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Past-Oriented Foreign Policy: Japanese State-Identity and South Korea Discourse 2009-2012

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Abstract

Upon its 2009 General Elections victory, the Democratic Party of Japan defined the Republic of Korea as the core of its Asia-focused foreign policy. Despite initial enthusiasm, the resurgence of controversies like the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and the Comfort Women issue pulled bilateral relations down to historic lows. This paper contributes to the research on Japan-South Korea relations by adopting a relational constructivist perspective, and offers a comprehensive account of DPJ state-identity narratives vis-à-vis South Korea, until now little discussed in existing literature. An analysis of the foreign policy discourse of Japan's DPJ prime ministers and their cabinet will show that what neutralises successful cooperation is a resilient narrative of superiority against the South Korean other.

Keywords: *relational constructivism, Japan-South Korea relations, identity, Democratic Party of Japan*

Introduction

Upon its 2009 General Elections victory, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) pledged to pursue a more Asia-focused foreign policy by putting the Republic

of Korea (ROK) at its core. Despite initial enthusiasm, the resurgence of controversies like the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and the Comfort Women issue pulled bilateral relations down to historic lows. Tokyo and Seoul are close commercial partners and US allies, but both face a diplomatic deadlock each time they are confronted with issues belonging to their wartime past. Indeed, Japan's claims of 'future-oriented relations' and 'facing the past squarely' seem to be vague pledges rather than serious commitments to effective foreign policy. The South Korean population is very sensitive to historical memory, and according to Seoul, Japan is still trying to eschew past responsibility. In fact, it appears that what underlies Japan's foreign policy stance vis-à-vis Asian 'others' is a resilient sense of superiority, which several scholars indicated as a direct inheritance of wartime state-identity. More precisely, this legacy can be traced back to processes of identity formation during the so-called Meiji Restoration, when Japan underwent a radical change in its social and political structures. The ideologues of Japanese modernisation saw neighbouring countries as backward and incapable of industrialising, hence offering a weak flank to the pressure of Western powers in Asia. This view, paired with the rising ethnocentric ideology of *kokutai*, bolstered Japan's self-appointed role as Asia's saviour, ready to fend off the West even by directly colonising 'peripheral' nations (Tamaki 2010: 63).

The literature on state-identity in IR, and of Japanese identity in particular, has developed into two main theoretical strands, namely norm-constructivism and relational constructivism. The first attempts at explaining state-identity as something created domestically and following local norms. When focusing on Japan, norm-constructivist scholars tended to emphasise that Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (Cabinet Office 1947) was the main reason why Japan had an overall peace-oriented foreign-policy attitude. This kind of perspective would make us assume that Japan's 'pacifist' identity and culture reproduce a pacifist behaviour. However, recent developments in Japanese security policy challenged this normative constraint. Notable examples are, among others, the introduction of a National Security Council in 2013 and the nationwide campaigning for the revision of Article 9 aimed at allowing collective self-defence.

On the other hand, relational constructivists view state-identity as something which is intersubjectively created through the interaction of a 'self' and an 'other'. State identities are thus located on the liminal zone between sameness and difference. There, behavioural patterns are not defined by a fixed content, but are always subject to mutation according to ongoing political struggles. Differently from norm-constructivists, who can be criticised for their view of Japanese pacifism as an inherently domestic feature, relational constructivists disregard the possibility of a domestic domain without it being indissolubly linked to

an outside, international 'otherness'. However, not all relational constructivists agree on how to observe state-identity. Some argue that it tends towards resilience and reification, while others claim that it has more propensity for change.

This paper aims at contributing to Japanese IR literature by adopting a relational constructivist approach to state-identity construction, while also corroborating the theoretical stance which sees identity as resilient in international politics. It does so by conducting an analysis of Japan's South Korea foreign-policy discourse under the DPJ government, with special attention paid to how state-identity articulations in official discourse play out and evolve in light of controversial events and what kind of repercussions they have on bilateral ties. The DPJ defeated a long-dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) rule and promised to break with the 'traditional' patterns of Japanese politics, with the ambitious intent of establishing a flourishing Asia-Pacific community. Nonetheless, successful cooperation has been neutralised by the resurfacing of a narrative of superiority against the South Korean other.

The DPJ stint as party leader of Japan's cabinet has received limited attention from IR scholars. Neorealists have claimed that the DPJ failed to implement its policy lines due to domestic and international structural pressures, which condemned the administration to fall back into LDP-style policymaking (Hughes 2012). Regarding South Korea more specifically, policy analysts had readily noticed how military agreements won't come to fruition until historical issues are thoroughly addressed (Khan 2012). Still, the reasons why Japan's state-identity narratives under the DPJ turned antagonistic towards South Korea, a US ally and a prominent liberal democracy in East Asia, remain largely under-researched. Since after the American occupation, Japanese politics has been dominated by the LDP, which often irked neighbouring states over wartime issues.[1] The only precedent of a non-LDP led government in 1994-1996 had Japan publicly apologising for the atrocities committed during colonialism. Hence, a thorough analysis of Japan's state-identity under the 2009-2012 DPJ government can help us understand what kind of deep-seated issues nullify efforts at cooperation and diplomacy even under a purportedly more progressive government.

The paper will be structured as follows: first, a literature review on state-of-the-art IR research on Japanese state-identity will contextualise the theoretical and methodological approaches informing this study. Subsequently, an intro-

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[1]   A foremost example is represented by the visits of LDP leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. The Yasukuni Shrine is a privately run Shintō shrine located in central Tokyo commemorating Japanese war victims. The controversy is due to the fact that 14 Class A war criminals, i.e. those who actively contributed to the planning and the waging of the war, are also enshrined among other war dead.

duction to South Korea-Japan relations will outline a background for the main foreign policy discourse analysis, which will be structured around the three different premiership tenures of Hatoyama Yukio, Kan Naoto and Noda Yoshihiko. Empirical evidence will be gathered from official statements, cabinet session speeches, press releases and diplomatic materials of the Government of Japan. A conclusion will finally summarise the findings and highlight the resilience of state-level narratives of superiority, which precluded successful bilateral cooperation despite favourable auspices.

Japan, state-identity and IR

From the end of World War II up until the late 1980s, Tokyo was able to maintain relatively stable relations with most of its neighbours in East Asia. Territorial disputes were set aside after initial turmoil, as Japan pursued a normalisation of relations with South Korea and China (UN 1965; MOFA 1978). Thanks to the American Umbrella and the canons of the Yoshida Doctrine,[2] the Japanese economy managed to recover and flourish. The long period of stability granted by American protection and the country's isolationism allowed Japan and its economy to grow unrivalled. However, the domestic implosion of the asset bubble shook the country's very foundations, sparking a debate among IR scholars on what would have Japan's foreign policy choices been in the short to the midterm. Academia was essentially divided between two interpretations of Japanese state-identity: one describing a 'great power state' and the other hinting at a 'culturally anti-militaristic' country. Prominent realists claimed that the 'abnormal state' Japan would have eventually remilitarised as a great power by resorting to nuclear weapons (Layne 1993; Waltz 1992, 2000). Although, while some contended that to a great economic power should correspond an equivalent military capability (Waltz 2000: 64), others viewed that, historically, Japan's aims of achieving the status of great power were mainly driven by its strong vulnerability (Layne 1993: 28-31). In general, realists contended that no state identifying as a 'great power' could escape the framework of nuclear deterrence.

Neo-liberal and norm-constructivist scholars have offered alternative views to explain Japan's anomalous state-identity. Some believed that Japan, due to its binary characterisation as 'economic giant' and 'military dwarf', should have pursued a twofold foreign policy line: namely, a strong engagement for world peace and a path of military self-restraint (Funabashi 1991: 66). The Japanese leadership role had to be ancillary to the American hegemon, so that Japan could reassert a

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2   The tenet of the Yoshida Doctrine, named after the Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1878-1967), was to build up a strong US-Japan alliance for security purposes while spending as little as possible on defence.

new image of itself in the world as a 'global civilian power' (Funabashi 1991: 65). Others stressed instead the 'reactive' and 'defensive' aspects of Japan's security identity (Calder 2003; Pharr 1993). Meanwhile, norm-constructivists purported that common cultural norms and 'domestic' identities had a major part in influencing a state's anti-militaristic stance. For some, Japanese policy was shaped by a mutually constitutive structure of domestic determinants and shared norms (Katzenstein & Okawara 1993: 85). Different scholars argued instead that the disaster of the war and the American usurpation fostered a sense of opposition to militarisation, an opinion which was shared both by the elites and the population at large (Berger 1993: 120). Most recently, it has been claimed that Japan's pacifist identity was challenged by security reforms, but would have nonetheless preserved itself under the reassuring label of 'proactive pacifism' (Oros 2015: 157).

Both under neorealist/neo-liberal and norm-constructivist perspectives, Japanese identity has been considered as something either already determined by the structure of international anarchy, or as an inherent feature to one country's specific culture and set of norms. These views are underpinned by a conception of state-identity that is fixed and pre-given, and considers state behaviour as the dependent variable for policy analysis. In recent times, these epistemological positions, particularly within Japanese IR scholarship, have been challenged by the surge of relational constructivism (Gustafsson, Hagström & Hanssen 2018; Hagström 2015; Hagström & Gustafsson 2015; Hagström & Hanssen 2016). The stress on the relational aspect of inter-state interaction allows us to grasp intersubjective identity formation processes. That is, state-identity is a variable that shifts in accordance with political struggles and is formed at the liminal zone where sameness and difference are determined among political actors. This novel approach has produced a largely heterogeneous body of literature and theoretical perspectives, where scholars of ontological security theory (Bukh 2015; Gustafsson 2015, 2019; Kumagai 2015; Zarakol 2010), historical memory studies (Gustafsson 2014; Kim 2014) and those studying state-level identity narratives (Guillaume 2011; Tamaki 2010), all demonstrated how processes of identity construction are ultimately the result of the struggle against a differential 'otherness'.

How to analyse Japanese state-identity: a theoretical and methodological approach

The thrust of constructivist IR and its focus on ideas and norms has widely promoted the interest in the identity of states and other political actors. Identity as such is a rather slippery concept and often makes it difficult to determine clearly what it refers to. Relational constructivist analyses of state-identity are focused on the processes that bring into existence a nation's collective imagination or

ideological foundation, which is ultimately subject to transformation over space and time (Hagström & Hanssen 2016: 271). In turn, specific identities either enable or constrain political choices and actions.

This research article adopts the theoretical stance according to which identity construction relies on processes of differentiation. By differentiation it is meant the demarcation of one's self-identity from that of the other, following the principle by which something can be known only by what it is not (Rumelili 2004: 29), recalling the classical thesis '*omnis determinatio est negatio*'. This dualism of self versus other implies a binary logic of equivalence and difference (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 128-130), namely one according to which states tend to be friendly towards political actors endorsing ideologies akin to their own, and exclude others which are not (Hagström 2015: 124-126). Obviously, instances of pure equivalence and pure difference are mere abstractions, and state identities are oscillating on a continuum between polar opposites. The more two different identities oscillate towards equivalence, the more positive will be the identification of the self versus the other. In international politics, positive definitions like 'rational' and 'democratic' are usually in line with what is regarded as superior in the hierarchical frame of world politics; conversely, representations of 'emotional' or 'non-transparent' others are examples of negative differentiation (Hansen 2008: 16-20), as is non-compliance with shared norms in the international community.

In order to make sense of how states articulate their identity vis-à-vis each other, it is crucial to identify the wide frame of discourse through which identity comes into force. To solve the issue of pinpointing a nationwide discursive space we ought to be looking for the structure of such a discourse (Wæver 2002). That is, by observing how leaders and prominent spokespeople, sometimes defined as identity entrepreneurs (Hagström & Gustafsson 2015: 7-9), shape dominant discourses through political struggles (Lupovici 2016: 80-81). The methodological advantage of this strategy is that dominant positions within a political discourse can be efficiently recognised by following, among others, official statements and diplomatic documents, parliamentary debates, party programmes and media outlets. These textual sources eventually constitute a dominant 'biographical narrative' of political ideologies (Hansen 2008: 21), conveying along deeply embedded variables, such as culture and social hierarchy (Steele 2008: 5). The identity of a state emerges out of predominant narratives, and is subsequently set against other states at the international level, where lines of demarcation between an 'us' and a 'them' are drawn (Hansen 2008: 16).

This article adopts discourse analysis as a tool to dissect the Democratic Party of Japan's South Korea discourse during the 2009-2012 government. The DPJ assumed office pledging fundamental changes from the previous Liberal Demo-

cratic Party governments, not only at the domestic level, but especially in foreign policy, with South Korea being heralded as the core of Japan's Asia policy (Hatoyama 2009b). Prime minister speeches, Cabinet press releases and various governmental sources will be adopted as main evidence, according to the principle that decision makers and political elites are powerful agents who contribute to establishing the dominant identity discourse of the polity they represent. The rationale behind the choice of texts is that they are widely attended sources and contribute to the creation of an official, state-level discourse (Hansen 2008: 65-82). The analysis will pay special attention to the ways in which the DJP cabinet, the self-component, differentiated the Korean other, highlighting how the foreign policy discourse is re-articulated in order to reassert security and keep at bay state-identity anxiety.

Japan's state-identity and South Korea discourse

Japan's state-identity has been one of an actor striving to occupying an 'honoured place in the international society' (Cabinet Office 1947) since the end of World War II. The impact of defeat and the acceptance of universal principles built the grounds for new, pacifist narratives, such as the ones of *heiwa kokka* (peace state) and *shōnin kokka* (merchant state) (Tamaki 2010: 7-8). Since the unprecedented set of apologies towards former colonial states enshrined in the 1995 Murayama Statement, Japan has embraced the so-called *mirai shikō gaikō* (future-oriented foreign policy), a diplomatic attitude aimed at maintaining friendly relations with neighbouring states, especially those sharing a negative past with Japan. However, recent efforts towards military normalisation and constitutional revision (Hagström & Hanssen 2016: 268), as well as controversies pertaining to wartime issues, have stirred significant controversy both at the regional and global level (Zarakol 2010: 18).

This duality of Japanese state-identity can be better understood if we frame in hierarchical terms Japan's relations with the outside world. In order to do this, we ought to consider the importance of *kokutai* in shaping modern Japanese identity (Kitagawa 1974; Tamaki 2010). Traditionally, the term *kokutai* referred to the ethnocentric, foundational myth of Japan, and could be translated literally as 'body of the nation', with the Emperor as a central figure towards whom Japanese people are eternally devoted. The Western-style, modern Japanese state has evolved out of the *kokutai* theocratic model, thus unifying the social and legal patterns of occidental polities and the uniqueness of being 'Japanese'. This allowed Japan to compete with Western powers, and at the same time fostered a sense of superiority towards Asian backwardness and 'weakness', which eventually gave rise to colonialism (Notehelfer 2005). Contemporary scholars tend to

agree that *kokutai* was a 'key narrative matrix' in the construction of Japanese identity (Guillaume 2011: 63-99), and that it embodies a resilient identity pattern shaping the way Japan relates to its various others (Tamaki 2010: 62).

To give a thorough account of Japan's South Korea discourse is beyond the scope of this research. Nonetheless, a contextualisation of such discourse is necessary to follow the subsequent discussion of DPJ's South Korea foreign policy. Japan and the ROK normalised bilateral relations in 1965, with Tokyo providing compensation money for wartime victims such as Comfort Women and forced labourers (Ishikida 2005: 21). The treaty also established that upon Japan's reparations South Korea would have waived any right to ask for further reparations in the future. Even if relations had been relatively stable for several decades, lingering issues were *de facto* merely shelved, as the Comfort Women controversy resurged in the early 1990s (Jonsson 2015), while the Takeshima territorial dispute re-emerged in the mid-2000s (Emmers 2012). In the meantime, South Korea's growing economy drew Seoul closer to powerful Western liberal democracies, and at the same time closer to Japan's state-identity. The economic growth, coupled by nationalist claims over wartime issues, engendered ambiguous narratives in Japan's South Korea discourse. Tokyo often praised Seoul for endorsing 'the values of democracy, freedom and market economy', and by such principles also contributing to 'world peace' (Kan 2010d). However, remnants of a 'negative past', still heartfelt by the majority of Koreans according to recent surveys (Genron NPO 2018), happen to reify backwardness in Japan-ROK relations as 'a predominant mode of representing Korean otherness against which the Japanese self needs to reassert its legitimacy' (Tamaki 2010: 111). In other words, in the eyes of the ROK, Japan is trying to forget about the past and eschew responsibility, whereas Japan claims of having dealt sufficiently with history and sees South Korea's criticism as irrational and disqualifying.

Hatoyama Yukio: substantive regionalism and *'yū-ai'* politics

The establishment of the new governmental coalition, formed by the DPJ, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the People's New Party (PNP), marked the first step towards a transformation of Japanese politics since the 1955 System. The two pillars upon which the new government was founded were 'true popular sovereignty' and 'substantive regionalism' (Hatoyama 2009a). If the first tenet would have been observed by breaking the links with the long-established pork barrel politics,[3] the second one was to be implemented by taking a foremost role

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3   By pork barrel politics, especially in the case of Japan, I refer to what has been described as the interplay between politicians, bureaucracy and interest groups,

in the shaping of an Asia-Pacific community. An increased degree of interdependence among Asian nations would have guaranteed a stronger, peace-friendly environment within which to tackle delicate issues, such as nuclear disarmament and the economic crisis. As Hatoyama put it:

> From the present, Japan will contribute to the well-being of the international community through not only activities in the economic field but also those in the areas of the environment, peace, culture, science and technology, creating a country that is trusted by the international community. We must build a country and a society whose people can once again hold great pride in being Japanese (Hatoyama 2009a).

Against such a backdrop, representations of the South Korean other were exceptionally favourable. Tokyo recognised Seoul as a prominent member of the international community, one with whom to create a 'sea of fraternity' in order to establish peace and prosperity along maritime routes (Hatoyama 2009d). The line of Hatoyama's foreign policy revolved around the concept of *yū-ai* (literally 'friendship', also note the assonance with the English 'You-I'), and the Prime Minister pledged to pursue bilateral relations with a future-oriented approach and to have the courage to look at history squarely (Hatoyama 2009b). The *yū-ai* ideology juxtaposed two positive differentiations of the Japanese self versus the Korean other: on the one hand, both Japan and Korea are considered strong regional actors proud of their cultural roots and identity; on the other, the international community acknowledges their efforts in keeping peace and prosperity and welcomes them as states with a 'global perspective' (Hatoyama 2009b). Moreover, Hatoyama intended to resume the promotion of economic partnerships and trade agreements with South Korea, in order to ease Japan's investment environment for foreigners (Hatoayma 2010).

The instability of North Korea was also a factor in the strengthening of Tokyo-Seoul relations (see Hagström & Söderberg 2006). At the regional level, pacifism and economic development were key points in the six-party talks,[4] where both Japan and the ROK cooperated in a trilateral axis with

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working closely together to achieve mutual interests and secure political control. A landmark case is *amakudari* (literally, 'descent from heaven'), a practice through which retired senior bureaucrats are employed in public or private corporations and organisations, often in the same field of their ministerial occupation. The practice has been characterised by high degrees of corruption and regulatory laxity in managing industry and markets.

4   The six-party talks is a series of multilateral meetings aimed at finding a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme. States participating to the talks are North Korea, the ROK, Japan, China, the US and Russia. Official

China in keeping at check fluctuations in North Korea's nuclear programme and military non-transparency. It is of interest to note that, during a Japan-ROK-China trilateral summit, then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao characterised China's efforts for North Korea's development and denuclearisation as in line with the 'UN's thinking' (Hatoyama 2009c). Mentioning directly 'consistency' with the 'UN's thinking' is not casual, as Japan and Korea, unlike China, had already established their identities as states committed to liberal, western-friendly values.

Hatoyama eventually stepped down from his office due to low consensus, mainly driven by political scandals and the failure in managing successfully the relocation of the Futenma air base.[5] Throughout his premiership South Korea was regarded as 'intimate as well as nearby' (Hatoyama 2009b), and no international accidents of relevance occurred between Tokyo and Seoul. The *yū-ai* ideology worked in shelving recurring issues, such as the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, even if those were soon to be back in official discourse. In fact, the 2010 Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan, published a few months before Hatoyama's resignation, claimed that according to both history and international law the island belonged to Japan (MOFA 2010: 29). Still, apart from ordinary counter-claims from the ROK, there occurred no significant changes in foreign policy narratives on both sides.

Kan Naoto: dynamic defense and the importance of alliance

The change of prime minister did not entail much change in policy-making, at least in the initial phase of the new course. Kan Naoto, deputy prime minister of the Hatoyama Cabinet, built up his agenda by endorsing Hatoyama's reformist approach, with the resolution of pushing forward initiatives that had been previously left unfinished. Kan's administration stressed once again the importance for Japan to make clear what kind of country it aspired to be (Kan 2010b). While retaining the focus on Japan being regarded as a country respected by the international community, Kan and his cabinet established a narrative that relied heavily on the role of defence capabilities and the strengthening of existing alliances

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meetings started in 2003 and stopped after North Korea announced a satellite launch, despite international pressure not to do so. At the actual state, further updates upon resumption of the talks are pending, as Kim Jong-un recently agreed to reopen discussions.

5   I refer here to the funding scandal that involved the then party secretary general (ex-LDP) Ozawa Ichiro, whose image was still connected to the interest-based politics that was the status quo of the old LDP establishment. The mishandling of the Futenma base relocation brought about the dismissal of Minister for Consumer Affairs Fukushima Mizuho, who was the head of the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDP). In turn, her sacking caused the retreat of the SDP from the ruling coalition.

(MOD 2010: 149-165). Most importantly, the new National Defense Program Guidelines were approved by the government in December 2010. The key point of the security reform was the streamlining of the Self-Defense Forces for a more dynamic and qualitative approach to security issues, favouring reflexive deterrence over offensive deterrence (MOD 2010: 155). This defensive thrust was likely prompted by a series of international incidents that increased the perception of instability in North-East Asia, i.e. a missile test from North Korea (Choe 2009) and a boat collision near the Senkaku/Diaoyu contested islets (McCurry 2010).

The new PM differentiated clearly the diplomatic identification of Japan's two main interlocutors in East Asia, i.e. China and South Korea. He referred to the first country as one with whom to 'deepen our mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests', whereas with the ROK Japan had to 'forge a future-oriented partnership' (Kan 2010a). Clearly, the phrasing 'common strategic interests' implies a sort of detached view of the partner, meaning that the way China was integrated in the Japanese foreign policy discourse was in terms of how it could 'instrumentally' contribute to a shared 'strategic' aim, with not much space conceded to how to construct a relationship between potentially 'equal' entities. On the other hand, the ROK is seen as a partner with whom to deepen trust for the sake of a common future. South Korea narratives indeed maintained the imprint of Hatoyama's *yū-ai* foreign policy, and bilateral ties were depicted as unprecedented in their strength:

> Japan and the Republic of Korea have become the most important and closest neighbouring nations now in this twenty-first century, sharing such values as democracy, freedom and market economy. Our relationship is not confined to our bilateral relations, but rather it is a partnership where we cooperate and exercise leadership for the peace and prosperity of the region and the world by encompassing a broad spectrum of agenda: the peace and stability of this region envisioning, among others, the future establishment of an East Asia community, the growth and development of the world's economy, as well as issues of global scale such as nuclear disarmament, climate change, poverty and peace-building (Kan 2010d).

The ROK was fully integrated into Japan's 'international community' narrative, as well as being admired as a leading regional partner (Kan 2011). Efforts in recognising past mistakes, and even in helping restore Korea's cultural heritage, were effectively undertaken. Kan extended 'heartfelt apologies' and reiterated a sense of 'deep remorse' for Japan's colonisation of Korea, going as far as mention-

ing the strength of the *Sam-il*[6] resistance movement during Japan's colonial rule (Kan 2010d). He also promised to transfer back from Japan precious archives of the *Joseon* era seized during the occupation, and to return remains of ethnic Koreans buried in Japan. One cannot underestimate the impact of these latter pledges: they do not represent a mere commitment to atonement (as monetary compensation would have been), but contribute to reinstating South Korea's cultural wholeness and human dignity.

However, Kan's Cabinet reinstated the same controversial positions on the Dokdo/Takeshima territorial dispute, contained both in the Defense White Paper (MOD 2011: 3) and the Diplomatic Bluebook released in 2011 (MOFA 2011a: 32). In addition, Japan's territorial claims were also repeated in history textbooks officially approved by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (Borowiec 2011). Kan and his administration eventually managed to navigate the preludes to a diplomatic crisis. Direct confrontation of issues was usually eschewed in public press releases (Kan 2010c), and at the same time the occurrence of the catastrophic Tōhoku earthquake shifted the attention of political actors towards urgent humanitarian aid and the dispatch of rescue personnel. Nonetheless, the increased regional instability and the flare-ups of lingering issues paved the way to a more severe bilateral deadlock in the following government.

Noda Yoshihiko: economic diplomacy and South Korea crisis

Kan officially resigned as prime minister on 30 August 2011. His approval ratings plunged as criticism hit the slow progress in reconstruction and the confused management of the nuclear crisis that followed the earthquake (The Associated Press 2011). The ensuing head of the Cabinet, Noda Yoshihiko, had served as minister of finance in the previous administration, and his new foreign policy was heavily imprinted on economic diplomacy:

> To date I have engaged in my own way in economic diplomacy in matters such as currency and international finance, and in the future it is my intention to also engage actively in multi-faceted economic diplomacy, including even greater levels of economic cooperation and also diplomacy relating to natural resources, among other issues. In particular, I believe that it is essential for Japan to draw on the inherent vitality in

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6   Commonly referred to as the March First Movement, the *Sam-il* movement sought independence from Japanese colonial rule and refused the assimilation of the Japanese way of life for Koreans. The name comes from a protest occurred on 1 March 1919, where 33 activists assembled together in a Seoul restaurant and read aloud the Korean Declaration of Independence.

the Asia-Pacific region. From this perspective too, I will engage in active efforts to promote economic diplomacy (Noda 2011a).

The cornerstone of Noda's new foreign policy line was to enter negotiations for a Trans Pacific Partnership, an initiative which was previously opposed by Hatoyama but embraced enthusiastically by Kan. Moreover, the government opened negotiations for a trilateral Economic Partnership Agreement with the ROK and China (MOFA 2011c). This latter agreement had the purpose of keeping in check currency fluctuations among the three countries (Noda 2011b), in order to be shielded from financial turmoil in the eurozone.

With Noda's economic diplomacy, South Korea narratives had an unprecedented shift after the establishment of Hatoyama's government. During Noda's Cabinet Japan recognised the ROK as an equal only when it successfully complied with dominant narratives in the international community: the condemnation of military non-transparency (MOFA 2012a), the peaceful use of nuclear energy (MOFA 2011b), the signing of multilateral agreements (MOFA 2012b). While the two former Cabinets integrated Seoul in their identity discourse as both a global actor and an intimate neighbour with unique cultural values, this latter identification was almost completely ignored throughout the new course of government. In other words, under the last DPJ premiership, Japanese official sources generally disregarded the recognition of South Korea's 'positive uniqueness', i.e. that national character rendering different states united across borders in their diversity. In turn, this posture enabled the resurfacing of these narratives of superiority that underlay Japan-South Korea relations already in the past.

A diplomatic deadlock was already looming large since the day of Kan's resignation. On 30 August 2011, the Korean Constitutional Court concluded that the ROK government acted unconstitutionally by failing to address the Comfort Women issue properly since the 1990s, prioritising the development of ROK-Japan relations instead of making efforts to solve the controversy. The flare-up of the issue also triggered the installation of a 'peace monument', a life-size statue of a young woman, in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul (Lee 2011). Noda's approach to the outbreak was all but diplomatic. He offered no apology to South Korea and requested the statue be removed (Jonsson 2015: 15): a demand which the ROK promptly rejected. An attempt at easing the impasse was made by Vice Foreign Minister Sasae Kenichirō, who proposed a three-point solution: a letter to the victims from the Prime Minister, a face-to-face apology from the Japanese ambassador to South Korea, and financial support. The ROK government did not accept the proposal as it was considered insufficient (Yoo & Kim 2015). Here it is clear how Japan was yet again attempting at buying its way out of past bur-

dens. The Sasae proposal had close resemblance to the one-time compensation of the normalisation treaty, which effectively only managed to shelve the problem for a few decades. The promised apologies give the impression of being a token to the international community itself. Indeed, it can be argued that among what changed from 1965 is the way humanitarian issues are perceived globally, hence not paying attention to them in foreign-policy discourse would risk undermining Japan's identity of global actor.

In addition to how strained Japan-ROK relations were becoming, the instability of the security environment in North-East Asia induced even more anxiety. The death of the Supreme Leader of North Korea Kim Jong-Il in December 2011 and the subsequent ascension to the chairman seat of his son Kim Jong-Un, urged Japan to be ready for extreme contingencies and to gather as much intelligence data as possible (Noda 2012a). Tokyo and Seoul were expected to sign two crucial military agreements, the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). The first would have facilitated the sharing of classified defence information on North Korea's nuclear programme, while the second agreement was more logistical in nature, dealing with matters of humanitarian assistance and post-disaster relief (Cossa 2012). Nonetheless, the ROK government decided to withdraw from the two agreements on the day scheduled for the signing. Such a move did not come as unexpected though. South Korea's PM Cabinet hastily approved the agreement provisions without first briefing the Korean National Assembly, whose ratification is necessary for matters concerning national security. Some scholars argue that the burden of a negative past had a significant impact in this failure (Taylor 2012). It has in fact been proven how common security agendas can be torn apart by problems pertaining to historical memory (Koga 2016). Memory is not merely a dead matter belonging to a distant past, but is a collectively institutionalised cultural asset (Gustafsson 2011). The institutionalisation of memory allows for the creation of group narratives that can ultimately provide ontological security to an entire society (Gustafsson 2014: 73-74). In turn, these narratives easily conflate with nationalist and identitarian discourse, both for victims and aggressors alike. It is then clear that Japan's reticence to acknowledge responsibility for the past still offers the image of an unrepentant aggressor in the eyes of former colonies.

The Japan-ROK diplomatic crisis exploded in full force during the summer of 2012. ROK president Lee Myung-Bak explicitly challenged Japan's sovereignty claims over Dokdo/Takeshima by making an official visit to the contested island (McCurry 2012). The gesture had been defined as an act of ‚unilateral occupation' and contradictory to ‚law and justice of the international community'

(Noda 2012b). Upon the ROK government's refusal to settle the case in front of the International Court of Justice, Foreign Affairs Minister Gemba Koichirō further expressed disappointment and advocated for 'Global Korea' to be consistent with international law (Gemba 2012). This streak of statements openly betrays Japan's self-perceived superiority vis-à-vis South Korea. While Tokyo reinstated its identity as a ‚law-abiding' member of the international community, Seoul was essentially regarded as prey to an emotional fit of nationalism, thus challenged over its role as ‚important member state' of the UN. Reading between the lines and throwing a glance at past relations, we can identify a shift in emphasis along the superiority narrative. For some decades after the end of the war, ‚backward' South Korea was no threat to Japan's security identity: Tokyo had already learned its lesson from the defeat, and aimed at consolidating its role as a pacifist nation by economically cooperating with an open, yet underdeveloped, Seoul. In 2012, South Korea's economic development was comparable to Japan, and the only way for Japan to reassert its identity was to resort to a superiority of moral disposition and (inter)national character, i.e. one of a ‚rational' and ‚mature' state.

Conclusion

The article has shown how the DPJ's South Korea discourse deteriorated down to a fully-fledged diplomatic crisis along the three different premierships. During the first two administrations, official narratives proposed a positive differentiation of the South Korean other, which has been in turn defined as 'intimate as well as nearby', a 'leader for peace and stability' in East Asia, and also a global promoter of 'democracy and market economy'. However, flare-ups of deep-seated issues related to the wartime past made resurface a lingering narrative of superiority. The ROK's 'unilateral interpretation' of the past was branded as an emotional fit of nationalism, and its irrationality was not befitting the figure of a respected and law-abiding member of the international community. While both Hatoyama and Kan recognised the 'positive uniqueness' of South Korea taken singularly, i.e. not bound to a series of equivalences with international community narratives, Noda's Cabinet ended up ignoring this aspect and treated Seoul as a cold and merely economic partner. This lack of recognition, paired with an increased perception of security anxiety in North-East Asia, steered Japan's official foreign policy discourse towards entrenched identity positions. The impact of this resilient pattern in Japanese state-identity cannot be underestimated enough, since it even contributed to the failure of important intelligence and logistics agreements such as the GSOMIA and the ACSA.

The tenets of the Murayama Statement eventually did not resonate with the ideology of the 2009-2012 DPJ government. This research demonstrated how, at

its most sedimented layer, Japanese state-identity was still orientated at maintaining the integrity of Japan's own image to the detriment of the South Korean other. The ubiquitous slogan of 'future-oriented ties' has proved its exact opposite: Japan's foreign policy has effectively been *past-oriented*, as Tokyo struggled to be immune from any further responsibility. The evidence collected in this article demonstrates that, fundamentally, Japanese political elites across the whole electoral spectrum tend to reproduce the same patterns of identity construction, which corroborates the theoretical assumptions upheld in the introduction. Structural issues, both domestic and abroad, have surely put significant pressure on the DPJ cabinets, but not in all three of them increased tension was followed by diplomatic crisis. The unkept promise of looking at history squarely eventually backfired, bearing witness to the fact that to reach a practical solution of wartime issues is almost impossible. This is all the more evident if we consider that Japanese administrations have constantly tried to buy themselves out of colonial responsibilities, either by dispensing one-time atonement money or through apologetic tokenism.

However culpable the DPJ government, one must not forget the more or less complicit role of South Korean governmental elites in stirring trouble for political reasons. Further research should aim at analysing articulations of state identity narratives in the ROK, and assess to what extent they might be entangled with party interests in gathering domestic support and disqualifying international 'others'. An imaginable solution to this seemingly unending deadlock cannot come unilaterally, and both states should be held accountable for how much they are aggrandising the self to the detriment of their significant others.

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Military Defection During the Collapse of the Soviet Union

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Abstract

How did armed forces behave in response to dissent, political instability and territorial disintegration during the collapse of the Soviet Union? To date, substantial attention has been cast on the 1991 August coup attempt, yet our understanding of other potential instances of defection remains incomplete. This study undertakes a comparative analysis of defection throughout 15 Soviet republics. Results reveal that 13 republics experienced subordinates defecting and three experienced commanders defecting. In total, four different pathways led to defection. These findings produce the first comparative observations of defection in this historical time period and lend support to the claim that this phenomenon is equifinal in nature.

Introduction

Throughout the 74 years of its existence, the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) evolved into a superpower that comprised 15 different republics and a complex bureaucratic system with substantial state capacity. To enforce order over 22 million square kilometres, the USSR had a military with over 5 million members, a sophisticated nuclear arsenal and it spent upwards of 25% of its GDP on defence through a planned war mobilisation economy. Not only was

the USSR one of the more powerful empires in all of human history, but it was home to around 35 different national groups (Sakwa 1990: 233). By the end of 1991, collapse was imminent due to several processes, one of which was driven by national groups that demanded and successfully achieved territorial and governmental independence (Beissinger 2002; 2009). The breaking apart of this governance superstructure into more than a dozen separate states has since received significant interdisciplinary scholarly attention. To date, there have been hundreds of articles and dozens of books written on the topic of the Soviet collapse in multiple languages. However, our understanding of how military actors behaved in the face of territorial disintegration, mass rebellion and political power grabs remains underdeveloped.

While attention has been cast on military defection and its relation to regime transition and democratisation in the Arab Spring, we lack understanding of how armed forces behaved during one of the most significant periods of the twentieth century. This study puts forward the first analysis of military defection(s) that arose during the collapse of the USSR. Defection involves military actors that abrogate a basic commitment to defend their principal, fail to carry out orders or not report to duty (Brooks 2017; 2019). The phenomenon of defection represents an occurrence of insubordination on the part of senior or junior military members or security forces. Insubordination can take form as direct defiance of orders or through indirect defiance such as not doing or showing up for one's job to protect a political status quo (Anisin 2020). Military personnel are not unified actors, and can engage in different types of defections according to the actor as well as the institutional context under attention (Albrecht & Ohl 2016: 41). A considerable literature has been concerned with observable avenues that incumbent regimes go down in order to prevent the occurrence of defection in times of political stability (Lee 2005; McLauchlin 2010; Pilster & Böhmelt 2011; Pion-Berlin et al. 2012; Makara 2013; Nepstad 2013; Geddes et al. 2014; Bou Nassif 2015; Johnson 2017; Anisin & Ayan Musil 2021; Kalin, Lounsbery & Pearson 2022). Similarly, civil resistance scholars have emphasised that the strategies waged by civilians have much to do with the conditions under which defection occurs (Sharp 2005; Nepstad 2013; Sutton et al. 2014; Degaut 2017; Croissant et al. 2018; Anisin 2020).

The downfall of the Soviet regime and its disintegration into 15 national states presents us with a fascinating but complex context in which to examine defection and its determinants. To date, data on this particular historical context have been underdeveloped and troubled by missing values. Only a few instances of defection in the context of the Soviet collapse have been observed in both comparative and quantitative literature on defection and in specific his-

torical research on this time period. This study fills these gaps. First, it identifies the extent to which defections arose during the Soviet collapse according to republic and actor type. Second, it adds to scholarship on the nature of defection through identifying the different pathways that can bring about this outcome. The results of this study reveal that defections were brought about by multiple pathways and mechanisms. Pathway one features civil resistance and repression in which officers, soldiers and conscripts defected either before being ordered to repress civilians or after repressive acts were carried out. The second identified pathway features the waging of a coup-attempt by commanders, whereas pathway three features defection by conscripts which took place in the late 1980s as a result of severe forms of hazing and ethnic antagonisms. The fourth pathway features defections that arose from territorial disintegration alongside national independence movements in which military members rejected serving prior principals.

The order of this study is as follows: an overview of the historical time period under attention is provided followed by a section that identifies the gaps in knowledge that currently exist on defection during the Soviet collapse. A research design section then lays out this study's comparative approach and describes underlying theoretical assumptions as well as variables that surround the phenomenon of defection. This is complemented by a description of Soviet civil-military relations including an explanation of the complexity of ethnic dynamics that underpinned the Soviet Armed Forces. Afterwards, a comparative investigation is carried out. Four total pathways are identified to have brought about defection during the Soviet collapse. The pathways are complemented by an assessment of specific republics. Concluding segments of this study relate these findings to scholarship on this time period of history, on the nature of the phenomenon of defection, and propose directions for future social inquiry.

Investigating defection during the fall of the Soviet Union

The ending years of the USSR represent a difficult empirical realm in which to engage in comparative inquiry due to its territorial vastness, the diversity of the people that lived within the 15 republics and due to the significant degree of contingency that marked this period of political history. There is no single criterion that can accommodate all characteristics of the fall of the USSR (Karklins 1994, p. 29). While there are many different interesting and arguably unique components of the Soviet system, its economy warrants preliminary consideration. The USSR had a war-economy that dated to the 1920s. Its armament industry was not only confined to conflict endeavours but it covered nearly all socio-economic conditions and industries. The war-economy was the entire material

and technical basis of the Soviet labour pool. It directed the state's allocation and dealing of fiscal resources and encompassed sectors such as transportation, communication industries, public health, education, science and even culture (Checinski 1989, p. 207). By the 1980s, economic stagnation was a leading problem and a reformist debate was emerging in the Soviet Armed Forces. Some believed that the fundamental components of the Soviet economic system had to be altered. As Kass and Boli (1990) point out, 'the High Command supported Gorbachev's restructuring agenda precisely because it responded to the military's long-standing concerns. Perestroika promised to deliver what the military needed: a modern economy, capable of producing the requisite quantity and quality of high-tech weaponry, and a healthy society, able to produce educated, fit, and motivated citizens to man the new weapons' (Kass & Boli 1990: 390).

In conjunction with failure in the Afghan conflict, exceedingly poor conditions for soldiers and conscripts, and a general lack of morale, there was significant political pressure being aimed at the armed forces. Ideas on establishing a volunteer-only professional army were gaining prominence as was the notion that each republic should have its own national army. Another salient proposal was for military units to be newly established based on national minorities (Arnett & Fitzgerald 1990: 193). Those that advocated the latter idea of national formations did so due to concerns coming from various republics that wanted independence from the Soviet Union – such as Moldova, Armenia, Georgia and the Baltic states (Arnett & Fitzgerald 1990: 198). High ranking military leaders, however, starkly opposed reform (Raevsky 1993). Those who sought to reform the military emphasised that corruption, stagnation and patronage in the armed forces were contingent on the secrecy of the Soviet system itself which allowed and even permitted military commanders to exploit their subordinates (Vallance 1994). On top of these issues and accompanying debates, pressure from mobilised segments of society was significant as dissent was present in nearly all of the Soviet Republics by the end of 1989. From February 1988 through to August 1991, an average of one million people participated each month over ethno-nationalist issues in the republics (Beissinger 2010: 106). In December 1988 Gorbachev announced reduction of the armed forces by 500,000 men.

Literature on the Soviet collapse falls into two categories, with the first being national identity and the second institutional decay and change (Barnes 2014). Mobilisation during the collapse of the USSR was widespread. Mass mobilisation campaigns in numerous republics had significant effects on one another in a grander course of action based around national sovereignty (Beissinger 2002). The greatest degrees of mobilisation were observed in areas of republics that were socially and economically developed and those with concentrated urban

populations (Emizet & Hesli 1995). In contrast, Dallin (1992) points out that glasnost and the state-led project of democratisation were of great significance to stirring both discontent and opportunity in the republics. The formation of new unofficial organisations in 1988 was the moment in which the Soviet regime 'ceased to be totalitarian', argues Karklin (1994: 38). Some scholars, such as Brubaker (1994), contend that institutionally empowered elites of the national republics had the biggest roles in bringing the USSR into disintegration (Brubaker 1994: 60-61).

It is expected that significant focus has hitherto been placed on the coup attempt as this was a turning point in history, yet this has left a substantial gap in our knowledge when it comes to the other republics of the Soviet Union. How did military forces behave during the disintegration of the USSR? Apart from the coup attempt, were there any other defections? If so, what actors or groups defected, and how did they defect? Answers to these questions cannot be found in a diverse literature on the Soviet collapse. Similar issues are evident in popularly utilised data on civil resistance. The table below highlights these significant gaps in knowledge on defection during this time period. Data are drawn from the NAVCO 2.0 (Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes Data Project) which has been widely utilised by scholars and is among the only data sets that contain observations on both oppositional campaigns that challenged status quos during the Soviet collapse as well as the outcome of security force defection. Here, defection is defined as 'the regime loses support from the military and/or security forces through major defections or loyalty shifts' (Chenoweth & Lewis 2013).

As subsequent sections of this study will reveal, a number of the republics listed above that NAVCO 2.0 labels as having experienced no defections actually did experience defections. More significantly, 8 out of the 15 republics listed above are not included in the data at all. There was a significant amount of dissent that arose throughout most republics (Beissinger 2009), but the data do not capture these observations. From January 1988 to January 1989, three to eight million people dissented across the republics (Beissinger 2002). Second to this period, from June 1989 to July 1990 there were one to four and a half million dissidents per month on average (Beissinger 2002: 105). The data shown in Table 1 accurately highlight the lack of scholarly attention that has been given to the Soviet collapse in quantitative and comparative inquiry. This study adopts a comparative approach to investigate these processes across 15 Soviet republics during the union's collapse.

Table 1. Commonly used data on defection

Republic	Oppositional Movement	Strategy	Defection
1. Lithuania	Sajudis, Pro-dem movement (1989-91)	Nonviolent	None
2. Latvia	Pro-dem movement (1989-91)	Nonviolent	None
3. Georgia	Gamsakhurdia & Abkhazia (1988-93)	Violent	Yes, 1992
4. Estonia	Singing Revolution (1987-91)	Nonviolent	None
5. Ukraine	Not included in data	n/a	n/a
6. Belarus	Anti-communist movement (1988-91)	Nonviolent	None
7. Moldova	Not included in data	n/a	n/a
8. Azerbaijan	Not included in data	n/a	n/a
9. Uzbekistan	Not included in data	n/a	n/a
10. Kyrgyzstan	Pro-dem movement (1990-91)	Nonviolent	None
11. Tajikistan	Not included in data	n/a	n/a
12. Armenia	Not included in data	n/a	n/a
13. Turkmenistan	Not included in data	n/a	n/a
14. Kazakhstan	Not included in data	n/a	n/a
15. Russia	Pro-dem movement (1990-91)	Nonviolent	Yes, 1991

Source: Data drawn from NAVCO 2.0 (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013)

Research design

In the contexts under attention, defection either did occur or did not occur across all Soviet republics which indicates variance in the dependent variable. There were also different actors who either did or did not defect. Likewise, there is variation between different republics, the degrees of mobilisation they experienced as well as the interactions that took place between armed forces and opposition. On the other hand, there is no variance in the types of governmental systems that formulated the 15 republics under attention – all were communist systems and were integrated into the USSR's planned war mobilisation economy. The dependent variable is classified based on a two-fold definition of defection (which will enable the results of this study to be integrated into commonly used data on this topic). First, defection is defined in the NAVCO 2.0 data: 'the regime loses support from the military and/or security forces through major defections or loyalty shifts' (Chenoweth & Lewis 2013: 8). Second, Albrecht and Ohl's (2016) categorisation of military actor types is drawn on. A given incumbent principal's orders will either be met by commander resistance (failure to carry out the

order) or commander loyalty (agreement). Contingent upon one of these two choices, subordinates (lower ranking military agents) will then either: 1) exit – defect, or: 2) resist their orders – defect; or 3) remain loyal – carry out the order.

Considering that the Soviet context featured different republics and ethnicities, and that a heterogeneous collection of events occurred during its downfall, this analysis is not limited to only contextual circumstances featuring resistance and repression. Defection is observed on a case-by-case basis across different situations. Our comparative approach enables this study to account for equifinality which is a critical feature of multiple case study methodology (Goertz 2017: 52). Equifinality means a given outcome or phenomenon of interest has emerged across different cases through a different set of independent variables and pathways (George and Bennett 2005: 157). These are important dynamics to consider for our understanding of causation because equifinality entails there may exist not only multiple causal mechanisms that contribute to the occurrence of a given outcome, but there may also exist multiple pathways that bring it about (Geortz 2017: 53). For example, subordinates (including conscripts), can defect from their principal(s) due to different mechanisms which ultimately bring about an identical outcome of defection. Along similar lines, in the context of protest and mass mobilisation, the reason behind why civil resistance is not the only condition or 'master variable' that is responsible for aggregate increases in defection is because of equifinality – different patterns can lead to similar outcomes. As subsequent sections will reveal, defections occurred during the Soviet collapse throughout contexts in which mobilisation was not the determinative factor.

We now turn to the qualitative characteristics that formulated civil-military relations and security institutions throughout the USSR. Once these characteristics are described and categorised, we then will shift to the ethnic relations within the armed forces in the USSR followed by factors that have been found to be causally related to the outcome of defection in scholarship.

Characteristics and the extent of defections throughout Soviet Republics

Soviet civil-military relations

The Soviet Army was under control of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the most powerful political position. The General Staff of the Soviet Army was the main defence and planning organ of the Ministry of Defense (Betz 2004: 22). The Soviet Army included Ground Forces, Air Forces, Air Defence Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces and the Navy. On the other hand, security agencies such as the Committee for State Security (KGB)

and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) also had significant power in internal security as well as in safeguarding the Kremlin (Taylor 2003: 199). The KGB possessed around 250,000 members, whereas the MVD had around 350,000 internal troops (Odom 1998: 33). Patronage systems within the Soviet military were used for promotion and position assignment preferences (Raevsky 1993: 536; Vallance 1994: 704). The hierarchies of the Communist Party (CP) entailed that different functions and relationships existed between not only party and military, but also between military and society. This makes it difficult to observe these relationships as a single unit of analysis (Hough 1969). Nevertheless, certain periods Soviet history did possess particular consistencies between armed forces and civilian leadership. Some historians argue that throughout the duration of the USSR's existence, there were significant organisational 'structure barriers' that stood in the way of military intervention in civil affairs (Taylor 2003: 201).

The Soviet Armed Forces were based on a unitary configuration that was divided territorially into military districts; while the military structure was comprised of professional military (officer corps) and enlisted personnel (conscripts). The ethnic composition of units did not depend upon their location due to an exterritorial recruiting concept. Officer schools were entered by educated male youth from all the republics after passing a security filter of a KGB check. On the other hand, the security force structure was also the same for all the republics — featuring both the police force (MVD) and secret political police (KGB). In the field, officers of the MVD and KGB were recruited from local ethnic groups, while senior leadership was appointed after approval from Moscow headquarters. Apart from the 1991 coup attempt, the armed forces were apolitical throughout the post-Stalinist era. For example, Gorbachev's climb to the top leadership position in the CP was made possible by the inner circle of the CP, and the armed forces played 'absolutely no role' in his egress (Taylor 2003: 197).

Conscription and ethnic makeup
During the historical formation of the Soviet Union, in the 1920s, 15 republics were founded through nation-building processes in which a Soviet 'people' (narod) were constructed (Isaacs & Polese 2015). There were many ethnic groups and nationalities who served for the USSR, and from the outset of the establishment of the republics, linguistic and cultural autonomy were granted to populations (Terry 1998). For example, at the height of WWII, infantry units in the armed forces were comprised of Russians (62.95%), Ukrainians (14.52%), Belarussians (1.9%), Uzbeks (2.88%), Tartars (2.38%), Kazakhs (2.4%), Jews (1.42%), Azerbaijanis (1.55%), Georgians (1.5%), Armenians (1.51%), Mordvinians (0.79%), Chuvash (0.75%), Tadzhiks (0.48%), Kirghiz (0.57%), Bashkirs (0.5%), Peoples of Dag-

estan (0.18%), Turkmen (0.47%), Udmurts (0.26%), Chechen-Ingush (0.004%), Mari (0.26%), Komi (0.16), Osetins (0.16), Karelians (0.09%), Kabardino-Balkars (0.06), Kalmyks (0.08%), Moldovans (0.04%) and Baltic peoples [Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian] (0.5%) (Blauvelt 2003: 54). By the late 1980s, Slavic troops still made up a substantial majority of all armed forces members. In detail, in 1990, 69.2% of all military members were ethnic Slavic (Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian), 1.9% were Baltic people, 20.6% were Muslim-Turkic people and 8.3% were all other types of people (Alexiev & Wimbush 1988).

Moscow strategically created institutions for each national territory that were led by their own ethnic elites who were aligned with communist policy preferences. Although Marxist theory and Leninist principles entail that ethnicity and nationalism are bourgeois conditions that present obstacles to revolutionary consciousness, the large number of national minorities were somewhat of a nuisance for Soviet Bolshevik leadership (Blauvelt 2003: 47). Ethnic dynamics did not end up interfering with the greater ideological purpose of articulating an idea and identity of a Soviet proletariat and they did not weaken the USSR during the Nazi invasion of its territory in WWII. They did, however, play a major role during the Soviet collapse. All men were mandatory conscripts to the Soviet Army from the age of 18. Once in the military, conscripts would be purposely disconnected from their homes and civilian social groups – hence they would serve in varying areas throughout the USSR (Lehrke 2013). The Soviet Army reflected the immense diverse ethnic composition of the country, but it also reflected stereotypes and contained intentional policies of discrimination (Daugherty 1994: 172). Conscription was not a straightforward and equal process for all civilians in the Soviet Union. Any Central Asian, Transcaucasian, Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian or Jewish man would face discrimination in the process of assignment via ethnic, educational and physical profiling (Daugherty 1994: 178).

Ethnic minorities did not get assigned to positions that required the managing of sophisticated equipment, as they were largely in the construction, repairing and building segments of the military (Daugherty 1994: 179). Soviet leadership also took the historical reliability of troops from Central Asia and Transcaucasia into consideration when forming its promotion and recruitment policies. Lack of reliability of troops from these regions was prevalent in Tsarist times and throughout the existence of the Soviet Union. For example, an ethnic-Georgian unit was dispatched to respond to protesters in Tbilisi in 1956, but the troops did not open fire on their native countrymen, even under orders to do so from higher ranking officers (ethnic Russians) (Daugherty 1994: 167). As such, it is plausible to make the general claim that ethnic differences in the Soviet Army were significant. Around 90 percent of the officer corps was Slavic

(Taylor 2003: 214). Of the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), ethnic Russians were a minority population in Lithuania even though they comprised the same percentage of citizens in Lithuania as did ethnic Polish (8 percent), yet their numbers in the armed forces were greater than of citizens from those respective republics. The same characteristics were present in other neighbouring republics such as in Moldova (Scott & Scott 1979). This enabled higher ranked military actors to have significant agreement with one another throughout established hierarchies. Such practices paved the way for later adversities including rifts, inequality and cleavages between non-ethnic Russians and ethnic Russians throughout the lower ranks of the armed forces.

Characteristics surrounding defection

The following variables are drawn from literature on defection. These are factors that scholars in both civil-military relations and civil resistance literatures have identified as antecedent characteristics that surround the outcome of interest.

First, *regime fragility* differs from state fragility which has been utilised to measure how much capacity governments have across social, economic and political indicators or has been drawn on via the World Bank's low-income countries under stress categorisation (Simpson & Hawkins 2018: 2-23). The Soviet Union possessed significant governmental capacity that functioned largely through its war mobilisation economy, but towards the latter half of the 1980s, regime fragility arose while state capacity remained robust. Regime fragility has to do with both citizen and elite level perceptions of the status and stability of the incumbent government. A low level of regime fragility would be attributed to the USSR in the 1960s or 70s – both were decades in which political power was consolidated, perceptions of the standing of the incumbent regime were positive, political opposition was nearly absent and cultural and international standings of the regime were optimistic. A medium level of regime fragility was present throughout the Stalinist purges of the 1930s and the period of WWII in the 1940s. In contrast, the 1980s were marked by a high level of regime fragility. Perestroika and glasnost led to a newfound contingency in Soviet structure that had yet to be seen or even imagined in that point of historical time. There was also a significant economic downturn that fostered significant debate around the direction of the Soviet system and its sustainability. In conjunction, a failed military operation in Afghanistan contributed to decisions to reduce governmental spending including cutting down the whopping 25% GDP that was spent on defence. On top of all of these newly arisen forces, 1989 saw nearly all Warsaw Pact allied states experience successful pro-democracy revolutions including East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania.

Second, the variable of *mobilisation* captures degrees of collective action that were waged against status quos. High dissent entails an opposition movement that numbered in the millions. Low dissent entails small oppositional campaigns numbering in the thousands whereas a medium threshold entails collective action in the tens of thousands. For example, dissent in the Central Asian republics was substantially less than in Transcaucasia. In the Central Asian republics, there was a lack of popular nationalist movements, and hence, when the Soviet Union formally collapsed in 1991, the Central Asian republics were 'reluctantly' shifted into being independent states (Merry 2004). In some regions of the republics, such as in Eastern Ukraine and Northern Kazakhstan, ethnic-Russian coal miners were prominently active in protest. As noted by Beissinger (2002: 398), 'Outside of highly Russified regions such as Donbass, northern Kazakhstan, and Belorussia, nationalism trumped class as the most significant frame for mobilisation in the non-Russian republics.' In January of 1991, upwards of one million participants demonstrated throughout only Russia.

Third, the variable of *military-society ethnicity* captures the makeup of the armed forces in relation to the societies that its members stem to. Estimates indicate that in 1985, there were a total of 195 million Slavs in the Soviet Union (142 million Russians, 42 million Ukrainians, 9.5 million Belarussians); 5 million Baltic people; 53 million Muslim-Turkic people; and 23 million of all others (Armenians, Georgians, Jews, Moldovans) (Daugherty 1994: 181). Ethnic Russians made up more than a majority of the armed forces that were stationed across all 15 republics. As such, observable rifts existed between Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians with relation to ethnic Russians in the Soviet Army (Daugherty 1994: 172).

Fourth, the Soviet Armed Forces were *counterbalanced* to a significant extent. The greater purpose of the KGB was counter-intelligence and special intelligence pertaining to political dissent, whereas the MVD's purpose was to manage internal affairs. While some scholars have argued that both bodies simply could not counterbalance the armed forces due to their strategic positions and roles in the structure of the Soviet communist system (Knight 1990), such viewpoints are in the minority. Most scholars believe the KGB did monitor the political attitudes of military agents, specifically through its Third Chief Directorate. This was a counter-intelligence and political surveillance division of the KGB that oversaw the entire armed forces (Sever 2008). Several specific units such as the 27th motorised rifle brigade and the Internal Troops (Vnutrenniye Voyska) of the MVD served as counterweights to army intervention (Taylor 2003: 212).

Table 2. Pathways towards defection during the Soviet collapse

Republic	Pathway(s)	Defector(s)
1. Lithuania	Pathways, (1) Resistance / Repression; (3) Hazing / Draft Non-compliance; (4) Territorial Disintegration	Subordinates
2. Latvia	Pathways, (3) Hazing / Draft Non-compliance; (4) Territorial Disintegration	Subordinates
3. Georgia	Pathways, (1) Resistance / Repression; (3) Hazing / Draft Non-compliance; (4) Territorial Disintegration	Subordinates
4. Estonia	Pathways, (3) Hazing / Draft Non-compliance; (4) Territorial Disintegration	Commander; Subordinates
5. Ukraine	Pathways, (3) Hazing / Draft Non-compliance; (4) Territorial Disintegration	Commanders; Subordinates
6. Belarus	Pathways, (3) Hazing / Draft Non-compliance	Subordinates
7. Moldova	Pathways, (3) Hazing / Draft Non-compliance; (4) Territorial Disintegration	Subordinates
8. Azerbaijan	Pathways, (1) Resistance / Repression; (3) Hazing / Draft Non-compliance; (4) Territorial Disintegration	Subordinates
9. Uzbekistan	Pathways, (3) Hazing / Draft Non-compliance; (4) Territorial Disintegration	Subordinates
10. Kyrgyzstan	None	
11. Tajikistan	Pathways, (3) Hazing / Draft Non-compliance; (4) Territorial Disintegration	Subordinates
12. Armenia	Pathways, (3) Hazing / Draft Non-compliance; (4) Territorial Disintegration	Subordinates
13. Turkmenistan	Pathways, (3) Hazing / Draft Non-compliance; (4) Territorial Disintegration	Subordinates
14. Kazakhstan	None	
15. Russia	Pathways, (1) Resistance / Repression; (2) Coup; (3) Hazing / Draft Non-compliance; (4) Territorial Disintegration	Commanders; Subordinates

*Pathway 1 – Resistance and Repression; *Pathway 2 – Waging a Coup; *Pathway 3 – Hazing and Draft Non-compliance; *Pathway 4 – Territorial Disintegration
Source: Data drawn from author's work based on qualitative inquiry into each republic.

These four variables were either present or absent across the cases under attention – Lithuania, Latvia, Georgia, Estonia, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Russia had the following characteristics: all contexts experienced high levels of regime fragility during the Soviet collapse. In terms of mobilisation all countries had high rates apart from Belarus (low), Kyrgyzstan (low), Kazakhstan (low) and Moldova (medium). In terms of military-society ethnic relations in each country, all had a majority of Russian ethnic members serving in the armed forces. Likewise, all republics had high levels of counterbalancing through the presence of the KGB and MVD.

Below, results from empirical analysis of the 15 cases reveal that four different pathways resulted in defections during the period of the Soviet collapse. Table 2 includes the specific characteristics of defection that each republic experienced according to pathway and actor type. These results contain the first documentation of defections that either arose or did not arise across the Soviet republics. The subsequent section visualises the conceptual nature of these four pathways and is complemented by qualitative case specific analyses.

In light of the lack of knowledge that currently exists (see Table 1) on this topic as observed in quantitative research on conflict and protest outcomes, the results in Table 2 reveal that in the context of the collapse of the USSR, a significant number of empirical outcomes occurred but have yet to be identified and documented. Defections occurred first in 1989 by subordinates (officers and conscripts) and reoccurred until late 1991 in different temporal circumstances and pathways. In total, 13 out of 15 republics experienced subordinate defection – whereas 3 out of 15 experienced commander defections. Before delving into specific cases, it is important to list the republics that did not experience defections. No defections took place in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) were deployed in Kazakhstan – these included intercontinental ballistic missile systems (Odom 1998: 300). Kyrgyzstan, in contrast, hosted one of the more prestigious pilot training schools for the Air Force. As Odom notes, the SRF did not experience the same rapid deterioration as other branches of forces (Odom 1998: 303). Furthermore, events that arose in 1988 served as a catalyst for numerous instances of defection across 13 republics. An ethnic and territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh broke out into armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Upwards of 20,000 Soviet troops entered the Azerbaijani capital Baku in January 1990 – leading to a significant number of civilian casualties. Across nearly all 15 republics, actions of exiting and resisting orders were widespread.

Pathways to defection throughout the Soviet republics

Along with identifying instances of defection, visualising and conceptualising their spatial and temporal characteristics can help to make sense of the empirical phenomenon of defection – a phenomenon that is causally complex (non-linear) and equifinal (multifaceted) in its nature. The most common pathways observable across cases are pathways three and four – widespread draft resistance along with territorial disintegration were significant across nearly all republics. Figure 1 below (and Figure 2 on subsequent pages) help to visualise these four pathways.

Figure 1. Pathways one (resistance and repression) and two (coup)
Pathway one – Resistance and repression [officers, soldiers and conscripts defect either before being
ordered to repress civilians or after repressive acts are carried out]

Pathway Two – Waging a coup d'état [Commanders and in some cases, subordinates, defect in
attempt to overthrow the incumbent government]

*Pathway one – Resistance and repression [officers, soldiers and conscripts
defect either before being ordered to repress civilians or after repressive acts
are carried out]*

Tbilisi, Georgia: Dissidents in Georgia organised a mass resistance movement
in an attempt to rid their republic of communist governance and achieve full in-
dependence from Moscow (Zhirokhov 2012: 315). A massacre occurred on 9 April
1989 – MVD troops and military units dispersed a meeting which led to 19 fatali-
ties. The Tbilisi massacre was a highly significant turning point that negatively

impacted the morale of the Soviet Army, and also shifted public consciousness about communist governments (Hosking 1991). Taylor (2003) describes the fall-out from this massacre as being psychologically detrimental to the institutional basis and public standing of the armed forces. Blame was cast on the armed forces for the events in Tbilisi which led to the 'Tbilisi Syndrome' – an adverse psychological development that caused hesitation about military involvement in the internal context of the USSR (Taylor 2003: 223). Publicly, Gorbachev and the Kremlin refused to acknowledge their role in ordering the Soviet Army to use violence against demonstrations. This further exacerbated an already impeding problem that the military was facing – blame. Society increasingly blamed the army and extraordinary amounts of defence spending for the Soviet Union's economic hardships (Lehrke 2013: 90). Tbilisi fostered public outrage and escalated calls for radical democratisation (Karklin 1994: 36). From this point on, both ethnic soldiers and Slavic soldiers in the Soviet Army engaged in resistance to future orders, while others exited their positions altogether. Gorbachev's specific orders to attempt to settle unrest led to the refusal of minorities to serve in the Soviet Army (Reese 2002: 172).

After the events in Tbilisi, high ranking generals (commanders) defected from the CPSU and pursued their own political interests. Although joining political movements was technically not illegal under Soviet law, this still qualifies as a form of defection because the allegiance that given actors shifted, which falls under the definition of defection used in this study. Along these lines, over the course of less than one year, right-wing or hard-line generals created extra-party organisations such as 'Soyuz' which sought to stop the disintegration of the USSR. A General by the name of Volkogonov in contrast, joined a liberal political movement - 'For Democratic Reforms' (Barany 1993: 16).

Baku, Azerbaijan: Regular acts of repression and repeated states of emergency 'lost much of their dampening effects on dissent after mid-1989' (Beissinger 2002: 371). To make matters worse for Moscow, by summer of 1989, violent ethno-religious conflicts broke out in the southern USSR in Azerbaijan. Gorbachev's orders to send in the Soviet Army in the years of 1989-90 resulted in its eventual death and destruction (Sultanov 2004: 118). Specifically, in January 1990, the Soviet army, its Black Sea fleet and KGB special forces clashed with civilians which led to upwards of 100 civilian fatalities and around 20-30 soldier fatalities (Kushen 1991). The Soviet government notified the UN that it had called a state of emergency in Baku (as per guidelines of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), but it did not call a state of emergency in the cities of Lenkoran, Neftechala and among others in which Soviet soldiers killed civilians (Kushen 1991: 10). The fallout from these events was substantial. Defections

that occurred in 1989 were enacted not only by ethnic minorities in the Soviet Army, but also by ethnic Slavs that formed the greater majority of its personnel. In the latter scenario, defection and resistance of ethnic-Slavic members of the Soviet Army was heavily propelled by newly formed domestic NGO groups such as 'Mothers for Soldiers' who became highly active in the Baltic republics, Ukraine, regional Russian cities and in Uzbekistan. Such organisations gained prominence due to persistent domestic upheavals, the dangers associated with responding to those upheavals for soldiers and conflicts, as well as a newfound uncertainty surrounding the integrity of military service. Even Gorbachev appointed a Presidential commission to investigate noncombat deaths across military units (Solnick 1999: 205). What later became known as 'Black January', led to the secession of Azerbaijan from the USSR in the first ranks.

Vilnius, Lithuania: In 1991, the final nail went into the Politburo's coffin. Events in 1991 Vilnius exacerbated an already salient problem in the USSR. In March of 1990, the Lithuanian parliament had voted for a restoration of pre-WWII independence, which essentially was the first step in ridding the country of its long stemming communist institutions. The Soviet government continuously sent paratroopers into Vilnius for the duration of the year, and in the face of January of 1991, paratroopers killed 14 unarmed protesters and wounded 200 (Sharp 2005: 281). These events led to Lithuanians receiving solidarity from other republics who also sought to undermine the Soviet regime. More than 64 different demonstrations arose in response to the events at Vilnius in Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova (Beissinger 2002: 380). In an analysis of the Vilnius events, Russian historians asked in 1991, [translation from Russian] 'I am interested, in his view, does Gorbachev thinks he is now in control of the situation? Are the army, MVD and KGB still under his control? The latest events in the Baltics make me doubt this is so' (Moroz 2011: 441). Events in the Baltics signalled that mass civilian demonstrations could deter armed units and can make soldiers back down from orders of repression – both dynamics re-emerged in the 1991 coup attempt (Karklin 1994: 37).

Another fascinating case can be observed in the context of Estonia. Here, Dzhokhar Dudayev (among the only non-ethnic Russian generals and commander of strategic nuclear units), refused orders from Moscow to shut down Estonian media networks in 1989 (Cornell 2005:195). Sympathetic to Estonian national independence claims, Seely (2012) describes Dudayev as a 'closet supporter' of the movement who learned from it and took revolutionary insights with him back to his native area of Chechnya. In the span of one year (1989-1990), the aforementioned dramatic events occurred as Soviet troops stormed into Vilnius. Afterwards, there were plans to go to Tallin and at this point in

Figure 2. Pathways three (hazing and draft non-compliance) and four (territorial disintegration)
Pathway three – Hazing [widespread practices of person-to-person brutality, racism and abuse arise in in settings of training as well as deployment – bringing about defection]

Pathway four – Territorial disintegration [as part of a national independence movement, commanders, subordinates including soldiers and conscripts will reject serving for a prior principal due to the prospect and desire to serve for a newly founded territorial or political organisation]

time, Boris Yeltsin attempted to fly into Tallin in an effort to de-escalate the situation (Seely 2012). As this was occurring, Dudayev went on the national radio of Estonia and stated that as commander of the Tartu Air Division, he would not permit Soviet troops to come through the republic's air space. As a supporter of Yeltsin, Dudayev then permitted him to enter the republic via automobile. Yeltsin would go on to be a key actor in an event that we will now turn to, an event that led to the formal collapse of the USSR, the August Coup attempt.

Pathway Two – Waging a Coup d'état [Commanders and in some cases, subordinates, defect in attempt to overthrow the incumbent government]
August 1991, Coup Attempt: By late summer of 1991, high ranking actors (e.g., Dmitry Yazov; Mikhail Moiseyev; Pavel Grachev; Valentin Varennikov; Vladimir

Chernavin; Vladimir Kryuchkov, among others) from the Soviet Army, KGB and MVD grew increasingly displeased with Gorbachev's actions. These actors viewed Gorbachev's response to national independence movements in the republics as a contradictory mixture of sanctions and threats and negotiations, and hence, members of the high command urged harsher measures if Gorbachev failed to act on their recommendations (Brusster & Jones 1995: 8). In July, Boris Gromov (ground forces commander and first deputy chief of the Internal Ministry) issued a 'Word to the People' along with other conservative actors in order to halt the disintegration of the USSR (Brusster & Jones 1995: 12). Meanwhile, as described by Brusster and Jones (1995) many officers had completely opposite viewpoints and became active in republic legislatures while simultaneously aligning themselves with reformist groups. This resulted in a deeply divided military and both ends of the political spectrum were involved in reformist political groups (Brusster & Jones 1995: 12). Just days before Gorbachev was set to negotiate a new Union treaty with republics that was intended to give them sovereignty status, the August coup attempt was launched. Known as the great 'Putsch', hardliner insiders initiated the putsch with the aim to hold back reforms and retain state power (Lehrke 2013: 98).

As tanks rolled into the centre of Moscow, a plan was launched to attack the Russian White House (Brusster & Jones 1995: 14). On the night of 20 August, mass crowds surrounded the White House and, in response, the following morning Yazov and Kryuchkov withdrew the troops. Throughout these quick and contingent events, when orders were given by commanders, subordinates did not respond to instructions of repression (Smith 2002: 30). Some of the units even defected to Boris Yeltsin's side. Historians generally agree that the military was divided over the coup, and that the precedent of non-interference into civilian affairs that the Soviet army was accustomed to ended up preventing subordinates from carrying out their orders. Another dynamic has to do with the ethnic-Russian dominated officer corps being unwilling to use force against other Russians, in the specific context of the Moscow city centre (Odom 1998: 466). The failed coup also illustrates how a different set of mechanisms that drove defection – based around a power struggle that arose during a period of immense regime fragility. Whereas the first pathway we observed features repression and mobilisation with commanders giving orders and subordinates either defecting from orders or defecting after carrying them out, this pathway specifically saw commanders breaking away from their principal(s) and then subordinates failing to carry out commander orders.

Finally, the impact of the failed coup attempt had dramatic consequences for the republic of Ukraine where there were not only more senior military com-

manders than in any other republic apart from Russia, but the great majority of senior military commanders at the time had opposed the creation of an independent Ukrainian armed forces (UAF) (Jaworsky 1996: 227). However, two senior members, Leonid Kravchuk and Kostiantyn Morozov put forward a determined effort to establish the UAF by December of 1991, which in part was made possible by the 'dramatic developments which followed the August 1991 coup attempt and were unable to organise a coherent opposition to the creation of the UAF' (Jaworsky 1996: 226).

Pathway three – Hazing [widespread practices of person-to-person brutality, racism and abuse arise in in settings of training as well as deployment – bringing about defection]

Dedovchshina and Zemlyachestvo: To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies in the civil-military relations literature that link occurrences of widespread defection directly to hazing or bullying in a given country's armed forces. In the Soviet context however, hazing turned out to be monumentally significant in discouraging both soldiers and conscripts from participating in military service in the late 1980s. Known in the Russian language as 'dedovshchina' - a unique form of hazing existed in the context of the Russian empire, was carried over to the Soviet Union and remained prevalent into the early 2000s in the Russian Federation. This was as Daugherty (1994) correctly describes it, a form of severe bullying that ended up being integral to and inseparable to the basic training processes dating back to Tsar Nicholas I. Dedovschina includes abuse of soldiers and conscripts such as sexual violence, beatings, bullying, confiscation of personal belongings, salaries and other adverse behaviour (Eichler 2011). During the late 1980s, Glasnost made public discussions of dedovshchina possible for the first time and a grim reality set in for parents who had sons that were either in the armed forces or in plan to be conscripted– young men that entered the army fit, healthy and with ambitions for a future career often returned to their parents as 'corpses, murdered or hounded to suicide by the predators within their own ranks' (Eaton 2004: 94). Dedovshchina was not a Slavic-on-Slavic or Slavic-on-ethnic minority practice. It was widespread throughout the armed forces, and ethnic groups, where possible, would bound together and carry out this hazing practice on individuals from other ethnic backgrounds.

In contrast to the hierarchical nature of dedovschina, zemlyachestvo refers to a historical concept in which an individual is said to belong to his/her place of origin whether it be a village, region or qualitative place of residence. In practice, zemlyachestvo resulted in regional bonding and would be used by ethnic

groups in an attempt to combat the ill-effects of dedovschina. Zemlyachestvo resulted in the formation of networks of 'regiment-level gangs' that were designed to protect members from abuse (Spivak & Pridemore 2004: 35). Abuse often stemmed to the general practice of dedovschina along with the presence of ethnic antagonisms and racist components. As Spivak and Pridemore (2004) describe it, when ethnic minority soldiers were abused, their national comrades would band together and attempt to offer protection. Differences in language also exacerbated the already pre-existent problem of ethnic segregation within enlisted forces. Ethnic minority conscripts were often unable to communicate with their commanders and by the time the Afghan invasion occurred, these adversities resulted in violent clashes between different enlisted ranks and even led to the setting up of language camps for non-Russian conscripts (Solnick 1999: 183). In the late 1980s, sociologists observed that ethnic gags even arose within units which led to Baltic conscripts getting pinned against Russians or Russians against Transcaucasians or Central Asians (Solnick 1999: 184). In conjunction, the many different components of ethnic difference(s) contributed to an adverse spiral of outcomes. As a result of hazing, it is estimated up to 60-70% of all conscripts from non-Slavic republics refused their service orders in the late 1980s (Daucé & Sieca-Kozlowski 2006), which brings us to the fourth and final pathway.

Pathway four – Territorial disintegration [as part of a national independence movement, commanders, subordinates including soldiers and conscripts will reject serving for a prior principal due to the prospect and desire to serve for a newly founded territorial or political organisation]

Widespread Draft Non-compliance: Draft evasion in the 1960s and 70s was rare but not unheard of (Solnick 1999: 170), yet by the late 1980s, draft non-compliance became widespread – some estimates indicate that draft evasion increased eightfold from 1985 to 1990 (Cortright & Watts 1991: 166). Fowkes argues that, 'the Soviet Army was under threat of dissolution from the moment that the nations decided to insist on their sovereignty' (Fowkes 1999: 168). **Sol**nick notes that, 'In the late 1980s the undisputed authority of the Ministry of Defense over military manpower policy came into question. In effect, alternate principals emerged—newly elected parliaments at the all-Union and republican levels—asserting for the first time their constitutional right to set conscription policy independent of the defense ministry'(Solnick 1999: 176). What's more, by 1990, noncombat deaths were at a historic high, 20 percent were brought about by suicide. There was no single process that led to widespread draft dodging, but rather, several factors undermined the overall draft including the demobilisation

of students, reinterpretations of health deferrals and the defense ministry's unsuccessful attempts to regain control over 'renegade draft boards' (Solnick 1999: 176). Additionally, many of the independence movements that arose in republics also called for conscripts to evade local drafts.

For instance, in Lithuania, 5000 men handed back their draft cards in February 1990 as a form of protest (Fowkes 1996: 169). In Georgia, hunger strikes and sit-ins were waged by draftees which led to widespread defiance and subsequent concessions from the Ministry of Defense which let Georgians serve only within their republic's territory (Solnick 1999: 206). The Ministry of Defense ended up losing control over draft policies which in the context of Russia meant that other bodies, such as a committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet, articulated new guidelines for military reform which even included a first of its kind law that enabled conscientious objectors (as well as other objectors) to be registered (Solnick 1999: 205). On the ground, things were even grimmer. For the first time, the traditional Soviet conscription system became ineffective. From 1989 to 1990, draft reporting dropped in every single Soviet republic apart from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; some drop-offs were colossal such as Armenia who experienced 100 percent of conscripts report for their draft in 1989 and only 22.5 percent the subsequent year. Estonia had a 79.5 percent rate of reporting in 1989 which dropped to only 35.9 percent in 1990. Similar drops can be observed in Latvia (90.7 to 39.5), Azerbaijan (97.8 to 84), Georgia (94.0 to 18.5), Lithuania (91.6 to 25.1), while most other republics experienced less (but still significant) drops such as Russia (100 to 95.4), Tajikistan (100 to 93), Moldova (100 to 96), Turkmenistan (100 to 96.1), Belorussia (100 to 90.4), Moldova (100 to 96), to the fewest changes in percentages as observed in Ukraine (97.6 to 95.1), Kazakhstan (100 to 100) and Kyrgyzstan (100 to 100) (Clark 2019). By April of 1991, the General Staff revealed that the military was short 135,000 men (Clark 2019). In non-Russian republics, new republic legislatures started to offer new guidelines that conflicted with those of the Military of Defense – which ultimately led to the former claiming ownership and power over local draft policy (Solnick 1999: 205).

Transcaucasia and the Baltic Republics: By gaining independence, republics simultaneously formalised their own citizens' disservice from the Soviet Army through constructing new registration and enlistment regulations (Reese 2002: 176). The argument that many republics put forward to Moscow to justify the creation of their own armed forces was that it was a part of their sovereignty (Fowkes 1996: 169). Republics began to demand that their own conscripts refuse service outside of their territories and in an attempt to stop this process, on 1 December 1990 Gorbachev called such policies null and void. However, 'it made no difference, they went on doing it' (Fowkes 1996: 169). By the summer of 1991,

over thirty laws or acts had been passed by republican parliaments or governments that interfered with the all-Union draft. Besides this drastic change in the status quo, the number of draft evaders was observed to have grown dramatically in the last years of the Soviet Union. Russian General Dmitrii Iazov noted that the army was short 400,000 soldiers due to their obstruction of conscription in 1990 (Reese 2002: 175). In July of 1990, the Ministry of Defense stated they were short of 536,000 men. By 1990, resistance to orders and military service grew to be so significant that all military units that were stationed in Transcaucasia were placed on a voluntary basis. The actions of officers and conscripts gave national separatists not only a concrete issue on which to base their social movements platform on, but it enabled them to quickly capture government positions in republics (Odom 1998: 297).

In the context of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared its right to have its own armed forces. In The fallout of disintegration was arguably the most significant of any non-Russian republic as most of the USSR's military industrial complex was in this republic along with 750,000 troops. When the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) were created, this 'played a crucial role in ensuring the success of the state-building process in Ukraine' (Jaworsky 1996: 223). Similar declarations were made by Moldovans in 1990 and Georgians in 1991 followed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Lithuania (Foweks 1996: 169). By the end of 1990, many of the Soviet draft boards (the physical premises of these locations), were no longer operative and did not even have electricity or running water (Solnick 1999: 207). An important dynamic to consider here is that it became incredibly difficult and unrealistic for Moscow to be able to punish draft evaders in the republics, and even domestically, officials that sought to prosecute evaders faced difficult barriers (Solnick 1999: 207). The process of territorial disintegration led to new boundaries of governance being established through declarations and legal decrees that literally ended up shifting the flow of members of armed forces away from the USSR Military Defense to each republic. Breakaway territories also arose such as the Chechen Republic – here Dzhokhar Dudayev led an independence struggle which ended up in a prolonged set of conflicts and two Russian-Chechen wars that spanned most of the 1990s. In Lithuania, political elites called for reconstituting a national military with combined units that were independent of the USSR. A decree was issued that enabled civilians to serve on Lithuanian territory. A similar decree was issued several months earlier in 1989 in Georgia.

In total, the four identified pathways of defection led to a great physical drop in the Soviet Army which can be summarised by the following numbers: in 1985 the Soviet Armed Forces numbered 5.3 million. Although Gorbachev did cut the total number of people in the armed forces by half a million in 1988, the total

number kept shrinking and different types of defections played a role in contributing to this decrease. By 1990 there were only 3.99 million, and by the time the Soviet Union morphed into the Russian Federation in late 1991, only 2.72 million remained. As noted by Brusster and Jones (1995), already in the fall of 1990, 'the high command's concern had deepened to alarm. Military leaders were not just concerned over the impact of republic sovereignty on armed forces manpower. In their view, what was at stake in the struggle between the republics and the center was no less than the union itself and the unified army' (Brusster & Jones 1995: 8). The greater majority of this astounding decrease was due to subordinates resisting and defecting from service through a process of 'lower level disintegration' (Beissinger 2002: 574). On 7 May 1992, the newly constituted Russian Federation established its own armed forces.

Conclusion

This study has carried out the first comprehensive analyses of defections that arose during the collapse of the Soviet Union. Prevalent research on defection has framed this phenomenon as being integral to different empirical processes including revolutions, coups, coup attempts and civil war. The context of the Soviet collapse has been under-researched and apart from the 1991 coup attempt, there is a systematic deficit in public and scholarly knowledge of defection during the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Through investigation of 15 different Soviet republics, the ethnic makeup of the armed forces, their experiences in dealing with multiple nationalist and territorial movements, as well as a coup attempt, this study has identified four pathways that led to defection. In total, 13 out of 15 republics experienced at least one form of defection. These outcomes arose due to a heterogeneous collection of factors. Defections arose due to soldiers' lack of disagreement with orders of repression as well as the fallout of post-repression dynamics (in three republics). Defections additionally occurred due to a coup being waged (in one republic), and due to hazing which interacted with ethnic antagonisms (in 13 republics), as well as due to territorial disintegration where republics became self-governing institutions over the span of a short number of months (in 12 republics).

These results reveal that a mixture of different factors was relevant in spurring multiple processes of defection during the Soviet downfall 1988-1991. Conceptually, this lends support to the claim that defection is an equifinal phenomenon in its nature because multiple pathways and causal mechanisms can be observed to bring about this outcome. Along these lines, this study has identified that similar forms of defection (e.g. draft resistance by subordinates and conscripts) can be brought about by more than one pathway. For these reasons, scholars

are recommended to broaden their scope of analysis of the outcome of defection – this phenomenon should not be studied as an isolated process attuned to protest-state interactions or contexts featuring only mobilisation. Finally, the results of this study can be easily triangulated into other analyses of defection or into data sets featuring this outcome. The two-tier specification – commanders and subordinates (as drawn from Albrecht & Ohl), can be useful for subsequent research on defection and civil-military relations during periods of political instability. Future research should continue to stringently compare different processes of defection and comparisons should be made across variant historical eras and cross-national settings.

<div align="center">॰</div>

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Theorising Systemic Appeasement in International Politics

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Abstract

The current state of the relations between Russia and the 'West' presents curious similarities with the '30s appeasement of Germany. These include the change in the international order, the (late) emergence of a system-challenger after an 'intermediary' period that followed the change, the conduct of the challenge and the reactions of the direct custodians of the system. Similarly in both cases, a cycle of escalation-empathy-appeasement defines the interactions between the system and its challenger, creates a centrifugal effect among third actors and deteriorates the system. The similarity necessitates a theoretical effort to define the phenomenon as to its genesis, processes and its end from a systemic perspective, through the comparison of the two cases yet beyond a purely historical angle that has been almost the only one in dealing with the appeasement. In other words, this article engages in two theory-developing case studies centred on the German Reich and contemporary Russia to understand the theoretical value of appeasement as a specific mode of interactions in international politics.

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1   This is a personal work. It does not reflect the official views of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs where the author currently works.

Introduction

Appeasement has mostly been studied from a historical perspective and moreover, as one particular case, the British and French appeasement of Nazi Germany, almost to the point of making the phenomenon identical with this particular period. Furthermore, Aster's work on the 'appeasement literature' (Aster 2008) amply shows that the study of this period, be it 'mainstream' or 'revisionist', mostly concentrated on the decision-makers' personalities and beliefs. As such, work on the appeasement became roughly reducible to a debate on the 'Guilty Men' of 1940 ("Cato" 1998).

Within this framework, the '30s appeasement was much criticised as the ultimate error in dealing with an aggressive, system-challenging power. According to critics, (Churchill 2002; Shirer 1991; Namier 1949, 1952; Wheeler-Bennett 1948; Gilbert & Gott 1963[2]) the appeasers did not only fail to reconcile with the challenger but in trying to do so overlooked their commitments *vis-à-vis* their partners/allies. They gradually sacrificed the principles and the safeguards of the post-War international system. They consequently freed the system-challenger from the need to compromise. A self-perpetuating escalation/appeasement cycle emerged. As they discredited the system, they caused other actors to revise their alignments and behaviour patterns. It led to a point where neither further appeasement nor the system-challenger's self-restraint were possible. Revisionist approaches, on the other hand, consisted of various re-interpretations of the balance of power or of the decision-makers' (appeasers') intentions, yet without denying the process' spiral-descent to bankruptcy (Hoare 1954; Medlicott 1968; Taylor 1991; Northedge 1966; Ripsman & Levy 2008; Weinberg 1994: 56-57, 66-67; Gilbert 1966; Feiling 1946).

Arguably the climatic event of the '30s appeasement, Munich has been the popular symbol of how not to deal with aggressive actors. It was also – and controversially – referred to when rationalising escalation (Aster 2008; Lippmann 1966). Still, it is difficult to say that the 'ghost of Munich' eradicated appeasement. During the '30s, appeasers had enjoyed considerable public and intellectual support (Adams 1993: 128) and there is no reason to think that the dynamics of appeasement vanished altogether. After all, Roosevelt dismissed Churchill's warnings about the Soviet policies in Yalta only a few years and a world war after Munich.

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2   With an emphasis on anti-communist "obsessions" that made the German appeasement an ideological choice.

Could the phenomenon of appeasement be confined to the decision-makers' behaviour or does it transcend a unique period and a unique set of decision-makers? As such, can it be defined as part of IR theory?

Theorisation of the appeasement is not wholly absent in the literature. Lanyi's attempt to define active and passive forms of appeasement constitutes a valuable example and an important source of inspiration for this paper (Lanyi 1963). Still, it is centred on the policy form and does not expand the study toward its (possible) systemic framework.

Is it possible to bring a theoretical framework specific to the study of the appeasement as a systemic phenomenon? Is it useful?

As to the possibility of a theoretical framework, the answer is affirmative. Yet such a study requires rethinking some ground concepts of the IR theorisation, to combine a systemic approach with a 'behavioural pattern' that would be defined beyond decision-makers' individuality. Here the international *order*, not being identical with the international *structure* but defining its intersubjective, actual, lived and normatively expressed (therefore referred to as such) appearance, more defining the actors' positions in their power relations than vice versa, shall constitute the ground notion of this study. The nature of the actor-order relationship will give the matter of research: A relationship defined by the actor's position toward the order as the normative appearance of the system, it is conducted with actors that are identified with it as its 'custodians'. These are not the great/major powers of a given international structure at a given time, but the ones, *among them*, which founded or have been maintaining the order as a normative reference. While a major power is a main constituting part of the international *structure*, it may be at the same time in a confrontational, even antithetic relationship with the international *order*. The phenomenon of appeasement of a systemic nature appears in such a case as a possibility.

As to usefulness, if the '30s appeasement was in fact a unique process with only historical significance, a negative answer could be more valid. Yet the '30s process had apparently more fundamental and repetitive traits as to its genesis, forms, contents and self-and-system consuming 'natural course'. Appeasement has a tendency to reappear in *comparable* – not meaning identical – systemic circumstances. Their identification necessitates a theoretical effort.

Is there then an appeasement case of a systemic nature comparable to that of the '30s? Post-bipolar relations between the 'West' and the Russian Federation present fundamental similarities; however, the two periods differ from each other as regards the international structure (multipolar and – arguably – unipolar) as well as the ideology, aims and practises of the system-challenger regimes (the Third Reich and the Russian Federation). The similarities between the two cases

appear as a strong discontent of and increasing challenge to the international *order* based on a preceding 'injury'. The emergence of the system-challenge follows an intermediary period in both cases, in reference to the order. The challengers' general issues with the international order, such as sovereignty questions, irredentism and free hand demands are comparable. The reactions of the international order of the two periods resemble each other and consist of empathy conducive to active/passive appeasement. The consequences of these reactions, such as the challenger's commitment to escalation, the discredit of the order and the centrifugal effect on the third actors are quite common.

To build a theoretical framework for the study of the systemic appeasement, this paper shall attempt in its first section to define the system and the appeasement as a systemic phenomenon as necessary groundwork. Here, the structural realist terminology will be employed with adjustments, given its comprehensive, inherently 'systemic' understanding of the international relations on the one hand and its apparent lacunas at that on the other – stemming from its over-reductionist, 'microeconomic' assumptions. The said section will then proceed toward an account of the two 'cases' genetic background: The actor-order relationship's evolution toward the system-challenge and appeasement shall be debated from the perspective of the actor and of the custodians. The second section will deal with the phenomenon of appeasement itself as to its forms and contents again within the framework of the two cases, as well as with its consequences on the international order as it creates a system-consuming cycle of escalation-empathy-appeasement-centrifugality. Within the two separate sub-sections of this part, the *initial* phase – the first month – of the Russian invasion of Ukraine shall also be debated from the perspective of the systemic appeasement.

The system and the genetic background of the systemic appeasement
Defining the system and the appeasement as a systemic phenomenon
Appeasement is bilateral. One actor appeases another actor on an issue of escalation. However, it may be related to a particular relationship between the actor and the system, from where the 'issue' that constitutes the object of appeasement stems as 'issue'. Yet the 'system' – international system – needs to be re-thought at that point, to be able to define the actor-system relationship more comprehensively.

Structural realism brings a definition of the international system by uniformising the actors through a series of common parameters as an adaptation of microeconomic agents, reducing the variables to 'power' and the relations to power-relations (Waltz 1979). As it is the case for microeconomy, it provides the research with a solid *Weltanschauung*. Still, while defining the general structure

is necessary for displaying how the actors are positioned within, it is not enough to explain the translation of the actor's basic position into political behaviour, acts of foreign policy. Here the structural realist ground does not support the entire *praxis* of international politics. Waltz's differentiation between the theory of international politics and the theory of foreign policy, one explaining 'why States similarly placed behave similarly despite their internal differences' and the other 'why States similarly placed in a system behave in different ways – differences in behaviour arising from differences of internal composition' is of note at that junction (Waltz 1996). Here, instead of revising its own framework, structural realism seems to make use of the 'internal composition', a sphere of arguably infinite variables, as a field where it may export behaviours incompatible with its construct, yet which are occurrences inherent to *praxis*.

There might, however, be another way to preserve the structural realist study ground without breaking up the connection between the two fields mentioned above. Actors that are similarly or differently placed in a system behave similarly or differently *within* the system, therefore in accordance with the relationship they build *with* the system. Here the system is a constant and the variable becomes the nature of the relationship, instead of the vague field of 'internal composition'. The 'internal composition', while it may be a causal precedent to the 'relationship', is not the relationship itself which is given in the *praxis* of the international politics. Now, how to express the actor-system relationship? To begin with, what is the system to which the actor relates itself in such and such manner?

The structure is unipolar, bipolar or a variant of multipolarity. The actor is a pole, a major power, a regional power, a minor power and so on. Structural realism restricts itself to these elements and consequently to defining the relationship between the actor and the structure. Yet the actor's relation to the system presents more contents than a forcedly objectivised power-classification and general behaviour patterns matched to it, still without omitting the structural framework. If not the structure, then what is the system to which the actor relates itself *individually*?

Hansen draws attention to the difference between the international structure and the international *order* (Hansen 2011: 7-8)*.* Further advancing her proposal, it is possible to define the international order as the intersubjective, actual, lived appearance of the system, its substance, which the actor positions itself toward and with this reference to others, rather than a mere 'objective', neutral structure. The order would appear within the structure as *normative* substance, a 'canon', a meaning ground of the *praxis* of the international politics. The study of the actor's relationship with the *order*, not merely with the structure, unifies

the fields of the international relations theory and the foreign policy theory. The study of actors' *subjective* references to *intersubjective* international order may thus enhance the explicative function of the structural realism.

Then what would be the nature of the 'relationship'? Power defines the actor's position within the structure. Yet regarding the relationship with the order and consequently with other actors, power-relations take shape and meaning through 'normative' concordances or discordances. The study of the actor-order (system) relationship consequently forms the-still-structural realist – *systemic* – study of the *praxis* of the international politics, of the systemic phenomena. The normative addition in the form of actor-system relationship may complete the structural realist meaning ground in order to support the study of the *praxis*.

In which conditions may a confrontational/antithetic relation, expressed at normative level and reflecting on power relations, appear between a major power and the order itself? Revolutions may constitute a first category: 1789 and 1917 are examples of a major power's radical 'normative' change that fundamentally conflicted with the contemporary order, yet not with the 'structure'. In both cases, it is interesting that the initially contradictory relation between the actor and the order tended toward 'normalisation' through 'taming' – and not elimination – of the normative differences. The French 'Empire' became a normatively non-antithetic part of the 'usual' power-relations of its time's multipolarity which did not inherently exclude the phenomenon of general war, given that it had already occurred before (the Seven Years' War). The USSR, following the revolutionary war period – with its civil and external aspects – and its relatively short isolation from the interstate community, quickly developed bilateral and (less quickly) multilateral ties with non-socialist countries, became part of the Society of Nations, transforming into a not-antithetic element of its time's multipolarity.

On the other hand, in contrast with revolutions, the change of the order itself may create ground for a confrontational/antithetic actor-order relationship: The 'defeated' of the event that changed the order, which however retains the *intersubjective* status of major power, may *potentially* be the source of this dialectic, not necessarily because of the defeat but because of the new order's ensuing imposition by its 'custodians'. The actor-order relations may be conducted but through the custodians of the actual order. The imposition of the order – existentially since it gives the systemic reference and volitionally since the custodians' policies would follow this direction – would constitute the ground theme of this relationship, notwithstanding its actual form, be it the actor's attempt to integrate itself to the order or to confront it. The form might reflect the scale of the 'defeat' as well as the nature of the new order. In the example of the bipolar-

ity, the totality of Germany's and Japan's defeat and the bipolarity's own dialectic 'rigidity' apparently prevented any revisionist turn: The former firmly imposed integration upon the defeated and the latter defined and monopolised systemic confrontation as inherent to the very nature of the order (Waltz 1979: 168, 170-173). However and in contrast to this particular period, the actor-order relationship's dialectic evolution is visible during two other periods of order change, which constituted the ground for the systemic appeasement.

How to define the causality between the actor-order dialectic and the appeasement? The difference of nature and consequently of intentionality between the actor's and the custodians' positions may constitute an answer here: The actor's position would consist of clearer individual policy aims and contents within this dialectical relation, expressible as recovering the 'loss' and neutralising the environment that perpetuated the loss. On the other hand, the custodians' positions are to be vaguer within this framework, expressible as conserving the order, which would consist rather of a horizon, a multitude of forms and contents that would be fitting to the *normative* generalities of the order. The custodians' relative positional flexibility in conserving the order may engender appeasement as a valid option face to the immediacy of *individual* tensions. However, individual cases seemingly tend to become a self-perpetuating process as they but stem from the underlying actor-order relationship with consequences on the order itself, not only related to the custodians' positions but also to other, non-confrontational actor-order relations.

The change of order and the late emergence of the system-challenger: The genetic background of the systemic appeasement in two cases

At first glimpse, the international structure did not change radically after the First World War: The structure remained multipolar. Most of the major powers remained major powers; however, their 'qualitative edge' (Waltz 1979: 131) relative to each other changed (with the exception of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire), since Germany and 'Russia' were reduced, arguably temporarily, to a weaker position. The *order* on the other hand, as intersubjective reference to the system, was radically altered in normative terms: Multilateralism within the League of Nations, non-interference, sovereign equality and avoidance of war largely defined the post-War international order, as established by its custodians, the victorious powers of the War. The actor-system relations were defined largely on these terms, deviations from them gained their meaning as 'deviations' also according to the same references.

The system-challenge/appeasement cycle of the '30s was not the immediate consequence of the 'injustice' of the treaties that ended the First World War.

Obviously, the peace regime inflicted a deep injury to Germany and to German-ethnicity in general. Germany lost large swathes of territory. Large ethnic-German communities, either part of Germany or the Austro-Hungarian Empire, were left in newly independent non-German countries (Suppan 2019: 11-20, 162-67; Blanke 1993: 9-31). The Wilsonian self-determination principle of the post-War international order was 'stretched' to the detriment of Germany for example in Upper Silesia (Heater 1994: 121-153; Finch 1922), Danzig and much of the Corridor as well as in prevention of the *Anschluss* (Shirer 1991: 295-296; Gould 1950). The Versailles Treaty reduced the German Army to a token existence, imposed war guilt and extremely heavy reparations[3]. Germany was marginalised by the post-War international order and surrounded by the founders and custodians of the Peace regime or by its direct beneficiaries which quickly developed their relations with the custodians.

The Weimar Republic's relationship with the post-War order was characterised by its integration effort which included, within this framework, a struggle for eroding the Versailles regime. When faced with additional disasters such as the Ruhr occupation (Roosevelt 1925; Cornebise 1972), the Republic tried to break its isolation though rapprochement with the other marginalised power of the international order, the USSR, as in the example of the Rapallo Treaty (Duroselle 1993: 68-69; Krüger 1993: 151-162; Hale 1989). It succeeded in integrating itself to the post-War order with the Locarno Pact in 1925 and with its membership to the League of Nations the following year (Krüger 1993: 269-300; Milza 1995: 62-63). It signed the Briand-Kellogg Pact in 1928 which 'outlawed' war. It participated in and supported the Disarmament Conference (Duroselle 1993: 162-168; Milza 1995: 65, 111-113). While doing these, it could avoid guaranteeing its disputed eastern borders during the Locarno negotiations (Jacobson 1972: 152-156; Hoeltje 1958; Turner 1963: 211-212) and preserve its 'Russian option' by fortifying Rapallo with the Treaty of Berlin (Turner 1963: 220-221). It could decrease its war reparations burden by its integration to the system, consequently weakening the anti-German circles of the system's custodians: It involved the US in, separated the British and French positions from each other and made the Dawes and Young Plans possible (Trachtenberg 1980; Mills 1931; Jacobson 1972: 156-167). It almost achieved their total suspension/abolition through the Lausanne Agreement of 1932 (Helbich 1959). It attracted the American capital and could revivify the German economy until the Great Depression as that capital inflow largely surpassed the reparation payments (Schuker 1988). As such, the Weimar Republic's integration to the post-War order significantly eroded the

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3 The Treaty of Versailles, accessed online: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/versailles_menu.asp.

burden of the Versailles regime without a system-challenge and without appeasement.

The regime 'to be appeased' came to power 14 years after the Treaty and turned to a policy of system-challenge. It did not only reject the normative canon of the international order but also tested the 'custodian powers'' sanctification of lasting peace and stability. Soon after the regime change, Berlin quitted the Disarmament Conference, revealed its intention to rearm, quitted the League of Nations and denounced the Versailles Treaty restrictions. It built its relationship with the *order* on a confrontational basis, challenging the normative canon by its own normative proposals mostly based on its re-discovery of the injury inflicted to Germany, even when a significant part of it was already neutralised (Baynes 1969)[4].

The dismemberment of the USSR and of its alliance structure was not the result of a war, nor accompanied by a Versailles-like Treaty. Yet the international structure was changed, from bipolarity into unipolarity or at least, to non-bipolarity (Ikenberry, Mastanduno & Wohlforth 2011: 1-32; Jervis 2009) in the sense of suppression of the fundamental systemic reference to the balance between two superpowers. On the other hand, the international *order* was even more radically changed: The normative position of the 'West'; democracy, rule of law, human rights and global market economy became the canon of the new order and the parameters of the actor-system relations appeared as confrontation, adherence or depending on the actor's capabilities 'coexistence' with the canon[5].

Russia took over the main privileges of the USSR such as the UN Security Council membership and its nuclear arsenal as the successor state. Still, being successor, the losses of the USSR also meant, intersubjectively, Russia's losses: In this sense, Moscow lost large swathes of territory. Big Russian communities were left outside of the Russian borders, the *Anschluss* attempt in Crimea was prevented[6], the economic system was utterly disrupted (Tikhomirov 2000; Hare et al. 1998[7]; also Leitzel 1995), the military establishment crumbled (Herspring 1995). Much like the Weimar Republic, the country found itself surrounded by the beneficiaries of the dismemberment, a part of which quickly sought and found prospects of alignment with the custodians of the new order.

Russia's relationship with the post-bipolar order was characterised by its integration effort which included, within this framework, a struggle for eroding

4   Particularly on Versailles' "war guilt clause", at a time it had but little meaning left.
5   When incompatibility with some part of the canon is balanced with compatibility with and contribution to another part, as in the examples of the Gulf States or China.
6   The Crimean Parliament's declaration of independence in May 1992 (subject to referendum which was prevented), accessed online: https://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/06/world/crimea-parliament-votes-to-back-independence-from-ukraine.html.
7   For the steady GDP decrease after the dismemberment of the USSR.

its uncontrolled (Russia-neglecting) expansion toward Moscow's (ex)-sphere of influence (Rumer 2007: 13-21; Aalto 2007). The Foreign Policy Concept of 1993 shows the Yeltsin-era logic of erosion/integration policy (Melville & Shakhleina 2005). This fundamental policy paper of the Federation, while mentioning possibilities of strategic partnership or alliance with the US, objected to its 'unipolar' tendency in particular against 'Russia's role in the countries of Russia's traditional influence' and stressed the necessity to 'firmly resist the US' possible relapses'. It advocated 'regionally centered power relations' with emphasis on the 'great power' identity of Russia. It warned against 'the states in adjacent regions' that were 'pursuing their own policies conspicuously aimed at taking advantage of the disintegration of the USSR' in relation to 'the former Soviet republics'.

Russia participated in the PfP in 1994 and concluded the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 (Melville & Shakhleina 2005: 75-84)[8], which became the NATO-Russia Council in 2002. She engaged in reforms with a view to participate in or cooperate with the forthcoming international mechanisms of the 'West' such as the WTO[9], the G-8 and the Council of Europe/ECHR system. Despite her domestic reforms' relatively slow pace (Westin 1999), Russia showed signs of recovery and firmer integration to the world trade a few years after the dismemberment. The trade with the West increased with significant surpluses (Hare et al. 1998). Simultaneously, Moscow advocated the establishment of an 'inclusive' security architecture that would replace or balance the bipolarity-inherited NATO (Smith 2003: 55-73), while clinging to an also bipolarity-inherited UN Security Council where Russia had its veto-capability and to the CSCE/OSCE. While criticising the NATO enlargement perspectives, she interfered in the politics of the western-inclined near-abroad countries, including support to the secessionist uprisings (Rywkin 2015[10], Laenen2012: 17-38). She initiated the CIS and its appended economic/security integration processes in the ex-USSR geography, though with questionable progress and results (Olcott 1995; Kobrinskaya 2007; Vinokurov 2007; Willerton & Beznosov 2007).

The regime change began in August 1999, eight years after the dismemberment of the USSR, with Putin's appointment as 'acting Prime Minister' in parallel with the 1998 economic crisis, the Kosovo intervention of the 'unipolar' order and the continuing impasse in Chechnya that raised doubts about the viability of the Federation. The new regime deviated from the post-bipolar 'canon' first

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8   NATO-Russia Founding Act, accessed online: https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm.
9   Although the WTO membership took 18 years of negotiations including its suspension from 2008 until 2011 because of the Georgian blockage, accessed online: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-16212643.
10 For the Yeltsin-era background.

in the domestic field, quite in line with its reason of coming to power. Chechnya issue was 'solved' with determined military action (Russell 2007: 67-88). Moscow initiated a heavy-handed centralisation *or* 'stabilisation' throughout the Federation, progressively pacifying non-violent centrifugal tendencies as in the example of Tatarstan (Frombgen 1999; Dinc 2021) and gradually taming the political opposition in general (McNabb 2016: 45-47; also Sakwa 2020: 23-56; Levitsky & Way 2010: 5-23; Van Herpen 2013: 103-106). It imposed a *de facto* economic *dirigisme* (Sakwa 2020: 113-123). The steady increase of the oil prices and natural gas demand provided the change with means.

The foreign policy of the new regime began to evolve from the Yeltsin-era erosion/integration toward challenging the post-bipolar order, however slowly and gradually, compared to the Third Reich's direct actions. The three fundamental policy papers of 2000 outlined this change (Melville & Shakhleina 2005). The Foreign Policy Concept diagnosed 'a growing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar world order, with economic and power domination by the United States' that was 'devaluing the UN Security Council' and firmly refuted the 'humanitarian intervention' and 'limited sovereignty' concepts. It criticised the selectiveness of Euro-Atlantic integration processes and stressed that NATO's new Strategic Concept was contrary to Russia's security interests. It declared that Russia would promote a multipolar system of international relations. The Military Doctrine of the same year defined the NATO enlargement as an external security risk to Russia. The National Security Concept diagnosed two trends in international relations, one being the Russian-defined multipolarism/polycentrism and the second being the US/West's unipolarism/unilateralism which was circumventing 'the fundamental norms of international law'. It warned that 'ignoring Russia's interests when addressing major issues in international relations, including conflict situations' could 'undermine international security and stability'. It also depicted the eastward enlargement of NATO as a main threat. From there onwards the near-abroad concept gained even more emphasis, as Moscow's natural/historical influence zone (Babak 2000: 93-103; also see Toal 2017) to be *defended* against a hostile 'system' and its custodians.

Two forms of empathy
As custodians of the post-War and the post-bipolar order, western democracies' approach toward Germany and Russia as 'victims' of the change of the international order included empathy. The nature and the outcomes of their empathy changed quite similarly in both cases, according to the state of relations of these actors with the international order, the integration/erosion and the system-challenge.

The custodians' empathy for the Weimar Republic did not suppress the injury but served Berlin's integration/erosion policy (Namier 1942 about imposing clauses at Versailles but being unwilling to enforce them), even from the Peace Conference onward (Fry 1998), with the main concern of reinforcing the post-War order. Here, the risk of a communist revolution in Germany, German rapprochement with the USSR, the Ruhr occupation's effect on the public opinion seem to have been influential at varying degrees and depending on the individual position of each custodian power (Cornebise 1972). Empathy facilitated the evacuation of the German territory, the 'readmission' of Germany into the European system, the restructuring of war reparations and the influx of the US capital/loans to Germany. On the other hand, empathy accompanied by the integration/erosion policy also served to strengthen the post-War order by enhancing its flexibility, as long as Germany was willing to become a part of it (Jacobson 1972: 156[11]). Germany's membership to the League of Nations and its signature of the Briand-Kellogg Pact exemplify the complementarity between the custodians' empathy and German integration/erosion policy to the benefit of the post-War order.

The Third Reich's emergence as a system-challenger and its almost immediate acts against it such as quitting the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, denouncing the Versailles Treaty restrictions on rearmament and the actual modalities of war reparations obliged the custodians to make a choice between enforcement and appeasement. Here the custodians' avoidance of enforcement seems to have been facilitated by their practice of empathy. However, the avoidance, in its turn, seems to have altered the nature of empathy as well, in parallel to the new relation between the object of empathy, Germany, and the post-War order. Consequently, instead of reinforcing the post-War order in tandem with the integration/erosion policy, empathy began to assist dismantling the order by rationalising the German challenge (see for example Nicolson 1936) and on occasion, even directly aiding it as in the case of the very one-sided British-German Naval Agreement of 1935[12]. In a way, the custodians' empathy, instead of adjusting the system to increase its viability, began to accommodate it to Berlin's *faits accomplis*. This took the form of appeasement.

Empathy for the Russian Federation after the USSR's collapse resembled the case of the Weimar Republic as it aimed at assuring the post-bipolar/unipolar order. It was directed toward the Russian integration efforts to post-bipolar order and its normative canon, namely the domestic economic and politic reforms,

11   On the British "empathy" during Locarno process concerning Germany's "right" to revise its eastern borders.
12   The British-German Naval Agreement, accessed online: http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-089_Anglo_German_Agreement_1935.php.

efforts to participate in the post-bipolar order's (once the Western bloc's) international mechanisms and becoming consequently an in-system partner (see also Rumer 2007: 18). However, it lacked injuries/injustices that would openly *contradict* with the current order like it was the case for the discriminatory Versailles Treaty clauses. It is true that the custodians of the post-bipolar order held Russia *relatively* at arm's length (Rumer 2007: 20; Aalto 2007) while they were rapidly developing their relations with the ex-Warsaw Pact and ex-Soviet republics of Europe: For example the PfP, in which Russia participated in 1994, had been *de facto* discriminatory among its partners, meaning for some countries an intermediary for NATO membership and for others, including Russia, a mere politico-military harmonisation mechanism with the West, including the post-bipolar order's normative canon. Developing cooperation with – and spreading the normative canon toward – countries that were within Moscow's ex-sphere of influence or direct domination did not constitute an injustice from the custodians' perspective or contradict the post-bipolar order. However, mostly in retention of the bipolar state of affairs, Moscow continued to consider these countries as its 'near abroad' where the post-bipolar order's custodians' activities as well as the local governments' tendencies were of direct concern for Russia (Lepingwell 1994; Shashenkov 1994). Also, the custodians' interventions in various parts of the world, which were based on the post-bipolar normative canon and mostly circumvented the bipolarity-inherited international mechanisms, in particular of the UN Security Council where Russia held her right to veto, deepened this difference of interpreting empathy between the two sides.

The post-Yeltsin regime appears to have solicited empathy on the same matters with the same impasses. What it gradually altered seems to be the margins of compromise with the post-bipolar order and therefore Yeltsin-era's integration efforts to the system. Face to continuing 'injury', Moscow adopted an increasingly litigious stance in its relationship with the order and its custodians as seen in the policy papers of 2000 in comparison with the Foreign Policy Concept of 1993. As such, certainly much more gradually, indirectly and even perhaps involuntarily, Russian foreign policy's transformation seems to have coincided with that of Germany of 1933. The fundamental difference between the two eras seems to be that while in the Weimar-case empathy and integration/erosion policy worked in tandem and reinforced the post-War order, in the Russian case the post-bipolar order steadily undermined the integration/ erosion policy – therefore Russia's relationship with the order – due to the fundamental difference between the expected and granted empathy, which was amplified by the incomplete passage to post-bipolarity that partly carried bipolarity's mechanisms and practices into post-bipolarity.

Yet the 'delayed' appearance of 1933's Germany in post-bipolarity may be placed, not to the regime-change of 1999-2000 but to Putin's 2007 Munich Security Conference speech[13], which frontally and determinedly warned the custodians about 'unipolar/unilateral acts' including enlargement policies. Between 2000 and 2007, despite growing tensions after the Kosovo intervention, the US-led coalition's intervention in Iraq in 2003, the NATO enlargement toward the Baltic Republics in 2004, the coloured revolutions in the near-abroad (Mitchell 2012: 44-72, 168-186; Gerlach 2014: 39-44) or GUAM's foundation in 2006 which favoured post-bipolar order and its institutions against Russian political influence (Simon 2008: 102-103)[14] and Russian integration efforts in the near-abroad (Eyvazov 2008) were not deterred: It furthered Russia's understanding of 'injury' in its relationship with the post-bipolar order.

After Munich 2007, Russia's self-assertion appeared to have been instrumental in some NATO members' avoidance of granting MAPs to Ukraine and Georgia during the NATO Bucharest Summit of 2008, despite the US' efforts (Arbuthnot 2008). The custodians thus *tacitly* accommodated themselves to Russian understanding of near-abroad, therefore to a *de facto* Russian say – if not veto right – over particular independent countries. The event marked a beginning of empathy which is detached from the custodians' understanding of the post-bipolar order until then. Nor did it support the Russian integration/erosion policy which was eclipsed by its new, confrontational attitude which in fact brought the custodians to recognise, without approving, the Russian *Weltanschauung* of the post-bipolarity. The empathy *gradually* served; instead, to avoid confrontation with Russia – or support to ex-USSR countries – in its 'near abroad' first and then, again gradually, in the crisis areas where Russia appeared as a balancing power. In other words, empathy began; however, not with the same sharpness and pace of the '30s, to accommodate the post-bipolar order to Russia's understanding and acts, if not by justifying them then at least by recognising them. This took the form of appeasement.

Appeasement's contents and course
Forms and issues of appeasement
The forms and issues of appeasement have significant similarities in the German and the Russian cases. Lanyi's active and passive appeasement notions are of particular importance for describing the form (Lanyi 1963): Active appeasement consists of the custodians' negotiating with the system-challenger 'by lending

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13 Putin's Munich speech, accessed online: http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034.
14 GUAM's Charter, accessed online: https://guam-organization.org/en/charter-of-organization-for-democracy-and-economic-development-guam/.

a sympathetic ear' to its concrete demands that are incompatible with the order and ends by satisfying most of them. Passive appeasement means permitting the system-challenger to improve its position through acting against the order. Here the 'permission' may be disguised by *acting passively*, undeterringly, for example by 'disapproving' the system-challenger or even, in our opinion, 'sanctioning' it ineffectively, without forcing it to alter its policy course.

The issues of appeasement of a systemic nature in the German and the Russian cases may be regrouped under 'sovereignty', 'irredentism' and 'free hand', still with differences between them as to their context and meaning. While they appear to be less overlapping for Germany, the *sui generis* meaning of sovereignty for Russia blurs the boundaries between them to an extent.

Versailles' discriminatory restrictions on German sovereignty were obvious. They constituted the first issues of Germany's challenge as it declared rearmament and denounced the war reparations. However these acts constituted open violations – and not erosions – of the Peace Regime, they were empathised with, not retaliated, and therefore passively appeased. When Germany quitted the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, it targeted both the institutional infrastructure and the evolutionary direction of the post-War international order. The custodians did not retaliate, giving another example of passive appeasement and of the changing nature of empathy. On the other hand, the irredentist move against Austria in 1934, (including Dollfuss' assassination) met immediate resistance; however, not from the custodians (Shirer 1991: 247-248; Churchill 2002: 117-122, 131-133). It was Italy, a system-challenger on its own merit, which 'dragged' the custodians under the Stresa Front for a brief time in 1935-1936 in reaction to *increased* German rearmament – a sovereignty issue – and interference to Austria – an irredentist attempt – forced Germany to a temporary halt in the second issue but not in the first one (Churchill 2002: 163-166, Shirer 1991: 252-254). Even here the custodians, instead of protecting on their own initiative the international order built by themselves, were reduced to the position of secondary actors to what became a mere bilateral confrontation between two system-challengers. When Italy invaded Ethiopia, western democracies took but weak bilateral and multilateral (League of Nations) countermeasures which did not deter Rome but disintegrated the Stresa Front (Churchill 2002: 202-206, 208-228; Shirer 1991: 256). If Berlin did not then attempt another irredentist move against Austria, this was mostly because the Italian position was not yet clarified on the matter (Churchill 2002: 249, for the Austro-German Pact of July 1936 for non-interference in the internal affairs of Austria *following* the occupation of Rhineland). Germany continued to rearm and occupied the demilitarised zone of Rhineland the same year, resolving another sovereignty

issue with direct action. The custodians of the post-War order passively appeased this latest violation of the Versailles regime as well (Shirer 1991: 256-261; Churchill 2002: 233-241).

In 1938, the German irredentism was again put in motion in Austria and the custodians repeated their passive appeasement (Churchill 2002: 308-324; Shirer 1991: 287-315). The *Anschluss*, which was prevented twice, was at last achieved. Even the Austrian insistence on a plebiscite and German refusal did not incite western democracies to active involvement. The custodians thus tacitly recognised and passively appeased German irredentism as well, opening the way to German demands on Sudetenland during the same year (Bruegel 1973) despite the fact that Czechoslovakia was guaranteed by France and the USSR, the latter guarantee becoming effective if France intervened (Churchill 2002: 326)[15]. The subsequent 'Munich process' constituted the arch-example to active appeasement. It resolved the legitimacy problem of the German irredentism, which was already taken into the sphere of empathy and appeasement with *Anschluss*. German demands and German *modalities* of satisfying them were made the bases of negotiations, accompanied by British and French pressure on Prague (Shirer 1991: 336, 340-360, 363-369; Churchill 2002: 326, 337-352; Adamthwaite 1968; Saroléa 2004). The USSR's anti-German position was neutralised through the non-fulfilment of the French guarantee and the Polish refusal to grant passage to Soviet troops through its territory (Shirer 1991: 359; Adams 1993: 97,1 00-127). In the Munich Conference proper, merely the modalities of this active appeasement were decided upon, not even involving the Czechs themselves (Shirer 1991: 353-365, 369-376; Churchill 2002: 371-379). Ironically, at the time of Munich, the balance of power in Europe was still and almost absolutely in favour of the custodians of the post-War order, even without the USSR, should they choose not to appease Berlin (Ben-Arie 1990).

The next irredentist move, the German ultimatum of March 1939 to Lithuania for Memel (Shirer 1991: 383-384, 412-413), despite the city's being guaranteed by the UK, France, Italy and Japan, did not even necessitate active appeasement. The UK and France merely expressed their sympathies to Vilnius and Germany occupied Memel.

On the other hand, it is difficult to state that the German desire for a free-hand in Eastern Europe was empathised with (Ryder 1973: 317-380; Churchill 2002: 267-269). A partial exception to that may be the US' 'contemplation' of an economic zone of influence/preponderance for Berlin (Manne 1986; Offner 1977; Marks 1985). The free-hand was nevertheless sought as the natural conse-

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15 Still, the Chamberlain government declared its reluctance to support the guarantees to Czechoslovakia in March 1938 - so not to encourage France.

quence of the custodians' empathy and appeasement related to escalations on sovereignty and irredentism issues. As such, even without empathy and despite the custodians' renewed guarantees in Munich, Germany annexed the remaining parts of Czech territory in March 1939 (Boucek 1975; Shirer 1991: 383-384, 396-406) and created a satellite Slovakia (Boucek 1975; Procházka 1981; Shirer 1991: 391-396). This move was not retaliated either, therefore passively appeased. The custodians reacted rather 'discursively' (Boucek 1975; also Weinberg 1994: 465-534). However, this empathy-deprived *fait accompli* proved to be conducive to ending the cycle in the next German move concerning Danzig and the Corridor which amalgamated irredentism and the free-hand demand.

There were no Versailles-like restrictions against Russia's sovereignty. Yet sovereignty issues emerged from Russia's relationship with the post-bipolar order, which was built with the partial retention of the bipolar order's conceptions and practices. Within this framework they had a rather 'outwardly' meaning, both regarding the ex-Soviet countries and the *praxis* of international politics, including the post-bipolar order's normative canon. This 'outwardliness' seems to have occupied the niche of Germany's sovereignty issues in its relations with the post-War order.

The western 'democratism' for example, was depicted as a discursive tool of the unipolar/unilateral interventionism in particular during the post-Yeltsin times (Lukin 2018a: 3-8, 18-19, 27-29, 192; Michalski & Nilsson 2018), however this understanding was not absent within the earlier integration/erosion policy. The Putin-era concept of 'sovereign democracy' should perhaps be understood within this framework, not only as a laundering-motto of authoritarianism but also as a reference to the post-bipolar order's invasive norms (Van Herpen 2013: 180; Makarychev 2008; Casula 2013; also see Lo 2002: 67-72, 86-97). In this vein, the multipolarism/polycentrism concept has increasingly been promoted by Russia in tandem with the sovereign democracy from the very early phase of the regime change as an alternative to the intersubjective post-bipolar/'unipolar' *order* rather than to the objective post-bipolar/unipolar *structure* defined on the basis of power-statuses (Melville & Shakhleina 2005 for the three "fundamental policy papers" of 2000; Chebankova 2017; Lewis 2018).

The outwardly nature of Russian understanding of sovereignty naturally encompassed the near-abroad, as the custodians of the post-bipolar order found aspirations for NATO and EU membership there, therefore collaboration for reforms aiming at fully adopting the order's normative canon. Russia therefore applied weight to counter the 'westernisation' of the near-abroad, increasingly during the post-Yeltsin era yet also before that, openly supporting autocratic tendencies (Cameron & Orenstein; Babayan 2015), as long as they were friendly to Moscow (Way 2015).

Russian expectation of a *de facto* veto-right regarding the 'major issues in international relations, including conflict situations' (Melville & Shakhleina 2005, for the Foreign Policy Concept of 2000), therefore the international crises involving the custodians and their normative canon outside the near-abroad became another issue of 'outwardly' sovereignty. Opposition to western 'unilateral' interventions was gradually intensified. During the Kosovo intervention, tensions between Russia and NATO reached serious levels. Moscow ardently criticised the second Iraqi War and the Libya interventions. The opposition in its later phase took the form of direct military intervention in the Syrian War including close cooperation with Iranian interventionism there, and of intense political support to Venezuelan regime in another theatre, furthering the system-challenge through backing the 'opponents of the West' and its normative canon (see also Allison 2013; Pieper 2019).

The outwardly character of Russian sovereignty issues were largely overlooked by the custodians in their earlier phase (Van Herpen 2013: 104). It did not affect the dialogue or the willingness to cooperate with Moscow, yet within the framework of the post-bipolar order as understood by the western powers, therefore unsatisfactorily for Russia. It did not affect the flow of western investment toward Russia either, which continued to increase without serious political hindrance. During the Yeltsin-era, Moscow's 'warnings' expressing the nature of Russia-post bipolar order relationship or the emergence and successes of Russian-backed secessionism in the near-abroad in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia neither discouraged the West-near abroad rapprochement, nor incited the custodians to be more active in preventing Russian moves. The general overlook of Russian sovereignty issues continued into the Putin-era Russia, in sympathising with and encouraging alternative groupings in the near-abroad such as GUAM or pro-western/democratic coloured revolutions, yet without granting them any guarantee or effective support with the notable exception of the Baltic Republics' membership NATO and EU in 2004. Moreover, the multipolarist/polycentrist discourse has been empathised with at least by a significant part of the western intelligentsia and some western governments, apparently often confused with *multilateralism*. The frequent disregard or negligence of this discourse's reactionary nature to post-bipolar *order* has contributed to passive appeasement of the Russian policies.

As mentioned in the previous subsection, the 2007 Munich Security Conference seems to have changed this 'overlook' into the particular form of empathy conducive to appeasement. Moscow's immediate issue of NATO's granting MAPs to Ukraine and Georgia was passively appeased at the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit. Ironically, Russian-backed 'frozen conflicts' of the near abroad

constituted one of the NATO members' central arguments for empathising with and appeasing Russia on the matter (Arbuthnot 2008). Following the Russian warning of the previous year, the custodians appeared to have recognised the Russian understanding of 'sovereignty' at least as a valid factor in conducting relations with the near-abroad.

The empathy and the passive appeasement of the Bucharest Summit obviously contributed to the Russian move of August 2008, when Georgia intervened in its Russia-backed secessionist entity of South Ossetia. Russia riposted immediately, both within South Ossetia and in Georgia proper, using overwhelming force (Asmus 2010; Desseyn and Tchantouridze, 2012). Russia recognised the independencies of South Ossetia and Abkhazia right after the clashes. This move was also passively appeased by the custodians, after loud discursive reactions and some non-military aid to Tbilisi. In addition, the MAP issue – which was to be revised in December 2008 – was 'buried' both for Ukraine and Georgia. Even the token reaction was discontinued one year later as the US initiated the 'Reset' with Russia (see also Hahn 2013; Lazarević 2009).

In the circumstances it was initiated, the Reset seems to have two meanings: the passive appeasement related to the Georgian Crisis evolved into Russia's active appeasement through a new agenda that *indirectly* yet even further validated the Russian position in the near-abroad. Secondly, the very substance of the 'Reset' was related to cooperation in systemic-level issues between 'equal counterparts', as seen through its *positive* outcomes such as the new START or the coordination in the Afghanistan operation (Deyermond 2013). As such, the Russian sovereignty issues were more firmly imported into the sphere of empathy and appeasement at least until the Reset's collapse (Hahn 2013).

The Georgian and the Reset episodes of appeasement apparently encouraged Russian irredentism much like the German case; however, it overlapped with the 'sovereignty issues' (see also Alexander 2020; Miholjcic 2019) in contrast to the '30s. During the early years of post-bipolarity, the move of the Russian populations from the near abroad to Russia proper showed significant variances. While the emigration from the Caucasian and Central Asian republics reached important proportions of their Russian diaspora, exodus was weaker from the Baltic Republics, Belarus and Ukraine (Heleniak 2001; Peyrouse 2007). In the case of Moldova, the Russian-speaking part of the country seceded very early with Moscow's support. On the other hand, Russian minorities in the Baltics remained largely passive due to these countries' firm anchorage to the West and their ensuing NATO and EU membership (Pietrowsky 2020). As to Belarus, irredentism has always been irrelevant due to its firm alignment with Russia from

the beginning, which evolved toward a quasi-union between the two countries (Melville & Shakhleina 2005 for the "Union" document).

In the case of Ukraine, however, the Russian ethnicity balanced the Ukrainian one[16] and the division found its political expression as pro-western and pro-Russian factions with no clear majority. The power changed hands between the two factions, as seen in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution and then in the 2010 elections. These changes reflected on the main foreign policy issues, such as the NATO candidacy, which froze or thawed depending on the faction that held the power. However, the country came to a crossroads in 2013 which *necessitated* a choice between the mutually exclusive EU Association Agreement and the EAEU (Libman & Obydenkova 2018). The pro-Russian Yanukovich government went for the EAEU and the pro-western faction seized power. Russian-inclined Donetsk, Lugansk and Crimea rebelled and Russia intervened in force (Menon & Rumer 2015; Hahn 2018). However, in Donetsk and Lugansk new secessionist entities were created, Crimea was annexed by Russia, much comparably to a hypothetical German annexation of Sudetenland *without* even Munich. Here, Russia ironically had recourse to the landmark event of Kosovo as precedent (Ambrosio 2016).

Face to Russian irredentism in motion, overlapped with sovereignty issues, the custodians – and remarkably not the international community in general – imposed sanctions, which have proven to be inefficient in reversing the Russian move (Kholodilin & Netšunajev 2019). Even the EU investments to and trade with Russia began to recover quickly, added by newer projects in the all-important energy sector. As for Ukraine, besides the token military cooperation and sympathetic discourse, the custodians' reluctance continued in the now-urgent matters of NATO-MAP or the EU integration. Meanwhile, Russia heavily militarised Crimea, rapidly increased its area-denial capability in the Black Sea (Åtland & Kabanenko, 2019; Wilk 2014; Sanders 2014) and displayed her determination to close the Azov Sea at will[17], while maintaining its position in Lugansk and Donetsk. However, the Russian irredentism was not fully empathised with, the Ukrainian incident constituted an additional case of passive appeasement.

While the 'free hand' constituted a 'sequel' to sovereignty issues and irredentism for Germany as seen in the occupation of Czech territory in March 1939,

16 2001 Census figures, accessed online: http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/;
   http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/language/.
17 Kerch incident news as an example, accessed online: https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2018/the-kerch-strait-incident;
   https://www.ft.com/content/f5c68dd4-765c-11e9-be7d-6d846537acab;
   https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/ukraine-nato-in-talks-over-naval-escorts-through-kerch-strait.

in the Russian case it appeared more synchronously with the other two issues, related to near-abroad in particular. The free hand also overlapped with the Russian outward-sovereignty issues in the spillover of the Russian system-challenge to other geographies, rather in the pursuit of challenging/balancing the post-bipolar order in the areas of crisis. Currently, the presence of Russian forces in Syria or of a Russian 'mercenary' organisation in Libya constitutes examples to efforts to prevent new Kosovo or Iraq cases. This makes the Russian 'free hand' appear more as the denial of free hand to the post-bipolar order, therefore more reactionary than the German free hand.

Also in contrast to the '30s Germany, the Russian overlap of free hand with 'outward' sovereignty in the near abroad[18] prevented more rigid reaction from the custodians of the post-bipolar order, since the sovereignty issues were *de facto* recognised or empathised with and in any case appeased. As to the crisis-areas of Syria and Libya, the overlap seems also to have engendered empathy and limited passive appeasement: The custodians avoided escalation and accepted a balance with Russia also in these areas, in contrast to their earlier, overwhelming interventions in various places.

Russian invasion of Ukraine compares surprisingly to the Winter War in Finland at least at the moment this sub-section is written, as the Russian army remains stalled for more than three weeks after the first days' advances. Currently, the sort of the war is obscure, but the aggressor has obviously not achieved its declared aims[19], which may be boiled down to establishing a pro-Russian, Belarussian type regime in Kiev.

Yet how, from the perspective of the appeasement cycle, may the current war be interpreted? Moscow chose to take the ultimate step of invasion, with an amalgamated discourse of outward sovereignty (Ukrainian prospects of NATO membership), irredentism (oppression of, even genocide against the Russian-speaking people of Ukraine, arguments quite similar to 'Danzig, Corridor and Posen Germans') and related free hand demand (right to intervene)[20]. As such, Moscow apparently repeated Third Reich's gambles – in particular – of March and September 1939. In that, Moscow seems to have been encouraged by the relative ineffectiveness of the sanctions since 2014, absence of guarantees given to Kiev during the last phase of escalation – best expressed by the US'

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18 In the form of supporting secessionist movements and direct military intervention.

19 Accessed online: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-authorises-military-operations-donbass-domestic-media-2022-02-24/.

20 Accessed online: https://mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesman/briefings/1800470/#4; https://mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesman/briefings/1800470/#11; https://tass.com/defense/1409813.

President's exclusion of the *possibility* to deploy troops in Ukraine[21] – and the prevalence of the discourse of a 'diplomatic/negotiated solution'. The last element constitutes an example to the empathy as it expresses tacit validation of the system-challenger's escalation content as an 'issue', thus changing its very nature into an 'objective' problem which needs to be solved, much in resemblance to Czechoslovakia or even to Danzig-Corridor 'issues' until 1 September 1939. Apparently, Moscow's anticipation was a discursive and economic reaction from the custodians of the order that might be stronger yet by nature similar to 2014, which could gradually dissipate through empathy and become another example of passive appeasement after the snuffing out of the Ukrainian resistance, decapitation of the Kiev regime and the political completion of the military *fait accompli*.

System's deterioration

Centrifugality was a phenomenon common to both post-War and post-bipolar periods, independently from the system-challenge and ensuing appeasement cycles. *Rigid* alignments characteristic to pre-First World War or bipolar environments loosened as their constitutive-dialectic disappeared as the system changed. Depending on the nature of the systemic change, *rigidification* as centrifugality's exact contrary is also possible, as was the case in the aftermath of the Second World War when multipolarity was replaced by a far less flexible bipolarity (see also Waltz 1979:168, 170-173). However, German and Russian system-challenge and ensuing appeasement cycles engendered a *second* phenomenon of centrifugality as a consequence of the current system's deterioration.

Many European actors gradually altered their relations both with Germany and with each other in the '30s, as appeasement progressively discredited the post-War order (Weinberg 1994: 4). The custodians' avoidance to retaliate the system-challenge encouraged for example the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, weak and failed retaliation of the invasion further encouraged Rome's move toward Germany. The escalation-empathy-appeasement cycle related to Germany steadily decreased the system's credibility as its custodians repeatedly avoided defending it. It was Italy, itself a system-challenger, which prevented *Anschluss* in 1934 and which 'permitted' *Anschluss* in 1938 (Robertson 1977; Adams 1993: 82) when, ironically, Schuschnigg's hopes lied – in vain – with Italy rather than with the post-War order and its custodians (Shirer 1991: 306-308; Eichstaedt 1955). Po-

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21 Accessed online: https://mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesman/briefings/1800470/#4; https://mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesman/briefings/1800470/#11; https://tass.com/defense/1409813.

land's transition from its western-alliance toward a *de facto* rapprochement with Germany until the Danzig-Corridor crisis followed the episodes of appeasement (Sakwa 1973; Cienciala 1999). As late as the Munich period and emboldened by the appeasement process, Poland blocked the passage to USSR troops toward Czechoslovakia and occupied Teschen soon after (Churchill 2002: 391, 409-410; Shirer 1991: 336, 346, 375), months before becoming itself Germany's target. The deterioration of the post-War order encouraged Hungarian revisionism and its rapprochement with Germany (also see Pritz 2003). Again ironically, the same process in its later phases pushed the Trianon-beneficiary Romania, the natural target of the Hungarian revisionism, toward Berlin instead of the custodians, for the sake of a credible alignment in particular against the USSR. Bulgaria also shifted to revisionism and was attracted to Germany in parallel with the custodians' continuous failure to defend the post-War order. The last pre-War example of appeasement-produced centrifugality was the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 1939, including the additional protocol that defined each power's 'zone of influence': The isolation of the USSR by the custodians for the sake of appeasement during the Munich period and afterward (Churchill 2002: 435-444[22]) pushed Moscow to a revisionist-expansionist arrangement with Germany (Shirer 1991: 425-426).

The relative loosening of the Western alignment in post-bipolarity may certainly be considered as the natural result of the disappearance of its opponent (Simón 2013: 181-234; Sperling 2019). Still, NATO – and the EU – as alignment framework not only remained but was adapted to post-bipolarity. It reformulated its priorities and expanded, not only of its own volition but also due to the strong desire of its ex-opponents to adhere to it. It thus constituted the main drive of the post-bipolar order and its normative canon. However, with Russia's challenge declared in 2007 and the custodians' choice for appeasement in the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, the 'second' type of centrifugality emerged due to the decreasing credibility of the Western alignment. It was furthered by the passive appeasement of the Georgian crisis and the active appeasement of the 'Reset', apparently reproducing the 1930's European actors' positional changes in a wider scope yet with less intensity. The contrasted attitude of the non-Russian members of the BRICS between the earlier western-involved and later Russia-involved international crises could be taken as an example to ensuing and expanding centrifugality (Brosig 2019: 81-86, 149-151). As to the Russian near-abroad, the 2010 electoral triumph of pro-Russian Yanukovich may be considered as an early example to the phenomenon.

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22 Regarding the USSR's joint French-British-Soviet guarantee against aggression in Central Europe proposal of May 1939, which was turned down by France and the UK.

The passive appeasement of the Ukrainian crisis seems to have given a new impetus to centrifugality: The Russian-Chinese rapprochement, already having progressed fast after 2001[23], gained further pace in May 2014 with a 400 billion USD worth natural gas agreement, added quickly by a further series of strategic-level projects of strategic scale (Overland & Kubayeva 2018). The bilateral trade volume leapt forward to reach 108 billion USD in 2018 with a declared aim of 200 billion by 2024[24]. In May 2015, during the Russia visit of Xi Jinping, the statement on cooperation between the EAEU and the Silk Road Economic Belt was signed (Lukin 2018a: 179; Lukin 2018b). Moreover, though the SCO Development Strategy until 2025 (2015) indicated that the SCO is not a political-military alliance or an economic integration milieu, changing attitudes as to the alignment of the SCO with the 'Belt' have been observed ever since (Fels 2018: 258-260). Furthermore, Russian entry into Syria and in 2015 and its continuing, undeterred presence there further spread centrifugality at both regional and systemic-levels. It not only attracted the Damascus regime and Iran toward Russian alignment but also enabled Russia to establish direct, 'bypassing' relations and arrangements with western-allied or neutral countries of the region.

Ironically, centrifugality among the western democracies appeared even in sanctioning Russia. Not only did the sanctions remain largely inefficient but also, as mentioned in the previous section, the Euro-Russian trade recovered and approached pre-2014 levels: The volume had declined sharply from 2014 to 2017 (from 326 billion euros to 191 billion), when it leapt to 231 and to 253 billion euros the following years with steadily increasing surpluses for Russia[25]. In terms of FDI, the EU stock in Russia continued to grow between 2014 and 2016 reaching 232 billion euros, then declined to 216 billion in 2017. In the same period, Russian investments in the EU increased from 51 billion to 83.6 billion euros[26].

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23 Treaty of Good-Neighborhood and Friendly Cooperation as the Sino-Russian framework document which also defined a common world-view, stressing sovereignty and non-interference over the post-bipolar order's normative canon.

24 Accessed online: http://en.russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/2016-04/russian-trade-with-china-in-2014/;
http://en.russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/2016-05/russian-trade-with-china-in-2015/; http://en.russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/2017-02/russian-trade-with-china-in-2016/;
http://en.russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/2018-02/russian-trade-with-china-in-2017/; http://en.russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/2019-02/russian-trade-with-china-in-2018/.
https://www.rt.com/business/466481-russia-china-200-billion-turnover/.

25 Accessed online: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_russia_en.pdf.

26 Accessed online: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/overview_russia_en.pdf.

On the other hand, the western democracies attempted also to counter their centrifugality face to the Russian challenge after the Ukrainian Crisis: The Summits of Wales 2014, Warsaw 2016 and Brussels 2018 displayed the political awareness of the situation. The mothballed-looking concepts belonging to the alliance-identity came forth (Burton 2018: 156-166; Larsen 2019). NATO initiated measures regarding the force readiness and deployment accordingly, through the Readiness Action Plan of the Wales Summit; the enhanced security measures with a focus on the Eastern Flank, the 'renewed emphasis on deterrence and collective defence' as well as the 'reliance to US forces' of the Warsaw Summit and the conventional deterrence commitment '30/30/30 over 30' of the Brussels Summit (Heisbourg 2020; Ringsmose & Rynning 2017). Additional measures were taken in the field of nuclear deterrence as well (Larsen 2019). Finally, the Brussels NATO Summit *Communiqué*[27] of June 2021 increased the tone against the Russian system-challenge, added China to the 'list' in stronger terms that it did previously, underlined NATO's anti-authoritarian (pronormative canon) stance and heavily stressed collective security. However, the reinforcement of the NATO-members on their contact-zone with Russia face to its speedy military modernisation, capacity-building and demonstrations has so far been feeble (also see Giles 2017; Petersson 2019). Beyond the discourse, the commitment level of the allies in terms of burden-sharing and their determination face to escalation proved to be obscure. The issue of granting MAPs to Ukraine and Georgia, still a matter of strong inner divergences, did not offer much prospect even in the language of the last NATO Summit and no guarantee was granted to Ukraine during the last escalation prior to Russian invasion, except political support and relatively lower-level demonstrations of military cooperation.

The first month of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which was completed when this part of the paper was written, has shown that the likelihood of empathy and centrifugality was *initially* reduced by Ukraine's success in recovering from the shock and in stalling the Russian advance in all three sub-theatres of the war. As cities did not fall and Russian military resorted to indiscriminate bombing of them, developing empathy for Moscow among the custodians has become more and more difficult. The custodians' initial reaction (heavy economic sanctions and limited yet significant transfer of military equipment to Kiev) has apparently taken root and has been increasing as a Russian defeat has become a possibility. Furthermore, as the war and current sanctions have shown so far the contrast between Russia's imaginary and real economic/mili-

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27 NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué, accessed online: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm.

tary capabilities, centrifugality has been losing one of its motivations, which is Russia's means to balance the custodians. Consequently, the Western Alliance's 'recovery' seems to have gained momentum[28] and the third countries have become more reluctant to appear as Russia's open supporters, including China[29].

Is this state-of-affairs stable? Is it possible to state that the Russian case of systemic appeasement has come to its end without bankrupting the system in contrast to the German one? Has Russia failed in its challenge to the order?

Current discourse of revivification of the custodians' unity and determination may prove to be false after all, despite all miscalculations, failures and proven aggression of Moscow until today. First, the nuclear balance reduces the threat of a general war to a suicidal non-policy and as such, Ukraine remains the only belligerent in the field directly facing the system-challenger's onslaught. After all, the invasion itself was encouraged by the absence of guarantees for Ukraine rather than Ukraine's already long-frozen candidature to NATO membership. Secondly, the likeness of the Ukrainian invasion to the Finnish Winter War may well extend to a similar end in the absence of massive military aid or intervention by the order, which is a compromise that would satisfy some of the Russian demands on Ukraine, namely plebiscites in Donetsk, Lugansk and Crimea as well as constitutional neutrality of Ukraine with a Moscow-involved monitoring and enforcement mechanism. The ongoing negotiations apparently include these and the Ukrainian side already voiced its possible consent to neutrality and arguably even plebiscites[30]. If the Ukrainian army will be unable to inflict a total military defeat upon Russia, which does not seem probable, a 'Finnish so-

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28 Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government, Brussels 24 March 2022, accessed online: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_193719.htm.

29 News on China's attitude, accessed online: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/15/china-does-not-want-to-be-impacted-by-russia-sanctions-fm; https://www.economist.com/china/chinas-friendship-with-russia-has-boundaries-despite-what-their-leaders-say/21808197; https://www.usnews.com/news/world-report/articles/2022-03-18/china-indicates-to-biden-it-wont-send-weapons-to-russia-as-bloody-war-in-ukraine-grinds-on.

30 News on the matters being discussed for ending hostilities: accessed online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/30/ukraine-offer-neutrality-meaning-constitution-russia-what-does-neutral-status-country-mean-how-would-it-work; https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-zelenskyy-says-ukraine-is-willing-to-consider-declaring-neutrality-and-offer-security-guarantees-to-russia-12576688; https://www.ft.com/content/7b341e46-d375-4817-be67-802b7fa77ef1; https://www.newsweek.com/russia-claims-dispute-over-crimea-donbas-settled-ukraine-1693474; https://www.forbes.com/sites/dereksaul/2022/03/29/russia-ukraine-talks-ukraine-hints-at-progress-on-crimea-while-both-sides-optimistic-on-putin-zelensky-meeting/?sh=4f806e6e27d3.

lution' in terms of territorial arrangements akin to that of the Winter War's end and in terms of neutrality similar to that of the Continuation War's end, is becoming more and more likely. The very Ukrainian 'consent' is susceptible to legitimate Crimea's and the two secessionist entities' statuses, thus eliminate the basis for the sanctions against Russia. Moreover, Ukrainian consent to neutrality would *impose* recognition of Russia's predominance in its self-declared near-abroad upon the custodians with repercussions on Georgia and Moldova as well as on Central Asia and the rest of the Caucasus. How individual defence guarantees, in particular if they would be conditional, would prevent a repetition of the Czechoslovakian affair is obscure. As such, Russian invasion's reduction to a stalemate, due to the peace solution it brings forward, appears *even* more deteriorating to the order than a complete achievement of the initial Russian goals in Ukraine, which would but perpetuate the new set of sanctions as well as the custodians' reversal of the centrifugality.

In other words, the current *systemic* impasse the custodians find themselves in is but the result of the appeasement cycle which is susceptible to self-perpetuate even against the appeasers' will. Years of appeasement, here in the form of failure to guarantee Ukraine, provided the system-challenger with a considerable margin of manoeuvre including advantageous results from a *militarily inconclusive aggression war*, while depriving the custodians from it, making their main tool to deter the system-challenger, the sanctions, vulnerable to compromise the aggressed side may have to make. Passive appeasement, as such, may become a situation – rather than policy – which imposes itself upon the-now-unwilling custodians.

In case the Russian regime proves to be a resilient face to the current wave of sanctions, the end of the war, however militarily humiliating, may still serve Moscow by completing the exclusion of the 'order' from its near-abroad for a foreseeable future, through the neutralisation of Ukraine that would immediately gain validity for all ex-Soviet Republics minus the three NATO-members. From there onward, in particular if the Ukrainian peace would suppress the sanctions as passive appeasement *forced* upon the custodians as the uncontrollable result of the previous appeasements, the system-challenge may but be reinvigorated, focus probably on shifting itself to third geographies in creating more Syria-type order-challenger balances with more centrifugality. The appeasement cycle, in such a case, may even lose its meaning, for the post-bipolar 'order' would likely lose its meaning, the normative canon being no more preponderant but reduced to an 'option' of the dialectic which replaces it, instead of constituting a deteriorating-yet-inner dynamic of it.

Conclusion

Appeasement of a systemic nature is a phenomenon produced by the change of international order that sets a major power with *specifically* definable yet *systemic* issues against custodian-actors with much more flexible, vaguer concerns of preserving the order in general. Appeasement stems from this positional difference between the challenger and the challenged and it satisfies both sides for a time. However, it progresses in the form of escalation-(altered) empathy-appeasement-centrifugality cycle and stopping it becomes more and more difficult given the centrifugality's consequences on alignments and the appeasement's empowerment of the challenger within the framework of the antithetic actor-system relationship. As such, it reaches to a point where no more room remains for appeasement and no possibility for the system-challenger to stop escalation. As such, the cycle leads to its own bankruptcy together with that of the order. This happened in September 1939, when the custodians unilaterally guaranteed Poland and maintained their stance even when Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was signed (Gillard 2007: 157-177). Germany proved to be unable to cease its challenge as well, which would consequently contradict the very dynamics that brought it to its position from 1933 onwards as it would constitute an appeasement of its own.

Are we there now? The Russian 'cycle' progressed substantially as regards its outward sovereignty issues related to its 'near-abroad' and the 'matters of international importance', as regards its irredentism (passively appeased in the form of ineffective sanctions) and as regards its free hand demand as far as it overlapped with these two categories. Appeasement-incited centrifugality increased both among the western-anchored actors and the third countries despite the custodians' recovery efforts since the 2014 NATO Summit. Russian alignment became an option for the more authoritarian regimes, themselves system-challengers or by nature challenged by the system.

The process, however, committed Russia to its own momentum as it did to Germany in its time. The invasion of Ukraine appears as the most critical episode of the cycle so far and it is ongoing, with surprising military humiliation for Moscow yet with a significant systemic advantage stemming from this very stalemate, which is a peace that might provide Russia with limited yet *systemically* meaningful gains in Ukraine (neutrality and plebiscites) and with the consequent, if 'unwilling', lifting of the now-effective western sanctions. Such a peace is seemingly on the table, as the negotiations show, unless Russia is thoroughly defeated in its war. As such, the appeasement cycle may impose itself upon the custodians, now against their will. Yet it may be the last episode as well, such as it had been in March 1939, as there is now at least a will to stop the cycle

and awareness of a viable non-belligerent tool to struggle against the challenger, which is the now-proven efficiency of rigorous and comprehensive sanctions. Possibly not Ukraine but the upcoming episode is therefore susceptible to constitute the 'Danzig of our times'.

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The Struggle for Development

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The history of development economics as a scholarly discipline has followed two trajectories in the social sciences: in the first instance, an authoritative wave of studies led by Gerschenkron and Rostow has argued that any country follows a linear path from backwardness to growth and development through successive steps. This trajectory is supposed to gain traction in former developing countries when these economies catch up with industrial nations through the acquisition of new technologies, the creation of new economic institutions and a vast mobilisation of bank credit: this tangle of multiple factors prompts the least developed countries (LDCs) to experience a fast-growing economic modernisation. The second theory worth mentioning in order to review a text on contemporary development policies such as *The Struggle for Development* by Benjamin Selwyn, is the marxist theory of underdevelopment. Post-WWII marxist theories of modernisation (Baran 1957) have brought into question a classical idea of 'modernisation' as the evolution of 'tradition'; according to marxist economic sociology the process of modernisation stems from a set of multiple exploitative relations between a few core capitalist countries and the underdeveloped periphery (Wallerstein 1983): such unequal balance of power relations let the advanced industrial economies acquire at low-price the LDCs' strategic and natural resources, as well as their manpower. Accordingly, the industrialised economies gain the lion's share of global manufacturing and trading. *The Struggle for Development* falls in this category of marxist interpretation of development as both

a theoretical concept and as a policy specific to contemporary global economic governance.

The author focuses attention on the concept of development as defined by most global economic institutions (UN, World Bank, IMF, ILO, etc) gathered in what is usually termed the Anti-Poverty Consensus (APC), as well as on liberal-thinking critical of the APC. According to the APC global alliance, economic growth has spread across the globe over the last quarter-century as a result of the process of international economic integration of national markets. This has supposedly brought an ever-growing number of underemployed or unemployed people across the globe to leave poverty and enjoy the economic fruits of global market integration. A corollary to this APC theory is therefore that in the fore-seeable future GDP-centred growth induced by global capitalism will certainly eradicate poverty. On the other hand, according to the author it is true that most prominent liberal intellectuals as Stiglitz and others critical of contemporary global capitalism run counter to its ill-functioning, charged with growing world inequality and wealth concentration. Notwithstanding this, they acknowledge property rights and do not take a departure from the APC in so far as they make the argument that workers and employers get access to global markets of their own free will. Therefore, this Anti-Poverty Counter Consensus (APCC) refrains from focusing on what Selwyn considers a key issue to understand development: the balance of power between capital and labour in global production chains and markets. The author first offers a contestation of the APC approach to development both by reappraising the money metric definition of poverty line set by the World Bank (chapter 2), and through a thorough reflection on capital labour-relations in contemporary Global Value Chains (GVC), tackled in chapter 3. More specifically, Selwyn contends that the $1 a day poverty line set by the World Bank (World Bank 1990) is a fundamentally misleading and flawed criterion to measure poverty: it is a consumption per person index, not an income-based index of poverty; it is revalued and adjusted according to a metric purchasing power parity criterion but is not in any way linked either to the amount of hours worked and the working conditions under which a least minimum disposable income to consume a $1 a day is earned. Neither does it consider the quality of life, for instance foodstuffs, a worker can afford under such a poverty threshold. This benchmark has let the APC institutions successfully sustain that international market integration has raised a global middle-income class. However, according to the author, this approach underestimates the impoverishment of a vast majority of former peasants or family households who – from Africa to China and Asia – over the last few decades have migrated to global cities to get a job on global production lines. Along the line of a marxian reasoning on the extrac-

tion of surplus value, Selwyn suggests that the work of this new global working class is paid less than the wealth it contributes to generating. The asymmetric power relations between capital and labour is the premise to let global firms join fierce competition among global corporations across the manufacturing and service sectors. Therefore the author renames GVC as Global Poverty Chains. The second part of this book, based on the assumption that social reproduction in contemporary global capitalism rests on the exploitation of a global labouring class according to a set of gender and racial biases resembling Marx's idea of a pre-industrial working class, offers first a reappraisal of development theories revolving around a capital centred conception of the world premised over the assumption that labour is an input into development policies and as such labour exploitation can be justified (chapter 4). Thereafter Selwyn traces the types of development policies that revolved around the pillar of workers (pro-labour and labour-driven development). Then he provides a proposal on how to structure a labour-led development model based on labouring-class collective actions aimed at making developmental gains out of states and capital. Such labour-led development, epitomised by contemporary struggles in both rural societies of Brazil and India, and in metalworking industries in Africa, according to *The Struggle for Development* is well-rooted in the history of mass struggles since the start of modernity. It has the final objective of building new organisation forms thought to ameliorate the life and work of today's global labour class in the productive and reproductive spheres (chapter 5). The final chapter is a kind of political manifesto tracing the strategy to set up political conditions in a relatively poor country to establish labour-led development: the combination of mass movements and labour class access to democratic and representative institutions such as parliaments are pinpointed as preconditions to create a truly democratic labour-led model of development.

This book, albeit authored by a professional scholar specialising in development and international relations, is premised over a clear-cut ideological approach to capital-labour relations and, more importantly, provides an analysis aimed to formulate a specific action proposal tailored to political movements, not germane to academic debates. Aside from this, the author reappraises some mainstream concepts of development by making some weak theoretical or historical arguments. For instance, he calls attention to the unequal wealth distribution featuring economic growth in contemporary global capitalism. He argues that this asymmetric income distribution is generated by both intensive use of high tech and information technology, particularly in financial markets, and industrial relations devised to clamp down on labour cost. According to Selwyn, this twin strategy lets global firms increase their competitive edge in global

markets and step up the competitive race among global corporations to conquer the lion's share of world trade and transactions. In arguing this the author underestimates the role of states in leveraging and subsidising global firms. Furthermore, he pinpoints the process of industrial hiving off from the industrial world to the LDCs as the specific way global firms faced up to declining profits following the 1970s world economic slowdown. In his view industrial decentralisation to those countries served the purpose of cutting labour costs. However, he downplays that what prompted corporations to move production lines to the LDCs was also a closer proximity to natural and strategic resources and, more importantly, the opportunity to take advantage of more favourable fiscal pressure.

This book is a succinct and ideological bias handbook on development useful for sophomore classes and anyone without previous knowledge of development theories and history in international studies.

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