Cejiss

Introduction

Former Jewish guerrilla-turned-Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, reputedly remarked that the ‘darkest place is directly under the light.’ While the context of his observation was rooted in conducting a terrorist war of attrition against British mandate forces, the logic can be superimposed onto nearly any situation involving the game of political hide and seek. In the dynamic environment of current Middle Eastern politics it is clear that all political communities should seek optimal policies to cushion themselves from both internal combustion and spill-over from turmoil among their neighbours. Despite the obvious policies Israel could advance it is sitting idly on the fence waiting for situations to unfold instead of meeting challenges more directly and constructing a more innovative and thoughtful set of policy options. This is hazardous to the Israeli polity which is already desperately straddling a political abyss as the sweeping revolutions in Egypt and Syria threaten to redraw political allegiances along the Crescent while the recent Declaration of Palestinian Independence painted Israel into a reinforced, but terribly uncomfortable, corner.

Israel’s political leadership bears full responsibility for ensuring that the citizens of the country are safe and secure in terms of physical security, economic prospects and social cohesion. Yet, by allowing the domestic and foreign policies of Israel to be determined by exogenous factors they are culpable of the crime of costly political lethargy. Indeed, Israel’s political toolbox is expansive, yet its leaders have shown themselves to be incapable of adequately addressing the problems faced by Israelis and prefer to rasp-on, deploying archaic themes and archaic language.

Whether Israeli leaders publically admit so or not there are five distinct states which border Israel and it is irresponsible to relegate any one of them from the state’s political radar. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria are of equal importance for Israel and if Israel were truly interested in participating in the construction of a viable, politically stable Crescent region it needs to mobilise its energies much more comprehensively then it currently does. Israel requires a new grand strategy, a new approach, for utilising the opportunities which are opening all around it.

While domestic problems – re: the ‘tentifada’ – are certainly important, those beyond Israel’s frontiers are, at the time of this writing, more pressing as they are certain to impact the domestic socio-political and economic scene. If, for instance, Israel were not concentrating on finding ways to expropriate more Palestinian territories for the sake of consolidating counter-productive settlements, it would find its purse heavier and its international economic and political clout more robust. Alternatively, if it continues to construct such housing units it risks further international isolation combined with the sunken costs of having to secure volatile swathes of land. In short, Israel’s West Bank policy is denying its own citizens important financial resources while empowering more radical elements of Israeli society and, consequently, heightening tensions with Palestine and the wider Arab world.

On reflection, it is clear that Israel’s leadership is missing glaring opportunities to secure the state and the wellbeing of its citizens. Instead of falling victim to the logic of tit-for-tat garrison security Israel must look two steps back in order to take one step forward. There is no reason, ethical or practical, for why Israel is hunkered behind metaphorical barricades. In fact, it is bizarre that a country with such enormous economic and military power is so politically languid. If Israel is to trail-blaze a new course which would benefit its citizens and the surrounding Arab peoples it needs to change the nature of its interpretation of the world around it. This can only come about through regime change; not the kind of regime change experienced in Egypt, Libya or Tunisia, but rather the kind of regime change seen in the former Communist state of Czechoslovakia (now the Czech and Slovak Republics) where domestic dissatisfaction obliged the Communist leadership to stand down and ultimately be held responsible for its abuse of power. In Israel, although Netanyahu (PM) and Lieberman (FM) were democratically elected, the situation warrants a complete shake-up of the political system to make room for new, fresh ideas otherwise Israel will become entrenched in Middle Eastern mud and ultimately fall victim to national suicide.

This brief survey is meant to illustrate some of the more comprehensive steps Israel could and should take if it is determined to: 1. remain a legitimate, recognised state, 2. make peace with its neighbours, 3. secure an adequate future for its citizens, and 4. remain a culturally Jewish though ethno-heterogeneous state. The work proceeds by presenting a brief set of defining issues of discontent, current contexts and potential solutions to construct or repair Israel’s relations to each of its five neighbours.

Egypt

Major Issue(s) of Discontent: At present Israeli-Egyptian relations are determined by three minor territorial issues (re: the status of the Sinai Peninsula as a ‘demilitarised zone,’ the Gaza Strip and access to the Suez Canal), one politico-economic issue (re: the Egyptian-Israeli gas pipeline) and one ethical issue (re: Palestine).

The Current Context: Since the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, Israeli-Egyptian relations have plummeted to their lowest levels since before the Camp David Accords (1979). From Israel’s confused shooting of Egyptian border guards, the sacking and arson of Israel’s embassy in Cairo, to the Egyptian acceptance of Iran’s navy traversing the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean Sea, it is clear that Israeli-Egyptian relations are undergoing tremendous transformations. Whereas, previously, Israel could rely on Mubarak’s Egypt to act in favour of preserving the status quo, the current situation is largely unpredictable and it seems that the Egyptian military has lost control of the Sinai Peninsula, producing a vacuum that organised criminal and militia groups have rapidly sought to fill. This led to the successive bombing of the Egypt-Israel-Jordan gas pipeline, the increase of arms and people smuggling operations into and out of Gaza and a general decline in border security. Israel has not adequately responded to the changes along the tristate border with a comprehensive set of policy objectives and treats Egypt as though it were still governed by Mubarak. Whether such lethargy stems from Israel’s current incapacity for policy innovation or is symptomatic of its fear of international involvement in its foreign relations, the result is the same: Israel is losing its Egyptian ally and doing little to avoid such an outcome.

Potential Solutions: There are four mutually reinforcing policy additives Israel could embark on for the long-term objective of sustaining and enhancing peace with Egypt:

Firstly, Israel needs to involve other members of the international community in preserving its relationship to Egypt. Lieberman’s bullish diplomacy is not going to win over any friends among the emerging political elites in Egypt, who themselves must respond to the demands of Egyptians, not Israelis. Instead, Israel needs to change its tactics and seek to demonstrate the consequences to regional and even international security the erosion of Egyptian-Israeli relations is likely to produce. The UN and EU stand as the best-placed actors since the former has been deeply involved in monitoring and enforcing the demilitarisation of the Sinai since the 1956 Suez war and the latter has consistently prioritised EU-Egyptian relations and Egyptian-Israeli normalisation as part of its regional security drive. In other words, while the UN is endowed with practical knowledge of the border region and has the mandate to maintain the demilitarised nature of the Sinai, the EU has the financial means, and political will, to ensure that Egyptian-Israeli relations weather the storm the former’s popular revolution produced. But these actors require an appropriate mandate prior to re-engagement; a mandate that can only be requested by Egypt and Israel together.

Indeed, Egypt and Israel must reinvent their relations through a Camp David II Agreement which pledges to retain their unique relations, empower the UN and EU to assist them in securing their shared frontier. Such an agreement should not depend on which party is in power in Egypt, as Israel has forfeited its right to demand ‘favourable’ governments in Egypt since it has, on many occasions, elected governments or constructed coalitions which were detrimental to Egypt’s internal security and actually played a significant role in alienating Mubarak from the Egyptian people.

Thirdly, one of the key areas of discontent in Egyptian-Israeli relations continues to be dogged Palestinian-Israel relations and it seems that, despite Egypt’s strategic interests, Palestine will continue to act as an engine driving a wedge between Egypt and Israel. Indeed, Egypt is, like any other country, guided in its foreign policy by both strategic and moral interests and Israel needs to address both if it wishes to retain Egypt as a dependable and peaceful neighbour. This implies that Egyptian-Israeli relations are tied to the way in which Israel engages with, and behaves towards, Palestine. While there is no love lost between Egypt and Hamas or even between Egypt and Palestine – after all Egypt occupied the Gaza Strip between 1949-1967 without extending citizenship or even basic rights to the Palestinians – there is an increasingly acute demand that Israel allow Palestine and Palestinians to enjoy sovereign rights and socio-economic and political freedom. Whereas the Mubarak regime was comfortable enforcing its own blockade on the Gaza Strip, the current and likely future, political elites are working to undo much of the former regimes labours and have opened up the Rafah crossing, somewhat relieving Gazans of economic burdens. This comes at the cost of tensions with Israel which is neither willing nor politically able to follow suit. Israel needs to further engage with Egypt to hoist it to a more pronounced and responsible arbitration position as vital negotiator between Israel and Hamas. This has already been practised, with varying success, over the past five years though the recent prisoner swap which freed 1000 Palestinians and Israeli soldier Shalit clearly demonstrates the positive outcome the involvement of Egypt may produce in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

Fourthly and finally, Israel needs to engage Egypt to maintain the Crescent’s balance of power. Over the past decade a four-way miniature ‘great game’ has unfolded in the Arab-Muslim Middle East involving: Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and Egypt’s own long-term security very much depends on its relationship to Israel – a regional military superpower – and the EU and US. However, Egypt has been slow to accept such a perspective over its own geostrategic role. This should be reinforced by Israel through further intellectual and political joint-ventures which seek to build consensus on avoiding exogenous penetration of the East Mediterranean Sea area.

Jordan

Major Issue(s) of Discontent: At present Israeli-Jordanian relations are determined by one ethical issue (re: Palestinians).

The Current Context: Jordan has, de facto, been an unofficial ally of Israel since the assassination of King Abdullah I (1951) in Jerusalem’s Al Aqsa mosque. Despite the wars waged between Israel and Jordan (1948 and 1967), they have identified and pursued the shared strategic interests of: preventing the rise of Nasser’s Egypt to regional hegemony (1950’s and 1960’s), waged simultaneous conflicts against the PLO (1970’s and 1980’s) and against religious-inspired terrorist groups (1980’s until the present), balanced against Syria (1970), and formalised their relationship in 1994 with the invocation of an official peace treaty and alliance. Additionally, both countries face a challenge from Palestinian groups since both are part of ancient Palestine and, at present, Palestinians comprise some 70% of Jordan’s total population. However, Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza reverberate throughout Jordan and have, at times, produced immense tremors in the former’s political establishment, contributing to alienating the ruling Hashemite leaders from large segments of the population. So, while in the current context Israel and Jordan enjoy wide and comprehensive relations, including a visa-free travel regime, any disruption to the ruling order in Jordan will likely upset such relations. Likewise, in the event of Palestinian independence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Jordan will probably face renewed internal pressures to connect with Palestine. Given such circumstances, Israel needs to strike a balance between its strategic alliance with Jordan and its relationship to Palestinians in both soon-to-be-Palestine and Jordan.

Potential Solutions: In a bid to maintain and deepen its strategic relationship to Jordan, Israel should develop a three-pronged policy approach:

Firstly, it is important to note that Israeli-Jordanian relations currently gravitate around intelligence sharing, military cooperation (joint training), and strategic calculations. While such relations are mutually beneficial when it comes to hard balancing, deterrence, coercion and broader military security, they are limited and unable to address the new security dilemmas currently faced by both. Indeed, while Israel is busy fighting its war of attrition with the Palestinians and Hezbollah, Jordan is facing an acute legitimation predicament where the ruling Hashimites are increasingly labelled as un-Islamic, Western serving, Israeli pawns by an increasingly assertive number of Palestinians who do not share many of the financial benefits awarded to the ruling classes. This has resulted in Jordan’s distancing from Israel – instead of further entrenchment – during times of crisis. While Jordan continues to behave as an Israeli ally, their relationship is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. Therefore, Israel needs to launch a diplomatic offensive in Jordan to reinvent the Wadi Araba Treaty (1994) and extend it beyond the hard security relations the two countries currently enjoy. Such a Treaty renewal should act to consolidate economic and social activities in much the same way the Benelux countries embarked on their integration project after WWII. The visa-free travel regime between Israel and Jordan should pave the way for enhanced economic interactions and produce a free-trade zone. It is likely that such an initiative would spiral beyond the two within a relatively short period of time since economic, and subsequent political, benefits would quickly materialise. Such a project would secure Israeli-Jordanian relations by providing an economic boost both could enjoy, relieving Israel of its regional isolation and generally tie the two together in areas beyond material security. In short, the Wadi Araba II Treaty could evolve into a distinctive regional union, a Union of the Red Sea (URS) or East Mediterranean Union (EMedU), where past and present economic and political relations are institutionalised, lines of communications are opened and sustained and the wide spectrum of shared interests are pursued.

Secondly, and as part of their renewed relations, Israel must embark on a diplomatic offensive among its more enduring partners in the EU. At present, Israel enjoys intense economic and political relations to the EU and is often considered the 28th state of the Union. Such a favoured status however only truly benefits Israel (and the EU) and must be considered as a relative gain since Israel’s regional isolation prevents its economic gains from percolating to its neighbours. Israel should deploy its energies to bring Jordan to a similar position. Jordan can offer the EU a variety of important economic opportunities though, at present, has no direct way to demonstrate these. Additionally, as the EU is emerging as a unique regional security actor it requires stable partners to fulfil its own strategic objectives. A union of Israel and Jordan (later joined by others) could act as an EU platform into the Red and East Mediterranean Seas more comprehensively than through bilateral relations. Finally, such efforts, if successful, would deepen other states’ desire to conform to the (new) Union’s requirements and would likely encourage more diplomatic exchanges between Israel and the wider Middle East. In this, and behaving the way and ally should, Israel could work alongside Jordan to reshape the Crescent region by encouraging its European allies to further engage with its Jordanian partner.

Finally, in order for such efforts to bear fruit, and to decrease Jordan’s legitimacy crisis, Israel again needs to solve its own Palestinian quagmire. Unlike Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, Jordan granted its Palestinian population full citizenship rights and fully integrated them into Jordan’s socio-political structures. Despite gross economic disparities between the Hashimites and Palestinians, it is clear that Jordan has been much more responsible towards the Palestinians than any other Arab state. However, Israel’s incapacity of solving its Palestinian ‘problem’ has stymied more robust relations with Jordan. Therefore, for Israel to fully capitalise on its relationship to Jordan (and much of the rest of the Arab world) it needs to recognise Palestine and labour towards its economic and political stability.

Lebanon

Issue(s) of Discontent: Israeli-Lebanese relations are currently determined by one minor territorial dispute (re: the Shabaa Farms), two relational quagmires (re: Hezbollah and Iran), and one ethical issue (re: Palestinian refugees).

The Current Context: Although Lebanon managed, largely, to steer clear of the revolution engulfing Syria, its position remains the most tenuous in the region. Plagued by an enduring ethno-religious conflict between Christian (Maronite), Shiite, Sunni (Lebanese and Palestinian) and Druze, major powers have attempted to penetrate the country in a bid to influence the direction of Lebanese politics. Iran continues to materially and diplomatically support Shiite Hezbollah while Saudi Arabia has moved to consolidate its own political influence among the post-Rafik Hariri Sunni community. The geopolitical swaggering of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon is pervasive and it is a matter of time before Lebanon is again in the midst of paramilitary activity. Israel cannot afford to be idle. The intra-Lebanese conflict in the 1970’s and 1980’s brought Israel to occupy large portions of the country in a long-term, but disastrous, ‘stabilisation’ mission. The result was many thousands of Israeli soldiers and Lebanese civilians killed and wounded, hundreds of thousands displaced, the creation of more radical resistance movements such as Hezbollah, the penetration of Lebanon by Syria and Iran and a general undermining of Israel’s international image as a ‘defensive’ actor. If Israel has learned from its own recent history then it must never again occupy Lebanon. Instead it needs to deny its adversaries, particularly Hezbollah (re: Iran) legitimate grounds for belligerency so it may, finally, secure its northern frontier.

Potential Solutions: There are three mutually reinforcing policy additives Israel could embark on for the long-term objective of sustainable peace with Lebanon:

Firstly, Israel must unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw from the Shabaa Farms, a left-over out-post of its failed occupation of Southern Lebanon. Legally, the Shabaa Farms belong to Lebanon though Syria, under the al Assad regime, claims the territories as its own. Israel’s public logic for holding onto the territory rests on the argument that if it were to withdraw Syria would take the land and use it as a spring-board for further claims on the Golan. This logic is completely skewed since Israel’s presence deflects the growing tensions between Lebanon and Syria over ownership of the Farms. If Israel were to evacuate the area and allow the Lebanese and Syrian’s to sort out ownership issues themselves it would simultaneously deny Hezbollah legitimate ‘rights’ of self-defence against Israeli occupation since Israel would not be in command of any recognised Lebanese territory. Additionally, it would force the hand of the al Assad regime since any Syrian claims to Shabaa would be countered by Lebanon and Hezbollah.

Secondly, similar to Syria, though to a much greater extent, Lebanon has been forced to bear the financial brunt of resettling many tens of thousands of Palestinians. While part of these came from the Jordanian-Palestinian conflict (Black September, 1970), the bulk were made stateless during the first Arab-Israeli conflict (1948). From then until our own times, Palestinians have not been integrated into Lebanese society, not least because of the PLO’s paramilitary actions against Lebanese civilians prior to their 1982 expulsion by the Israeli military. However, the existence of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (some 422000 in 12 facilities) delegitimises Israel since many continue to live in squalid conditions with few prospects; they are turned into perpetual scapegoats for what is wrong in Lebanon and into the reason for rejecting a general Arab-Israeli peace initiative. Israel should develop a clear financial package to help integrate Lebanon’s Palestinian community into the wider society. This would, obviously, be a tricky endeavour and likely to be met with initial rejection. However, if Israel were to deploy some of its political leverage, expend adequate energies, and develop a progressive strategic approach to the issue, it may get results. This financial package should be based on providing funds to the Lebanese Ministries of Housing and Economics – under US, EU, Russian and UN auspices – to directly construct housing and industrial-commercial opportunities for Palestinian refugees. Israel needs to demonstrate its willingness to financially compensate Palestinians for their lost lands and to Lebanon which has paid for such displacement for nearly five decades. Finally, such incentives could be sold as a national interest for Lebanon, which has had its own troubles attempting to govern Palestinian camps, as witnessed in the 2007 ‘camp war’ in Nahr al Bared when the Lebanese army was deployed to suppress a Palestinian Islamic uprising. The result was the destruction of the camp and the re-displacement of some 28000 Palestinians.

Thirdly, in order to secure its northern frontier, and contribute funds for the integration of Palestinians Israel needs to work together with Lebanese authorities. It is time for Israel to remove its self-imposed political blinders and start the long and arduous process of relationship building with Lebanon. Since the aborted 17 May 1983 Israeli-Lebanese Peace Treaty, there have been almost no high-level contacts between Israeli and Lebanese officials despite their increasingly apparent mutual interests. For instance, despite the lack of internal Lebanese public discourse on the issue, most Lebanese, including most Shiite Muslims, are sceptical of Hezbollah and the means it has deployed on its assent to power. The only reason Hezbollah has managed to maintain its power position has been through the successful deployment of Iranian and Syrian arms to coerce Lebanese officials and civilians, Iranian money to bribe other officials and civilians, and nationalist sentiment as a glue to coalesce many Lebanese around a make-shift flag; the flag of resistance to Israel. However, without properly addressing the real needs of the Lebanese people, Hezbollah is destined to collapse. Thus, if Israel were to evacuate its last out-post, the Shabaa Farms, Hezbollah would lose a major part of its raison d’être and be forced into the mainstream of Lebanese politics, where Israel should keep open the option of negotiating with it since it also, legitimately, represents the aspirations of many Lebanese.

Palestine

Major Issue(s) of Discontent: At present, Israeli-Palestinian relations are defined according to three major territorial disputes (re: the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem), two socio-economic issues (re: taxation transfers, trans-border employment), and two major ethical issues (re: Palestinian refugees and rights of return, the West Bank Wall).

The Current Context: Whether Israel accepts so or not, Palestine has taken a major step forward in its bid to achieve national independence. This comes at a time when Hamas is firmly in control of the Gaza Strip; compounding the difficulties facing Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas in gaining international acceptance for a Palestinian state. While Palestine has avoided the major revolutionary movements engulfing the Middle East, there is growing momentum that the PA make unilateral progress in constructing a viable, secure and recognised state. This implies a tenuous four-way balance between the demands of the international community, Israel, Hamas, and the Palestinian people, all of which have different objectives, interests and demands over how to create an independent Palestine and what its frontiers would look like. Israel has developed a self-destructive policy towards Palestine and prefers an unstable status quo to long-term peace and mutual prosperity. While Israeli leaders, particularly Netanyahu, have gone to great lengths to suggest that there is no one person he could call to make peace, it is doubtful he is even willing to use the telephone. As a result of Israeli leadership – and its co-option of the US – it is likely that Palestine’s UN bid will be vetoed. This will not only besmirch Israel’s and the US’s reputation, but will likely instigate renewed violence since the Palestinians will truly feel, as a community, a sense of complete desperation and opt for a more violent solution to gaining national independence. While violence should always be considered morally wrong, such a violent outburst would be understandable. In order to avoid further bloodshed, and to achieve their moral and strategic visions, Israel and the PA need to cooperate on the construction of an independent Palestine. However, Israel holds almost all the cards and it needs to readjust itself to make way for such a Palestinian enterprise.

Potential Solutions: There are four mutually reinforcing policy additives Israel could embark on for the long-term objective of sustainable peace with Palestine:

Prior to undertaking any other steps, Israel needs to recognise the natural right of Palestine to exist as an independent member of the international community. This is both in Israel’s strategic and moral interests since it should be the first to understand the great insecurities borne of a nation unable to exercise statehood. After all, the entire Zionist project was rooted in providing a modern state for the dispossessed and vulnerable Jewish people of Europe; a state that was meant to coexist with the wider Arab populations in Palestine and throughout the region. It is also worth remembering that the term ‘terrorist’ was applied to many of Israel’s founders as the young, burgeoning state deployed asymmetrical violence against the governing British authorities in much the same way that Palestinians deploy violence against Israel. While there are, of course, stark differences between how (re: suicide bombers) and why Palestinians resort to terrorism, it is undeniable that they are carrying on a long tradition of deploying such means. As it stands, Palestine is already independent and Israeli authorities are loathe to directly and adequately govern Palestinian-majority territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. All that is missing is the official stamp of recognition and Israel needs to be among the first to extend its hand to Palestine in its independence bid so it can disengage and its military get back to what it does best, defend Israel’s recognised territorial boundaries in ways that are consistent with its self-prescribed doctrine of defence instead of conducting morale-sapping police exercises.

Extending official recognition to Palestine is only part of the answer though and, secondly, Israel must abandon the politics of peace in favour of the prudence of peace as the foundation for how it behaves towards an independent Palestinian state. This entails the transfer of responsibility for delineating Israeli-Palestinian boundaries from governmental to civil-legal authorities. In other words, Israel must allow its Supreme Court (ISC) to decide on the final frontiers with Palestine. Precedence offers some insights into how the ISC functions and it is the only body which has ordered the removal of parts of the ‘security fence’ so that it does not impinge on Palestinian territory. Admittedly, such actions are few and far apart. However, if the Courts were granted ultimate authority over deciding on Israel’s frontiers, the outcome would likely be more acceptable to the international community and the Palestinians and Israelis than if responsibility would continue to be held by the governing elites who tend to use potential borders as either a ‘land grab’ or to obtain other political goals. Additionally, the ISC, in ruling on the boundaries of Israel, would also be able to delegitimise Israel’s settlement policy from within and order concrete actions to aid in overcoming these all-too-political obstacles erected by successive Israeli administrations to put ‘facts on the ground.’ Indeed, the ISC could build its own ‘judicial union’ with the Palestinians and international legal bodies such as the UN’s International Court of Justice (ICJ), to facilitate transparency in its legal proceedings over both states’ territoriality and to assist the Palestinians construct adequate legal instruments and institutions to fill the legal vacuum likely to be spawned by final status agreements.

Using a joint ISC-ICJ-PA ‘judicial union’ is also essential in solving the most potent hurdle to the normalisation of Israeli-Palestinian relations: Jerusalem. There are few places on earth which evoke such blind passions over ownership than Jerusalem, which is precisely why legal arbitration is required. For Jerusalem however, the only truly viable solution is the double-edge demilitarisation-internationalisation of the city, under the auspices of the UN and EU. Practically, Palestine’s administrative capital should move to Ramallah while Israel’s should move to Tel Aviv, both of which are already home to the international diplomatic corps, are the most populous urban centres of their respected state as well as economic and social engines. This will prove to be a strenuous endeavour, but it is vitally needed since the suspended animation of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations demands that both compromise on their religiously-inspired claims so they can start to focus on their political interests.

Chief among such political interests, and the third potential solution presented in this work, is economic in character though will produce political dividends, namely Israel needs to financially invest in constructing a viable Palestinian economy through a series of ‘tied’ industries which mirror the foundation of the European Communities following WWII. In other words, Israel needs to invest in the industrial and economic sustainability of Palestine by constructing ‘High Commissions’ in which Palestinian’s play a decision-making role in the distribution of monies to the sectors that most need financial boosts. This will reduce the amount of foreign aid Palestine requires and will ensure that Israel and Palestine maintain open negotiations, no matter the tensions and crises they face since both their economies would suffer from any severing of relations. In this, Israel again holds all the cards since its economy is world-class while Palestine is an international dependent and has no economy to speak of. But Israel cannot hope to retain its economic status while fighting a series of small wars, propping up defunct settlements and sponsoring an assortment of strange religious communities that are not reflective of the wider Israeli polity, do not serve in the Israeli army or pay regular taxes and tend to drag Israel into unnecessary conflicts. Simply, Israel is haemorrhaging monies in support of those who do not contribute to a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians while denying Palestinians investment that could be used as a means of ‘tying’ two economies, reduce economic disparities and thus produce a win-win economic-political situation.

In saying this, and in light of the recent, successful indirect negotiations between Israel and Hamas over Shalit, it is clear that Israel needs to consider Hamas as a political counterpart, together with the PA and Fatah under Abbas. While Hamas is more concerned with maintaining its control over Gaza as a statelet, and should, by any measure, be considered a criminal organisation, Hamas can deliver on its pledges. Thus, the fourth and final solution to the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict is rooted in the legitimation of Hamas as an equal – to the PA – representative of Palestine. The intra-Palestinian conflict likely to ensue following the declaration of Palestinian independence must be considered part of Palestine’s political maturation and Israel needs to remain impartial. At the same time however, Israel needs to enter the political discourse of the Palestinian people no matter their elected or unelected leaders. This implies not selecting the type of government it is willing to negotiate with, but rather keeping an open approach to negotiations and dialogue and allowing Palestinians to choose their government according to their own ambitions and desires. On the surface this approach is wrought with insecurities for Israel. After all, it is possible that the Palestinians vote in Hamas as a revisionist entity seeking to reclaim ‘all of Palestine,’ including pre-1967 territories. However, if such a situation were to materialise, Israel would be able to stifle resistance since Palestine would be independent and thus forced to follow international protocol. In the case that Hamas would, as the legal representatives of Palestine, seek to upset the status quo through subversion or direct military combat, Israel would be within its legal rights to respond with its full military capacity. In short, Hamas needs to be brought into the fold of Israeli-Palestinian relations and if it takes up a hard-line stance and physically attacks, or allows others to attack, Israel, the latter would have international law on its side when it defends its citizens and territory. This is in direct contrast with the current situation where attacks against Israel are not subject to international law since Palestine is not considered an independent state and therefore does not have to abide by the rules of international relations.

Syria

Issue(s) of Discontent: Israeli-Syrian relations are defined by one significant territorial dispute (re: the Golan Heights), three relational quagmires (re: Syria’s support for Hezbollah, and Hamas and its alliance with Iran) and one ethical dispute (re: Palestine and Palestinian refugees living in Syria). Each of these are reconcilable and it is wholly possible to negotiate a settlement over each.

The Current Context: Syria is in the midst of upheaval. More than three thousand people have been murdered by the ruling Ba’athists’ crackdown on demonstrations since March 2011. This has resulted in a tremendous influx of internally and internationally displaced people with Lebanon, Jordan and, particularly, Turkey, rushing to provide humanitarian assistance to those either fleeing the violence or taking the opportunity to improve their general quality of life through migration. Such an internal Syrian conflict has the potential to greatly enhance the perception of Israel as a respected regional actor, which, when the violence ceases – hopefully following the collapse or major reform of the al Assad dynasty – could be developed to construct a viable peace between Syria and Israel while undermining exogenous strategic influences in the region. Such an outcome is not merely guesswork and neither is it a naive appreciation for the unravelling situation. It is possible if Israel were to take bold initiatives to expose the duplicity of Iran in the suppression of Syria’s reform movement and reach out to address the interests and socio-political desires of the Syrian people.

Potential Solutions: There are five mutually reinforcing policy additives Israel could embark on for the long-term objective of sustainable peace with Syria:

Firstly, Israel should emerge as a refugee destination for the endangered Syrian populace. While Israel is (rightly) wary of allowing untold numbers of Syrian political refugees into its (post-1967) territory, it must clearly demonstrate that it is the humanitarian actor it claims to be. If, for instance, Israel were to allow some 5,000 Syrian refugees to enter the Golan Heights where they are greeted by an established refugee camp with clean water, food and safety, it would do much for the international perception of Israel while saving Syrian civilian lives. Israel would be under no obligation to incorporate such refugees into Israeli society but should take the opportunity to provide them with economic incentives by constructing industrial and commercial centres on the Golan for their employment. These can later – after the fall or complete overhaul of the al Assad regime – be used as a confidence building measure (CBM), where Israel and Syria begin their new relationship as two democratic states committed to each others’ material and physical security.

Secondly, as the internal combustion in Syria continues to sputter along, Israel needs to enhance its media coverage of the depth of the al Assad regime’s support from Iran and Hezbollah thus delegitimising both the former and latter in the eyes of Syrian citizens and the emerging political elites. Far too few reports have been publicised connecting the suppression of Syria’s democratic movement to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah despite the overwhelming, and mounting, evidence revealing just that.

Thirdly, while Israel is not required to relinquish control over the Golan Heights – prior to 1967 Syria had abused its strategic position overlooking the Galilee to launch fedayeen and artillery attacks against Israeli civilians and lost the territory fair-and-square in the Six Day War – it is able to increase its regional clout by offering financial compensation for the captured territory. This would be an especially prudent step considering that Syria often sites lost revenues and therefore a weakened economy as justification for reclaiming the mountain range. Additionally, Israel would, through such a financial compensation package, provide the new government (if the al Assad regime would collapse) with vital finances required to reconstruct the state’s economy and infrastructure after decades of mismanagement, nepotism and corruption.

Fourthly, Syria may be sceptical of dealing with Israel as long as the latter’s position vis-a-vis the Palestinians remains unchanged. In this regard, Syrians – no matter their political colours – regard the road to Damascus (re: peace between Israel and Syria) as running through Jerusalem (re: a fair settlement between Israel and Palestine). To overcome this stigma Israel should embark on a two-pronged approach: 1. it should immediately negotiate with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas for the establishment of a free and independent Palestinian state and, 2. it should offer additional financial compensation for the Palestinian refugees currently residing on Syrian territory. The first of these is discussed at length below; however the second point needs to be explored since Syria has absorbed a heavy financial burden attempting to provide for Palestinian refugees. Admittedly, Israel is not the only actor responsible for Palestinian displacement. However, it has the potential to positively contribute to solving the problem and thus could take measures to financially support Palestinian refugees’ incorporation into Syrian society.

Fifth and finally, Israel needs to surmount its scepticism of inter- and non-governmental organisations and properly involve the international community, particularly the EU, NATO, and the Council of Europe in formally ending its state of war with Syria. Gone are the days when the US monopolised international influence and would unabashedly support Israel and the latter needs to engage those organisations which truly want to see an end to Israeli-Syrian hostilities. Engaging with the three aforementioned actors would assist Israel make the financial contributions noted above and would facilitate Israel’s emergence as an engaging and progressive contributor to regional and international peace, security and stability.

Conclusion

While the above sought to demonstrate ways for Israel to forge a new strategic identity through the adoption of an entirely different foreign policy approach which recognises some of the more obvious tracks it could embark on, there is one additional area that needs to be considered, namely the way others view Israel. Indeed, this work would be absurdly incomplete if it were to neglect the major hurdles Israel itself has erected in the construction of a more stable and prosperous Crescent region. While this concluding section will not specifically revisit issues covered above, it seeks to highlight general political impasses that Israel is responsible for and that only Israel can remove.

Israel

Major Issue(s) of Discontent: At present, Israel’s regional and international relations are determined by three major and one minor territorial disputes (re: the Golan Heights, West Bank Settlements, the Gaza siege and the Shabaa Farms), two major strategic military issues (re: WMD and alliance to the US), one major ethical issue (re: Palestine – Gaza and the West Bank) and one major relational issue (re: tolerance of radical Israeli religious communities).

The Current Context: Israel has not escaped the revolutions sweeping across the region: its own population has demonstrated in the so-called ‘tentifada’ and (Syrian-)Palestinians have attempted to cross the Syrian-Israeli frontier (Golan) in an al Assad deflection manoeuvre. Additionally, while Israel dealt (or did not deal) with its decrepit alliances to Turkey and Egypt, Abbas presented Palestine’s bid to join the UN and gain UN recognition. At the same time, Israel’s relationship to the US and EU fell into crisis as the latter were infuriated at Israel’s approval of additional settlements in and around Jerusalem. Having missed the opportunity to consolidate its economic and political gains over the past decade and capitalise on its unilateral withdraw from Gaza, Israel has lost the thread of international engagement. Indeed, many observers – even those that traditionally support Israel – are at loggerheads to figure out the origins of the disastrous state of Israel’s public relations and its political ineptitude of dealing with its neighbours in a constructive manner. It seems that Israel’s diplomacy, similar to its chief diplomat, Lieberman, is bullish, aggressive and prone to the use of force rather than other, more suitable means. This is alienating Israel from the international community and placing its steadfast allies into extremely unnerving positions that will, eventually, return to haunt Israel.

Potential Solutions: For Israel to end its regional and international isolation, defend its values and populace it must adopt the following policies:

Firstly, Israel must redefine its relationship to the US. While it is true that in the wide political spectrum of the US, a variety of actors with varying sympathies are present. However, there are two, interlaced political communities that determine US relations to Israel: US political administrations and America’s Christian Right. Israel’s relationship to these actors needs to be altered since neither truly assists Israel in dealing with its own political circumstances but rather seeks to achieve their self-interests vis-à-vis Israel.

Israeli-US politico-military engagement began in earnest following the 1967 Six Day War. Prior to that conflict, Israel’s closest allies were the UK and France, which provided vital military assistance until the eve of war when both defected from the alliance and left Israel to fend for itself. Despite Israel’s numeric disadvantage, it had developed and deployed a strategy of pre-emption and defeated the regular armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria and support troops from throughout the Arab world using prudent military techniques. As the fog of war cleared, the US quickly, but curiously, mobilised its political energies in support of Israel. Such overtures were based on its recognition of Israel as a regional power, capable of humbling even the staunchest of its adversaries. Since then successive US administrations have financially and militarily backed Israel, which is one of the main reasons for Israel’s military prowess and enhanced capabilities today. However, the US is not altruistic. Instead, Israel must recognise that the US has its own objectives based on its own strategic interests. Indeed, any cursory examination of six decades of engagement with the Middle East reveals that the US’s primary goals are to: 1. secure the cheap supply of hydrocarbons, 2. retain naval and military basing rights, 3. prevent other exogenous states from penetrating the region, and 4. prevent the construction of a sustainable Middle Eastern community of states that could balance against US regional power. These suggest that the US is driven by its own calculations and, on reflection, that Israel is regarded as an effective tool to achieving these. After all, a strong Israel ensures that a balance of power favouring the US is maintained.

While official US rhetoric sites Israel as a ‘fellow’ democracy and routinely stresses the Holocaust as the moral cognition of Israeli-US relations, these are dangerous window-dressings. For instance, democracy does not underline the US’s relationship to other regional powers so why does it feature so prevalently in discourses surrounding Israel? Likewise, the Holocaust; while it surely impacted the US’s collective psyche, the US has never directly been involved in physically securing Israel, even when – prior to 1967 – its survival was not guaranteed. These two themes are habitually invoked though do not properly reflect observable trends in Israeli-US relations. Instead, the US supports Israel in-so-far as the latter assists the former achieve its own strategic objectives, of which comprehensive peace in the region is not present. Israel would be wise to re-evaluate its relationship to the US if it were truly interested in peace and reconciliation with its neighbours. Military means are not going to achieve such goals. These are only able to secure Israel’s territorial boundaries, not assist it in constructing bridges of dialogue.

Additionally, many US political elites – particularly Republicans – are ideologically driven by obscure religious beliefs that often gravitate around the resurrection of Christ based on Jewish command of Jerusalem and then ultimate Jewish conversion to Christianity. While in the 21st century it may seem irrational for a country to base its political calculations on such mysticism, such a moral compass has guided US thinking since the first Reagan administration, taking a break during the Clinton administrations, and then resurging as George W. Bush took over the Oval Office. The language of “good” versus “evil,” and “crusades” were more than rhetorical ploys; they emerged as real political fodder, ways for the US to justify its involvement in the Middle East, support for Israel and war against Iraq. Currently, the (aptly named) Tea Party has surfaced as the US’s most fertile Christian-political soil and its unequivocal support for Israel is not governed by sensitivity to Israel’s regional position or the dire consequences Israel would face if another conflict were to erupt. Instead, the Tea Party is driven by messianic visions of the Second Coming. Why Israel has continued to work at fostering solid relations with such religious factions is reducible to its addiction to US political, military and financial support. Thus, despite the glaring contrasts between US and Israeli ideological persuasions, Israel continues to quest after US relations. This could be avoided if Israel were to reduce tensions in the Crescent region and produce a comprehensive peace with its Arab neighbours. It should be noted that not all Republicans, or US Christians for that matter, hold such messianic visions and there are many thousands of genuine Christian believers and non-religious Americans which support Israel for reasons that go beyond interpreting scripture and are often rooted in ethical and moral persuasions. However, over the past decades the so-called Christian Right has surged into political power and have prioritised relations to Israel for their own religio-ideological reasons. Israel will not be forced to make concessions to its neighbours so long as the Christian Right in the US blindly supports it. Thus, if Israel were truly interested in regional peace it must alter its behaviour to the US and choose its friends for the friendship they offer, not allow its own political constellations be determined by religious zealots who are ready to encourage Israel to fight to the last Arab and Israeli to make way for the realisation of their fanciful apocalyptical epoch.

Secondly, Israel must energise its relationship to the EU. Although, as mentioned, Israel is often regarded by the EU as the Union’s 28th member, it does not fully appreciate its position and continues to prioritise relations to the US, seemingly oblivious of the urgent need to simultaneously engage the EU. As noted, the US is not a steadfast ally of Israel for altruistic reasons; it is driven either by its strategic interests, religious cognition or a combination of these. European states, on the other hand, are genuinely oriented to the defence and well-being of Israel due primarily to the assumption of moral responsibility for the tragedy conducted against Europe’s Yiddish population at the hands of the NAZIS, their puppet regimes (re: Vichy France), and many tens of thousands of ‘volunteers’ from NAZI administered lands particularly Austria, Lithuania and Poland. In the immediate aftermath of WWII, Europe’s moral indignation at its own ‘years of insanity,’ produced a wave of unfettered support for the remnants of the European Yiddish community; – then fully engaged in a ‘last stand’ war of attrition against British mandate forces in Palestine – support which pressed the UK to abandon its mandate to the UN and ultimately led to the recognition of Israel as a member of the international community. Many Israelis may be reluctant to recognise the importance of Europeans in the construction of Israel, however without European support for the UN’s Partition Plan (29 November 1947) and with it Israel’s right to statehood, the acceptance of Israel’s Declaration of Independence (14 May 1948) and military support for the young state to counter the subsequent Arab invasions (15 May 1948), history would have taken a very different course. Indeed, it is noteworthy that (pre-Communist) Czechoslovakia helped Israel build its first air force, France trained Israel’s navy and Germany provided Israel with the means of civil development, infrastructural enhancements and industrial capabilities, nearly twenty years before the US sent its first arms shipment in support of Israel.

From the tragic first years until the present, many, if not all, European states have stood shoulder to shoulder with Israel in ensuring its security, international engagement and economic prosperity. Of course there was an ‘official’ break between the USSR and Central/East European states and Israel during the Cold War as the USSR cozied up to any ‘resistance’ movement and state proclaiming socialism, which most Arab movements and states did; however this did not bleed into public consciousness. In fact, the 1968 Prague Spring was partially inspired by Prague-based journalists who wanted to report on the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and not just recite Soviet propaganda. With the end of the Cold War however, not only was Europe reunited geographically, but also emotionally and Euro-Israeli relations received a boost that has, so far, not subsided.

This should not be taken as Europe providing Israel with a carte blanc to pursue any policy it wishes, as the US does. Instead, European states are more honest and forthcoming in support of Israeli security. Indeed, while it is true that many European states condemn Israel when its actions undermine their moral sensibilities, they have also taken a leading role in recognising and working with Palestine to help secure Israel, they have assumed responsibility for monitoring the Lebanese-Israeli border, have worked to isolate Iran and Hezbollah and have generally expended tremendous energies supporting (financially) a viable two-state solution. So, while many in Europe are quick to condemn Israel, this should not be taken as ingrained anti-Semitism or political opportunism – two deflecting techniques deployed by subsequent Israeli governments to justify low-level relations to Europe – but part of a more honest approach to Middle Eastern politics.

At present, there are only a handful of European states Israel has enhanced relations to: the Czech Republic, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and the UK. This list should surely be expanded on though Israel must recognise that the EU, and its members, are not bent on its destruction but rather on its preservation. Of course, international politics is a dual carriage-way and the EU must also be more explicit in its support for Israel. But the logic and language coming out of Jerusalem is alienating Israel’s true allies, which have done more physically for the state than any other member of the international community. This must be recognised and used as the basis for a proper re-evaluation and retrenching of Euro-Israeli relations.

Finally, Israel must recognise and support the creation of an independent Palestine. This is both a moral and strategic imperative and although this point has already been raised (above) it needs to be reiterated because, at the time of this writing, the entire history of the Middle East and the next chapter of international relations will rest on the singular decision to recognise Palestine, an independent people in every sense of the term and already a, de facto, independent state. It is truly mind-boggling that the daily situation in Palestine has not filtered into direct policies. Palestine is not governed by Israel; it is in essence not governed at all. So, the political-commotion/emotion about preserving Israel’s “historic boundaries” is absurd considering the state does not actually control the West Bank and, apart from some outposts and settlement blocks, Israelis do not visit Palestine. The policy towards Palestine is both immature and imprudent, revealing that Israel is move comfortable stifling opposition then developing policies which would keep Palestine from drowning and taking many Israelis with it.

While this work was meant to provide an overall picture of what Israel is doing wrong and sought to offer ways for Israel to enhance its security, there is one issue which links everything together – Palestine. Hence, for Israel to move in from the dark and to assume its proper historic place as the Third Jewish Republic, it needs to adopt republican values which are not attached to “hope” but rather to “wisdom.” The speed of change currently engulfing the Crescent region will not spare Israel and if Israel is to survive the next fifty years its leadership must abandon its bullish politics and own up to its responsibility; to the region, Palestinians, and most importantly to itself.