Turkey's Strategic Imperatives (2010-2012)
By Aneta Speldova, Martin Sotola and Tereza Trejbalova
Introduction
With the unfolding nuclearisation of Iran, it is necessary to reassess Turkey, as a regional pivot, able to shape the boundaries of engagement -- whether such engagement occurs on the diplomatic/political or military level -- and explore some strategic imperatives Turkey may define (for itself) vis-à-vis Iran. While it is clear that Iran is reaching for hegemony, Turkey has the capability to balance against Iran's ambitions and of emerging as a regional hegemon itself. It is noteworthy that Turkey's power is not only based on its military prowess, its economic potential and geographic proximity is also central. On the latter, Turkey bridges the EU to the Middle East, though has clearly staked its future, at least for the time-being, on Europe, as it is an EU candidate country and contributes to EU security provisions though its active NATO membership. This analysis explores some priorities for Turkey and seeks to present particular options and courses of action it may embark on in order to: defend its own material interests, shape regional power relations and centre itself in the strategic perspective of its NATO and EU allies in the face of Iran's nuclear and hegemonic ambitions. This analysis is relatively narrow, and aims to present the current situation and provide an anticipatory view of Turkey's strategic imperatives regarding Iran, between 2010 and 2012.
The Turkey-Iran Dyad
Like other proximate states, Turkish security would be undermined by Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons. At present, the two states enjoy vibrant economic relations, enhanced by several trade and security agreements. However, the introduction of (Iranian) nuclear weapons into the relationship promises to disrupt the distribution of power, and Iran will likely use their possession of such weapons to reach for regional hegemony and the underlining Turko-Iranian rivalry will surface and pose an acute security challenge. This would be coupled with the ominous danger posed by a deepening Russo-Iranian alliance encouraged by the potential spike in physical power Iran would experience as it emerged as a nuclear armed state. The Russo-Iran nexus must not be divided, into its parts, in the strategic perspective of Turkey, which would have to deal with an assortment of security issues, on two fronts -- on its South-eastern land frontier (Iran), and on its Northern coastal areas (Black Sea, Russia) -- as Iran's bid for regional hegemony would raise to prospect of Russian belligerence and its own quest to cement its regional influence.
Despite Turkey's NATO membership, and EU candidacy, it cannot fully rely on either of these for support in dealing with the growing Iranian threat. NATO will only militarily aid Turkey following physical Iranian aggression against it, and the EU seems unwilling to deepen their security relationship to help Turkey resolve its security challenges before they reach critical points. At the same time however, Turkey continues to pursue its potential EU membership and thus is forced to maintain a policy of strategic restraint.
Turkey's Objectives
Turkey should perceive the challenge presented by Iran as a top priority. It should attempt to weaken the position of Iran and, by extension Russia, and prevent either from extending their sphere(s) of influence further in the Caucasus and Caspian regions.
Turkey's prospective EU membership demands that it does not act in an overtly aggressive manner, even though it is unable to enlist any additional assistance from the EU. As a second priority then, Turkey should attempt to boost its credibility, and encourage EU commitments to the resolution of its pending challenges.
The aforementioned objectives may be summarized in the following order of importance; Turkey should try and:
1. Keep Iran down
2. Keep Russia out
3. Get the EU in
These objectives are fundamentally linked. In order to curtail Iran's power, Turkey must undermine Russia's support for Iran, and prevent it from consolidating its regional position as this could isolate Iran and therefore increase its vulnerability. A vulnerable Iran could, in turn, limit further Russian influence. To achieve such ambitions, Turkey must enlist the EU.
Keeping Iran down
Although Iran is a first level challenge to Turkey, the latter is unable to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, it is in Turkey's best interest to limit the regional influence of Iran since becoming a nuclear power would potentially shift the balance of power in the region in its favour. As part of its strategic approach, Turkey should split its economic interests and diversify its energy supplies to reduce dependence on Iran while heighten its regional alliance role. It is on this last point that Turkey may find its optimal strategic advantage.
Turkey could direct its political energies to forming an alliance network which aims to strengthen its own position and balance against Iran. This would allow Turkey to project its military power in the region without causing regional fluctuation.
Turkey should:
1. Continue reconciliation efforts with Armenia;
2. Strengthen cooperation and form alliances with: Ukraine, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Israel;
3. Offer attractive values and constructive solutions to regional problems; and,
4. Employ its strong economic potential, ties to the West and unique geopolitical position.
This approach has implications for an extensive set of objectives as it could also increase Turkey's strategic importance for the EU, and limit Russia's influence in the region.
Keep Russia Out
Preventing Russia from tightening its grip on the region is a second level challenge, one closely related to the challenge posed by Iran as these are mutually reinforcing. Without Russian support, Iran is vulnerable, and Russia is hampered if Iran were successfully ‘kept down.'
An alliance policy (as noted above) could help increase Turkey's relevance, and reduce Russia's manoeuvrability, though Turkey is not powerful enough to ‘keep Russia out' on its own.
‘Keeping Russia out' is directly dependent on ‘getting EU in,' as the EU is significantly more important to Russian interests than Iran is, due to the volumes of economic activity between them.
Getting the EU In
If Turkey is to solve the challenges it faces, without undermining its potential EU membership, it must get the EU involved. Turkey needs to demonstrate that it is a responsible partner for the EU, and this entails negotiated settlements with Kurdistan and Armenia. Turkey must convince the EU that they share certain common long-term interests, such as a nuclear-weapons free Iran, the limitation of Russian influence, energy security, confronting Islamic extremism, and promoting regional stability and peace, (etc). In doing so, Turkey needs to start ‘thinking outside of the box' make concessions and being the long process of political stabilisation.
Of key importance for the EU and Turkey, is the issue of Kurdistan. Turkey should begin promoting the establishment of an independent Kurdistan, and request the EU's partnership with the task of consolidating the new state. This would increase Turkey's credibility and raise its appeal for the EU. More importantly, it would draw the EU into the region as a partner of Turkey, and construct viable regional stakes for the EU. The EU might even establish a presence in a newly-created Kurdistan. On a strategic level, an independent Kurdistan could introduce a new pressure point against Iran, since the latter would likely not grant its Kurdish population the right to succeed into a Kurdish state. This approach would therefore add to the objective of keeping Iran down.
Summary
Turkey is faced with challenges posed by its Middle Eastern neighbours, and the expectations of the EU. In this context, Turkey must deal with a growing nuclear threat from Iran -- aided by Russia -- while the EU offers little or no support. Turkey's strategies should concentrate on drawing the EU nearer to Turkey in order to gain the EU's help in retarding Russia's ‘influence proliferation' in the region, with the ultimate goal of limiting Iran's hegemonic reach.
To accomplish this, Turkey should engage in a policy of accumulating allies; attempt to increase its appeal through the exhibition of responsible leadership and enlist the EU's help in establishing an independent Kurdistan.
17 November 2009
