Cejiss

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Legitimacy; traditionally manifested in types of political representation and extensions of territorial sovereignty, form the backbone of domestic and international political life. Yet processes of legitimation are not stagnant; they interact with wider political contexts. In other words, legitimacy is ever-evolving. What is less prone to alteration however is the manner in which states and political representatives defend their perceived legitimacy and it is a matter of urgency to view recent events in the Middle East and North Africa not as a struggle for a particular ideology but as a struggle for greater harmony between the governed and governing classes. Such a legitimacy-centric vantage must be contrasted with the seeming spontaneity of the separate, but somehow interconnected, spate of Arab unrest, often depicted as ‘revolts,’ ‘revolutions,’ or ‘uprisings,’ and collectively referred to as the Arab Spring.

If the recent proliferation of political activism and violence is truly based on questions of legitimacy then it stands to reason that the tensions that gave rise to such mass movements have more expansive histories and are not simply violent out-bursts intended to rapidly mobilise people towards one exclusive political goal. The Arab states did not go through a period of awakening and suddenly, at the end of 2010, demanded democracy. Instead, there were a series of processes and conditions unique to individual Arab states which boiled over forcing people to reassess who is endowed with legitimacy.

Only through such a ‘legitimacy lens’ is it possible to fully appreciate what is actually going on among a handful of Arab states and understand both the root issues and the manifestation of political activism, which greatly differ state-to-state. For instance, Egypt’s Mubarak had pandered too close to the US, EU and Israel and his regime was deeply corrupt, prone to nepotism and generally denied the masses equal economic prospects while hording immense financial assets. These enduring preferences and behaviours led the majority of Egyptians to view Mubarak as an illegitimate ruler and the mass upheaval Egypt underwent was a means to deliver Egypt from the clutches of a petty dictator. That democracy has been rhetorically embraced is based on the public’s preference to select a new genre of political representation and not necessarily for the sake of democracy itself. In Tunisia a similar cycle occurred where the masses sought to seize the levers of power from the corrupt Ben-Ali’s. The Tunisians may have selected democracy as the vehicle for change however it is clear that what the wider public sought was greater legitimacy for the governing classes. Unlike Egypt, Tunisia is not a geopolitical magnet for the US and EU and neither does it have an especially close relationship to Israel. Indeed, the reason behind public political activism was primarily driven by Tunisians’ economic interests and the removal of the restraints erected by Ben-Ali’s regime.

Currently, in the Middle East, varying motivations acts as the fundament of political change with the only real similarity being the public recognition of ‘legitimacy gaps’ and the mass movements meant to redress the problem. In short, very different motivations – based on recent and more distant history – sit as the root causes of the Egyptian and Tunisian political activism and will produce different types of governments in those states. The same logic may be applied to Algeria, Libya, Syria and Yemen.

Despite the stark differences between the unfolding revolutionary movements, far too many scholars and media outlets summarise them according to the binary view of democracy and non-democracy. This has led to a misunderstanding of the issues at stake in and among each of the conflagrating states. Indeed, it has been assumed that the ill-defined ‘Arabs’ had simply grown tired of their regimes and wanted democratic change. Such simplicity clouds the real issues that were and are at stake and each Arab revolt needs to be viewed through their own, unique geopolitical and identity-based lenses.

This problematic is especially true in the small Sheikdom of Bahrain, which occupied the front pages of the international press as though it represented concrete evidence that the Arab world was attempting to breathe life into their dormant states and economies. Indeed, Bahrain has been so markedly internationally ostracised for its (state) actions against the self-proclaimed ‘Pearl Revolutionaries’ that few have adequately reflected on the revolution and are content to lay blame on ‘heavy-handed’ Bahraini security forces and the military intervention of Saudi Arabia. This has, in effect, veiled the dynamic international elements, namely Iran, which inspired and geopolitically gained from the revolution.

Bahrain is no stranger to the ‘revolutionary zeal’ it experienced between 17 February and 19 March 2011 and the upheaval was not based on internal combustion (as in Tunisia and Egypt). The violence was just another episode in the three decade (+) geopolitical struggle instigated by Iran in a bid to manipulate sentiments for incremental advances in their regional political power. Only through an investigation of Iran’s geopolitical ambitions can sense be made of the Bahraini circumstances and only then can adequate counter-policies be adopted and applied.

The Irano-Bahraini War of Attrition

Despite the (then) Iranian Shah’s 1970 proclamation relinquishing territorial claims to Bahrain, the Islamic revolutionary council – which after 1979 sought to undo the former regimes political labours – commenced on a Shiite revival movement blending the exportation of the revolution to areas containing substantial Shiite populations within the (late) Persian Empire’s territorial configurations. In other words, the Islamic Republic of Iran has adopted the objective of reclaiming the boundaries of the Persian Empire as part of its grand strategy to spread its ideology and enhance its regional influence. Indeed, key members of Iran’s religio-political leadership have consistently sought to undermine the legitimacy of Bahrain’s sovereignty in public proclamations and more brazen clandestine operations.

The former types of delegitimation are irresponsible and likely to heighten tensions. Take the 22 February 2009 pronouncement of Advisor to the Grand Ayatollah, Nateq Nuri, who claimed that Bahrain was Iran’s fourteenth province based on the Persian Empires’ former control of the territory in the 17th and 18th centuries. While many in the Middle East and North Africa suffer from selective memory syndrome (SMS), this statement underscores just how myopic the Iran is. Consider a return to the 17th and 18th century, or better yet the 19th and 20th century when Persia was ripped into two competing spheres of influence, the UK’s and Imperial Russia’s. It is likely that Iran would launch a tirade of international condemnations if one of those powers were to suggest a return to colonial times. However, sensing the shifting political tides and the momentum of Shiite movements in Bahrain, the Iranian leadership took the opportunity to politically delegitimise Bahrain and has revealed its own colonial ambitions. To be sure, it cost them some political clout in the Arab world as Morocco withdrew its ambassador to Tehran and the Arab world unanimously condemned the statement. After a brief period of ‘wound-licking’ however, it was back to business as usual.

Despite the seemingly ‘low-intensity’ delegitimising remarks by Nuri, the reestablishment of Iran’s claim has reverberated throughout the chambers of Bahraini state security which became even more acutely sensitive to all Shiite political movements owing to the great uncertainty of how far Iran would be willing to go in order to physically reclaim its proclaimed ‘fourteenth province.’

States have initiated hostilities for far less affronts to their legitimacy and the so-called ‘Football War’ (1969) between El Salvador and Honduras should act as a solemn reminder at the length states are willing to go to defend their integrity. Unlike the El Salvador-Honduran conflict however, there is an intimidating imbalance of power between Iran and Bahrain with the former’s total population sitting around 77 million and the latter at 750,000. Indeed, Iran’s standing military (510,000) is the roughly equivalent to 2/3 of Bahrain’s entire population and significantly greater than its Sunni community. With such a power imbalance there is little wonder why Bahrain’s leaders are sensitive to even verbal attacks against its legitimacy. This must also be considered against the backdrop of previous cases of delegitimising territorial claims. For instance, as Iraqi tanks rolled against Kuwait on 02 August 1990, Hussein announced that the latter was Iraq’s 19th province and that his action was meant to reconstruct the State of Iraq as it was ‘meant’ to be.

The political posturing of a select number of leading Iranian officials is not going to undermine the legitimacy of Bahrain, and it is a matter of speculation how much credence the Bahrainis lend such proclamations. Ultimately, whether Iran recognises Bahrain is not of fundamental importance. However, its actions speak volumes as to its true intent and the ominous challenges hurled at Bahrain are becoming increasingly acute and deserve attention. If Iran were content with uttering a few controversial remarks for domestic political consumption then Bahrain would have little to worry about both internally and regionally. However, Iran has, since the birth of the Islamic Republic (1979), taken concrete steps to destabilise, delegitimise and denigrate Bahrain through exogenous pressures and the support of domestic (Shiite Bahraini) revolutionary movements. Indeed, there are three identifiable phases of Iran’s interference with Bahrain: 1. Islamic Revolution exportation, 1979-1989; 2. Shiite Intifada, 1994-2000; and 3. the ‘Pearl Revolution,’ 2008-2011.

Revolutionary Exportation, 1979-1989

While Bahrain’s internal political scene, much like the wider region, faced increased tensions during and following the Islamic millenarian year 1400 (1979 on the Gregorian Calendar), it had to wait two excruciating years to witness the zealous political fermentation inspired and supported (materially and spiritually) by Iran unfold on its territory. By 1981 however, Iran’s regional intensions were clear; the exportation of the Shiite-led Islamic revolution to other Shiite communities in the region (notably: Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and North-Western Yemen).

The direct consequence of Iran’s revolution exportation took the form of the Tehran based Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB), which commenced its activities in 1981 with a high-profile, but unsuccessful, attempted coup d’état planned for 16 December, Bahrain’s national day. The details of the plot are telling. Iranian intelligence officers assembled a disciplined and highly motivated team of local Shiite Bahrainis who conducted in-depth intelligence operations and were trained in small arms and explosives. The idea was to have these Bahrainis dress as police and security officials and simultaneously attack the radio and television broadcasting facilities, Bahraini international airport, assassinate key members of the Al-Khalifa regime and stoke a wider Shiite rebellion. From within the ensuing chaos, Iran would directly militarily intervene and establish a Shiite theocracy under the leadership of Hojjat ol-Eslam Kamal Haidari, an Iranian cleric. The plot was discovered when the United Arab Emirates (UAE) recorded unusual sea-faring transits of young men from Iran to Bahrain and tipped off security officials. All the conspirators were arrested and large weapons caches and communications devices were discovered in six locations around the island.

The fear of Iran’s military conquest of Bahrain resulted in tremendous political tremors throughout the region, prodding the six Arabian Peninsula states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) into an economic-military alliance; the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC, 1981) in addition to a variety of new security oriented pacts and alliances. For instance, on 20 December 1981 Saudi Arabia and Bahrain sign a Security Pact based on the shared recognition of a mounting Iranian threat. The Saudi Government, represented by Prince Nayef ibn Abdel Aziz, announced that Iran was ‘training, arming and financing terrorists with the aim of undermining stability throughout the Persian Gulf’ and that the Kingdom places its entire ‘potential in the service of Bahrain’s security.’ This was no standard mutual security pact; it was based on using the full capabilities of Saudi Arabia in order to deter Iran from continuing to flood the smaller peninsular states with Shiite revolutionary movements. The Saudi-Iranian game of political brinkmanship had kicked off.

At first, Iran paid little heed to the Bahraini-Saudi alliance, continuing in its attempts to export the Islamic Revolution and using the spiralling conflict with Iraq as an excuse, began to further militarise Shiite communities throughout the region. This carried on for much of the early 1980s, with Iran supplying money, weapons and military leaders to bands of Shiite rebels, seeking unrest in Bahrain and the military intervention of Iran. While such activities were routinely countered the situation was a perpetual four-way game of cat-and-mouse with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain chasing after Iran and Bahraini Shiite rebels.

The balance of power only shifted in Bahrain’s (and Saudi Arabia’s) favour after direct US military intervention in defence of the Persian Gulf sea lanes. US involvement provided Bahrain with needed breathing space to adjust its posture for dealing with the looming Iranian threat. While many may seek to criticise the US’s regional presence – it set up a maritime facility in Bahrain in 1987, after attacks on its merchant fleet – it was acting in a defensive manner, responding as it were to Iran’s illegal naval mining of the sea lanes in a geopolitical bid to turn the international straits into an Iranian ‘lake.’

Indeed, while US forces were engaged in Operation Earnest Will, protecting Kuwaiti flagged vessels heading to and from the Indian Ocean, the US frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts was struck by an Iranian mine (14 April 1988) and severely damaged. The US was quick to respond and four days later it launched Operation Praying Mantis (OPM) which was a 24-hour blitz to sweep Iran’s naval presence from both sides of the Gulf. OPM was successful and Iran lost two frigates (one sunk, one severely damaged), two oil platforms that had been refit as command, control and communications (C3) centres for Iran’s navy, and at least five smaller high-speed sea vehicles. This action occurred against the backdrop of clear evidence that a 1987 attempted terrorist campaign against Bahrain was 1. Iranian sponsored and 2. aimed at US and European targets including the US Embassy, oil depots and European bank offices.

With the deployment of the US navy to Bahrain, as part of OPM, the Iranians were operationally checked, and with the end of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), had other pressing issues to attend to. It is clear that US deployments forced Iran to abandon its direct military involvement in Bahrain and dashed its hopes of exporting its Islamic revolution through direct efforts.

The Intifada, 1994-2000

The US naval presence in Bahrain posed a formidable deterrent against militarised intervention though only encouraged Iran to achieve its objectives through the deployment of more oblique methods. Indeed, the US had shown its support for Bahrain and Saudi Arabia through the humiliating onslaught delivered against Iran’s navy. For the US, this action was enough to dispel the myths of Iranian power (regional and international) but did not altogether discourage the Islamic Republic from interfering in its immediate and more distant neighbourhoods.

When it comes to Bahrain, it is clear that Iran has played the ‘ethnic card’ to rally Shiite Bahrainis behind the drum-beat of ‘democracy’ and ‘equality;’ themes that have spilt-over to more recent times. This was in many ways a media coup for Iran as it was able to deploy all the technologies the late 20th century had to offer to ‘reveal’ the suppression of the Al-Khalifa regime supported by the US and Saudi Arabia. This came at a time when much of the world was watching the collapse of the USSR and the eruption of genuine democracy movements.

Using the momentum and shifting international priorities, Iran championed itself as a democratic state and has gone to great lengths to show that it supports democracy in Bahrain. How the regime managed to gain such high levels of support throughout the predominately Sunni Arab states of the Middle East is a mystery, however it occurred and the US, EU and Sunni States had to contend with a new wave of anti-establishment political activism.

In contrast to the first, more direct, phase of the Irano-Bahraini conflict, the second took the form of an intifada; a not-so-spontaneous display of local Shiite determination to secure the mantel of power at the expense of the ruling Al-Khalifa’s. Iranian fingers were not lingering too far behind the first round of coordinated violence in mid-November 1994. Shiite demonstrators publically rallied for ‘jobs’ and insisted that they were denied adequate opportunities. This was merely a pretext and it soon became apparent that the preferred tactic of such employment-seeking activists was violence, stone and Molotov-cocktail throwing. The first round of the demonstrations left ten people dead (nine demonstrators and one police officer), dozens injured and hundreds languishing in Bahraini prisons.

Street protests, expressed as ‘Days of Rage (Arabic: Youm al-Ghadad, الغضب يوم)’ picked-up both tempo and ferocity; Bahrainis faced daily acts of subversion, violence, and general insecurity while Iranian authorities cynically offered to ‘mediate’ between the regime and demonstrators while evidence mounted which proved Iran’s inspirational and training activities provided to the leaders of the intifada. Once this evidence was relayed to US and Saudi officials, the US sought to discourage Iranian involvement by permanently stationing its Fifth Fleet, which includes a Carrier Strike Group and an Amphibious Ready Group (roughly 16000 troops) in Manama. The Shiites and their Iranian backers took the US move as a provocation – probably because the latter’s influence and capabilities would be further sapped – and intensified their intifada, using the daily violence as cover for more ambitious plans of launching a terrorist campaign against Bahrain and the US personnel stationed there. Indeed, as the intifada unfolded, Muhammed Taqi Mudarissi, (reportedly trained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards), encouraged by the success of Hezbollah in Lebanon established a hybrid in Bahrain called the Military Wing of Hezbollah Bahrain (MWHB).

On 12 February 1996, Islamic ‘militants’ claimed responsibility for the bombing of a hotel in central Manama and while initial indications pointed to the IFLB, it soon became apparent that the IFLB had merged with the new-found MWHB in all but name and it was the latter which had carried out the attack. This was followed by the 15 March 1996, Arson attack against a Bangladeshi restaurant and renewed street violence, which peaked following Bahrain’s execution of a Shiite demonstrator found guilty of murdering a police officer during the December 1994 wave of violence; it was Bahrain’s first invocation of capital punishment in twenty years.

Once again however, Iran over-played its cards, encouraged the MWHB to stage a Shiite coup (03 June 1996), which again brought Bahrain’s allies to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the Al-Khalifa’s and a general downgrading of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain to Iran. The result was a series of arrests and the undeclared issuance of martial law which strangled the last remaining plotters and demonstrators and paved the way for the restoration of stability and public order.

The intifada finally drew to a close at the end of the millennium with two defining events: the trial of Sheik Abdul-Ameer al-Jamri and the death of Sheik Issa bin Salman Al Khalifa and the succession of his eldest son Hamed ibn Issa Khalifa who promptly ordered an end to emergency rule.

The importance of al-Jamri’s trial should not be understated as he was not only the ringleader of the Shiite intifada; he was also the most important conduit between Iran and Bahraini Shiite organisations. Instead of ordering the death penalty, the Bahraini courts decided on a ‘more lenient’ but very visible punishment: a ten-year prison sentence and a fine of some $15.4 million (USD) for the charges of espionage (for Iran) and inciting demonstrators to violence. Bahrain, it seems, had learned important lessons in dealing with Iranian sponsored demonstrations and coups; it is better to imprison and humiliate Iran’s servants rather than kill them and elevate them to ‘Shiite martyrs.’ Indeed, the trial was tense and brought Shiites out to the streets in groves. However, the sentence was enough to quell the brewing unrest and thus postponed the return to street violence.

Additionally, Hamed’s assumption of power further defused the Sunni-Shiite standoff and whereas the US and Saudi Arabia successfully prevented Iran’s penetration of the Island – with even small numbers of activists or Revolutionary Guards – Hamed’s general amnesty and (re)invocation of the Shura Council (elected parliament) denied political agitators the critical masses required to achieve their objectives by addressing the grievances of legitimate demonstrators and even in the age of savvy revolutionaries deploying 21st century technologies, it is difficult to spin such high-ranking overtures with any degree of seriousness, especially since al-Jamri himself was pardoned.

And so, for nearly a decade, Bahrain remained in some form of suspended animation, attempting to balance reform and security; to give all Bahraini citizens, Sunni and Shiite, more freedom and means of political expression while defending the integrity of the state and preventing a return to the violence of the previous decades. Curiously however, the more the Al-Khalifa regime reformed the Sheikdom, the more militant the Shiite community became. For instance, between 2001 and 2002 the Sheikdom transformed itself into a Constitutional Monarchy and granted all citizens (male and female) the right to vote and run for parliamentary seats which required free and fair elections. These were held in October 2002 despite Shiite parties calling for a total boycott.

The Pearl Revolution, 2008-2011

While many have attempted to paint the 2011 situation in Bahrain as part of the unfolding set of Arab revolutions, such are false premises and the so-called Pearl Revolution, preceding its (again, savvy) namesake, began in January 2008 with the arrest of senior Shiite clerics connected to the al-Hak movement and accused of conspiracy and planning a coup d’état. Their followers went on hunger strikes and tensions again began to mount. Interestingly, these tensions were directly connected to other unfolding regional events directly connected to Iran. For instance, as part of the US’s drive to prevent the nuclearisation of Iran, it pressured Bahrain to suspend its financial dealings with the Islamic Republic, and on 18 January 2008, Bahrain’s Ahli United Bank suspended cooperation with Iran, resulting in an acute currency shortage in the latter. Additionally, later in the month Bahrain and Oman concluded aviation agreements with India (Saudi Arabia had done so earlier in the month) which was interpreted by Tehran as a ‘flanking manoeuvre.’ Finally, on 26 April 2008, Bahrain signed a distinct security deal with NATO as part of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). The agreement was meant to provide avenues of direct communications between intelligence agencies and military planners. While such an arrangement is well within the rights of Bahrain as an independent state, Iran viewed the arrangement as a deliberate ploy to bring NATO more completely into the region and thereby restrict Iran’s freedom of action. In other words, Iran began to feel a strategic pinch, orchestrated by Bahrain, and was determined to ‘break-out’ of it.

Apparently however, the final insult to the Islamic Republic came on 01 October 2008, when Bahraini Foreign Minister, Sheik Khalid pronounced a peace overture which suggested that Iran, Israel and Turkey join the Arab states in forming one organisation to present their grievances and work to solving them. This painted Iran into an awkward corner as recognising Israel ran counter to its revolutionary ideology. Therefore, Iran understood the Bahraini plan as an attempt to either delegitimise the Islamic Revolution promoted by Iran or further isolate it from the wider international community since its rejection of the formation of such a regional body would cast it as the ‘spoiler’ of regional conciliation.

Instead of heeding or rejecting the calls of Khalid Iran, predictably, lashed out against Bahrain and reduced the proposal to a shell of its intentions. Once again Iran’s policy towards Bahrain took the form of an attempted coup. On 17 December 2008, now dubbed ‘Al-Shaheed Day (Martyr’s Day)’ by Shiite revisionists, fourteen people were arrested in connection with a planned MWHB terrorist campaign aimed at destabilising Bahrain by hitting a variety of ‘soft targets;’ commercial centres, diplomatic missions and night clubs. After interviews with the detainees, it was revealed that the MWHB cell was trained in Syria, though its leaders were residing in London, UK. Al-Shaheed Day is tense at the best of times and the arrest of the fourteen MWHB members fuelled conspiracy theories of arbitrary government violence against the Shiite community leading to yet another round of street demonstrations, nearly on a daily basis, until the end of February 2009. Ostensibly, the Shiites were on the streets to protest the trials being held for the conspirators of the 2008 botched coup attempt, though it soon became clear that Iran was positioning itself to rekindle its more direct involvement in Bahrain as it was against the backdrop of continued street violence that Nateq Nuri made his claim that Bahrain was Iran’s Fourteenth Province, a statement which was greeted with joyous chanting of support for Iran by Bahrain’s Shiite rebels.

Despite such provocations, Hamed declared an amnesty in April 2009 and pardoned 170 prisoners, including 35 Shiites who were being tried for treason and attempting to over-throw the state. In normal circumstances such overtures reduce tensions and provide space for dialogue and national reconciliation. However, these were not normal circumstances and one of the key actors involved, Iran, with no desire to allow its position to erode has instead been very proactive in sowing the seeds of discontent – probably directly paying demonstrators – to ensure that Bahrain continues on the path to full-scale civil war where it could intervene to ‘stop’ civilian casualties, though would be unlikely to ever voluntarily leave again.

These are the conditions that have resulted in Bahrain’s own chapter in the so-called Arab Spring. However, the path to the 2011 uprising finds its root in Tehran’s actions and the exploitation of a perceived opportunity. Indeed, Bahrain’s Pearl Revolution began in late August / early September 2010 – months before Tunisians and Egyptians took to the streets – when another attempted coup d’état was discovered leading to 160 people being arrested just before October’s parliamentary elections. The arrests led to the familiar tit-for-tat street battles between Shiite demonstrators and Bahraini security officials, this time however the street violence was meant to mobilise Shiites to vote against the ruling party. The election did not favour Shiite parties and allegations of vote rigging triggered riots and still more clashes.

By the time the other Arab revolts were in full swing, Manama was seething and, again stoked by Iran, many Shiites believed that the conditions were ripe to forcibly remove the Al-Khalifa regime. The serial demonstrators were out in full force by 17 February 2011, but this time they were better prepared: Shiite men and women divided themselves into two separate mobs, the women covered from head to toe in the black ‘show-only-the-face-not-the-form’ Chador, the Ayatollah’s preferred fashion, holding demonstrations calling for freedom while the men wrapped their faces in Balaklava’s and gathered chunks of stone to hurl at authorities. At the same time Iran was prepared for the eventualities of Shiite deaths and were mobilising their ‘public relations’ teams to debase Bahrain while its armed forces again pondered the circumstances that would bring them to directly intervene. The rest is recent history with protesters camping out in Pearl Square by night – replicating Cairo’s Tahir Square – and waging asymmetrical war by day. The death toll mounted while international condemnation was piled on the Al-Khalifa regime and Bahrain. In typical fashion the depth of the crisis was lost on many European and US decision-makers who shied away from addressing the true origins of the violence, namely Iran, and instead pressured Bahrain to show restraint.

Predictably, as street tensions rose, so did anxieties in Riyadh which entered the Bahraini fray in support of the Al-Khalifas. Indeed, the operations which ended Bahrain’s street rage were two-pronged: Saudi Arabia would militarily enter Bahraini territory in an active show of force while Bahraini security forces used all means necessary to empty Pearl Square and detain those encamped there. Saudi Arabia’s intervention and military support was more symbolic than practical, though it did produce three clear messages: firstly that Saudi Arabia considers Bahrain to be part of its Western Persian Gulf sphere of influence, secondly that the Al-Khalifa regime is a prime Saudi ally and finally, that the US and EU were peripheral powers unable or, worse, unwilling to actively defend the regional status quo.

Conclusions

Given the long history of Iran’s regional belligerency and direct interference in Bahrain the mystery of US and EU reactions to the most recent spate of violent political activism is compounded. However, fair treatment of the Irano-Bahraini conflict reveals some worrying trends that decision-makers should consider as they reformulate their regional policies and work to developing the political infrastructure necessary to achieve both normative and material interests.

The past thirty years of Iranian intransigence has removed ambiguities; revealing the extent of its revisionist tendencies and political preferences towards Bahrain. Since Iran is bent on achieving regional hegemony but is strategically checked by US naval power, it changed tact and developed more clandestine tactics to undermine Bahrain’s domestic stability so it may, eventually, militarily intervene to ‘defend’ the Shiite community from Sunni violence. This would not be a short-term stabilisation mission however and it is very likely that Iran would use its position in Bahrain to establish a theocracy in its image and then use its new-found forward position along the west coast of the Persian Gulf as a stepping stone for greater projections of power on the Arabian Peninsula. Indeed, Iran is patiently waiting for the right opportunity to do so. According to the Arab Times, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are training ‘a large number of Kuwaitis, Bahrainis and Saudis in a private training camp located in Waheera, a remote area near the borders of Venezuela and Columbia, and intends to use them to carry out terrorist activities within their respective countries and other areas across the world in case Iran is attacked militarily.’ While this information may be fodder for Arab states’ military mobilisation, it is likely that the story is accurate, given Iran’s track record. Also, if Iran would wrestle Bahrain from the Al-Khalifa’s, Tehran’s geostrategic position in the Persian Gulf would be greatly enhanced, turning the international waterway into an internal Iranian lake which it could regulate. In other words, Iran would control sea-faring trade, including hydrocarbons, in and out of the Persian Gulf.

Such explicit goals and probable outcomes should have the international community rushing to support, not ostracise Bahrain. Instead, it seems that too many decision-makers are lost in the rhetoric of the Arab Spring and are developing ‘face saving’ policies which aim at appeasing the disenfranchised Arab masses by treating them as a mass. This is extremely short-sighted and dangerous since the specificities of each case are being whitewashed in one simply equation; the Arab peoples have been oppressed by their leaders and want democratic reform. This is only partially correct in some cases and fundamentally erroneous in Bahrain. Instead of reading demonstrator’s placards as the basis for regional policy, leaders need to break out the history books. The Middle East of 2011 is very much the same Middle East of 1911, 1948 and 1971 only the stakes have changed. It is a sad commentary that Bahrain is in the midst of an existential struggle with a vastly superior and sharply aggressive Iran and the international community, so enraptured by the language of democracy, is content with listening to moderate voices calling for moderate reforms coming from immoderate Ayatollahs.