Cejiss

Despite the self-gratifying need to describe the yet unfolding instability among the Arab states as the natural outcome of decades of dictatorial styles of governance or somehow hem them in as democratic movements which simultaneously combusted such simplifications are erroneous and leading decision-makers, in the region and beyond, to make ill-judged policy choices. From London to Jerusalem, Washington to Riyadh, Paris to Tripoli and Beijing to Tehran, it seems that the international community is in dire-straits resulting in mass confusion, insecurity, conflict contagion and the ‘who said what’ game of political brinkmanship. This is compounded by the general apathy which has greeted this latest – but by no means first – bout of intra-Arab contests.

Those segments of the international public which are desperate to inform themselves on the actions of their governments and the forces for change (both positive and negative) in the Middle East are thwarted by the ineptitude of many modern media outlets, which tend to be preoccupied with attempts at shaping public opinion rather than reflecting on events through more objective lenses. At the same time, armies of scholars are caught on the side-lines of history and perpetuate the mythology of democracy, human rights and justice as the spinal cord of motivations guiding behaviours in this Season of Arab Discontent.

While it is accurate that certain democratic values – particularly those which encourage freedom of economic activities – underscore the goals of the Yemeni, Tunisian and Egyptian public disobedience and ultimately revolts, other motivations inspired the Bahraini and Syrian campaigns while the Libyan situation remains an utter fiasco; a civil war waged by two Libyan tribes reinforced by lackey mercenaries to control that country’s vast oil reserves. Unfortunately, in the latter case, NATO forces have transformed into such mercenaries, hoisting a more comprehensive understanding of the Libyan conflict to a priority. But yet and still public discourses on the particulars of Arab discontent are lost in the language of democratisation which if said enough times, and with enough vigour, is taken as truth.

To be sure, there are three identifiable typologies of political movements currently embroiled in transformative conflicts in the Middle East, each with very different objectives and consisting of very different actors. These are: the popular revolt (re: Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen); the ethno-religious (re: Bahrain, Syria); and civil war (re: Libya). It is essential to provide some insights into these to be able to recognise what is at stake and how to best formulate adequate policies.

The Revenge of the Arab Street

Commentators in Europe and the US have written volume after volume on the pressures and power of the so-called Arab Street, a synonym for an unruly mass of people who, if deployed, can produce regional and international chaos. This was a scapegoat tactic used by the Ben-Ali’s and Mubarak’s of the region for the better part of their reigns in bids to reduce Western (re: European and US) attempts at directing domestic and foreign affairs. ‘We can’t do this ...’ they told Europe and the US ‘... or our Arab Street will revolt.’ While many grew weary of the notion of the Arab Street, an everything-fits-in answer to arrested political development, history has shown otherwise. There was, after all, an Arab Street and it has now revolted; consuming Ben-Ali and Mubarak (Yemen’s Saleh is surely next) and literally using the “book” as a projectile for political reform. So, a part of the instability in the Middle East was based on the Arab Street’s internal combustion. Too many leaders thought that they could control, or at least placate, it for their own ambitions and they were wrong.

The people power in Tunisia and Egypt was based on democratisation, though it is not at all clear whether the first free and fair elections in either country will produce the changes necessary for democratic rule or if they will in fact also mark the last of such elections. Whatever the end result, it is clear that political reform was the key demand of the famed “demonstrators,” and they are on the brink of obtaining it and thus should be revered for their courage and determination. After all, this is precisely the types of mass popular movements many have been waiting and in some quarters even wishing for. However, as the old saying goes, ‘be careful what you wish for.’ It is not that spectators to the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts should tread cautiously when dealing with the new governments; rather, before jumping onto the “democracy-now” bandwagon, thoughtful reflection – not gut reactions – should have preceded policy alterations, at least among Western states, since these accepted the logic of the governed Arab Street as augmented by Ben-Ali and Mubarak, and granted them tremendous military and political support. It stands to reason that the outcome of these revolts will empower Ben-Ali’s and Mubarak’s opponents and European and US interests are likely to be undermined as a result of their political duplicity with the previous regimes.

In the case of Tunisia, the first European victims have already been claimed; French Foreign Minister Alliot-Marie was forced to resign while many more in the establishment have gone “underground” to insulate themselves from public scrutiny. However, such internal moves are too little too late and as the Tunisian dust settles it is likely that France’s (and the EU’s more generally) influence will be further diminished. Tunisia will reshape its identity in stark contrast to its previous subjugation at the hands of the Ben-Ali crew and their primarily French support network. This is said against the backdrop of increasing intra-European tensions which have been produced by the Tunisian revolt; tensions which are unravelling a half-century of European labours to remove the internal border. Indeed, France and Italy are at loggerheads over the latter’s granting of visas to Tunisian refugees who quickly migrated to France. What a sad and ironic commentary that France’s prime tourist destination, a place where untold millions have rested and relaxed in the sweltering south Mediterranean sun, was not staffed by pliant docile workers living simply to cater to European travellers but had their own sense of political pride. The tables have now turned and Tunisians are on their own tourist adventure only this time the tourists are here to stay and Europe is left holding the towel.

Likewise in Egypt, Mubarak’s labours are piecemeal being undone. The country’s first elections are rapidly approaching and the Muslim Brotherhood, previously outlawed, not least for its role in the assassination of President Anwar Sadat (1980), is creeping back into public life and will participate. The international repercussions are likely to be enormous. Already Egypt has made moves to heal its cracked Muslim identity at the expense of its pandering to Europe, the US and Israel. In the month and a half since the ousting of Mubarak Egypt has facilitated intra-Palestinian talks which successfully ended the Hamas-Fatah impasse and constructed a National Reconciliation Government; it opened the Rafah Crossing to the Gaza Strip ending the blockade and, rather uncomfortably for Israel, has allowed an Iranian naval vessel to sail through the Suez Canal and into the Mediterranean Sea. While some of these moves are well within the more traditional interests of Egypt (it has been brokering a Palestinian deal for years), its cozying up to Iran is upsetting the tenuous balance of regional power and will likely fuel Israeli suspicions and could lead to a renewed arms race in and around the Sinai.

Within this unfolding reorientation, the EU has to be especially prudent so as not to further alienate itself from the emerging political and military elites while pursuing its more enduring interests of retaining freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal for all EU members, working towards a just solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and generally maintain its deep economic relationship to Egypt; a preferred partner. Traditionally, Egypt’s foreign policy priorities swing back-and forth between the twin peaks of Europe and the Arab-Muslim belt in North Africa and the Middle East. Only by anticipating the result of the current upheaval can the EU secure its regional position; it will not be able to preserve the status quo if it continues to analyse Egypt through archaic and uninformed eyes.

Ethno-Religious Revolts

Unlike popular revolts in Egypt and Tunisia, the conflicts in Bahrain and Syria bear the hallmarks of ethno-religious violence, where ruling classes represent a privileged ethno-religious minority and the rest of the country want to reconstruct the state and redirect the flow of privilege. Yet, even these cases need to be analysed separately since Bahrain is a very tolerant, excessively wealthy, Sunni Arab Sheikdom whose ruling elite has depended on the power of the purse to pre-empt political discontent while Syria’s ruling Alawite minority has used explicit forms of political coercion since the al-Assad family consolidated power in 1969.

The largely concluded, but still simmering, Sunni-Shiite battle which occurred in Bahrain, needs to be understood geopolitically, especially regarding Iran’s drive for regional hegemony as opposed to a black and white struggle for democracy emanating from the suggested Shiite “underclass.” In fact, evidence is mounting which suggests that the demonstrators’ leadership received encouragement and vital material support from Iran. This would hardly be the first time Iran sought to stoke the seeds of discontent in Bahrain. In 1981, the Bahraini authorities uncovered an Iranian plot to overthrow the monarchy and forcefully export the Iranian revolution to the shores of the Arabian Peninsula. This is logical given the dubious legitimacy the Iranian leadership retains; its revolutionary zeal requires further embers to quell domestic pressures in a typical “rally-around-the-flag” attempt and Bahrain is a relatively vulnerable, ethno-religiously divided polity where the opportunity of interference is high and easily exploitable by Iran.

A glimpse at the rallying crowds that swelled the central square of Manama should have hinted to the style of revolution unfolding there; men and women gathering in separate crowds, the men aggressively chanting while the majority of women, clothed in black Chadors, angrily chanted anti-government slogans on their own. Indeed, honest reflection reveals two simultaneous sets of demonstrations and demands, one led by men and the other by women. Surely this initial segregation acts as an indication of the type of “democracy” that would emerge if the Iranian-backed Shiite’s of Bahrain were successful; a system that encourages gendercide and the purging of all-too-rare moderates in the Middle East. In Bahrain, it is probable that the first elections would also be the last. Unlike in contrast to the dynamic geopolitics which sparked the Bahrain conflict, the intifada in Syria – also not driven primarily by demands for true democracy – is simply another round of the civil war of attrition which has incrementally been waged since 1976 with a long break after 1982 when Rifaat al-Assad, (then) President Hafez al-Assad’s younger brother, massacred between 17000-40000 people in Hama. That six-year conflict was fought between the Alawite dominated state security apparatuses and a Syrian Muslim Brotherhood militia comprised exclusively of Sunnis. A disquieting air of repression followed, ensured by the tribal bonds of the ruling elite and the (often forced) coercion of a moderately empowered Sunni aristocracy answerable to the al-Assad regime.

The death of Hafez coupled with Bashar al-Assad’s power inheritance, opened space for political reform, which the majority Sunni religious community hoped would produce the right environment for their own political consolidation and the reconstruction of a functioning Sunni governing class. The Sunni demands were voiced as democratic reform, but for all observers of the ethno-religious divisions in Syria, such calls amount to revolution since, if given the chance at the polls, Syrians would undoubtedly vote the Alawites from power, a move likely to spark civil war as the Alawites know that ethno-religious retribution, for the decades of wholesale suppression, would be close at hand. So, while rhetorical democracy underlines the demands of the current serial protesters, it is the brand of democracy that would empower the majority at the expense of the minority and in the tribal politics of the Middle East, the transfer of political power in the current climate would result in renewed violence, this time directed at the Alawite community.

From both ethical and practical perspectives, the al-Assad family should be deposed and the Syrian people freed to construct the polity of their choosing. However, the continuous popular (re: Western) depictions of the intra-Syrian conflict as evidence of a democracy surge reveals a lack of political awareness and produces the wrong policy orientations. For instance, the EU has placed a sanctions regime against the state (re: embargo on arms sales) and certain individuals within the Alawite political and business classes. Considering Syria’s miniscule level of military support from, and its periodic relationship to the EU, it is clear that this policy choice is meant to answer the ‘why are you not doing something’ questions of the uninformed rather than a more thoughtful policy with a clear set of objectives, since al-Assad will hardly change his or the state’s behaviour in fear of EU actions.

Indeed, just as Ben-Ali and Mubarak’s replacements are in the process of undoing the labours of the former ring-leaders, it is conceivable that a Sunni Muslim state in Syria would do the same and abandon Iran and Hezbollah, two actors which had helped legitimise Syria’s Alawites at the expense of its Sunnis. Such a result would be, of course, positive for the region and the international community at large. However, the cost of such a transformation – in blood and monies – will be tremendous, especially since the stakes are so high and both ethno-religious communities (among many others) believe that their very existence is at stake. So, instead of simply praising the “democratic” movements, and punishing the state for its crimes, thoughtful policies would be aimed at explicitly supporting the forces for change while protecting civilians, Alawite and Sunni (et al) from ethnic cleansing, genocide or other forms of post-conflict communal violence. But the EU and the West more generally has an aversion to such direct military conflict and choosing sides in other peoples’ conflicts ... or do they?

Civil War

The prolongation of civil war in Libya speaks volumes to the level of political mismanagement by the Euro-Atlantic axis of arrogance, which is aiding and abetting the wholesale destruction of the dictatorial but contained Libyan state. In short, NATO has hijacked, and liberally interpreted, UNSC Resolution 1973 – which calls for UN members to use all means necessary to ‘defend civilians’ – to achieve more remarkable goals such as regime change, hydrocarbon redistribution and, in the process, first degree murder.

What began as a militarised intra-state dispute by an increasingly clear minority of Libyan’s has deteriorated into a conflict abyss in which NATO is a culpable key protagonist. Target selection by superior NATO air forces never aimed simply at imposing the coveted ‘no-fly zone,’ but rather systematically attacked a wide variety of “ground targets,” usually manned by 18 year old conscripts, and ‘dual use facilities’ such as hospitals and apartment blocks. While debates may rage over why the conflict began and why France, the UK and the other usual suspects were so eager to jump headlong into it, these are eclipsed by more immediate concerns such as where this ends, and what post-conflict Libya will look like?

In the first case, the conflict will not terminate until the Kaddafi clique is destroyed (killed or exiled) or Libya is subdivided into two independent states. The continuous cease-fire calls by Kaddafi routinely fall on deaf ears. If the “democracy-seeking” rebels don’t accept a cease-fire, why should NATO, after all the latter has become the servant of the former. Kaddafi though, is not going anywhere and thus a two state solution is being anticipated; at least until the rebels gain more ground. However, imagine what a two state solution would look like; two militarised entities guarding an ill-defined frontier each seeking to exploit the first opportunity of perceived weakness of the other to launch fresh attacks. Not to mention that the stakes involve more than territory or political legitimacy; they centre on the country’s rich hydrocarbons and everyone wants their share. Such a solution is no solution at all; it is a recipe for long-term devastation in which civilians on both sides of the new, even more arbitrarily defined, border would shoulder the full weight of the consequences.

Through the fog-o-war, it is also evident that there are preferred civilians; those which do not support Kaddafi and are (wrongly) labelled as democracy fighters. But a picture speaks a thousand words and the images broadcast back from the front bespeak a fractured rebel movement where the ranks are a motley crew of gun-toting liberal democrats, Islamists, criminals and the disenfranchised who will likely turn the guns on each other as soon they are forced to debate the contours of the new state.

In a situation where all the millions of Kaddafi supporters are considered legitimate targets and the rebels are legitimate democrats there is no wonder that this conflict is intractable and unless a new leader, which can act for the greater good of Libya, emerges it will remain so. Where to find such a leader? Surely the hermetically sealed state of pre-war Libya has no real alternative leadership?
Enter the EU ... with a smashing idea. Prep a dictator who has never stepped foot in Libya to replace a dictator who seldom steps outside of it. While the international community has been busy waging or debating war in Libya and the shape of Kate Middleton’s wedding dress, the EU has been grooming the Great Nephew of Libya’s exiled monarch, King Idris. In mid-April (2011) the EU played host to Crown Prince Mohammed El Senussi and while the particulars of what was discussed will remain (for the time being) a mystery, it is clear that the EU is falling victim to the Chalabi-syndrome and buy into the rhetoric of exiled elites longing to return home and heal the damage done in calculated moves meant to shore up assistance for their own rise to power with the helpful hands, eyes, ears and guns of the democracy-loving, civilian population protecting West.

Towards Democracide

The popular misappropriation of the term “democratic movements” to capture the full spectrum of political unrest throughout the Arab world is more than irresponsible, it is outright dangerous. The EU and to a lesser extent the US, have spent – over the past decades – considerable resources and political energies trying to convince the world of their normative intents, to lead by example into a world where politically inspired violence was criminalised and met by collective efforts to defend the integrity of human rights and dignity. Currently however, these labours are being denigrated and the example being set is rooted in the old dictum that might makes right and that material interests, wrapped in the correct rhapsody, can dissuade critics and generally push the internationally community to the whims of the West. This is the first step towards democracide, or the death of democracy, where the term devolves from a political ideal into a hollow slogan synonymous with Western interests and raw power rather than the legitimate socio-political aspiration of millions of people throughout the Middle East and the world.