurgency measures in authoritative regimes (Byman 2016; Ucko 2016). The repressive approach against pro-rebel (or extremist) political forces in democratic states is analysed within the concept of militant democracy, which Karl Loewenstein coined in the 1930s. He argued that attempts to establish democracy in Weimar Germany failed due to the lack of militancy against subversive movements (Tyulkina 2015).

Post-Maidan decommunisation advocates make a case for decommunisation/de- Sovietisation in Ukraine as a matter of national security and a prerequisite for the country's Europeanisation and democratisation (Mälksoo 2018). On the other hand, critics of such processes, such as Maria Mälksoo, draw on the analogy of militant democracy and criticises the decommunisation in the Ukrai-

nian context as a militant memocracy or the governance of historical memory through a dense network of prescribing and proscribing memory laws and politics (Mälksoo 2021).

In this article, I analyse a set of potentially key factors that could facilitate the double marginalisation's process on the example of the Communist Party of Ukraine in the Russian-backed insurgency: a) Personal and financial resources of the party; b) The behaviour of the party leaders and local officials; c) Militancy of the party. Militancy is defined as direct involvement or material support for the armed struggle on the side of a rebel group (Kudelia 2019: 279). Relevant political actors in the rebellion should have the resources, competent leaders and commitment to fight against the incumbent government in order to avoid marginalisation or failure (Weinstein 2007). The concept of double marginalisation brings a theoretical contribution to the existing literature on insurgencies and political violence that tends to be either rebel-centric or state-centric (Woldemariam 2018; Eck 2010; Kenny 2010).

Case selection and data collection

I chose the KPU as the case of a relevant political party descending into double marginalisation on both sides of the frontlines. The party had been a relevant political actor with the potential to be the primary speaker of aggrieved people in Donbas. The KPU was traditionally one of the most popular and organised political parties in Ukraine, successful in the 1990s in monopolising Russophone Ukraine. The party constantly demanded official status of the Russian language in Ukraine. Symonenko said in an interview with the Russian media in 2012 that:

> Our position remains unchanged: the Russian language should receive the status of a second state language. It should be reflected in the Constitution. Who does not agree, let us put this question to an all-Ukrainian referendum and let the people answer (Ria.ru 2012).

The support for the Russian language was one of the KPU's main political activities. KPU deputy Serhiy Khrapov stated in 2011 that he believes that granting Russian the status of a second state language would have an impact on improving relations with Russia: 'We, Communists, did not vote for it in 1996 [Constitution] precisely because the Russian language was not prescribed there as the state language' (LB.ua 2011). Although the support has declined since the 1990s, the KPU remained an integral part of the political system (Lassila & Nizhnikau 2018). The KPU later became the second most popular party in Donbas after the dominant party, the Party of Regions (see Table 1).

Table 1: Party of Regions (PR) and KPU in national elections and results in Donetsk and Luhansk Provinces

Elections	PR in total	Donetsk province	Luhansk province	KPU in total	Donetsk province	Luhansk province
1998	-	-	-	24.65 %	35.45 %	45.97 %
2002	coalition	coalition	coalition	19.98 %	29.78 %	39.68 %
2006	32.14 %	73.63 %	74.33 %	3.66 %	3.14 %	4.43 %
2007	34.37 %	72.05 %	73.53 %	5.39 %	6.05 %	8.48 %
2012	30 %	65.09 %	57.06 %	13.18 %	18.85 %	25.14 %
2014 (Oct.)	9.43 %*	38.59 %	36.59 %	3.88 %	10.25 %	11.88 %
2019	13.05 % + 3.03 %**	43.41 % + 10.77 %	49.83 % + 4.78 %	No participation	No participation	No participation

Source: Tsentralna vyborcha komisia Ukraiiny
* PoR was transformed under the name Opposition Bloc
** Prior to 2019 elections, Opposition Bloc split into Opposition Platform – For Life (13.05 %) and Opposition Bloc (3.03 %).

I conducted thirty-two semi-structured interviews with the local pro-Ukrainian experts and representatives of civic society who lived in Donbas until the start of armed conflict: political analysts, bloggers, academics, journalists, local politicians, NGO workers. None of them has been a KPU member or sympathiser. The data was collected from interviews between August 2018 and May 2020. I made a choice to anonymise interviews so as not to compromise respondents' identities. I asked the respondents about the personal and financial resources of the KPU in both provinces, the party's militancy and the public behaviour of its leaders during the insurgency. My gatekeepers recommended the respondents during my long-standing research in Ukraine. When I refer to my interviews, respondent's positions are provided at the end of the article. I collected oral consent from the respondents and transcribed the data from the interviews to my personal computer.

Originally, I did many more interviews to support the arguments of the work. However, the scope of this text does not allow me to discuss them more in detail, but I listed all interviews I made on this topic. They relate mainly to the respondents from the cities occupied only for a couple of months before the liberation by the government forces in July 2014, such as Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Mariupol, Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. Despite my efforts, I was unable to reach out to the representatives of the Communist Party and its successors in the rebel-controlled areas. The potential respondents refused to communicate with the author.

The thorough analysis of the KPU documents and statements is complicated by the fact that all websites related to the party have been down for the last

couple of years, including the party's newspaper, The Communist (*Kommunist*)[1]. The only remaining option has been to search for printed materials in archives and libraries in Ukraine, which is also impossible in the current situation. That's why the analysis is limited to the statements of KPU leaders, especially Petro Symonenko.

I am aware that case studies based on conflict zones pose significant challenges. The data is often relatively limited, and its accuracy not always beyond doubt (Wolff 2020). However, the interviews were taken several years after the most intense fighting. Respondents were not in danger during the interviews and were not exposed to retribution. I take a positivist approach, considering collected interviews as reflections of the existing reality, but I mitigate the potential biases and incorrect facts or information by triangulation relying on collecting observations from different sources of the same type (interviewing different participants) and collecting observations across different types of sources from both sides of the conflict. The information provided has been checked and compared with other respondents' data, secondary empirical literature and media sources (Beach & Pedersen 2013).

The KPU's closeness to the rebel political cause

The ideological background of the party remained the same from the re-emergence of the party on the Ukrainian political landscape in 1993 up to its ban by state authorities. The KPU inherited an official Soviet historiography and view of Ukrainian national identity promoted in the Brezhnev era. The party inherited the Soviet linking of 'Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism' with fascism and World War II Nazi collaborators, and the fifth column acting with the support of Western intelligence agencies seeking to destroy the Soviet Union (Kuzio 2015a). Andrew Wilson calls the party extremely conservative, deriving much of its strength from its anti-national agenda. In his opinion, Ukrainian Communists have been even more unreformed than their Russian counterparts (Wilson 2009: 191).

Whereas Soviet nostalgia culture made Russian Communists natural allies of the Russian far right, in Ukraine right and left have been bitter enemies, and the left has gained strength from being the main de facto vehicle for Russophone protest at 'nationalising' policies in Ukraine. Ukraine should be a bilingual state, 'purged of the imposed language of the Ukrainian diaspora' and the influence of Ukrainian nationalism. The KPU is a party of the Soviet people and for the Soviet people, supranational and civil rather than ethnic. The Ukrainian Communists are in essence still Soviet nationalists, believing that Russians, Belarussians and Ukrainians are one people (Wilson 2009: 189-193).

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1   Kommunist, <accessed online: http://www.komunist.com.ua/>.

The party's ideology endorses a hardline anti-western conspiracy-prone mindset (Kuzio 2015a). The issues of the official status of the Russian language, 'oppression of Russian-speaking population', restoration of the USSR as panacea for all problems, convincing people that Ukrainians have no future without Russia – were the main arguments of the KPU from at least the Orange Revolution in 2004 (Torba 2016). The main political slogans of pro-Russian rebels in the most active stage of conflict in 2014-2015 were 'people's rule' (*narodovlastie*), anti-elitism, 'anti-fascism', social justice and fight against oligarchs, slogans identical to KPU ideology (Interview 9; Matveeva 2018: 115). Communist Party leadership supported these rebel narratives.

Communists, rebels and their foreign patron shared a similar ideological background based on fascist labeling and Soviet nostalgia, depicting the Ukrainian Euromaidan as fascist. It helped mobilise locals against the new government, which was presented as a Nazi junta. 'Anti-fascist' rhetoric was used extensively by the KPU against the national-democratic and nationalist parties prior to war in 2014. According to Taras Kuzio, the instigation of fear of alleged fascists was probably the decisive and most efficient element of mobilising the local population in Donbas and Crimea. It had a direct impact upon the slogans, discourse and ideology of pro-Russian separatists in Donbas (Kuzio 2015a; 2015b).

The 'anti-fascist' rhetoric has been supplemented by an anti-western tirade. The West, and more specifically the USA and NATO, are the main villains in the communist narratives: the USA and NATO deliberately use Ukrainian fascists as the tool in their plans to defeat and destroy Russia. Symonenko said in Portugal at a communist festival Avante! in 2015 that:

> In order to spread its influence on the Eurasian space and create a hotbed of tension around Russia, gigantic efforts of the West, especially the U.S. and NATO, were aimed at reformatting the consciousness of Ukrainians, especially young people, to split our country along ethnic, linguistic and religious lines and to raise nationalism and Russophobia to the level of state ideology. . . . Special attention was paid to the glorification of accomplices of Hitler's fascists - insurgents of OUN-UPA, SS battalions 'Galicia', 'Roland' and other units that fought on Hitler's side (Putivlskii raionnyi komitet Kompartii Ukrainy 2015).

The Ukrainian Communists hold derogatory views and stereotypes of the Ukrainian language, culture and national identity. Local prejudices in Eastern Ukraine, instigated by local KPU officials, were based on feeding the negative stereotypes of people from Western Ukraine, depicting them as people who celebrate 'Nazi collaborator' Stepan Bandera, hate everything Russian and parasite

on the hard work of the Donbas people (Kuzio 2015a). Party officials frequently turned their stances into anti-Ukrainian hate speech similar to marginal secessionist pro-Russian groups, such as Donetsk Republic (*Donetskaya respublika*). Some KPU functionaries openly engaged in derogatory anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, for instance the former Luhansk councilwoman Natalia Maksymets, infamous with her statements in her blog that Ukrainians are not a nation, just a wild tribe, and scoffed at the victims of the Famine in 1932-33 (Kazansky 2014a).

In the communist narrative, the Ukrainian state, built on the ruins of the Soviet motherland, is solely blamed for the dire socio-economic conditions of working people suffering from inequality and injustice. The region's industrial potential was subjected to large-scale de-industrialisation as the consequence of the failed reforms of the 1990s. The Ukrainian government's ill-conceived actions and local elites' predation gave rise to numerous social-economic problems in the Donbas region. The closure of city-forming enterprises put entire cities on the brink of collapse. Whole neighbourhoods were abandoned due to a lack of livelihoods. Under these conditions, nostalgia for the Soviet times was projected onto contemporary Russia with its officially higher standard of living (Interview 9).

The communist electorate was usually represented by the older people, Russians rather than Ukrainians, poorly educated and unsatisfied with their lives (Khomenko 2014; Gentile 2015). A typical characteristic of the KPU electorate was their resilience to change as the Soviet régime had stifled independent initiatives and installed habits of dependence, creating a deeply held culture of paternalism. Some experts call them 'transition losers' in post-communist Ukraine, ready to back parties and politicians willing to pursue closer ties with Russia, perhaps even compromising Ukrainian sovereignty (Kubicek 2000: 282). The KPU voters looked to Russia as their substitute Soviet motherland and remained mired in Soviet nostalgia (Kuzio 2017).

Grievances had also been directed against any popularisation of Ukrainian national identity immediately denounced as 'violent Ukrainisation'. The communist arguments claimed that 'other' Ukrainians (people with this national identity) hated the inhabitants of Donbas (Interview 2; Kazansky 2017). One of KPU's leaders, Adam Martynyuk, said in 2007 that most of the residents of western Ukraine, who were deported to Siberia by the Soviet authorities during and after the Second World War, deserved it (Censor.net 2007). Xenophobic othering preached by the KPU came at the line of hatred towards pro-national Ukrainians, complaining they see the Donbas people as second-class citizens. Communist supporters blamed 'other' Ukrainians for preferring heroes perceived as traitors and Nazi collaborators by the Soviets, which is also the traditional narrative of the Russian state propaganda (Interview 1; Kuzio 2015a).

Once the party becomes politically aligned with the rebel cause, it implies that its loyalty to the domestic state is dubious. A growing body of literature confirms that a vast share of rebel groups has had an explicit or widely accepted link with a foreign patron (Byman et al. 2001; Salehyan 2010; Salehyan, Gleditsch & Cunningham 2011; Popovic 2017; Bapat 2012). The KPU had been the prominent advocate of Russian interests in the Ukrainian parliament, agitating for the vision of the USSR as a lost paradise, instigating local grievances and questioning the loyalty of the party to Ukraine as an independent state (Kuzio 2015a). Andrew Wilson describes the KPU as deriving much of its strength from its anti-national agenda, being the primary vehicle for Russophone protests against 'nationalising' policies in Ukraine (Wilson 2009: 191-193). It is obvious that the ideological principles of Ukrainian communists have a lot in common with the authoritarian regime in Russia due to their shared legacy rooted in the Soviet past.

Factors facilitating the KPU's marginalisation after Euromaidan

In the Donbas rebellion, domestic actors were mixed with both direct and indirect Russian military intervention (Åtland 2020; Kudelia & van Zyl 2019; Katchanovski 2016). Some scholars emphasise the role of the local elites linked to the Party of Regions in the onset of the rebellion in Ukraine's southeast (Portnov 2015; Stebelsky 2018; Buckholz 2017; Matsuzato 2017). Other authors claim that Russia exploited developments in Ukraine but did not play a determined role in them (Kudelia 2016). Several authors, such as Matveeva (2016; 2018), stress the leaderless essence of the pro-Russian rebellion and downsize the role of the local elites and the external actor. However, most experts agree on Russia's decisive role in the rebellion's breakout because incipient rebels had insufficient resources and were mostly not determined enough to engage in war (Kuzio 2020; Wilson 2014; Wynnyckyj 2019; Mitrokhin 2015).

Andrew Wilson noted that Euromaidan was an attempt at the anti-Soviet revolution that Ukraine never had in 1991 (Wilson 2014: viii-ix). The fight against Soviet symbols and heritage by Euromaidan supporters was perceived by Communists almost as a declaration of war. De-Sovietisation and decommunisation were interpreted as 'cultural genocide'. Euromaidan's victory, unleashing the delayed dismantling of the Soviet Union's burdening heritage, had been taken as a terrifying threat to these people's identity. Petro Symonenko constantly calls the Euromaidan an armed coup instigated by the USA to establish a fascist dictatorship:

> The pro-American junta's attempts to establish a Nazi ideology and a fascist regime throughout Ukraine were met with rejection and protest by a significant portion of our country's population. As a result,

Ukraine lost Crimea, and a fratricidal war broke out in Donbas. The policy of inciting hatred and escalating violence pursued and imposed by reactionary and militaristic circles in the United States and NATO has sharply exacerbated all internal contradictions in Ukraine and led to a confrontation with Russia, severing economic and cultural ties with it' (Putivlskii raionnyi komitet Kompartii Ukrainy 2015).

Many KPU members and their supporters organised voluntary groups to protect the Lenin statues in the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in late February 2014, because as a culmination of the post-communist transition, Euromaidan brought about the so-called Leninfall, the spontaneous destruction of monuments to Lenin (Olszański 2017). The revolutionary period between November 2013 and February 2014 swept away more than five hundred Lenin statues in the central, southern and eastern parts of Ukraine (Fedinec & Csernicsko 2017). The removal of the remaining statues of Lenin has been of great importance. As a rule, they occupied key symbolic places. Thus, their absence removed one of the main tools of Soviet dominance in the public space in its symbolic aspect (Olszański 2017).

Communist supporters identify present-day Russia with the USSR. Their loyalty to Russia was strengthened when the demonstrators on the Maidan in Kyiv made their choice in favour of the West (Giuliano 2015). The KPU's othering of the rest of Ukraine contributed to the instigation of a full-scale campaign about the arrival of 'fascists' coming to punish local 'Soviet people' for not being proper Ukrainians. Local KPU structures supported the early stage of the insurgency when the protesters' demands reflected the main theses of its political programme: a referendum on federalisation, support for closer relations with Russia and declaration of the Russian language as the second state language (Interview 9; KPU 2014).

However, with the rising tensions, violent attacks against pro-Ukrainian activists and radicalisation fueled by the Russian state media's propaganda, the demands switched to open manifestations of secessionism and renunciation of Ukrainian statehood (Interview 1; 9). Pro-Russian protesters seized state buildings in early April 2014, and the militants led by the Russian citizen Igor Girkin seized Sloviansk on 12 April. Communist councilmen and supporters in Donbas felt the state's weakness, fueled by the sense of impunity and belief they had nothing to lose. Higher party officials in Kyiv profiting from participation in the domestic political system were not so decisive. The KPU leaders did not give any orders on what to do; party discipline declined.

When the anti-government protests turned into insurgency, from May 2014, the party definitively lost its breath through fragmentation and uncoordinated

activities. Kyiv party leaders, rhetorically siding with rebels, were unwilling to violently confront the government. Simultaneously, the KPU city deputies in Donbas supported the rebels enthusiastically, and some joined them as rebel fighters (Interview 9; Luganskiy informatsionnyi tsentr 2019; Kirillov & Dergachev 2016). In the meantime, until summer 2014, the situation on the ground was chaotic with multiple centres of governance when some state buildings were occupied by the nascent rebel groups, which co-existed with the local self-government bodies controlled by the remnants of the disintegrated Party of Regions. Representatives of the executive power nominated by Kyiv lost the rest of their declining power relatively soon in early May 2014 (Matveeva 2018; Sakadynskiy 2020; Argument 2014).

Personal and financial resources
The KPU's electoral support has declined since the 1990s, but the party remained an integral part of the domestic political system until the onset of the insurgency in Donbas (Lassila & Nizhnikau 2018). From the early 2000s to 2014, the KPU was the second most popular party in Donbas after the party in power, the Party of Regions (PR). The party of the downtrodden proletariat functioned on the national scale as the junior satellite partner of the Party of Regions, being gradually co-opted in its governments and joining Party of Regions–led parliamentary coalitions in 2006-7 and 2010-14 (Kuzio 2015b; Kuzio & Kudelia 2015: 251).

The communist Party leaders allegedly received substantial financial resources from the Party of Regions and oligarchs for lobbying for their interests. Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko reportedly received vast amounts of money for 'correct' voting in parliamentary sessions or blocking initiatives harmful to the interests of the powerful Donetsk tycoons. Some sources talk about tens of millions of dollars going to Symonenko for selling political posts and votes in parliament (Interview 3; Censor.net 2014). The communist leaders proposed a return to the USSR to resolve social problems while living well on the back of a 'moribund capitalism' (Kovalskiy 2012). Other experts indicated that Symonenko could be financed from the Kremlin (Censor.net 2013).

Communists in Donbas had only a minor share of power because the PR had created a subnational authoritarian system in Donbas with an overwhelming majority in all the regional, city and district councils. The KPU in Donbas functioned as a fake opposition, fed by the local thuggish political structures, intended for capturing the protesting electorate unwilling to vote for the PR (Interview 1; 2; 4). The PR sucked out the resources from the communists and left them on the margins of local political life, making them useful only for some political deals, maintaining the appearance of opposition and taming the protest electorate (Interview 6). The communist leadership in the region became the

same 'bourgeois' elements they criticised in their speeches and newspapers. The discipline of the voters and Soviet nostalgia secured the communists the access to power they criticised. The KPU was often co-opted into the local economic schemes and did not do anything against prominent tycoons' exploitative practices in the coal industry and metallurgy (Interview 10; Kovalskiy 2012).

The involvement of some opportunistic, corrupted and openly criminal elements in the party activities further undermined the party's reputation. The KPU in the Luhansk region was reportedly financed by local tycoon Volodymyr Medianyk, elected as KPU councilman in Luhansk in 2010. Medianyk opportunistically started his political career in Yushchenko's pro-western and national-democratic bloc Our Ukraine (*Nasha Ukraiina*). Later he sponsored Kilinkarov's political campaign in 2010, after which he defected to the Party of Regions and became MP for this party (Kazansky 2013). Another local controversial figure was Volodymyr Kryvobokov, a criminal authority protecting local marketplaces (Kazansky 2011). Kryvobokov drew public attention to his short amateur movie about a civil war in Ukraine between Donbas and western Ukraine during the election campaign in 2012.

The leaders and local party officials

The KPU party leaders in Kyiv remained passive during the rebellion in 2014, although their sympathies were on the side of Russian-backed rebels. It had supported all the Russian propagandist narratives, but the leaders were not ready to go into an open armed confrontation with Kyiv (Interview 9). Communist leadership sat on the fence by avoiding an open call to arms against the Ukrainian state but overtly advocated for the secessionist agenda. Communist leader Petro Symonenko said in April 2014 that 'our people participating in protests in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, and other cities are being accused of separatism and terrorism. . . . There are no extremists in Donetsk. There are no separatists. . . . We, the Communists, support them on the status of the Russian language. We support them to defend our interests by discussing all these issues in local referenda . . . and we support them in federalisation' (Ukraiinska Pravda 2014).

In another speech, Symonenko claimed that the KPU supports Ukraine's territorial integrity despite calling the counterinsurgency measures the terrorist war against own nation (YouTube 2014). All foremost party leaders remained passive during the insurgency in 2014, although it was clear that their sympathies were on the side of the Russian-backed rebels (112 Ukraina 2018). When the insurgency broke out, most of them were waiting for what was going to happen. Families of the leading party members like Symonenko or Kaletnik lived in luxurious mansions close to Kyiv. Kaletnik's family is an excellent example of the party leaders' clientelism and rent-seeking. Hryhorii Kaletnik, former governor of

Vinnytsia province, was Party of Regions deputy, while his niece Oksana and son Igor were KPU deputies until 2014. Ihor Kaletnik became the Customs Service director (2010-12) and the Ukrainian parliament's first vice-speaker (2012-14).

One of the most powerful party members was Spiridon Kilinkarov, the KPU leader in the Luhansk province and deputy of the Ukrainian parliament. His role in the insurgency is still not sufficiently clear. Kilinkarov had the ambition to replace Symonenko as the KPU leader prior to the war. During the spring of 2014 Kilinkarov dealt independently of him (Interview 3; 9). Kilinkarov did not openly call for Russian arms and dismemberment of Ukraine but stayed in occupied Luhansk until June 2014, probably waiting to see how things would turn out. When conflicts erupted between him and rebel leaders, he left the occupied city to be shortly arrested by Ukrainian volunteer fighters. Later he moved to Moscow, endorsing anti-Ukrainian rhetoric in Russian TV propaganda shows (Interview 5; Vecher s Vladimirom Solovevym 2022; 60 minut 2020). The first secretary of the Donetsk regional KPU branch, Nikolai Kravchenko, was not caught red-handed in support of the insurgency. Later he moved to his weekend house in central Ukraine and quit political activities altogether (Kirillov & Dergachev 2016).

The KPU city secretaries acted on their own without any orders from their leaders in Kyiv. Many officials from the KPU regional leadership in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces stayed to support the 'people's republics'. The leader of the regional deputies in the Luhansk province, Oleksandr Andriyanov, declared in June 2014 that the whole communist faction in the regional council joined the parliament of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic (LNR). Symonenko denied any such decision was authorised by the party (Informator.Media 2014). Kravchenko's deputy, Volodymyr Bidevka, was the KPU deputy in the Ukrainian parliament. When the riots started in Donetsk in March-April 2014, he sat in Kyiv and supported the moves of the new Ukrainian government. When the KPU did not enter parliament in October 2014, Bidevka returned to Donetsk to be politically active and enjoy the spoils of the so-called DNR becoming the parliamentary speaker in 2018.

In spring 2014, the KPU officials co-organised the pro-Russian meetings, the state administration buildings' violent seizures and the rebels' supplies with food and other material (Interview 5; Chernov 2015). At the beginning of the insurgency, the major anti-Ukrainian forces were the militant Luhansk Guard (*Luganskaya gvardiya*, LG) made up of the remnants of the marginal Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (*Prohresyvna sotsialistychna partiya Ukraiiny*, PSPU), a far-left group competitive with the KPU several years earlier. Later, LG was replaced by the militant Army of the South-East (*Armia yugovostoka*) led by Valerii Bolotov and the splinter group People's Militia of Luhansk Province (*Narodnoe opolchenie Luganshchiny*) of Oleksiy Mozgovoi.

In Donetsk, the role of the Communists was similar. The KPU was the co-organiser of the anti-Maidan movement, setting up tents where it promoted federalisation and fundraising for the DNR (Interview 7; Ostrov 2014). More militant forces represented the vanguard of the secessionist movement in Donetsk. Some of them were traditionally marginal forces occasionally used by the Party of Regions' officials for political provocations. With the onset of insurgency, the local elites lost control over these unruly elements (Wilson 2014).

Since early March 2014, the KPU organised pro-Russian rallies in the towns as the sole organiser or with other radical forces, such as the Progressive Socialists (PSPU) or various local 'initiative groups'. The meetings were usually organised every week, attended by 100-300 people in cities with up to 100 thousand inhabitants. Oddly, this is quite a high number considering the demographic structure in provincial cities (mostly elderly people) and the local population's political passivity (Interview 4; Russkaya vesna 2014; Kramatorsk.info 2014).

During spring 2014, local bosses from the disintegrating PR outsourced the mobilisation to communists while remaining hidden from the public. The KPU's task was to mobilise people to the streets to create the image of a people's uprising. Communists became the secessionist forces' public face as an auxiliary force to local power-holders afraid to openly support the insurgency (Interview 8). The local Communist structures supported the 'referendum on the sovereignty of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics' (DNR and LNR) held simultaneously on 11 May 2014.

Luhansk province, more impoverished and smaller than Donetsk, was the main communist stronghold in Ukraine. KPU officials played a vital role in the insurgency in the northern chemical-industrial triangle Severodonetsk – Lysychansk – Rubizhne, the second-largest city Alchevsk and the border coal mining town of Dovzhansk, named Sverdlovsk from 1938-2016 (Interview 8; 11; 12; 13; 14; 15; 16; 17). The northern rural districts of the Luhansk province have never been occupied. The pro-Ukrainian identity is much stronger there, and, notwithstanding the efforts of the KPU, referendums were not organised there either. The southern 'rust belt' of the region (Khrustalnyi[2], Antratsyt) was a backwater where the former ruling party's structures organised separatist meetings without significant communist mobilisation. In Kadiivka, named Stakhanov from 1978-2016, pro-Russian meetings were organised by the third secretary of the local KPU party office Oleksandr Chulkov (Pavlik 2020).

The militancy
Rebels did not consider the local party leaders the honest believers in the cause for their involvement in corruption schemes and serving the Party of Regions'

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2   Known as Krasnyi Luch in 1920–2016.

bosses' interests. Since the outbreak of insurgency in spring 2014, only the Russian intervention could stop the local communist leaders' gradual shifting to political marginality. Communist deputies on all levels claimed they were defending the interests of the local population, unlike militants appearing from nowhere without any political experience. After the initial legitimisation of the rebel demands, the communists were pushed aside because of their lack of militancy. The most passionate KPU supporters were pensioners, not militants ready to kill. A few idealistic people in the KPU ranks were unable to manage the whole process while the rest instead waited for the new posts in the rebel government (Interview 3).

There were only a few individuals who openly joined the rebel ranks on the battlefields. Viktor Kiselev (*Kommunist*), former second KPU secretary in the Kamennobrodskii district of Luhansk city, led the organisation Red East (*Krasnyi Vostok*), actively cooperating with the major rebel groups in the province. Red East assisted in supplies of weapons and food from Russia. Kiselev collaborated mainly with the Ghost (*Prizrak*), led by Mozgovoi. Kiselev eventually became deputy commander of LNR rebel forces in February 2015, but one year later he was arrested during purges organised by former LNR head Ihor Plotnitskyi. Kiselev was sentenced to 12.5 years for allegedly organising the coup against Plotnitskyi. Later he was freed when Leonid Pasechnik came to power in LNR in 2017. Among other KPU officials, who openly joined the rebel ranks was KPU press-secretary in Kadiivka Oleksandr Skidanov ('Krot'), active in the Volunteer Communist Unit (*Dobrovolcheskii kommunisticheskii otriad*, DKO)[3], or LNR deputy and former KPU councilwoman in Krasnodon Tetyana Kalinina, who fought near Metallist in the rebel group Odessa (Lugansk_LG_UA 2015; Aleksandr 'Krot' Skidanov 2015). Other cases of communist functionaries turned into rebels involve Yuryi Sinenko and Oleh Popov,[4] both former KPU city district deputies from Luhansk, and party functionaries from Lutuhyno.

The KPU councilman in Dovzhansk, Oleksander Haidei, became a local rebel commander controlling this city independently of LNR thanks to his alleged close ties to Russian intelligence services, presumably because of his leadership of the local Afghanistan War veterans' organisation (*Soyuz veteranov Afganistana*) (Interview 16; 17; Nykonorov 2015). Haidei presented himself as a Cossack chieftain during the chaotic fragmentation of the region into criminal enclaves controlled by local rebel commanders independent of the LNR. Due to conflicts with Plotnitskyi, Haidei left Dovzhansk in August 2015 for Russia (Stepova 2016;

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3   DKO was structural part of Mozgovoi's 'Ghost'. It was founded in October 2014 by Russian communists from St.-Petersburg led by commander Petr Biriukov ('Arkadich'), alleged veteran of fighting in Transnistria.
4   Popov has been the head of LNR 'parliamentary committee' for national defense and security.

Svetikov 2014). Haidei was not the only communist official and leader of an Afghanistan War veterans' group at the same time. Other examples were the KPU first secretary in Starobilsk Aleksandr Miliutenko, Vadym Zaibert in Donetsk and Kostyantyn Beskorovainyi in Kostyantynivka. Afghanistan War veterans were often closely connected to Communist Party structures, like Volodymyr Hlushchenko in Rovenky or pro-Russian militants from veteran circles in Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeisk from 1938-2016).

Other KPU leaders and functionaries have served in the rebel groups but did not physically engage in fights with Ukrainian forces. Usually, they helped with supplies, arms, humanitarian aid, or have been politically active as so-called political officers (or *politruks*). Most of them served in Ghost (*Prizrak*) in Alchevsk. These rebels evolved from the People's Militia of Lugansk Province (*Narodnoe opolchenie Luganshchiny*) after it retreated from Lysychansk to Alchevsk in July 2014 and was the bastion of communist militants (Garmata 2015). Ghost was led by local commander Olexiy Mozgovoi, who carefully built his Che Guevara-style revolutionary image with the assistance of several KPU officials. They assisted him in dealing with political affairs as he was seeking fame on an international level, eclectically merging sympathies for Soviet communism and Russian imperial-orthodox monarchism (Avakumov 2017).

Former KPU regional deputy Maksym Chalenko and other KPU officials helped Mozgovoi to organise the international conference on 8-9 May 2015 visited by communists from Southern Europe, followed by a military parade. Less than two weeks afterwards, Mozgovoi was killed in a car explosion during Plotnitskyi's consolidation of control over the occupied territories with the help of Russian private military companies and intelligence services (Crime 2016; Bukvoll & Ostensen 2020). After Mozgovoi's death, the first secretary of Alchevsk KPU, former city councilman Oleksandr Bebeshko ('Kommunarsk')[5] became Ghost 'politruk' (Crime 2015).

The Communist Party's marginalisation

Since the onset of the insurgency in 2014, the Communist Party has been ostracised by both sides: for the voters in government-controlled territories the party has been too pro-separatist or unacceptable for other reasons, as the post-2014 electoral results suggest, and for rebels too soft and prone to compromises (Druz 2015).

KPU marginalised in the political system of the domestic state and the decommunisation process

The communists' marginalisation has been part of the wider processes undergoing in Ukraine, resulting in the adoption of the legislative package on decom-

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5   Former name for Alchevsk in 1961-1991.

munisation to eliminate the Soviet legacy. The so-called decommunisation package, prohibiting all symbols and propaganda of Nazism and Communism in Ukraine, was approved by the Ukrainian Parliament on 9 April 2015 and signed by the President Poroshenko on 15 May. The 'decommunisation package' consists of four laws on: the condemnation of the communist and national socialist (Nazi) regimes, and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols; the legal status and honoring of fighters for Ukraine's independence in the 20th century; remembering the victory over Nazism in the Second World War; access to the archives of repressive bodies of the communist totalitarian regime from 1917-1991 (Shevel 2016). Included in the laws are instructions on removing remnants of the communist past (monuments and street names), prescriptions on how to write the country's history, as well as new measures to reconfigure the country's archives (Marples and McBride 2015).

The laws resulted in a ban on the Communist Party of Ukraine by the Ministry of Justice, issued on 24 July 2015 and coming into effect four months later, prohibiting the KPU activities in the country. The parliamentary faction of the Communist Party was disbanded before in July 2014 by means of a procedural process. At the same time, based on a prosecution submission, legal proceedings began against the party (Fedinec & Csernicsko 2017). Petro Symonenko declared that he would appeal to the European Court of Human Rights to reverse the decision but was unable to get an appeal ratified by the Ukrainian court system. The party managed to participate in the 2014 autumn elections but did not reach the 5% parliamentary threshold (Marples 2018).

From the very beginning, a powerful debate broke out among Ukrainian intellectuals about the necessity and nature of the process of decommunisation in Ukraine (Hrynykha 2019). While the defenders of the laws argue similar measures were taken in other post-communist countries and they are necessary to win the current conflict with Russia, several scholars and other groups have questioned the impact on academic freedom, as well as freedom of speech more generally in Ukraine (Marples & McBride 2015). According to Volodymyr Viatrovych, the head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance and one of the key authors of the above-mentioned laws, the communist past is an important tool that Russia has used and will use again, and decommunisation has another important mission and task – the fewer the carriers of Soviet consciousness there are in Ukraine, the lower the danger of Russian aggression (Hrynykha 2019).

Most critics of decommunisation point out that the process of renaming and getting rid of Soviet heritage is chaotic, hasty and unprofessional. Ukrainian historian Georgiy Kasianov, probably the fiercest critic of decommunisation laws, has repeatedly reiterated that decommunisation in Ukraine is carried

out using Soviet methods, without discussion in society, when one version of the past is imposed on society as a single rule. Vasyl Rasevych, senior researcher at the Institute of Ukrainian Studies in Lviv, also criticises Ukrainian historical politics, since he believes that decommunisation resulted in a purely formal process – renaming streets and replacing some monuments with others (Hrynykha 2019). Critics have said that the laws will prohibit open discussion of Ukraine's complex history and may deepen societal divisions. According to Oxana Shevel from Tufts University, Ukraine's decommunisation efforts may turn out to have a modest yet significant effect: the successful shedding of the Soviet symbolic legacy (Shevel 2016).

Related to this process, the communist officials had been the subject of increasing pressure from the new government for their anti-Ukrainian rhetoric and local party officials' support for the rebels in Eastern Ukraine. Although the state avoided open repression of Communist Party functionaries, some of them were investigated for activities that threatened the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state, including Anna Aleksandrovskaia, parliamentary deputy and party leader in Kharkiv, for her involvement in creating a short-lived 'people's republic' in the Kharkiv province, or Oksana Kaletnik for talking about the legitimacy of the DNR/LNR and their right to secede from Ukraine (Interfax Ukraina 2014).

Many party leaders like Oksana and Igor Kaletnik left the KPU parliamentary faction already in May-June 2014. Other deputies left in July 2014 because of their indignation with Symonenko, who, in turn, called them traitors (Interfax Ukraina 2014). The party faced an internal rebellion by several regional units against the central leadership. It lost many influential party members and grassroots activists who supported pro-Russian secessionist movements across the East of Ukraine or joined other political projects. The KPU's participation in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 was seen as a betrayal of the pro-Russian rebel political cause. Moscow is not eager to support the KPU despite its pro-Russian rhetoric and promotion of other political forces in Ukraine (Lassila & Nizhnikau 2018).

Communist leader Symonenko has not abandoned his pro-rebel rhetoric: he calls the Euromaidan an armed coup, the seizure of power by Nazi-Oligarchs and the government is a fascist dictatorship, based on punitive battalions in an SA-fashioned style. Symonenko talks about the 'violent Ukrainisation' and the 'anti-people and terrorist' nature of the Ukrainian government' (Pravda 2018). On the other hand, Symonenko had been publicly accused by other pro-Russian politicians, like Igor Markov from the Odesa-based Motherland party living in Russia, of being an agent of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) because he could freely walk in Kyiv. Markov indicated that Symonenko expelled from the

party all members actively participating in the Odesa anti-Maidan and that he received 5 million USD for betraying his party 'comrades' to support the 'Kyiv regime' (YouTube 2018).

The people who stayed with Symonenko hold the same pro-Russian political line. The second secretary of KPU and former vice-speaker of the Ukrainian parliament Adam Martyniuk said in 2018 that the Ukrainian government is solely to be blamed for the loss of Crimea and that he recognises the Crimean 'referendum' in 2014 as legal (112 Ukraina 2018). Ironically, if the Ukrainian state had controlled communist strongholds in industrial parts of both Donetsk and Luhansk provinces and Crimea during the parliamentary elections in October 2014, the KPU would almost certainly have made it to the parliament. The party received 3.88 percent, while the election threshold is five percent, and several million people living in the Communist strongholds could not vote. Only two years earlier, KPU obtained 13.18 percent and thirty-two seats in the parliament. Petro Symomenko won only 1.51 percent of votes in May 2014 presidential elections, compared to 22.24 percent in 1999, 4.97 percent in 2004, and 3.55 percent in 2010 (Tsentralna vyborcha komissiya)[6].

As a result, the Ukrainian state did not repress the Communists for their involvement in the insurgency, but Symonenko, Martynyuk, the Kaletnik family and other leading figures lost the opportunity to make money in politics. Part of the party officials escaped or stayed in rebel enclaves. Some fled to Russia while the rest stayed in Ukrainian territory, either in Kyiv or in liberated parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces. The party was banished from participating in parliamentary elections in 2019. However, even if they balloted under a different name, the KPU would hardly make it into the parliament because their electorate has been taken over by new pro-Russian political parties that emerged on the Party of Regions' remnants.

The Ukrainian state authorities have been hesitant to implement and apply the decommunisation laws to KPU's activities. The party held its congress in September 2020 under its communist symbolics or organised the rally on May Day in Kyiv in 2021 (KPU 2020; 2021b). The party leader Symonenko constantly called for the regime change on pro-Russian TV channels owned by pro-Russian politician Viktor Medvedchuk or his protégés up to mid-February 2022. In those public appearances, Symonenko agitated against president Zelenskyi and his government. He accused them of selling national interests to American imperialists and keeping Ukraine on the leash as the protectorate of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is the root of all social problems in Ukraine because 'foreign protectors do not care about the well-being of ordinary Ukrainian people' (KPU 2021a).

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6   Tsentralna vyborcha kommissiya Ukraiiny, <accessed online: https://www.cvk.gov. ua/>.

Successor communist parties marginalised in rebel-controlled territories

The Communists have been marginalised by marionette rebel administrations. Despite the proclaimed people's republics' partial return to Soviet ideals and old communist rhetoric, the communists themselves have been marginalised (Nykonorov & Yermolenko 2017). The Communist Party might have been attractive for Russia because it could gather people to publicly demonstrate a social demand for the Russian intervention in spring 2014. Local communist officials mobilised the communist electorate, who called on Putin to invade Ukraine (Interview 1; 3; Torba 2016). However, this informal cooperation was short-lived. Moscow was in dire need of militants that the KPU could not deliver. The party supporters were suitable for news coverage in Russia's information war, demonstrating that the rebellion has widespread popular support, but they could not enforce the creation of a buffer proto-state necessary for controlling the Ukrainian territory (Interview 4).

Pragmatists, put in charge of the DNR and LNR by Moscow, who signed the Minsk Peace Accords in September 2014, conflicted with rebel hardliners – autonomous rebel commanders, such as Dremov or Mozgovoi – who opposed the DNR and LNR puppet leaders (Kikhtenko 2016; Vlad Triel 2014). Some communists gravitated towards Mozgovoi, who combined pro-Soviet communist and imperialist-right ideologies, while the local communist political structures, which were not affiliated with any particular rebel group, tried to be more or less loyal to the official rebel governance structures.

The lack of real leaders also undermined the Communists' position during the insurgency and the perspectives for the cooperation with Moscow. The communists did not have any ideological monopoly over the rebellion. Pro-Soviet communist ideas were just part of the political legitimisation of the rebellion in Eastern Ukraine. According to Wilson, the rebel narrative was a morphed Russian – Orthodox – Soviet absolutist nationalism, which absorbed different ideological ingredients from monarchism to 'Sovietism', reflecting the kaleidoscope of identities (Wilson 2014).

There were many defenders of the old Soviet values among rebels, but they considered themselves as participants in a broader so-called Russian World. They saw their war as a defense of Orthodox values against the advance of the corrupt West (Plokhy 2015: 343-352). Marlene Laruelle argues that the ideological background of the rebels was based on the convergence of three underlying paradigms – red (Soviet great-powerness, opposition to the West, and a socialist mission), white (Orthodox Christianity as a civilisational principle making Russia a distinct country with strong religious values) and brown (Fascist – national revolution of the 'Russian Spring') (Laruelle 2016). These anti-democratic ideological platforms eclectically mix political orthodoxy, Soviet imperialism and neo-fascist tendencies.

Although the KPU functionaries supported the rebel political agenda, they soon lost the drive to the new rebel elites. Consequently, local communists splintered from the KPU. They founded the new communist organisations in the rebel-controlled territories to legalise former KPU members due to the suspension of party activity in rebel enclaves. The organisations were entrusted with deliveries of humanitarian aid sent by their Russian comrades from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (*Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiyskoi federatsii*, KPRF). The new local communist parties received legal status as the political movements but were not allowed to participate in the illegitimate elections in 'people's republics' in fall 2014. They were simply not registered.

Rebel-controlled territories in the Donetsk Province (Donetsk People's Republic, DNR)

The Communist Party of the DNR (*Kommunisticheskaya partiya DNR*) was founded in October 2014 and led by Borys Litvinov, pre-war KPU head of the Donetsk Kirov district cell. In May 2014, Litvinov became the secretary of the Council of Ministers of the DNR led by the Moscow spin doctor Alexander Borodai. From July to October 2014, Litvinov headed the People's Council of the DNR. Then he was removed from his post, and in 2016 he was expelled from the so-called parliament of the DNR due to the 'loss of credibility' of the Donetsk Republic movement (Narodnyi sovet DNR 2016). One of the first things the new Communist Party did was seize the offices of the KPU registered personally to the former Donetsk leader Nikolai Kravchenko. The communist organisation supported the rebel leader Aleksandr Zakharchenko, although he mostly ignored this political subject (Lenta.ru 2014; Polukhina 2018).

The situation changed after the assassination of Aleksandr Zakharchenko in 2018 when the so-called presidential elections were set to legitimise the Moscow-ordered efforts to confirm Zakharchenko's successor Denys Pushilin as the new head of this rebel enclave. Communists decided to run for this office, but the explosion shattered the congress of the Communist Party of the DNR in September 2018. Ihor Khakimzyanov, a communist candidate for the DNR head, was among the victims injured in the explosion. The information resources controlled by the rebel administration spread information that Khakimzyanov himself allegedly set up the blast. Eventually, Khakimzyanov, the first defense minister of the DNR in April-May 2014, was not allowed to participate in the 'elections' (Molchanova 2018).

Rebel-controlled territories in the Luhansk Province (Lugansk People's Republic, LNR)

In the neighbouring LNR, the Communists of Luhansk Province (*Kommunisty Luganshchiny*) splintered from the Luhansk KPU branch. Several leading mem-

bers, such as former chairman of the KPU regional deputies Oleksandr Andriyanov and former KPU leader in Rubizhne Nelli Zadiraka, defected to the main rebel movement 'Peace to the Lugansk Province' (*Mir Luganshchine*) before the so-called elections in November 2014 in rebel-controlled territories were held. The Communists of Luhansk Province were in moderate opposition to the then LNR head Ihor Plotnitskyi. In August 2015, they transformed into the Union of Communists of Lugansk Province (*Soyuz kommunistov Luganshchiny*) with other marginal far-left subjects, and then jointly created the Communist Party of LNR (*Kommunisticheskaya partiya LNR*) in March 2016, led by Ihor Humenyuk.

Humenyuk was a former member of pro-Euromaidan and pro-Western national democratic parties Fatherland (*Batkivshchyna*) led by Yulia Tymoshenko and Front of Changes (*Front zmin*) of Arsenii Yatsenyuk. He was even city deputy for this party in the small town of Aleksandrovsk. Humenyuk fiercely criticised former KPU leader in Luhansk Spiridon Kilinkarov for an allegedly pro-Ukrainian position. He seized the KPU offices in the rebel-occupied territories and removed from the leadership positions people close to Kilinkarov. According to some information, Humenyuk profited from the humanitarian aid supplies from KPRF, organised by State Duma deputy Kazbek Taysayev, patron of the Donbas communists on behalf of the KPRF (Gorodenko 2015).

Conclusion

The communist electorate and KPU officials considered the Euromaidan a direct threat to their identity and values. However, the party's pro-rebel policy did not bring any success to the KPU on the national level nor in the rebel-held territories, despite the party's strong social ties in its strongholds, such as Donetsk and Luhansk provinces. The Euromaidan and toppling of Yanukovych's regime sparked off the decommunisation by banning the communist symbolic and renaming the streets and whole cities, especially in the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces.

Since 2014, the KPU has been marginalised in the domestic state due to the decommunisation process and people in government-controlled territories refused to vote for the party. In 2014, the KPU could not get into the national parliament for the first time since 1994, mainly because the main Communist strongholds have been out of the Ukrainian state's control. The party was banned from participation in the following parliamentary elections in 2019.

In the rebel-occupied territories, the marginalised party splinters became an unwanted competitor for the rebel political projects with the reputation of scammers involved in the 'dirty business' during the *ancien régime* when Donetsk oligarchs had ruled Donbas. The Communist Party of Ukraine had been strongly pro-Russian, but even the Russian authorities preferred the other actors for the rebel governance job.

The newly-founded communist organisations in the rebel enclaves were not allowed to participate in the illegitimate elections since the first ones in November 2014. The Russian-backed insurgency hypothetically presented a new opportunity for the lower ranks of the party officials in Donbas, but they did not use the window of opportunity because of the weak resources the party had after the years spent in the shadow of the dominant PR on both regional and national level.

The embeddedness of the party within the Ukrainian political system resulted in the leaders' indecisiveness during the political turmoil in Eastern Ukraine. The Communists paid for their collaboration with the Party of Regions and their regional leaders' behaviour seeking to be part of the local business elite. Being ideologically anti-Ukrainian, the KPU had been nevertheless tightly integrated into Ukrainian political life. Party leaders became reluctant to support raising arms against the Ukrainian state, feeling comfortable as the supposedly irreconcilable opposition against the new government but still within the Ukrainian political system.

The party started to become fragmented and members uncoordinated at the very moment when Russian authorities found proxies willing to serve their interests. Communists in both so-called people's republics lost any relevance as Russia wanted somebody more politically flexible and obedient for state-building efforts in the rebel enclaves. Communists, although still loyal to Russia, were seen by both anti-system radicals and Russia as a 'relic from the past', unable to adjust to the new political realities (Gorodenko 2015).

To conclude, the KPU has been double-marginalised due to weak financial and personal resources; the indecisiveness of the party leaders; lack of militancy when the party did not have any paramilitary structures and let itself to be ousted and sidelined by major rebel forces. The KPU never had any militant wing. Its main strength laid in mobilising crowds of committed electorate and transforming their votes into political capital in the Ukrainian parliament. Insufficient personal and financial resources; indecisive leaders unwilling to violently confront the incumbent; and the lack of militancy are also preliminary scope conditions that lead to the double-marginalisation of the pro-rebel political parties and organisations.

<div align="center">෮</div>

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Recuperar la Patria: Xenophobic Sentiments in Costa Rica in the Context of the Nicaraguan Refugee Crisis 2018

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Abstract

This case study explores xenophobic sentiments and actions in Costa Rica during the refugee crisis from April to December 2018, caused by the internal political crisis in Nicaragua. By looking at Costa Rica's long histories of migration it is evident that xenophobic sentiments against Nicaraguans derive from long-lasting interconnections and migration movements between these two countries. This study demonstrates not only that much of nationalist and xenophobic discourses originate from prolonged historical arguments, but also that the global dimension of anti-migration sentiments has to be considered. Using neo-institutionalist theory, in particular historical and sociological institutionalism, this paper explores how the history of migration in Costa Rica has contributed to the creation of Costa Rican nationalism. Furthermore, by combining past and present examples, namely the history of migrations between Nicaragua and Costa Rica and actions by nationalist groups on social media channels, this paper contributes to a historically centered analysis to one of the central issues of the 21st century.

Keywords: refugees, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, xenophobia, social media, international migration

Introduction

In the context of the political crisis in Nicaragua in April 2018 tens of thousands of Nicaraguans fled to Costa Rica to seek asylum and refuge. The majority of the Costa Rican population as well as the government reacted with solidarity and active assistance. Nevertheless, at the height of the migration movement in August 2018 xenophobic protests in the capital of Costa Rica, San José, were directed against the Nicaraguan refugees (CRHoy.com 2018). Since then, groups and activists have organized on different social media platforms, engaging in xenophobic and racist agitations against Nicaraguan migrants coming to Costa Rica, and also connecting themselves with international anti-refugee and migratory movements, activists and parties.

This may be surprising at first glance, since the perception of Costa Rica – from outside as well as from a self-reflective point of view – is linked to a democratic tradition and an overall a liberal political landscape (Werz 2008: 343-345). Costa Rica has an independent media landscape and introduced progressive policies in the last years, for example opening marriage to same-sex couples in 2020 via a sentence of the Supreme Court of Justice in August 2018 (INFOBAE 2018). Many of these characteristics are contrasted by Costa Rica's immediate neighbouring countries. A historically grown structural poverty has shaped for example Nicaragua for decades while in Costa Rica a middle class has emerged during the 20th century. Costa Rica also has the highest life expectancy – 80 years in 2018 – compared to the other Central American countries (World Bank 2019). Its image as a county of internal peace is symbolically represented by the 1949 abolition of the military while dictatorships and military coups characterized the other neighbouring countries, especially in the 20th century (Huhn 2008). For more than half a century Costa Rica also has positioned itself as a neutral country in foreign policy and has acted as a mediator in various conflicts in the past. All of this has brought Costa Rica the nickname 'Switzerland of Central America' and crated the image of Costa Rica as 'different' in the Central American context (Acuña Ortega 2002).

The narrative of Costa Rica's superior political and social status—which cause a strong sense of nationalism—is deeply rooted in at least two perspectives. The first perspective relates to the institutional design of Costa Rica's political structure—which created a solid democratic system in the country. The second perspective studies a racial myth fostered by an ethnic idea of a Costa Rican 'whiteness' compared to the rest of the countries of Central America. Using the neo-institutionalist theory, in particular historical and sociological institutionalism (Steinmo 2018), this paper explores how the processes in which political institutions and ethnicism in Costa Rica have built a xenophobic nationalism.

The implications of Costa Rica's nationalism are many. First, it leads to a strong xenophobic sentiment that could weaken the countries' social tissue, especially concerning Nicaraguan migrants. Second, history is used to justify excluding Costa Ricans from the ethnically diverse population. These two factors, deeply intertwined, have contributed to the creation of Costa Rica's national identity.

Nevertheless, recent research distances itself from these imprecise attributions and does not speak of a special case *per se* (Kordick 2019; Molina Jimenéz 2015; Díaz Arias 2014; Palmer & Molina 2004). Rather, the contradictions in the self-image, but also the interpretation of the historical process of the country are under critical review today. The fact that the Costa Rican identity which defines itself as 'white' and 'European' and therefore presents itself as different from the other Latin American societies (especially towards the neighbouring countries), seems problematic. The non-white population, *mestizos*, indigenous people, and people of African descent are often marginalized and not considered part of the history of Costa Rica which is still interpreted in terms of national history. Researchers today emphasize that it is necessary to look at ambiguities in the Costa Rican self-image, to take a new path of deconstructing national myths and to overcome traditional historiography (Sandoval-García 2010; Alvarenga Venutolo 1998).

This article intents to contribute to this reassessment by focusing on the recent migration movement of Nicaraguans into Costa Rica and the appearance of xenophobic groups agitating against Nicaraguans. I argue that the xenophobic sentiments against Nicaraguans are not something new in Costa Rican society, but the consequence of a long history of interactions between these two countries, especially in relation to migration. The overall goal is to show that prolonged historical attributions and imaginaries associated with Nicaraguans, reaper in times of crisis. The paper will focus on a limited timeframe from April 2018 to April 2020 and focus on a specific social media group called group *Recuperemos Costa Rica*. In the first part, I will establish the overall historical framework between the two countries, focusing on Costa Rica's and Nicaraguans interconnected history of migration. Second, I will elaborate on the events evolving in Nicaragua since 2018, causing the migration movement. Third, I will concentrate on the group *Recuperemos Costa Rica* where I will look at the groups neo-national ideology (Van Dijk 2006; Gingrich & Banks 2006) and analyse the contents of their anti-migrant discourse.

Histories of migration in Costa Rica

Costa Rica's history can be defined as histories of migration. Starting with the immigration of various ethnic groups more than 20.000 years ago from North

America to the Southern part of the continent, to the violent conquest and integration of Mesoamerica into the Spanish colonial empire in the 16th century, and the forced displacement of African people in the context of the transatlantic slave trade. In this way, Costa Rica – and the Americas – appear as a place of intercultural encounters (Hensel 2019: 153-164).

Since the mid-19th century there has been a decisive change in terms of migration which is linked to the political independence of the Central American regions from Spain in 1821 and the creation of separate nation-states. Within this process various Central American states adopted the so-called agroexport model (*modelo agroexportador*) in which the region's economic growth became dependent to a greater part on the export profits of agricultural products such as coffee, bananas, sugar, and cotton. In Costa Rica, this economic-political model is associated with the intensive cultivation of coffee with its production centers in the *Valle Central* which includes the today's provinces of Alajuela, Heredia, San José, and Cartago. Compared to the other republics of Central America, Costa Rica started early with the production of coffee which around 1870 represented around 90 percent of Costa Rica's total exports (Samper 1993).

Coffee and later also banana plantations required modern technologies, such as railroad lines and ports for the interoceanic transport to Europe and the United States of America, but also a large number of seasonal workers who were able to cope with the physically difficult work in the tropical heat. Due to a persistent shortage of labour force the Costa Rican government and businesses started to implement immigration policies since the middle of the 19th century to overcome this situation. Initially the political and economic elites preferred Europeans which should also reinforce Costa Rica's 'white' identity. The elites were keen to identify themselves as descendants of 'poor' and 'white' Spanish settlers from colonial times in order to differentiate themselves from *mestizos* as well as from Indigenous and Afro-Caribbean communities (Palmer & Molina 2004: 2; Harpelle 2000: 29-30). However, the physically challenging work on the plantations was not desirable and simply too hard for most Europeans, and as a consequence the majority of them stayed in the cities where they worked as businessmen or merchants. Therefore, the government in San José started to depend on a workforce primarily by people from the Caribbean area, such as Jamaica and Haiti, or from neighbouring countries, like Nicaragua or Panama.

However, people coming from these regions did not fit the identity politics of the Costa Rican elite of the 19th century, because most of them were ethnically of indigenous or Afro-Caribbean descent. The elites were aware of this contradiction and the Costa Rican historian Patricia Alvarenga elaborates how this led to the construction of three types of migrants: First, there were the 'desired migrants', that is 'white' Europeans. Second 'unwanted migrants' who,

depending on the decade, were people of different ethnicities and nationalities and were prevented by laws from entering Costa Rica. At the beginning of the 20th century this affected, for example, people from China or the Ottoman Empire, but also people from Roma and Sinti communities. Third, there were those who were tolerated as a 'necessary evil', as Alvarenga calls it. This meant people of the neighbouring countries and regions who were tolerated due to the need of (cheap)labour force in the agricultural sector. Basically, the elites in Costa Rica had to subordinate their imaginary vision of a 'white' Costa Rica behind long-term economic ambitions. Further, Alvarenga emphasizes that this hierarchization was based on racist motives as well as eugenic and social Darwinist discourses that were circulating in the early 20th century (Alvarenga Venutolo 2011: 3-22). Thus, since the 19th century systematic discrimination practices and policies, can be identified, and were directed against immigrants and ethnic minorities who did not fit into the idea of 'white' Costa Rica. During the late 19th century, the Costa Rican state and the political elites established a long-term polarization within its society into a 'we', the Costa Ricans, and the 'others', migrants and ethnic minorities (Díaz Arias 2014: 59-70).

Looking at census data from 1864 to 1984 Nicaraguans represented the largest group of foreign citizens coming to Costa Rica followed by Jamaicans, Panamanians, and Europeans (Alvarenga Venutolo 2011: 10). Historically, there have been (at least) three major migration movements from Nicaragua to Costa Rica since the 19th century. The first took place in the middle of the 19th century and was related to the expansion of the plantation economy and the cultivation of coffee, bananas, and sugar. The main reason for Nicaraguans migrating to Costa Rica was due to economic considerations, because Costa Rica appeared to be economically more successful, whereas in contrast to Nicaragua, there were better job opportunities and – albeit small – social advancement was possible (Castro 2010). A second migration movement took place in the late 1970s and 1980s and was influenced by political events in Nicaragua, connected with the downfall of the Somoza family-dictatorship. Around 1977/78 when the support for the *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN) – then a guerrilla movement and since 1980s a political party – grew and a popular uprising against the dictatorship was eminent, the regime increased its repression against the population. Therefore, around 50.000 Nicaraguans sought exile in Costa Rica before the culmination of the revolution on 19 July 1979. Many returned in the 1980s, but soon the country was caught up in the next conflict, the so-called Contra War which made Nicaragua a hot spot of Cold War dynamics. Again, thousands fled to Costa Rica, but this time the economic crisis of the war also played its part, as well as unpopular measures by the FSLN government, such as compulsory military service. Oppositional politicians who opposed the policies of the FSLN in the 1980s also went

into exile to Costa Rica as well as to the USA (Baumeister, Fernández & Acuña 2004: 15; Basok 1990: 727).[1] After the defeat of the FSLN in the elections and the takeover of the government by Violetta Barrios de Chamorro in February 1990, a neo-liberal economic policy was implemented, supported by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These policies further intensified the economic crisis, already resilient due to the Contra War. The country's inflation, unemployment and poverty rates continued to rise, resulting in the third migratory movement in the 1990s (Sandoval-García 2017: 7).

It is important to note that the 1980s were a decisive turning point in regard to the migration situation in Central America in general (Lizcano Fernández 2000: 165-180), and also specifically considering migration movements of Nicaraguans into Costa Rica. In a study from 2008 the authors argue that up to the 1980s the socio-economic developments of Costa Rica and Nicaragua were quite similar in their overall structures; the annual economic growth was approximately the same in both countries, the traditional agricultural products (coffee, bananas, cotton, and sugar) remained central in the export sector and only two percent of the total population in both countries were living abroad. However, this changed at the beginning of the 1980s when Costa Rica invested in the cultivation of different agricultural products, like fruits, flowers, and wheat, as well as in tourism. The later had a significant impact on many other areas of the labour market, demanding, for example, training of bilingual staff for tourism businesses or investments in infrastructure. In general, an overall expansion of the tertiary work sector was in progress. One of the consequences was a decline of Costa Ricans working in agriculture and it was therefore have played a vital role for seasonal and later continuous emigration of Nicaraguans to Costa Rica (Baumeister, Fernández & Acuña 2004: 72-73).

This also differs in numbers of earlier migration movements, but also in the fact that the majority of Nicaraguans in Costa Rica do not return to Nicaragua anymore. Since the late 1980s and then especially since the 1990s young Costa Ricans receive a better education and seek jobs that require higher education and university degrees. As a result, many of them go abroad, especially to the United States, but also to Europe which implies that there is again a shortage of labour in the agriculture sector. More importantly, there is also an increasing number of people needed in partially informal jobs, like housekeeping or babysitting – traditionally carried out by young women – as well as in construction,

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1   In the case of the USA, the migrants primarily belonged to the 'old' elites or middle-class people who already had networks in the USA or had the necessary financial means to migrate. A quarter of Nicaraguans over 25 years who came to the United States in the 1980s achieved a university degree, which stands out, compared to Salvadorans or Guatemalans. Nicaraguan social scientist Rocha Gómez (2016: 122) attributes this to the class difference since Nicaraguan emigrants belong since the 1980s to the (upper) middle class.

where mainly men work. These jobs are no longer attractive for young Costa Ricans and the majority is done by Nicaraguans (Castro 2010).

Consequently, migration of Nicaraguans to Costa Rica is not a temporarily limited phenomenon but a prolonged historical development. In the province of Guanacaste – a border region between the two countries – thousands of Nicaraguans often live and work in the second or third generation and international families are rather the rule than the exception (Castro 2010: 39).

Still, the Nicaraguans are defined as 'the others' in Costa Rican society. This does not mean that they are discriminated *per se*. When it comes to differences in the Spanish language in fact there are local linguistic variations (Sandoval-García 2006: 109).[2] Even the question between the *Nicas* and the *Ticos* about who created the national dish *gallo pinto* (rice with beans) remains a controversial, but humoristic issue, as both sides claim the creation for themselves (Gutiérrez Silva 1964; Ruiz Herrero 1964). However, apart from this rather harmless popular culture example that occur often between neighbouring countries, stereotypical visions and interpretations about Nicaraguans remain evident in Costa Rican society. Most evident are references such as the 'darker' skin colour of the *Nicas* or that they are 'uncivilized' and generally more involved in crime, in comparison to the *Ticos*. These attributions are not new, but rather exist since the 1940s, as historian Patricia Alvarenga has shown (2011: 17). For the upcoming analysis this is crucial because it will show that these discriminatory and xenophobic discourses are used in various social media groups since the outbreak of the political crisis in Nicaragua and the most recent migration movement since April 2018.

The political crisis of April 2018 in Nicaragua and the migration movement into Costa Rica

Two events led to the biggest protests in recent Nicaraguan history and against the government under President Daniel Ortega of the FSLN. In March 2018, a forest fire broke out in the *Indio Maíz Biological Reserve* which for a long time could not be brought under control by the local authorities. Environmentalists spoke about intentional passivity from the government, in order to obtain land for the agro-industry. Just a month later the government announced reforms regarding the social security system without conducting a prior parliamentary discussion and evaluation.[3] This led to protests against the government in the capital Managua and in other parts of the country. These two events can be seen

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2   Nevertheless, Sarceño (2017) points at the dialectics and inherent power relations when it comes to language also between Costa Ricans and Nicaraguans.

3   The reforms, demanded also by the International Monetary Fund, included among other things a reduction of the pensions by 5% and an increase in social security fees. See: Munguía Argeñal (2018).

as a kind of catalyst for the growing dissatisfaction with the government under President Ortega since he took office in 2007. The increasing corruption in the state's institutions, the steady dismantling of democratic structures, as well as the growing nepotism of the FSLN were central motivations for the discontent of many Nicaraguans, especially the young generation. An expression of the concentration of power was the appointment of Ortega's wife, Rosario Murillo, as vice-president after the 2017 elections, which many, including many former FSLN members, interpreted as a return to a family dictatorship *a la* Somoza (Álvaro Navarro 2016).

As the protest evolved during March and April 2018, the security forces reacted increasingly violent. In the following weeks more than 300 people lost their lives and more than 2.000 were injured in confrontations with security forces as well as paramilitary groups. Also, hundreds of protesters were arrested, particularly young people and students, but also journalists and human rights activists. The situation worsened between July and August 2018 and thousands of Nicaraguans fled to avoid persecution and apply for asylum. The statistics of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) show the destination countries of Nicaraguans: almost 90 percent applied for asylum in Costa Rica, followed by Panama and the United States and the peak of the migration movement was between June and August 2018 (UNHCR 2018: table 1 & 2). Since then, Nicaraguans make up to 80% of the total number of people seeking refuge in Costa Rica and as of December 2020, around 368,000 Nicaraguan regular immigrants and refugees lived in Costa Rica, making them the largest group in terms of Costa Rica's immigration population (Chaves-González & Mora 2021: 7, 11).

Analysis of the group *Recuperemos Costa Rica*

As already mentioned, the Costa Rican society largely showed their solidarity with the Nicaraguan refugees and welcomed their 'Nicaraguan brothers' and sisters (ElPaís.cr 2018).[4] However, a demonstration on 18 August 2018 at the *Parque de la Merced* in the capital San José showed a different picture. Around 500 people gathered that Saturday to protest against the Nicaraguan refugees coming to Costa Rica. It is not clear who organized the protests, but independent journalists reported that members of violent football fan clubs (*barras*) and in some cases individuals associated to the criminal scene were seen as lead figures during the manifestations (CRHoy.com 2018). Statements such as '*Fuera nicas*' ('Nicaraguans out') or '*Fuera Alvarado*' were heard. The later was directed at the Costa Rican president, Carlos Alvarado of the centre left *Partido Acción Ciudadana*. After the protest, Alvarado made a public statement in which he emphasized that he understood the concerns of many Costa Ricans, but also spoke about the

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4   All translations from Spanish into English are made by the author.

long history of migration movements into Costa Rica, highlighting its positive effects on the country. However, he also implied that if one of the refugees did not comply with national laws or posed a threat to the security of the country, he/she would be refused to enter the country or even be deported (Trinchera de la Noticia TV 2018).

Most of the groups engaging in actions against migrations were formed between July and August 2018 and included *Costa Rica en Desarrollo*, *CR Revoluciones*, *Salvemos Costa Rica*, *Resistencia Costarricense*, *Denuncias Costa Rica*, *Liberales Costa Rica*, *Movimiento Nacionalista Costarricense*, *Periódico Juanito Mora*, *Noticias Nacionales CR* or *MNC San José* and *Recuperemos Costa Rica* (Chinchilla 2019). The outreach of these groups grew since mid-2018 substantially, reaching up to 160.000 followers only on Facebook, according to investigative journalists of the Costa Rican newspaper *La Nación* (Robles 2019).

It is noteworthy to mention some details about the meeting spot the demonstration took place. The Parque de la Merced has been associated with Nicaraguans since the 1980s. There, individuals, or groups of *Nicas* would celebrate *La Purissima*, a popular festival to honour the Virgen Mary (Equipo Envío 1981). The park has since developed into a meeting place for Nicaraguan migrants, to share information, to look out for jobs or to engage in small-scale economic activities, like selling traditional Nicaraguan street-food (The Tico Times 2018). Thus, organizing anti-refugee protests at the park can be interpreted a sign to reconquer a public space, as the name *Recuperemos Costa Rica* already points at. The social practice of occupying the public space, reshaping it and change the socio-urban landscape, has been a common feature of recent social movements across the Americas.[5]

The group had been active on Twitter as well as on Facebook, where it had reached up to 5.000 subscribers in September 2019. Their ideology can be described as neo-nationalist and 'populist radical right'. According to Van Dijk ideology is a 'belief system' which is 'socially shared', 'controls society' and its individuals to a certain point. The coherence is an essential part in it because it elaborates a sense of belonging to a group. This can be established via a set of common values, ideas or opinions which are central for the group's coherence (Van Dijk 2009: 116-117). Within this context groups which appear to occupy extreme ideological position in society often adopt a practice of social inclusion. Cas Mudde for example has defined the populist radical right as movements which also radicalize the political mainstream and mobilizes members not only at the far right (or left) ideological specters of society (Mudde 2019). Dominant features include 'nativism, a combination of nationalism and xenophobia' as Mudde mentions.

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5   Having in mind *Occupy Wall Street* or the *Black Lives Matter* movement (see: Belli, & López Raventós 2021: 66–68).

For *Recuperemos Costa Rica* these definitions become visible, looking at a text published on Facebook on 27 August 2018 called *La Patria Primero* (The homeland first) the group defined itself as 'Movement against the impending destruction of the homeland, our values and the people'. Their vision was a society of 'national solidarity', 'love for our country', 'the family as its core', 'self-respect', and 'individual freedom' (Recuperemos Costa Rica 2019). The first notion of this text is that the migration movement is interpreted as a moment of crisis for the Costa Rican society. The text implies an imminent threat caused by Nicaraguans referring to the 'destruction of the homeland' together with images of migrants at the border with police forces. The combination of these type of texts together with pictures creates fear and the migration itself becomes a moment of crisis and danger for the Costa Rican population. This leads on a discursive level to the image of Nicaraguans are to blame for causing the crisis. This is then turned into the national framework, e.g., Nicaraguans endanger Costa Rica as a nation. Referring to the 'homeland' and the 'country' points at this neo-nationalist ideology of the group.

In general, security as topic play an important part in the discourses of the group. As Muddle states, security is central for right-wing movements and agents across the world. Their 'obsession' derives from the fact that the issue emotionalizes and individuals as well as collectives are concerned with their own security (Mudde 2019: 30). In order to better understand the symbolic world view of the group some considerations of Ulrich Beck can help. Already at the end of the 1980s, he spoke of the so-called 'risk society' which he later renamed a 'world risk society', emphasizing its globality. According to Beck, globalization means that fear is a central part of nationalist thinking and actions. This fears a manifold: there can be an economic fear (a stock market crash), an ecological (tsunami or volcanic eruption) or a social one (losing a job). The overall feeling is, that we live in a time with too many risks (economic, ecological, political, technological, etc.) at once, on which we as individuals have no longer control, since they are global and transcend the national. Therefore, neo-nationalist groups assume it would be better to reduce the state, its people, the economy and other aspects of our societies back to the national framework (Beck 1992, 2007).

In relation to Costa Rica, *Recuperemos Costa Rica,* for example, interpreted the Costa Rican population as being at risk from various sides: from outside, e.g., from migrants but also from capitalism and globalization as well as from inside, referring to local elites (politicians) who – in their interpretation – are mere agents of globalization and capitalism. There is also the fear from 'forces' from below, migrants or/and minorities. This is emphasized in a second text (*Nuestra Lucha*) where globalization is seen as a danger together with other 'extreme forms of control' like Marxism and Capitalism. The Costa Rican citizens are thus

interpreted by *Recuperemos Costa Rica* as a disadvantaged and threatened collective which also goes hand in hand with the loss of their own identity.

Also, Andre Gingrich and Marcus Banks mentioned something similar about neo-nationalist groups. They argue that neo-nationalist groups struggle for an independent nation state within globalization, while in contrast to 'traditional nationalism', neo-nationalist movements and agents reject influences from outside and above – in their interpretation traditional liberal or conservative politics – and emphasize the local identity of a community.

Thus, these groups and agents not only address their messages to traditional right-wing and conservative sections of the society, but also to the political centre that – in their interpretation – is dissatisfied with and dependent on globalization, which has only negative consequences for them. Often, they reject classifications into the political right and left and define themselves as anti-systemic, whereby the liberal-democratic system is considered outdated Gingrich & Banks 2006). These is no data available of the specific ideological composition of the group, but it appeared to be diverse in its composition. Referring to what Simone Belli and Cristian López Raventós (2021) write that such 'movements are heterogeneous but share some features such as the rejection of the foreign-born population, referring to the dangers of immigration; and criticizing traditional political parties, corrupt elites and the impossibility of improving the living conditions of the population' seems correct also in the case of *Recuperemos Costa Rica*. Their affinity for ideas to address the political centre can be seen by one of their guiding principles: 'Social justice for all without distinction of social classes and necessary property for all' (*Justicia social para todos sin distinción de clases sociales y propiedad necesaria para todos*). However, this refers again to the national framework (*solidaridad nacional*) and thus excludes other nationalities, ethnic minorities as well as migrants. The *todos* (all) is therefore reduced to 'some' who have the 'correct' nationality or/and ethnicity.

Here, the question arises where the limitations between the imaginary 'us' and 'them' are drawn. This always requires a definition of the identity of Costa Ricans, assuming that all identity is imagined and socially constructed. Postings on *Facebook* provide information for this. The group mentioned that 'anti-fascist' and 'leftist' people are not considered as Costa Ricans. These are described as 'traitors to the fatherland' (*traidores de la patria*), as well as the politicians who are committed to the concerns of immigrants and intend to help them.

One of the predominant associations which is used in the groups postings was that Nicaraguans are criminals. Media reports on crime, such as rape, theft, domestic or public violence, drug trafficking, and illegal work activities were posted and shared extensively. Attributions such as 'criminals' (*delinquentes*) or 'illegal migrants' (*inmigrante ilegal*) dominate the postings. Therefore, a Costa

Rican is all but not theses affirmations. Based on reports of violence or crimes committed by individuals, the group exaggerates on a discursive level, creating the image of Nicaraguans (as a collective) as *per se* criminal. As already mentioned above, this is a historically reproduced image of 'uncivilized' and 'criminal' Nicaraguans, reactivated in a time of crisis. The Costa Ricans, according to the interpretation of *Recuperemos Costa Rica*, are portrayed as 'victims' of Nicaraguans who are illegally in the country. Particular attention is drawn to the fact that they take the jobs away from the Costa Ricans, especially in the construction industry. The hashtag *#CostaRicaPrimero*, based on the slogan *America First* by former US-President Donald Trump, is used in connection with the alleged disadvantage of Costa Ricans against compared with migrants. *Recuperemos Costa Rica* thus implies in the postings that the government in San José cares more about the Nicaraguans than the unemployed Costa Ricans and that it lets them down. It also implies that members of *Recuperemos Costa Rica* perceived themselves as the 'real' Costa Ricans.

Another significant aspect of neo-nationalist groups and agents is their revisionist interpretation of history. In the case of *Recuperemos Costa Rica* the group uses symbolism which can be seen within this context. The groups symbol was a hand holding a torch on a blue, white, and red basis (see figure 1), symbolizing the Costa Rican flag. On the one side it can be interpreted and associated with the history of Juan Santamaría (1831-1856). For his action during the war against William Walkers filibusters (1854-1857) Santamaría – a young soldier and drummer in the Costa Rican army – set a *Hazienda* on fire where the US-American filibusters had barricaded themselves. This not only caused the Costa Rican victory in the Battle of Rivas, but also the death of Santamaría who became a national hero of Costa Rica and nationalist historiography (Acuña Ortega 2014: 87-98).

On the other side a graphic posted on 4 September 2018, by the group can be clearly assigned to the right spectrum.[6] The picture shows a stature of a man holding a flag created by the German sculptor Arno Breker (1900-1991) and the logo of the group in the right corner (figure 2). Breker remains an extremely controversial and problematic figure for his (artistic) work during the National Socialist regime, being part of contributing to the NS-aesthetics in the arts.

Conclusion

It is clear that the current migration movements in Central America are of transnational character; whether it is the ongoing violence, the overall economic situation or also recently the climate change (Ferris 2020), the movement of Central Americans from one country to another will continue. Of course, in detail the Central American countries face different situations: data collected

6   Screenshot, https://www.facebook.com/CostaRicaRecuperemos/photos/a.545847212 504335/546665212422535/?type=3&theater (accessed on 26.08.2019).

by the UNHCR shows for example that Costa Rica was the country with the highest number of refugees and asylum seekers in 2018, followed by Panama. Honduras, on the other hand, as the northern neighbour of Nicaragua, officially accepted (officially) only 80 refugees and asylum seekers in 2018 but had the largest number of internally displaced people in the entire Central American region (UNHCR 2019).

Migration emotionalizes and mobilizes people, even though is not a new phenomenon of the present century. As shown in the case of Costa Rica, the long history of Nicaraguans coming to its neighbouring country, is still marked by a nationalist and xenophobic discursive framework, although the self-image and outside perception of Costa Rica relates to its democratic tradition. But in times of crisis, these sentiments can reappear, and seemingly old hostilities revived. The border dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua would be another current example in the context of the late migration movements where long lasting struggles over rescues and control of territory still play a part in the policies and discourses about sovereignty, security and of course immigration of the two countries (Vega García & Gómez 2012).Therefore, the protests in 2018 against Nicaraguan refugees in Costa Rica can be seen as a decisive moment in which xenophobic groups and activists appeared on a much broader public scene as well as a further mobilization especially on social media platforms. As shown, the historically based stereotypes against Nicaraguans ('uncivilized', 'criminal') that Alvarenga has addressed have been used in public discourse, in this case on Social Media channels.

Taking a global perspective on the issue of anti-migration movements the Costa Rican case is not an isolated phenomenon. Having in mind Europe where right-wing populist parties and agents in the last decade have been part of government coalitions, like the *Lega Nord* in Italy. Their unconventional methods of attracting attention have been successful and in the case of Costa Rica xenophobic and racist ideas from *Recuperemos Costa Rica* could in the future resonate within a wider social discourse. Particularly in the current debates on the migration issue in Central America, neo-nationalist and right-wing movements and agents already find a wider audience than a decade before. Therefore, emotionalized debates are placed in an appropriate historical moment, for example, during a political, economic crisis or in times of global pandemics, as even a health crisis can trigger an anti-migrant effect on the population. Though this article has concentrated on xenophobic sentiments against Nicaraguan migration, the multiplicity of migration profiles, from ethnicity or nationality to economic aspects, could resonate in similar actions and sentiments against other groups and indicates coming to Costa Rica. Researchers of the *Migration Policy Institute* recently stated that Cost Rican policy makers 'need to guide and even changer the

public debate on migration by highlighting its potential long-term benefits' as well as 'recognize the real tensions and challenges involved in effective migration and integration management'. In their interpretation this will 'be important to avoid fanning the flames of xenophobia by appearing to give immigrants special treatment or opportunities that are not available to the native population' (Chaves-González & Mora 2021: 44).

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American Sea Power in the Old World: the United States Navy in European and Near Eastern Waters, 1865-1917

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The question of maritime activities in the Mediterranean Sea has always been a crucial yet minor topic in modern naval history. Because of the increasing maritime activity through the trade routes from Europe to its colonies and the progressive redistribution of power outside the old continent, historians have generally focused on the world's oceans. Experienced historian William N. Still Jr. goes against this tendency with a volume on the United States Navy's history in the Mediterranean, which details the evolution of the European squadron in the Basin.

Starting from American naval activity in the post-Civil War era, Still details the development of the European squadron amidst the political ferment that crossed Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. After the frantic years of the American Civil War, when the U.S. Navy was in charge of holding the Confederacy off from major trade lines with Europe, the existence of the European Squadron was under scrutiny by American Congressional leaders. Despite the remarkable presence of American citizens along the Mediterranean shores, American naval presence in the region seemed superfluous due

to relatively minor incidents. Yet, the political situation in Europe was only apparently at peace. In the years leading up to the First World War, every place from the Spanish coast to the Near East waters was a theatre of crucial political turmoil that progressively shaped the region's history and the destiny of regional empires. The alternation between quiet and storm made Mediterranean naval affairs hard to navigate for American political leaders who wished to cut back on naval costs but often realised that the European squadron was the best protection for American interests and citizens. Through the narration of the swinging attitude that American leaders held toward the Mediterranean, Still also manages to provide an interesting account of American relations with powers in the Basin at the time. Although Still's narration covers all significant actors, his focus consistently circles back to the Ottoman Empire, gradually descending to the status of 'the great sick man of Europe' during the last decades of the nineteenth century. In this respect, Still interestingly points out how American attitudes and interests towards their naval presence in Eastern waters were not only due to trade and maritime interests but also greatly influenced by domestic political dynamics and their grasp on American diplomacy (the presence of religious missionaries in the Ottoman Empire is a clear example, albeit not the only one (Chapter Two and Four). This well-rounded survey of American relationships in the Basin is evident in the structure of the volume, which perfectly describes the ascendant parable of the European squadron. The chapters are indeed chronologically ordered and successfully balance the recollection of the region's political environment with the history of the crucial changes that interested the European squadron – and, by default, the U.S. Navy – at the turn of the twentieth century.

The centre of the volume (Chapters Five and Six) marks the dramatic shift in American naval policies in the last decade of the nineteenth century. A revived naval conscience allowed for the political attitude toward the thorny question of the European squadron to give rise to a new season for the U.S. Navy, whose relevance in the American strategic perspective grew exponentially. The rest of the volume, which finishes in the crucial year 1917, chronicles the constant crescendo of American maritime activity in the Mediterranean, especially in Ottoman waters. This final yet revealing analysis sheds light on the American naval approach in Eastern Mediterranean waters during the initial years of neutrality in the First World War and opens a window into the role of the U.S. Navy in Eastern European waters during the conflict, a less talked about role than the more notorious cooperation with the Royal Navy in the Atlantic blockade of the German Empire. Unfortunately, the time frame of the volume does not allow Still to go further into this specific topic. There is a clear choice of reporting American naval activity between wars, allowing Still to delve into the history

of the U.S. Navy from an intertwined perspective and underline the double role of naval forces as both political and military means. Yet, because of the general disproportion of resources available between the Atlantic and Mediterranean theatres, it would have been great to have an additional chapter which could expand on American naval activity between 1917 and 1923, the birth year of the Turkish Republic. This final missing chapter, however, does not hinder the overall reading experience of a volume that contains an excellent example of historical prose and provides a sound argument for reorienting the compass of naval history beyond the world's oceans.

The most noteworthy feature of *American Sea Power in the Old World* is the focus on the interactions between political and military leaders at various levels. Throughout his narration, Still pays excellent attention to the personalities that characterised American diplomatic and maritime activity during this era. Each phase of the squadron can be easily identified by the description of its commanders or the diplomatic and political leaders with whom they interacted. This attention to the human side of history provides Still's volume with a crucial analytical edge, combining detailed and in-depth historical research with captivating storytelling. The book is well-researched and perfectly demonstrates the author's expertise, never sacrificing the reader's experience. Still's style is seamless and well-balanced throughout the pages, even when he dedicates space to more technical aspects of his research, like the logistics of the squadron (Chapter Three).

The impeccable approach to historical narration makes *American Sea Power in the Old World* a must-read for all naval history buffs and one of the best examples of historical research in the field. Part of Still's talent resides in providing the reader with an all-encompassing reading experience. Although it is a descriptive volume, *American Sea Power in the Old World* still offers some food for thought to scholars and history enthusiasts who can appreciate the connections with the present situation in the Mediterranean Basin. Through a thorough overview of the political environment in the region and the slow but steady build-up to the First World War and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, William N. Still Jr. offers solid evidence of the importance of the Mediterranean in American naval strategy and the pivotal role of civil-naval relations in the history of the U.S. Navy's European Squadron. As Still demonstrates, these elements created a crucial interplay that favoured the survival and later revival of the European squadron, which became essential in wartime. In this spirit, *American Sea Power in the Old World* offers a precious lesson for the United States as it rediscovers its position as the preeminent naval power in the world: never forget the Mediterranean.

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